The Social Representation of Populism

in Europe

A cross-sectional case study of populist supporters across four European states.

Ameer Hassan Farooq

Political Science Research: Dissertation (15 credits)

Department of Government

Uppsala University, Spring 2019

Supervisor: Andreas Gottardis

Word count: 11,353

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Abstract

The following paper focuses on the relatively new rise of populism which has seen a surge

across states across the western world. Populism refers to governance of and for the people,

as opposed to the ruling elites. As the sensation of democratic deficits and partisan cleavages

increase, the reaction is populism which aims to restore the fundamental democratic values

back to the people, advocating a more transparent form of democracy, where power moves

away from the ruling elites, back to the people.

We explore what populism entails through defining it through its theoretical identifiers and

analyzing which political and social attitudes are present in supporters of populist parties.

This study is meant to complement Staerkle and Greens study about the social representation

of right-populists. By using the same research methodology as Staerkle and Green but also

including left populists. This means looking at the social representation of left-right populist

supporters and identifying mutual conventions and relations through a cross sectional case

study of four countries which have seen a rise in populist parties.

The findings lead us to see convergence in left-right populist parties toward institutional distrust

and divergence in opinion towards globalism and multiculturalism. In essence, we compare and

present the social representation of populist supporters of left-right populist parties and

investigate which attributes cause the divergence in their political and social identities.

Key words: Populist Parties, Social Representation, Identity Politics, Trust, Institutions,

Democratic Deficit, The Elite

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Table of Contents

Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………………………...3

1.1 Populism 4

1.2 Social Representation 5

1.3 Deconstructing Populism and Social Representation 5

Theoretical Framework……………………………………………………………………………………….. 7

2.1 Social Representation of Populism 7

2.2 Political and Social Identity 9

2.3 Social Position 10

2.4 Literature Review 11

Research Design………………………………………………………………………………………………12

3.1 Method and Analysis 12

3.1.1 Analysis 12

3.2 Data Selection 14

3.2.1 Scales and Centrality Measurements 14

3.3 Operationalization 15

3.4 Country and Party Selection 15

3.4.1 Populist Parties and Populist Leaders 16

3.5 Filters and Limitations 17

Results and Analysis………………………………………………………………………………………… 17

4.1 Institutional dimension: 18

4.2 Globalist dimension 21

4.3 Political Identity and Social Identity 24

4.4 Social Position 27

4.5 Limitations 29

Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 29

__References…………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 31

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Introduction

Populism has recently become more visible in politics across the western world. Successful populist

leaders such as Donald Trump, Marine Le Pen and Alexis Tsipras are all gaining electoral support

because of their successes in utilizing populist ideologies and connecting to the people. The vocal point

for the populists’ agenda is being representative of the people's best interest, which also raises the

question: if democracies are about pursuing the will of the people, is populism an indicator of democratic

deficits, or even the failure of democracies?

The key for populist success has been linked to certain attributes: a strong leader whom is

representative of the people1, anti-establishment sentiment 2, economic restrains 3, role of social media 4

and most importantly, relating to the electors’ struggles through direct communication5. Recognizing and

relating to the social representation of the target market of electorates is fundamental for any populist to

exploit and gain power, legitimacy and mobilization6. In this paper we analyze the social conventions

through a cross sectional study of four populist parties’ supporters from different European states. We

aim to identify indicators which are mutually exclusive for all populist party supporters and the

differences between left-right populists.

We investigate the social and political identities of the people voting for populist parties. Giving

complementary value to previous research on the social representation of populism by Staerkle and

Green, who focused on the social representation of right-populists and provided meaningful data,

operationalization’s and results for right-wing populist supporters. However, Staerkle and Green did not

do a comparison between left-right populists which this paper aims to do by focusing on rise of populism

in countries which have recently seen a rise in left and right populism.

By the end of this paper we aim to understand the conventions of populism that are mutual through four

European populist parties as well as conventions which diverge populism into left-right ideologies. We

will confirm if Staerkle and Greens results were correct Additionally, we get to view the social

representations in gender, ethnicity and age amongst other variables that are behind the populism.

1 Moffitt, Benjamin. "Introduction: The Global Rise of Populism." In The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style,

and Representation. Stanford University Press, 2016. University Press Scholarship Online, 2017. doi:

10.11126/stanford/9780804796132.003.0001. 2 Canovan, Margaret. “Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy.” Political Studies 47, no. 1 (March 1999):

2–16. doi:10.1111/1467-9248.00184. 3 Poli, Maria Daniela. "Contemporary populism and the economic crisis in western Europe." Baltic Journal of Political Science 5, no. 1 (2016): 40-52 doi: https://doi.org/10.15388/bjps.2016.5.10335 4 Engesser, Sven, Nicole Ernst, Frank Esser, and Florin Büchel. "Populism and social media: How politicians spread a fragmented ideology." Information, communication & society20, no. 8 (2017): 1109-1126. doi:10.1080/1369118X.2016.1207697 5 Muller, Jan-Werner. 2017. What is populism? 6 Engesser, Sven, Nayla Fawzi, and Anders Olof Larsson. "Populist online communication: introduction to the special issue." (2017): 1279-1292. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2017.1328525

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Our research question is therefore set as:

- Are there any social characteristics or relations that differ between the left-right populist supporters

besides the political ideology they align with?

The purpose of this paper is therefore to explore the social representation of populist supporters. By

doing so we analyze populism as an ideology and operationalize the empirical material according to the

populist ideology.

Successfully meeting this purpose will deepen our knowledge on what populism means through the

social representation affiliated to populist supporters. This would also give us a meaningful

understanding on what type of people the populist leaders and parties exploit for electoral support. The

research should provide valuable knowledge to the study of political science with regards to the rise in

populism and social psychology through the analysis of political and social attributes affiliated with

populism.

The paper begins with a review of populism and its social representation. Previous research is then

discussed, accompanied by relevant theoretical framework for us to investigate and understand the

relationship of social representation with respect to populism. Thereafter is a chapter on the research

design, following straight into the results, analysis and limitations of the study.

1.1 Populism

Populism is a term thrown around by politicians and within social media, but seldom does it retain a

concrete definition. We analyze populism as an ideology as political scientist Cas Mudde describes:

‘Thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and

antagonistic camps, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite,” and which argues that politics should be

an expression of the general will of the people” 7

This ideology can naturally be deconstructed to two definitive groups: “us” the pure people who are

taking a stance against the antagonist elites “them”, who are liable for instability through bad

governance. The people are the vocal point for populism and there is a whole discourse on what is

categorically identified as being a part of “the people”. Ethnicity, sexuality, religion, socio-economic

class, cultural differences all play fundamental roles in the political and social identities of the people vis-

a-vis the elites and the ostracized other.

There is also focus on the subjective nature of electorates. On matters of trust towards political

institutions from the ‘pure sovereign people’ within the society. These two conventions differentiate the

left-wing populist into two groups the right-populist ideals are based on mistrust and anti-elitist

sentiments where the governing elites are not fulfilling and delivering on the will of the people, which can

be identified on the national level and supranational level through Euroscepticism8. Secondly, the

7 The Problem with Populism | Cas Mudde - Access: 2019-04-27 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/feb/17/problem-populism-syriza-podemos-dark-side-europe 8 Kneuer, Marianne. “The Tandem of Populism and Euroscepticism: a Comparative Perspective in the Light of the European Crises.” Contemporary Social Science 14, no. 1 (2018): 26–42. https://doi.org/10.1080/21582041.2018.1426874.

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“ostracized other” is seen as a threat to the people because of the identity politics which come into play

against the “ostracized other”. Anti-immigration sentiment is seen to be high, usually complemented by

ideologies of nationalism and protecting the sovereignty of a nation. The left-populist also has the anti-

elitist attitude to differentiate itself from the antagonist, but the key difference is that there is lesser

exclusion of marginalized groups and the “ostracized other”. Cultural rejection plays less of a role for

liberal populists, but the key antagonist remains as the elitist.

1.2 Social Representation

Social representation is a study from social psychology where different collective cognition, schools of

thought and common sense are connected to different groups of people for representation. Social

representation allows us to identify and categories certain people or objects. Allow comparison of

different behaviors. There is no concrete definition for social representation of a specific group because

of the ever-changing fluid nature of sociological beings but Serge Moscovici, a social psychologist

describes it as:

“Social representations […] concern the contents of everyday thinking and the stock of ideas that give

coherence to our religious beliefs, political ideas and the connections we create as spontaneously as we

breathe. They make it possible for us to classify persons and objects, to compare and explain behaviors

and to objectify them as part of our social setting. While representations are often to be located in the

minds of men and women, they can just as often be found “in the world”, and as such examined

separately. (Moscovici 1988: 214)” 9

The social representation of populist supporters would provide us with knowledge and disciplines of

populist parties and their ideology. As discussed in the definition of populism, there is a clear distrust

from the people towards the elitists and “ostracized others” in society for right-populists. Likewise,

distrust towards the elites and institutions for the left-populists. These sensations of distrust are

therefore central for analysis of the representation in citizen’s subjective realities and identities10

1.3 Deconstructing Populism and Social Representation

Social representation of populism will be analyzed together but will be split into distinct parts.

