the state of liberal democracy in africa

For much of the post-colonial period, Africans tended tolive under one-party dictatorships. Today, even the mostdespotic of African leaders wish to have their leadership

affirmed by elections. Democracy is increasingly seen as the onlylegitimate form of government in Africa, but regular multipartyelections are not synonymous with good government, rule oflaw, and economic development. Indeed, corruption, repression,and underdevelopment continue to scar much of Africa.

Instead of paying attention only to the trappings ofdemocracy, African reformers should focus on building freesocieties characterized by the separation of powers, checksand balances, an independent media and judiciary, restrictionon presidential power, term limits, and so on.

Africa’s transition to liberal democracy is unlikely to hap-pen without far-reaching economic reforms; in fact, all liberaldemocracies are also market-oriented economies. Regrettably,many African countries are not only politically repressive butalso economically dirigiste. Increased economic freedom and

the emergence of a vibrant private sector can bring aboutdirect economic benefits, such as higher incomes, and indi-rect benefits, such as decentralization of power.

As the cases of Kenya, South Africa, and Zimbabwe show, thespread of liberal democracy in Africa can be checked by a numberof important inhibitors. Unresolved inter-ethnic power strugglesoften lead to tensions or conflicts. Abundant natural resourcescan shield irresponsible governments from the necessity of eco-nomic reforms and pressure from taxpayers. Similar problemsbedevil foreign-aid programs in Africa. Finally, Africa continuesto suffer from “big-man” politics or “imperial” presidents.

Fortunately, as the case of Botswana shows, most of theaforementioned inhibitors need not be fatal to the emergenceof a relatively liberal democracy. Inter-ethnic tensions couldbe successfully handled through devolution of power andgenuine federalism, along the Swiss lines, while corruptioncould be better combated by laws that limit the power of theexecutive and increase government transparency.

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A p r i l 2 6 , 2 0 1 0 � n o . 1 2

The State of Liberal Democracy in Africa Resurgence or Retreat?

by Tony Leon

Tony Leon was a visiting fellow at the Cato Institute’s Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity in 2008. He was a member of the South AfricanParliament between 1989 and 2009 and the leader of the opposition between 1999 and 2007. This paper was written before his appointment as South

African ambassador to Argentina in August 2009, and the views expressed herein are his own.

Executive Summary

22197.3_Marker_DPA12_noindicia:22197.3_Marker_DPA12_noindicia 4/15/2010 9:58 AM

Introduction

The incomparable paradoxes of Africainclude a continent which is richlyendowed with human and mineralresources and yet is the poorest continentin the world; a continent which has tractsof arable land large enough to feed conti-nents, yet which cannot feed itself; a con-tinent which is blessed with lakes andlarge rivers and yet suffers from droughtsand where her people die of thirst; and,the strangest paradox of all—the poorestcontinent on earth which has some ofthe world’s wealthiest leaders.

—Sam Mpasu, former minister ofeducation, Malawi1

Sub-Saharan Africa (Africa hereafter) con-tains 48 countries.2 In its 2007 book entitledChallenges of African Growth, the World Banknotes that African nations range from “sophis-ticated, middle-income countries such asSouth Africa, to failed states such as Somalia;from large, oil-rich countries such as Nigeria,to small resource-poor countries such as Niger;from countries that have come out of conflictand have experienced tremendous recent suc-cess, such as Mozambique and Rwanda, tocountries trapped in conflict, poverty, andpoor government such as Somalia.”3

However, for the bulk of the post–indepen-dence period (i.e., since 1960), most Africancountries have displayed, with a strikingdegree of similarity, an absence of even themost basic essentials of democratic govern-ment. Thus, many scholars, policymakers, andpolitical practitioners had regarded Africanliberal democracy as an oxymoron. The WorldBank, for example, noted that until 1982, onlyone-tenth of African countries had competi-tively elected heads of state and, even as late as1991, Africa “showed virtually no improve-ment” in its democratic fortunes.4

The first 30 years after Africa emerged fromcolonial rule were marked by the specter ofone-party states, “presidents for life,” and vio-

lent usurpations of power either throughassassination or military coups. Personaliza-tion of power, repression of human rights, andpredatory and rent-seeking leaders were all thegrim orders of the day. Mobutu Sese Seko,whose corrupt and dictatorial rule held swayover Zaire for more than 30 years, allegedlymade the claim that “democracy is not forAfrica.”5 That was a good working definitionfor much of the continent, at least until theend of the Cold War.

During this so-called “first liberation peri-od,” only a few small African countries, such asMauritius and Botswana, could have been clas-sified as democratic. To the extent that elec-tions in the rest of Africa were convened at all,they were mandated to affirm the incumbent’stenure in office and were usually characterizedby outright rigging and poll violence. LarryDiamond of Stanford University notes thatonly one African president, Aden AbdullahOsman of Somalia, was defeated at the pollsbetween 1960 and 1990.6

By the end of the 1980s, out of some 150heads of state who had governed African coun-tries since independence, only 6 had voluntarilyrelinquished power—and even in those cases,after 20 or more years in office.7 In his book TheState of Africa, Martin Meredith records the 1991remark of the 84-year-old Felix Houphouet-Boigny, who, after 29 years of untrammeledauthoritarian rule in Côte D’Ivoire, said,“There’s no number two, or three or four . . . inCôte D’Ivoire. . . . [T]here’s only number one,that’s me and I don’t share my decisions.”8

That president could well have been speak-ing for an entire generation of so-called “big-men” leaders who treated their countries andtheir countries’ treasuries as their personal pos-sessions. They ruled without let or hindrance,taking full advantage of the so-called “libera-tion dividend,” which allowed them, as thepost-colonial liberators, a significant degree ofpolitical leeway. That was coupled with theirproxy status in the Cold War, where alignmentsor allegiances to Washington or Moscow werefar more determinative of aid flows and inter-national recognition than any adherence to thebasic rules of good government.

2

Democracy isincreasingly seen

as the onlylegitimate form ofgovernment in

Africa.


Today, the democratic picture in 48 Africancountries that are home to some 800 millionpeople is better than at any time since Africannations gained independence. In 2009,Freedom House identified 10 African coun-tries as “free,” 23 as “partly free,” and 15 as “notfree.” By contrast, in 1980, only 4 countrieswere free, 15 partly free, and 27 not free.9

According to Larry Diamond of the HooverInstitution, democracy on the African conti-nent is fragile, but “there are significantgrounds for hope.”10 This paper will examineboth the quality of varying levels of democrati-zation and the extent to which such democrat-ic developments are reversible.

It is certainly true that in the 1960s, the one-party state was seen as a model for developmentby much of Africa’s then regnant leadership.Today, it is only democracy—often admittedlyof the very rickety or pseudo sort—that is seen asa legitimate form of government on the sub-continent. That has led Jeff Herbst of MiamiUniversity to conclude that, notwithstandingother dangers and the lack of democratic deep-ening, “as long as there is no intellectual con-tender to democracy, the prospect of furtherdemocratization [in Africa] remains at leastpositive.”11

Further encouraging metrics have been pro-vided in a range of studies that all point to theuptake of democracy on the subcontinent andsome prospect for its permanence. A study byDaniel Posner and Daniel Young from theUniversity of California, Los Angeles, contains awealth of data that suggest that Africa is nolonger synonymous with rigged elections, rapa-cious and unaccountable big-man rulers, andthe accoutrements of predatory and vampiricstates.12

Among their more interesting findings arethe following:

• Elections are now the norm, not the excep-tion in Africa. In the 1960s and 1970s, thesubcontinent averaged only 28 electionsper decade. By the 1990s, this hadincreased to 65 elections per decade and,in the period between 2000 and 2005,there were 41 elections in just five years.

• Elections are now increasingly contested,often vigorously. Extraordinarily, in theearly years of independence, only two pres-idents faced any opposition at all in 26elections conducted across the subconti-nent. By the 1990s, 90 percent of electionswere contested. Although, as discussed infurther detail below, the nature and quali-ty of the electoral contestation varies wild-ly, there is at least a “modest but meaning-ful” rise in the theoretical possibility of anincumbent losing power in an Africanpresidential election. The authors rate thechances of a ruling president being oustedas slight, at just 14 percent. But it has hap-pened with a relative frequency comparedto the 1960s.

• Given the preponderant advantagesenjoyed by incumbent heads of state inAfrica, the most noteworthy limitationto have emerged on prolongation ofincumbent rule has been the setting,and to a great degree the adherence to,formal constitutional rules on how lead-ers acquire and leave power. Posner andYoung point to the fact that a slew ofpowerful incumbent African presidents,including Malawi’s Muluzi, Ghana’sRawlings, Kenya’s Arap Moi, Nigeria’sObasanjo, and ultimately 10 others,were forced by term-limits to leave officesince 2000 alone. They draw the con-trast with the situation in the 1960s and1970s, when violent overthrow was therule of thumb when it came to leaders’departures from office.

• The authors surveyed 18 cases whenAfrican presidents had completed twoterms of office and were barred, in termsof the relevant instrument, from seekinga third term. The incumbent had threechoices to abide by the term-limit andstep down; to attempt to change theconstitution to allow prolongation inoffice; or to scrap the constitution andretain power extra-constitutionally.Significantly, not one president chosethe extra-constitutional route; ninestood down voluntarily, while the other

3

Africa’s transitionto liberal democracy isunlikely to happen withoutfar-reaching economicreforms.


nine tried to change the constitution,and in one-third of the cases (in Zambia,Malawi, and Nigeria) they were rebuffed.Of the six who successfully amendedtheir constitutions, all six went on towin the subsequent election.

Posner and Young draw an important con-clusion. Instead of presenting a taxonomy ofAfrican democracy, classifying regimes as “fulldemocracies,” “façade democracies,” “hybriddemocracies,” “at-risk democracies,” and thelike, it is more worthwhile to examine whetheror not the behavior of the political actor isrule-bound and therefore subject to con-straint. While they caution that the existenceof “formal constraints on the exercise of pow-er” is no inoculation against misuse of power,it is nevertheless illuminating of how the“rules of the game” have changed profoundlyand, on balance, for the better in Africa.

