December 2020

The Senate

Select Committee on COVID-19

First interim report

© Commonwealth of Australia 2020

ISBN 978-1-76093-173-5 (Printed Version)

ISBN 978-1-76093-173-5 (HTML Version)

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Membership of the committee

Chair Senator Katy Gallagher ALP, ACT

Deputy Chair Senator James Paterson LP, VIC

Members Senator Perin Davey NATS, NSW Senator the Hon Kristina Keneally ALP, NSW Senator Rachel Siewert AG, WA Senator Murray Watt ALP, QLD Senator Jacqui Lambie JLN, TAS

Substitute Members Senator Amanda Stoker LP, QLD (for Senator Paterson on 15 and 17 September 2020) Senator Slade Brockman LP, WA (for Senator Paterson on 22, 24 and 29 September 2020)

Participating Members Senator Patrick Dodson ALP, WA Senator Mehreen Faruqi AG, NSW Senator Sarah Hanson-Young AG, SA Senator Malarndirri McCarthy ALP, NT Senator Nick McKim AG, TAS Senator Rex Patrick IND, SA Senator Janet Rice AG, VIC Senator Jordon Steele-John AG, WA Senator Larissa Waters AG, QLD Senator Peter Wish-Wilson AG, TAS Former Senator Richard Di Natale AG, VIC

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Secretariat Ms Jeanette Radcliffe, Committee Secretary Dr Jane Thomson, Former Committee Secretary Mr Antony Paul, Principal Research Officer Mr Alan Raine, Former Principal Research Officer Ms Natasha Rusjakovski, Principal Research Officer Ms Pothida Youhorn, Former Principal Research Officer Ms Samantha Bradley, Senior Research Officer Mr Michael Finch, Senior Research Officer Ms Jade Monaghan, Research Officer Mr Jordan Knapp, Administrative Officer Committee web page: www.aph.gov.au/select covid-19 PO Box 6100 E-mail: covid.sen@aph.gov.au Parliament House Ph: 02 6277 3892 Canberra ACT 2600 Fax: 02 6277 5706

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Table of contents

Membership of the committee ....................................................................................................... iii

Table of abbreviations and acronyms ............................................................................................ ix

Executive summary ............................................................................................................................ xi

Recommendations ............................................................................................................................. xv

Supporting findings ...................................................................................................................... xvii

Chapter 1—Introduction .................................................................................................................... 1

COVID-19 cases in Australia .............................................................................................................. 2

The scrutiny role of the committee .................................................................................................... 2

Purpose of this report .......................................................................................................................... 3

Conduct of the inquiry ........................................................................................................................ 4

Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................................. 4

Chapter 2—Preparation and initial response................................................................................. 7

Initial response in January 2020 ......................................................................................................... 7

Pandemic planning and preparation................................................................................................. 9

Pandemic planning prior to COVID-19 ............................................................................... 10

The government's initial COVID-19 plan ............................................................................ 11

National Medical Stockpile ............................................................................................................... 12

Closing Australia's international borders ....................................................................................... 14

Extension of travel restrictions.............................................................................................. 14

Self-isolation and quarantine requirements ........................................................................ 16

Australians stranded overseas ......................................................................................................... 17

Containment measures for cruise ships .......................................................................................... 23

Chapter 3—Health response part I: managing COVID-19 in Australia ................................. 31

The overarching health strategy ...................................................................................................... 32

Clarity in the strategy being pursued by National Cabinet .............................................. 32

Adoption of social distancing measures ............................................................................. 35

Lack of transparency behind key medical decisions..................................................................... 39

COVIDSafe app .................................................................................................................................. 43

Access to a successful vaccine candidate ....................................................................................... 45

An Australian Centre for Disease Control ..................................................................................... 49

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Chapter 4—Health response part II: aged care ........................................................................... 53

Responsibility for the aged care crisis ............................................................................................. 54

How the crisis unfolded ......................................................................................................... 54

The Australian Government's refusal to accept responsibility ........................................ 56

Preparation and planning for COVID-19 ....................................................................................... 57

Failure to anticipate shortages of staff and PPE ............................................................................ 60

Response to heightened community transmission in Victoria .................................................... 62

The Aged Care Quality and Safety Commission ........................................................................... 64

Chapter 5—Economic response part I: The immediate economic fallout and response .... 69

The jobs impact of stage 3 lockdown .............................................................................................. 70

The fiscal response to the economic crisis ...................................................................................... 72

The design of JobKeeper ................................................................................................................... 75

Casual employees .................................................................................................................. 76

Temporary visa holders ......................................................................................................... 76

Local government ................................................................................................................... 77

Australian companies owned by foreign sovereign entities ............................................ 77

University workers ................................................................................................................ 77

Timing of JobKeeper ............................................................................................................... 78

Justification for exclusions ..................................................................................................... 79

The $60 billion costing mistake ............................................................................................. 79

Decision to remove JobKeeper and other relief from the childcare sector ..................... 81

JobSeeker ............................................................................................................................................ 82

Coronavirus supplement ...................................................................................................... 83

Permanent increase for JobSeeker ........................................................................................ 84

Economic impact on women ............................................................................................................ 86

Early access to superannuation ........................................................................................................ 88

Access to paid pandemic leave ........................................................................................................ 92

Chapter 6—Economic response part II: the recession and the Australian jobs crisis .......... 95

The need for ongoing fiscal stimulus and job creation measures ............................................... 96

The Australian economy prior to COVID-19 ...................................................................... 96

Australia in recession: economic outlook over the forward estimates ........................... 97

The ongoing need for fiscal stimulus and job creation ...................................................... 98

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The 'JobMaker' plan ........................................................................................................................... 99

Missed Opportunities for Economic Recovery ............................................................................ 102

Social Housing ...................................................................................................................... 103

Childcare as a measure to boost economic participation ................................................ 104

Renewable energy as a source of job creation................................................................... 106

A manufacturing future in Australia ................................................................................. 107

Chapter 7—National governance, coordination and communication ................................... 109

National Cabinet .............................................................................................................................. 109

Communication around the need for school closures ..................................................... 112

Internal border measures ..................................................................................................... 113

National Cabinet as a vehicle for secrecy .......................................................................... 115

The National COVID-19 Commission Advisory Board ............................................................. 116

Chapter 8—Looking ahead ............................................................................................................ 121

Concluding comments .................................................................................................................... 121

Future direction of the inquiry ....................................................................................................... 122

Coalition Senators' dissenting report .......................................................................................... 123

Australian Greens Senators' additional comments .................................................................. 169

Appendix 1—Timeline of key decisions and announcements ............................................... 183

Appendix 2—Public hearings and witnesses ............................................................................ 189

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personal protective equipment PPE Prime Minister’s Office PMO Reserve Bank of Australia RBA Royal Commission into Aged Care Quality and Safety

Aged Care Royal Commission

Royal Commission into Violence, Abuse, Neglect and Exploitation of People with Disability

Disability Royal Commission

Senate Select Committee on COVID-19 committee St Basil’s Home for the Aged St Basil’s Traveller with Illness Checklist TIC Western Australia WA World Health Organisation WHO

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Executive summary

Background On 23 March 2020, the Senate established the Select Committee on COVID-19 (committee) to scrutinise the Australian Government’s (government) health and economic response to COVID-19. The committee has broad terms of reference and is due to provide its final report by 30 June 2022. This interim report sets out the committee’s initial findings with a focus on the government’s preparedness for a pandemic, the speed and efficacy of its health response, the economic response packages prior to the 2020–21 Budget, as well as the issues emerging from the initial phase of the pandemic including the aged care crisis and the lack of national co-ordination, governance and transparency of decision making. The report does not focus on decisions taken by the states or territories as this falls outside of the terms of reference of this committee. The establishment of the committee has allowed opposition and crossbench Senators to continue to engage constructively in the national interest to improve the government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. In publishing this report, the committee hopes that it can be used by the government to ensure that weaknesses in the initial phases of the response can be strengthened moving forward. The report is principally based on evidence provided to the committee via 37 public hearings, 505 written submissions and answers to questions on notice provided by government departments, agencies and other witnesses.

Preparation and initial response While Australia has avoided the worst of the potential health outcomes, as at 8 December 2020 there have been over 27 987 confirmed cases of COVID-19 in Australia and 908 people have died. More could have been done to prevent illness and this tragic loss of life. The government did not have adequate plans in place either before, or during the pandemic. Not only did it fail to heed warnings prior to COVID-19 about the National Medical Stockpile of personal protective equipment, there were inadequacies in its approach to pandemic planning exercises. In its COVID-19 Response Plan developed in February, the government did not contemplate the closure of international borders and failed to properly prepare the aged care and disability sectors for the pandemic.

