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Development Southern Africa

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The South African brain drain: An empiricalassessment

David Kaplan & Thomas Höppli

To cite this article: David Kaplan & Thomas Höppli (2017): The South African brain drain: Anempirical assessment, Development Southern Africa, DOI: 10.1080/0376835X.2017.1351870

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The South African brain drain: An empirical assessmentDavid Kaplana and Thomas Höpplib

aDepartment of Economics, Policy Research in International Services and Manufacturing (PRISM), University ofCape Town, Cape Town, South Africa; bEconomist, South African Institute of Professional Accountants (SAIPA),Midrand, South Africa

ABSTRACTThere is no reliable data on the extent of South African skilledemigration and return migration. Statistics South Africa stoppedcollecting emigration data more than a decade ago. This paperprovides data from the turn of the century collected in thecountries to which South Africans emigrate. It first providesdetailed data on emigration to the United Kingdom, Australia,New Zealand, Canada and the United States – the maindestinations for emigrants from South Africa. It then providesestimates for the United Arab Emirates. Finally, it presents data fortwenty-five other OECD countries. By contrast with widespreadclaims that there has been a very large brain gain as SouthAfricans have returned following the global financial crisis, itshows that there was still a net brain drain, albeit at a slowerpace. The most recent data suggest that the rate of emigrationmay be accelerating again.

Abbreviations: OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment

KEYWORDSMigration; post-apartheidSouth Africa; skilledemigration; skills shortage;brain drain

1. Introduction

Emigration and immigration are hotly debated topics in South Africa. There is currentlyno consensus on the skill composition of South African emigrants or the migrationbalance in relation to skills. Has South Africa experienced a brain drain? And if so,how large? Have skilled South Africans, as some have claimed, recently been returningin large numbers such that the brain drain has been reversed?

This paper addresses these questions. The core of the paper is a presentation and exam-ination of empirical data on South African emigration. The paper provides data on all ofthe major countries to which skilled South Africans emigrate. Based on this data, theextent of the brain drain is assessed. In the final section of the paper, some broader con-clusions and implications for policy are drawn.

Measuring the brain drain is difficult. Brain drain is generally defined as the (net) emi-gration of skilled people. This poses an empirical challenge as skills cannot be directlyobserved or measured. Education levels (usually tertiary education) are frequently used

© 2017 Government Technical Advisory Centre (GTAC)

CONTACT David Kaplan david.kaplan@uct.ac.za Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, PolicyResearch in International Services and Manufacturing (PRISM), University of Cape Town, Rondebosch, Private Bag X7700,Cape Town 7701, South Africa

DEVELOPMENT SOUTHERN AFRICA, 2017https://doi.org/10.1080/0376835X.2017.1351870

as the proxy for skills. However, this approach does not take into account that many of thepopular destination countries for emigrants from South Africa have skills shortages inoccupations that do not require a tertiary education (e.g. electricians, boilermakers,chefs, hairdressers, etc).

In this paper, we assess total emigration from South Africa. We assume that all SouthAfricans who emigrate have some relevant skills and that all emigration therefore contrib-utes to the brain drain, irrespective of the education level of emigrants.

2. A historical look at emigration and immigration

Despite global concerns with migration and the loss of skills, the quality and accuracy ofmigration data has not kept pace with the increase in international migration flows. This istrue both internationally (Lemaitre, 2005) and in South Africa.

Up to 2003, Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) captured the annual number of immi-grants and (self-declared) emigrants. As from February 2004, statistics on self-declaredemigrants were no longer collected in terms of the Immigration Act, 2002 (Act No. 13of 2002; StatsSA, 2014b). Figure 1 gives an overview of documented immigration and(self-declared) emigration from 1950 to 2003, as collected by StatsSA.

While immigration significantly exceeded emigration for some four decades after 1950(except for a very few years), the situation reversed in the early 1990s. Between 1994 and2003, self-declared emigration invariably exceeded documented immigration, therebyleading to a negative migration balance. However, these figures should be treated withcaution. While the documented immigration flows give a fair and reasonably accurate rep-resentation of the extent of (legal) immigration to South Africa, the emigration figures

Figure 1. Documented immigrants and self-declared emigrants, 1950–2003. Source: own represen-tation, data from StatsSA (2003).

2 D. KAPLAN AND T. HÖPPLI

collected by StatsSA suffered from severe shortcomings as only self-declared emigrantswere captured.

