The State, Globalisation and Public Opinion.

Ian Marsh

University of Sydney.

(This paper has been prepared for IPSA 2006, Fukuoka, JSO1.316 session entitled ‘Citizens and Democracy: Asia and Europe’. The paper is a draft of the concluding chapter of a forthcoming study entitled Globalization and Public Opinion in Western Europe and East and South-East Asia edited by Takashi Inoguchi et al. The research on which this study was based was funded under Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Japan, grants to Professor T. Inoguchi, Projet Number 11102001 (1999-2002; 15203005 (2002-2004). The oral presentation will concentrate on the first and third parts of the paper)

1979 did not mark the end of history, but it did initiate a new phase in relations between

technologies, private organisation, states and peoples. The term globalisation has become

the label for this work-in-progress. But it is an exceedingly slippery term. Globalisation is

used descriptively as an umbrella word to link a variety of otherwise unconnected

developments, and also evaluatively to indicate an attitude or orientation towards these

developments. The term globalisation is ubiquitous in political rhetoric. Politicians

invoke it as the cause of insoluble problems or the reason for unavoidable changes. For

scholars and activists, it functions variously as a problematic analytical construct or as a

value-laden ideology. For some, it is the new guise of orientalism, for others a code for

the pursuit of American self-interest, and for still others, the royal road to economic

prosperity, democracy and freedom.

These ambiguities are reflected in a burgeoning literature: references on the Social

Sciences Citation Index have mushroomed from twenty-three in 1990 to two thousand six

hundred and sixty-four in 2003 (Fine, 2005 p. 222). Yet missing from this armada of

studies is any comprehensive empirical assessment of how ordinary citizens respond to

globalisation. This exploratory study sought to begin to fill this gap. It had three primary

aims: first, to assess comparatively exposure to, and evaluation of, globalisation amongst

ordinary citizens; second, to assess some at least of its impacts on attitudes to politics and

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the state; and third, conversely, to evaluate the impact of attitudes to politics and the state

on citizens’ responses to globalisation.

The literature on globalisation covers a variety of topics that are directly or indirectly

relevant to this assessment. It includes such issues as its nature and scope (e.g. Held et al,

2002), its economic dimensions (e.g. Dicken, 2003), the development of trans-national

regulatory regimes (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000), international elites and globalisation

(e.g. Berger and Huntington, 2002) and the development and impact of international

social movements (e.g. Tarrow, 2005). Its impacts on patterns of governance and state

policy choices have also been extensively examined (e.g. Hay, 2004; Hobson and

Ramesh, 2002; Weiss, 2005; Held and McGrew, 2002). The inclusion of European states

introduced a further issue, namely the complementary, mixed or defensive relationship

between a regional order like the EU and globalisation (e.g. Wallace, 2000).

The literature on globalisation also addresses impacts on individuals. It has figured in a

broader debate about what it means to be cosmopolitan (e.g. Vertovic and Cohen, 2002;

Waldron, 2000; Jung and Tarrow, 2004). Some argue that globalisation has fostered a

hybrid identity based on multiple connections (e.g. Hall, 2002). Others contend that it

fosters temporary identifications (e.g. Sennett, 2002: ‘the global inhabitants of modern

cities tend to see the city as a space for economic activity without any desire to

participate in it as citizens…the churning instability of capitalism…produces a more

standardised environment to which people have fewer attachments’). For Zabaida too,

globalisation fragments rather then unifies experience. ‘International business creates its

own milieux….Tourism creates its own milieux’ (Zabaida, 2002, p. 39).

There were many conceptual, comparative and interpretive difficulties associated with a

wide-ranging study across a large number of otherwise varied countries. These

difficulties touched all aspects of the project, starting from definitions of the two key

terms, globalisation and the state. First, there is no agreement in the literature about the

forms and scope of globalisation. Hay (2004) has discussed the causal power of ideas

about globalisation, particularly those held and disseminated by elites. These have no

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doubt helped spread awareness and reinforced, if not framed, impacts of globalisation on

citizen attitudes. Others emphasise institutional and structural changes. The roles of

international political organisations like the WTO or the UN have expanded. MNCs and

international financial markets have become particularly significant (e.g. Crouch, 2004).

Cultural as well as commercial goods and services are now extensively traded. Global

integration may also be the consequence of a variety of otherwise unrelated structural

developments. In the words of William Wallace, integration is driven by ‘those intense

patterns of interaction which develop amongst countries without the impetus of deliberate

political decisions, following the dynamics of markets, technology, communications

networks and social change’ (quoted Rosamund, p. 655).

The activities of citizens can also enhance their exposure to globalisation. Some activities

mark its presence not because of their novelty but rather because of their contemporary

accessibility and popularity, for example tourism and studying abroad. Other individual

activities are novel, in particular those that reflect new, easy and cheap ways of

connecting with people in other countries, for example via the Internet and email.

Migration too has risen significantly in political salience. Many states are endeavouring

to restrict these movements and, at least in a number of European countries, populist right

wing parties have mobilised new anti-migration constituencies.

To overcome confusion about the scope and range of globalisation, this study adopted a

particular approach. Citizens may come to understand globalisation less through

cognitive processes, and more through practical experience. Respondents were thus

invited to indicate whether they engaged in activities that are commonly associated with

globalisation, and also whether they recognised an impact on aspects of everyday life.

But in both cases the focus of this study was on particular activities or experiences.

