British Society for Middle Eastern Studies

The Shia of Saudi Arabia: A Minority in Search of Cultural AuthenticityAuthor(s): Madawi al-RasheedSource: British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1 (May, 1998), pp. 121-138Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/195850 .Accessed: 17/07/2011 10:23

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British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (1998), 25(1), 121-138

The Shia of Saudi Arabia: a

Minority in Search of Cultural

Authenticity MADAWI AL-RASHEED*

ABSTRACT This article focuses on the transformation of Saudi ShiCa resistance from one which centred on military confrontation in the 1980s to one which invokes searching for cultural authenticity (al-asala al-shiciyya) in the 1990s. Today the struggle of the Shica for equal status among the Sunni majority draws attention to the attempts of ShiCa intellectuals to write their own regional history. Shica intellectuals and opposition leaders deconstruct official representations of themselves and provide alternative historical narratives which anchor their community in Saudi history and society, thus dismissing suggestions that they are a non-indigenous community. This article examines Shica historical narra- tives in an attempt to understand the transformation in their struggle against discrimination in Saudi Arabia.

Introduction

The transformation of Saudi Shica opposition from military confrontation in the 1980s to the quest for cultural authenticity in the 1990s has not attracted the attention of scholars. The sparse literature on this community tends to concen- trate on the open and violent confrontations in the early 1980s.1 Such overt *Lecturer in Social Anthropology, Dept of Theology and Religious Studies, King's College, University of

London, London, UK. This article draws on a joint research project conducted by the author and Loulouwa Al-Rasheed. This involved interviewing Shi'a opposition leaders in London in 1992-1993. Interviews were conducted with Hamza al Hasan and 'Abdul Amir Musa, two active leaders of the opposition. An earlier version of this article was presented in a Workshop on Minorities in the Middle East organized by the Carsten Niebuhr Institute for Near Eastern Studies, University of Copenhagen in 1996. I thank the contributors to the workshop for their comments. Also I thank the anonymous BJMES referees for their constructive criticism and suggestions, some of which have been addressed in this article. 1 Research on the Saudi Shi'a remains very limited. In the 1980s, a number of references to their mobilization

were included in some books and articles on Saudi Arabia. See W. Quandt, Saudi Arabia in the 1980's (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1981); J. Buchan, 'Secular and Religious Opposition in Saudi Arabia', in T. Niblock (ed.), State, Society and Economy in Saudi Arabia (London: Croom Helm, 1982), pp. 106-124; J. Bill, 'Islam, Politics, and Shi'ism in the Gulf,' Middle East Insight, 3 (1980); J. Goldberg, 'The Shi'i Minority in Saudi Arabia,' in J. Cole and N. Keddie (eds), Shiism and Social Protest (New York: Yale University Press, 1986), pp. 230-246; J. Kostiner, 'Shi'i Unrest in the Gulf,' in M. Kramer (ed.), Shi'ism, Resistance and Revolution (Colorado: Westview Press, 1987), pp. 173-186. The Shi'a are also mentioned in research on Saudi-Iranian relations; see I. Leverrier, 'L'Arabie Saoudite, Le Pelerinage et L'Iran,' Cahiers d'Etudes sur La Mediterranee Orientales et Le Monde Turco-Iranien, 22 (1996), pp. 111-147; and Y. Richard, L'lslam Chi'ite Croyances et Ideologies (Paris: Fayard, 1991).

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confrontations are no longer the main strategy of the Shi'a opposition. There has been a shift towards more subtle forms of resistance, led by Shi'a intellectuals and opposition leaders who assert what they call al-asdla al-shiliyya, (cultural authenticity). In this article, I consider the search for cultural authenticity as a mechanism for asserting the group's identity by drawing on cultural and historical elements. This assertion has come to replace direct confrontations with the regime, thus allowing resistance to take place at the level of cultural contestation.

While the relationship between the Saudi Shi'a and the Sunni majority has always been characterized by violence and conflict,2 the greatest confrontation with the Saudi government took place after the success of the Islamic revolution in Iran. In 1979, the Shi'a took to the streets during the cashura to mourn the death of their martyrs, Hasan and Hussein, a practice forbidden by the state and confined to the private sphere of Shi'a homes since 1913. The state dispatched 20,000 National Guard soldiers to disperse the mourners.3 In the following year (1980) the Saudi Shi'a organized a large demonstration and a series of strikes in Qatif to celebrate the first anniversary of the return of Imam Khomeini to Iran. This became an occasion to voice their discontent over their status as second class citizens in Saudi Arabia. Demonstrations were repressed by the Saudi authorities and the National Guard, leading to a number of deaths in the region. The Shi'a remember the events as intif.dat al-min.taqa al-sharqiyya (the uprising of the Eastern Province),4 a symbol of the repression which the community had historically been subjected to. The Organization of Islamic Revolution (Mu- naz.zamat al-thawra al-islamiyya), a clandestine Shi'a organization representing the community in the Eastern Province, began to take shape as the political outlet for the group following the spontaneous events of 1979-1980. Member- ship of the Organization was drawn from students in the University of Minerals and Petroleum (Dammam) and workers at the oil company, ARAMCO. The Organization began broadcasting from Iranian radio stations in an attempt to reach the community in Saudi Arabia, and an information office was opened in Tehran to co-ordinate political activities.5 While the Organization denies the patronage of Iran, it is proud of the fact that it has become a focal point for other Shica in the Gulf (mainly in Kuwait, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates). It insists that their opposition is an indigenous response to political conditions in Saudi Arabia, although it is clear that the support of Iran and its adoption of the movement played a crucial role in the intensification of conflict with the Saudi government in the early 1980s. 2 References to the tension between the Wahhabis and the Shi'a in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries are

found in C. Doughty, Travels in Arabia Deserta, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); G. A. Wallin, 'Narrative of a Journey from Cairo to Medina and Mecca, by Suez, Araba, Tawila, al-Jauf, Jublae, Hail and Negd in 1845,' Journal of the Royal Geographical Society,1854, 243, pp. 115-201; W. C. Palgrave, Personal Narrative of a Year's Journey through Central and Eastern Arabia (1862-1863), 2 vols (London: Macmillan and Co., 1865); and J. Philby, Saudi Arabia (London: Benn, 1955). For a quick summary of the events of this period, see Goldberg, 'The Shi'i Minority'. 3 Goldberg, 'The Shi'i Minority', pp. 240-241. 4 Hamza al-Hasan referred to the event of 1979 in this manner in his book and during the interview session. 5 Personal interview with Hamza al-Hasan, January 1993.

