The Simmering Cauldrons of Madhya Bharatan account of left wing terrorism

GenesisIt is commonly accepted that domestic terrorism based on a

political ideology is defined by the genesis of the Naxalbari incidents of 1967. Charu Mazumdar, leading a break-away faction of the Communist Party of India (Marxist), {CPI (M)}, with Kanu Sanyal as his activist collaborator, is deemed the originator of the violent, extremist Naxalites.

The term itself comes from the village of Naxalbari, in the Darjeeling district of north Bengal, where hired ruffians beat up a tribal peasant who had been granted land owning rights by the local court. The court had merely upheld the land tenancy Acts. In retaliation the tribals arose and attacked the landlord's hired men, and the incident, the 'Naxalbari Incident' as reported by the press coined the term Naxalites.

It would be pertinent to note that the earliest evidence of some form of grass roots revolt against established authority can be traced to the then new state of Madras in Jul 1948 for the establishment of a separate Telugu speaking state.

In 1967, C Pulla Reddy revived the agitation, this time for the Telengana region to split from Andhra Pradesh to form a separate state. A peasant revolution with several; incidents of violence erupted in the Srikakulam district of the Telengana region of Andhra Pradesh. Srikakulam has, since, been synonymous with violent rural unrest – tenuously linked, by the simultaneity of the rural uprisings, with Naxalbari.

The original inspiration for violent protest against established authority is Marxian thought, morphed by the social revolutions in Russia and China. The undivided Communist Party of India (CPI) was

the source for the basic ideology, though not directly responsible for the resultant actions. In fact, Charu Mazumdar split from the CPI (Marxist){CPI(M)}, and created the CPI(Marxist-Leninist)){CPI(M-L)}, because he objected to the CPI(M) in West Bengal agreeing to participate in a coalition government and taking part in the electoral process.

In the late 1960s and through the 1970s, the Naxalites had an aura which attracted the bright and brilliant from all walks of life, particularly young idealistic students of universities (see Hazaroan Khwaishen

Aisee … a recent art film from Bollywood).

The professed morality itself was magnetic to idealists – a déjà vu of the 1848 French Revolution – with equality, fraternity and liberty echoing the aspirations of the landless under-privileged, and condemning the vested interests of the rich oppressors. Popular for a couple of decades, the image of the Naxalites became tarnished with the dimming of the vision of the original principles. However left wing terrorism still has a constant stream of recruits whose beliefs are fresh and vigorous.

Established authority in the Indian political system, the elected government, has always opposed Naxalites, or more generically named nowadays left wing extremists (LWE). This opposition has no exceptions through the whole range of political parties, rightist and conservative to leftist and revolutionary. In the case of West Bengal itself, the CPI (M) was the harshest in its actions to suppress the movement, in active collaboration with the Congress party, itself in power in Delhi.

An unintended consequence of the armed protests by the underprivileged has been the birth of many local (vigilante) gangs, nurtured and armed by the rich and privileged. These span the entire social spectrum and are political in nature. Typical examples are found in Bihar and Jharkhand with the likes of the 'Ranvir Sena'.

Growth and Development

Violent, armed action by peasantry, starting with the incident at Naxalbari sought to highlight two aspects of rural India. One was the complete lack of development activities by the elected government and the established administration. The second was the inequality in land holdings and the absence of any move towards effective land reform. These two factors inevitably led to exploitation of the lower social classes and the perpetuation of the feudal lord – peasant serf relationship. The very identification of the stratification of society itself was one of the factors of the growth of the unrest.

To add more heat to the simmering discontent, the early (1967) broadcast from Radio Peking seemed to support the cause of the downtrodden by hailing 'the commencement of the revolutionary struggle by the people of north Bengal'.1

At the outset there were charismatic leaders like Charu Mazumdar, Kanu Sanyal in Bengal and C Pulla Reddy, K Seetharamaiah in Andhra Pradesh. With their leadership and the factors enumerated cadres strengths continued to rise with the surge of popular support during the years 1967 – 1971. However, soon thereafter, the entire left wing extremist movement suffered a decline.

The first and foremost reason for this decline was the strong action taken by the police with the full support of the state and union governments. Many of the leaders of the movement were pursued and killed in encounters. The decimation of the leadership severely affected the coordinated growth of the LWE.

Secondly, ideological differences splintered the movement and further dissipated the effect of mass unrest against elected government and established administration. Thirdly, apart from the initial verbal support, material support from the two bulwarks of

Communism – the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) and the Union of Soviet Socialist republics (USSR). The CPI party cadres in India had linkages and exchanges with the Soviets and the Chinese factions, but this did not result in any tangible advantage to LWE. There was also significant land reform effected in West Bengal, by its government under MR SS Ray, the Chief Minister.