Examining immigration figures of the destination countries, StatsSA which was respon-sible for collecting the data on self-declared emigrants noted that the total number of emi-grants from South Africa in these countries was considerably higher. Based on theimmigration statistics from destination countries that StatsSA had at its disposal, it con-cluded that its own figures underestimated the actual emigration figures by 57.3%(StatsSA, 2003).

An independent study examining emigration flows from 1987 to 1997 concluded thatthe actual emigration flows were 2.8 times larger than the official StatsSA figuressuggested. With regard to professionals, the study showed that the actual number of emi-grants was 3.2 times larger than the official data suggested (Kaplan et al., 2000). TheUnited Nations (2005:17) concluded that ‘Official South African emigration statisticsare highly misleading and give little concrete sense of the dimensions, and likelyimpact, of the brain drain from the country’.

This underestimation of emigration flows is a very common phenomenon and by nomeans unique to South Africa. It is well documented that in most countries, immigrationis more effectively regulated and recorded than emigration. For this reason, the measure-ment of the (generally unregulated) emigration flows tends to be less accurate than thatof the (regulated) immigration flows of foreigners, which can be more easily captured(Lemaitre, 2005). The officially recorded immigration flows should therefore give a fairlyaccurate picture of immigration. The same cannot be said of official emigration figures.

3. South African skilled emigration

3.1. Methodology

Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) stopped collecting emigration data more than a decadeago. No other local comprehensive data is available. This paper therefore relies on analternative approach. Each migration flow affects two countries: the country of origin(where data in this case is not available) and the destination country. Data collected inthe immigration countries is an alternative to utilising locally generated data to capturethe extent of emigration from South Africa.

In fact, immigration statistics are generally considered to be more reliable and accuratethan emigration statistics for any given country (Poulain et al., 2006; United Nations,2010). Apart from the lack of emigration data, the use of destination country statisticsto assess South African emigration has significant advantages. There are three reasonsfor this (Kaplan et al., 2000; Höppli, 2010):

(1) Emigrants often do not declare themselves when they leave their country of origin.This makes it virtually impossible for authorities to accurately track the number ofpersons who emigrate.

(2) StatsSA data only captured emigrants leaving from the three main international air-ports. South Africans emigrating from anywhere else were not recorded. By contrast,entering a foreign country through any airport (or port) illegally or without declara-tion is almost impossible. Virtually all immigrants from South Africa can therefore beexpected to be recorded in the destination country in some form or another.

DEVELOPMENT SOUTHERN AFRICA 3

(3) Skilled South African emigrants are very unlikely to emigrate illegally or, since theyseek high-paying skilled employment, to be employed illegally. The destinationcountry statistics should therefore accurately reflect the true number of skilledSouth African immigrants.

National data on migration flows is often inaccurate and unreliable. This is due to anumber of factors: the diversity in the definitions used by countries; the challenge ofreliably and consistently distinguishing between short-term movements (such as touristsor business travellers) and long-termmigrants;1 and the complexity of coordinating differ-ent data sources and different types of data collection (e.g. border data, permits, registers,etc.) that are utilised by individual countries (United Nations, 2004).

The use of stock data instead of flow data is generally more attractive for economic andstatistical reasons (Docquier & Marfouk, 2006). Researchers accordingly prefer to usestock data to analyse the extent of migration between two countries. Stock data refersto the total number of persons from a specific country of origin present in the destinationcountry at a particular point in time – often at the time of a national census.

Countries tend to collect two types of immigrant stock data – immigrant numbers bycountry of birth or by nationality. For the purposes of this paper, country of birth data ismore useful. A significant number of South Africans hold dual citizenship. Immigrantswho hold a passport from that particular country would not be registered as an immigrantfrom South Africa, but rather be captured as the return migration of a national. Moreover,citizenship/nationality may change over time (due to naturalisation), while the place ofbirth does not change. The reported number by nationality is therefore likely to signifi-cantly underestimate the true number of persons who have emigrated from SouthAfrica. To avoid these problems, the data presented in this paper is based on thecountry of birth and not on nationality.

The stock of South African born immigrants in a country increases only through theimmigration of new persons from South Africa or previous emigrants who arrive fromanother country. Children born overseas to South African parents would obviously berecorded as South African under the ‘nationality’ category, but not under the ‘countryof birth’ category. The stock can decrease only through deaths, return, or onwardmigration.

3.2. Data sources

Due to the lack of official South African statistics and the disadvantages of flow data, thispaper uses stock data on the number of South African born immigrants published by thestatistical offices of the destination countries that have recorded significant numbers ofimmigrants from South Africa. Most of these countries carry out censuses in regular inter-vals, while some countries even publish annual estimates of the number of foreign-bornpersons.