Much like the spread and distribution ofits natural resources, the growth and sustain-ability of democracy in Africa have been deeplyuneven. The 10 most democratic countries,that is, those that achieved Freedom House’stop rating, are, with the exception of SouthAfrica, fairly small. Jeff Herbst posits the strik-ing contrast between those nations and thethree largest countries on the continent, hometo over one-third of the subcontinent’s popu-lation. Those three nations are, at best, “partlyfree,” as is the case with Nigeria and its 146million inhabitants and Ethiopia with its 82million people. The Democratic Republic ofCongo, with a population of 67 million peo-ple, is not free.13 The conclusion he draws isthat smaller countries, by definition, have lesscomplicated and fraught ethnic and regionaltensions. Indeed, the three largest and far lessdemocratized countries in Africa have allemerged from, or are still engaged in, ethnicand regional wars.14

The revival of democracy in Africa hashelped create a more nuanced picture of Africa.For example, in its survey of Africa, TheEconomist noted that the continent “oncedescribed by this newspaper, perhaps withundue harshness, as ‘the hopeless continent,’

could yet confound its legion of gloomsters andshow that its oft-heralded renaissance is notjust another false dawn prompted by the pass-ing windfall of booming commodity prices, butthe start of something solid and sustainable.”15

However, the same article, while broadlypositive and optimistic, indicated that themyriad of challenges Africa faces, includingbad climate, widespread disease, high levels ofilliteracy, and a plethora of ethnic tensions, areall compounded by “bad and corrupt govern-ment,” which The Economist regards as themain reason for the continent’s failure to“march steadily towards prosperity.”16

The problem of bad government is notconfined to Africa. However, Africa has one ofthe weakest civil societies, which negativelyaffects the quality and transparency of thestate and its institutions. Rich countries canoften afford bad or incompetent govern-ments. In Africa, bad government can destroyany prospect for economic liftoff.

Can Liberal DemocracyTake Root on Africa’s

Stony Soil?The purpose of this paper is to examine

whether liberal democracy has taken root inAfrica, what factors mitigate in favor and mil-itate against the fashioning of true democracyon the subcontinent, and whether liberaldemocracy is a necessary or appropriate formof government for Africa. It will also brieflyexamine different democratic experiences inBotswana, Zimbabwe, Kenya, and SouthAfrica. All of these countries embraced democ-racy at the start of the majority rule, but that iswhere the similarities between them ended.Botswana has been a democracy since inde-pendence, while Zimbabwe descended intotyranny after a short experiment with democ-ratic rule. After many years of one-party rule,Kenya has embarked on an uneven road todemocracy, while South Africa, until the endof the Mbeki presidency in 2008, showed signsof democratic stress. Below I will look at thereasons for these disparate developments.

4

Personalizationof power,

repression ofhuman rights,and predatory

and rent-seeking leaders were all

the grim orders ofthe day.


Crucially, I will show that political freedomand economic liberalization go together.

Liberal Democracy versus Democracy“Liberalism” is a much contested term, both

in Africa and around the world. It has applica-tion to a wide range of political propositions,from the libertarianism of laissez-faire econom-ics to the democratic and dirigiste egalitarianismof the welfare state. However, for the purposesof this paper, it will be confined to the generalconclusion on the meaning of liberalism drawnby Thomas Nagel of New York University, whonoted that “the sovereign power of the stateover the individual is bounded by the require-ment that individuals remain inviolable in cer-tain respects and that they must be treatedequally.”17

There is a wealth of scholarship thatstrongly suggests that many new democracieshave stalled in their purpose of spreading free-dom, eradicating poverty, and lesseninginequality due to corruption, foolish econom-ic policies, and predatory elite behavior.Accordingly, a liberal democracy requiresmore than simply periodic elections. It alsomeans the existence of the rule of law, individ-ual freedoms, constitutional checks and bal-ances, proper transparency and accountability,and civilian control of the armed forces.18 Thatis by no means a closed list, but it does includethe essential aspects of a liberal democracy.

The distinction between what might bedescribed as “electoralism” or “democracy nar-rowly defined,” and a full-blown liberal demo-cratic order, was delineated by Samuel P.Huntington of Harvard University who notedthat “elections, open, free and fair, are theessence of democracy, the inescapable sine quanon. Governments produced by elections maybe inefficient, corrupt, shortsighted, irrespon-sible, dominated by special interests. . . . Thesequalities make such governments undesirablebut do not make them undemocratic.”19

In other words, democratic procedures,such as freely contested elections, can some-times lead to doubtful or even profoundlyundemocratic outcomes. That is the centralthesis of Fareed Zakaria’s The Future of Freedom.

In order for a democracy to service both demo-cratic means and ends, he suggests that theadjectival qualification of “liberal” is necessary.Thus, free and fair elections must be fortifiedby a “bundle of freedoms,” characterized by,but not confined to, the rule of law, the sepa-ration of powers, and the protection of basicliberties of speech, assembly, religion, andproperty.20 According to Zakaria, while thetwo strands of liberal democracy (i.e. libertyand democracy) are interwoven in the Westernpolitical fabric, in other parts of the world theyare “coming apart.”21

Does “Democratic Deepening” Depend onEconomic Freedom?

Liberal democracy places both the individ-ual and the rule of law at the center of politics,and protects individual claims of libertyagainst all assailants, ranging from the state tothe church to the ethnic group and so on. Inhis analysis, Zakaria quotes with approval thepolitical scientist Seymour M. Lipset, who not-ed that “the more well to-do a nation, thegreater its chances to sustain democracy.”22

While there are some exceptions to this for-mula, economic development generally seemsto provide the most nurturing soil for liberaldemocracy. The establishment of a private sec-tor that is independent of government controlcreates competing centers of power. It is thisbroad decentralization of power that is one ofthe keys to democratic development.

Unfortunately, Africa is poor. The world’sGDP in 2008 was $60.6 trillion. Of thatamount, Africa created a mere $987 billion.23

According to the World Bank, Africa accountsfor 10 percent of the world’s population, butfor 30 percent of the world’s poor.24 Unsurpris-ingly, Michael Chege of the University ofFlorida at Gainesville points out that althoughAfrica has held a succession of multiparty elec-tions since 1990, those elections have not led,in the majority of countries, to the establish-ment of truly liberal democracies. Zakaria alsosuggests that it is no coincidence that the twomost advanced liberal democracies in Africa,South Africa and Botswana, have per capitaincomes substantially higher than the African

5

Africa has one ofthe weakest civilsocieties, whichnegatively affectsthe quality andtransparency ofthe state and itsinstitutions.


average.25 In 2008, for example, average grossnational income per capita in South Africa andBotswana was $5,820 and $6,470, respectively.The African average was $1,082.26

In the main, the evidence seems to supportthe proposition that the higher the level of eco-nomic development, the greater the prospectfor democratic deepening. It is noteworthy thatseveral poor African states have progressedquite significantly along the road to fulldemocracy. Mali and Benin are two stand-outexamples, but they might also be two excep-tions that prove the general rule. (Their demo-cratic continuity is also far from assured.)

Peter Lewis of the Johns HopkinsUniversity School of Advanced InternationalStudies found an “elective affinity” betweendemocracy and markets. Lewis noted that they“both rely on open information, choice, anddecentralized outflows for decisionmaking.Market systems give rise to informationdemands and assertive social groups thatimpel governments to relax controls.”27 Thecontrary conditions often, though not always,characterize authoritarian regimes. That hascertainly been the African experience. As Lewispoints out, the linkage between market sys-tems and democracy is affirmed by the factthat every single mature democracy in theworld is also based on a market system.28

James Gwartney of Florida State Universityand Robert Lawson of Auburn University havefound that economic freedom is highly correlat-ed with income and growth. Countries withhigher degrees of economic freedom tend tohave richer populations and experience highergrowth. In their publication, Economic Freedom ofthe World: 2009 Annual Report, they also foundthat economic freedom is highly correlated withpolitical rights and civil liberties (as measured byFreedom House), and with less corruption (asmeasured by Transparency International).People who live in countries with higher degreesof economic freedom tend to enjoy more politi-cal rights and civil liberties. They also tend toexperience lower degrees of corruption.29

In 2008, Larry Diamond concluded a surveyof what he termed “democracy in retreat.”30 Henoted that while democracy had become glob-

alized, any celebration of its triumph was pre-mature. He drew attention to the “powerfulauthoritarian undertow” that has caused partsof the world to slip into a democratic recession.In contrast to Zakaria’s thesis, which sees eco-nomic growth as a leading condition for theconsolidation of democracy, Diamond believesthat only a profound reform of both the instru-ments and institutions of the democratic statewill create conditions for economic liftoff andthe sustainability of pro-growth policies.31

Additionally, Paul Collier of OxfordUniversity believes that improved democracywill not, on its own, turn around failingstates. A “critical mass of educated peoplewho work out and improve reform strategy”may be more conducive to positive changethan good institutions (e.g., democracy orpolitical rights), important as the latterindeed are.32 Whatever the causal linkbetween economic growth and democraticsustainability, there is no doubting that box-ticking and other superficial forms of democ-racy avert the world’s gaze from bad govern-ment in poor countries.

Poor Government and PlummetingHuman Development in Africa

The historical absence and the currentuneven spread of full-blown democracy inAfrica are mirrored in the continent’s econom-ic decline. The salutary example is Ghana, thefirst African country to achieve independencefrom Britain back in 1957. Although it hasemerged today as a constitutional democracy,it has suffered from 40 years of bad govern-ment. As The Economist noted, Ghana’s “recentsuccess needs to be set against a history of dis-aster.”33 At independence, Ghana was approxi-mately as wealthy as South Korea, but today itis 30 times poorer in wealth per person.34

According to the 2006 United NationsHuman Development Report, Africa’s grim statis-tics are unrelentingly negative. The poorest 23countries in the world in terms of humandevelopment are all African. Primarily due tothe spread of HIV/AIDS, life expectancy inAfrica has dropped to just 46 years, while anestimated half of all Africans lack access to

6

A liberal democracy

requires morethan simply periodic elections.


decent water and 30 percent are permanentlyundernourished.35

Larry Diamond draws a direct correlationbetween the historic and, in many areas of thecontinent, continuing absence of liberaldemocracy, and chronic underdevelopment.He notes that “the survival figures are notunrelated to the data in respect of quality ofgovernance.”36 Alongside the countries of theformer Soviet Union, he notes that Africa isstill “the most badly governed region in theworld. This may help explain why Africa ranksdead last, and by a wide margin, in its averageHuman Development Index Score.”37

However, it was only after decades of sus-tained economic failure and democraticregression that some international institu-tions acknowledged that Africa’s economicproblems had political as well as economiccauses.38 Drawing on 45 years of the Africaneconomic experience, for example, the WorldBank found that “the impact of poor policytypically accounted for between one-quarterand one-half of the difference in predictedgrowth between African and non-Africandeveloping countries.”39 Regrettably, a rangeof commentators, from Columbia Universityeconomist Jeffrey Sachs to pop stars such asBono and Bob Geldoff, dismiss or minimizethe importance of good government as a keydeterminant of economic performance.Instead, as Peter Lewis argues, “aid optimists”prefer to blame Africa’s enfeebled growth on“unfavorable geography, capital shortages,and lack of access to global markets.”40