Resurgence

In spite of the decline of the movement and the resulting uncoordinated splintering of the armed groups, there was a slow but steady resurgence in the years that followed, especially in the 1980s and the 1990s. Some of the factors responsible for the continuing existence of LWE and its growth in the last few years are touched upon in subsequent paragraphs.

Land Rights and Ownership. Land reform was hardly made effective by legislation and follow up action in enforcement. The holdings of big landowners were curtailed but the distribution of the holding did not benefit the majority of the landless. The burgeoning rural landless population, combined with the inheritance laws made doubly sure that subsequent generations held ever decreasing portions of land.

Social Stratification. The ideal of equal opportunity as envisaged by the Constituent Assembly was given form by the Schedules appended to the Indian Constitution itself. The schedules, in effect, codified and modernized the traditional caste system in perpetuity. Recent events starting from the Mandal Commission, and culminating perhaps in the Arjun Singh policy, have only accentuated this stratification and given license to protest and agitation against inequality.

Administrative Defaults. The 'steel frame' erected by the Indian Civil Service2, upon which the strong administrative network of British Indian rested had a deep and robust foundation. This strong foundation was the effective and impartial delivery to the governed masses of development and justice. In the last three decades of the twentieth century, both development and justice have been withheld from those who need it the most, and the foundation of governance has eroded. Development is now entirely dependent on patronage and therefore directed towards favoured constituencies, particularly urban. The district administration and its development plans and funds are dismal, thereby fueling rural discontent and resentment.

Terrain Drawbacks. The twin factors of stratification of society and the lack of development makes many areas of rural India inaccessible (though many times inaccessibility is cited, by the administration, as the cause of poor progress). Moreover, much of the interior areas of Jharkhand, Orissa, Chattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh are rugged, hilly and forested offering ideal refuge to the militant groups of LWE(also=left wing extremism).

Cadres and Groups

These factors have aided the proliferation of a multitude of armed groups and cadres which constitute LWE in India. There are around thirty such militant groups, each professing allegiance to some local leader and also to one of the splintered offshoots of the communist parties. It will suffice to detail the major ones, and outline the way ahead envisaged by them.

Maoist Communist Centre (MCC). The split in the CPI (M), leading to the formation of the CPI (M-L) under the leadership of Charu Mazumdar united several dissident groups at that time. One such group, the Dakshin Desh, did not merge but determined to continue its

independent existence. This Dakshin Desh renamed itself in 1975 as the MCC. Names associated with MCC are Amulya Sen, Kanhai Chatterjee (died 1987), Shivenji, Ramadhan Singh, Pramod Mishra and Sanjay Dusadh3. Though initially active in five districts of southern West Bengal, the MCC is now present and active in eight to ten districts of Bihar, fourteen districts of Jharkhand and three districts of Uttar Pradesh. The declared objective of the MCC is to establish a government of the people through armed struggle – a 'peoples' war'.

Peoples War Group (PWG). Kondapalli Seetharamaiah, a leading light of the CPI (M-L) and well known in the state of Andhra Pradesh, formed the PWG in Apr 19804. The group commenced its initial activity in the Karimnagar district of the north Telengana region of Andhra Pradesh, but soon spread its influence throughout Telengana. The PWH wants to emulate Mao Tse Tung's peasant revolution and aims at obtaining political power through protracted guerilla warfare. It calls this process the New Democratic Revolution.

A central committee heads the PWG as the policy making nucleus. It consists of 21 permanent members, plus an additional, it is understood, six co-opted from localities which are more active. The general secretary is one M Lakshmana Rao, also known as Ganapathi. The PWG demarcates clearly the division between its political organization – the hierarchy of central committee, regional, zonal, district and squad committees – and the military wing. The military wing is led by Ganapathi, as the head of the central military commission, being its general secretary. The parallels with the Chinese model are clearly intended. The political hierarchy is mirrored by the military organisation at each level – with the lowest being the village defence squad mirroring the village governing committee. The fighting component of the military wing is organized as the Peoples Guerilla Army (PGA), formed in Dec 2000.

Peoples Guerilla Army (PGA). It appears, from uncorroborated reports, that the formation of the PGA was a coordinated reaction to the decision of the Union and state governments to launch joint operations by various police forces in the states in which LWE were present. This impression is reinforced by the fact that the formation of the PGA in Dec 2000 was timed to coincide with the first centenary of the death of the top PWG members (one or two also featuring in the central committee) at the hands of the Andhra Pradesh police. A purported organisation is appended below:

Fig 1

The modus operandi encompasses killings, abductions and destruction of property.