1Long-term migrants are generally defined as persons who leave their country of origin with the intention to remain abroadfor more than one year. Experts agreed on this (arbitrary) threshold of one year in the 1990s (Hovy, 1995). The challengeof measuring long-termmigration when entering the destination country (flow data) is that the initial intention to remainfor at least one year may change over time. Similarly, short-term migrants may change the duration of their stay after the(flow) data has been captured.

4 D. KAPLAN AND T. HÖPPLI

The Central European Forum for Migration Research notes that official country stat-istics published by the national statistical offices on their websites are usually the mostrecent and the most reliable migration data that is publicly available (Kupiszewska &Nowok, 2005). In line with this, the data for the individual countries included in thispaper is based on official statistics published by the respective statistical offices (withthe exception of the United Arab Emirates, which does not publish detailed immigrationstatistics by nationality or country of birth) and/or international databases that providedata sourced from local statistical institutions. It is therefore safe to assume that thedata presented in this paper gives a reasonably accurate picture of the actual number ofpersons who have emigrated from South Africa.

Data has been drawn from the following sources:

. United Kingdom –Office for National Statistics (Population of the United Kingdom byCountry of Birth and Nationality)

. Australia – Australian Bureau of Statistics (Estimated Resident Population by Countryof Birth)

. USA –United States Census Bureau (Selected Population Profile – Place of Birth for theForeign-Born Population in the United States; 1-year estimates)

. New Zealand – Statistics New Zealand (census data by place of birth)

. Canada – Statistics Canada (census data and National Household Survey by place ofbirth)

. UAE – estimates based on UN data

. Other OECD countries – OECD (International Migration Database: Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth); Central Bureau of Statistics, Israel (populationcensus 2008); selected data on South Korea reported by Koehler (2008).

3.3. Stock of South African born persons overseas

The United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United States have tra-ditionally been the main destinations for emigrants from South Africa. Empirical evidencehas shown that these five countries absorbed the bulk of emigrants from South Africa. Thefive English-speaking countries accounted for some 79% of the total emigration before1994 and 71% after 1994 (Kaplan et al., 2000).

The popularity of these destination countries for South African emigrants accords withmigration theory. These countries not only share a common language with South Africa,they also have historical and cultural similarities to South Africa. Collectively, this makes itrelatively easy for immigrants from South Africa to establish themselves in the labourmarket and to integrate into the local society. At the same time, there has been a consider-able demand for skilled professionals in these five countries. This has added to their appealas emigration destinations.

Data from the most recent World Bank skilled migration database (World Bank, 2004)corroborates the popularity of these five countries. In 2000, over 90% of all the immigrantsfrom South Africa in the 30 OECD countries resided in one of these five countries. Interms of skills (if education level is used as a proxy), emigration was even more concen-trated: over 95% of the emigrants from South Africa with a tertiary education were to be

DEVELOPMENT SOUTHERN AFRICA 5

found in one of these five countries. An examination of these five destination countries istherefore indispensable when assessing the brain drain from South Africa. Not only havethese countries absorbed a very high percentage of emigrants from South Africa, theseemigrants also tend to be disproportionately highly educated.

Immigration laws in the United States have resulted in the selection of highly skilledimmigrants (Massey et al., 1998). Similarly, strict immigration laws that favour highly-skilled immigration have contributed to this bias in the skill composition of immigrantsin other developed countries. Canada, Australia and New Zealand, for example, usepoint systems to recruit the highly skilled workers that their local economies need(OECD, 2005). The United Kingdom has a comparable system. However, an analysis ofthe World Bank (2004) data reveals that South African born immigrants in the UK hada significantly lower average skills level than those in the other four countries (using edu-cation level as a proxy). This can be explained by the fact that many South African bornimmigrants hold British citizenship (or citizenship of another EU country), which allowsthem to live and work in the UK and so bypass any skills-based immigration restrictions.

The number of South African born immigrants in these five countries since the turn ofthe century is shown in Figure 2. All data is based on the category of ‘country of birth’ anddoes therefore include dual nationals. This is particularly important in the case of the UK asa significant number of South African citizens also hold British citizenship. Such emigrantswould obviously not be included if the category utilised were that of ‘citizenship’. Data fromthe UK’s Office for National Statistics (ONS) confirms that this distinction is important.