First, we aim to identify the beliefs and trusts of the populist supporters towards political institutions and

the elites. Since all populist supporters have a similarity in institutional distrust, it would allow us to see a

common discipline and convergence across all left-right populist parties across the populist

demographic.

Secondly, we aim to explain the differences of the populists by filtering down their political identities to

right-left parties. This allows us to see what factors matter most when it comes to subjective realities, in

terms of trust in multiculturalism, economic insecurities and interpersonal trust. These subjective realities

9 Moscovici, Serge. “Notes towards a Description of Social Representations.” European Journal of Social Psychology 18, no. 3 (1988): 211–50. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2420180303

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also allow us to categorize differences in the social identities of left-right populists. This will be the

factors that explain the divergence of the political identities.

Thirdly, the social position and profile of all the populist supporters will be viewed to give us

representation in terms of gender, age, ethnicity, education and unemployment status. Allowing us to

have specificity when referring to populist supporters as a narrow demographic. We will have no

analysis in the third part.

The research framework is picked up from a previous study conducted by Staerkle & Green from the

faculty of Social and Political Science in Lausanne Switzerland. Staerkle & Green investigated the social

representation of right-wing populism through a cross-national comparative case study10. Staerkle &

Green did not include left-wing populists in their study, which gave us the opportunity for this study to be

inclusive of left-right populism in a cross-sectional case study of four European states. Bringing a

broader understanding to the social representation of populism as a whole and complementing Staerkle

and Greens research on right-populists and testing if we get the same results for right-wing populists.

To conduct this research on social representation of populism, we set our four objectives:

1) Populism ideology will be defined in two dimensions in the same way as Staerkle and Green.

The first dimension focuses on attitudes towards institutional trust. We aim to analyze the convergence

in attitudes and relations towards political institutions and the elites for a pair of left-right populist parties’

supporters through the cross-sectional analysis.

2) The second dimension will focus on globalism. We aim to analyze the divergence in attitudes and

relations toward culture and economic threats for the pair of left-right populist parties’ supporters through

a cross-sectional analysis. Staerkle and Green used the name “Pluralism” on this dimension- but that

limits Staerkle and Greens study to a vocal point for right-populists. Globalism is more inclusive

definition of political, economic and cultural development, relative to pluralism for left-right populists.

3) The political and social identities of the respondent will be analyzed to view if there is any clear

distinction between the left-right populist supporters through what previous literature suggests. Such as

the role of the economy, multiculturalism, political efficacy.

4) The social position of the populist supporters will be presented to view the genders, age, ethnicity and

other factors relevant to our research. These social positions are shown to give us an outlook of the

populist supporters included in our dataset.

10 Staerklé, Christian, and Eva G.t. Green. “Right-Wing Populism as a Social Representation: A Comparison across Four European Countries.” Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology 28, no. 6 (2018): 430–45. https://doi.org/10.1002/casp.2369.

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Theoretical Framework

This chapter will deepen on the central measures of our research objectives. Increasing our knowledge

in what is included in the social representation of populism, social and political identities. A literature

review towards the end of the chapter will summarize and lay the foundations for our research, what

variables we will look at and what our expectations are from previous research.

2.1 Social Representation of Populism

Populism carries no clear-cut definition or relations since its basis of antagonizing and marginalizing

specific groups are purely subjective, which allows the populists to introduce their own ideology such as

nationalism or socialism11. Previous research also shows that we cannot define populism in single

dimensional of the ‘pure sovereign people’ and ‘the elites’ but rather, the focus is on two dimensions of

‘us’ and ‘them’12. The first dimension focuses on distrust between the ‘pure sovereign people’ and the

‘ruling elites’. This dimension is mutual in all populist ideologies. The second dimension is based on the

divides in the ‘sovereign pure people’ where certain groups such as ethnic minorities and immigrants are

marginalized and seen as the ‘ostracized other’.

We name the first dimension which measures distrust between the ‘pure sovereign people’ and ‘the

elites’ as the Institutional dimension. The focuses of this dimension are on the cleavages between the

people and the elites and their institutions. This dimension measures the separation between the ruling

elite and the ordinary people. The elites are seemingly more interested in personal gain and benefitting

immigrants and failing to be representative of the commoners.

The fundamental elements of the institutional dimension are seen represented in the distrust and

negative attitude between the ‘pure sovereign people’ towards the elitists13, which is inclusive of the

media, the judiciary and other related institutions associated to the elitists. We focus therefore on

institutional trust, which will measure the populist supporters’ level of trust or rather distrust towards

parliament, the legal system, politicians and political parties.

Besides institutional distrust, the institutional dimension also highlights the importance of democratic

deficits which allow populism to thrive. Democratic deficits are defined as democracies lacking

accessibility and transparency for the ‘pure sovereign people’ 14 The democratic deficit will focus on

questions regarding how much the political system allows people to engage in politics. We aim to

measure how inclusive the democratic system is to the people as how satisfied the people are with the

way the democratic political system works. Through measuring democratic deficits, we can identify and

highlight the responsiveness and successfulness of democratic processes when contributing to

populism.

11 Engesser, Sven, Nicole Ernst, Frank Esser, and Florin Büchel. "Populism and social media: How politicians spread a fragmented ideology." Information, communication & society20, no. 8 (2017): 1109-1126. doi:10.1080/1369118X.2016.1207697 12 Mudde, Cas, and . “Populism: A Very Short Introduction,” 2017. https://doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780190234874.001.0001. 13 Albertazzi, Daniele, and Duncan Mcdonnell. “Conclusion: Populism and Twenty-First Century Western European Democracy.” Twenty-First Century Populism, 2008, 217–23. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230592100_14. 14 “Lex Access to European Union Law.” EUR. Accessed April 27, 2019. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/democratic_deficit.htm

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The institutional dimension will be measured through these two points: institutional trust and

democratic deficits. We should expect a convergence across our cross-national comparison. All populist

parties’ supporters should theoretically have minimal institutional trust alongside a democratic deficit.

The second dimension which focuses on the divides within the “pure sovereign people” is called the

Globalist dimension. The divide on this dimension is between “people like us” and the “ostracized

other”. The differentiation and otherness are created due to a rejection of globalism. The focuses are

therefore on the people themselves, where the subjective element of ‘us’ and ‘the others’ plays when

identifying the role of cultural diversity and acceptance of pluralism as well as rejecting cultural diversity

simply because of economic reasoning such as immigrants stealing the sovereign natives jobs and

exhaust their economy.15

There will be specific focuses on economic threats and cultural acceptance which will explain our anti-

globalist stances. The globalist dimension also aims to explain the role of complimenting ideologies such

as orientalism, nationalism, socialism which assist in diverging the left-wing populists, since their political

identities are no longer aligned but their social identities come to play.

Economic threats gain their basis on the globalist dimensions because of an untested hypothesis

brought forward by Inglehart and Norris. The hypothesis stipulates that left-populists are more likely to

attract support from ‘economically insecure’ people whereas the right-populist focuses on targeting

people who reject cultural diversity.16 Naturally, we have two indicators of right-left populism here from

economic security and acceptance of cultural diversity which are measurable within the globalist

dimensions and this hypothesis will be tested.

The economic insecurity brings relevance to the right-wing populists arguing that ‘others’ are being

prioritized to the sovereign people for jobs. Prioritization and outsourcing jobs leads to a decrease in

employment within the sovereign state which implicates a sentiment of rejection towards globalism. A

contemporary example of this is seen during the Brexit campaign where immigrants were blamed for

increasing competition and as a consequence decreasing the wage levels due to the surplus in labour

supplies.17 Likewise, the left-wing populist can take economic insecurity to address issues regarding

economic inequalities and unemployment caused within the sovereign state itself.

Cultural acceptance is another element which is highly debated by right-wing populists. Sovereign

identity and the motherland are prioritized to add-on identities such as nationalism. Going back to

Brexit’s discourse in rejecting their European identity and wanting to ‘Make Great Britain Great Again’18.