An interview was published on the website of rediff.com on 1 Feb 2000, now available in their archives5. Some notable quotes which summarize the PWG aims and activities are:".. Their murders in an encounter shall be avenged … … one always repays ones blood debts…."

Central Military Commission

Regional Military Commission

Zonal/State Military Commission

Main Force Secondary Force Peoples Militia

Military platoons Special guerrilla squads Local guerrilla squads

"… they spent the most part of their revolutionary lives in areas of class struggle, amidst guerilla squads and oppressed masses .. … firmly adhering to Marxism-Leninism Mao Tse Tung thought.(sic)""…The revolutionary movement constantly replenishes itself from the masses… new blood is produced every moment…. So long as we stick to the correct line and adhere to the masses, new leaders are made continuously.""…Our movement develops through many ups and downs, many defeats, until we achieve final victory. Such is the nature of our protracted war…"

Communist Party of India (Maoist) {CPI(Maoist)} The MCC and the PWG merged on 21 Sep 2004, although the merger was announced by the 'state secretary' of the Andhra Pradesh PWG on 14 Oct, the eve of the talks of the LWE with the government of Andhra Pradesh in Hyderabad. The united groups named themselves the CPI(Maoist).

Though the merger culminated in 2004, the events leading to the union and the creation of this amalgam started in the 1980s. Since the beginning , the PWG had a vision of a coordinated and comprehensive politico-military organisation comprising all the existing factions (fractions really numbering around 40) of the LWE.

The initial thrust of the PWG was to attract the MCC and amalgamate. As with all organisations, turf battles and the perceived precedence of the leaders came in the way of progress towards unity. Internecine quarrels and a struggle for dominance preoccupied much of the time of the leaders of both groups, and at times the rank and file too. In undivided(at that time) Bihar, the rival groups fought each other murderously and suffered numerous casualties.

Realisation slowly dawned on the antagonists that the real gainers of this internal conflict were the state security forces. The two

factions gradually reduced the physical conflicts and increase cooperation, recognizing the unity of purpose. Initially in 1981, though Kanhai Chatterjee of the MCC had met with K Seetharamaiah of the PWG, stressing the unity of purpose, the death of Chatterjee in 1982 and the arrest of Seetharamaiah at about the same time made the twelve day meeting fruitless. In the late 1980s, with increasing confidence in each other and seeing the need for coordination amongst all the factions, the PWG, MCC and the Bihar CPI(M-L) decided to step up revolutionary activity(namely violence) in the Madhya Bharat states. By 1993 this wave of violence had reached a crest. These groups also constituted the All India Peoples' resistance Forum to intensify the struggle of the proletariat. But once again internal rivalries frittered away the initiatives taken and by 1996, cooperation was at an end.

In the years between 1998 and 2003, the cycle of distrust, violence and mutual belligerence, feelers for compromise and talks was repeated several times. Finally in Feb 2003, various definite steps were taken towards union of cadres and unity in action. The union was hastened by the creation of Jharkhand and the increased effort by the administration of this new state against LWE. A truce between the PWG and the MCC was announced in 2002-3.

Many meetings were held and a series of written documents emerged, of which five are known: Marxism – Leninism – Maoism Ideology; Party Programs; Strategy and Tactics; Political resolution of the International and Domestic Situation; and the Party Constitution. Further talks and meetings at high levels including the central committees of both groups continued, till agreement was reached and the announcement of the merger in Oct 2004, and the formation of one central committee.

Communist Party of India (Marxist){CPI(M)} – Janashakti. LWE in India has had several splinter groups through the last fifty

years. In 1992, a merger of seven such splinter groups took place, resulting in the emergence of the CPI (M) Janashakti. The seven merging groups were: the CPI(M-L) resistance; one faction of the Unity Centre of the Communist Revolutionaries of India (Marxist-Leninist); CPI(M-L) Agami Yug; Paila Vasudev Rao's CPI(M-L); The Khokan Mazumdar faction of the CPI(M-L); the Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries; and Communist Revolutionary Group for Unity6.