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After the confrontations of 1979-1980, the Saudi state realized that a prag- matic approach to the Shi'a problem would be more beneficial. Officials visiting the region immediately after these events openly recognized the social and economic privation of the community and promised to improve the educational, health and economic infrastructure of Shi'a towns.6

An assessment of the Shi'a opposition in the 1990s shows that economic development in the region did not immediately succeed in pacifying the Shi'a and winning their allegiance. Economic development did appeal to the tra- ditional Shi'a leadership, who were satisfied with the promises of the state. However, they did not succeed in pacifying the young Shi'a activists, who were influenced by the rising tide of political Islam in the Middle East, and looked to Iran for inspiration.7 Young Shi'a activists, who were behind the riots of 1979-1980 opted for exile, where they established their headquarters to chal- lenge the state.

This article investigates the shift in Shi'a tactics by examining Shi'a journal- istic and historical narratives in which their cultural authenticity is established. Three sources are used. First, the monthly magazine al-JazTra al-'Arabiyya (The Arabian Peninsula),8 published by the Shi'a opposition in London until 1993, was one of the most systematic publications of this opposition. It incorporated the views of the opposition and differed from other sources owing to the quality of its content and its regular appearance over three years. Second, Hamza al-Hasan's two volumes on the history of the Saudi Shi'a are consulted because they represent the most recent version of Shi'a historiography, written by an historian and political activist.9 His historical account is a unique attempt to represent the community's past and present from the perspective of an insider. Although these sources were officially outside the reach of the Saudi Shi'a because of the ban on opposition literature, they worried the government sufficiently that when the opposition reconciled with the state early in the 1990s, one of the state's conditions was that the magazine cease publication and what the state regards as 'hostile literature' be suspended.?1 However, it remains difficult to assess whether the magazine and al-Hasan's narratives have reached a wide public in Saudi Arabia. One can speculate that such literature did attract the attention of not only the Saudi Shi'a but also other Saudi citizens, given the government's concern about their appearance. They were widely available in bookshops and newsagents in London and Arab countries such as Syria and Lebanon.

Third, a number of interviews were conducted with Shi'a opposition leaders during their exile in London. These interviews provided an opportunity to discuss the content of the opposition's publications and clarify their position

6 Goldberg, 'The Shi'i Minority', p. 243.

7 Personal interview with Hamza al-Hasan, 1993. 8 Al-JazTra al-'Arabiyya (1991-1993), 1-31 (London). 9 Hamza al-Hasan, al-Shl'a ft al-Mamlaka al-'Arabiyya al-Sa'udiyya, 2 vols (Mu'assasat al-Baqi li-Ihya'al-

Turath, 1993). 10 Personal interview with Abdul Amir Musa, January 1993.

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regarding urgent political matters. I will argue that the apparent absence of open conflict with the state at present does not indicate the pacification of the Shi'a community. While violence remains an option, in the 1990s the Shi'a have so far appeared to express their opposition as a cultural contestation reflecting their concern as a minority in Saudi Arabia.

Resistance to domination by powerless groups takes various forms and aggression may not be the only feasible option. Scott, the political scientist, discusses alternative forms of resistance in situations whereby open con- frontation results in high casualties, which powerless groups cannot tolerate.1 One such option is the articulation of what Scott calls the 'hidden transcripts'. In these 'hidden transcripts', the subordinate groups usually articulate ideas which 'reverse' and 'negate' those generated by the dominant group. They consist of speeches, gestures, rituals and practices often taking place off-stage beyond direct observation by power holders. They also include narratives and discourses challenging power relations of domination. Scott shows how 'hidden transcripts' may not remain 'hidden' as they erupt into the public realm. He argues that 'moments of challenge and open defiance typically provoke either a swift stroke of repression or, if unanswered, often lead to further words and acts of daring'.12 'Breaking the silence', that is, the eruption of the hidden discourse into the public sphere, is a moment which generates its own political electricity, not only for the individual whose discourse enters the public sphere, but also for the collectivity, the subordinate group that shares this discourse.13 The subjective power of this moment is compounded by a collective sense of satisfaction.

Scott's important analysis of the resistance of subordinate groups has attracted the attention of those anthropologists who have traditionally preoccupied them- selves with investigating local responses to domination. Although his concept of 'hidden transcripts' has been criticized and revised,'4 his general line of reason- ing seems to provide an analytical framework for the interpretation of the shift in Shi'a resistance. Shi'a narratives about their authenticity and their historical and social place in Saudi society can be regarded as 'hidden transcripts', increasingly finding their way into the public sphere. Although Shi'a publica- tions are banned in Saudi Arabia (they are usually published in other Arab countries and Europe, mainly in London), they have reached clandestine mem- bers of the community in Saudi Arabia and abroad. These publications articulate an alternative historical narrative to that which is propagated by Saudi official discourse. The latter has condemned the Shi'a because of their religious beliefs and practices, which do not conform to Wahhabism, the official religious ideology of the state. Shi'a narratives, therefore, reverse these representations of

11 J. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance Hidden Transcripts (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990). 12

Ibid., p. 19. 13 Ibid., p. 206. 14 S. Gall, 'Language and the Arts of Resistance', Cultural Anthropology, 1995, 10(3), pp. 407-424 and D. Kulick, 'Causing a Commotion: Public Scandal as Resistance among Brazilian Transgendered Prostitutes,' Anthropology Today, 12(3) (1996), pp. 3-7.