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In relation to international border measures, there was much more the government could have done to prevent the spread of COVID-19. The early travel restrictions on four high risk countries were not extended beyond China, Italy, Iran and Korea until 20 March, by which point case numbers had risen to over 60 000 in Europe (excluding Italy) and over 10 000 in the United States. The Ruby Princess debacle, which occurred despite ‘bespoke arrangements’ under the command of the Australian Border Force, saw hundreds of passengers with COVID-19 spread the virus across the country. Efforts to bring Australians stranded overseas home have been woefully inadequate throughout the pandemic—as at 24 November 2020 there were still over 35 000 Australians unable to get home.

Health response The national health strategy was not explained clearly to the public until late July. Throughout most of March the Prime Minister appeared reluctant to fully embrace social distancing measures and confused the public with messages suggesting that things could carry on as normal. The lack of any clear strategy in this critical period ultimately saw New South Wales (NSW) and Victoria take the lead on a decision to go into a national lockdown. Issues with the government's leadership of the health response persisted throughout the pandemic. The COVIDSafe app, which was supposed to be 'like sunscreen' and enable the states and territories to reopen, failed to meet its download target, suffered performance issues and to date has only identified 17 close contacts. Australia has lagged behind other countries in securing access to a vaccine and is yet to reassure the community it has a plan to deal with major logistical hurdles. Medical advice behind key decisions has been kept secret from the public and attempts by the committee to seek more information have been deliberately frustrated. The government is responsible for significant failings in the aged care sector prior to, and during the pandemic. As at 9 October 2020, 683 Australians had died from COVID-19 in aged care facilities—accounting for 74.6 per cent of all deaths from COVID-19 in Australia.1 The pandemic exposed and exacerbated long-running problems in the sector. The government was unprepared; failing to anticipate crippling staff shortages and a high volume of requests for personal protective equipment (PPE). It failed to learn important lessons from early outbreaks at residential aged care facilities in NSW and was too slow to respond to escalating community transmission in Victoria. The Aged Care Quality and Safety Commission should have done more to keep residents safe.

1 Department of Health, 'COVID-19 outbreaks in Australian residential aged care facilities',

www.health.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/2020/10/covid-19-outbreaks-in-australian-residential-aged-care-facilities-9-october-2020 1.pdf (accessed 12 October 2020).

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The committee is disappointed that, rather than accept its mistakes in leading the health response and keeping aged care residents safe, the government has repeatedly sought to avoid taking responsibility and shift blame onto the states. The Prime Minister also created confusion and splintered federal cooperation by criticising state and territory decisions to close schools and impose domestic border restrictions.

Economic response In terms of the government's economic response, the JobKeeper initiative has been critical in staving off the worst-case scenario. However, the government's initial reluctance to embrace a large-scale wage subsidy meant it opted for an early access super scheme which will see $41.9 billion taken from the retirement savings of those workers who were the hardest hit by COVID-19. It did not conduct any analysis of the gendered impact of the pandemic, nor did the government consider gender impact in designing key measures like the early access super scheme and JobKeeper.

The ongoing uncertainty about the inadequate permanent rate of JobSeeker remains a handbrake on economic recovery and a source of unnecessary anxiety for the 1.5 million Australians relying on unemployment payments to survive. The government could have fixed this in the 2020–21 Budget but they chose not to.

Australia is now in a deep recession after entering 2020 with slow growth, falling business confidence and a prolonged period of stagnant wages. Economic forecasts paint a stark picture, with unemployment projected to remain above pre-pandemic levels throughout the forward estimates.

In this context, the economic recovery measures announced in the government's recent budget are not enough to create jobs and restore the Australian economy to full employment. To make matters worse, the government signalled its intention to pull back on economic stimulus measures and focus on fiscal discipline once unemployment falls below 6 per cent. The committee urges the government to adopt further measures aimed at job creation, including investment in social housing and reforms to childcare aimed at boosting economic participation.

To ensure Australia is better prepared for future outbreaks of COVID-19 or another pandemic, the committee makes the following recommendations.

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Recommendations

Recommendation 1 3.44 The committee recommends that the Australian Government publish all

previous and future minutes of the Australian Health Protection Principal Committee to provide the public with access to the medical advice behind all decisions affecting the community's safety, livelihoods and personal freedoms.

Recommendation 2 3.62 The committee recommends that the Australian Government commission an

independent review into expenditure on, and design of, the COVIDSafe app.

Recommendation 3 3.88 The committee recommends that the Australian Government establish an

Australian Centre for Disease Control to improve Australia's pandemic preparedness, operational response capacity and communication across different levels of government.

Recommendation 4 5.74 The committee recommends that the Australian Government monitor the

economic impact of reducing the Coronavirus Supplement and report back to the Senate with any data on the impact of the reductions.

Recommendation 5 5.75 The committee recommends that the Australian Government permanently

raise the rate of JobSeeker at the Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook or in the 2021–22 Budget.

Recommendation 6 7.41 Considering the significant public expenditure on the National COVID-19

Commission Advisory Board (NCCAB), the committee recommends that the Australian Government make all reports of the NCCAB public, along with all declarations of actual and perceived conflicts of interest made by commissioners.

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Supporting findings

Preparation and initial response

Interim finding 2.1 The Australian Government should have responded to COVID-19 with greater urgency in January 2020 and begun preparations for a possible pandemic.

Interim finding 2.2 Pandemic planning pre-COVID-19 was not adequate.

Australia's planning for a pandemic had assumed an influenza-type virus. This left us unprepared when that wasn't the case.

The Australian Government's initial COVID-19 response plan adopted in February contained key gaps, including failures to contemplate the closure of international borders, and the neglect of the aged care and disability sectors.

Interim finding 2.3 The Australian Government failed to act on warnings regarding the inadequacy of its National Medical Stockpile prior to the bushfires and the pandemic.

Interim finding 2.4 The Australian Government should have acted earlier and with more consistency on decisions to extend travel restrictions and impose strict quarantine measures on international arrivals.

It is unclear which level of government was responsible for compliance with home quarantine arrangements for returning travellers between 1 February and 28 March—when compulsory hotel quarantine arrangements were mandated. There were no compliance checks taken throughout this time.

Interim finding 2.5 As at 24 November, there were 36 875 Australians registered with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade as being stranded overseas as wishing to come home to Australia.

The Australian Government should have been putting in place plans for Australians stranded overseas to return home after international borders were closed in March.

The Australian Government knew of the escalating crisis for Australians overseas and did not adequately prepare or plan for their safe return.

There remains a number of options that the Australian Government could utilise—including expanding commonwealth-funded quarantine facilities,

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chartering flights or using the Royal Australian Air Force fleet—to assist stranded Australians in getting home.

Interim finding 2.6 The Ruby Princess outbreak occurred following the Prime Minister announcing that arriving cruise ships would be 'directly under the command of the Australian Border Force' with 'bespoke arrangements' in place.

The Australian Government did not follow its legislated responsibilities on human quarantine.

The Australian Government did not follow its legislated responsibilities on human biosecurity, with officials from the Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment failing to administer Traveller with Illness Checklists and follow other key protocols designed to identify and manage active cases of COVID-19.

The Australian Government is still unable to identify which Australian Government official granted pratique for passengers to disembark the Ruby Princess on 19 March 2020.

Health Response Part I: Managing COVID-19 in Australia

Interim finding 3.1 The Australian Government's overarching strategy to deal with COVID-19 was not explained clearly to the public until late July—more than four months after strict sanctions were placed on the way Australians lived their lives.

The lack of a clear strategy on how to respond to COVID-19 in Australia affected early decision making by the Australian Government, which ultimately saw the states and territories, in particular New South Wales and Victoria, take charge and force the national lockdown on 30 March.

Interim finding 3.2 The $5.24 million COVIDSafe app has significantly under-delivered on the Prime Minister's promise that the app would enable an opening up of the economy in a COVID safe manner.

The app was launched with significant performance issues and has only been of limited effectiveness in its primary function of contact-tracing.

Interim finding 3.3 The Australian Government has lagged in securing vaccine deals and needs to do more to catch up. It also overstated its progress towards securing access to a vaccine in August when it prematurely announced a deal with the pharmaceutical company AstraZeneca.

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Health Response Part II: Aged Care

Interim finding 4.1 The aged care sector experienced a COVID-19 crisis which resulted in unacceptably poor outcomes, including hundreds of tragic and preventable deaths.