The merger was followed, as with most of the LWE factions, by splits caused by internal rivalries. The first split in 1996 was followed by seven more. Of these, the K Rajanna faction was dominant and inherited the mantle of the CPI (M-L) Janashakti. This dominant Rajanna faction too suffered a split with seven senior leaders falling out, accusing Rajanna of the misuse of funds. Suffice it to say that, in since 2004-5, the CPI (M-L) Janashakti Rajanna faction is the most active LWE group after the CPI (Maoist) and is predominant in the Telengana region of Andhra Pradesh. It is also active in two more states viz. Maharashtra and Chattisgarh. There are ongoing talks between the CPI (Maoist) and the governments of several of the thirteen to fifteen states in which it is active.

Ideology

The left wing ideology, across all the factions, is similar though the rhetoric expounding it varies in tone, timbre and context. All share their belief in the "annihilation of class enemies" and in the use of violence in achieving organizational goals.

The main difference was always between Leninist ethos (Soviet style) and Maoist action (Chinese example), but Maoism has now prevailed. In the words of the self styled state secretary of the PWG in Andhra Pradesh, it is the ".. the higher stage of Marxist-Leninist

philosophy. Marxist-Leninist-Maoism will be guiding our thinking in all spheres of activity." The goal therefore is ultimate state power in full. Not the local control of land, districts or areas. In this plan, participation in the electoral process of the prevailing, as they put it "bourgeois democracy" is rejected unanimously. The concentration is on revolutionary activities to undermine the state and seize power by force.

Objectives and Aims

Ideology defines the aims and objectives of LWE and that being so, the ultimate driving objective is to further the cause of revolution in India. The thoughts and pronouncements of the main factions, documented, published and publicized by our media are too numerous to quote here. The jargon is stereotyped and is full of words and phrases like 'democratic revolution', 'imperialism', 'feudalism', 'bureaucratic capitalism', 'ruling classes', 'aspirations of the masses', 'proletarian revolution' etc., etc.

The patterned advance of their plans is to seize control of remote parts on India through terror induced by violence; raise armed groups; increase guerilla actions and gradually control larger and larger areas by arousing and organizing the people; finally morphing into the governing entity.

The documents published by the CPI(Maoist) define, in their jargon, the purpose and plan of actions. The increase in fire power, areas of activity of LWE and the growing sophistication of equipment only serves to highlight the fact that the threat to the existing democratic polity is enormous.

Magnitude of the Threat

A glance at the daily news – in print or in the electronic media – is sufficient to illustrate the omnipresence of the LWE. It is estimated, and this is a matter in the public domain, that LWE is an active threat in 156 districts of 13 states of the Indian Union. These states are: Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chattisgarh, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, Uttaranchal and West Bengal. Some other contiguous states like Gujerat, Rajasthan, Haryana, Punjab and Himachal Pradesh are targeted by the LWE for extension of their influence and activities.

Commonality in planning and coordination of action is still in the formative stages, and therefore, a pan-Indian plan of revolutionary activities in a pre-determined schedule is still not a reality. However the formation of the CPI (Maoist) as a result of the merger has made it a pan-Indian revolutionary organisation, and its central committee is closer to the declared objective of control over a revolutionary zone. Yet, in spite of the merger, the MCC and PWG cadres retain dominance over certain districts and states. The MCC is based and oriented towards the northern and eastern parts of India, whereas the PWG dominates in the southern states. The map below gives a vivid visual impact of the spread of the influence of LWE.

Conflict MapFig 2 (reproduced with permission from www.satp.org)

The areas highlighted by colour also give a vivid reality to the term mentioned in one of the CPI (Maoist) manifestos – the Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ). The media has also coined a phrase – the Red Corridor – and the core area in the conflict map in Bihar, Jharkhand, Chattisgarh, north Andhra Pradesh and the land connectivity to the Maoist groups in Nepal amply illustrates the phrase.

The magnitude of the problem faced by the organisations responsible for law and order, the police forces as well as the district administration, can also be quantified in the tabulated datasheets compiled by the Institute of Conflict Studies and put on the same website. Some of these datasheets are reproduced below to elucidate.

2006

States Civilian SF Naxal Total

Andhra Pradesh 6 2 52 60

Bihar 11 2 19 32

Jharkhand 6 18 16 40

Chhattisgarh 112 45 30 187

Maharashtra 13 2 16 31

Orissa 1 3 7 11

West Bengal 5 3 2 10

Uttar Pradesh 0 0 1 1

Total* 154 75 143 372

* Data till May 28, 2006

(Note: Compiled from news reports and are provisional)

Table 1 (with permission from www.satp.org)

1 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naxalite2 Mason, Philip: The Founders, Vintage/Ebury (A Division of Random House Group) (December 31, 1953)3 www.satp.org4 www.satp.org5 http://www.rediff.com/news/2000/feb/01pw.htm6 www.satp.org