15 The Sun. “Brits Are Suffering from Immigrants Taking Their Jobs for Half the Price.” The Sun. The Sun, Accessed April 03, 2019. https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/2876121/brits-are-suffering-from-immigrants-taking-their-jobs-for-half-the-price-we-need-an-immigration-deal-that-works-for-everyone-not-just-bosses-who-want-cut-price-labour/. 16 Inglehart, Ronald, and Pippa Norris. “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash.” SSRN Electronic Journal, 2016. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2818659. 17 Travis, Alan. “Are EU Migrants Really Taking British Jobs and Pushing down Wages?” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, Accessed April 03, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/may/20/reality-check-are-eu-migrants-really-taking-british-jobs 18 Haynes, Gavin. “UK Trump Fans Gathered to 'Make Britain Great Again'.” Vice. VICE, Accessed April 10, 2019. https://www.vice.com/en_uk/article/3kyq45/uk-trump-fans-gathered-to-make-britain-great-again.

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Cultural backlash is important for populists who feel ignored, colonized or devalued.19 this measures a

rejection of pluralism is common, specifically amongst right-wing populists who see outsider “others” as

people “who threaten our way of life”.20The threats are seen to be a negative attitude towards the elites

from the populist supporters.

It is important to highlight the role of the populist leaders due to their role in being ‘the voice of the

people’ and utilize the globalist dimension since it is exclusive of certain groups, playing on the

subjective distrust of the electorates towards globalism21. Whether it is based on economic or cultural

reasoning’s. We do not explicitly focus on populist leaders in this study since our focuses is on the

supporters, but it is of great importance to mention how populist leaders such as Donald Trump utilize

this specific dimension to exclude Muslims22 or Mexicans23 from exploiting ‘his sovereign’ nation, the

United States of America.

2.2 Political and Social Identity

The identities of the populist supporters are central for social representation. To identify mutual attitudes,

we narrow down to two sorts of identities. The political and social identity, which are operationalized to

several measurements.

The political identity, or partisan identity is highlighted through party affiliation. The political identity of

populist parties enables us to categorize electorates that hold similar political preferences. This is

measured through which party one votes for, or has the most favor for, even if they do not to vote.

Although the political and social identities are compounded together in the electorate, they have different

implications for our analysis. The social identities for populist supporters may be similar but the political

identity could vary and vice-versa.

Our research aims to find if there are indeed cross-national similarities in populist supporters so the

political identity for our data will be narrowed down and filtered through two populist rhetoric: a) left-wing

populist and b) right-wing populist. The measure of political activity is central in identifying the electors’

faith in the government. We expect low levels of political activity due to the lack of faith in government. It

is also important to highlight this measurement was not included in Staerkle and Greens study

(explicitly), this measurement should deepen understand on the faith in government per left-right

populist. The political activity measures if the populist electorates have engaged in politics in the most

basic way by taking part in a petition. We expect a somewhat low result here too due to the distrust in

political institutions.

19 Bang, Henrik, and David Marsh. “Populism: a Major Threat to Democracy?” Policy Studies 39, no. 3 (April 2018): 352–63. https://doi.org/10.1080/01442872.2018.1475640 20 Brubaker, Rogers. “Between Nationalism and Civilizationism: the European Populist Moment in Comparative Perspective.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 40, no. 8 (March 2017): 1191–1226. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2017.1294700 21 Rodrik, Dani. "Populism and the Economics of Globalization." Journal of International Business Policy 1, no. 1-2 (2018): 12-33. 18). https://doi.org/10.1057/s42214-018-0001-4 22 “Trump Says Executive Order Is Not a Muslim Ban.” BBC News . BBC, Accessed April 10, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-us-canada-38786462/trump-says-executive-order-is-not-a-muslim-ban 23 “'Drug Dealers, Criminals, Rapists': What Trump Thinks of Mexicans.” BBC News. BBC, Accessed April 10 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-us-canada-37230916/drug-dealers-criminals-rapists-what-trump-thinks-of-mexicans.

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The social identity focuses rather on the conventions that divides people into different social groups

creating the ‘us’ and ‘them’. Social identities are based on categorical differences such as ethnicity,

gender, age, and social class and subjective and socially constructed. Since there are infinite types of

social identities, we narrow our research down to the subjective nature of the social identities attributed

to the populists. We focus therefore on measuring materialistic insecurity and interpersonal trust.

Material Insecurity focuses on the self-appraisal of the populist supporters’ economic status. If the

feeling is that ends are being met by household incomes, then there should be very little material

insecurity. On the other hand, if ends are felt to be not met, then there is a high level of material

insecurity leaving the respondent vulnerable. The material insecurities allow us to see if the populist are

satisfied with the status quo in their everyday living and any differences can be highlighted due to the

role of material insecurity due to economic climate or just sensation.

The social identity also opens up subjective affiliations where trust plays a major factor. Interpersonal

trust or rather distrust of other people is subjective to the electorate and plays in populist agendas of

ostracizing others when creating a divide between sovereign people and people of other social groups.

The measure of interpersonal trust should indicate how trusting the right-populists are vis-à-vis the left-

populist with people in general. Since the ideology of populism is based on distrust, we should be able to

analyze if this distrust of elites or others is extended onto people generally for the right-populist or if its

exclusive for specific groups in society and right-populists are trusting generically.

Our research question is to see if social characteristics play a role in differentiating the left-right

populists, so any differences highlighted under the social and political identity would signify that there is

indeed a factor beyond the political ideology which separates the left-right populist supporters. Staerkle

and Greens study concludes that right-populists retain lower levels of interpersonal trust and political

efficacy.24 Likewise, the left-wing populist are restrained by materialist needs due to their economic

struggles.25 So, these become central factors for us to test in the political and social identities of left-right

populists.

2.3 Social Position

Social position of the populist supporters will be presented to give a profile of what populist supporters

are represented as. These social categories are not part of the analysis. These categories consist of the

following:

- Gender: Measured dichotomously to either male or female

- Age: Average age of the entire survey sample

- Ethnicity: Measured dichotomously to either ethnic minority or not

- Education: Average years of education of the entire survey sample

- Unemployment history: Measured dichotomously to yes or no by viewing unemployment status of the

respondent in the time span of the previous 12 months

24 Ibid. (Staerklé and Green) 25 Ibid. (Inglehart and Norris)

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2.4 Literature Review

Staerkle & Greens study provides a great framework to test our data for the right-populists social

representation. We want to therefore review the literature relevant to left-right populists and apply

Staerkle and Greens framework to see what we should expect in the data for the left-right populists.

The Institutional dimension should show us clear signs of distrust between ‘the people’ and the elites.

High levels of mistrust should be seen from all populists because they have been neglected, betrayed or

exploited by the ruling elite26. Left-right populist ideologies have this common trait in this dimension and

utilize the ever-growing mistrust between the elites and the people. This distrust is used by populist

leaders to gain popularity and legitimacy to be advocating for the people in ways the elites do not.27

There should be clear patterns of association between the left-right populist because the elites

are the ones solely responsible for the problem-making, although to different degrees. The institutional

dimension is referred to a thin populist ideology, where there are only two homogenous group and the

divide in between them will be a democratic deficit.

The Globalist dimension should show some divergence between the left-right populists. Cultural

cleavages and backlash are used by right-wing populists 28 to create mistrust towards anyone that

advocates for something foreign to the sovereign nation, specifically immigrants who fail to assimilate

into society of the sovereign state. Right-populists also question if they’re endangering their identity 29

through this cultural backlash. The role of the economy plays into the left-wing populists, where

immigrants taking jobs is not seen as the threat, but rather the way the elites have dealt with the

economic crisis is the core issue30. The populist leader plays on distrust against the elites in pushing

their own fiscal policies to deal with the economic issues, usually with along other promises such as tax

cuts and increased wages. The globalist dimension can be developed into a thick populist ideology the

moment add-on ideologies are asserted into the political identity.31

The Identity Politics of left-right populists shadows the ideologies the populist roots itself from. Since

right-populism is usually complemented by nationalism vis a vis left-populism with socialist ideologies. It

is therefore important to filter populists into two distinctive groups (left-right). The political efficacy and

activity on the other hand should be relatively low, further fueling the willingness to support populism

since the rise of identity politics have been linked to the decline in collectivist organizations, such as

trade unions.

Social Identity and positions are also intertwined with the political identity in creating different categories

26 Rooduijn, Matthijs. “Why Is Populism Suddenly All the Rage?” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, Accessed April 10 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/world/political-science/2018/nov/20/why-is-populism-suddenly-so-sexy-the-reasons-are-many. 27 “The Rise and Rise of Populism?” OpenMind. Accessed June 8, 2019. https://www.bbvaopenmind.com/en/articles/the-rise-and-rise-of-populism/. 28 “Cultural Backlash.” Pippa Norris. Accessed May 18, 2019. https://www.pippanorris.com/cultural-backlash. 29 Traub, James. “The Economic Crisis Is Over. Populism Is Forever.” Foreign Policy. Foreign Policy, Accessed April 12, 2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/10/31/the-economic-crisis-is-over-populism-is-forever/ 30 Ibid. (Dani) 31 Mudde, Cas, and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. “Vox Populiorvox Masculini? Populism and Gender in Northern Europe and South America.” Patterns of Prejudice 49, no. 1-2 (2015): 16–36. https://doi.org/10.1080/0031322x.2015.1014197.