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themselves and articulate their history in a way that aims to correct what they call 'the misrepresentation of their community, religion and history'."1 Examin- ing Shi'a narratives allows us to investigate how this minority resists by articulating an alternative discourse, whose main objective is to create a space for themselves in a society which so far has deprived them of religious and political rights, social recognition and economic prosperity. The narratives of their historians and intellectuals resemble what Scott calls 'cooked declarations'. According to him, these are:

more likely to be nuanced and elaborate because they arise under circumstances in which there is a good deal of off-stage freedom among subordinate groups, allowing them to share a rich and deep hidden transcript. In a sense, the hidden transcript of such subordinate groups is already a product of mutual communication that already has a quasi-public existence. 6

The exile of Shi'a opposition intellectuals allows the production of 'cooked declarations' on the pages of a press beyond the control of the Saudi govern- ment. The mobilizing capacity of these declarations cannot be underestimated because in Scott's words 'at the level of political beliefs, anger, and dreams they are a social explosion'.17

Shi'a Opposition Discourse: 'Return to Ibn Khaldun'

The monthly magazine al-Jazfra al-'Arabiyya was perhaps one of the most consistent publications containing the discourse of the Organization of the Islamic Revolution, which since 1992 has been known as al-haraka al-islahiyya (The Reform Movement). It represented the views of the movement's leadership. While the magazine systematically exposed the physical and symbolic violence of the Saudi state against members of the Shi'a community (by reproducing the reports of international human rights agencies), its exiled London-based editorial board tried to combine their direct attacks on the regime with quasi-academic discourse. In its search for credibility, the magazine contained leading articles by distinguished Shi'a writers and activists, including among others, Abdullah al-Hasan, Tawfiq al-Sheikh, Abdul al Amir Musa, and Hamza al-Hasan.

One interesting and recurrent theme developed by the editorial board (founders and active members of The Reform Movement), was reference to the theories of Ibn Khaldun, the fourteenth century north African scholar. In his analysis of Muslim politics, Ibn Khaldun emphasized the segmentary nature of tribal and nomadic societies, which in his opinion were responsible for the cyclical pattern of dynastic rise and fall.18 Ibn Khaldun condemned the

15 Personal interview with Hamza al-Hasan, 1993. 16 Scott, Domination, p. 216. 17 Ibid., p. 227. 18 Ibn Khaldun, The Muqqadimah. An Introduction to History, trans. F. Rosenthal, N. J. Dawood (eds) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967).

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'bedouins' for their alleged continuous raids on the centres of civilization (the oases and cities of the region). He held them responsible for the instability of dynastic rule. However, he highlighted the crucial role of their military skills and more importantly their kinship solidarity, 'asabiyya, which if combined with religious zeal, tend to create favourable ground for the foundation of dynasties. In brief, he characterized Muslim politics as a succession of dynasties, founded by bedouin chiefs, who combine their tribal solidarity with religious zeal to establish centralized polities with a lifespan not exceeding three or four genera- tions. As bedouins establish their power and authority over the oases, they tend to become lax, thus losing the purity of desert society. They eventually become corrupt as they indulge themselves in the luxuries of sedentary life. This results in the disintegration of their political power under pressure from a new and fresh 'asabiyya.

Ibn Khaldun's description of the bedouins oscillates between admiration and condemnation. He praises the social cohesion of the bedouins and their military might. These two qualities allow the bedouins to play the role of founders of dynasties. However, these same qualities, in his opinion, predisposed the bedouins to destroy civilization. Ibn Khaldun's images of the bedouins appeal to some contributors to al-Jazrra al-'Arabiyya as they provide a framework for the analysis of modern Saudi history and the rise of the Wahhabi movement, which so far condemned the Shi'a and depicted them as ahl al-bida' (innovators). Above all, Ibn Khaldun's emphasis on the importance of the alliance between religion and bedouin casabiyya as a foundation for dynastic rule seems to explain the establishment of the Saudi state. Moreover the concept of 'asabiyya is used to analyse the domination of the Najdi elite over other groups in modern Saudi Arabia.

In a leader article, Abdullah al-Hasan criticizes the regime for promoting tribal 'asabiyya and for promoting regionalism and sectarianism at the expense of developing a unifying national and religious identity in the country. Above all, he emphasizes the cultural, political and religious domination of Najd and its Saudi-Wahhabi allies over the rest of the Arabian Peninsula, including the Eastern Province, the Hijaz and Asir.19 In his view, a Najdi identity, (al-hawiyya al-najdiyya) did not crystallize until the rise of the Wahhabi movement in the eighteenth century. Until that date, the 'Najdis' consisted of bedouin tribes whose internal cohesion compensated for lack of overarching identity. While bedouins resented and despised the city dwellers of the oases and cities of the Hijaz and the Eastern province, the latter reciprocated and regarded the bedouins as 'uncivilized', 'poor' and 'in a state of savagery'. This line of argument clearly reiterates the famous Ibn Khaldunian model and uncritically adopts its premises. Abdullah al Hasan concludes that the Wahhabi movement transformed the Najdi bedouins and gave them a unity which they used as a weapon against other tribal groups and city dwellers, in areas surrounding Najd. This was later perpetuated by consistent Saudi policies to marginalize important regional identities in the

19 Al-Jazrra al-'Arabiyya, 16 (1992), pp. 12-18.

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Hijaz where a more established tradition of sedentarization and civility had existed and in al Hasa, especially among the agricultural Shi'a population. In his opinion, a geographical schism between al-ddkhil (the interior, i.e. Najd) and al-sahil (the coastal areas) was transformed into a political and social schism whereby the Najdi population and its ruling religio-political elite enforced their domination over the rest of the country thanks to the power of Wahhabi dogma. Again Ibn Khaldun's emphasis on the crucial role of religious ideology is reiterated here.

The legacy of Ibn Khaldun permeates other articles in the magazine. Tawfiq al Sheikh asserts a pattern in modern Saudi history whereby the rise of Saudi hegemony was accompanied by a deliberate attempt to destroy al-madfna (the city) not only physically but socially and culturally, especially in the Hijaz.20 He states that 'the fall of Jiddah to the bedouin forces of King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud in January 1926 represents the unofficial collapse of civility and the triumph of the bedouin way of life, which became the dominant force between the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf'.21 While acknowledging that Ibn Saud was not a bedouin (his ancestors had been settled first in Deraiyya and later in Riyadh), he asserts that the bedouin social organization and ethos were too strong to subdue. He argues that Ibn Saud's failure to attract the allegiance of city dwellers led to his reliance on al-badiya (the bedouins) for the consolidation of his rule. This resulted in the triumph of the 'bedouin/tribal model of social and political relations', which was transformed into a state ideology insensitive to the identities of cities and their cultural heritage. One of the consequences of this triumph, in al Sheikh's view, was the marginalization of al muthaqqaf, the intellectual, a product of city life. Al Sheikh observes that this marginalization was severe not only in the Hijaz but also in al Hasa, both of which had important intellectual traditions. According to al Sheikh, the consolidation of the Saudi state in the thirties led to the reduction of intellectual activities because of the flight of intellectuals to other countries or their retreat and isolation in their own cities. It is clear that al Sheikh's analysis of the alleged dwindling of intellectual life in Saudi Arabia immediately after the establishment of the state is attributed to the triumph of the bedouins-who were considered a menace to civilization in Ibn Khaldun's thesis.