2005

States Civilian SF Naxal Total

Andhra Pradesh 132 21 167 320

Bihar 25 29 52 106

Jharkhand 49 27 20 96

Chhattisgarh 52 48 26 126

Orissa 13 1 3 17

Maharashtra 2 17 8 27

Karnataka 2 6 4 12

Uttar Pradesh 1 0 6 7

West Bengal 5 1 0 6

Total* 281 150 286 717

*Compiled from news reports and are provisional

Table 2 (with permission from www.satp.org)

2005

Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India DataStates Deaths Incidents

Andhra Pradesh 206 532

Bihar 94 183

Chhattisgarh 165 380

Jharkhand 118 308

Madhya Pradesh 3 20

Maharashtra 53 95

Orissa 14 42

Uttar Pradesh 1 10

West Bengal 7 14

Other States 8 10

Total* 669 1594

* Deaths include security force (SF) personnel and civilian fatalities only

516 civilians, 153 SF personnel and 223 Naxalites were killed, taking the total for the year to 892.

Table 3 (with permission from www.satp.org)

Revolutionary activity of LWE can broadly be divided into four categories, namely abductions (leading to ransom in cash or kind), damage or destruction to (public or private) property, setting off of improvised explosive devices ( as intimidation as well as inducement) and armed confrontations with policing forces (a show of strength as well as intimidation). All four categories of violence contribute substantially to the collected revenue of all left wing groups. The ransoms yield bulk sums on occurrence, whilst the act of abduction itself ensures a steady flow of funds from the local population as well as businesses in the area as tax and protection money (also the subject of a serious Bollywood movie named Apharan). An illustrative

example of the trend of these for broad categories is depicted in the graphs below.

Fig 3 Fig 4

Fig 5 Fig 6

Analysis and an Action Taken Review

The Institute of Conflict Studies hosts a variety of papers on their website, which is aptly designated at the South Asia Terrorism Portal. Many of these pertain to India, amongst the many nations of South Asia being addressed, and the text contained is detailed and coordinated. In addition, other centres of study also have published material accessible by those interested. The Ministry of Home Affairs of the Government of India is the core agency for internal security, and their analyses are numerous, and available for researchers, after a fashion.

While it would be repetitive to analyse the causes of LWE in India, it would be worthwhile to keep in focus some of the conclusions which are common in these analyses. Two of the common ones are lack of good governance and the ineffective judicial system. It is interesting to see the consequences of such conclusions.

Acts and Ordinances. Much before LWE was recognized as such, there existed on the statutes two Acts, dealing with activities subversive to the State. The Prevention of Seditious Meetings Act of 1911 was one of them and it still is on the statutes. The second one dates to 1967, when the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act was passed by parliament. With LWE gaining ground, a barrage of laws (Acts and Ordinances) were instituted in the late 1970s and later. Some of them are:

1976 The Disturbed Areas Special Courts Act1980 The National Security Act1982 The Suppression of Unlawful Activities against Safety of

Civil Aviation Act The Anti-Hijacking Act

1984 Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Act1987 Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (prevention) Act1988 The Religious Institutions (Prevention of Misuse)

Ordinance1993 The Protection of Human Rights Act The SAARC Convention (Suppression of Terrorism) Act1995 The Criminal Law Amendment Bill (later passed)1999 Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act2001 The Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance2004 The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment

Ordinance The Prevention of Terrorism (Repeal) Ordinance

As is evident, one of the major reactions of the government, regardless of the party in power, has been to add to the statutes, seemingly in an effort to strengthen the means of enforcement. A fair assessment of this measure would be to term it a double-edged weapon, prone to inflict more damage to the system than to those it was meant to control.

The Home Ministry of the Union Government has also made considerable effort to coordinate the approach to the LWE problem at the level of the states. This has resulted in progress, or expression of intent at least, in many areas such as the one listed below.

Modernisation of state police forces by way of equipment, vehicles and communication.

Coordination of intelligence collection efforts between states and between the Union Government and the states.

Better sharing of intelligence between states. Training of police forces in counter insurgency operations.

Notable the establishment of a specialized school for such training in Chattisgarh, under the leadership of an experienced Army brigadier.

Maintenance of data banks. Creation of village defence organisations (often counter

productive, fatally so in the recent case of Chattisgarh)

It must be recognized that these efforts have induced a sense of urgency in state organisations dealing with LWE. The urgency is given additional impetus by the desire of ruling parties to stay in power. Sadly, the demand from the top seems to require intelligence analysts to tell the government that on Monday next, Borivli railway station will be bombed! Or some such exact prediction. The understanding that

trends can be forecast, but hard intelligence is hard to come by without years and years of dedicated infiltration and development of sources is slow to dawn on successive executives.

