William P. Fisher, Jr.

Research Associate, BEAR CenterUniversity of California, Berkeley, CA, USA

&Living Capital Metrics LLC, Sausalito, CA, USA

BEAR Seminar28 January 2020

The Semiotics of Identifiable Models in the Economy of Thought:

Making Improved Measurement More Widely Available in Psychology and the Social Sciences

A simple problem

Outline

• Some definitions• Semiotics

• Identifiability

• Economy of thought

• Philosophical and historical considerations

• A plan for action

Semiotics

• Dictionary definition:• The study of signs and symbols

• The study of their use or interpretation

• Semiotic triangle:• A concept: ‘chair’

• A word: “chair”

• A thing: chair

Idea

WordThing

Identified and unidentified models

• Originated in Frisch’s concept of autonomy of data from econometric model (Aldrich, 1989)

• "A system of autonomous equations has the property 'that it is possible that the parameters in any one of the equations could in fact change ... without any change taking place in any of the parameters of the other equations.‘” (Girshick & Haavelmo, 1947, p. 106)

• Aldrich (1989, p. 15) “Autonomy is significant because an equation (or its parameters) in a system of autonomous relations will be ‘detachable’ or ‘projectible’. Detachability matters both for interpretation and for ‘policy simulation.’”

Economy of thought

• Mach (emphasis added)• "It is the object of science to replace, or save, experiences, by the

reproduction and anticipation of facts in thought. Memory is handier than experience, and often answers the same purpose. This economical office of science, which fills its whole life, is apparent at first glance...”

• "Language, the instrument of this communication, is itself an economical contrivance.”

Mach, E. (1883/1919). The science of mechanics: A critical and historical account of its development (T. J. McCormack, Trans.) (4th ed.). Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., p. 481.

Science and language anticipate new facts by structuring perception and focusing attention

chair

椅子la sillaкрісло

كرسي

No abstract concept is ever fully realized in any actual reference to any concrete thing.

The economy of language works because , generally speaking, linguistic models are identified.

a) the formal conceptual model of the ‘chair’ is invariantly represented by the standardized arbitrary abstraction of the word “chair” in relation to all possible actual chairs;

b) standardized pronunciation and inscription of the word “chair” instrumentally mediates the relation between the formal ideal and any actual chairs being referred to; and

c) actual chairs as places to sit can encompass a wide range from metaphorical places on the ground, rocks, or logs; to functional kitchen and desk chairs; to comfortable chairs; to dysfunctional decorative or elaborate ceremonial chairs; to positions of rank, as endowed or committee chairs.

‘Chair’

Chair “Chair”

So language gives us cognitive models that work because the models are identified.

Learning a language by imitating established usage is easier than inventing our own languages, and then translating between ours and everyone else’s.

Both poetry and science are labor-saving devices that bring empirically repeatable and formally explained effects into language.

‘Meter’Theory

Data Instrument

Meter “Meter”

Scientific models are identified.

Length of the path travelled by light in vacuum during a time interval of 1/299792458 of a second

Autonomy and identifiability flip descriptive statistical modeling into prescriptive scientific modeling

• Frisch “realised that a model was not a correctly specified structural model just because it fitted well.”

• Before the introduction of autonomy as a criterion, data analysis was the driver. The goal was to “first find relations in the data and then make sense of them. Here [with autonomy] the sequence was reversed: define the relations that made economic sense and estimate them.”

Aldrich, J. (1989). Autonomy. Oxford Economic Papers, 41, p. 25. (emphasis added)

Anticipatory model identifiability in philosophy

• "...reason has insight only into that which it produces after a plan of its own.”

• Reason “must itself show the way with principles of judgment based upon fixed laws.”

• “Accidental observations, made in obedience to no previously thought-out plan, can never be made to yield a necessary law, which alone reason is concerned to discover. “

• Kant, I. (1929/1965). Critique of pure reason (N. K. Smith, Trans.) (Unabridged). New York: St. Martin's Press, p. 20.

• Whitehead (emphasis added)

• “Symbolization of the associative law (x+y=y+x), for instance, simplifies the representation of the idea that 'If a second number be added to any given number the result is the same as if the first given number had been added to the second number'. This example shows that, by the aid of symbolism, we can make transitions in reasoning almost mechanically by the eye, which otherwise would call into play the higher faculties of the brain.”