Respondents were asked to indicate if they had engaged in particular activities, like

tourism. They were also asked if they recognised the influence of international factors in

changes in everyday experiences. Whether respondents made a further step and

associated these experiences with a more or less coherent notion of globalisation could

only be inferred.

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The second definitional problem concerned the idea of the state. What is a state? An

imagined community? A community of fate? A (more or less porous) infrastructure of

political and civil institutions? A particular patterning of policy and power? All four are

relevant. Katzenstein (2000), Swank (2003) and Svallfors (1997) have all explored the

links between state strategies that buffer citizens against global forces and support for

international economic engagement. State economic strategies also vary with presumably

differential effects on citizen attitudes. (e.g. Campbell and Pedersen, 2001; Hall and

Soskice, 2001; Crouch, 2005; Marsh, 2006). Meantime, a burgeoning literature discusses

the role of institutions, of which the state is the most prominent example. Institutional

theories trace many present practices and attitudes to historical experience, including

events in the very remote past. Expedient solutions to past conflicts become the customs

and habits of later generations (Pierson, 2004; also March and Olsen, 1995; North, 1990).

Such factors constitute the state in the memory of its citizens. Contemporary policy

strategies can reinforce these loyalties. Together, these varied factors create the idea of

the state in the minds of its citizens. They also create degrees of freedom for states in

influencing citizen attitudes. In turn, both could mediate impacts of globalisation. But the

current and historical, institutional, structural and cultural elements that are joined in the

idea of a state are too complex and too variegated to be collected into a single proxy

variable. Hence, we were unable to calculate with any precision the impact of states tout

court on citizen orientations.

To overcome this problem, this study focused on the most generally accepted measures of

citizen attitudes to politics and the state, namely political culture - including identity,

ideology, policy preferences, confidence and participation. The range of variables

indicates the complex structure of citizen opinion and the varied psychological planes and

processes that constitute it. For example, policy issues and preferences involve primarily

cognitive judgements, ideological orientations reflect values and beliefs, and identity is

associated with more deeply rooted affective or emotional loyalties. These variables thus

draw variously on formative, life cycle and current experiences, and they are expressed in

hopes, beliefs, ideals and aspirations.

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A further difficulty arose from the absence of firm knowledge about the direction of

impacts. The impacts of globalisation on the identities, beliefs and preferences of citizens

can be measured. But a reciprocal relationship is no less plausible. Hence, the impact of

citizen identities, beliefs and policy preferences also needs to be assessed. The results

then need to be interpreted. For example, does experience of globalisation weaken,

supplement, enhance or have no affect on attitudes to politics and the state? Conversely,

do attitudes to politics and the state supplement, enhance, weaken or have no affect on

assessments of globalisation? Is there evidence of a convergence in attitudes between

citizens from different states and regions? The impact of a supra-state infrastructure on

citizen identities has been studied in the context of the EU, but this is a much more

developed institutional order than those associated with globalisation (e.g. Marcusson et

al, 1999; Hermann et al. 2004). In the absence of both a comprehensive theory and

longitudinal data, the findings presented here can only be limited and tentative.

The results of this study are summarised in the following two sections. The first outlines

specific findings in relation to the impacts of globalisation on attitudes to politics and the

state. The second looks at the more general relationship between globalisation and states,

in particular the significance of this development from the perspective of public opinion.

The chapter concludes with a discussion of some more general implications of

globalisation.

Globalisation and Citizen Attitudes to Politics and the State

This has been a study of experiences of globalisation as they affect attitudes to politics

and the state that are held by ordinary citizens. The European and Asian countries from

which the respondents to this study were drawn are marked by significant differences in

religion, economic levels, culture, history etc. Despite this, these eighteen states are those

that have been most exposed to the impacts of globalisation, at least in a material,

economic, and cultural sense. Some scholars and pundits treat globalisation, particularly

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its economic dimension, as pervasive, indeed the pre-eminent contemporary force. For

their part, political leaders have uniformly asserted that it is irresistible and they have

invoked globalisation as the rationale for domestic programs of change.1 But how far are

these elite judgements mirrored in the attitudes of ordinary citizens? Do they recognise

globalisation as a pervasive phenomenon? Have their attitudes to politics and the state

marched in step with those of their leaders? If the force of globalisation is as pervasive as

some claim, its effects should perhaps be apparent in convergent responses across

countries and/or regions. If these effects are not evident, the challenge is to tease out its

more subtle and/or more narrowly based - and doubtless more ambiguous - impacts and

implications. .

The specific findings of this study can be summarised in four broad conclusions:

• The first concerns exposure to and awareness of globalisation: as it is defined in this

study, globalisation is clearly having significant impacts. Over 75% of respondents

indicated awareness. Of these, around 35% recorded a positive response, 15% a

negative response, 25% were undecided and 25% indicated no awareness. Exposure

was also widespread, but the most common channel was the passive medium of

television. Responses varied widely within and between the regions, both in their

incidence and in their potential political significance.

• Second, and not surprisingly, globalisation is not associated with weakened citizen

attitudes to politics and the state in any pervasive sense. Rather, its impacts are more

particularised, elusive and apparently cross-cutting. For example, ideological and

evaluative orientations are not shared by European and Asian respondents, which

potentially differentiate globalisation’s impacts on an array of citizen attitudes.

• Third, there is clear evidence of convergence in attitudes to particular issues (e.g. the

environment) held by citizens from different states and regions, but it is not clear if

this is attributable to globalisation, or if mass opinion is rather primarily fostered by

national political elites. Further, even where attitudes have converged, this does not

necessarily diminish state legitimacy – for example, unemployment that is attributed

to globalisation is almost universally seen as a responsibility of national governments.