Democracy needs to deepen beyond period-ic multiparty elections. Indeed, the World Bankitself now recognizes that to raise growth, coun-tries must build what it calls institutionalcapacity—including the protection of propertyrights, the enforcement of contracts, the pro-motion of civil society, and the prevention ofcorruption through enhanced constitutionalchecks and balances.41

The Advantages of Liberal Democracy forAfrica

African countries with similar opportunities,and often facing the same advantages or disad-

vantages, performed differently depending onthe policies they implemented.42 The strikingcontrast between neighboring Botswana andZambia, both landlocked and resource-richcountries that were granted independence in thesame period, is a case in point. At independencein 1964, Zambia was Africa’s second richestcountry, whereas Botswana was referred to by adeparting British colonial official as a “uselesspiece of territory.”43 However, Botswana adopt-ed market-friendly economic policies anchoredin and bolstered by, a democratic environmentthat propelled it into a group of upper-middle-income countries. Zambia, meanwhile, lan-guishes at the bottom of the income rankings,with a per capita income level barely distin-guishable from what it had in 1960. Botswana’sper capita income, adjusted for inflation andpurchasing power parity, was $12,420 in 2007. Itwas $167 in 1960. Zambia’s was $1,220 in 2007.In 1960, it was $984.44

Botswana’s democratic journey since inde-pendence in 1966 will be examined below.However, government nationalization of thecopper mines and the installation of a one-party state that lasted for 25 years should beconsidered mileposts on the Zambian road toruin. Zambia’s transition from the somewhatbenign authoritarianism of Kenneth Kaunda(1964–1991) to the elected kleptocracy of hissuccessor Frederick Chiluba (1991–2001)exemplifies the dangers inherent in superficialdemocratizations. During his time in office,this democratically elected leader of Zambiastole tens of millions of dollars. In 2008, aBritish court found that Chiluba conspired tosteal $40 million, while the Zambian govern-ment claimed that it recovered $60 million byfreezing his assets at home and overseas.45

Zambia only started to recover when Chiluba’ssuccessor, Levy Mwanawasa, began to pursuemarket-friendly policies and greater democra-tic accountability after becoming president in2002. However, his death in August 2008 andthe flawed election of his successor inNovember 2008 point to the fragility ofZambian democracy.

Rapacious asset-grabbing by predatorypolitical elites is often found in completely

7

The establishmentof a private sectorthat is independent ofgovernment control createscompeting centers of power.


autocratic environments, like Sudan andGabon. But, as Zambia shows, it can also occurin nominally democratic countries. Thus,much of Africa presents a dismal picture whenit comes to corruption. Consider the annualCorruption Perceptions Index, published byTransparency International, which rates coun-tries on a scale from 0 to 10, with the lowernumber denoting a higher perception of cor-ruption. According to the 2008 CPI, out of the47 African countries reviewed, 30 scored below3 and 14 scored between 3 and 5. Only threeAfrican countries scored above 5. They wereBotswana, Cape Verde, and Mauritius.46 In con-trast, Denmark, the least corrupt country in theworld in 2008, scored 9.3.47 Predictably, thethree least corrupt countries also received topratings among the African countries surveyedby Freedom House.48

The prevalence of corruption causes a vari-ety of problems. It can discourage privateinvestment, while at the same time trappingthe poor into dependence on ineffective ornon-existent delivery of public services. Collierprovides an instructive example of corruptionin Chad. As he writes, “In 2004 a surveytracked money released by the Ministry ofFinance in Chad intended for rural health clin-ics. The survey had the extremely modest pur-pose of finding out how much of the moneyactually reached the clinics—not whether theclinics spent it well, or whether the staff at theclinics knew what they were doing—just wherethe money went. Amazingly, less than 1 per-cent of it reached the clinics—99 percent failedto reach its destination.”49 Good governmentmatters far more in countries where state ser-vices, or lack thereof, can literally mean the dif-ference between life and death.

Accountability is the enemy of opaque gov-ernment practices and official secrecy. But inmany, if not most, African states, the latter iswidespread. The Open Society Institute’sJustice Initiative, for example, promotes adop-tion of freedom of information laws, improve-ments in the criminal justice system, and, cru-cially, the establishment and protection ofeffective rights of citizenship. Drawing fromits practical work in these crucial fields across

Africa, the organization recently concluded,“Political processes and government functionsremain largely personalized and arbitrary inmost countries, while institutional founda-tions are quite weak. As a result, abuse of statepower continues to go largely unchecked.”50

Accordingly, countries that became moredemocratic between 1975 and 2000 grew at afaster pace than their less democratic counter-parts.51 Crucially, the study found no evidenceto support the “so-called authoritarian advan-tage” for economic development sometimesproffered in Asia and Latin America. Instead,the study found that “it is difficult to escapethe association between non-democratic ruleand economic failure in Africa.”52

But even in African democracies, the rule oflaw and the rule of strong men continue to viefor dominance. Liberal democracy is a power-ful antidote to political authoritarianism. Itsspread, however, faces certain key inhibitions.

The Ethnic InhibitorNo region on earth exhibits Africa’s propen-

sity for conflict and civil war. Since decoloniza-tion, nearly 40 percent of African countrieshave experienced civil war. Violence still ragesin the eastern Congo. This conflict has, overtime, drawn in 10 countries and cost millionsof lives. Little wonder that in 2007, 70 percentof the 70,000 United Nations peacekeepersengaged worldwide were deployed in Africa.53

Not every conflict in Africa is caused by eth-nic tensions. Somalia, for example, is an ethni-cally homogenous state. But most of Africa’sviolent ruptures relate to ethnic or religious dif-ferences. The European colonizers paid littleheed to the existence of homogenous and eth-nically distinct African societies during thegreat carve-up of the continent in the late 19thcentury. Colonial boundaries either brokeasunder traditional African societies or, moreominously in terms of future conflict, in somecases enclosed together hundreds of diversegroups with little or no common interests tobind them together.

At independence, the borders of thesemakeshift states with varied, often volatile, eth-nically mixed populations were left intact. It is

8

The higher thelevel of economicdevelopment, the

greater theprospect

for democraticdeepening.


possible that partitions, like the one that sepa-rated Pakistan from India in 1948, would havehad their own violent consequences. But thepersistence of the colonial status quo and,more importantly, the failure of the colonialpowers and the independence leaders to makemeaningful constitutional arrangements toaccount for ethnic differences, have cost Africadearly in economic terms. For example, studiesshow that countries that experienced a civil warhad an average income that was about 50 per-cent lower than countries that did not undergosuch conflict. Investment ratios for bothhuman and physical capital were also about 50percent lower in post-conflict countries.54

But beyond its economic effects and theextraordinary levels of human sufferingwrought by ethnic conflicts, ethnic loyaltieshave inhibited democratic consolidation andpolitical accommodation of minorities. As farback as 1979, sociologist Pierre van den Berghewarned that “if your constituency has the goodfortune to contain a demographic majority,racism can easily be disguised as democracy.The ideological sleight of hand of course is thatan ascriptive racially defined majority is a farcry from a majority made up of a shifting coali-tion of individuals. . . . [M]ajority rule in Africacan thus easily become a veneer for racial dom-ination.”55 Politics of identity, in other words,will trump the politics of interest.

Most political parties in Africa have shallowideological roots. They are far more defined inboth their policies and voters’ perceptions byethnic or regional cleavages. As a result, politicsis often reduced to a zero-sum struggle betweenmajority winners and excluded minority out-siders.56 In the absence of constitutionalarrangements that accommodate minorities,like those that can be seen in Belgium orSwitzerland, majorities tend to dominate, andopposition tends to be weak and alienated. Ofcourse, as Jerry Muller of the CatholicUniversity of America observed, ethnicallydefined political identities are not peculiar toAfrica. Indeed, the peaceful post–World War IIEuropean settlement followed a previously vio-lent process of ethnic separation. “In areas [ofEurope] where the separation has not yet

occurred [such as Yugoslavia] politics is apt toremain ugly,” he wrote.57

The persistence of ethno-nationalist con-flicts in several key African countries has alsoinhibited the flourishing of broadly based civilsociety organizations and trans-ethnic nation-al institutions. Even in sophisticated countries,such as South Africa, the recent spate of xeno-phobic violence, which erupted in May 2008,indicates the prevalence of destructive ethnic-nationalist sentiments. Muller suggests thatwhile liberal democracy is, by definition, racial-ly and ethnically inclusive, it works best inpolitical units that are largely ethnicallyhomogenous.58 Of course, it is not simply trib-al identities that cause civil unrest and ethnicstrife, but the deliberate incitement to violenceof some unscrupulous leaders. As RobertGuest of The Economist notes, “Most of today’sconflicts owe their persistence to modern poli-tics, not primordial passions.”59

The Resource CurseEthnicity is not the sole democracy-

inhibitor in Africa. Nearly one-third of Africanstates are resource-rich, and Africa is a majorproducer of the world’s most important min-erals and metals, including gold, diamonds,platinum, petroleum, and gas.60 The immedi-ate economic advantage derived from suchmineral abundance varies due to price fluctu-ations, and is countered by the adverse effectsthat high commodity prices have on domesticexchange rates and the consequent underde-velopment of the local export industry.61

Nevertheless, oil in particular has had analmost entirely negative effect on wideningdemocracy in Africa’s oil-producing nations—especially Angola, Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea,and Sudan. Not a single one of Africa’s oil-exporting nations has been rated as “free” byFreedom House.62

South Africa and Botswana, both mineralproducers, did achieve such a rating, but nei-ther of them has oil. According to Herbst, “Apolitical economy based on hard mineralexports, most notably oil, fuels authoritarian-ism, because so much of the country’s totalexport revenue is captured by the central gov-

9

Box-ticking andother superficialforms of democracyavert the world’sgaze from badgovernmentin poor countries.


ernment. Relatively large financial flows helpsupport governments that would otherwisehave collapsed, and makes it very hard forauthoritarians to walk away from power.”63

Interestingly, significant oil reserves haverecently been discovered in Ghana.64 Itremains to be determined whether that coun-try’s recent and impressive democratic rank-ings will be affected by its new windfall.

Angola is one of the most egregious exam-ples of a venal and despotic state fueled by oil.The large-scale production of oil off itsAtlantic coast in the 1960s extended andfueled the 40-year-long Angolan civil war.During that period, 1 million people out of apopulation of 13 million were killed and 1.7million people were displaced.65 HumanRights Watch has alleged that the Angolanleaders have “lost” more than $4 billion ofstate revenue between 1997 and 2002.66 Thecycle of civil war and violence was, at impor-tant times, aided by revenues from the extrac-tive industry, and while peace has returned toAngola, the resurgence of violence in theneighboring and mineral-rich DemocraticRepublic of Congo points to a continuation ofa similar problem in that country.