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of ‘us and them’. The role of gender predicts that left populism is more favorable amongst women.32

Likewise, right-populists should be exclusive of ethnic minorities due to the sensations toward “others”.

We should expect to see unemployment play a greater roll for the left-wing populists due to their

economic insecurities33

Research Design

This chapter focuses on the research model and design, we start with the methodology and data

selection for the research. Explanations of formulas and data models will be discussed and then the

scales and limitations as well as operationalization and case selection of the study will be discussed.

3.1 Method and Analysis

Using cross-sectional case study as our method was based upon what we were comparing from our

survey. Due to survey data being frequently employed within the cross-sectional analysis this was

matched to be the best method for us to pursue our research.

A cross-sectional case study design was derived from Bryman’s Social Research Methods34 and

consists of the following conventions:

- A small demographic of population: left-right populists

- More than one case: four nations and subsequently four parties

- At a single point in time: The survey was carried out in the same time period for all our cases (2016)

- Retain quantitative or quantifiable data: Yes

- Aim to find patterns of association: Through our covariation and correlation analysis

External validity will be high since we are analyzing multiple cases and aiming to find mutual patterns of

association across all cases. Meaning we can generalize our results if we see clear convergence in

attitudes across our four nations selected for populism, especially with regards to Staerkle and Greens

study who employed the same method.

3.1.1 Analysis

The analysis of the datasets was carried out on Microsoft Excel to allow us to manage the multiple tasks

and commands simultaneously to give quick and reliable results and tables with minimal human error.

We calculate the gradients, standard error, covariance and correlation of left-right wing populism for

every operationalized variable to get bivariate results required for our analysis. The operationalized

variables are highlighted in the Theoretical Framework chapter and are brought forward through

32 Clarke, Seán, and Sam Jones. “Guardian Quiz Finds Women More Populist than Men.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media Accessed April 10, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/30/guardian-survey-suggests-women-are-more-populist-than-men. 33 Ibid (Inglehart and Norris) 34 Bryman, A. (2016). Social Research Methods (5th ed.). London Oxford University Press. - References - Scientific Research Publishing.

13

qualitative research of academic articles and online articles.

The gradient of each dataset will be separately calculated for us to view the specific attitudes of the left-

right populist. These are important statistics, allowing us to see the differences independently, before

viewing the covariance and correlations which focus on the similarities and variances of both datasets.

Covariance shows the relationship between two variables, where neither can be categorized as

independent or dependent. If the relationship between the variables should be reciprocal then we get

values which are large relative to the scales of measurement.35 Negative covariance values indicate that

the relationship between the variables is negative and the variables move in inverse directions.36Positive

covariance values indicate that the relationship between the variables is positive and they move in the

same direction. Null covariance (and values close to zero) indicate no relationship or at all, thus

confirming the null hypothesis. It is also worthwhile highlighting that if all the values of the compared

variables are the identical then we could get 0 covariance, since there is no variation. The variables

incremental changes are identical to one another. To monitor this limitation, we have another control

measure through correlation.

Correlation also measures the relationship and direction of bivariate correlations. The key difference in

correlation is that it also indicates the strength of this relationship. All values of correlation are given in a

numerical value within the interval: -1 < x < 1.37Rather than being infinite because of the scales. The

extreme points -1 and 1 indicate a perfect negative and positive correlation relationship between the

variables. All other negative and positive numerical values are reflective of the strength and direction of

the correlation. Null hypothesis is confirmed when there is no correlation at all, and this occurs when the

correlation coefficient is very close to or equal to zero.

The formula and definitions for covariance and correlation:

Xi = Variable X value | X = Mean of X variable

Yi = Variable Y value | Ȳ = Mean of Y variable

Stdev = Standard deviation | n = Total number of observations

Covariance analysis and correlation are the most suitable methods to analyze the datasets because we

are comparing the same operationalized variable for two different demographics (left-right populists).

There is no differentiation on what could be classified as an independent or dependent variable between

these variables since they are the same and our focus is solely on the variation, direction and strength of

35 Michael, Ajith, and Aniruddha Ingle. “Difference Between Covariance and Correlation (with Comparison Chart).” Key Differences. Accessed May 18, 2019. https://keydifferences.com/difference-between-covariance-and-correlation.html. 36 “Covariance - Definition, Formula, and Practical Example.” Corporate Finance Institute. Accessed May 18, 2019. https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/finance/covariance/. 37 Ibid. (Ajith and Ingle)

14

correlation between them. Having no definite independent or dependent variable immediately rules out

regression analysis and Pearson's r, because they require measurements on independent and

dependent variables which we do not have in our study.

The analysis does not consist with Staerkle and Greens analytical tools due to the inclusiveness of both

left-right populists which makes us lose that mutualism which was retained in Staerkle and Greens case

selection.

3.2 Data Selection

The analysis consists of survey data available from European Social Survey 2016 (ESS8). ESS conduct

biennial cross-national surveys of attitudes and behavior throughout European states.38 This data is

useful to utilize since the surveys consists of political and social attitudes, personal, economical and

geological traits of European respondents over the age of 15.

Since the dissertation is regarding social representation, the dataset allows identification of populist

conventions in a quantitative manner across four European countries, when we filter for the specific

niche populist demographics to increase our external validity and ability to generalize results for that

specific demographic. Staerkle and Green also used the same data source but their data was derived

from ESS7 which was conducted in 2014.

3.2.1 Scales and Centrality Measurements

We operationalize the survey data from ESS8 to be analyzed individually in our methodology. Since the

data source is the same, we can establish and define the scales, centrality measures and variables

together.

The ESS8 data is survey answers from Populist Party supporters. Since the data is primarily of a

subjective nature it is measured as an ordinal variable. Thereby can we rank the ordinal variables but

not measure the incremental changes between the subjective choices made by the respondents.

The x-axis for the bar charts is therefore subjective and representative of the subjective opinions of the

respondents (with the exemption of certain charts in Social Position).

The y-axis represents the frequency of answers in percentage. This gives a relative measurement based

on the frequency of the same answer rather than an absolute measure on the number of respondents

(N) who answered in the same way. This relative measurement allows us to a) generalize for the entire

left-populist relative to right-populist and b) combat the issue of uneven observations N from either of the

populist parties.

For centrality measures we selected the averages of the two right-left populist parties since averages

38 “About ESS.” FAQ | European Social Survey (ESS). Accessed April 10, 2019. https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/about/faq.html.

15

are the most accurate fit for ordinal variables. The centrality measurement of averages was given in

relative terms.

3.3 Operationalization

Operationalization is the process of defining abstracts concepts into measurable variables.

For our ESS8 data set it means changing the survey data from ordinal variables into statistics through

covariance and correlational analysis. Allowing us to compare ordinal variables in relative terms.39

For higher reliability with regards Staerkle and Greens study, we have decided to operationalize the

same questions which measure trust. The differences come in the measurements of Cultural

acceptance where we measure acceptance of European Unification and Democratic deficit where the

measurements sensation toward political change.

The reason for these additional operationalizations in Cultural acceptance was to confirm our suggestive

factors for instances such as Brexit and view if the right-left populists have a common view to

supranational governance beyond national governance. For the democratic deficit it was important to

see the sensations toward political inclusion of the left-right populists to see if there are any patterns of

association present.

3.4 Country and Party Selection

Selecting appropriate countries for the analysis is central for representation and generalization of

populism. The dataset is derived from a survey conducted in 2016, at a time of austerity and uncertainty

due to the war in Syria and terrorist threats and attacks across European nations.

We have therefore selected four parties that have populist rhetoric used or ingrained in their manifestos,

have been implicated by the European refugee crisis or the Eurozone debt crisis and have seen a rise in

support in the past two decades. Since the named reasoning were contemporary issues in public debate

at the time of the survey, they are acknowledged in the correct context for us to measure populism.

Spain and Netherlands have been selected to represent left-wing populism. Spain has been implicated

by the Eurozone debt crisis which led to an increase in government debt amongst other economic

challenges. This gives the perfect breeding ground for populist parties such as Podemos to thrive

representing left-wing rhetoric. Netherlands’ Socialist Party on the other hand has had populist rhetoric

and anti-elitism40 in the election manifestos of 2012 which led to the party to retaining their 15 seats in

parliament, some elements of Euroscepticism have also been observed by the party regarding

39 Social Research Glossary. Accessed August 12, 2019.

https://www.qualityresearchinternational.com/socialresearch/operationalisation.htm. 40 Otjes, Simon, and Tom Louwerse. “Populists in Parliament: Comparing Left-Wing and Right-Wing Populism in the Netherlands.” Political Studies 63, no. 1 (2013): 60–79. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.12089.