Local reaction and resistance to LWE has been confined mainly to Bihar, where several organisations have sprung up. Some are financed by land owners, some form by caste orientation, and some are sponsored by political parties. The fairly well known ones are:

Ranvir Sena Lorik Sena Bhumi Sena Kunwar Sena Kisan Sangram Parishad Sunlight Sena

Success has been limited to the area of influence of the sponsor, and since action has bee directed at protection of the sponsor, the ordinary peasant is the victim of both the sides. A similar government sponsored organisation in Chattisgarh is the Salwa Judum.

An unintended consequence of the acts and ordinances has been the creation of legal front organisations by the LWE themselves. These are too many to list in full, many being very short-lived, and many confined to very small geographical area. Some names are:

Lok Sangram Morcha Workers Peasant Liberation front Peoples Liberation Council Indian Youth Association Workers Peasant Unity front Workers Peasant Struggle Association Peoples Liberation Struggle Front Naujawan Pratirodh Sangharsh Manch Krantikari Budhijivi Sangh Krantikari Sanskritik Sangh

Krantikari Chhatra League Communist Yuva League Naari Mukti Sangh Mazdoor Mukti Sangh

An Assessment

The very nature of the police – administration – politician relationship militates against a coordinated and well planned approach to counter LWE. Frequent change of key personnel frustrates the very organisation set up to monitor, plan and coordinate action.

A look at the profiles of many of the legislators in the states affected by LWE reveals that elected government often has a clash of interest with its own appointed officials. This bodes ill for anti-LWE actions and this shows in the results achieved.

The interest and involvement of professionals in the field is beyond doubt. However, as mentioned earlier, their efforts are most often nullified by either inaction at the appropriate level, or a quick transfer of the official to a lea troublesome appointment.

All anti-LWE efforts depend upon adequate financing, and thereafter judicious expenditure. States are all strapped for cash, and very reluctant to allocate the necessary fiscal resources. Apart from funding, the anti-terrorist game is entirely dependent on the human talent concentrated against it. It is also directly proportional to the time invested in planning and preparation. Talented individuals with long tenures in their specializations, as well as the time invested are both woefully inadequate.

All the official and other analyses of the causes of the growth of LWE list the lack of development as one of the primary reasons. A co-relation of the conflict map (fig 2) to the backward areas of India highlights the fact that no developmental activity – either agricultural

or industrial – has touched these areas for the past fifty years. The poor, landless, dispossessed and deprived population of these areas supports LWE, in the hope that the 'revolution' will improve their prospects. This hope is augmented by the actions of the 'lok adalats' or the local instant justice system practiced by the left wing groups. The down trodden feel empowered by joining the guerilla groups.

It is interesting to note that LWE are secular – there is no distinction made by caste, creed or religion. But it would also be pertinent to note that the vast majority of the population of these backward areas of India figures in one of the schedules of the Indian Constitution.

Linkages

It is reported in the media as well as on the portal cited that an umbrella organisation called the Coordination Committees of the Maoist Parties and Organisations was constituted in 2001, comprising:

1. PWG |2. MCC | since merged into CPI (Maoist)3. Revolutionary Communist Centre of India (M-L-M)4. Revolutionary Communist Centre (Maoist)5. Purba Bangla Sarbahara Party (Maoist Punargathan Kendra)6. Purba Bangla Sarbahara Party7. Bangladesh Samaywadi party (M-L)8. Communist party of Nepal (Maoist)9. Communist party of Ceylon (Maoist)

The impetus in forming this organisation was provided by the PWG and the MCC, with the aim of unifying and coordinating the activities of the constituent parties.

Ideological themes are derived from Marxism, Leninism and the Maoist interpretation of Communism. However considerable lateral shifts have taken place and it is generally accepted that the mother countries (the erstwhile USSR and the PRC) have no direct ideological linkages with these groups. On the contrary, a glance at the economic policies of Russia and China today reveals that these countries are now following the path of what can only be termed as 'authoritarian capitalism'. Material and monetary support are also in short supply – though weaponry and equipment are available for payment in hard currency. And the source is not limited to communist regimes.