The Australian Government failed to accept full responsibility for the aged care crisis, despite being the primary source of funding and the principal regulator of the sector. The crisis had catastrophic consequences for many elderly Australians and their families.

Interim finding 4.2 Australia's aged care system was in crisis before the pandemic arrived.

Lack of access to health care staff, inadequate staffing levels, and lack of access to personal protective equipment and infection control training were all problems that predated COVID-19 and that had been outlined to the government in various reports over several years including in the 2019 Aged Care Royal Commission's report titled Neglect.

The Australian Government failed to develop a COVID-19 plan for the sector, which was unprepared and ill-equipped to protect the safety of residents when the pandemic hit.

The committee does not accept the argument put to it by the Minister and senior officials that once community transmission of COVID-19 occurs, outbreaks and deaths in aged care are inevitable.

Interim finding 4.3 The committee does not accept claims by the Australian Government that it was unable to anticipate the situation which occurred at St Basil's Home for the Aged and other Victorian aged care facilities.

The Australian Government failed to learn from earlier outbreaks at aged care facilities in New South Wales, particularly in relation to surge staffing capacity, personal protective equipment and infection control.

Interim finding 4.4 The Australian Government failed to respond quickly enough to protect elderly Australians living in aged care facilities.

The Victorian Aged Care Response Centre should have been stood up before 25 July when there was already 294 infections and 26 deaths.

A more urgent response from the Australian Government could have prevented the significant loss of the lives of elderly Australians.

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Interim finding 4.5 The Aged Care Quality and Safety Commission (ACQSC) failed to use all available regulatory powers to ensure the safety of aged care residents.

The ACQSC placed too much reliance on self-assessment surveys by aged care service providers to gauge the sector's preparedness for keeping elderly Australians safe.

ACQSC assessors perform essential work and should not have suspended all unannounced visits during the pandemic.

Economic Response Part I: The immediate economic fallout and response

Interim finding 5.1 The Australian Government's reluctance and delay in adopting a large-scale wage subsidy distorted the design of its economic packages.

The Australian Government's decision to rely on the retirement savings system for economic stimulus will have long term consequences for millions of Australians.

Interim finding 5.2 The Australian Government designed JobKeeper in a way which unnecessarily and deliberately excluded over one million Australian workers from the scheme.

The Australian Government should have expanded JobKeeper eligibility to include more Australian workers when the $60 billion costing error was identified.

If JobKeeper had been designed to include more Australian workers, more jobs could have been saved.

Interim finding 5.3 The rate of JobSeeker is inadequate at $40 per day.

The committee is concerned that the Australian Government is withdrawing fiscal support too early in the recovery phase by reducing the Coronavirus Supplement at the end of September 2020 and again in January 2021, and that this will have negative consequences for the economy.

Interim finding 5.4 The Australian Government should have undertaken analysis of the gendered impact of the decisions it made when responding to the pandemic. This would have improved the information available to decision makers and ensured that specific impacts were considered before finalising fiscal or policy measures.

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Interim finding 5.5 In the first six months of the pandemic, the Australian economy was supported by the private savings of the people who were hit hardest by COVID-19 restrictions.

The early access superannuation scheme is Australia's largest economic response to the pandemic after JobKeeper. More than 2.7 million Australians have accessed the scheme and the Department of the Treasury estimates $41.9 billion will be withdrawn from superannuation accounts by December 2020. This will cost Australia's retirement income system more than $100 billion over the long term.

Interim finding 5.6 The Australian Government refused to put in place a paid pandemic leave scheme at the earliest opportunity in order to protect workers and protect lives.

The Australian Government only acted following the aged care crisis and in response to a concerted public campaign and significant evidence that low paid workers were continuing to attend work despite being unwell.

Economic Response Part II: The recession and the Australian jobs crisis

Interim finding 6.1 Economic forecasts over the forward estimates paint a grim economic reality for the years ahead. The Australian economy was weak prior to COVID-19, and recovery from the recession will take a long time.

The economy cannot afford for the Australian Government to prematurely withdraw fiscal stimulus measures and jeopardise the recovery.

Interim finding 6.2 In the six months since it was first announced, the Prime Minister's 'JobMaker Plan' has promised much but delivered little.

Two major initiatives under the JobMaker brand—HomeBuilder and the Hiring Credit—significantly overstated the likely job creation impact.

Interim finding 6.3 The Australian Government's JobMaker plan should have included investment in social housing and reforms to childcare to promote jobs and economic recovery.

The Australian Government should consider these and other opportunities to get Australia back to full employment, including new policies to promote onshore manufacturing capability and renewable energy as sources of job creation.

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Interim finding 7.1 Despite claiming the protection of cabinet processes, the National Cabinet has not functioned in accordance with longstanding Westminster conventions on cabinet government in relation to collective responsibility and solidarity.

The Prime Minister's public criticisms of certain state premiers' decisions (school closures and internal border measures) fractured the national response and created unnecessary public confusion and anxiety.

The Australian Government has improperly applied cabinet conventions to avoid transparency in relation to decisions made by the National Cabinet.

Interim finding 7.2 The $6.5 million National COVID-19 Commission Advisory Board lacks transparency, has access to cabinet documents without commensurate accountability, has not released any work publicly, and has failed to demonstrate how conflicts of interest are managed for commissioners.

National Governance, Coordination and Communication

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Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1 The Department of Health first became aware of undiagnosed pneumonia in the People's Republic of China on 31 December 2019.1 On 25 January 2020, the first case of COVID-19 was detected in Australia.2 Eight weeks later on 18 March, the Governor-General declared a human biosecurity emergency under the Biosecurity Act 2015. 3

1.2 To respond to the threat posed by the virus and limit its spread, the Commonwealth, state and territory governments implemented a range of extraordinary health and economic responses, including unprecedented restrictions to enforce social distancing, border control measures, and high levels of government spending.

1.3 From March 2020, the pandemic fundamentally changed our way of life. For its part, the Parliament accepted the need for swift and serious action and worked across party lines. While the opposition and crossbench expressed concerns about certain aspects of the Australian Government's (government)4 response, all members of parliament and Senators recognised the need to facilitate the passage of key government legislation aimed at supporting Australians during the crisis.

1.4 The Coronavirus Economic Response Package Omnibus Bill 2020 (package) was introduced to Parliament on 23 March 2020.5 The package gave legislative effect to the government's response to the COVID-19 pandemic, including its economic response, as announced between 12 and 22 March. 6 The package focused on four key areas: targeted payments to households; cash flow assistance to small and medium sized businesses; investment support through

1 Department of Health (DoH), answers to written questions on notice, 22 May 2020 (received 24 June 2020), p. 1.

2 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPM&C), Submission 3, p. 3.

3 DPM&C, Submission 3, Attachment 1, p. 9; Biosecurity (Human Biosecurity Emergency) (Human Coronavirus with Pandemic Potential) Declaration 2020 (Cth), 18 March 2020.

4 Unless otherwise stated, 'the government' refers to the Australian Government throughout this report.

5 House of Representatives, Votes and Proceedings, No. 51, 23 March 2020, p. 827; Journals of the Senate, No. 47, 23 March 2020, p. 1548.

6 Explanatory Memorandum, Coronavirus Economic Response Package Omnibus Bill 2020, p. 1.

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an increase to the instant asset write off; and support for regions and communities disproportionately affected by COVID-19.7

1.5 A third package announced on 30 March established a new wage subsidy in the form of 'JobKeeper', which provided a $1500 fortnightly wage subsidy to eligible employees of businesses that could demonstrate a sufficient decline in revenue during the pandemic.8

1.6 The government's fiscal support announced in March equated to $194 billion across the forward estimates, representing 10 per cent of annual GDP. 9 Provisions of the bill provided the Minister for Families and Social Services with the broad discretion to extend the coronavirus supplement to other income support payments by legislative instrument.10

COVID-19 cases in Australia 1.7 As of 8 December 2020, there have been 27 987 cases of COVID-19 in Australia,

of which 25 450 individuals have recovered.11 To date, 908 people have died from COVID-19 in Australia, of which three-quarters have been from aged care facilities. 12

The scrutiny role of the committee 1.8 The Parliament met for a single day on 23 March to consider the government's

economic response to the pandemic. Due to concerns that further meetings would risk spreading the virus, the Parliament agreed through the two chambers to substantially reduce the number of planned sittings.13 The Senate

7 Senator the Hon Mathias Cormann, Minister for Finance, Senate Hansard, 23 March 2020, p. 1788.

8 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, '130 billion JobKeeper payment to keep Australians in a job', Transcript, 30 March 2020.