16

supranational governance.41 Due to the ideological add-on of socialism to the anti-elitist sentiment, the

Socialist Party naturally fits into the left-wing rhetoric.

United Kingdom and Sweden are selected for the right-wing populism. The Swedish Democrats (SD)

have had strong anti-immigration stance, which grew throughout the refugee crisis in 2015 where

Sweden had ‘open borders’ for refugees. This subsequently allowed SD to push the anti-immigration

stance further and led to an increase of SD MPs in the general election of 2018.42 United Kingdom's

Independence Party (UKIP) has had similar stances towards immigration but also towards supranational

governance in the EU. UKIP has been a strong advocate for Brexit and has MPs in the European

parliament, but only one MP in the British Parliament43. The anti-elitist sentiment is mutual across all

these parties but that doesn’t mean all these parties have populist leaders.

Due to time restrains for the thesis and limited countries who have both left and right populist parties. An

interesting case would be to view Greece which has both – since the ESS8 did not include Greece when

the survey took place, we cannot focus on specific countries.

3.4.1 Populist Parties and Populist Leaders

Filtering these countries down to populist parties is a necessary step of identifying the right demographic

for our social representation. It is also extremely important to distinguish populist leaders from an

‘ordinary’ party and a party with populist rhetoric ingrained.

The reason we have chosen pairs of populist parties from different countries opposing to left-right

populist parties in the same country is for us to be able to generalize our results from the specific

segments of four diverse populations, rather than two. Besides external validity, not all states have a

left-populist and right-populist party. If that was the case, then we have another limitation which arises if

with finding reliable data or any data at all on ESS8 which can allow us to include that country in our

analysis.

Populist leaders play a central role in which they claim to represent the voice of the sovereign people.

We must therefore create a clear differentiation between the populist leader and the Populist Party to be

accurate in our research when studying the representation of the electorates. The limitation with our

party selection is that ordinary parties can see increases in popularity due to populist leaders, this

cannot be disentangled from populist rhetoric internally within the party, or externally within the media.

Therefore, the limitation of party selection not being fully representative cannot be passed as

trivial because party loyalty and identity politics can cause electors to favour a party even though they

41 “Dutch Euroscepticism Moves Mainstream.” EUobserver. Accessed May 19, 2019. https://euobserver.com/eu-election/123923. 42 “Election Results 2018.” Till startsidan. Accessed June 13, 2019. https://www.val.se/servicelankar/other-languages/english-engelska/election-results-2018.html 43 Traynor, Ian. “'A Sad Day for Britain' as BNP Members Take European Parliament Seats.” The Guardian. Guardian News

and Media. Accessed June 15, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jul/14/nick-griffin-andrew-brons-bnp-european-

parliament.

17

may not agree with the populist leader. A contemporary example of this would be to view the populist

Donald Trump. Trump’s leadership and views on immigration and the EU aren’t universal across the

entire Republican partisans. Hence using such a party to measure populism would lead to low validity.

Table 1 presents information regarding the selected countries and parties for the analysis.

Country Party Leader (in 2016) Type of rhetoric Respondents (N)

Sweden Swedish Democrats Jimmie Åkesson Right-wing populist

80

United Kingdom

United Kingdom Independence Party

Nigel Farage Right-wing populist

57

Spain Podemos Pablo Iglesias Left-wing populist 159

Netherlands

Socialist Party Emile Roemer Left-wing populist 100

3.5 Filters and Limitations

Party identification was filtered through which party the survey respondents felt closest to. This filter was

used as opposed to which party the respondents voted for in the last election because it was inclusive of

a greater number of respondents. Respondents over the ages 15 but under the legal age of voting in

their respective state. The sentimental attachment of feeling closer to a party may also not be reflective

of the voting behavior of the respondent. Party loyalty, voting for different parties and not believing a

party will win with your vote can therefore be combated through this filter for a more accurate

representation and external validity.

Due to filtering, the total number of observations became limited, specifically for the right-populist parties

whom had a combined N= 137 whilst the left-populist parties had a combined N= 260. This leaves us

with an under-represented right-populism and an over-represented left-populism with approximately

48% margin. This limitation can therefore cause low reliability since the quantity in the subsets of

comparable data are inconsistent with one another. We dealt with this limitation in the methodology by

measuring the frequency of observations (N) in percentage, rather than the observation N in absolute

measures. This led to the relative representation of answers, which would combat the limitation we have

with the absolute measures.

Results and Analysis

Results and analysis are set in four parts to go through key parts of the research: Institutional and

Globalist dimension aim to identify what converges and diverges for the left-right populists. The Political

and Social Identity view the material, political and interpersonal trust of the left-right populists. Social

position and profiles of populists are discussed.

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4.1 Institutional dimension:

The two subsections for this dimension are Institutional trust which measures the ‘us’ and ‘them’ mistrust

towards political institutions and Democratic Deficit, which measures the sentiment of inclusiveness and

satisfaction of democratic political systems.

Institutional Trust

Institutional trust is the basis for these tables where we operationalize the ‘elite’ as the parliament, legal

system, politicians and parties. The four tables and figures below show sensations toward the respective

institute. The x-axis for each bar chart represents the ordinal scale answers 0-10 on sensation where 0

signifies no trust and 10 complete trust. The y-axis represents the quantity of the respondents who

answered in percentage.

Table of analysis on Trust in Parliament.

Trust in Parliament Populism (Entirety) Left-Wing Populism Right-Wing Populism

Gradient -1,10 -0,70 -1,50

Standard Deviation 5,30 5,82 6,33

Covariance 19,44 N/A N/A

Correlation 0,58 N/A N/A

19

There is a clear negative view towards the parliament from the populist supporters but more so by the

right-wing populist supporters. The correlation between the left-right populists is relatively strong and

positive, thereby confirming that the mistrust in the country's parliament is present for left-right populists.

Table of analysis on Trust in the Legal system

Trust in the legal system Populism (Entirety) Left-Wing Populism Right-Wing Populism

Gradient -0,66 -0,49 -0,82

Standard Deviation 4,64 5,01 5,17

Covariance 15,65 N/A N/A

Correlation 0,67 N/A N/A

The negative gradients indicate a mistrust towards the legal system with slightly higher trust levels

towards the legal system from the left-wing populists. The correlation is strong and positive between the

parties, confirming the mistrust towards the legal institutions in the left-right populists.

Table of analysis on Trust in Politicians

Trust in politicians Populism (Entirety) Left-Wing Populism Right-Wing Populism

Gradient -1,93 -1,54 -2,33

Standard Deviation 7,01 6,66 7,01

Covariance 36,77 N/A N/A

Correlation 0,72 N/A N/A

The negative gradients are steep when it comes to mistrust in politicians for the left-right populists with a

strong positive correlation. There is again a higher mistrust from the right-wing populists toward

politicians. The mistrust towards politicians is the highest in this subsection leading us to believe that

individuality is a major factor when facing distrust towards the political institutions. It is the people, rather

than parties which retain the most distrust.

Table of analysis on Trust in Political Parties

Trust in political parties Populism (Entirety) Left-Wing Populism Right-Wing Populism

Gradient -1,65 -1,39 -1,91

Standard Deviation 6,69 6,55 7,43

Covariance 36,71 N/A N/A

Correlation 0,83 N/A N/A

The negative gradients indicate that the right-wing populists lose trust in political parties in a faster pace

20

than the left-wing populist. There is a strong positive correlation between the left-right populist,

confirming the mistrust in political parties.

Democratic Deficit

Democratic Deficit aims on measuring the inclusiveness of the democratic systems in place for the left-

right populist. There are two tables and figures below show sensation towards governments’

inclusiveness in decision making and how satisfied people are with democracy. The x-axis for both bar

charts represents the ordinal scale answers ranging from 0-4 & 0-10. 0 represents No

inclusiveness/Dissatisfied and 4/10 Inclusive/Satisfied. The y-axis represents the quantity of the

respondents who answered in percentage.

Table of analysis on Political Inclusiveness - Political System allows people to have a say in what gov.

does

Political System Inclusiveness Populism (Entirety) Left-Wing Populism Right-Wing Populism

Gradient -7,63 -6,95 -8,31

Standard Deviation 18,24 16,98 19,69

Covariance 262,13 N/A N/A

Correlation 0,98 N/A N/A

There are extremely steep negative gradients for the left-right populists, some of this steepness could be

accounted to the limited 5-answer scales. The covariance coefficient is extremely high considering the

5-answer scale and there is an almost perfect correlation between the left-right populists. These results

indicate that there is indeed a very strong sensation of exclusion of the people from political processes

which plays right into the thin political ideological definition of populism.