Two recent international initiatives haveyielded mixed results in taming the authori-tarian and violent impulses fueled by the fightover mineral resources. The world campaignagainst so-called “blood diamonds” has result-ed in the “Kimberley Process”—an instrumentdesigned to improve levels of transparencyand accountability that are among the twomost important prerequisites for democraticreform.67 This joint initiative by governments,industry, and civil society imposes extensiverequirements on its members to certify ship-ments of rough diamonds as “conflict-free.”That could stem the flow of illicit stones,which are often used by rebel movements tofinance wars in Africa. Among the 74 signato-ries are Angola, Côte D’Ivoire, the DemocraticRepublic of Congo, and Sierra Leone.

Another attempt to establish principles ofgood government in Africa is the ExtractiveIndustries Transparency Initiative that wasput into place by the British government in

2003. The EITI creates a framework for trans-parency and accountability in mineral-richcountries. For example, it requires greaterfinancial disclosure from state-run and privateextraction companies and from governmentsin developing countries. Unfortunately, theonly African country that is fully compliantwith the EITI criteria is Liberia.68 The EITIprocess is voluntary, requiring honestaccounting, legislative enactments, and care-ful monitoring. Those are precisely the hall-marks of good government that are absentfrom many of the African states that signedthe EITI initiative, but have not complied withthe EITI requirements.

Foreign Aid: Democratization’s Friend orFoe?

There must be several forests’ worth ofstudies chronicling the failure of internationalaid to alleviate poverty in Africa. Robert Guestwrites, “Some African leaders sometimes talkof the need for a Marshall Plan. But Africa hasreceived aid equivalent to six Marshall Plans[since independence]. . . . Between 1960 and1992, Africa received aid totaling roughly $400billion [adjusted for inflation]. But whereasthe original Marshall Plan was a triumph, aidto Africa has failed to alleviate the continent’spoverty.”69

Some commentators believe that aid canbenefit populations in countries where soundeconomic policies are practiced within ademocratic framework anchored by the rule oflaw.70 However, that conclusion has been chal-lenged by a range of scholars who found noconclusive evidence that in a good policy envi-ronment foreign aid has a positive effect oneconomic growth.71

The failure of foreign aid to improve eco-nomic growth rates and human developmentin Africa has not inhibited calls and commit-ments for its increase. In 2005, for example,Jeffrey Sachs of Columbia University called fora doubling of aid for the world’s poorestnations.72 That same year, the G8 had com-mitted itself to doubling aid to Africa to $50billion per annum.73 Although those totalshave yet to be seen in reality, the G8 has put far

10

The historicalabsence and the

currentuneven spread of

full-blowndemocracy inAfrica are

mirrored in thecontinent’s

economic decline.


too much emphasis on aid and debt relief assolutions to Africa’s problems. Africa needs toembrace economic and political reforms assolutions to underdevelopment.

While the G8 has also committed itself toaddressing the rich world’s distorting agricul-tural tariffs and subsidies, which harm Africanexports, it is noteworthy that trade liberaliza-tion has not progressed in recent years. Thefailure of the Doha Development round ofnegotiations on trade liberalization places aquestion mark over future realization of thatcommitment.

Far more controversial in reach and doubt-ful in outcome have been attempts to use for-eign aid as leverage to promote and rewarddemocratization in Africa. There are severalexamples where a combination of foreign pres-sure and domestic opposition led to the transi-tion from one-party or military rule to multi-party systems. Kenya in 1991, for example,comes to mind. Still, even in those countries,results have been mixed. It is striking thatrecently the incumbents have retained powerafter blatantly flawed elections.

It is arguable that multiparty elections, eventhe flawed ones, create more democratic spacethan the perpetuation of one-party rule. Butwhile aid conditionality has had some successin widening the electoral arena, it has been farmore ineffective in the more complex task ofdeepening and developing democracy and itssupporting institutions. In his thoughtfulstudy on foreign aid and democracy promo-tion, Stephen Brown of the University ofOttawa concluded that “autocrats often survivethe pressure for democratization. Political con-ditionality, as currently applied, can be evaded.Many African governments quickly learn howto make the minimum necessary reforms toretain their levels of aid: allowing oppositionparties to compete but not win; permitting anindependent press to operate, but not freely;allowing civic groups to function, but not effec-tively; and consenting that elections be held,but not replace the ruling party.”74

As Brown points out, countries rangingfrom Ethiopia to Uganda have implementedthe bare minimum of reforms to pass interna-

tional muster.75 In any event, far too manydemocracy-assistance programs are technicallybiased and fail to assess whether democracy hastaken root or not. Too often, donors and inter-national democracy promoters treat symptomsrather than causes, and lack the on-the-groundexperience or expertise to monitor the efficacyof institutions and their personnel.

There has been strong support in theUnited States for the principle of conditionali-ty and selectivity that was placed at the heart ofthe Millennium Challenge Corporation—a keyaid initiative of the Bush administration. Itostensibly provides objective criteria—based ongood government, sound economics, and pro-poor policies—that the recipient country has tomeet in order to receive aid.76 Unfortunately,the MCC has come under criticism for dis-pensing aid to corrupt countries like Senegal.77

At least the MCC has been relatively transpar-ent in its use of third-party evaluations, likethose published by Freedom House. The MCCmay be an improvement on the previous waysof dispensing aid, but it is important to notethat the MCC adds to, rather than replaces,other aid programs.

The approach of Africa’s leadership todemocracy-deepening is striking for its lack ofappreciation of civil society. Take the AfricanUnion’s New Partnership for African Develop-ment that was pioneered by then presidentsThabo Mbeki of South Africa and OlusegunObasanjo of Nigeria, and presidents AbdoulayiWade of Senegal and Abdelaziz Bouteflika ofAlgeria in 2001. NEPAD is an attempt toobtain increased levels of international aid,debt relief, and investment in exchange forimprovements in democracy and good govern-ment.78 Yet its founding documents containno reference to any political formations otherthan the ruling parties and governments.Perhaps that omission explains, in large part,NEPAD’s lack of success in democratizingAfrica over the past nine years.

The Imperial Presidency ReduxThe previous section leads to the central

and perhaps most important challenge todemocratization in Africa: the entrenchment

11

Liberal democracyis a powerfulantidote to political authoritarianism.


of political elites due to the very absence ofdemocratic counterweights and independentinstitutions. The survival of neo-patrimonial-ism or the imperial presidency, together withits withering effects on the creation of democ-ratic checks and balances, remains a key obsta-cle to genuine democratization in Africa.

In almost every African country the welcomeimprovements in the general democratic out-look need to be weighed against the survival,and often the supremacy, of “neo-patrimonial-ism,” known in Africa as big-man leadership. Asthe Ghanaian scholar H. Kwasi Prempeh noted,“African presidents may be term-limited but byall accounts they have not been tamed. . . . [T]heyhave emerged from recent rounds of democrat-ic reform with their power extant. . . . [T]here’smore personal liberty and improved oppositionspace, but African presidents still controlresources and patronage, [which] means thatcapture and control of the presidency is still thesingular ambition of Africa’s politicians.”79

We will observe this phenomenon at workto varying degrees in each of the four countriesunder specific review below. However, mostAfrican countries today continue to bear wit-ness to the perpetuation of presidential domi-nance and the absence of effective democraticcounterweights. The results in each case mayvary, but the causes appear to be common.

For example, very few African democratictransitions have been characterized by funda-mental root-and-branch constitutional re-forms. Constitutional conferences have beendominated by “issues of access,” such as freeelections, media freedom, term limits, and soon. Often little, if any, attention has been givento establishing and deepening democraticchecks and balances. Even in countries wherean entirely new constitutional order was creat-ed, like in South Africa between 1992 and 1994,the creation of a political framework but-tressed by a bill of rights, separation of powers,and the creation of independent institutionsproved largely ineffective in practice. The over-whelming political weight of the newly electedmajority party allowed it to breach many of theconstitutional edifices intended to counteroverconcentration of power.

The continued one-party dominance ofmany African democracies—for reasons of eth-nicity, the so-called “liberation dividend,” andopposition feebleness—has further reduced theefficacy of constitutional designs and allowedthe majority party leaderships in various coun-tries to misuse and abuse their power.

Also, the democratic experience in Africa isrelatively new. As a consequence, legislaturesand municipal and regional governmentsoften display a pathological dependence onthe president and his patronage. Oversight ofthe executive and the creation of criticalcitadels of countervailing power have so faryielded very mixed results.

There have been recent instances of Africanparliaments pushing back against executiveoverreach. For example, in July 2008, theKenyan parliament, now controlled by theopposition, passed a motion of no-confidencein President Kibaki’s finance minister. In con-trast, just three years before the country’s anti-corruption chief John Githongo was firedwhen his investigations came too close to thepresidency. That experience had led him toconclude that “a whole era, starting in the mid-1990s when African governments at least triedto take corruption seriously, is over.”80 Nigeria,which has become a synonym for corruption inAfrica, visited the same fate on the head of itsanti-corruption commission, Nuhu Ribadu.After he was dismissed earlier in 2008 from hispost for probing corruption at the highest lev-el of state, he described Nigeria’s mode of gov-ernment as “gangsterism.”81

There appears to be little appetite amongopposition forces to reform government andits institutions. Rather, most oppositionactivists driving political change in Africa have,in Prempeh’s view, “been motivated by thenear-term goal of forming government them-selves.” He cites the case of Ghana, whereenthusiasm for the reforms demanded by theNew Patriot Party “waned appreciably oncethey obtained office.”82

The judicial branch, in many countries, hasshown a big improvement since the 1960s. Inmany jurisdictions, it has acted as the mosteffective counterweight to presidential over-

12

The failure of foreign aid to

improve economicgrowth rates and

human development

in Africa has notinhibited calls for its increase.


reach. However, the experience varies in differ-ent countries and there still appear to be toomany instances where the courts shrink fromtaking on the executive power.