Yet, for the record, the voice of the 'revolutionary proletariat' is heard and, occasionally, given some energetic rhetoric. It is believed also that the PWG has fraternal relations with the Liberation Army of Peru and the Kurdistan Workers Party. The PWG sent some representatives to attend an international seminar organised by the Workers Party of Belgium in May 1995, in an attempt to internationalize their cause. The PWG is also believed to have a working relationship with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and some arms training for its cadres in Sri Lanka is reported. It is also believed that some wireless intercepts in Bihar revealed Tamil being spoken, indicating the presence of some Tamil speaking individuals – though not necessarily from Sri Lanka.

These linkages and the merger of the PWG and the MCC do have wider implications. The CRZ mentioned in one of the manifestos of the CPI (Maoist) does now, de facto, extend from Nepal, through Bihar – Jharkhand – Chattisgarh – Andhra Pradesh – Madhya Pradesh – Maharashtra – Tamil Nadu to Kerala. In the east it reaches out to Bangladesh, and creates possibilities of cooperation with the militant groups of Assam and the other north eastern states of India. In the peninsula the coast is pervious and to the south is the most resourceful

and persistent insurgent group – the LTTE – ready for mutual support and help.

Role Play by Government and its Agencies

The various facets of government which address one or more aspects of LWE are enumerated in a broad classification:

The Union GovernmentThe various State GovernmentsThe State police forcesThe Central Reserve Police ForceThe intelligence wings

of the central governmentof the states

The Armed ForcesA mention has been made earlier of the clash of interests

between individual legislators who form the government (in the states) and the government itself. This results in a divorce of policy from action, to the detriment of the ground forces actually deployed against LWE.

In addition, there is also the larger interest of some political parties, particularly when in power. Swinging between inaction against LWE is the policy at its best, and support, albeit covert, at its worst, the government in such cases shows up in the public's and media's view in a very poor light. Such political interests at the state levels force coalition governments at the centre to approve, often tacitly, the policy of conciliation adopted by the states in question.

An example is the willing ness of Andhra Pradesh to sit down and negotiate with the Naxalites, suspending police action. The LWE groups welcome this opportunity to regroup and revitalize their ranks by fresh recruitment attracted by the perceived legitimacy and clout of

the LWE. The governments of Bihar, Jharkhand and Uttar Pradesh also exhibit some inclination towards negotiation, though issuing verbal warnings at the same time, like the Uttar Pradesh media announcement,"The challenge posed by armed activities of Naxalites shall be met firmly".

In riposte, upon talks with the Andhra Pradesh government seeming imminent, a Naxalite leader said, as reported by media, "By going to the talks we are not declaring any cease fire … …. talks are a part of our tactical line. Naxalism is not a problem, it is a solution." The LWE leaders attended the talks with their weapons and left to return to their hideouts unhindered.

Actions. The Union Home Ministry has now established regular coordinating meetings for intelligence gathering, analysis and dissemination. These meetings also coordinate police policy and action. The meetings are convened, but the attendance is by no means complete. Far less in quantum is the conversion of policy into concrete action with relentless follow up.

A policy of control of the Indo-Nepal border is in place, but mainly left to the states to implement. Trans-border movement, as well as trans-migration of segments of the population from interior regions to the proximity of the border continues unabated.

Of late, several of the states have once again started wooing the extremists to the negotiating table. Chattisgarh is the latest, the Indian Express of 14 Jul 06 reporting that the Chief Minister Mr. Raman Singh has asked the Naxalites to come to his capital, Raipur for talks. He is also reported to have said that a determined political party in power cannot be overthrown by arson, abduction and anarchy.

The fact of the matter is that none of the affected states have the will to follow through with the required action. Thorough knowledge of the insurgents, active monitoring of their activities, prompt arrest and swift judicial action is essential. This must be

matched with corresponding devotion to the rural backward areas and communities. Support for agriculture, establishment of employment and education avenues, and the construction of adequate infrastructure must take place. The first requires will, determination and unity of purpose, the second equal amounts of the same wedded to adequate financing and probity in execution.

The Armed Forces

It is far too often that recourse is taken by the Indian Government to the last resort. And that last resort is, of course, the military. The Armed Forces are used both for policing as well as for succour, often at the slightest pretext. The nation has seen the involvement of the Armed Forces in the maintenance of law and order in the north eastern states for close to fifty years, and in Jammu and Kashmir for the last twenty five.

Well documented statistics show that Naxalite activities spread over thirteen states. The badly affected ones are five or six, all of them falling within the region of central India (Madhya Bharat). In two of these states, the elected officials are relatively new in their offices, and perhaps inexperienced in dealing with a situation which is out of their control. But in all the states there is a gradual realisation that their own police forces, augmented by the Union Government's reserve police forces and para-military units are not in a position to restore peace and tranquility. They are also aware that the central resources are stretched already and are not easily made available for Madhya Bharat areas.