9 Department of the Treasury, Overview – Economic Response to the Coronavirus, 31 March 2020, treasury.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/Overview-Economic Response to the Coronavirus 2.pdf (accessed 19 November 2020).

10 Explanatory Memorandum, Coronavirus Economic Response Package Omnibus Bill 2020, p. 14.

11 DoH, Coronavirus (COVID-19) at a glance – 8 December 2020, 9 December 2020, https://www.health.gov.au/resources/publications/coronavirus-covid-19-at-a-glance-8-december-2020 (accessed 9 December 2020).

12 DoH, Coronavirus (COVID-19) at a glance – 8 December 2020, 9 December 2020, https://www.health.gov.au/resources/publications/coronavirus-covid-19-at-a-glance-8-december-2020 (accessed 9 December 2020).

13 See comments about the revised sitting calendar by the Hon Christian Porter MP, Leader of the House, House of Representatives Hansard, 23 March 2020, p. 2893.

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suspended its schedule of sittings until 11 August 2020, but each House agreed to resolutions providing flexibility for them to meet before then if required. 14

1.9 In the absence of a regular parliamentary sitting schedule, on 8 April the Senate established the Select Committee on COVID-19 (committee) with extremely broad terms of reference: 'the Australian Government's response to the COVID-19 pandemic and any related matters'.15

1.10 With Parliament not expected to meet for another four months, the committee was established so that it could discharge the parliamentary oversight that Parliament itself was not able to carry out via regular means.

1.11 There was no opposition to the Senate resolution establishing the committee.16 The government said it welcomed this oversight of its decisions.17

1.12 At the first public hearing, the Chair, Senator Katy Gallagher, observed that the committee 'is not your typical Senate committee'. She explained:

This committee is a key vehicle to provide accountability, transparency and scrutiny of the Australian Government's response to the pandemic for the Australian people. Over the next [26] months we will work tirelessly to shine a light on every aspect of the national response.18

1.13 Throughout its inquiry, the committee will look back to scrutinise the programs and policies that have already been implemented by government. It will also look ahead to short and long-term risks and opportunities for Australia's economic recovery and management of the pandemic.

Purpose of this report 1.14 This interim report sets out the committee's early findings on the government's

response to COVID-19.

1.15 This report focuses on some of the major issues arising from the first eight months of COVID-19 in Australia. It is not intended to provide an exhaustive examination of the many issues raised with the committee in written submissions, correspondence and hearings. The committee may choose to

14 Journals of the Senate, No. 47, 23 March 2020, p. 1462; House of Representatives Votes and Proceedings, No. 51, 23 March 2020, pp. 826–827.

15 Journals of the Senate, No. 48, 8 April 2020, pp. 1480–1484. See comments about the proposal to establish the committee by Senator the Hon Penny Wong, Leader of the Opposition in the Senate, Senate Hansard, 8 April 2020, p. 1870; and by Senator Katy Gallagher, Senate Hansard, 8 April 2020, p. 1904.

16 Journals of the Senate, No. 48, 8 April 2020, pp. 1480–1484. The resolution establishing the committee provides for its membership and procedures.

17 See comments by Senator the Hon Mathias Cormann, Leader of the Government in the Senate, Senate Hansard, 8 April 2020, p. 1867, p. 1885, and pp. 1908–1909; and by Senator James Paterson, Senate Hansard, 8 April 2020, p. 1897.

18 Committee Hansard, 23 April 2020, p. 1.

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revisit some of these issues and report on them in greater detail throughout the inquiry period.

1.16 The committee's oversight work is not limited to its reports. The committee has also held a substantial number of public hearings and accepted a large body of written evidence from government and the community.

Conduct of the inquiry 1.17 The committee is due to present its final report by 30 June 2022, but also intends

to present interim reports like this one over the course of its inquiry. The pace and nature of the inquiry will reflect the evolution of the pandemic and the government's response. The committee's intentions for the future of its inquiry are discussed further in Chapter 8.

1.18 The committee has held 37 public hearings and one private hearing thus far. While videoconferencing was used at every hearing, each one was based in Canberra with appropriate physical distancing and other COVID safe measures observed. The dates of the hearings and witnesses who gave evidence at each public hearing are listed in Appendix 2.

1.19 The committee called for written submissions to be lodged by 28 May 2020. After continuing to receive a great deal of interest from the public, the committee decided to formally re-open the submission period. As at 9 December 2020, the committee has accepted 505 written submissions. All published submissions are available on the committee's webpage.19 This is in addition to:

558 published documents containing more than 1800 answers to questions on notice;

124 other published documents including tabled documents, correspondence and additional documents;

two separate form letters received from 1700 individuals and 117 individuals respectively; and

hundreds of pieces of correspondence.

Acknowledgements 1.20 The committee thanks all those who have provided evidence to the inquiry. In

particular, the committee acknowledges the substantial efforts of public servants to assist the committee and appear at hearings, often at short notice, amidst high pressures and large workloads.

1.21 More broadly, the committee recognises all those who have come together in the face of this pandemic. Doctors, nurses and other medical staff have dedicated themselves to treating Australians under immense pressures. Public servants have worked hard to develop and deliver critical supports like JobSeeker and

19 www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary Business/Committees/Senate/COVID-19/COVID19/Submissions.

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JobKeeper. Employers and employees, businesses and unions, teachers, cleaners, aged care workers, supermarket staff, delivery drivers, and so many other members of our community have worked together—often in very difficult circumstances—to keep our community safe whilst maintaining essential services.

1.22 The committee also acknowledges that as COVID-19 first spread, our country was already weathering another crisis. The 2019–20 summer saw bushfires devastate our environment, damage livelihoods, and, most regrettably, take the lives of fellow Australians.

1.23 While Australia has fared better than many other parts of the world so far, the COVID-19 pandemic is not over. The committee will continue to scrutinise the government's response to the pandemic and encourage a strong recovery that is fair, inclusive and does not leave people behind.

8

which ministers were briefed and when on the unfolding developments in China.

2.6 The Australian consulate in Shanghai, which is responsible for the Hubei province and the city of Wuhan, sent only three cables to Canberra regarding the outbreak between 2 and 20 January 2020.6 These cables referred to publicly available material, and provided limited additional information from private sources such as direct discussions with Chinese authorities or the World Health Organisation (WHO).7

2.7 The information relied upon by the government in January 2020 does not appear to have extended beyond this information, which we now know had some limitations and may not have presented a full picture of the early stages of the outbreak in China.8

2.8 It is unclear when key Cabinet ministers were briefed about this 'watching mode'. The committee was told the CMO 'informally briefed' the Minister for Health sometime before 19 January, and that formal briefings to government started on 19 January.9 However, despite repeated requests from the committee, further details regarding early briefings have not been provided.10

2.9 Other countries—particularly certain countries in Asia that were affected by previous pathogens—responded to news of undiagnosed pneumonia in Wuhan with more urgency than Australia. Media reports in various Asian publications discussed concerns about the potential for a serious outbreak,11 and, for example, travellers from Wuhan to Changi airport in Singapore were subject to

6 Ms Frances Adamson, Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Committee Hansard, 20

August 2020, pp. 50–51; Andrew Greene and Georgia Hitch, 'Australian diplomatic cables from China detail early confused weeks of coronavirus emergency', ABC News, 31 August 2020, www.abc.net.au/news/2020-08-31/coronavirus-diplomatic-cables-show-early-confused-weeks-covid-19/12401064 (accessed 31 August 2020).

7 Ms Adamson, Secretary, DFAT, Committee Hansard, 20 August 2020, pp. 50–51.

8 Regarding the limitations of the public advice see, for example, Dr Raina MacIntyre, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 25 June 2020, p. 2. Also see Dr Peter Collignon, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 25 June 2020, p. 3.

9 Dr Murphy, CMO, DoH Committee Hansard, 23 April 2020, p. 3.

10 See for example: DoH, answers to written questions on notice, 28 April 2020 (received 26 June 2020), document no. 154, [p. 1].

11 Mr Ross Daniels, Ms Sharon Smith, Dr Lee Coaldrake and Mr Samuel Daniels, Submission 344, p. 3.

10

Pandemic planning prior to COVID-19 2.14 Before the emergence of COVID-19, the government had a series of plans in

place to address disasters, including the Australian Health Management Plan for Pandemic Influenza (updated in August 2019).17

2.15 However, the committee received evidence suggesting Australia's pandemic planning prior to COVID-19 had some deficiencies.