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Globalisation has also given a new impetus to anti-globalisation populism, at least

amongst European states: significant minorities are concerned to defend their national

cultures and are worried about social integration (immigration, ethnic and religious

conflict).

• Fourth, there are varying responses by individuals who belong to particular socio-

demographic groups, particularly according to age, income, and education and in

some cases gender, but these do not form any immediately consistent pattern. For

example, age is associated with cross-cutting effects. Young people constitute a

particular case. Although there is some evidence of more internationalist orientations

among young people, it is unclear if these are life cycle or cohort affects (other

evidence suggests there is no case for seeing young people as more likely to jettison

national loyalties: Jung and Tarrow, 2004).

In general, globalisation, at least in the forms in which it has been presented and assessed

in this study, has an important but cross cutting direct and indirect influence on attitudes

to politics and the state. A variety of intermediary variables – not least the approaches of

political entrepreneurs, state economic or social strategies, and historic experiences - will

be primary in determining the patterning of national recognitions and whether and how

these translate into politically salient citizen responses. The following sections consider

these findings in turn.

1. Awareness and exposure were remarkably widespread

The survey included two broad measures of the scope and forms of citizen recognition of

globalisation covering both their exposure and their evaluations. The measures of

awareness covered eight aspects – goods in shops, food in restaurants, job security,

standard of living, impacts on neighbourhoods and communities, use of English and

foreign news and entertainment on television. On average 48% of the overall sample

responded with a definite positive or negative answer and a further 29% indicated that

they recognised an effect but could not say whether it was good or bad. This means that

overall approximately 75% of respondents indicated awareness of an effect of

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globalisation. There was also convergence between the regions. The numbers who

offered a definite view were about the same in both. In sum, overall levels of recognition

of particular impacts of globalisation amongst respondents were very high. Whether these

were understood as ‘globalisation’ is another matter.

The proportion of positive judgements was also quite high. Of the just on 50% of the

sample who had a definite view about these varied aspects of globalisation, an average of

71% said the effects were positive. The proportion of positive respondents was again

fairly close between the regions (75%, East and Southeast Asian and 66%, Western

Europe). On only one item – the use of English – and in only one region – Western

Europe - did negative answers exceed positive answer (27% versus 25%). The questions

on foods in restaurants and standard of living elicited the highest ratios of positive to

negative reposes (77% and 70%). The question on job security the lowest (59%). Again,

there were wide variations in country results which will be considered later. Meantime, a

factor analysis showed that these attitudes grouped into three realms of experience, but

when repeated on a country basis the patterns diverged widely. This suggests that

national factors significantly varied the structure of individual experience

Turning to exposure, a factor analysis showed that these experiences too were segmented

into three distinct domains: one related to connections through work and the Internet; a

second to connections based on family, friends or travel abroad; and a third to media

exposure. Whereas 13% of the overall sample indicated they were exposed to

globalisation via work and Internet links, for 51% this occurred via the medium of

television. The factor structure varied regionally and also by country thus implying

substantial variations in the patterning of encounters, an outcome that is presumably

attributable to distinctive national cultural, institutional, structural or other features.

Further, these exposures were likely to have very different impacts. They ranged from

relatively more active links (the work category) to the quite passive exposure represented

by television viewing.

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There was also divergence between the regions. Amongst Western European respondents,

22% registered a work and web link and 49% a family, friends and travel link. By

contrast, only 16% (check) of East and Southeast Asian respondents registered a work

and web link and 23% a family, friends and travel link. The EU is presumably one

powerful influence on the West European results. This was suggested when the analysis

was redone on a regional basis. The responses of West Europeans split between only two

groupings with work, family, friends and travel joined in a single factor. Presumably,

Western European respondents did not discriminate between the effects of the EU and

those created by wider processes of globalisation. There was also substantial variance

between the levels of exposure of citizens from different countries –and these will be

further considered later.

There was also some correlation between exposure to globalisation in one or another

form and positive views about its effects. Those who were exposed to globalisation in

both regions were more likely to have a positive attitude.

Knowledge of English was also probed. This is the dominant language of (northern)

globalisation and presumably essential for full participation in its processes. Excluding

English speaking states, on average 77% of respondents from the states in Asia and 54%

from those in Europe had no knowledge of English or only up to an elementary capacity.

A further 12% of respondents in Asia and 13% from Europe had ‘middling’ levels of

English competence. Finally, only a minority claimed fluency or near fluency: the Asian

average was 11% and 14% in Western Europe. These average results masked wide

variation at the country level.

At the level of political institutions, respondents were sceptical about the impacts of

international organisations on their daily lives. Of the overall sample, 58% said the UN

had no effect on their day-to-day lives or they did not know. MNCs were similarly

discounted: 51% said they had no effect on day-to-day life or they did not know what that

effect was. By contrast, amongst West Europeans, only 33% said this of the EU. These

results may suggest only a limited grasp of the deeper dynamics of globalisation.

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In sum, exposure to people from, and experiences involving, other countries was

widespread and general awareness of international impacts on daily life was particularly

widespread. In aggregate, around 35% of the respondents across the eighteen countries

offered a positive evaluation. There were however some important reservations relating

to job security and, in Europe, culture. The intensity of exposure also varied widely. For

example, in both regions, the most passive medium, television, was the most common

source. The incidence of both exposure and evaluations also varied widely between

countries. In addition, save for the EU, recognition of the influence of international

organisations was uniformly low. Finally, factor analyses of both exposure and awareness

variables suggested globalisation was not experienced as a unitary process but rather as a

variety of at least partially unrelated experiences.