Figure 2. Development of South African born population in the traditional five emigrant destinations,2000–13. Source: own representation, data from Australian Bureau of Statistics, Statistics Canada, Stat-istics New Zealand, Office for National Statistics (UK) and U.S. Census Bureau.Notes: The South African born population in years without census data or other official estimates was approximated using alinear extrapolation between the last known and the next known official data point. Linear extrapolations are illustrated bya straight line without a marker.

6 D. KAPLAN AND T. HÖPPLI

According toONS data for 2013, some 61% of the South African born population in the UKhad British citizenship and some 7% were citizens of other countries (presumably mostlySouth African dual nationals who immigrated to the UK based on their EU citizenship).This means that over two thirds of the emigrants from South Africa would not have beencaptured, had the category of ‘citizenship’ been utilised rather than that of ‘country of birth’.

The impact of the global financial and economic crisis is barely discernible in Australia,New Zealand and Canada, where the number of South African born persons continued thesame rate of increase as before the crisis. By contrast, the number of South African bornpersons in the USA remained almost constant between 2006 and 2009, and then decreasedby about 4500 in 2010. The number increased significantly again in 2011, by almost10 000, and again in 2013 by a similar amount. By 2013, the number in the USA wasmore than 10% larger than in 2005.

The most significant impact of the global financial and economic crisis on migrationwas observed in the UK, where the average skills (education) level of South Africanborn immigrants is significantly lower than in the other four major immigration countries.The UK saw a notable decrease in the number of South African born persons in 2009 (anet decrease of 7000 persons) and again in 2011 (a net decrease of 25 000 persons).However, by 2013, their number had increased again to roughly the level recordedbefore the global financial and economic crisis.

The aggregate number of South African born emigrants in these five countries is shownin Figure 3. The overall number increased almost continuously from 2001 to 2010. From2010 to 2012, the number remained virtually constant at roughly 560 000 persons. Signifi-cant growth resumed in 2013 with a net increase of almost 30 000 persons in that year.From the onset of the global financial and economic crisis in 2008 until 2013, there wasa net increase of over 63 000 South African born persons in these five countries – agrowth in excess of 12%.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has become another popular destination for emi-grants from South Africa. In contrast to the five destinations considered above, which pri-marily attract skilled emigrants and have corresponding immigration laws that favourskilled migrants, the UAE has attracted large numbers of skilled and unskilled immigrantsfrom all over the world.2 Neither the UAE statistical offices nor national census dataprovide data on the number of South Africans residing in the UAE. Estimates have puttheir number somewhere between 40 000 and 100 000 (Gerardy, 2008; Sagoodnews,2008). The actual number of South Africans in the UAE over time as well as their skillcomposition is unknown. Assumptions are therefore required to approximate the devel-opment of the number of emigrants from South Africa in the UAE.

According to the United Nations (2013), the total stock of immigrants in the UAEroughly tripled between 2000 and 2010, and continued to increase by about 7%between 2010 and 2013. However, given the lack of official data on the composition ofthe foreign population living in the UAE either by nationality or place of birth and thescarcity of credible estimates, this paper relies on the data provided by Phampi (2013),which is considered the most comprehensive attempt to establish the composition ofUAE’s population. Using a bottom-up approach, Phampi (2013) pieced together UAE’spopulation for 2010–11 with data collected from embassies, consulates and news

2In 2010, 88.5% of the UAE population were non-nationals (UAE National Bureau of Statistics, 2010).

DEVELOPMENT SOUTHERN AFRICA 7

publications. According to the population distribution compiled by Phampi (2013), SouthAfricans made up roughly 1.2% of the foreign population in the UAE in 2010–11.

Given that there is no compelling evidence to suggest that the share of South Africansamong UAE’s stock of immigrants has significantly increased or decreased over time, it isassumed that South Africans represent a constant share of 1.2% of the total immigrantstock of the UAE reported by the United Nations. Based on this assumption, the estimatednumbers of emigrants from South Africa are shown in Figure 4. These estimates are withinthe range of estimates for the total number of South Africans in the UAE of other authors(e.g. Gerardy, 2008; Sagoodnews, 2008).

The total stock of SouthAfrican immigrants in theUAE includes not only skilled, but alsosemi- and unskilled persons. However, without any evidence that the skill composition hasshifted towards less skilled immigrants fromSouthAfrica, it is reasonable to assume that thenumber of skilled emigrants to the UAE has increased over time, at approximately the samerate as the overall increase in the stock of South African immigrants.

By contrast with other emigration destinations, including the five countries consideredabove, the options of permanent residency or obtaining citizenship are not easily availablein the UAE. Residency in the UAE is usually only temporary and based on a (renewable)sponsorship by an employer. In this sense, most of the brain drain to the UAE can be con-sidered to be of a temporary nature only. However, it is unclear at what age highly skilledemigrants return to South Africa, if they do, or whether they move on to other countries.To the extent that emigrants only return upon retiring or move on to other countries, thiswould contribute to the brain drain.