Table of analysis on Satisfaction with Democracy - How satisfied with the way democracy works in

country

Satisfaction with Democracy Populism (Entirety) Left-Wing Populism Right-Wing Populism

Gradient -0,62 -0,49 -0,76

21

Standard Deviation 4,05 4,81 4,51

Covariance 10,12 N/A N/A

Correlation 0,51 N/A N/A

There is a minute negative gradient from the left-right populists but with very low covariance and well

spread out results. The correlation shows a positive correlation showing these attitudes are mutual for

populist representation. Thereby, we see a negative sentiment towards how democracy works in the

four countries involved in the cross-sectional study from the populist supporters.

Findings:

The democratic deficit shows clear convergence between the left-right populists. There is both

sentimental insecurities toward how democracies work and lack of political inclusiveness. This exclusion

from political processes can explain the negative view towards democracy. This lack of intervention is

what decreases political efficacy and explains why populist leaders tend to advocate for direct

democracy and easy solution to complex issues such as being inclusive in a democratic system.

The institutional dimension shows clear convergence between the left-right populist. There is

institutional distrust toward political institutions. Interestingly, the politicians are seen with the most

distrust and the legal system the least, this result is interesting because the ‘othering’ of individual

politicians as opposed to political parties shows a greater distrust. Future research focused on trust in

key leaders could shine further light to explain this attitude. The institutional dimension confirms that

institutional distrust is across all populists.

4.2 Globalist dimension

There are two subsections for this dimension which focus on the people themselves as well as

ostracizing others. Economic threats measure the economic threat posed by globalism and Cultural

acceptance focuses rather on the cultural and identity roles for the sovereign people, if immigration and

supranational governance bring value to the sovereign nation.

Economic Threats:

Economic threats measures the sentiment towards immigrants, whether they are exhausting the

economic resources of a nation or enriching it. The table and figure below show the sensation towards

immigration and their enrichment of the economy. The x-axis represents the ordinal scale ranging 0-10,

where 0 means immigrants are bad for the economy and 10 vise-versa. The y-axis represents the

quantity of the respondents who answered in percentage.

22

Table of analysis on Economic Threats - Immigration good for the Economy

Economic Threats Populism (Entirety) Left-Wing Populism Right-Wing Populism

Gradient -0,26 1,00 -1,52

Standard Deviation 5,22 7,57 7,02

Covariance 0,99 N/A N/A

Correlation 0,02 N/A N/A

There is a negative gradient from the right-wing populist whereas the left-wing populist retain a positive

gradient. Factoring the right-left populist into one still leave a slightly negative gradient at -0,26 so there

is a stronger anti-immigration sentiment due to economic threats from the right-wing populists then the

pro-immigration sentiment for economic development from the left-wing populists. The interesting result

in this analysis is the extremely minute positive covariance coefficient and positive correlation coefficient

which both indicate little to no relationship and thereby indicating a null hypothesis between the dataset.

Whereas the gradients and bar charts indicate a clear strong negative correlation.

Cultural Acceptance:

Cultural acceptance focuses on the culture of the sovereign nation being enriched by immigrants. There

is also a measurement on how much the European Project of ‘Unification’ can stample on national

identities through Euroscepticism. The x-axis represents the ordinal scale ranging 0-10, where 0 means

immigrants are bad for culture/EU gone too far and 10 for Immigrants enrichen cultural life/EU should go

further. The y-axis represents the quantity of the respondents who answered in percentage.

23

Table of analysis on Cultural Enrichment - Cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants

Immigration to culture enrichment

Populism (Entirety) Left-Wing Populism Right-Wing Populism

Gradient 0,19 1,75 -1,37

Standard Deviation 3,19 7,06 6,21

Covariance -21,67 N/A N/A

Correlation -0,54 N/A N/A

As expected from left-right wing ideologies there is a divergence of opinion regarding immigration to

cultural enrichment. The left-wing populists’ gradient for cultural enrichment sensation is stronger than

the right-wings leaving the gradient representative for all populists to be positive. There is also a

negative covariance coefficient and a strong negative correlation indicating the inverse relation of the

left-right populists thereby proving that there is a divergence in opinion for cultural diversity from the left-

right populists.

Table of analysis on Euroscepticism - European Unification, go further or gone too far

European Unification Project Populism (Entirety) Left-Wing Populism Right-Wing Populism

Gradient -0,69 0,54 -1,92

Standard Deviation 4,38 4,12 8,08

Covariance -2,46 N/A N/A

Correlation -0,08 N/A N/A

There is a clear divergence in opinion towards the Unification project of the European Union. The right-

wing populist have a negative gradient whereas the left-wing positive. This is reflected in the covariance

analysis which has a negative number, likewise in the correlation coefficient. Both coefficients are

relatively small. It is noticeable in the bar chart that a large proportion of the left-right populists are

neutral towards the EU project. We can therefore deduce that Euroscepticism does indeed exist within

the right-populist but not in the left-populist.

24

Findings:

Economic threats gives controversial results in the analysis. We can see from the bar charts and

gradients that there is a clear inverse and negative relationship showing divergence between the left-

right populists. The data also passes with general views associated towards immigration enriching the

economy, being negative from typical right-populists and positive from left-populists. Due to an

extremely low correlation and covariance, the null hypothesis is proven for this specific measure.

The cultural backlash gives interesting results and shows divergence once again between the

left-right populists. Right-populists are more Eurosceptic and find cultural life to be undermined with

immigration as expected from the literature review. This shows that the anti-elitism exceeds above and

beyond national governance and relates to our democratic deficit results. On the other hand the left-

populists are a positive attitude towards immigrants’ value in enriching the culture for cultural diversity.

This positivity extends to supranational governance. This demonstrates that the anti-elitist sentiment for

left-populist is limited to national governance and that the democratic deficit is an ‘inside’ problem of only

the sovereign state.

4.3 Political Identity and Social Identity

The Political and Social Identity views the left-right populists to see if the insecurity and negative attitude

towards political institutions is extended in their everyday living in interpersonal trust, materialistic needs.

Political activity and efficacy will also be viewed to measure their political engagement. The table and

figure below show political efficacy, political activity, material insecurities and interpersonal trust. The x-

axis represents the ordinal scale and varies per table. The y-axis represents the quantity of the

respondents who answered in percentage.

25

Table of analysis on Political Efficacy - Able to take active role in Political Group

Political Efficacy Populism (Entirety) Left-Wing Populism Right-Wing Populism

Gradient -7,12 -7,52 -6,72

Standard Deviation 13,46 13,76 13,20

Covariance 144,20 N/A N/A

Correlation 0,99 N/A N/A

Political efficacy is the only factor in this research which shows almost perfect correlation. There is a

high positive covariance relative to the 5-scale answers indicating a positive relation in the same

direction. The left-wing populist are slightly more negative towards political participation than the right-

wing populist.

This proves that political efficacy is very low, meaning the belief, understanding and intervention into

politics is mutual across all populists. This plays hand in hand with the Democratic Deficit measurements

indicating the gap between the democratic political system and the marginalized populists.

Table of analysis on Political Activity - Signed petition in the past 12 months

Political Activity Populism (Entirety) Left-Wing Populism Right-Wing Populism

Yes (Average %) 44,48 47,85 41,10

No (Average %) 55,53 52,15 58,90

Number of observations (N) 394 259 135

Measuring political activity in forms of petitions which is the most user-friendly method and direct method

to bring political or social changes. It is also another indicator on how much we can measure political

activity. Due to the dichotomous answer options we had to change the table of analysis to suit the data.

Approximately 45% of the sample have engaged in a political activity in the past year across left-right

populist groups.

26

Even though the political efficacy is low, we see a fair amount of engagement in the left-right populists in

the most direct method for political change available to them, this matches with the theory that populists

want more deliberation.44

Table of analysis on Material Insecurity - Feelings about household’s income nowadays

Material Insecurity Populism (Entirety) Left-Wing Populism Right-Wing Populism

Gradient -13,11 -9,30 -16,92

Standard Deviation 18,06 14,64 22,73

Covariance 214,81 N/A N/A

Correlation 0,86 N/A N/A

There are steep negative gradients for the left-right populists toward material insecurity. The measure

shows us that the right-wing populist feel more comfortable with the status quo when thinking in regards

of everyday errands. The left-wing populist follow suit but are slightly less secure. There is a high

covariance coefficient relative to the 4-answer scale and a strong positive correlation showing that this a

point of convergence for the left-right populism.

Material insecurity thus proves that the materialistic needs of both left-right populists are being met.

They are mutually feeling somewhat comfortably with their current incomes. There is a higher material

insecurity (by economic means) within the left-wing populist, proving the hypothesis by Inglehart and

Norris correct that left-populist parties attract the economically insecure.