2. Globalisation and citizen orientations to the state.

Our initial task was to establish evidence of the impact of globalisation on orientations to

the state amongst citizens generally. Impacts on these more ‘elemental’ orientations

needed to be established before turning to consider impacts on more immediate issues.

Affective and evaluative orientations are considered in turn.

Affective Ties

Identity involves perhaps the most visceral connection to the state. The strength of

national identity varied widely by region. 60% of respondents from East and Southeast

Asia declared national identity to be extremely important compared to 40% of West

Europeans. Levels of supranational identification were rather similar in the two regions.

But whereas the political category, European, dominated in Europe, amongst Asian

respondents religion, ethnicity and culture all figured. Further, the forms and the

importance attached to these links varied widely not only between regions but between

countries and sometimes in surprising ways. For example, whereas 84% of Malaysians

rated their Islamic identity as extremely important only just on 50% of Indonesians

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(Javanese) recorded this response. Amongst Europeans, some 60% nominated European

as their supranational identity but only 20% indicated that they judged this as important

or extremely important.

Active exposure to the processes of globalisation was associated with a less intense

attachment to national identity. Those who experienced global impacts through work and

the Internet or through having family and friends in other countries were less likely to

declare their national identity to be very important and more likely to declare supra-

national identity to be important. The direction of influence cannot be demonstrated but

common sense might suggest the latter was a consequence of the exposure and not vice

versa. The incidence of these connections was also relatively limited, although higher in

Western Europe than in East and Southeast Asia. The most common (and most passive)

mode of exposure, watching foreign entertainment and news on television, had no effect

on the strength of national identity. It did however have some limited correlation with

supranational identification.

These effects were cross-cut by other impacts. Those who were exposed through

television (nearly 50% of the sample) and those who believed globalisation had a

negative impact on job security were more likely to believe their countries were treated

unfairly in international contexts. This sense of grievance may be the path through which

individual affects are translated into a collective response.

In general, these findings suggest that an orientation to the state remains a core element

of the self-recognitions of individual citizens but that its potency varies, with East and

Southeast Asians valuing this attachment much more than their West European cousins.

This may be an artefact of different historical experience. Further, the impacts of

exposure to globalisation were differentiated. Active engagement thorough work, family

and other direct contacts diminished the strength of national identity but passive

engagement through television and the perception of a negative effect on job security

enhanced collective grievances. Globalisation would appear to provide a new context for

an old cleavage.

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Evaluative Ties.

The ASES survey probed three evaluative dimensions of orientations to the state,

ideologies, policy preferences and confidence. Impacts of globalisation on ideology were

tested by assessing first, whether respondent’s recognised, and attached importance to,

the left-right scale and second, their approaches to substantive issues concerning equality,

economic freedom, the role of the state etc. Past survey research in specifically West

European contexts has revealed a consistent patterning of these latter responses and their

correlations with citizen self-positioning on a left-right scale. The ASES survey sought to

establish if these ideological aspirations and identifications with the left-right scale have

spread to citizens in East and Southeast Asia. Correlations between the exposure and

awareness variables and particular ideological dispositions were also assessed.

There was clearly no general ideological convergence between respondents from the two

regions and this could be expected to have a significant impact on more immediate

responses to globalisation. Starting with evidence of attachment to the left-right scale,

75% (?) of the citizens of the nine European countries located themselves on a left-right

dimension although as we will see later, there was substantial variance between countries

in the importance attached to this scale. In Asia the results were very different. Here

country specific results dominated. Between 88% and 95% of the citizens of the

Philippines, South Korea and Thailand were willing to place themselves on the scale. In

the other five states either relatively few were able to place themselves on the scale or

attached little importance to it. There was however similarity between the two regions in

the numbers placing themselves in the middle of the ten point scale. This self placement

was adopted by between 20% and 30% of respondents. Finally, left wing self placement

exceeded right wing self placement in Western Europe but the reverse was the case

amongst the Asian respondents.

At a substantive level, there was convergence on three issues. 85% approximately in both

regions agreed competition was good. On the need for government intervention (‘we

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need a lot of government intervention to deal with to-days economic problems’) 66%

overall were in agreement but West European support exceeded that of East and South

East Asians by 8 points (check). On the social policy issues, 85% agreed with the view

that ‘government should take responsibility for ensuring that everyone either has a job or

is provided with adequate social welfare’. But on the freedom of business to make profits,

52% of East and Southeast Asian respondents agreed compared to 34% of West

Europeans, with substantial country variations. On incomes should be made more equal,

77% of West Europeans affirmed this proposition but only 49% of Asian respondents.

Finally the relationship between left right self placement and policy preferences

suggested a classic interventionist-egalitarian dimension for Western Europe, which was

evident in all countries save for Ireland. In contrast, the data for the Asian countries failed

to produce an analogous pattern.

In sum, based on the battery of variables that were probed, ideology varied markedly

between the two regions. The European responses generally confirm earlier studies

concerning the importance of ideology and its substantive content. The Asian results

were quite different – thus suggesting that at least at the evaluative level, orientations to

politics and the state is being framed by quite different underlying sources.

Regressions on the impact of exposure and job security on ideology?