Figure 3. Development of total South African born population in the traditional five emigrant desti-nations, 2000–13. Source: see Figure 2.Notes: Canadian data for 2012 and 2013 was not yet available at the time of writing this article. Between 2001 and 2011,their South African born population had gradually increased by an average of 2.2% per annum. It is here conservativelyassumed that the population of immigrants from South Africa did not increase in 2012 and 2013.

8 D. KAPLAN AND T. HÖPPLI

Emigrants from South Africa have settled in a number of other countries apart from thefive English-speaking countries and the UAE. The emigration (and return migration) ofSouth Africans to countries in the European Union (EU) has received increasing attentionover the past few years, particularly as more and more countries have joined the EU and anumber of South Africans hold citizenship of one of these EU countries (particularly theUK, Portugal, Greece, or Cyprus).

Citizenship of any EU country allows South African dual nationals to settle and workanywhere in the EU without any skills-based restrictions. Since not all dual nationals arehighly skilled, the South African immigrant population in the EU is not expected to be asqualified, on average, as the immigrant population in those countries where immigrationlaws clearly favour highly skilled immigration and accordingly where South African bornimmigrants are primarily admitted based on their skills and not on dual citizenship.

The OECD (2015) migration database provides comparable statistics for most OECDcountries on the number of South African born immigrants since 2000. As Figure 5shows, for most countries, these numbers have been gradually but consistently increasingup to the latest reported year (2012). The largest South African born expatriate population,apart from the five traditional English speaking OECD immigration countries presentedabove and the UAE, can be found in the Netherlands. Their number has increased byroughly 1800 from 2000 to 2012, growing to about 13 000 persons. The similaritiesbetween Dutch and Afrikaans are likely to have added to the popularity of the Netherlandsas an emigration destination. In line with this, it could be argued that Flemish, which is

Figure 4. Estimated South African born population in the United Arab Emirates, 2000–13. Source: ownestimates using data from United Nations (2013) and Phampi (2013).Notes: The United Nations provided figures for the total immigrant stocks in 2000, 2010, and 2013 (all nationalities). Theestimated numbers of South African born immigrants for these years (marked by an asterisk *) are 1.2% of the total stock ofimmigrants, based on the relative share of South Africans according to Phampi. The stocks between these three years wereapproximated using linear extrapolations.

DEVELOPMENT SOUTHERN AFRICA 9

another language that is close to Afrikaans, makes Belgium a popular emigration destina-tion for South Africans. However, at the time of writing this paper, no statistics on thenumber of South African born immigrants in Belgium were available.

Portugal, the country with the second largest South African born population among theother OECD countries, has seen a much smaller increase since 2001, increasing by only280 persons to some 11 500 persons in 2011. In Switzerland, the number of SouthAfrican born immigrants increased from 4542 in 2000 to 7210 in 2012 – an increase of59%. By contrast, the number decreased slightly in Germany from 8000 in 2010 to7000 in 2012.

Israel is another important emigration destination for many South Africans. Accordingto the latest Israeli census, Israel had 11 290 immigrants born in South Africa in 2008 – theonly official data point available for the recent period. Unexpectedly, the number of SouthAfrican born immigrants in Ireland, which was particularly hit hard by the global financialand economic crisis, increased from 7576 in 2006 to 7892 in 2011. One marked exceptionto the increasing trend observed for most of the OECD countries is Greece. The SouthAfrican born population in Greece decreased from 5546 in 2001 to a mere 1985 in2012. Such a decrease is to be expected, given the economic crisis facing the country.

3.4. Summary of South African born emigrant population

Combining the official figures and estimates of the total number of South African bornpersons (emigrants) living overseas in the five traditional immigration countries, the

Figure 5. Stock of South African born population in other OECD countries, 2000–12. Source: OECD(2015); CBS (2008); Koehler (2008).Notes: For years without official data, linear extrapolation between the last known and the next known official data pointwere used. The corresponding extrapolations are indicated by a straight line without a marker. The data for (South) Koreaare based on the number of E-2 visa holders.

10 D. KAPLAN AND T. HÖPPLI

United Arab Emirates and the other twenty-five OECD countries for which data was avail-able, it is possible to track the development of the stock of South African born personsliving overseas since the turn of the century.