2.16 Dr Raina MacIntyre, who has been involved in pandemic planning for over 20 years in Australia, suggested that since the 2009 pandemic 'some things have changed in the way we think about broad expertise', and that in the early months of the pandemic 'we had very narrow expertise driving the agenda'.18

2.17 Appearing in a private capacity, Mr William Bowtell AO, an architect of Australia's public policy response to the AIDS pandemic, questioned how the government allowed itself to be 'caught seemingly unaware' and suggested the effectiveness of preventative pandemic planning 'has not been good'.19

2.18 Dr Norman Swan testified before the committee that:

This virus has behaved the way viruses and infections have behaved for centuries...[O]ne knows that the virus always wins, that this was coming, that it was serious and that the modellers, not necessarily Australian modellers but overseas modellers, were showing very early that the only thing that works to control it, and they've modelled all the variables—testing, isolation, quarantine—is social distancing when you've not got a vaccine and you've not got a treatment. We were behaving as though it was influenza. Our pandemic planning was around influenza.20

2.19 It is also not clear that the government conducted adequate preparatory pandemic exercises. Some media reporting indicates that Australia has not run a large-scale pandemic simulation exercise since 2008.21

17 Karen Elphick, Australian pandemic response planning: a quick guide, Australian Parliamentary Library,

28 April 2020, www.aph.gov.au/About Parliament/Parliamentary Departments/ Parliamentary Library/pubs/rp/rp1920/Quick Guides/AustralianPandemicResponsePlanning (accessed 28 August 2020).

18 Dr MacIntyre leads the Biosecurity Program at the Kirby Institute at the University of New South Wales and gave evidence in a private capacity. See, Dr MacIntyre, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 25 June 2020, p. 5.

19 Mr William Bowtell AO, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 25 June 2020, p. 13. Also see, for example, Australian Medical Association, Submission 86, p. 5.

20 Dr Norman Swan, Committee Hansard, 25 June 2020, p. 15.

21 Dylan Welch and Alexandra Blucher, 'Australia ran its last national pandemic drill the year the iPhone launched. Did that harm our coronavirus response?', ABC News, 20 April 2020, www.abc.net.au/news/2020-04-20/coronavirus-australia-ran-its-last-pandemic-exercise-in-2008/12157916 (accessed 28 August 2020); Adam Kamradt-Scott, 'Opinion: I helped prepare Australia's pandemic plan and so far it's unfolding reasonably well', The Sydney Morning Herald,

11

2.20 Dr Murphy rejected the suggestion that the last pandemic planning drill occurred over a decade ago as 'completely untrue', citing an exercise in May 2019 on a pandemic in a cruise ship coming into Sydney.22

2.21 However, the Ruby Princess cruise ship outbreak raises serious questions about the efficacy of the pandemic planning drill referred to by Dr Murphy. The fact that infected passengers disembarked a cruise ship without public health measures being enforced and subsequently became the major source of community transmission implies that this exercise was either inadequate or not used to inform the real-life response when the pandemic occurred.

The government's initial COVID-19 plan 2.22 In February, the government developed the Australian Health Sector

Emergency Response Plan for Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19 Plan).

2.23 However, there were clear gaps in this plan. For example, it did not contemplate closure of international borders, as highlighted in a submission from the Grattan Institute.23

2.24 The government stated in its COVID-19 Plan that it would be responsible for aged care.24 However, the government failed to develop a COVID-19 plan specifically for the aged care sector.25 In its special report, Aged care and COVID-19, the Royal Commission into Aged Care Quality and Safety found that measures implemented by the government 'were in some respects insufficient to ensure preparedness of the aged care sector'.26

2.25 The government also neglected the needs of people with disability in its initial planning and response. In a report released in November 2020, the Royal

1 April 2020, www.smh.com.au/national/i-helped-prepare-australia-s-pandemic-plan-and-so-far-it-s-unfolding-reasonably-well-20200331-p54fhf.html (accessed 28 August 2020).

22 Dr Murphy, CMO, Committee Hansard, 23 April 2020, p. 13; 'Australian Government Response to the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Health and Ageing report: Diseases have no Borders: Report on the Inquiry into Health Issues across International Borders, August 2018, pp. 20–21, www.health.gov.au/resources/publications/diseases-have-no-borders-report-on-the-inquiry-into-health-issues-across-international-borders (accessed 28 August 2020).

23 Grattan Institute, Submission 230, p. 20.

24 The plan provides, at paragraph 4.1.4, that ‘The Australian Government will also be responsible for residential aged care facilities; working with other healthcare providers to set standards to promote the safety and security of people in aged care and other institutional settings; and establishing and maintaining infection control guidelines, healthcare safety and quality standards’. See DoH, Australian Health Sector Emergency Response Plan for Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19), 2020, para. 4.1.4.

25 Mr Peter Rozen QC, Counsel Assisting, Royal Commission into Aged Care Quality and Safety (Aged Care Royal Commission), Transcript of Proceedings, 10 August 2020, p. 8367.

26 Aged Care Royal Commission, Aged care and COVID-19: a special report, Commonwealth of Australia, 30 September 2020, p. 11.

13

and ventilators.33 The stockpile of masks also increased substantially, at a total cost of $3.2 billion.34

2.30 The need to rapidly increase the quantity and type of items held in the stockpile implies that it may not have been appropriately stocked. Indeed, Dr Murphy told the committee that there were certain scenarios for which Australia would not have had enough PPE.35

2.31 Health expert Dr MacIntyre gave warnings before the COVID-19 pandemic hit that 'the stockpiling has failed to have anywhere near the required masks and respirators for health workers'.36 She added:

A year ago I presented research we'd done to the chair of the [Communicable Diseases Network Australia] which showed that, if there were a serious epidemic in Sydney that lasted six months, we'd need 30 million respirators for Sydney alone. This wasn't heeded clearly, and then we had the bushfires. So we were in a bad situation with the stockpiling of the masks. We can't make that mistake again.37

2.32 The DoH acknowledged there have been some concerns about PPE supplies, including of masks,38 and gowns.39 It also told the committee that of the 2865 requests made by aged care service providers to access PPE from the NMS between March and mid-August, only 1324 were approved.40

2.33 Peak bodies raised serious concerns directly with the committee about the availability or distribution of PPE.41 The Royal Australian College of General Practitioners said its members reported being encouraged or compelled to

33 Ms Caroline Edwards, Acting Secretary, DoH, Committee Hansard, 13 May 2020,

pp. 24–25.

34 DoH, answers to written questions on notice, 10 July 2020 (received 19 August 2020), document no. 283, [p. 7].

35 Dr Murphy, CMO, DoH, Committee Hansard, 23 April 2020, p. 5.

36 Dr MacIntyre, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 25 June 2020, p. 2; Dr Collignon, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 25 June 2020, p. 9; Mr Bowtell, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 25 June 2020, p. 14; Ms Annie Butler, Federal Secretary, Australian Nursing and Midwifery Federation, Committee Hansard, 25 June 2020, p. 26.

37 Dr MacIntyre, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 25 June 2020, p. 2.

38 DoH, answers to written questions on notice, 28 April 2020 (received 4 June 2020), document no. 90, p. 1.

39 Dr Murphy, CMO, DoH, Committee Hansard, 23 April 2020, p. 11.

40 DoH, answers to questions on notice, 28 August 2020 (received 21 October 2020), document no. 530, pp. 1–2.

41 See e.g., Australian Medical Association, Submission 86, p. 15; People with Disabilities Western Australia, Submission 116, p. 8; Australian Nursing and Midwifery Foundation, Submission 125, p. 9; Rural Doctors Association of Australia, Submission 411, p. 4; Dr MacIntyre, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 25 June 2020, p. 8.

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residents.48 In the period from 1 February to 20 March, Australia's number of reported cases of COVID-19 grew from 12 to 872.49

2.37 The committee heard testimony from Mr Bowtell that following the travel ban placed on China, 'there ought to have been a similar ban, or very strong restrictions, put on travel for people coming in from the United Kingdom, Europe and the United States'.50

2.38 On 13 March—one week prior to Australia extending restrictions to travellers from all countries—there were 1264 confirmed cases of COVID-19 in the US, 594 in the UK, and over 13 000 in Europe (excluding Italy), including 2965 in Spain.51 By the time travel restrictions were extended on 20 March, the number of cases had risen to over 60 000 in Europe (excluding Italy), 10 442 in the United States and 3277 in the United Kingdom.52

2.39 It is unclear why it wasn't until 18 March that the Australian Health Protection Principal Committee (AHPPC) stated that 'the risk for importation from the USA and Europe (including the UK) was now considered high, as is potentially the risk from other countries where ascertainment may be poor'.53

2.40 By that point, the AHPPC had become ambivalent about the need for travel restrictions as long as universal quarantine continued, citing low levels of international travel by foreign nationals and recommending that travel restrictions be either lifted completely or applied equally to all countries'.54

48 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'Update on Coronavirus Measures',

Media Release, 20 March 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/update-coronavirus-measures-0 (accessed 26 August 2020).