The first African Human Rights Court thathas sat in Arusha, Tanzania, since June 2008, isa hopeful development in the institutionaliza-tion of a continentwide protection of humanrights. The court’s jurisdictional remit empow-ers it to give binding judgments against all par-ties, including signatory states, which violatethe African Charter on Human and People’sRights. However, only 24 out of the 53 mem-bers of the African Union have ratified theArusha protocol and are, thus, subject to itsjudgments.83

Unfortunately, pan-African institutionshave tended to reflect, and in many cases toreinforce, the democratic defects of the mem-ber states. For example, a 2008 report byAmnesty International notes a “deplorablelack of political will to address the human-rights violations that usually lie at the roots ofpolitical tensions and hostilities.” It also statesthat the African Unions’s Peace and SecurityCouncil has “failed to fulfill its mandate toaddress the human rights dimensions ofarmed conflict in Africa.”84 A plethora of oth-er institutions and charters, including the1986 African Charter on Human and People’sRights and the African Commission andCourt on Human Rights, continue to be inef-fective because of “continuing financial andpolitical obstacles.”85

There was considerable expectation thatNEPAD’s African Peer Review Mechanism,which contained provisions for assessment ofgood government in an attempt to increaseinternational aid and investment to Africa,would yield positive results. Unfortunately,the most odious regimes, like those ofZimbabwe and Sudan, have simply opted outof the process, which is, again, entirely volun-tary. The South African government was wide-ly accused by its domestic opponents of mar-ginalizing opposition and civil society groupsfrom the African Peer Review Mechanism’sprocess. As a consequence, Ian Taylor of St.Andrews University notes, “NEPAD will

remain a club of African states and the strongmen who rule them.”86

Africa’s Experience withDemocratization: The Casesof Botswana, Kenya,

Zimbabwe, and South Africa

Botswana, Kenya, Zimbabwe, and SouthAfrica embraced democracy at the start of themajority rule, but only Botswana’s democraticrecord remains strong. Zimbabwe became adictatorship after a short experiment withdemocratic rule, while Kenya’s democraticrecord is patchy at best. Worryingly, SouthAfrica’s democracy is under threat. These cas-es represent the range of Africa’s experiencewith democratization. Below, I will look at thereasons for these disparate developments.

Botswana: A Democratic Success Story Botswana is widely regarded as a “shining

example of liberal democracy” in SouthernAfrica.87 Since its independence in 1966, all elec-tions have been freely and fairly contested andhave been held on schedule.88 The success ofdemocracy in Botswana is often ascribed to aconfluence of ethnic homogeneity and tribaltraditions that checked the power of the centralgovernment. But, crucially, Botswana has fordecades had one of Africa’s freest economies.

Ethnic homogeneity has facilitated theestablishment of democracy in Botswana. Allpresidents have been from the Tswana ethnicgroup that accounts for 79 percent of the pop-ulation.89 Moreover, there is a clear linkagebetween the tribal and political leaderships.Both the first president, Seretse Khama, and hisson, the current president Ian Khama, werechiefs of the Bamangwato tribe, which is themost important constituent element of theTswana tribal group.90

Botswana’s continuing democratic trajecto-ry is also in part due to the customs and politi-cal traditions of the dominant Tswana tribe.During the pre-colonial era, the Tswana tribeswere ruled by a chief whose power was limited

13

Africa needs toembrace economicand politicalreforms assolutions tounder-development.


by custom and law. He consulted with severaladvisers and was expected to discuss his likelydecisions in public assemblies where villagerscould express their views.91 The Tswana’s sup-port for democratic ideals was also evident intheir culture. For example, the Tswana phrase“Kgosi ke kgosi ka batho,” means “a chief is achief with the consent of his people.”92 The tra-dition of democratic values held by such a largepart of the population undoubtedly smoothedthe transition to a modern democracy.

This democratic tradition, which was leftlargely untouched during the British adminis-tration, has prevented the emergence of big-man rulers in Botswana. The strong institu-tions and democratic traditions haveprevented presidents form obtaining too muchpower. Moreover, since the enactment of termlimits in 1997, presidents have peacefullystepped down after their constitutionallyallowed rule of two five-year terms.

In addition to good institutions that hadtheir roots in pre-colonial times, after its inde-pendence Botswana’s government adoptedmarket-friendly economic policies. Accordingto Scott Beaulier of Mercer University, “Unlikeother African leaders, Khama adopted pro-market policies on a wide front. His new gov-ernment promised low and stable taxes tomining companies, liberalized trade, increasedpersonal freedoms, and kept marginal incometax rates low to deter tax evasion and corrup-tion. In addition, Khama preserved the kgotlasand many elements of customary law.”93

For decades, Botswana ranked as continen-tal Africa’s freest or second freest economy. Inthe Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of theWorld: 2009 Annual Report, Botswana wasranked as Africa’s third-freest economy, rough-ly on a par with Belgium and freer than theCzech Republic and Greece. As a result, over aperiod of more than four decades, stretchingfrom Botswana’s independence in 1966 to2008, Botswana’s average annual compoundgrowth rate of GDP per capita was 6.51 percent.In contrast, African growth over the same peri-od was 0.52 percent. Botswana’s GDP per capi-ta, adjusted for inflation and purchasing powerparity, rose from $3,380 in 1980 to $12,378 in

2008. Africa’s barely moved, rising from $1,796in 1980 to $1,935 in 2008.94

Foreign aid, on which many African coun-tries heavily depended for decades, has played arelatively minor role in Botswana’s success. AsBeaulier writes, “Traditionally, any connectionto the International Monetary Fund and WorldBank has proven the kiss of death for developingcountries. . . . Botswana’s leadership seemed torecognize the danger involved in depending onthe IMF and World Bank. Instead of borrowingheavily from those organizations, Botswanaallowed them to play an advisory role.”95

Of course, Botswana has much room forimprovement. In particular, the size of thegovernment and amount of governmentspending have grown in recent years. In spiteof its status as a relatively free African econo-my, Botswana now ranks 50th out of the 141countries surveyed by the Fraser Institute.That being said, Botswana’s success story isconsistent with experience in other parts ofthe world. Economic freedom is highly corre-lated with growth, but also with political andcivil freedoms. Botswana has accomplished ahigh degree of all three freedoms and shouldbe an example for others to follow.

Kenya: Democracy InterruptedMost of Kenya’s post-independence history

happened in the shadow of a de facto(1963–1982) and de jure (1982–1992) one-par-ty state. When the British rule ended, politicalpower was soon consolidated in the hands ofthe Kikuyu political elite.96 Comprising 22 per-cent of the Kenyan population, the Kikuyuformed the core of Kenya’s nationalist move-ment and came to dominate the civil serviceand the private sector during the 1960s and1970s. Civil society was suppressed and politi-cal institutions perverted to serve an ethnicallybased elite. Jomo Kenyatta, Kenya’s first presi-dent, exemplified big-man presidentialismalmost to the point of caricature—-he largelyruled by decree and through informal net-works, bypassing the formal political and con-stitutional structures.97

Kenyatta died in August 1978, and little-known vice president Daniel arap Moi took

14

Legislaturesand municipaland regional governmentsoften display apathological

dependence onthe president andhis patronage.


over the presidency in October of that year.Seeking to redress the ethnic imbalance creat-ed by Kenyatta, Moi pursued a set of redistrib-utive polices that favored his own ethnicgroup—the Kalenjin—and other disadvantagedtribes in the Rift Valley of Kenya. Althoughthese policies were initially popular, they incit-ed a failed coup attempt in 1982, after whichMoi became increasingly repressive. Electionswere rigged, the press and civil society wererepressed, and opponents were jailed.98

In the 2002 elections, Mwai Kibaki, the formerfinance minister, defeated Moi’s designated suc-cessor, Uhuru Kenyatta. Kibaki’s NationalRainbow Coalition party, which later split intothe Party of National Unity and OrangeDemocratic Movement, committed itself to a“zero tolerance of corruption” policy. Foreigninvestors and tourists poured into the country,and civil society and a free press were advancingdemocratization through increased influence.99

The Kenyan economy picked up, experiencingsome of its highest growth rates in 20 years.100

Unfortunately, the government’s anti-corruptiondrive soon fizzled out and, as John Githongo, theformer head of the Office of Governance andEthics, noted, corruption soon enveloped thehighest ranks of the government.101

The December 2007 election pitted Kibaki’sParty of National Unity against its former ally,the Orange Democratic Movement, led by aLuo politician named Raila Odinga. Prior tothe election, the opposition’s Odinga ledKibaki in all the opinion polls by commandingpercentages. With half of the 210 constituen-cies reporting that Odinga was in the lead, theElectoral Commission of Kenya abruptlystopped the count. When counting wasresumed, Kibaki surged ahead and, withinhours of the result, he was sworn in to his sec-ond term at a hastily arranged ceremony.Unsurprisingly, the chief European Unionmonitor, Alexander Lambsdorff, said that “thepresidential elections were flawed.”102 Violenceerupted over the confusion, with OrangeDemocratic Movement supporters accusingKibaki’s party of electoral fraud.103 Some 1,700people were killed in post-election violence,while an estimated 300,000 Kenyans were dis-

placed from their homes.104 Targeted ethnicviolence was mainly directed at Kibaki’s ethnicgroup, the Kikuyu.

Widespread international pressure followed,as many countries, ranging from the UnitedStates to South Africa, refused to accept theelection result. On February 28, 2008, Kibakiand Odinga signed a power-sharing agreementcalled the National Accord and ReconciliationAct, which recognized Kibaki as president andOdinga as prime minister.105 This legitimiza-tion of a patently flawed election through postfacto bargaining had the advantage of restoringa semblance of peace and stability. However, itcame with significant cost: an implicit recogni-tion that incumbent rule could be extended,despite significant evidence that a different out-come was mandated by the electorate.106

What lessons can be learned from Kenya’shistory of democratic transition? The first isthe recognition that Kenya has been led by big-men rulers. In the end, it is individuals, notinstitutions, who have forged Kenya’s unevenpath to democracy. Kenya’s strong centralauthority, a holdover from the colonial period,keeps the judiciary, parliament, and the elec-toral commission subservient to the presi-dent.107 The slow movement of politicalchange in Kenya, exemplified in the transitionfrom Moi to Kibaki, “is a function of the single-minded preoccupation with the replacementof incumbent leaders in the democratizationwave in Africa.”108

Second, Kenya must build its democraticinstitutions. There is broad consensus withinand outside Kenya that the country needs con-stitutional reforms that strengthen local gov-ernment and help decentralize power.109

There has been a push for those reforms since1991 and many experts think the currentpolitical climate offers an opportunity foraction.110 However, widespread corruption haseroded public trust in political institutions.111

The third lesson is that ethnic divisionsmust be addressed. The idea of federalism, or“majimbo,” dates back to the pre-indepen-dence era, when the British envisaged Kenya asa federation of three self-governing regions:the Rift Valley, the Western region, and the

15

Pan-African institutionshave tended toreflect, and inmany cases toreinforce, thedemocraticdefects of themember states.