Whitehead, A. N. (1911). An introduction to mathematics. New York:

Henry Holt and Co., p. 61.

Representing semiotically stable relationships in an economy of thought

Economy of thought supports learning as habituated behaviors• “…the very heart, blood and sinews of learning is creation of

habitudes.”

• “Habit does not preclude the use of thought, but it determines the channels within which it operates. Thinking is secreted in the interstices of habits.“

Dewey, J. (1954). The public and its problems. Athens, Ohio: Swallow Press, Ohio University Press

Autonomy and identifiability in history of science

• “…to Copernicus' mind the question was not one of truth or falsity, not, does the earth move? He simply included the earth in the question which Ptolemy had asked with reference to the celestial bodies alone; what motions should we attribute to the earth in order to obtain the simplest and most harmonious geometry of the heavens that will accord with the facts?“

• Burtt, E. A. (1954/1932). The metaphysical foundations of modern physical science [First edition published in 1924] (Rev. ed.). Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor, p. 39.

Conceptual idealization in history of science

• The "law of inertia is not the kind of thing you would discover by mere photographic methods of observation--it required a different kind of thinking-cap, a transposition in the mind of the scientist himself; for we do not actually see ordinary objects continuing their rectilinear motion in that kind of empty space....“

• Butterfield, H. (1957). The origins of modern science (revised edition).New York: The Free Press, pp. 16-17. (emphasis added)

Unrealistic conceptual ideals in science

• Newton's first law "...speaks of a body...which is left to itself. Where do we find it? There is no such body. There is also no experiment which could ever bring such a body to direct perception. But modern science…is supposed to be based upon experience. Instead, is has such a law at its apex. This law speaks of a thing that does not exist. It demands a fundamental representation of things which contradict the ordinary.“

• Heidegger, M. (1967). What is a thing? (W. B. Barton, Jr. & V. Deutsch, Trans.). South Bend, Indiana: Regnery/Gateway, p. 89.

Rasch’s involvement in early development of the concept of identified models

• Autonomy redefined as identifiability by Koopmans and Reiersol (1950)• In a footnote, thank Rasch and Thurstone for “fruitful” discussions

in 1947 at Cowles Commission meeting at University of Chicago

• Rasch (1953, p. 65) also refers to these conversations as “fruitful”

• Rasch (1977): “...the Models for Measuring are an elaboration in the same direction of the class of distributions called the Darmois-Koopmans exponential family, and discussed extensively since 1935.”

Reversing the sequence from descriptive to prescriptive, from empiricist to rationalist• Identified models have a uniquely determined statistical meaning.

• Frisch’s work with autonomy and identifiability explain his astonishment in 1959 at Rasch’s “disappearing parameter.”

• “Haavelmo gave three reasons for being concerned with autonomy: autonomous relations are likely to be more stable; they are more intelligible; they are useful for policy analysis” (Aldrich, 1989, p. 27)

• "'The principal task of economic theory is to establish such relations as might be expected to possess as high a degree of autonomy as possible‘” (Aldrich 1989, p. 28, quoting Haavelmo, 1943b, p. 29).

Beyond centralized analysis to distributed multilevel implementations of instruments calibrated in consensus standard unit

• Different but equivalent models should support the same substantive inferences concerning comparisons within and across ability and difficulty distributions.

• But the primary reason for valuing identifiable models is not analytic.

• Facilitating new economies of thought is possible only by means of well formed semiotic relationships in identified models.

Beyond centralized analysis to distributed multilevel implementations of instruments calibrated in shared consensus standard unit

• Semiotically stable identified models support the cultivation of multilevel knowledge infrastructures.

• So how can new understandings built into successful models be packaged in portable calibrated instruments and distributed to end users in reliable, quality assured forms?

Discourse on method to date exhibits reactive shifts between extreme positions of positivist objectification and radical contextualism.

• Modern positivist objectification• Embraces universalized generalization of one set of reified data.• The facts to be emphasized in any given situation are the ones that meet immediate

political and economic ends, satisfying the interests of a particular agenda.

• Postmodern radical contextualism• Embraces incommensurability of fragmented local values.• The facts emphasized in any given situation emerge as a function of interests that

have to be acknowledged and constrained to serve the greater good.