As Figure 6 illustrates, the global financial and economic crisis did not have an immedi-ate impact on the total stock of South African born persons living overseas. People gen-erally require time to assess new events (e.g. whether the crisis is only temporary, if andhow it will affect them etc.) and adjust their migration plans accordingly. This resultsin a lag in migration activity. It is therefore not surprising that the rate of growth of theimmigrant stock only reacted about two years after the crisis commenced. From 2010to 2012, the growth of the stock of South African born immigrants virtually came to ahalt, indicating that the number of new emigrants from South Africa only just about com-pensated for the decrease in the existing stock through deaths, return, or onwardmigration to destinations other than the thirty-one countries included in this paper.

However, the most recent data clearly indicates that the growth in South African emi-gration evident in the years before the crisis has resumed. The total number of SouthAfrican born persons in the thirty-one countries examined increased significantly in2013 – by 4.2% compared to 2012. This is equivalent to a net increase of over 31 000persons, i.e. the number of new emigrants from South Africa exceeded the combinednumber of deaths, return, and onward migrants by more than 31 000. Since the onsetof the global financial and economic crisis in 2008, the total number of South Africanborn persons living overseas has in fact grown by roughly 12% – a net increase inexcess of 81 000 persons.

Figure 6. Development of total stock of South African born persons overseas, 2000–13. Source: seeFigures 2–5.Notes: The data for the other twenty-five OECD countries only cover the period up to 2012. It was conservatively assumedthat their numbers remained constant in 2013 and did not continue along the growth path observed in the past. It wasfurther assumed that the stock in 2000 was the same as in 2001 if no data was available.

DEVELOPMENT SOUTHERN AFRICA 11

The five traditional English-speaking immigration countries continue to absorb thebulk of South African born emigrants. In 2013, roughly 77% of the approximately767 000 South African born persons residing in one of the thirty-one countries includedin this paper lived in these five countries. These countries also arguably absorb an evenlarger share of the highly skilled emigrants from South Africa due to immigration lawsthat favour skilled immigrants.

In the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the total number of non-nationals has been on anincreasing trend, even after the global financial and economic crisis. According to the esti-mates in Figure 4, there were about 95 000 emigrants from South Africa in the UAE in2013 (some 12% of the total stock of South African emigrants).3 The remaining 11% ofthe stock of South African born emigrants reside in other OECD countries (some85 000 persons according to the latest available data). Empirical evidence suggests thatemigrants in these countries are not as highly skilled, on average, as those in the five tra-ditional English-speaking immigration countries.

There is no doubt that the global financial and economic crisis has affected the jobsecurity of South African emigrants and that it has induced some of them to moveback to South Africa. Even under stable economic conditions, emigration is not alwayspermanent. People re-evaluate their initial migration decision and some decide to moveback to their country of origin, while others move on to other countries. However, asthe data in this paper shows, the total stock of South African born persons living overseasin fact continued to increase, in aggregate and in most countries, albeit at a slower rateafter the global financial and economic crisis. This means that more South Africanborn persons have emigrated to those countries than either moved back to South Africaor moved on to another country not included here (or passed away, which would alsolead to a decrease in the stock).

It is unlikely that highly-skilled emigrants were disproportionately more affected by theimpact of the global financial and economic crisis than less skilled emigrants. In an econ-omic downturn, less skilled workers are generally affected more adversely than skilledworkers.4 Moreover, there is empirical evidence that when highly skilled persons emigrate,it is generally the least skilled of them that eventually return to their country of origin. As aconsequence of return migration, the skill composition in the destination country becomeseven more biased in favour of highly skilled persons (Borjas & Bratsberg, 1996). It is there-fore unlikely that returnmigration significantly reduces the brain drain from the country oforigin (SouthAfrica in this case), since it is generally not the ‘best and brightest’who return.

3.5. Validation of data

Internationally comparable and accurate migration data is hard to come by. Some insti-tutions like the World Bank or the United Nations regularly publish internationally com-parable data sets based on census data and/or own estimates. However, contrary to the

3Due to the immigration laws in the UAE, the majority of these emigrants can be considered as temporary migrants.However, they may spend considerable time in the UAE – perhaps even returning to South Africa only to retire –and/or move on to other countries, in which case there would still be a brain drain.

4The findings in this paper support this. Among the five traditional immigration countries, the crisis had the greatest impacton immigrant stocks in the UK. The average skills (education) level of South African born immigrants in the UK is thelowest among these five countries.