It is but natural that these states will look towards the Armed Forces as a backup. It would be a disaster if the military were to be committed to an anti-Naxalite role in central India. The arguments of why and wherefore are not pertinent to this paper. However, as the

management ethos of the armed forces are based on the 'just in case' philosophy, there is a lot for them to do in their altogether brief transient peace time tenures, in the various cantonments and locations scattered over these thirteen states.

All the three Services, particularly the Army, need to prepare adequately. First of all their commanders at various levels must fully understand the local dynamics. They must be familiar with the faces and appointments in the government dealing with this matter. The higher commanders must also see the larger picture and establish coordinated information gathering and dissemination systems. Regular and involved interaction with state government – the bureaucracy, the police and regional executives, must be set into an established routine. At the same time, by spreading an awareness of the implications of involving the armed forces, make decision makers in government hesitate from calling upon this last resort.

A Summary and a Prognosis

There is an enemy within. The existence of over 30 groups which are revolutionary in ideology and violent to a greater or lesser degree in their actions is a grave threat to the democratic fabric of India. The term LWE encompasses all these diverse groups. Amongst them, unity of purpose is gaining ground, and the old adage of strength in unity is being proved once again.

This strength, exhibited by the exercise of administrative control over many remote districts, the imposition of a parallel tax structure, the establishment of common courts for the dispensation of quick justice, is augmented by their readiness to commit their armed cadres wherever the need is felt.

The display of resolve by the LWE is not matched by the elected government in any of its actions. The CRZ is a reality and there is a

nexus between our indigenous extremists and those of our neighbours. The world arms trade is more than willing to supply anyone able to meet their bills. All of the affected states have, at one time or another, acknowledged that there is a serious threat to peace and security. The Government of India admits that there is an internal security problem. The blasts in Mumbai on 11 Jul 06 only highlight the probability that such security problems are not confined to interior Madhya Bharat.

It is not sufficient to classify the LWE as a 'law and order' problem. The existence of extremism dedicated to violence as a means of bringing about change is a symptom of bad governance. It is a great challenge to the democratic polity and the rule of law that India projects to the developed world.

Some of the ways and means of finding solutions have been touched upon in passing, but the details have to be executed by the existing elected and official bodies. The root problems are not being addressed by a coherent, holistic approach encompassing both the Central and the State Governments. The coalition at the centre and the regional biases of the parties in power in the states do not generate any confidence that democratic government will be able to suppress LWE.

Mr. Shekhar Gupta recounts a meeting of his with the head of the Punjab Armed Police at that time, Mr. KPS Gill immediately after the Rajiv-Longowal accord.7 Journalists like Gupta covering the Punjab scene were jubilant and eager to report the return of peace to Punjab. Mr. Gill's view was quite the opposite. According to him, one makes peace only when wielding a big stick, when the other side knows there is no option. The article goes on to draw a parallel with the chaos in Punjab following Longowal's assassination and the militancy today. He theorizes that terrorism will match state suppression till a point is 7 The Indian Express, Sat 15 Jul 2006

reached when the terrorists realize that the superior resources of the state combined with the determination to fight to the finish will prevail. Then a compromise was sought and normalcy restored. Mr. Gupta reminds the UPA government of this and asks whether it has allowed its politics to confuse the security agencies so much that they have lost all sense of direction. He decries the fact that Naxalites were allowed to carry their arms to talks, resulting in loss of face and morale for the government's forces and a boost for the Naxalites.

Mr. Gupta ends his editorial on an optimistic note, stating that the UPA government has been woken up by the Mumbai blasts and its public rhetoric is indicative to strong action to come. Yet he hedges his bets by his last sentence, "Those on the frontlines of these operations, the heads of his (the Prime Minister's) security forces and intelligence agencies, would need more convincing from the subsequent actions and commitment levels that he and his colleagues demonstrate". His view only reiterates that the determination of government to solve the problem needs to be demonstrated effectively. There is indeed urgent need to exhibit this resolve, both from the Government of India and the State Governments. Once again, the Indian Express reports8 that Naxalites have chalked out plans for making their presence felt in urban areas by setting up zonal committees in four new states. This was revealed after the seizure of literature from hideouts in Chattisgarh. Gujerat and Assam are targeted along with the Bhilai - Kolkata and Ahmedadabad - Vadodara industrial areas.

8 The Indian Express, New Delhi, Tue 19 Jul 2006