While intellectuals are regarded as the first victims to have fallen after the triumph of the 'bedouins', other articles hold the success of the bedouin ethos responsible for the absence of an influential political elite in Saudi Arabia. According to al Sheikh, reasons for this include the domination of tribal ideology and the failure of Ibn Saud to transform the social and political organization of his bedouin entourage. In his view, such organization depends on the leadership of the tribal sheikh, za'im al-qabila and excludes other centres of authority. He asserts that 'Ibn Saud enforced bedouin leadership and never gave his advisors and ministers any real power to enable them to rise above their role as

20 Ibid., 18 (1992), pp. 10-14. 21

Ibid., p. 11.

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assistants'.22 He cites the example of Abullah al Suleiman, the influential finance minister, who served Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud for several years, but was not able to sustain a political position after the latter's death and the succession of his son, King Saud. Al Sheikh considers this case as a demonstration of the bedouin style of government, which inhibits the development of alternative political leadership, especially that with no tribal foundation.

The reiteration of some concepts in Ibn Khaldun's analysis of Islamic history seem to appeal to al-Jazira al-'Arabiyya and its various contributors. This is not surprising given Ibn Khaldun's views on Islamic history and disparaging description of nomadic tribal society. These are especially attractive to the Shi'a intellectuals and opposition leaders, who belong to a community distinguished by its history of sedentarization and agricultural production. Historically the Shi'a were not only members of a religious minority among a Sunni majority, but were also agricultural farmers. The social hierarchies of Arabia distinguished between hadar and badw. The asfl tribes, who were often nomadic, despised the sedentary farmers, regarding them as non-tribal or people who had fallen out of the tribal system even though the sedentary population of the oases included sections of important asfl tribes. Therefore, the Shi'a experienced discrimination not only on the basis of their faith and practices, but also on the basis of their livelihood (farming and sedentarization). Articles in the magazine addressed this double discrimination by a subtle reiteration of the famous Ibn Khaldunian model. Like Ibn Khaldun, contributors associate sedentarization with civilization and intellectual activity. Their narratives equate the bedouin with barbarism and savagery. One contributor on the political system of the Gulf states argues that these states can be described as 'oligarchies, whereby the rule of the minority is dominant. Al-takhalluf, 'backwardness' was one of the reasons behind the predominance of oligarchies, sustained by the fact that the majority of the population of the region consisted of nomadic bedouins who were poor, ignorant and unrelated to civilization'.23

The magazine provided a forum for highlighting the theme of regional identity, not only that of the Shi'a, but also that of other groups such as the Hijazis, which are believed to have been undermined by siyasat al-tanjtd, "Najdization', a reference to the supremacy of Najd and its ruling group over other communities in Saudi Arabia. Muhammad al Hussein questions Saudi official representations of this supremacy-'delivering the rest of the Arabian Peninsula from political and moral degeneration'24 His interpretation decon- structs this official 'myth', by emphasizing that the present unity of the regions is based on two pillars, so far endorsed by the Al-Saud: 'asabiyya najdiyya (Najdi solidarity) and 'asabiyya madhhabiyya (sectarian solidarity). This resulted in an imposed unity and dependency to the detriment of local autonomy and regional character. Above all, 'the so-called unification of Saudi Arabia replaced

22 Ibid., 17, p. 6. 23 Ibid., 5 (1991), p. 38. 24 Ibid., 18 (1992), pp. 24-30.

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the traditional economic and social interdependence by utter dependency on Najd and its population which began to occupy an unequal position vis-a-vis other areas and local communities'.25 The rhetoric of this argument centres on the concepts of taba'iyya, saytara, and ilhaq, (subordination, hegemony, and annexation) all pointing to the political and social inequality between Najd and the rest of the country. The text concludes by highlighting the potential threat of division (al-taqsTm) which is believed to follow such inequality. The solution in the author's view lies in a genuine attempt by the ruling group to introduce wider political participation which takes into account regional interests, cultural and religious specificity, and local political and economic aspirations. Moreover, this would involve the revival of mujtama' al-madaniyya (civil society) which is most conducive to the development of urban culture and intellectual pursuits. According to the same source, 'Najdization' has undermined the urbanity of the Hijaz and al Hasa in favour of the Najdi bedouin solidarity.

However, there remains the problem of accounting for the rise of the Wahhabi movement and its consequences for the Shi'a community. Some of the articles in al-JazLra al-'Arabiyya directly criticized the Wahhabi religious establishment, in particular the head of the Wahhabi 'ulamd', Sheikh Abdul Aziz Ibn Baz. The criticism revolved around the rigid interpretations of Wahhabism, its refusal to adapt to modern technological and social change and its resistance to new ijtihdd (interpretations). As the Shi'a clergy and their specific version of Islam represent an area totally rejected by Wahhabism, the magazine also endeavoured to refute stereotypical images of the community which the Saudi-Wahhabi establishment had been promoting to discredit Shicsm. The picture of the 'Blind Sheikh' has become the caricature to represent Ibn Baz, the spokesman of official Islam, on the pages of the magazine.