12 D. KAPLAN AND T. HÖPPLI

data presented in this paper, such data is often only available with large time lags. TheWorld Bank (2015) Global Bilateral Migration Databank, for example, contains dataranging back to 1960, but only up to 2000, and can therefore not be used to validatethe accuracy of the entire time series data from 2000 to 2013 presented in this paper.5

The United Nations (2013), on the other hand, has migration data/estimates for theyears 2000, 2010 and 2013, which allows a comparison of three points in time of ourtime series data over a 14-year period. As Figure 7 shows, our data tracks the UN datavery closely, but our estimates are a little lower.

One reason for the discrepancy, and the fact that the data for South African born emi-grants in this paper is less than the UN data, is that the UN database includes stocks ofSouth African born persons in over eighty countries worldwide, while the time seriesdata in this paper only include thirty-one of the main emigration destinations. Of note,our data does not include any African countries due to a lack of independent and reliableprimary time series data.

Another reason for the discrepancy could lie in the different data sources. The datapresented in this paper relies on statistics sourced directly from local statistical offices(or international databases which had sourced it from statistical offices). Our datasetmostly covers developed countries where skilled immigrants generally do not getaccess to formal and skilled positions, unless they have immigrated through theformal channel. Having immigrated legally, these persons would be included in theimmigration statistics of the destination country and there is no apparent reason forthese immigrants to systematically avoid being included in a census or to provide incor-rect information in a census, which would lead to an undercounting of skilledemigrants.

By contrast, the UN database covers more than eighty countries, including variousdeveloping countries for which no reliable statistics are available. Especially for thosecountries, different data sources and methods had to be used to obtain estimates (e.g.foreign-born population or foreign citizens) or the number was imputed. This cancause larger variations in the estimated total emigrant stock.

However, despite these differences, the data in this paper is in line with the indepen-dently collated UN data. The two data sets not only correspond in magnitude for eachof the three points in time considered, they also show a similar rate of increase over time.

4. The counter argument

There have been numerous claims reported in the media that very large numbers of SouthAfricans who had previously emigrated have been returning.

The most extravagant claim is that made by DavidMorgan, vice-president internationalpensions at Holborn Assets. Morgan utilises data collected from the company’s call centreson South Africans who have deferred pension benefits in Europe. Based on this data,Morgan estimates that 500 000 South Africans who have resided abroad for at least fiveyears have returned (Financial Mail, 2014a).

5Migration statistics are often published with large time delays, especially internationally comparable data. Data on theskills (education) levels of migrants is generally scarce and only published with substantial lags after census data ispublished.

DEVELOPMENT SOUTHERN AFRICA 13

The Homecoming Revolution, an organisation which assists returning South Africansto relocate, has provided a somewhat lesser figure. Based on data from relocation providerssuch as property agents and car importation companies, combined with their own find-ings, the Homecoming Revolution produced a ‘conservative’ estimate of 340 000 SouthAfricans who have returned in the past ten years (Financial Mail, 2014a).

Public company Adcorp has provided a similar figure, claiming that a net total of359 000 South Africans have returned from abroad since the global financial crisis in2008 (Adcorp, 2014). This figure was imputed from a purported decline in average realwages of skilled workers, said to have fallen by 23% in real terms in the period 2008–13.6 Adcorp claims that the only explanation for such a decline in average real skilledwages could be an increase in the supply of skills which, in turn, could only have resultedfrom returning skilled emigrants.

However, the purported decline in wages, let alone a decline of this magnitude, onwhich these results are based, is not supported by hard data. According to officialSouth African statistics, median monthly earnings of skilled employees in South Africahave in fact increased by over 22% from 2010–14. Monthly earnings for the subcategories‘Manager’ and ‘Professional’ have shown particularly high increases from 2010–14 ofabout 45% and 42%, respectively (StatsSA, 2015).

Somewhat later, Adcorp provided a second justification for their estimate, citing demo-graphic data from StatsSA which shows that the white population increased from 4.3million in 1991 to 4.6 million in 2014. This increase, argued Adcorp, cannot be accounted

Figure 7. Stock of South African born migrants – United Nations data vs. own data. Source: see Figure6; United Nations (2013).

6Adcorp based this on data from its own recruitment subsidiaries that specialise in placing high-skilled personnel (i.e.workers who earned more than R400 000 per annum in 2013).

14 D. KAPLAN AND T. HÖPPLI

for by white births since the replacement rate for whites (births minus deaths) has beennegative for a long time. Nor can this increase be accounted for by the immigration offoreign-born skilled whites due to South Africa’s very restrictive immigration laws. Theonly possible explanation for this increase could be the return of South African whiteswho had earlier emigrated (Financial Mail, 2014b).