Coast. Fearing that one ethnic group wouldcome to dominate the Kenyan parliament, thefederalists wanted self-governing ethnicgroups to negotiate new federal laws with oneanother. This plan, which was backed by theKenya African Democratic Union in the firstpost-independence parliamentary elections,was to ensure that national legislation benefit-ed all ethnic groups and discriminated againstnone. Unfortunately, the Kenya AfricanDemocratic Union lost to Kenyatta’s KenyaAfrican National Union and majimbo wasquickly forgotten.

Fourth, although Kenya’s economy is todayas free as that of the Czech Republic, muchwork still remains. Excessive regulation andlicensing continue to provide ample opportu-nities for corruption. Remaining parastatalsmake hiring based on family and tribal con-nections possible. Nontransparent govern-ment procurement allows sitting politicians toreward their family, friends, and supporterswith state contracts. Further privatization andderegulation will be necessary to limit corrup-tion and nepotism.112

To be sure, Kenya is doing better thanbefore. It has the 54th freest economy out of the141 economies surveyed in the 2009 EconomicFreedom of the World report.113 According to the2008 Media Sustainability Index that is publishedby the International Research and ExchangesBoard, Kenya achieved a “near sustainability”score in all of the indicators used to measure theviability of independent media around theworld.114 Encouragingly, some 70 percent of therespondents in a Centre for the Study of AfricanEconomies representative survey vieweddemocracy as the most preferred type of gov-ernment.115 But Kenyans also understand thattheir democracy is at risk. In December 2007,only 20 percent of the respondents felt they hada full democracy, while in August 2008 thatnumber decreased to 6 percent.116

Zimbabwe: A Case of Democratic ImplosionThe 1980 democratic elections that ended

white minority rule in what was then Rhodesiagave rise to the hope that Africa’s second mostdeveloped nation would provide an example of

racial reconciliation, minority accommoda-tion, and majority empowerment. After win-ning an absolute majority in the 1980 election,Prime Minister Robert Mugabe and hisZimbabwe African National Union govern-ment indicated their apparent commitment tonational reconciliation. In his first cabinet,Mugabe included members of JoshuaNkomo’s Zimbabwe African People’s Union, arival nationalist organization. He also includedseveral white cabinet members who weredrawn from the Rhodesian Front party of thelast white prime minister, Ian Smith.

Only a year later, Mugabe turned on theZimbabwe African People’s Union. Some 20,000of its members were killed, and the party wasforced to merge with Mugabe’s ZimbabweAfrican National Union in 1987. Zimbabwebecame a de facto one-party state. For the first10 years of independence, Mugabe was hand-cuffed by the provisions of the Lancaster HouseAgreement that ended the Rhodesian civil warand prevented the government from amendingthe constitution. In April 1990, however, thatrestriction expired. Mugabe’s government com-menced with wholesale changes to the constitu-tion, including the removal of some legal guar-antees to the commercial farmers in the event ofan expropriation.

During the 1990s, Mugabe used a combina-tion of methods to minimize both oppositionactivity and support.117 He vastly inflated thepublic service payrolls and parastatals to providejobs and patronage for his followers. He con-trolled the public media and much of the privatemedia. Moreover, the security forces could becounted on to do his bidding. In September1999, however, new opposition emerged in theform of the Movement for Democratic Change.A few months later, it helped to defeat Mugabein a constitutional referendum that would haveallowed him to seek two additional terms inoffice and official immunity from prosecution.Consequent to this unexpected defeat, Mugabeand his government prosecuted a violent landredistribution program that illegally, but withofficial sanction, expelled both white farmersand black laborers from the commercial farms.The Zimbabwe African National Union—

16

Botswana’s governmentadopted

market-friendlyeconomic policies.


Patriotic Front had systematically “torn downthe elaborate façade of democracy that it care-fully constructed in the first two decades of itsrule. In direct response to its sense of vulnerabil-ity, it began to erode civil liberties inZimbabwe.”118 In essence, Mugabe and the par-ty vandalized and intimidated all institutionsand civil society, and retained their support basethrough “the confiscation and redistribution ofprivately-owned assets.”119

At all stages of Zimbabwe’s decline, the variousregional and continental bodies charged withensuring peace, stability, and good government inAfrica—particularly the African Union and theSouthern African Development Community—proved, at best, ineffectual in action and, at worst,complicit in Mugabe’s reign of terror. Mugabe’sgreat fortune was that his excesses occurred dur-ing the presidency of his most powerful neighbor,Thabo Mbeki of South Africa. Mbeki’s own lin-gering resentments to colonialism, white racism,and the West provided a rich seam of personalinsecurity and racial solidarity that Mugabemined to great effect in impeding any formal andforthright action against him. While Mugabe jus-tified his increasingly repressive and economical-ly ruinous policies on the basis of restorative jus-tice for the majority that was excluded from landownership through the decades of colonial rule,his real constituency was not the African massesthat he claimed to represent (but was, in fact,plundering into abject penury), but the superan-nuated southern African post–colonial liberationelites. Thus, the Zimbabwe African NationalUnion—Patriotic Front, and to some extentSouth Africa’s governing African NationalCongress, were bound by a common interest.

The expropriation of land and businesses,periodic interference with the judiciary, andmaintenance of price controls and exchangerates, to name but a few fatal steps taken by thegovernment over the last decade, devastatedthe economy and destroyed investor confi-dence.120 The annual inflation rate reached anastounding 89.7 sextillion percent (10 to the21st power) in November 2008.121 There havebeen persistent shortages of foreign exchange,fuel, and food. According to some estimates,only one in 10 Zimbabweans had a job at this

time. Standards of living have collapsed, alongwith once relatively good education and healthcare systems. Longevity declined to among thelowest in the world. Zimbabwe ranked last in141 countries surveyed in the 2009 EconomicFreedom of the World report.122 Similarly, theInternational Research and Exchanges Board’sMedia Sustainability Index 2008 gave Zimbabwesome of the lowest ratings in Africa.123

The decline of Zimbabwe shows what hap-pens to democracy when property rights andeconomic freedom are attacked, and when anoutspoken press, a healthy opposition, and anindependent judiciary are undermined. Somehope that democracy in Zimbabwe will berestored as a result of the 2008 power-sharingagreement between the Zimbabwe AfricanNational Union—Patriotic Front and theMovement for Democratic Change. Thatagreement confirmed Mugabe in his role aspresident, while making Morgan Tsvangiraiprime minister. At present, however, the power-sharing government remains weak and agree-ment shaky. Zimbabwe may still return to theviolence that marked the last decade.

South Africa: A Case of Democracy underStress

South Africa is the sixth largest country onthe subcontinent and has a population of over49 million people. It is the only nation in Africawith a long-settled and numerically significantwhite minority that amounts to just over 9 per-cent of the population. Whites, together withthe numerically less significant “coloured” andIndian population groups, form a non-blackminority representing about one-fifth of thetotal population. South Africa’s mineral wealthis significant. The country houses the world’slargest deposits of gold, platinum, and chromi-um. South Africa produces close to 40 percentof sub-Saharan Africa’s GDP, and its GDP percapita, adjusted for purchasing power parity,was $10,187 in 2008. That income is, however,very unevenly distributed. For example, therichest 10 percent of households account fornearly half of the national income.125

South Africa is quite exceptional in a sensethat it is the only large, ethnically diverse, and

17

At all stages ofZimbabwe’sdecline, the various regionaland continentalbodies chargedwith ensuringpeace proved, atbest, ineffectual.


resource-rich African country to be rated“free” by Freedom House.126 After the end ofapartheid, South Africa enacted a widelyadmired and sophisticated liberal democraticconstitution. Its provisions include full votingrights for all, a judicially enforceable bill ofrights, an elaborate raft of fundamental indi-vidual freedoms, and a swath of independentdemocracy-enhancing institutions and watch-dogs. The constitution also provides for aseries of checks and balances against presiden-tial and executive overreach, including termlimits and separation of powers. Since theenactment of its constitution, South Africahas held four largely free and fair parliamen-tary elections and its 400-member parliamentprovides political voice for a number of politi-cal parties. Each of South Africa’s nineprovinces has a provincial legislature and aprovincial chief executive, and there is a thirdtier of government at metropolitan and locallevels, so that South Africa has a quasi-federaldispersal of political authority.

Economically, South Africa’s first democra-tic government inherited a large budget deficit,a volatile currency, gyrating interest rates, andan inflation rate between 15 percent and 18percent. It was also bequeathed a GDP growthrate per capita of –1.3 percent.127 Due to pru-dent macro-economic management, theAfrican National Congress government man-aged to reduce the deficit and inflation, andcreate an environment more suitable for invest-ment. During economically ebullient times,the ANC government oversaw low interestrates and, in 2007, a budget surplus. The SouthAfrican economy has grown by an average rateof over 4.5 percent between 2004 and 2008. Ablack middle class numbering some 3 millionadults has emerged, in part, because of thatgrowth. The size of the social welfare stateexpanded. In 2008, for example, it was estimat-ed that more than one-quarter of the popula-tion received at least one form of social grantfrom the government.128 Reporting to Parlia-ment in 2006, President Mbeki was able toclaim that, on the basis of sustained positiveand uninterrupted economic growth since1994, access to housing, electricity, water,

health, and education had improved.129

Unemployment, which increased significantlyafter 1994, fell slightly in recent years, althoughit still remains at around 25 percent of theworking-age population on a narrow defini-tion and 40 percent on a broader measure.130

Shortly before the commencement of hispresidency on 1994, Nelson Mandela declared“human rights will be the light that guides ourforeign policy.”131 In recognition of SouthAfrica’s continental preeminence, the countrybecame a leading member of multilateralinstitutions in Africa and the developingworld, and was elected to a nonpermanent seaton the United Nations Security Council in2007. Crowning its emerging leadership roleon the world stage, South Africa was chosen tohost the Soccer World Cup in 2010.132

Dark Clouds on South Africa’s DemocraticHorizon. There is, however, a darker side thatclouds the progress that South Africa hasmade since 1994. First, the government hasfailed to address the problem of unemploy-ment. To put a dent in unemployment, a GDPgrowth rate between 6 percent and 7 percentannually would have been required. That thistarget was never achieved, in the most benefi-cent international economic conditions, was aconsequence of misguided government poli-cies. Those mistaken policies included theimposition of labor-market rigidities that weremandated by the governing party’s alliancewith the trade union federation, the Congressof South African Trade Unions, and the SouthAfrican Communist Party, and the diversion ofnational resources into policies of wealth trans-fers to those oppressed by apartheid. While itwas politically and morally necessary to re-bal-ance the apartheid legacy, it is clear that highrates of growth rather than wealth transfers areneeded to move South Africa forward.133

Second, tensions have developed betweenthe government’s grandiose plans and its abili-ty to deliver on its promises. For example, by2007, the government spent 5.7 percent of GDPon education. That figure was among the high-est in the developing world and on par withmuch of the developed world. Between 2000and 2007, 20 percent of the national budget