It is worth noting that both the magazine and the editorial board behind it tried to build bridges with another Islamist movement in the country-that criticizing the regime from within the Wahhabi establishment. Since the Gulf War in 1991 the so-called salafiyyun, a dissident group of young Wahhabi 'ulamd' and university students have been very active in reaching the Saudi public through faxes, petitions, cassettes and Friday sermons.26 Their main criticism of the government originated with its use of foreign troops to defend the 'land of Islam'. Their demands revolve around reform and return to the doctrines of Wahhabism and the rejection of the corruption of the ruling group. While some of the demands of the Wahhabi salafiyyun correspond to those of the ShiCa community and its representatives, a wide gulf still separates the two opposition groups. The Shi'a community is still considered to be made up of 'kuffdr' (infidels) and 'mubdi'un' (innovators) by both the official Wahhabi establishment and the dissident group within it. The history of propaganda against Shi'sm and

25 Ibid, pp. 24-30. 26 For further details on the Wahhabi dissidents, see H. Dekmejian, 'The Rise of Political Islamism in Saudi Arabia,' The Middle East Journal, 48(4) (1994), pp. 628-643; and M. Abir, Saudi Arabia Government, Society and the Gulf Crisis (London: Routledge, 1993). For an analysis of the Islamist discourse, see M. Al-Rasheed, 'Saudi Arabia's Islamic Opposition,' Current History, 95(597) (1996), pp. 16-22.

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the theological differences that exist between the two branches are difficult to reconcile. This makes any serious co-operation between members of the two oppositions almost inconceivable at present.

This description of the main themes developed in al-Jazfra al-'Arabiyya demonstrates that they rely on a specific interpretation of Saudi history, politics and society. This interpretation draws heavily on Ibn Khaldunian concepts, specifically his description of bedouin society. His views seem to correspond to the Shi'a's political agenda, which remains critical of Saudi hegemony. From the Shi'a perspective, the so-called bedouin style of government resulted in the marginalization of important regions and groups, including the Shi'a while at the same time failing to establish a modern national identity in which they can be incorporated as equal citizens. In their view, equality for the Shi'a involves above all recognition of their cultural and religious heritage. The search for this recognition seems to underlie the historiography of their intellectuals. The following section demonstrates that Shi'a discourse goes beyond the demand for political rights as it tries to establish an authentic cultural, historical and social space for the community in Saudi society.

A Minority in Search of Cultural Authenticity

Today the Shi'a opposition calls for democracy and pluralism, having abandoned their previous discourse on Islamic revolution, militant action and extremism. Their main focus is no longer 'the tyrannical aspects of the Saudi regime'. Instead, the leadership invokes the discourse of human rights and the respect of religious and cultural diversity in the country. This has been accompanied by an emphasis on the centrality of al-asala al-shl'iyya (Shi'a cultural authenticity). Al-asala comes from the Arabic asl meaning root or origin. In recent Shi'a historical narratives, asala incorporates not only historical roots, but also hawiyya, identity. When Shi'a intellectuals talk about their asala, they invoke an authentic identity rooted in Arab culture and history.

Hamza al-Hasan's historical narrative is permeated by references to al-asala al-shl'iyya. In fact, the purpose of the narrative is to prove this asala using historical evidence including local oral narratives, oral and written literature, Arab and European sources and archival data. His narrative stresses from the very beginning the objectives of its author-namely to prove the Arab identity of the Shi'a, a counter claim to Saudi-Wahhabi propaganda which portrays them as a Persian satellite in the Arabian Peninsula. Al-Hasan declares that this historical study of his own community aims first to introduce the authentic history, culture and identity of the Saudi Shi'a, which in his opinion are omitted from Saudi narratives as if 'they do not exist', and second to highlight the discrimination to which the Shi'a are subjected under Saudi rule, described as promoting sectarian divisions among the population of the country.27

In his search for authenticity and a respectable and equal status for the Shi'a

27 Al-Hasan, al-Shla, I, pp. 7-10.

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within Saudi Arabia, al Hasan criticises official historical representations of themselves, which have dominated the teaching of history in the country. He laments the absence of the Shi'a from Saudi official history textbooks, which are taught in their local schools and also elsewhere in the country. He resents the fact that if ever they are mentioned, they are depicted as examples of ahl al-bida' 'innovators' who deviate from true Islam. This absence from history and their misrepresentation have given rise to his attempt to rewrite their own regional history, especially that of the al Hasa, where the majority of the Shi'a community live. As official narratives deny the Shi'a a position in history, he constructs counter-historical narratives whereby they are reintroduced into history as active agents with a separate, but not totally alien, regional identity.

In the first volume, the opening chapter entitled 'The Shi'a of Saudi Arabia: identity, history, and people' forcibly argues that the Shi'a are 'true Muslims'. Al Hasan invokes the badw-hadar divide to demonstrate that their faith and practices are authentic and in line with mainstream Islam. He claims that while the religiosity of the nomads has always been 'doubted' by Saudi-Wahhabi discourse, the Shi'a have a history of sedentary existence and agricultural labour, both believed to be suitable conditions for practising Islam and observing its obligations and rituals.

Al Hasan's work presents the origins of the Shi'a community as dating back to the times of the Prophet Muhammad. He lists the major Shi'a families in al-Hasa, Qatif and the Hijaz, while acknowledging the fact that Shi'a tribal origins cannot be easily traced because the community had been settled in towns, oases and cities longer than the rest of the population of Saudi Arabia. Sedentarization was accompanied by the weakening of tribal allegiances and marked genealogies. This combined with the fact that Shi'a Islam constituted the main bond uniting these sedentary communities led to the dissolution of tribal identities, which are now replaced by allegiance to Shiism. Al-Hasan's justification for the absence of extended tribal genealogies among the Shi'a is important in a country where tribal identities are still crucial in determining people's status, and access to resources and power. However, he clearly states that the absence of tribal genealogies among the Shi'a should not lead to doubting their 'Arabness'. In his opinion, the Shi'a are 'Arab in origin. They belong to two branches: one branch originated from the ancient Arab tribes in the pre-Islamic period such as 'Abd Qais, Bakr, and Way'l. Another branch consisted of the bedouin tribes who settled in the Eastern Province after they adopted Shi'ism'.28 He later concludes that Arab and foreign sources agree that the Shi'a of the al Hasa and Qatif have Arab origin and that they are the initial inhabitants of the land since ancient times'.29 In his opinion this should refute what he calls 'rumours' to discredit the Shi'a by claiming that they are not Arabs.