StatsSA did indeed record an increase in the number of whites aged fifteen and over inthe 2011 census, as compared to the 2001 census. However, this increase relies on theassumption that both census counts are accurate. Although the 2011 census is still to befully interrogated, there is widespread acceptance that the 2001 census significantly under-estimated the white population in South Africa.7

In contrast to the StatsSA population data, other estimations show a decline in thewhite population. The Institute for Futures Research (IFR) of the University of Stellen-bosch, for example, presented estimations by both the IFR and the Actuarial Society ofSouth Africa (ASSA). Both indicate a decline in the white population in South Africa.According to IFR (2011), the white population decreased from 4.627 million in 2000 to4.535 million in 2010 and was projected to further decrease to 4.499 million in 2015,while the ASSA assessed a decrease from 4.674 million in 2000 to 4.442 million in2010, and projected a further decrease to 4.349 million in 2015.

More recently, StatsSA made their own assessments of the likely extent of internationalmigration. StatsSA (2014a) estimated that there was a net outflow of whites for the entireperiod 2001–15. StatsSA assessed the outflow as a little lower than the estimates providedin this paper (see Table 1). This can be explained by the fact that the estimates in this paperare for all race groups (recipient country data makes no differentiation by race). Thiswould account for the somewhat higher total.

In the 2011 census, the number of whites reporting that they were outside SA at thetime of the previous (i.e. 2001) census was 70 000. If the ‘other,’ the ‘do not know’ and‘unspecified’ are all added in, the figure rises to 78 000. This is for all ages. If it is confinedto those over fifteen years, the total is 65 000; 15–64 years, 57 000. If this is further confinedto those reporting that they were born in South Africa, the number drops to 23 000 (cor-respondence with Professor Rob Dorrington).8

The conclusion is clear – neither the broad demographic data nor the specific data onthose who were outside of the country at the time of the 2001 census provide any justifica-tion for the claim that there have been large numbers of returning skilled SouthAfricans. Bycontrast, the data suggests that the numbers were very limited. In addition, it is importantnot to regard emigration, as Adcorp do, as solely a ‘white phenomenon’. While historically,as a function of apartheid whereby higher level skills were almost a white preserve, skilledemigration was overwhelmingly white, in recent years this has changed significantly.

5. Conclusion

The analysis of the stock of South African born emigrants in a total of thirty-one of themajor emigration destination countries shows that the brain drain has not reversed

7Even the Report of the Census Sub-Committee to the South African Statistics Council on Census 2001 indicated that the 2001census was likely to have resulted in an underestimate of the number in the white population (StatsSA, 2012).

8The inclusion of ‘other’, ‘do not know’, and ‘unspecified’ suggests that the StatsSA figure of 23 000 is inflated. On the otherhand, there is possibly some undercounting – but there is no reason to expect undercounting to be significant.

DEVELOPMENT SOUTHERN AFRICA 15

since the onset of the global financial and economic crisis in 2008. While the brain draindid slow down after 2010, it has remained positive and significant. There is no empiricalevidence to support the contention that very large numbers of skilled South African emi-grants returned from abroad. In fact, the most recent data indicates that the rate of emi-gration has begun to increase again.

South Africa combines major skills shortages with large-scale outflows of skills. Theoutflow of skills clearly adds significantly to the local shortage. In turn, the skills shortageis a major factor curtailing growth. Business surveys frequently identify the shortage ofskills as the major factor constraint on their further growth (see e.g. Grant Thornton,2013). Shortages of skills are also the major constraint on innovation and limit the for-mation and the development of new technology-based firms (Kaplan et al., 2011). Butskills shortages do not only impact on growth and more skilled activities. More skillswould also create more opportunities for unskilled and semi-skilled workers. Skills andemployment opportunities for those lacking skills are complementary.

The most effective way of addressing the brain drain is not to restrict the outflow ofemigrants. This would be ineffective at best and (more likely) exacerbate matters atworst. There is far more prospect of attracting new skilled immigrants to South Africa,more particularly from other developing countries, who would be attracted by thenumber of work opportunities for those with skills and the concomitant high earnings.

The empirical data presented in this paper show that contrary to some views, there hasbeen no mass immigration of returning skilled South Africans. The most recent datasuggests that the rate of net outflow is on the increase again. The continuing and likelyaccelerating emigration of skilled South Africans – now not only white, but increasinglyblack, Indian, and coloured South Africans – together with the need to enhance thegrowth rate and employment, make a consideration of this issue vital and urgent.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

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