Table of analysis on Interpersonal trust - Most people can be trusted, or you can’t be too careful

Interpersonal Trust Populism (Entirety) Left-Wing Populism Right-Wing Populism

Gradient 0,07 0,50 -0,37

Standard Deviation 6,69 7,11 7,18

Covariance 35,05 N/A N/A

Correlation 0,75 N/A N/A

Interpersonal trust also shows convergence for the left-right populists with a strong positive correlation of

0,75. The negative gradient for the right-populist show that there a negative attitude towards the

unknown, whereas the left-populist retain a positive outlook.

A large proportion of the right-populists are leaning towards neutrality and not being too careful with

most people insinuating mistrust in their interpersonal trust. The left-populist follow suit but retain a big

proportion between neutrality and being trustworthy. The gradient representative of populism as a whole

is still positive, showing that trust is seen for most people but on a very minute gradient.

44 “Why Populists Should Avoid Direct Democracy.” Democracy International e.V. Accessed May 19, 2019. https://www.democracy-international.org/why-populists-should-avoid-direct-democracy

27

Findings:

Political efficacy was low for the left-right populists with a 99% correlation indicating that they mutually

have a lack of belief in the political institutions. The negative gradients indicates that the populists lack

confidence in taking part in political groups and this can be generalized for all populists. Political activity

on the other hand shows that circa 45% of populists have taken part in at least one institutional method

to bring about political change. Although the 45% figure seems adequate to believe that the populists

prefer deliberation, we cannot be certain without seeing this figure to other non-populist parties.

Material insecurity was also a point of convergence for the left-right populists. Where a clear

majority felt that they can live comfortably with the status quo. The noticeable with this convergence was

with the left-populist who were somewhat more insecure with the household incomes confirming our

hypothesis of left-populists being economically challenged true. Interpersonal was the only

measurement which showed conflicting results. Although there is a positive correlation between the left-

right populists we see a negative gradient for the right-populist indicating a stronger distrust towards

people in general. This distrust can be identified as the only point of divergence in the political and social

identities of populists.

4.4 Social Position

This section provides some statistics on the social position and profile of populists from our cross-

sectional case study. There is no analysis done in this section. The information provides a good outlook

on what genders, ages, education level and unemployment statuses are reflected in the populist sample

of our research.

Tabulation on Gender

Gender Populism (Entirety) Left-Wing Populism Right-Wing Populism

Male (Average %) 58,35 49,85 66,85

Female (Average %) 41,65 50,15 33,15

Number of observations (N) 396 259 137

As the literature review suggested, we see a greater number of females engaged in left-populism where

it is almost a 50/50 split. Due to dichotomous answer options in the dataset, we were unable to be

inclusive of other genders. The right-populists are dominated by males, through a considerably small

margin.

Tabulation on Age

Age Swedish Democrats United Kingdom Independence Party

Socialist Party Podemos

Years (Average) 51 54 52 43

Number of observations (N)

80 57 100 159

28

The populist supporters consist almost entirely of baby boomers with the exception of Podemos which

has a somewhat younger following. Older people being the primary group for right-populism could be

attributed to their low interpersonal trust making them prone to follow ideologies that are attractive and

traditional to them, that challenge change such as nationalism45.This would also explain why Podemos

includes a younger following since the party has newly been established in 2014.

Tabulation on Ethnic Minorities

Belong to Ethnic Minority Populism (Entirety) Left-Wing Populism Right-Wing Populism

Yes (Average %) 3,85 3,80 3,90

No (Average %) 96,15 96,20 96,10

Number of observations (N) 389 253 136

The inclusiveness of ethnic minorities is mutual in the left-right populists with circa 4% of the following

belonging to ethnic minorities. For the right-populist this statistic makes sense since ostracizing others is

an established trait for cultural rejection. On the other hand, the left-populist are more inclusive of

females and have a more inclusive platform for ethnic minorities. Ethnic minorities have empirically been

more dominant in left-wing parties46 so it is unclear to explain the low participation.

Tabulation on Education

Years of full-time education completed.

Swedish Democrats United Kingdom Independence Party

Socialist Party Podemos

Years (Average) 11,6 12,4 13,7 14,2

Number of observations (N)

80 57 100 156

All of the populists have at least completed upper-school education. The left-populists are slightly more

educated with their education levels until sixth form. The levels of education are still relatively low for the

populist supporters since this amount of years in education does not give any of the populist supporters’

specialist knowledge in a specific field, or even a degree. The rise in populism has previously been

linked to the failure of education47 because education brings empowerment thus tackling populist

ideologies with knowledge.

Tabulation on Unemployment

Period of unemployment and seeking work in past year

Populism (Entirety) Left-Wing Populism Right-Wing Populism

Yes (Average %) 47,7 50,0 45,4

45 “The Politics of Ageing.” Psychology Today. Sussex Publishers. Accessed May 19, 2019. https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/out-the-darkness/201806/the-politics-ageing. 46 Campbell, Prof Rosie. “The Puzzle of the People Least Likely to Vote Tory.” BBC News. BBC. Accessed May 19, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-45765496. 47 “Is the Rise of Populism the Result of a Failure of Education?” Varkey Foundation. Accessed May 19, 2019. https://www.educationandskillsforum.org/news-blogs/is-the-rise-of-populism-the-result-of-a-failure-of-education/.

29

No (Average %) 52,3 50,0 54,6

Number of observations (N) 167 127 40

Unemployment in the past year has a high percentage for the left-right populists. This factor does not

seem to create any effect on the material insecurity although it can leave the sentiment of uncertainty.

Left-populism in the European Periphery has been associated to unemployment whereas Central

Europe and Northern Europe have used increasingly seen unemployment used to push people towards

right-populist or nationalist parties.48

4.5 Limitations

There were many limitations through the study, especially when it comes to generalizations and using

filters for further specificity. The filtration led to a large decrease in number of observations (N) leading to

volatile results which are difficult to interpret. There were also some discrepancies under ‘Economic

threats’ due to covariance indicating null hypothesis when the charts show a clear inverse negative

covariance relationship. The pairs of parties tended to converge with each other on most factors but it is

clear from the analysis which was carried out on excel that Netherlands Socialist Party was in most

cases noticeably different, raising the question if it really is a good case in of a left-populist

representation.

Limitations regarding the data itself can be seen when operationalizing was not completely satisfying

regarding what we aim to measure. With more data regarding specific positions within the political

systems such as ‘Trust in Party Leader’ could have led us to measure the sentiment towards the

populist leader, who are the ones who utilize populist ideologies. Additionally, the scales utilized in the

dataset were not consistent throughout the survey data set, limiting us to combine the statistics into one

measurement for each dimension. Due to time restrictions we were only able to focus on attitudes

towards “the elites” and “ostracized others” which is what the literature review suggested, such as

political institutions and marginalized people in society.

We were very limited both in data and time to focus on the economic elites, the cultural elites, the

religious elites and most importantly the media and social media elites. These groups have a variety of

resources and platforms to reach out to a much greater audience than conventional methods.

Conclusion

We start the conclusion by answering the research question. We discovered firstly that political ideology

is indeed a very good filter for populists. There is clear convergence and patterns of association

between left-right populists regarding distrust toward political institutions and indications of democratic

deficits explain this creation of ‘otherness’ between the people and the elites.

48 “How Populists Thrive in Hard Economic Times.” London Business School. Accessed May 19, 2019. https://www.london.edu/lbsr/how-populists-thrive-in-hard-economic-times

30

As for globalism and culturalism there was a divergence in attitudes from the left-right populists. The

right-populist has been anti-globalist due to cultural backlash whereas the left-populists retained a

positive attitude towards globalism. Similarly, the economic threats indicated that left-populists felt

immigration can increase economic situation of a country but the right-wing disagreed, due to an

extremely low correlations coefficient we cannot confirm this to be true with complete certainty.

Investigating social characteristics and relations that differed between left-right populists was then

focused upon in the social and political identities of the populists. We identified at least one

characteristic which was different between the left-right populist and this was interpersonal trust. So, the

research question is explicitly answered with a yes. Although the correlations are high between the left-

right populist, the left-populists are more trusting of people generically than the right-populist who

retained a negative gradient.

Low interpersonal trust is a strong indicator to explaining why populists exclude themselves from others

and have distrust towards the elites. The two central conventions of populism and this research are

a) trust and b) the people. Distrust is continually present in the right-populists towards people generally,

in addition to institutions. The left-populist have distrust only towards the institutions but retain positive

trust levels towards people. The specific differences in views on immigration which splits a populist in

the left-right spectrum is extended in the right-populist because distrust in the interpersonal nature for

the right-populist. This indication hints on feelings of paranoia and exclusion exerted from the right-

populist.