Further evidence is given to establish the indigenous identity of the Shi'a. Al-

28 Ibid., p. 27.

29 Ibid., p. 28.

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Hasan dismisses the claim that because the Shi'a's dialect resembles Iraqi dialect, one should conclude that they originated in Iraq.30 This resemblance is interpreted as a function of the theological and religious links that the Saudi Shi'a had maintained with the Iraqi centres of religious learning. He points out that 'as most Shi'a 'ulamd' study in the religious centres of Iraq, their dialect is bound to resemble that of their teachers'.31 Their dialect in his opinion remains familiar to the rest of the population of the Arabian Peninsula. He asks the question: 'how can a bedouin assess the dialect of the Shi'a on the basis of which we conclude that they are of mixed or foreign origin?' From this exploration of the question of origin and dialect, al-Hasan stresses that the Shi'a are an indigenous group well rooted in the Arabian Peninsula, a claim countering that of the state, which has continued to propagate that the Shi'a have their origins in neighbouring countries, mainly Iraq and Iran.

Al-Hasan also addresses the lack of official census data on the basis of which one can reach an accurate estimate of the size of the Shi'a community. He argues that the size of the Shi'a population is a political issue rather than a mere statistical concern. In his opinion, the reluctance of the Saudi government to provide an accurate estimate of its population is a reflection of its general insecurity. This is particularly relevant to the Shi'a given the fact that their region is the primary area for oil in the country. Therefore, it is in the government's interest to underestimate their number and reduce them to the status of an insignificant minority. After a survey of many Western and Arab sources, he estimates a community of 2.5 million, thus representing 12.5-25% of the total population;32 It is worth noting here that this figure exceeds most available estimates.

The rest of al-Hasan's first volume is a detailed analysis of the history of the community between 1871 and 1913, highlighting the various Saudi attempts to subjugate the Shi'a and the discrimination which resulted from their incorpora- tion in the first and second Saudi dynasties. At the same time, his account celebrates the intellectual developments, mainly in literature and theology which flourished among the Shi'a at that time: a reiteration of the theme developed on the pages of al-Jazira al-'Arabiyya which associates sedentary life with intellec- tual activity. Here it seems that al-asala al-shPiyya is not only anchored in the community's ancient Arab roots but is also sustained by their contribution to turath 'heritage'. Al-Hasan argues that 'under Ottoman influence in the last decades of the nineteenth century, religious freedom prevailed. This allowed Shi'a intellectuals and theologians to study and produce important religious treatise and interpretations'.33 He praises the Turks for not imposing their Hanafi

30 Ibid., p. 31.

31 Ibid, p.31..

32 It is difficult to give an accurate estimate of the size of the Shi'a community. Goldberg argues that one stumbles across figures ranging from the most reserved, 275,000-400,000, to the most optimistic, 500,000. He considers the Shi'a to represent 6% of the Saudi population. See Goldberg, 'The Shi'i Minority', p. 230. This figure may not include the Shi'a of the Hijaz. In this region, al Khoei estimates that 32,000 Shi'a live in Madina and Wadi al-Fara. See Y. al Khoei, 'The Shi'a of Medina,' Dialogue (July 1996), pp. 4-5. 33 Al-Hasan, al-Shfa, p. 227.

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religious interpretations on the population of the Eastern Province and contrasts this situation with the restrictions that the Wahhabis introduced as they suc- ceeded the Ottomans in the area. The Turks are also praised for establishing schools in the region as early as 1900. A numeration of Shi'a intellectuals and literary figures follows to establish evidence for the intellectual, literary and religious heritage of the community.

One of the most interesting accounts in al-Hasan's work is his reinterpretation of the incorporation of the al Hasa region in the Saudi realm at the beginning of the twentieth century. He deals with this theme in a chapter, entitled 'The critical moment ... before the occupation 1912-1913'. The title is significant as it is a clear declaration of how he understands the incorporation of the Shi'a territory into the modern Saudi state. While official narratives describe this as a function of a 'unification' process, al-Hasan's counter-narrative labels it as the 'occupation' of 1913. Al-Hasan dismisses the Saudi justification, described in Ibn Saud's words as 'a restoration of my ancestor's historical rights over this territory', by showing that in the nineteenth century Saudi hegemony over al Hasa lasted only for 31 years and was disrupted by various local revolts. According to al-Hasan, Ibn Saud's 'ancestral claim' does not represent a sound argument. Similarly, Saudi claims that they entered al Hasa on the basis of local complaints which invited them to rescue the population from Turkish rule echoes the well-established official story which depicts Saudi unification as rescuing local communities from the pervasive state of 'moral, social and political degeneration', an argument which is used in relation not only to al Hasa, but also to all regions which, in subsequent years, became part of Saudi Arabia.34

Al Hasan's second volume deals with the consequences of the Saudi 'occu- pation' of the Eastern Province. Here the narrative focuses on how this resulted in enforcing tai'ifiyya 'sectarianism', which has guided the Saudi regime's policy towards the Shi'a since 1913. He argues that Wahhabi dogma depicted the Shi'a as a .ta'ifa sect, outside the realm of Islam. This was adopted by the Saudis and was translated into various forms of discrimination. For example, he lists cases thereby the Shi'a were excluded from employment in educational institutions and the army. He also points to how they are excluded from high ranking jobs within the oil company, ARAMCO. The appropriation of Shi'a land by various Saudi princes is interpreted as depriving the Shi'a of their territory and threatening their livelihood. Discrimination also includes the ban on building Shi'a mosques and centres of religious learning.35 The narrative is full of cases of named individuals who have been discriminated against on the basis of their Shi'ism, thus adding a personal dimension to this historical account. Shi'a individuals are depicted as people whose life under Saudi rule is a continuous struggle. They are victims of Wahhabi prejudice and its Saudi enforcement. However, the narrative also portrays the Shi'a as people who resist. They have not remained silent in the face of discrimination. Their resistance has manifested itself in various ways

34 Ibid., p. 227. 35 Ibid., II, pp. 286-369.

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ranging from letters to princes, petitions to local governors, and open confron- tation with the government through demonstrations and revolts.

The narrative outlines the history of Shi'a military resistance in the Eastern Province and Saudi violence against it. Imprisonment, torture, termination of employment, and exile are described as daily occurrences in the lives of the Shi'a. However, in this account, the threatened Shi'a individual and community emerge as both victims and survivors. Continuous oppression results in the solidification of their identity and the crystallisation of their demand for equal status as an authentic indigenous group. What has been maintained is their asala, on the basis of which they deserve recognition.