• Unmodern/amodern integrated methodological pluralism• Finds general in specific and vice versa• The facts to be emphasized in any given situation are contextualized within formal

conceptual determinations embodied in standardized media and units with known uncertainties.

Centralized, Decentralized, & Distributed Networks(Baran 1962, Figure 1)

Positivist/Modern : Anti-Positivist/Postmodern : Post-Positivist/UnmodernHempel/Carnap/Ayer : Kuhn/Toulmin/Wittgenstein : Latour/Nersessian/Dewey

Ecosystem Alliances, Obligatory Passage Points,& Boundary Objects

(Adapted from Star & Griesemer, 1989, p. 390)

Construct maps, models, specification equations

Instrument calibrations, standards laboratories, Wright maps

Data sources, kidmaps

Data

InstrumentTheory

chair

椅子la sillaкрісло

كرسي

Modern positivist extreme: One defined universal rules in exclusive restriction

XX

X

chair

椅子la sillaкрісло

كرسي

Postmodern contextualist extreme: Local values rule in chaos of incommensurate relativism

X

Metaphor, analogy, and mythology

• "Wittgenstein (e.g., 1967) claimed that many scholarly confusions are induced by the "mythology in the forms of our language", by metaphors and analogies that beguile their users, by grammar projected onto reality, etcetera. Fields that involve mathematics(both applied and pure) are traditionally rich ground for the growth of language induced confusions, for symbolic representations, while notable for their compactness, are singularly able to mislead.” (Maraun, 1996, p. 603)

• Maraun, M. D. (1996). Meaning and mythology in the factor analysis model. Multivariate Behavioral Research, 31(4), 603-616.

Metaphor, analogy, and mythology

• “Bertrand Russell speaks of cases 'where the premises of sciences

turn out to be a set of pre-suppositions neither empirical nor logically

necessary'; and in a remarkable passage, Karl R. Popper confesses

very plainly to the impossibility of making a science out of only strictly

verifiable and justifiable elements.” (Holton, 1988, p. 41; also see

Polanyi, 1974, p. 323).

Identifiability in relation to semiotics

• "The strong hold that certain themes have on the mind of the scientisthelps to explain his commitment to some point of view that may in fact run exactly counter to all accepted doctrine and to the clear evidence of the senses. Of this no one has spoken more eloquently and memorably than Galileo when he commented on the fact that to accept the idea of a moving earth one must overcome the strong impression that one can 'see' that the sun is really moving…”

• Holton, G. (1988). Thematic origins of scientific thought: Kepler to Einstein(Revised ed.). Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, p. 43.

Identifiability, semiotics, and models in relation to reality• Cartwright noted, ‘fundamental equations do not govern objects in

reality; they govern only objects in models” (p. 129).

• "Today we often consider things like electric and magnetic fields to be real. This is not the case. The fields are purely abstract mathematical constructs that allow us to predict things we can actually perceive.“ (Rautio, 2005, p. 53)

• The point is whether the model-based governance of objects can be made useful.

Economy of Thought:Bounded Rationality and Captivated Imaginations

Georg Rasch and George Box:Models are not meant to be true, but to be useful.

So what do we do when we repeatedly bump up against the limits of our existing concepts, when the ways our imaginations are captivated by the ruling metaphors of the day start to cause more problems than they solve?

• Tocqueville’s (1805-1859) contrast of Europeans and Americans.

• When asked, “Why do you do that?”• Europeans say, “Because of…”

• Americans say, “In order to…”

• Both explanations are needed to establish basis for trust indomains of economic intangibles.

How are allies convinced to trust a technology?

Why do you do things that way?

• “Because of…”• Lindquist (1953, p.35) "The objective [of an educational test] is handed down by

those agents of society who are responsible for decisions concerning educational objectives, and what the test constructor must do is to attempt to incorporate that definition as clearly and exactly as possible in the examination that he builds."

• “In order to…”• Wright (1977, p. 97) “When a person tries to answer a test item the situation is

potentially complicated. Many forces influence the outcome--too many to be named in a workable theory of the person's response. To arrive at a workable position, we must invent a simple conception of what we are willing to suppose happens, do our best to write items and test persons so that their interaction is governed by this conception and then impose its statistical consequences upon the data to see if the invention can be made useful."

Thank you!

• William P. Fisher, Jr.• University of California, Berkeley

• wfisher@berkeley.edu