The social position of populists shows that most left-right populists are high school educated baby

boomers, they do not belong to ethnic minorities and roughly half of them have been unemployed in the

past year. The left-populist are split 50/50 in gender representation whereas the right-populist consists

primarily of males.

Through the social representation of populism we can see the negative attitudes and relations of the

‘pure sovereign people’ towards the ‘elites’ and political institutions. When the question arises as to

which people the populists relate to within their society, the role of political ideologies they sympathize

with best come into play alongside their interpersonal trusts. Leaving all left-right populists open to

nationalism and socialism, even though they all retain similar social positions in society.

Staerkle and Greens study on right-populists concluded that right-populists felt political powerlessness,

social distrust, had low level of education and low levels of trust in fellow citizens and our study

concludes the same results for right-populists. The complimentary value we added to their conclusion is

that these conventions are extended onto the left-populists on many factors when we view institutional

distrust confirming a pattern of association, but the divergence comes on the globalist dimension where

trust for fellow citizens is higher for the left-populists, a positive view towards supranational governance

and openness.

Future research can bring more value by being inclusive of other types of types of ‘advantaged’ elites,

specifically intellectual, economic, supranational and media elites to investigate if the negative attitude

extends to any type of advantaged positions from populists. There should also be focuses on specificity

31

on distrust in important leaders such as the heads of governments and organizations. Populist leaders

usually are negative towards the establishment. Our results confirmed that the greatest distrust was in

politicians as opposed to political parties or government organizations. The populist ideologies thrives on

forms of ‘otherness’ to sustain itself, the sentiments towards ‘otherness’ is what needs to be tackled for

populism to be defused.

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35

Annex

NOTE:

The data below is compromised raw data, where codes, units of measurements and raw data is not shown

– Analysing the data below without the excel sheet can give misleading results.

See the attached excel file where the sheets show the data in detail.

Method name Code in Excel (Swedish) Comments

Gradient LUTNING

Standard Deviation STDAV

Covariance (coefficient) KOVAR

Correlation (coefficient) KORREL

Average MEDEL

This command was used only in the rawdata re-arrangement

under 'Left-wing Populism' and 'Right-wing Populism'

Total SUMMA The usage of this command came only in sheet 'Social Position'

Bar chart - Y-axis limits were manually adjusted to the closest extreme point

Bubble Diagram - Y-axis limits were manually adjusted to the closest extreme point

** Each sheet contains raw data exported from ESS8. Sorted by the following country order ( View Column 2):

Rows A-E: Sweden / Filter "Which party feel closer to, Sweden, Sverigedemokraterna"

Rows G-K: United Kingdom / Filter "Which party feel closer to, United Kingdom, UK Independence Party"

Rows M-Q: Netherlands / Filter "Which party feel closer to, Netherlands, Socialist Party"

Rows S-W: Spain / Filter "Which party feel closer to, Spain, Podemos"

** Each Table of Analysis (containing codes) is located below or to the right of the raw data exports from ESS8.

** Each Barchart is located below or to the right of the raw data exports from ESS8.

** Each Bubble Diagram is located below or to the right of the raw data exports from ESS8.

Link to datasource: http://nesstar.ess.nsd.uib.no/webview/

36

Trust in political parties Left-Populism Right-Populism Populism

No trust at all 0 17,65 20 18,825

1 4,25 9,15 6,7

2 13,6 15 14,3

3 14,7 17,7 16,2

4 11,75 13,65 12,7

Neutral 5 15,4 14,65 15,025

6 13,5 2,5 8

7 6,5 4,3 5,4

8 2,55 0,9 1,725

9 0 0,6 0,3

Complete 10 0 0,9 0,45

Trust in politicians Left-Populism Right-Populism Populism

No trust at all 0 19,65 24,7 22,175

1 7,15 12,6 9,875

2 13,2 17,65 15,425

3 13,15 18,05 15,6

4 9,15 11,95 10,55

Neutral 5 14,7 7,75 11,225

6 14,55 1,9 8,225

7 7,45 2,15 4,8

8 1 1,8 1,4

9 0 0,65 0,325

Complete 10 0 0,9 0,45

Trust in the legal system Left-Populism Right-Populism Populism

No trust at all 0 12,3 10,6 11,45

1 6,05 4,3 5,175

2 7,3 12,2 9,75

3 9,35 15,5 12,425

4 11 12,7 11,85

Neutral 5 14,6 14,6 14,6

6 10,3 12,35 11,325

7 17,35 7,45 12,4

8 9,15 8,4 8,775

9 2,25 1,9 2,075

Complete 10 0,3 0 0,15

37

Trust in country's parliamentLeft-Populism Right-Populism Populism

No trust at all 0 11,05 15,7 13,375

1 5,8 8,2 7

2 7,6 15,25 11,425

3 13,7 18,15 15,925

4 12,4 8,2 10,3

Neutral 5 12 15,85 13,925

6 20,3 8,35 14,325

7 10 6,05 8,025

8 6,05 2,55 4,3

9 0,65 0 0,325

Complete 10 0,5 1,75 1,125

How satisfied with the way democracy works in country Right-wing Populism Left-Wing Populism Populism

0 9,9 8,35 9,125

1 9,35 6,45 7,9

2 12,5 10,3 11,4

3 8,7 10,1 9,4

4 18,85 11,9 15,375

5 11,4 13,45 12,425

6 5,55 16 10,775

7 10,75 11,15 10,95

8 6,55 10,75 8,65

9 2,55 1 1,775

10 4 0,5 2,25

Political system allows people to have a say in what government does Right-wing Populism Left-Wing Populism Populism

Not at all 19,65 17,9 18,8

Very little 51,05 44,5 47,8

Some 23 27,85 25,4

A lot 5,3 8,8 7,1

A great deal 1 1 1,0

38

Immigration bad or good for country's economy Right-wing Populist Left-Wing Populist Populist

0 14,05 2,65 8,35

1 9,9 0,65 5,275

2 12,9 1,7 7,3

3 18,8 6,2 12,5

4 11,75 5,3 8,525

5 20,2 24,65 22,425

6 2,8 15,65 9,225

7 3,95 15,5 9,725

8 4,15 15,4 9,775

9 0,65 6,05 3,35

10 0,9 6,3 3,6

Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants Left-Populism Right-Populism Populist

0 0,8 15,5 8,1

1 1,0 7,1 4,0

2 2,2 14,8 8,5

3 6,2 15,7 10,9

4 5,6 11,0 8,3

5 8,0 18,2 13,1

6 10,5 4,6 7,5

7 22,5 7,0 14,7

8 18,4 5,1 11,7

9 11,2 0,0 5,6

10 13,8 1,6 7,7

European Union: European unification go further or gone too far Left-Populism Right-Populism Populist

0 4,6 24 14,3

1 4,3 8,5 6,4

2 6,45 16,8 11,625

3 8,5 15,25 11,875

4 7 4,3 5,65

5 18,05 18,2 18,125

6 11,15 6,1 8,625

7 12,35 2,95 7,65

8 12,75 1,35 7,05

9 6,7 1,8 4,25

10 8,3 0,9 4,6

39

Able to take active role in political groupLeft-PopulismRight-PopulismPopulism

Not at all able 27,25 25,2 26,225

A little able 34,95 34,45 34,7

Quite able 26,95 28,4 27,675

Very able 7,45 6,4 6,925

Completely able 3,4 5,65 4,525

Signed petition last 12 months Left-Populism Right-Populism Populism

Yes 47,85 41,1 44,475

No 52,15 58,9 55,525Feeling about household's income nowadays Living comfortably with present income Coping with present income Difficult with present income Difficult with present income

Left-Populism 38,1 9,7 16,0 5,0

Right-Populism 55,35 29,3 9,95 5,4

Populism 46,7 19,5 13,0 5,2

Most people can be trusted or you can't be too careful Left-Populism Right-Populism Populism

0 2,25 5,7 3,975

1 2,05 6,65 4,35

2 6,9 8,85 7,875

3 11,15 11,85 11,5

4 6,85 6,45 6,65

5 14,55 23,95 19,25

6 13,3 10,2 11,75

7 24,05 19,55 21,8

8 14,45 4,9 9,675

9 2,75 1,9 2,325

10 1,65 0 0,825

Gender Left-wing Populism Right-wing Populism Populism

Male 49,85 66,85 58,35

Female 50,15 33,15 41,65

Right-wing Populism Left-wing Populism Populism

Ages 52,5 47,5 50,0

Standard Deviation 2,5 2,5 2,5

Ethnic Minority Left-wing Populism Right-wing Populism Populism

Yes 3,8 3,9 3,85

No 96,2 96,1 96,15

40

Unemployment in past year Left-wing Populism Right-wing Populism

Yes 49,95 45,35 47,65

No 50,05 54,65 52,35