Policy preferences are second evaluative area in which there does not appear to have been

any retreat from the state. Attitudes towards import protection, restriction of land

purchases and cultural protection were all probed. Again there was no evidence of

convergence. On each issue, substantially higher proportions of Asian respondents

favoured protection than their European counterparts (?).

The results for the policy preferences were correlated with the three exposure factors

identified in Chapter 3 (work and web, media and family and friends). There was a strong

positive correlation between each form of exposure and support for economic and

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cultural protection. This suggests that exposure to globalisation is not associated with

more ‘internationalist’ or economically liberal policy orientations (Check).

The more citizens were exposed to globalisation the lower their levels of confidence

in domestic political institutions? But if they had a negative attitude to job

security?

In sum, globalisation has had differentiated impacts on orientations to politics and the

state. Some exposures weakened national identity but others strengthened it. Meantime

policy preferences uniformly supported statist orientations; exposure to globalisation in

every form did not affect these orientations (?). Similarly confidence? Exposure to, and

attitudes towards, globalisation thus had identifiable but cross cutting impacts on

orientations to the state.

3. Globalisation and national political issues.

Attitudes to political issues were explored through respondent’s assessments of the

priority and causes of policy problems and their attribution of responsibility for solving

them. Again, if globalisation was as pervasive an influence as some assert, convergent

responses might be expected within if not between regions. Further, if globalisation was

to cause a shift in citizen attitudes, a perception that the causes of problems lay in

international developments might be expected to be associated with the view that they

also needed to be solved at this level.

There was evidence of the internationalisation of issues. The causes of policy problems

affecting the economy, unemployment and the environment and attributions of

responsibility for handling them were all probed. In the case of the economy, a majority

of respondents (60 % in Asia and 66% in Europe) attributed problems to international

causes or to both international and domestic causes and y% said the solution involved all

countries acting together. In the case of the environment, around 50% of respondents

attributed an international dimension to environmental problems and 60% believed this

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problem should be handled by all countries acting together. These results may point to a

weakening orientation to the state. But regional differences were significant. West

Europeans were fifteen percent more likely to see environmental problems as

international in origin than East and Southeast Asians. Whether this reflects the impact of

the EU, domestic Green parties or other influences is unclear. By contrast, in the case of

the most immediately salient issue, unemployment, solely domestic causes were

nominated by clear majorities (57% Asia, 53% Europe) and domestic solutions were

overwhelmingly favoured (y%)

Respondents were also asked whether they thought responses to six other issues should

be handled by all countries together or nations individually. On five of these, a majority

of respondents favoured action by all countries together. These were: regional or other

military conflict (between 66% and 77%); problems of developing countries (65%);

problems of refugees and asylum seekers (61%); and human rights (58%). On one issue,

women’s rights, roughly equal numbers supported national and international

responsibility (46% collective action; 43% national action). However on all these matters

there was often a significant difference of view between respondents from the two

regions, with West Europeans again generally more inclined to favour collaborative

governance.

Globalisation impacts were again cross cutting. Those indicating a link via work or web

were consistently more likely to judge policy problems as international and the

solutions? Not surprisingly those who saw globalisation as having a negative impact on

job security were also more likely to see its origin in the international economy. But they

looked to their national governments for a solution.

Attributions.

Regressions using the exposure and job security variables.

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There is clear evidence of convergence in attitudes to particular issues held by citizens

from different states and regions, but it is not clear if these are directly attributable to

globalisation or if they are mediated into mass opinion by national political elites.

Further, these attitudes do not necessarily diminish state legitimacy – for example,

unemployment that is attributed to globalisation is almost universally seen as a

responsibility of national governments. Globalisation has also brought new populist, anti-

globalisation constituencies to the fore, at least amongst European states: significant

minorities are concerned to defend their national cultures and worried about social

integration (immigration, ethnic and religious conflict).

4. Globalisation and the responses of particular socio-demographic categories.

What individual characteristics were particularly associated with impacts of globalisation

or with attitudes to politics and the state? There was a kaleidoscope of effects but no

consistent patterns across the categories (?). There were rather strongly differentiated

responses in particular cases. First, there was no close, systematic or general relationship

between exposure and the socio economic background of respondents. Not surprisingly,

exposure to the range of global connections was more likely amongst those with higher

levels of education or with higher living standards. Similarly, the proportion of ‘don’t

knows’ and of those who felt that there were no effects declined with higher living

standards and better education. Gender? Exposure to globalisation was also widespread

but less uniform with age. Younger people were more likely to watch foreign

entertainment on TV, to use the internet and more likely to speak English. Younger

people’s engagement was also higher with friends abroad, foreign news on TV and work

that involved contacts with other countries, but this was much less marked. The

proportion of ‘don’t knows’ increased with age.

In the case of evaluations, there was a substantial relationship between education, age and

living standards and views about globalisation. Positive views about globalisation were

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again strongly associated with younger age groups, better education and higher living

standards. So was confidence in international organisations and so was encountering

globalisation.

Turning to national identity, the strength of these feelings was strongly related to age –

but it was unclear if this was a cohort or life cycle effect. Education too had an effect.

The more educated were more likely to regard their country as unfairly treated or treated

with less respect than it’s due. The more highly educated were also more likely to

recognise a supra-national identity. Age had no effect on supra-national identity. Gender

did have an effect. Women were committed somewhat less strongly to either national or

supra national identity. But frequency of religious practice increased the strength of both.

In the case of ideology, only gender and education showed distinctive effects

Europeans, people identifying as left-leaning and males were much more likely to see

problems as international.