Al-Hasan also deals with the relationship between the Shi'a opposition and other opposition groups in Saudi Arabia. While al-JazTra al-'Arabiyya included references to the development of the salafiyyun as mentioned earlier in this article, al-Hasan's book offers a direct critique of it. He argues that 'they remain narrow in their focus and radical in their world view which does not accommo- date that of the Shi'a. The salafiyyun claim monopoly over the truth and have a tendency to impose their views on others'.36 In his opinion, the Shi'a and this opposition differ in their interpretation of political, religious and intellectual freedoms. According to him, 'the Shi'a insist on general freedoms to be granted to communities such as theirs whereas the salafiyyun's demand for increased freedoms in the country is not generalised to include those of the Shi'a'.37 Examples of these differences are drawn from the various opinions of activists and 'ulamd' who are associated with the Wahhabi salafiyyan and have not been sympathetic to the Shi'a, such as Juhayman, the leader of the 1979 siege of the Mecca Mosque, Sheikh Salman al'Awdah, outspoken young Wahhabi religious scholar whose anti-government preaching during the Gulf Crisis of 1991 led to his imprisonment, and Safar al Hawli, Dean of Islamic Studies at Umm al Qura University in Mecca whose critical treatise of the government also led to his imprisonment. These anti-government culama' share a consensus regarding the Shi'a. They continue to describe them as rawcfid 'rejectionists', 'allies of Khomenei and Iran', and kuffdr 'infidels'. He concludes that 'our salafiyyun brothers must pay attention to the religious and social diversity of the Saudi population. Co-operation with them at the present is not possible before they adopt the principle of mutual respect and above all the respect of the opinion of those who do not agree with them'.38

Al-Hasan's criticism of the salafiyyin confirms the observation that since the early 1990s the Shi'a opposition has been trying to distance itself from radical- ism by adopting the rhetoric of pluralism, diversity, dialogue, and mutual respect. Both al-Hasan's historical narrative and al-Jazrra al-'Arabiyya seem to project an image of the Shi'a as a community searching for a political and social position in Saudi Arabia founded on respect of their cultural uniqueness as a

36 Ibid., p. 402.

37 Ibid., p. 402. 38 Ibid., p. 410.

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minority. To argue like Goldberg that the Shi'a of Saudi Arabia have abandoned their confrontational attitude to the Saudi regime as they shifted their revolution- ary discourse and demands to one which concentrates on concrete economic and social demands does not fully describe the situation among the Saudi Shi'a in the 1990s.39 It is true that no serious confrontation with the state has taken place since 1980-a fact which Goldberg regards as an evidence to support his claim that the Shi'a have been successfully pacified by the state. However, this article has shown that the contestation has moved away from overt riots, demonstra- tions, and violence to one which is fought at the cultural level. Shi'a opposition publications and intellectual activity, discussed above, demonstrate that dealing with Shi'a socio-economic problems cannot alone fully pacify the community. While development projects may bring about tangible amelioration in life conditions, a serious change in attitudes towards this minority remains a precondition for their integration into Saudi society as citizens with equal rights. As long as Wahhabi dogma continues to be propagated by the radical inter- preters of Islam (an activity which so far has not been fully curbed or controlled by the state), the Shi'a will remain sceptical about the long-term benefits of regular or haphazard state economic handouts. While Shi'a intellectuals remain active in the rigorous production of counter-cultural claims, motivated by their search for asala, it cannot be said that this problem, which has worried the state since its creation and the discovery of oil in the heart of the Shi'a homeland, has been resolved.

The starting point of Shi'a intellectual activity is the deconstruction of the well-established official vision of society and history, which has so far negated the authenticity of the Shi'a as an indigenous Muslim community. Shi'a historiography challenges this official vision as part of their resistance. The Shi'a have taken the lead in making their own history. Al-Hasan's two volumes represent an experiment in applying historical research and methodology to political ends. The author informs his reader that his work is a reaction to the 'discourse of misrepresentation'. As such it is a counter-narrative, informed by both the historical record of outsiders, found in archives and in Western and Arab literature, and the oral testimony of the community itself. As a Shi'a, he has access to the Shi'a oral tradition. In this narrative, the past, the origins, the dialect, the suffering, the survival and the resistance of the Shi'a merge to form an identity, which privileges the voices of those who had been silenced. The search for cultural authenticity is a fixation that permeates the text at every juncture.

Responses to the Shift

Shi'a opposition discourse shifted from an insistence on the un-Islamic nature of the Saudi regime to one which increasingly stresses the need for democratiza- tion. According to Shi'a spokesman, Tawfiq al-Sheikh, this means 'a redistribu-

39 J. Goldberg, 'The Shi'i Minority', passim.

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tion of economic and political power among the different regions which make up the country'.40 The exiled Shi'a leadership moved from total rejection of the regime during the time when the movement was 'revolutionary' (i.e. immedi- ately after the events of the early 1980s)-to a call for dialogue with the state. In the 1990s, the leadership has called for gradual change and reform rather than revolution.

The change in Shi'a opposition discourse has been welcomed by the state. The latter responded by inviting the exiled opposition leadership to come back to the country. The initiator of dialogue with the Shi'a exiled opposition was the present Saudi ambassador to London Ghazi al-Guseibi.41 According to the Shi'a opposition, since al-Guseibi's appointment in London, he has been trying to build channels of communication with their leadership. In September 1993, his efforts succeeded in containing the opposition and the return of some of its leading figures to Saudi Arabia. The invitation was accompanied by further promises for investment in the Eastern Province, the creation of new economic opportunities and a general relaxation of the rules governing their presence such as the ban on building Shi'a Mosques and the celebration and excessive mourning during special Shi'a religious festivals and rituals.42 The government promised the release of some Shi'a political prisoners and issued passports to those in exile in order to enable them to return to Saudi Arabia. The invitation was dependent on the leadership's commitment to terminating the publication of their magazine, al-Jazira al-'Arabiyya. The London based Shi'a opposition accepted the invitation and sent representatives to Saudi Arabia to continue the process of negotiation with the government. Other members remain in exile because of the mistrust which has been nourished over the years between the opposition and the state. From the opposition's perspective, the reconciliation is interpreted as a success; now that the state has been forced to open channels of communication with them. However, from the state's point of view, this was the first move in the direction of encapsulating an opposition at a crucial moment when the Wahhabi establishment has generated its own opposition to the state. The Shi'a leadership, however, continues to propagate the idea that the publi- cation of their magazine is 'suspended' rather than permanently terminated.