49 DoH, States & Territories Report, 17 October 2020, www.health.gov.au/news/health-alerts/novel-coronavirus-2019-ncov-health-alert/coronavirus-covid-19-current-situation-and-case-numbers (accessed 18 November 2020).

50 Mr Bowtell, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 25 June 2020, p. 17.

51 WHO, COVID-19 Situation Report – 60, 13 March 2020, www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/situation-reports/20200313-sitrep-53-covid-19.pdf?sfvrsn=adb3f72 2 (accessed 16 November 2020).

52 WHO, COVID-19 Situation Report – 60, 20 March 2020, www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/situation-reports/20200320-sitrep-60-covid-19.pdf?sfvrsn=d2bb4f1f 2 (accessed 16 November 2020).

53 'Australian Health Protection Principal Committee (AHPPC) coronavirus (COVID-19) statement regarding travel restrictions on 18 March 2020', 19 March 2020, www.health.gov.au/news/australian-health-protection-principal-committee-ahppc-coronavirus-covid-19-statement-regarding-travel-restrictions-on-18-march-2020-0 (accessed 29 July 2020).

54 'Australian Health Protection Principal Committee (AHPPC) coronavirus (COVID-19) statement regarding travel restrictions on 18 March 2020', 19 March 2020, www.health.gov.au/news/australian-health-protection-principal-committee-ahppc-coronavirus-covid-19-statement-regarding-travel-restrictions-on-18-march-2020-0 (accessed 29 July 2020).

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2.41 It is also unclear exactly when the government first became aware of an elevated risk associated with travellers returning from the USA and Europe. It is equally unclear when the government became aware of risks from some countries with limited ability to ascertain transmission levels. This lack of clarity can be attributed to the government's refusal to prove the committee with access to key documents such as AHPPC minutes which would provide that information.55

2.42 Given how important the initial border closures have turned out to be, the government should not have waited so long to extend them to other countries where the risk was high or unknown.

2.43 Dr MacIntyre described border controls as 'the single most important measure', 56 while Dr Murphy told the committee on 23 April that of the decisions made by government, 'the most important early decisions were related to border measures'. 57 This is in conflict with the ambivalent advice released by the AHPPC on 18 March.

2.44 There are also important questions over why Australia did not engage in other risk mitigation measures at international airports. Mr Bowtell told the committee in a hearing on 25 June that in his view:

…over February there ought to have been a much higher degree of border surveillance, temperature checking and assessment at our international airports. That was done in Singapore, Hong Kong and other hub airports on the way to Australia.58

2.45 In light of the importance of border measures and Dr Murphy's evidence on 23 April that 'two-thirds of cases in Australia are reported as being overseas acquired', 59 the government should have acted prior to 20 March to extend travel restrictions beyond China, Iran, South Korea and Italy.

Self-isolation and quarantine requirements 2.46 From 1 February, returning travellers from China were required to self-isolate

at home for 14 days.60 The same mandatory self-isolation requirement was implemented when restrictions on travellers from Iran, South Korea and Italy came into effect. However, it was not until 16 March that the government

55 The committee was refused access to AHPPC minutes from 26 February 2020. See DoH, answers to

questions on notice, 26 June 2020 (received 19 August 2020), document no. 284.

56 Committee Hansard, 25 June 2020, p. 2.

57 Committee Hansard, 23 April 2020, p. 12.

58 Committee Hansard, 25 June 2020, p. 17.

59 Dr Murphy, CMO, DoH, Opening Statement, p. 1, document no. 19, (tabled 26 May 2020).

60 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'Updated travel advice to protect Australians from the novel coronavirus', Media Release, 1 February 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/updated-travel-advice-protect-australians-novel-coronavirus (accessed 4 September 2020).

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announced all overseas travellers would be required to self-isolate for 14 days on arrival.61

2.47 At no stage were compliance checks undertaken to ensure these requirements were being adhered to, nor is it clear which level of government would have been responsible for monitoring these arrangements.

2.48 The lack of home quarantining arrangements for most international arrivals between 1 February and 16 March is directly at odds with the arrangements put in place one month earlier for Australians stranded in Wuhan and Hubei, for whom the government had organised flights and mandatory quarantine.62

2.49 Further, mandatory hotel quarantine requirements were not introduced until 28 March—10 days after the AHPPC's advice of 'the imposition of universal quarantine'.63 In that 10 day period, new daily case numbers grew from 122 to 464 and another seven Australians died of COVID-19.64

2.50 Given the government recognised the importance of quarantine arrangements as early as 1 February, it should not have waited until 16 March to require that international travellers self-isolate and until 28 March to mandate hotel quarantine.

2.51 Additionally, clear lines of responsibility for quarantining arrangements and compliance arrangements should have been agreed upon and enforced when those decisions were initially taken.

61 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'Coronavirus measures endorsed by National Cabinet',

Media Release, 16 March 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/coronavirus-measures-endorsed-national-cabinet (accessed 17 September 2020).

62 Mr James Griffiths and Ms Amy Woodyatt, 'China goes into emergency mode as number of confirmed Wuhan coronavirus cases reaches 2,700', CNN, 27 January 2020, edition.cnn.com/2020/01/26/asia/wuhan-coronavirus-update-intl-hnk/index.html (accessed 26 August 2020).

63 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'Update on coronavirus measures', Media Release, 27 March 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/update-coronavirus-measures-270320 (accessed 17 September 2020).

64 See DoH, Coronavirus (COVID-19) current situation and numbers, 7 December 2020, www.health.gov.au/news/health-alerts/novel-coronavirus-2019-ncov-health-alert/coronavirus-covid-19-current-situation-and-case-numbers (accessed 7 December 2020); WHO, Australia Situation, December 2020, covid19.who.int/region/wpro/country/au (accessed 3 December 2020).

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per week to 4900 by 27 September and 5500 by 11 October.69 The Prime Minster stated:

I would hope that those who are looking to come home, that we'd be able to do that within months and I would hope that we can get as many people home, if not all of them by Christmas.70

2.56 On 26 November 2020 DFAT additionally told the committee that the weekly cap was '5625 arrivals, rising to 6745 arrivals with the resumption of arrivals into Melbourne on 7 December'.71

2.57 The large number of Australians stranded overseas is directly linked to the restrictions on international arrivals into Australia. In a hearing on 24 September, DFAT told the committee that '[t]he introduction of the caps has posed a significant challenge for those Australians overseas'.72

2.58 Following a meeting of the National Cabinet on 13 November, the Prime Minister announced the government will be extending the international air passenger caps until 31 January 2021 and that 'since 18 September 2020 the list of registered Australians has grown from 26 200 to 35 637'.73 Additionally, on 26 November 2020, DFAT told the committee that 'as at 24 November there were 36 875 Australians overseas registered with DFAT as seeking to return,' including 8 070 who were classed as being 'vulnerable'. 74

69 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'Press Conference', Transcript, 18 September 2020,

www.pm.gov.au/media/press-conference-sydney-nsw-5 (accessed 22 September 2020).

70 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'Press Conference', Transcript, 18 September 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/press-conference-sydney-nsw-5 (accessed 16 November 2020).

71 Mr Tony Sheehan, Deputy Secretary, International Security, Humanitarian and Consular Group, DFAT, Committee Hansard, 26 November 2020, p. 10.

72 Dr Webster, First Assistant Secretary, Consular and Crisis Management Division, DFAT, Committee Hansard, 20 August 2020, pp. 47 and 49.

73 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'National Cabinet', Media statement, 13 November 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/national-cabinet-2 (accessed 16 November 2020).

74 Mr Tony Sheehan, Deputy Secretary, International Security, Humanitarian and Consular Group, DFAT, Committee Hansard, 26 November 2020, pp. 10–11.