Individual level analyses of policy worries?

Policy preferences etc.

At the level of participation, men were more likely to engage in campaign activity, save

for respondents from Thailand and Spain. Men were also more likely to discuss politics

in Asia but this was not he case in Europe. Younger people were more likely than older

people to take part in contentious activity, as were the educated (but not in the UK).

In relation to individual level factors, the general picture

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Globalisation and the Outlook for States

What of the future for states themselves? For the reasons explored in the introduction to

this chapter there is no composite variable that would enable the mediating impacts of

states tout court to be definitively assessed. Nor do we have variables that would allow

the impacts of different state socio-economic strategies to be determined. At least four

strategies are represented in the approaches of the states covered in this survey (Chapter

2): neo-liberal (e.g. Britain); distributional (e.g. in different versions Germany and

Sweden); developmental (e.g. Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Ireland and perhaps

France); and familial social policy (Southern Europe). In the absence of proxy variables,

the impacts of globalisation on states are a subject for conjecture. On the basis of the

ASES findings, there are at least three reasons for believing that state settings remain pre-

eminent as sites for mobilising, framing and shaping citizen responses, and that they can

do this both directly, through the nature of public debate and deliberation, and indirectly,

through policies that mediate and buffer globalisation’s impacts on citizens:

i. Amongst those who were exposed to globalisation or had a definite attitude to this

development, responses were mostly cross-cutting. To the extent this stimulates

political conflict at national levels, there is a new impetus for fragmentation but the

salience of the former will not diminish. For example, the touchstone issue of

unemployment consolidated the standing of nation-states in the eyes of their publics.

ii. At a mass level, there is significant variation in political cultures, in the patterns in

which citizens from different states experience globalisation, and in their views about

touchstone issues. This suggests that even if globalisation has substantial effects on

citizen attitudes, responses at the level of individual states are likely to be coloured by

these intervening factors and thus highly varied.

iii. Finally, even on issues that have internationalised, like the environment, state elites

and state institutions have arguably played pre-eminent mediating roles in

transmitting concerns to the mass level and framing mass responses.

18

i. Globalisation, domestic cleavages and national politics.

At an aggregate level, a number of findings pointed to the potential of globalisation to

fragment national politics in new ways, but not to transcend national politics. There were

substantial impacts of globalisation on identity but, as we have seen, there was no

consistency in responses. Those who were more exposed to globalisation were less likely

to strongly identify with their own country. But those who were negative about the

impact of globalisation on employment or who were exposed to it through the media

were more likely to regard their country as unfairly treated in international contexts.

Further, the overwhelming majority of those who regarded unemployment as caused

wholly or partially by international factors nevertheless attributed responsibility to their

national government for solving the problem.

Similarly, social integration has already shown the potential, at least in Europe, to

mobilise new nationalist and populist constituencies that are hostile to aspects of

globalisation. On the other side of the ideological spectrum, Green parties have sought to

mobilise constituencies on the side of international action on environmental, human

rights and other trans-national issues associated with globalisation (e.g. trade). The

evidence clearly shows some publics have been persuaded of the need for international

action at least on the environment. Public attitudes to the environment and social

integration are clear evidence of the cross-cutting impacts of globalisation on mass

publics, albeit the effects are much stronger amongst European than Asian respondents.

But these are cleavages in national politics. International normative and institutional

infrastructures may have attracted activists and elites. Mass impacts are harder to discern

ii. Differentiated experiences, political cultures and attitudes, and the impacts of

globalisation on states.

There was abundant evidence of differentiated political cultures between regions and

states. To the extent globalisation has an impact, these are likely to preserve

19

predominantly differentiated responses amongst citizens from different states. Take

ideology. The evidence clearly establishes that the left-right cleavage that characterises

publics in Western European states is not shared by the publics of most East and

Southeast Asian states. Nor is the left-right cleavage recognised to be salient in these

latter states. Further, in none of them is it associated with consistent ideological

orientations, at least matching those found in Western Europe. This means that to the

extent ideological orientations influence responses to globalisation, quite different

attitudes could be expected from the publics of the two regions. There were also

significant variations on these matters between countries. These would further

differentiate national responses.

There was a similar difference between the regions in the attributions of responsibility for

solving problems to national governments. The publics of East and Southeast Asia were

much more oriented to the management of policy issues by their national governments

than those of the European states. But this latter reaction doubtless reflects the influence

of the EU, not any wider process of internationalisation. This difference too might be

expected to be associated with different national responses to particular issues.

There were marked regional differences in orientations to politics. Take participation

patterns. European respondents were four times more likely to attend a protest, march or

demonstration than their Asian counterparts. Similarly, European respondents were much

more likely to undertake what were described as ‘contentious’ political actions. These

differences point to the different levels of democratic development and political

socialisation that characterise the states in the sample. This too could be expected to

colour the responses of citizens from different states to global developments.

There were also outriders on particular matters, which reflected aspects of the different

cultures of the various countries. For example, despite their geographical proximity and

their overlapping cultural traditions, the French were three times more likely to attend a

protest, street march or demonstration than their British counterparts. 33% more Irish

than Portuguese respondents indicated they had contacted politician about a national

20

issue. Malaysians were seventeen times more likely than Singaporeans to join a political

party. Save for four countries, more educated people were more likely to engage in

contentious activity (the exceptions were UK, ). Or take an issue like immigration.