18

The expropriationof land and businesses, periodic

interference withthe judiciary, andmaintenance ofprice controls and exchange

rates devastatedthe economy.


was spent on education.134 Yet, in a 2007 survey,which measured reading ability of primaryschool students in 45 countries, South Africacame last, behind countries like Iran, Indonesia,and Trinidad and Tobago.135 Similarly, in a2003 survey that measured science and mathability of 8th graders in 45 countries, SouthAfrica came last, behind Ghana, Botswana, andeven the war-torn Palestinian territories.136

Third, the government has been enforcingracial quotas in government procurementpolicies, public sector appointments, and evenin the private sector. That policy requires thatblack South Africans be appointed in techni-cal and management positions even thoughthe education system has failed to deliverenough skilled non-white labor. Unsurpris-ngly, by 2008, the public service recorded avacancy rate of over 330,000 posts.137 This lackof capacity, at the precise moment when poorSouth Africans expected the most of their gov-ernment in terms of service delivery, was mostapparent at the municipal level. “During 2005,there were protests in 90 percent of the 136failing municipalities that receive central gov-ernment assistance and there were 881 illegaland 5,085 legal protests in municipalitiesthrough 2004–2005.”138

The skills shortage was exacerbated by thecontinuous emigration of skilled young, large-ly white, South Africans since 1994. The SouthAfrican Institute of Race Relations estimatedthe number at over 800,000 between 1996 and2007.139 While this emigration was a reflectionof the global value of skills it was also attribut-able to shrinking domestic opportunities dueto affirmative action and to the surge in vio-lent crime. South Africa is wracked by soaringlevels of crime, reflecting the failure of thestate to deliver on one of its most basic func-tions. In 2006–2007, over 19,000 people weremurdered in South Africa. That was seventimes more than the murder rate in the UnitedStates and 28 times more than the murder ratein the United Kingdom.140

Perhaps the most calamitous governmentfailure has been in the realm of public health.Once again, this failure was not due to a lack ofresources. The government increased spending

on health from 7.9 percent of its total expendi-tures in 1997 to 9.9 percent in 2006, placing thecountry in the same league as Hungary, Greece,Israel, and Poland.141 Yet life expectancy inSouth Africa fell from 58 years in 2000 to 51years in 2006.142 That decline was largely due tothe prevalence of HIV/AIDS, the causes andtreatment of which were disputed by PresidentMbeki just as the epidemic gained ascendancyin South Africa. The decline in life expectancycontributed to South Africa’s slide in the UN’sHuman Development Index, which measureshuman welfare around the world. South Africafell from 103rd place out of 174 countries sur-veyed in 2000 to 129th place out of 182 coun-tries surveyed in 2009.143

Fourth, the government has massivelyintruded in the private sector, even though itperforms much better in terms of delivery thanthe government. The difference between theperformances of the public and private sectorswas recorded in the 2009–2010 competitive-ness survey conducted by the World EconomicForum. South Africa scored very poorly in theareas under state control. According to theForum, “The business costs of crime and vio-lence (133rd) and the sense that the police areunable to provide protection from crime(106th) do not contribute to an environmentthat fosters competitiveness. Another majorconcern remains the health of the workforce,ranked 127th out of 133 countries, the resultof high rates of communicable diseases andpoor health indicators more generally.”

But South Africa’s private sector scoredrelatively well. In the accountability of privateinstitutions, for example, South Africa camein fifth place. The same goes for “the evalua-tion of the country’s financial markets, whichhave increased in rank from 24th last year to avery high fifth this year, indicating strongconfidence in South Africa’s financial mar-kets at a time when trust has been eroded inmany other parts of the world.” The countrydid “reasonably well in more complex areassuch as business sophistication (36th) andinnovation (41st).”144

In its pursuit of a policy of “Black EconomicEmpowerment,” the government has massive-

19

Aided by massivemajorities in parliament, theAfrican NationalCongressovercame constitutionalobstacles andsucceededin centralizingpolitical and economic powerin its hands.


ly intruded in the private economy, subjectingmuch of it to “transformation charters” thatrequires companies above a minimum level ofturnover and personnel to dispose of 25 per-cent of their equity to black interests. This hascome at a high economic cost: some $30 billionin equity transfers have occurred since 1994.Moreover, many of the deals are highly lever-aged, some up to 100 percent. This is likely tobe unaffordable in the long run.145

The Black Economic Empowerment policyhas also created rent-seeking that had a cor-rupting effect on the governing party. In 2007,Kgalema Motlanthe, the then–secretary generalof the ANC who was to become the President ofSouth Africa after Mbeki’s demise, admittedthat “this rot is across the board. . . . [A]lmostevery project is conceived because it offers cer-tain people a chance to make money.”146

Indeed, South Africa’s current president, JacobZuma, faced unresolved allegations relating to783 counts of bribery (which were withdrawn in2009) and the former national commissioner ofpolice, Jackie Selebi, is currently being tried oncharges of corruption and defeating the ends ofjustice. Not surprisingly, South Africa, whichwas ranked 38th place in the 2001 CorruptionPerception Index, fell to 55th in 2009.147

Fifth, South Africa’s foreign policy underThabo Mbeki’s presidency was at odds with thehumanitarian principles that the governmentclaims to promote. That led Michael Gerson ofthe Washington Post to call South Africa “a roguedemocracy.” The author was reflecting onSouth Africa’s role in the United Nations whereit was “the only real democracy” to block dis-cussions about human rights in Zimbabwe,Belarus, Cuba, and North Korea. South Africaalso voted against a resolution against theBurmese junta, and watered down a UNSecurity Council resolution on Iran. In theGeneral Assembly, Gerson noted, “South Africafought against a resolution condemning theuse of rape as a weapon of war because the res-olution was not sufficiently anti-American.”148

Disconnect between Democratic Potential andCurrent Realities. Part of the explanation for theparadoxes that South Africa exhibits can befound in a number of democratic inhibitors.

Those include the persistent racial politics, thecentralization of power (particularly in thehands of the president), and the correspondingfailure of some (although not all) of the key con-stitutional checks and balances.

Beginning in 1997, the ANC set out, as amatter of deliberate policy, to capture the stateand much of civil society under the rubric ofits self-declared “national democratic revolu-tion.” Although the ANC no longer followedan entirely socialist economic course, its agen-da sought “a racial rather than a socialisttransformation of South Africa.”149 The gov-erning party explicitly rejected the concept ofthe state as a neutral, nonpartisan entity.Instead, it endorsed the notion of “the state asan instrument in the hands of the liberationmovement.”150 In one of its most influentialpolicy papers, the ANC affirmed andembraced the Leninist notion of crushing theold order “to extend the power of the nationalliberation movement over all levers of power:the army, the police, the bureaucracy, intelli-gence structures, the judiciary, parastatals andagencies such as regulatory bodies, the publicbroadcaster, the central bank, and so on.”151

To facilitate this state capture, the ANC hadestablished a “national deployment committee”in 1998 to ensure the hiring of ANC appa-ratchiks across the state bureaucracy, in the pri-vate sector, and even in parts of civil society.Within a decade, the crucial bastions of constitu-tional oversight and accountability—from thepublic broadcaster, through the watchdog ofgovernment corruption, to the national directorof public prosecutions—were placed in the handsof people hand-picked by the ruling party.

The ANC succeeded in monopolizing pow-er partly because of its electoral dominance (inthe 2004 general election, it received 70 per-cent of the vote) and by the persistent racialcleavages in the electorate. According to theanalysis of the Democratic Alliance, the mainopposition party, the ANC received 81.8 per-cent of the black African vote in the 2004 gen-eral election, while the DA received 79.9 per-cent of its support from whites.152 In the April2009 parliamentary elections, the support forthe ANC slipped back a little and the opposi-

20

Asserting that acertain outcome

is good “byAfrican

standards” isinherentlypatronizingand racist.


tion improved its standing. Still, most SouthAfricans went on voting along racial lines.

While South Africa has a relativelyadvanced industrial economy and clear classformations, politics and electoral outcomes areoften reduced to a form of “ethnic entrepre-neurship.”153 The ANC used the politics ofracial solidarity and the invocation of struggleagainst apartheid as a potent and durable tar-paulin to keep its increasingly disparate con-stituency, which ranges from rural peasants toempowerment billionaires, under one roof.Race politics was also invoked by Mbeki to pre-vent real debate, forestall criticism, and over-come calls for policy changes on a range of hismost controversial and failing policies. Thoseincluded his refusal to combat AIDS and hisappeasement of Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe.

The parliament, constitutionally accordedcrucial and significant powers to check execu-tive and presidential overreach, failed for theduration of the Mbeki presidency (1999–2008)to fulfill its purpose. Given its huge majority,the governing party ignored opposition andthe legislature itself showed little appetite foracting as anything other than as an echo cham-ber of the presidency. Ministers routinelyavoided or were shielded by a partisan Speakerfrom answering critical opposition questions.Overall, South Africa’s proportional represen-tation electoral system—characterized byclosed party lists and the absence of con-stituency representation—has encouraged leg-islative docility and tamped down the rise ofindependent legislators.

Indeed, South Africa’s parliament underMbeki appeared to be characterized by thepathological dependence on the president,which Kwasi Prempeh identified as one of maininhibitors to democratic deepening. UnderMbeki’s baton, the president handpicked everyprovincial premier, executive mayor, provincialminister, and the director generals of thedepartments of state. However, Mbeki lost hispower-struggle with Jacob Zuma and was“recalled” as president of South Africa inSeptember 2008. There also appeared to be apushback by the ANC against the over-concen-tration of power in the hands of the president.

There are some positive signs since the2009 elections that the government is dis-playing a more tolerant approach to opposi-tion forces, including the ANC breakawayparty, the Congress of the People, than hadbeen the case until then.

The South Africa judiciary is the most cru-cial barrier that the constitution erected toprevent political overreach. It has been subjectto huge pressures for “transformation.” Onone level that pressure was understandable,given that 97 percent of South African judgeswere white males in 1994. The rebalancing ofthe judiciary was an important early task ofthe Judicial Service Commission that wasentrusted by the constitution to vet and rec-ommend jurists for appointment. However, alarge number of politicians appointed to thisbody (15 out of 25 members) made theCommission less independent. Although thejudiciary has, in key and controversial cases,held the ring against the government, judgeshave been increasingly subjected to attackswhen their judgments went against the inter-ests of the ANC and its leaders.154

There have also been legislative moves tospeed up stalled land redistribution by widen-ing government powers to expropriate proper-ty and to diminish constitutionally protectedrights of judicial recourse for property owners.