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2.59 The number of Australians stranded overseas wishing to return home has grown incrementally since the introduction of the international arrival cap—and continues to grow. These numbers include:

18 August—18 800;75 2 September—23 000;76 13 September—25 000;77 18 September—26 200;78 24 September—26 800;79 13 October—29 100;80 20 October—32 300;81 28 October—33 700;82 13 November—35 637;83 and 24 November—36 875.84

2.60 On these growing numbers, it is clear the Prime Minister's promise to get as many, if not all of these stranded Australians home by Christmas is no longer

75 Dr Webster, First Assistant Secretary, Consular and Crisis Management Division, DFAT, Committee

Hansard, 20 August 2020, p. 47.

76 Elias Visontay and Christopher Knaus, ' National cabinet: 23,000 stranded Australians hope for easing of arrival caps, The Guardian, 4 September 2020, www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/sep/04/national-cabinet-23000-stranded-australians-hope-for-easing-of-arrival-caps (accessed 16 November 2020).

77 Nour Haydar, 'Federal Government says hotel coronavirus quarantine boost could get overseas Australians 'home by Christmas'', ABC News online, 13 September 2020, www.abc.net.au/news/2020-09-13/peter-dutton-kristina-keneally-australians-stranded-covid-19/12659308 (accessed 16 November 2020).

78 Dr Webster, Acting First Assistant Secretary, Consular and Crisis Management Division, DFAT, Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee Hansard, 28 October 2020, p. 63.

79 Ms Frances Adamson, Secretary, DFAT, Committee Hansard, 24 September 2020, p. 40.

80 Tom McIlroy and Ronald Mizen, 'Waiting list for Australians stuck overseas passes 29,000', Australian Financial Review, 13 October 2020, www.afr.com/politics/federal/waiting-list-for-australians-stuck-overseas-passes-29-000-20201013-p564ks (accessed 16 November 2020).

81 Katina Curtis, '"Complex equation": Stranded Aussies' Christmas wish may not be granted', Sydney Morning Herald, 20 October 2020, www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/complex-equation-christmas-wish-may-not-be-granted-for-stranded-aussies-20201020-p566xt.html (accessed 16 November 2020).

82 Dr Webster, Acting First Assistant Secretary, Consular and Crisis Management Division, DFAT, Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee Hansard, 28 October 2020, p. 63.

83 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'National Cabinet', Media statement, 13 November 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/national-cabinet-2 (accessed 16 November 2020).

84 Mr Tony Sheehan, Deputy Secretary, International Security, Humanitarian and Consular Group, DFAT, Committee Hansard, 26 November 2020, pp. 10–11.

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possible. Even if these numbers stopped growing, with continued weekly flight caps of around 5500 the backlog of stranded Australians is simply too large.

2.61 Despite the government's clear constitutional responsibilities for incoming arrivals and quarantine,85 the government has been reluctant to accept full responsibility for the plight of Australians wanting to return home, with the Prime Minister explaining the passenger cap policy as a decision of National Cabinet intended to ease pressure on the states over a stretched hotel quarantine system.86

2.62 The Secretary of the Department of Home Affairs told the committee on 24 September that there are no legal barriers preventing the government from providing federal quarantine arrangements. He also stated there was a standing offer to increase quarantine capacity and that the government would provide states and territories 'whatever they need' to do so.87

2.63 The Prime Minister has not provided any explanation of why the government did not put in place the resources and planning needed to assist Australians to return home as borders closed in March instead of choosing to shift responsibility back onto stranded Australians themselves.

2.64 When questioned in July about the proposal to restrict people entering Australia, the Prime Minister stated, 'there's been many opportunities for people to return. If they're choosing to do so now, they have obviously delayed that decision for a period'.88

2.65 The Prime Minister's attempts to shift responsibility back on individuals is emblematic of the personal experiences described to the committee. Appearing in a private capacity, Mrs Claire Burles gave evidence that:

The only advice we have received from Home Affairs [Department of Home Affairs] or Smartraveller is that we had not attempted to come home soon enough and that there is no assistance available for citizens in our situation. In my most recent conversation with the Australian

85 The Australian Border Force (ABF) is responsible for incoming arrivals. In relation to quarantine,

section 51(ix) of the Australian Constitution lists quarantine as a Commonwealth head of power.

86 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'Press Conference', Transcript, 10 July 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/press-conference-australian-parliament-house-act-10jul20 (accessed 28 September 2020).

87 Mr Michael Pezzullo AO, Secretary of the Department of Home Affairs, Committee Hansard, 24 September 2020, p. 51.

88 The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, 'Press Conference', Transcript, 8 July 2020, www.pm.gov.au/media/press-conference-australian-parliament-house-8 (accessed 15 October 2020).

22

consulate the only resources they provided me with were the locations of homeless shelters.89

2.66 The shocking accounts from Mrs Burles and other witnesses of being directed to homeless shelters or told to take out loans was confirmed by DFAT's evidence to the committee on 24 September that 'where they have nowhere to live we provide them a list of homeless shelters, or we are able to provide loans as well to enable them to sustain themselves while we work to get them on flights'. 90

2.67 Mrs Deanne Vowels explained to the committee that she had been told by Australian consular officials that:

There's nothing we can do. We get hundreds of calls a day just like yours, so we can't do anything about yours. Have you set up a GoFundMe page? Ask your friends and family for help.91

2.68 These accounts—confirmed by the department responsible—demonstrate that the government's efforts to support Australians overseas during COVID-19 have been woefully inadequate.

2.69 In the same hearing, the Chair asked the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet why the government could not open its own quarantine facilities, as it had done so previously. The department suggested this was a result of the government's limited public health capacity, but admitted it had not taken any steps to test the market for privately contracted health workers, nor was it aware of any requests to repurpose government property as a quarantine facility.92

2.70 On 15 October, the government announced it would use the Howard Springs quarantine facility in the Northern Territory to facilitate the return of Australians stranded overseas.93

2.71 This demonstrates that the government had the capacity to provide quarantine arrangements and should not have sought to characterise the cap on international arrivals as a function of state and territory capacity constraints.

2.72 By the time it announced the increase in the cap and the use of Howard Springs for quarantine capacity, it had been more than seven months

89 Mrs Burles is an Australian stranded in Canada and hoping to return to Australia.

See, Mrs Claire Burles, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 24 September 2020, p. 7.

90 Ms Adamson, Secretary, DFAT, Committee Hansard, 24 September 2020, p. 44.

91 Mrs Deanne Vowels, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 24 September 2020, p. 1.

92 Mr Lachlan Colquhoun, First Assistant Secretary, National Security Division, DPM&C, Committee Hansard, 24 September 2020, pp. 32–33.

93 Andrew Probyn, Stephanie Borys and Georgia Hitch, 'Howard Springs coronavirus quarantine facility to be expanded in bid to get more Australians home', ABC Live Blog, 15 October 2020, www.abc.net.au/news/2020-10-15/howard-springs-coronavirus-quarantine-expanded-australians-home/12769796 (accessed 15 October 2020).

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the Hon Greg Hunt, Minister for Health—included an exemption allowing cruise ships which had departed for Australia by a certain date to enter port.97

2.76 Three days after the announcement, a cruise ship—the Ruby Princess—docked in Sydney and passengers disembarked the ship on the same day. The Ruby Princess had been allowed to dock under an exemption in the Determination of 18 March, as it had departed New Zealand before the time and date in the Determination. On 23 April, it was reported that approximately 10 per cent of all cases in Australia had been linked to the Ruby Princess.98

2.77 On 15 April, the New South Wales (NSW) Government established the Special Commission of Inquiry into the Ruby Princess, which handed down its final report on 14 August.99 The Special Commission of Inquiry found that:

of 1682 passengers from Australia, 663 (39.4 per cent) contracted COVID-19; of the 1148 crew, 191 (16.6 per cent) contracted COVID-19; and 28 people associated with the Ruby Princess have died.100

2.78 The Special Commission of Inquiry noted that '[t]he human consequences of the scattering upon disembarkation have not yet played out'.101 It also noted that the original source of the then 114 reported cases from the COVID-19 outbreak at North West Regional Hospital in Tasmania was most likely to be one, or both, of two inpatients admitted to the hospital with COVID-19 acquired on the Ruby Princess.102

2.79 The question of which jurisdiction and department was responsible for allowing passengers to disembark the Ruby Princess and for subsequent quarantine measures remains unresolved despite repeated requests by the committee for this question to be answered by relevant Australian Government agencies

97 Biosecurity (Human Biosecurity Emergency) (Human Coronavirus with Pandemic Potential) (Emergency

Requirements) Determination 2020 (Cth), 18 March 2020.

98 Paige Cockburn, 'How the coronavirus pandemic would look in Australia if Ruby Princess had never docked', ABC News, 23 April 2020, www.abc.net.au/news/2020-04-23/coronavirus-across-australia-if-ruby-princess-never-docked/12172314 (accessed 10 August 2020).