On average, 36% (?) of Europeans nominated this as an issue, but it was singled out by

56% of Italians and 52% of Greek respondents, the highest in Europe. None of these

outcomes is decisive by itself. But each is symptomatic of specific national cultural and

behavioural contours, which would inflect responses to broader international issues, were

they to spill into national politics.

This was not a study of the impact of particular state strategies on citizen opinion. This is

a much larger task which others have pursued (Katzestein, 2000; Swank, 2003; Svallfors,

1997). It is surely one that deserves more attention? The present findings suggest there

could be a link between state strategies and citizen attitudes. For example, in Europe only

two states, Germany and Sweden recorded majorities opposed to economic protection.

On the impacts of globalisation on employment, only Swedish and Irish respondents

recorded positive views. Sweden and Germany have both followed (different)

distributional strategies, which have been designed to buffer their citizens from the

vicissitudes of the international economy. Whereas in Sweden there has been some

adaptation of social strategies to globalisation, in Germany this task largely remains.

Meantime Ireland has adopted a classic developmental state strategy, which buffers its

citizens in a different way. In this respect, the Irish strategy is much closer to that of the

East Asian states.

Amongst Asian respondents there were positive majorities in favour of the impacts of

globalisation on employment in all states save for South Korea and Japan. This is a

remarkable result given the magnitude of the 1997 financial crisis. A number of these

states also favoured protection. This is wholly consistent with the developmental

approach followed by their national governments. Singapore, a paradigm development

state, has however based its approach on attracting foreign investment. This was

consistent with its citizen’s hostility to protection. In other areas Singaporean respondents

recorded very high levels of confidence in their national government. Similarly, Taiwan

21

has followed a developmental strategy which has been less welcoming of FDI or at least

made sure it is congruent with its own developmental priorities (Wade, 1989). Yet a

majority of Taiwanese respondents opposed protection. This may reflect Taiwan’s entry

to the WTO, which was occurring at the same time as this survey. Finally, Britain

represents the closest example of a neo-liberal state in this survey. A majority of British

respondents favoured economic protection and considered globalisation to be bad for

employment. The commitment of both major parties in Britain to neo-liberal economic

strategies makes broader public opinion on these issues of little immediate political

consequence. Yet this result is not propitious for advocates of globalisation. A

demonstrated link between positive citizen attitudes to global engagement and particular

national economic and social strategies would be a powerful argument for much greater

attention to the capacities of states to buffer international economic integration.

Finally, in the absence of a theory concerning the specific influence of globalisation on

public opinion, its impacts might nevertheless be recognised as important, but mostly in

an indirect sense and as part of a larger set of factors. For example, the policy concerns of

Asian respondents were generally more ‘materialist’ and thus, if we accept Inglehart’s

theory of attitude formation, consistent with their level of development. But this theory

implicitly assigns primary importance to developments in individual states, a process in

which the forces of globalisation might figure as an important, but mostly indirect,

influence. More generally, Inglehart and Wenzel’s (2005) theory of political development

proposes socio-economic development as the key driver. Globalisation might again be an

important factor but its influence would mostly be indirect or mediated. In Western

Europe at least, scholars have identified a more general problem of citizen ‘disaffection’,

which is likely to be driven by a kaleidoscope of factors of which elite convergence

concerning responses to ‘globalisation’ may be one (e.g. Pharr et al, 2000; Blyth and

Katz, 2005).

iii. States as a setting for the formation of public opinion on global issues.

22

At first blush some of the evidence reviewed earlier might suggest a new

internationalisation of public opinion, for example the results in relation to responses to

the environment. But there are at least two reasons for thinking local factors remain

paramount. First, if international developments had exercised a compelling or unmediated

influence on public opinion, the outcomes could have been expected to be closer between

citizens from different regions and states. In fact, there was considerable variation.

Second, national governments had themselves taken strong internationalist positions on

environmental issues. Theories of opinion formation suggest these political elites have

particular influence on the formation of public opinion more generally (Zaller, 1992). A

cursory review of the background to the most prominent international issue, global

warming, indicates the scale of publicity. Global warming was a principal issue at the Rio

Earth Summit in 1992. A variety of widely reported scientific and other gatherings

followed. These occurred prior to the Kyoto Summit in December 1997. Meantime,

throughout these negotiations the EU (supported by member states) was the principal

champion for strong measures The agreement reached at Kyoto needed further work

before it could become binding and follow-up sessions were held in Buenos Aires (1998)

and den Hague (1999). Hence, in the period preceding this survey, publicity on

intergovernmental co-operation on this one issue had been substantial. And in this

particular case, elite political opinion was supported by environmental movements and

Green parties (where they existed) and in general by expert opinion. In the development

of mass opinion, the combination of political, scientific and social movement elites

created formidable, perhaps unusual, pressures on public opinion more broadly. Top

down, bottom up and ‘outside-in’ influences on opinion formation all worked in one

direction. This may indicate the scale and coherence of the effort required to achieve

impact on mass opinion. Of course the views of these elite groups had themselves been

shaped by prior international engagements of various kinds. In sum, public opinion on the

environment points to the varied, complex and harmonised interactions that need to occur

for impacts to be attained.