The shift in Shi'a tactics and its welcome by the government need to be understood within the changing political context of Saudi Arabia in the 1990s. This new political context has influenced both the Shi'a opposition and the policies of the government towards them. Two main interrelated factors have been crucial: first the Gulf War and its political ramifications and second the rising influence of the Wahhabi dissident movement during the war, both of which created unprecedented upheavals in a country considered one of the most stable regions in the Middle East by outside observers. Until the early 1990s, political unrest in Saudi Arabia was not comparable to that experienced in, say, 40 The Independent, 3 March 1992. 41 Interview with Hamza al Hasan and Abdul Amir Musa, 1993. 42 Details of the reconciliation are in L. Al-Rasheed, 'L'Opposition Chiite en Arabie Saoudite,' Unpublished MA dissertation, Ecole d'Etudes Politiques, Paris, 1994.

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Egypt or Algeria. With the exception of the seizure of the Mecca Mosque in 1979 and Shi'a riots in the Eastern Province in the early 1980s, serious violence and political unrest have not been regular occurrences in Saudi Arabia.43 The Gulf War and the failure of the Saudi government to resolve the conflict with Iraq peacefully, exposed the precariousness of this apparent stability. New opposition forces began to take shape. These originated mainly from within the Wahhabi establishment and became identified as the new Islamists, thus bringing Saudi Arabia in line with the rising tide of political Islam in the region. 'Ulamd' petitions, critical Friday sermons by young preachers and demonstrations follow- ing the arrest of some activists were events which accompanied the progress of the military campaigns in the Eastern Province against Saddam Hussein.44 Negotiations with the Shi'a came at a crucial moment when their region was to receive thousands of foreign troops, invited by the government to defend the 'land of Islam' despite serious objections from some members of the religious establishment.45 The negotiations were to demonstrate the good will of the government and its intention to deal with discrimination against this minority whose territory had become the seat of a major international conflict. The Shi'a opposition capitalized on government insecurity during the war. It altered its image by distancing itself from extremism and elicited a favourable response from the state.

The reconciliation with the Shi'a can also be interpreted as a pre-emptive strike by the government to prevent the possibility of the Shi'a opposition joining forces with the Wahhabi dissident, even if this remained a remote possibility given the wide political and religious differences between the two oppositions.46 Both the Shi'a opposition and the Wahhabi dissidents were unable to entertain any pragmatic alliance which would have overcome their wide differences. From the Shi'a perspective, any scores gained by the so-called neo-Wahhabi movement would be detrimental to the survival of the Shi'a in Saudi Arabia because their 'ulamd' and activists seemed to continue the propaganda war against them. Al-JazTra al-'Arabiyya's coverage of the rising influence of this opposition and al-Hasan's direct criticism of it highlighted Shi'a fears and apprehension regarding the new dissidents. However, the government

43 On the events in Mecca, see A. al YassiniAl-D[n wa al-Dawlafifal Mamlaka al-'Arabiyya al Sa'udiyya (London: Dar al Saqi 1987). 44 On the activities of the Wahhabi dissidents, see M. Al-Rasheed, 'Saudi Arabia's Islamic Opposition' and M. Abir, Saudi Arabia Government, Society and the Gulf Crisis (London: Routledge, 1993). 45 For example, Sheikh Salman al-Awdah, a young Wahhabi religious scholar refused to sanction the invitation of foreign troops in his Friday sermons. He argued that it is un-Islamic to fight an evil with the aid of a greater evil (Wahhabi Opposition Cassette). The same opinion was reiterated by Sheikh Safar al Hawli in his treatise to Sheikh Ibn Baz, entitled, Kashf al-Ghamma Can 'ulamd' al-umma (The Unveiling of the 'Ulamd's Distress) (Dar al-Hikma, 1991). For a detailed discussion of the Wahhabi 'ulamd's reaction to the invitation of foreign troops, see M. Al-Rasheed, 'La couronne et le turban. L'Etat Saoudien a la recherche d'une nouvelle legitimitd apres la guerre du Golf,' in B. Qudmani-Darwish and M. Chartouni-Dubarry (eds) Les Etats Arabes Face a la Contestation Islamiste (Paris: Armand Colin, 1997), pp. 71-97. 46 The Shi'a opposition draws on the various fatawd, 'religious opinions', issued by members of the Wahhabi dissident movement regarding the status of the Shi'a; these Fatawds are referred to and criticized in Hamza al Hasan's book. See al Hasan, al-Shi'a, p. 410.

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could not rule out any overtures between the Shi'a and at least the moderate branches of the Wahhabi dissident movement. So far the containment of the Shi'a opposition has lessened the government's fears and allowed it to direct all its attention to the Wahhabi challenge. The Shi'a opposition abandoned its previous revolutionary rhetoric and adopted subtle forms of resistance fought at the level of culture. This is a transition period which began in 1993, and it is too early to predict whether the Shi'a will be satisfied in the long term. It remains to be seen whether the position of the Shi'a as equal citizens will be established without major restructuring of Saudi politics and widening of political partici- pation in the country.47 Until then, their journalistic narratives and historiography represent latent resistance against persistent domination. Their 'hidden tran- scripts' may prove to be more efficient weapons against their discrimination than overt aggression, the cost of which remains intolerably high for the community.

47 It is perhaps premature to assess the implications of the recent reforms introduced by the government after the Gulf War, especially the implementation of majlis al-shura 'Consultative Council' on the Shi'a community. So far the Wahhabi dissident movement has not been silenced by these reforms. The appointment of a Shi'a member to the council was considered a sign of goodwill by the Shi'a opposition. On the implications of the government's recent reforms, see R. Aba Namay, 'Constitutional Reforms: A Systemization of Saudi Politics', Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, XVI(3) (Spring, 1993), pp. 43-88, and A. Cordesman, Saudi Arabia Guarding the Desert Kingdom (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), pp. 19-27.

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