99 Special Commission of Inquiry into the Ruby Princess, www.rubyprincessinquiry.nsw.gov.au/ (accessed 10 August 2020).

100 Special Commission of Inquiry into the Ruby Princess, New South Wales (NSW) Government, 14 August 2020, p. 265. The 28 deaths comprise 20 deaths reported in Australia and eight deaths reported in the United States.

101 Special Commission of Inquiry into the Ruby Princess, NSW Government, 14 August 2020, p. 16.

102 Special Commission of Inquiry into the Ruby Princess, NSW Government, 14 August 2020, p. 266. The outbreak of COVID-19 at North West Regional Hospital is the subject of an ongoing review established by the Premier of Tasmania on 24 July 2020. On 5 August 2020, the Tasmanian Health Minister advised the Special Commission of Inquiry advised that there had been 138 confirmed cases associated with the outbreak, including 10 deaths.

25

including the Australian Border Force (ABF) and the Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment (DAWE).

2.80 Government departments explained to the committee their role in relation to cruise ships arriving in Australia:

DAWE advised that it is responsible for detecting items and goods that could pose a risk to Australia's animal, plant or environmental biosecurity;103

the Australian Government's CMO is responsible for human biosecurity;104 and

ABF advised that it is responsible for the customs and immigration process.105

2.81 In relation to cruise ship and vessel clearances, Mr Andrew Metcalfe AO, Secretary of DAWE, advised that 'pratique' (the legal authorisation to allow passengers to disembark a vessel) is granted by a biosecurity officer from DAWE.106

2.82 Prior to the Ruby Princess docking, DAWE was provided with four human health updates between 16 March to 18 March which clearly indicated that the number of passengers who had become ill, or showed signs of illness, had significantly increased—from 53 on 16 March to 128 on 18 March.107 This surge in ill passengers alone should have provided DAWE with reason to pause and consider raising the matter with NSW Health or the government CMO.

2.83 Despite a dedicated inquiry investigating the circumstances related to the Ruby Princess and direct questions from the committee, it remains unclear precisely when and who granted pratique. Passengers commenced disembarking the ship at 6.30 am on 19 March 2020, but the document advising the vessel operator that pratique had been granted was lodged at 7.39 am. 108 Furthermore, evidence suggests that an ABF officer had also boarded the ship and a crew member of the Ruby Princess had asked this officer whether the vessel had clearance to disembark, to which the ABF officer responded 'yes'. 109

103 Mr Andrew Metcalfe AO, Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment

(DAWE), Committee Hansard, 5 May 2020, p. 1.

104 Mr Metcalfe, Secretary, DAWE, Committee Hansard, 5 May 2020, p. 1.

105 Mr Michael Outram APM, Commissioner, ABF, Committee Hansard, 5 May 2020, p. 4.

106 Mr Metcalfe, Secretary, DAWE, Committee Hansard, 5 May 2020, p. 6.

107 DAWE, answers to questions on notice, 29 April 2020 (received 5 May 2020), pp. 1–22.

108 Ms Emily Canning, First Assistant Secretary, Biosecurity Operations Division, DAWE, Committee Hansard, 18 August 2020, pp. 6–7.

109 Mr Outram, Commissioner, ABF, Committee Hansard, 18 August 2020, p. 8.

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2.84 The committee accepts that NSW Health had provided a preliminary health approval for passengers to disembark. This approval was primarily based off a desktop review of documents provided by the Ruby Princess through DAWE's Maritime Arrival Reporting System. However, while NSW Health failed to recognise active cases of COVID-19 onboard the Ruby Princess, NSW Health was not onboard on the morning of 19 March and could not have played a role in the decision to let the Ruby Princess passengers disembark. Australian Government agencies were onboard the ship, and federal protocols and procedures to identify potential human health risks onboard cruise ships at the time of arrival into Australia, and to confirm the assessments made by NSW Health were carried out.

2.85 Key to these protocols was the administration of Traveller with Illness Checklists (TICs). TICs were designed by the DoH for use by DAWE biosecurity officers at air and seaports in Australia. TICs are administered to ill passengers arriving in Australia in order to identify active cases of, or potential exposure to, a variety of listed human diseases. Negative indications from the checklist—including the presence of symptoms such as fever and coughing—would require a biosecurity officer to then liaise with local health officials to provide further advice on treatment or quarantine for the relevant passenger.110

2.86 Beyond the administration of TICs, DAWE biosecurity officers are also required to interview officials onboard arriving cruise ships in order to ascertain the health situation at the time of arrival, and also verify the medical records that form the basis of NSW Health's pre-arrival assessment. In totality, these protocols form an important fail-safe in the management of human biosecurity risks at our borders by verifying the health status of passengers prior to the granting of pratique and the disembarking of passengers.111

2.87 This is particularly relevant in the case of the Ruby Princess, where the rapidly deteriorating health situation onboard the vessel was obscured from NSW Health officials due to delays in updating medical records and passenger logs. Evidence before the Special Commission of Inquiry demonstrates that there had been a surge in ill patients onboard the vessel in the period after NSW Health had made their assessment and before government officials boarded the ship in the early hours of 19 March.112

2.88 Secretary Metcalfe has subsequently admitted that DAWE biosecurity officers at the Port of Sydney failed to follow any of the aforementioned procedures on the morning of the arrival of the Ruby Princess. Further, evidence before this

110 Special Commission of Inquiry into the Ruby Princess, Exhibit 114, NSW Government, 14 August 2020,

pp. 13–14.

111 Mr Metcalfe, Secretary, DAWE, Committee Hansard, 18 August 2020, p. 3.

112 Special Commission of Inquiry into the Ruby Princess Auscript, NSW Government, 22 April 2020, pp. 92–93.

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committee suggests that it had in fact been the practice of officials at the harbor for some period of time to ignore these protocols in the interest of saving time.113

2.89 As such, an important aspect of the government's policy and procedure surrounding human biosecurity was ignored by officials during the nascent stages of a global pandemic, despite the clear risk posed by passengers returning on cruise ships.

2.90 The actions of Secretary Metcalfe's officials meant that passengers were allowed to disembark the Ruby Princess without a) the relevant health documentation being verified by officials, b) the ship's captain and medical staff being interviewed to ascertain the health situation onboard the ship at the time of arrival, and c) ill patients being triaged by administration of the TICs. Secretary Metcalfe's claim that his officials relied on the health assessment made by NSW Health is troubling,114 given the fact that his officials had not made contact to confirm NSW Health's findings until after passengers had commenced disembarking the vessel.

2.91 If officials onboard the Ruby Princess had been interviewed—per protocol—or if current health records had been examined—per protocol—it is highly likely that the significant increase in illness onboard the vessel would have been identified, and the appropriate safeguards regarding treatment and quarantine put in place. The revelations of the government's laissez faire approach to its own policy leaves open the possibility of fundamental flaws in the application of biosecurity procedures at every port in Australia. This in turn poses a threat to the health of our community, the sustainability of our native flora and fauna, and the livelihoods of many in the agricultural industry, which would be crippled by the entry of disease into our ecosystem.

2.92 Further, the government has thus far failed to identify who provided pratique to the Ruby Princess under the Biosecurity Act 2015 (Cth). The granting of pratique is an important aspect of biosecurity management at our seaports and airports, providing the legal approval for a vessel to disembark passengers and goods. This clearance should only be granted upon the completion of the required protocols and procedures around biosecurity and human biosecurity and can only be granted by officers authorised under the Biosecurity Act 2015. 115

2.93 Evidence before the committee indicates that passengers were allowed to disembark prior to the granting of pratique, and that permission to disembark was first given by an ABF official, despite them not holding the authority to do so. Further, per previous comments, pratique was granted without appropriate protocol having been followed with respect to human biosecurity, and

113 Mr Metcalfe, Secretary, DAWE, Committee Hansard, 18 August 2020, pp. 1–2.

114 Mr Metcalfe, Secretary, DAWE, Committee Hansard, 18 August 2020, p. 2.

115 See, Biosecurity (Negative Pratique) Instrument 2016 (Cth), 7 June 2016.

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ostensibly before direct contact had been made with NSW Health to confirm their assessment.

2.94 Despite the best efforts of the committee, the government has been unable—or unwilling—to explain who granted pratique, and on what basis.

2.95 It is the opinion of the committee that the failure of DAWE and ABF officials to follow government protocol and procedure in relation to the arrival of the Ruby Princess directly led to the further spread of