In fact, the most plausible explanation for the formation of public opinion on

environmental and other issues would recognise the continuing importance of nation

23

states. If the process of opinion formation often seems like alchemy, nation states

nevertheless provide the ‘atmosphere’ in which opinion crystallises. International

campaigns have augmented, but not displaced, national institutions. These latter

constitute the stage set on which the dramas of ‘globalisation’ are enacted - or converted

to comedy, farce or worse. Through the theatre and spectacle of local politics, public

opinion is engaged and its development stimulated. Local institutions disseminate the

integrating concepts through which otherwise unrelated experiences and perceptions gain

meaning and significance. Through succeeding acts and scenes, a formed opinion can

progressively take shape. In sum, in the unfolding politics of globalisation, domestic

institutions remain decisive as mediating, buffering and/or catalytic agents. It is hard to

disagree with Held’s assessment of the continuing importance of states as settings for the

formation of citizen opinion (2002, p. 56): ‘The available evidence suggests that national

(and local) cultures remain robust; national institutions continue in many states to have a

central impact on public life; national television and radio broadcasting continue to enjoy

substantial audiences; the organisation of the press and news coverage retain strong

national roots and imported products are constantly read and reinterpreted in novel ways

by national audiences’. Or Colin Hay: ‘The nation state remains the principal focus of

political identification and the principal focus of political debate and contestation in an

interdependent world’ (p. 236).

Summary.

The forces of globalisation are clearly present but are subtle and variegated and certainly

not consistent either in their gross or in their particular impacts. These findings diverge

sharply from Vertovic and Cohen’s contention: ‘We have strongly argued that

transnationals ethnic, religious and even virtual communities, global social movements

and global networks have already massively subverted state structures by going around

and beyond them’ (p. 20). That all these forces are present and significant features of

contemporary politics is undeniable. But the notion that they have ‘massively subverted’

state structures is quite another matter. This study has not of course explored state

structures tout court. But it has explored their most fundamental buttress – citizen

24

support. Here we find globalisation has had effects – but effects that lead citizens to

stronger attachments or greater dependence on states as much as to a broadening or

weakening of loyalties. Further, which response emerges arguably depends on the context

that particular states provide. Finally, even where globalisation encourages a more

internationalist orientation this is not inconsistent with persisting and strong local

attachments: these are the ‘rooted cosmopolitans’ who figure in Tarrow’s study (2005) of

international activists.

Conclusion.

Returning to the broader theme of globalisation, and looking back on this as a study of

citizen attitudes, what is most striking is the continuing importance of nation states as the

primary setting for their formation, not least about ‘globalisation’. Widespread awareness

of its aspects there may be. The increasing influence of international public and private

institutions on daily life may be acknowledged. Direct encounters with ‘foreign’ people,

places and things may be expanding. Media representations may bring new images and

even issues to the attention of ever-larger numbers of citizens. Benign - and malign -

developments both circulate at greater speeds. But in the formation of citizen attitudes

and opinions, nation states remain pre-eminent.

While it is clear citizens are well aware of many aspects of ‘globalisation’, it seems

equally clear that this awareness has not seeded the development of a new

‘cosmopolitanism’, at least if that is defined as ‘free from national limitations’ (OED);

and to the extent public opinion has ‘internationalised’ this does not yet seem to have

diminished in any significant way the role of the state as the setting for its refinement and

development.. On the contrary, there are even strong hints that those governments that

have played active mediating, buffering and/or catalytic roles have been far more

effective in building constituencies for international engagement than those which have

adopted a ‘laissez faire’ approach. This suggests important new brokerage and enabling

roles for the state, not any lessening of state roles.

25

‘Globalisation’ in its varied forms is an important, and clearly a growing, influence on the

self-understanding of citizens. It is also a growing and unavoidable political imperative.

Extreme inequalities (e.g. Scott, forthcoming) and environmental and other limits to

growth (e.g. Flannery, ; Gore, ) are just two reasons for this to be so. But these

great trans-national challenges are only one dimension of the contemporary political

scene. At least for the states covered in this survey, new issues are also apparent from

within. For those in the West, an expressive individualism has undermined older

hierarchies and attachments (Taylor, 2003; Crouch, 1999) and presented a new challenge

of mobilisation and integration (e.g. Dalton, 2004). For those in the East, and save for one

state, democratisation has imparted a new salience to the views of individual citizens. In

their different ways, these currents are making the self-understandings of citizens a more

important, albeit far from decisive, factor in the decisions of political elites. These related

but independent developments make responses to the challenge of globalisation

problematic. Held (2004) has described the best case: ‘Political agents who can reason

from the point of view of others are better equipped to resolve, and to fairly resolve, the

challenging trans-boundary issues that create overlapping communities of fate’ (p. 58).

Alternatively, globalisation could fuel a populist politics that plays on ignorance and fear

in the name of a selfish and self-absorbed nationalism.

This choice will be determined in an immediate sense by the actions and influence of

competing domestic elites. But the broad conversation about global issues, mediated by

national political institutions, constitutes a critical background which will frame and

influence the formation of public opinion. Current findings about the condition of that

mediating infrastructure in both East and West are not sanguine (e.g. for the west: Dalton,

2004; Katz and Blyth, 2004; for democratising Asia: Marsh (ed), 2006). Thus the single

most important conclusion of this study concerns the decisive role of national institutions,

in seeding and framing these national conversations. This covers both the incentives that

shape exchanges between rival partisans and the policies and programs that influence the

responses of individual citizens. In this respect, our findings parallel in another key those

of Dalton (2004). Political systems that facilitate national conversations that eschew

populism, that expose the realities of interdependence, and that build publics who

26

understand sympathetically the resultant complexities, will do a better job of shaping a

tolerable future world, even, in the best case and with luck, one that is prosperous and

mostly peaceful. But neither history nor current developments sanction optimism.

27

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33

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35