Moreover, the ruling party captured con-trol of the state broadcaster at an early stageof the democratic transition. Elsewhere, how-ever, the media exists outside formal statecontrol. Unfortunately, for much of thedemocratic transition, the media displayed aposture of deference toward the government.In contrast, over the past three years, aplethora of independent radio stations andprint media have proven increasingly criticalof government excesses.

South Africa has the largest number of non-governmental organizations on the continentand some of them have acted in an independentwatchdog role. Similarly, a strong democraticadvantage that distinguishes South Africa frommany African countries is the existence of anindependent, ideologically distinct, and vocalopposition in Parliament and at the local gov-

21

No internationally orregionally supervised political settlementshould condonethe consequencesof flawed orfailed electoralprocesses.


ernment level. The Democratic Alliance, forexample, has been able to win power in most ofthe municipalities in the Western Cape. In2006, the DA took control of Cape Town, thecountry’s second largest city. In the 2009provincial elections, the DA ousted the ANC asthe governing party of the Western Cape.

South Africa’s political evolution since theend of apartheid is instructive. Most scholarsagree that South Africa’s democratic consti-tution contained plenty of checks and bal-ances that were intended to ensure govern-ment transparency and accountability. Aidedby massive majorities in parliament, the ANCovercame constitutional obstacles and suc-ceeded in centralizing political and economicpower in its hands. It turns out that the con-stitution is only as strong as the public senti-ment supporting it. At present, the country ison an uncertain path—in some areas movingaway from liberal democracy and the rule oflaw, yet in other areas reanimating the earlierethos of protest and democratic pushback.

Conclusion:The Road Ahead

The causes of continuing democratic failureare complex and, sometimes, country-specific.But, as the British historian Martin Meredithwrote, “although Africa is a continent of greatdiversity, African countries have much in com-mon, not only their origins as colonial territo-ries but the similar hazards and difficulties theyhave faced. Indeed what is striking about the50-year period since independence is the extentto which Africans states have suffered so manyof the same misfortunes.”155

There is a real desire on the part of manyWestern governments to help alleviate the con-sequences of those “misfortunes,” but there arealso real limits to the effectiveness of outsideinterventions, however well considered. Theinternational community needs to view itsfuture policies and its diplomatic engagementwith Africa with the knowledge that what thecontinent needs most is good government andthe institutions that reinforce it.

Toward that end, here are some specificpolicy recommendations for the internation-al community in general and for Africans inparticular:

1. Africans and their international part-ners should not lower the bar when itcomes to African policies and institu-tions. They should never condonefraud, theft, and corruption. Africanrulers are not exempted from universaldemocratic norms and standards. Todo otherwise is profoundly insultingto many brave—indeed heroic—Africandemocratic activists. Asserting that acertain outcome is good “by Africanstandards” is inherently patronizingand racist.

2. The African Union should amend itsprotocols to require all member statesto allow internationally supervisedelections. Depending on the degree ofelectoral sophistication and on thespecific history of the country in ques-tion, such supervision may need tobegin months rather than days beforethe election takes place. As an absoluteminimum, independent internationalcertification must be required relatingto the integrity of the voters roll, oppo-sition must be allowed access to state-controlled media, and any laws thatprotect incumbent presidents from so-called “insult” or defamation must berepealed.

3. No internationally or regionally super-vised political settlement should con-done the consequences of flawed orfailed electoral processes. For example,in Kenya and Zimbabwe, the AfricanUnion and the international commu-nity effectively legitimized stolen ordeeply flawed elections by fosteringgovernments of national unity. Thereshould be no continental or interna-tional support for rigged polls, espe-cially those that perpetuate the rule ofdictatorial incumbents. Where anyelection on the continent fails to meet

22

African governments

should eliminatecurrent

restrictionson mass media.


the commonly accepted standards offreedom and fairness, it should berepeated.

4. Africa and its institutions require bothreform and differentiation. Thereshould be, for example, an inner coreof AU members comprised of thedozen or so countries that FreedomHouse has certified as “free democra-cies,” an outer core of those countriesthat are “partly free,” and a peripheralcore of those categorized “not free.”The AU should also take into accountmember states’ membership in theAfrican Peer Review process, theAfrican Convention on Preventing andCombating Corruption, and theAfrican Human Rights Court. Interms of its current constitution, theAU does not differentiate betweenmember states. Nor does it provide anypractical penalty for states that violatedemocratic practices. Voting privilegesfor African countries should increasewith improvements in their democrat-ic rankings.

5. There should be less inhibition on thepart of the more successful Africancountries to take a more defined lead-ership role on the road to democracyand development. African leaders havetended to avoid such an approach, pre-ferring instead the “politics of solidari-ty.” That has often led to pan-Africanefforts based on common lowestdenominator, efforts that were accept-able to the weakest and least democra-tic African countries. It is necessary forAfrican states to break the shackle of“solidarity politics.”

6. Rein in presidential and executive pow-er. Even in the most sophisticateddemocracies in Africa, the power of thepresident is so great that it tends tooverwhelm the independent anddemocracy supporting institutions.The general adherence to term-limitedpresidents has not led to a diminutionof presidential power. All African states

should revisit their constitutions toconsider controls on presidential dom-inance. Presidential power remains akey impediment to democratic deepen-ing. Those African countries engagingin constitution-writing processes, orrevisions, need to place the issue ofpresidential power prominently on theagenda. It certainly cannot be left tosome future political resolution ornegotiations. A number of practicaland constitutional steps can be consid-ered in this regard:

• Restrict presidential appointmentsat the executive level by prescribing amaximum number of ministers anddeputy ministers.

• Require presidential appointmentsto conform to minimum merit-basedstandards.

• In order to prevent the filling of inde-pendent constitutional offices withpartisans or politically malleable fig-ures, presidential appointmentsshould require either a super-majorityof votes in the legislature or a degreeof concurrence by the political oppo-sition in such appointments.

• Ban members of the executive andtheir immediate family members fromjoining private company boards orbenefiting from state privatizations.

• Require all public investment projectsto be put out for competitive biddingas a means of inhibiting both graft-taking and presidential patronage.157

• Disclosure provisions need to governthe granting of political donations.The perpetuation of dominant partyregimes in Africa has been partlyfacilitated by unlimited and undis-closed funding for political parties.

• Enhance pluralism through the allo-cation of specific competencies andpowers to sub-national units, such asstates or provinces and local authori-ties. The key to reducing the excessivecentralization of power is to ensure its

23

Presidential power remains akey impedimentto democraticdeepening.


devolution and dispersal. New atten-tion needs to be given to federalarrangements.

7. In Africa it is not uncommon for theopposition to be dismissed as unpatri-otic. Incumbents often assert thatopposition efforts or opposition itselfis inimical to the development needs ofthe country as a whole. None of the AUfounding documents or those ofNEPAD acknowledge the role of polit-ical opposition. It is imperative thatAfrican countries and internationaldiplomatic efforts should seek to legit-imate peaceful opposition. True, theparty political terrain is controversial.But, the rapid expansion of non-gov-ernmental organizations on the conti-nent, fueled by such technologies asmobile phones and the internet, pro-vides a rich scene for increasing levelsof democracy and accountability.

8. Also, as Calderisi notes, far too manyAfrican institutions are “stuffed witheminent personalities and friends ofcurrent and former regimes.” This bothreinforces elite rent-seeking and perpet-uates an uncritical culture that dimin-ishes true accountability. The net needsto be spread far wider in appointingnonpartisans and qualified citizensfrom, for example, the ranks of theNGO communities, religious bodies,human rights networks, and so on.158

9. Media freedom and the probing powerof investigative journalists reduce badgovernment and expose corrupt offi-cials. Africa provides some of theworld’s most extreme examples ofmedia curbs and restrictions, which isat odds with the public’s right toreceive information that is set out inthe African Charter on Human andPeoples’ Rights. African governmentsshould eliminate current restrictionson mass media, stop hindering invest-ment in diverse broadcasting infra-structure, and develop transparent

and flexible regulatory environments.10. Capitalism and democracy are not sim-

ply compatible, but mutually reinforc-ing. In fact, there are no democraticsocieties in the world today that do nothave relatively free market economies.Economic freedom empowers peopleto pursue their goals and earn a livingfree of government. It allows for thecreation of multiple centers of powerthat make the emergence of authori-tarianism less likely. It is difficult toimagine democracy flourishing inAfrica without further economic liber-alization. Indeed, greater economicfreedom is central to the success of ademocratic Africa, or at least as impor-tant as all of the above recommendedmeasures.

NotesAcknowledgment is due to Andrew Knauer andMario Magaña Duarte, research interns at theCato Institute in the fall of 2008. I am also grate-ful to my wife Michal Leon for her technical assis-tance and advice on editing.

1. Quoted in Tony Leon, On The Contrary: Leadingthe Opposition in a Democratic South Africa (Johannes-burg: Jonathan Ball, 2008), p. 275.

2. World Bank, “Fact Sheet: Energy in Africa,”April 6, 2009, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/0,,contentMDK:21935594~pagePK:146736~piPK:146830~theSitePK:258644,00.html.

3. Benno Ndulu, Lopamudra Chakraborti, Lebo-hang Lijane, Vijaya Ramachandran, and JeromeWolgin, Challenges of African Growth (Washington:World Bank, 2007), p. 13.

4. Ibid., p.135.

5. Swarns and Norimitsu Onishi, “Africa CreepsAlong Path to Democracy,” New York Times, June2, 2002.

6. Larry Diamond, “The State of Democracy inAfrica,” in Democratization in Africa: What Progresstoward Institutionalization? (Washington: NationalIntelligence Council, 2008), p. 5, http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_confreports/african_democ_2008.pdf.

24

Greater economicfreedom is centralto the success of a

democraticAfrica.


7. Martin Meredith, The State of Africa: A History ofFifty Years of Independence (Johannesburg: JonathanBall, 2005), pp. 368–69.

8. Ibid., p. 378.

9. Freedom in the World 2009 (Washington: Free-dom House, 2009), p. 5. Freedom House defines a“partly free” country as one in which there is limit-ed respect for political rights and civil liberties.“Partly free” states frequently suffer from endemiccorruption, weak rule of law, ethnic or religiousstrife, and they often feature a single political partythat enjoys dominance despite a façade of limitedpluralism. It defines countries as “not free” whenthey are characterized by repression, authoritarian-ism, and the absence of civil liberties.

10. Diamond, “The State of Democracy in Africa,”p. 9.

11. Jeffrey Herbst, “The Institutionalization ofDemocracy in Africa,” in Democratization in Africa:What Progress toward Institutionalization? (Washing-ton: National Intelligence Council, 2008), p. 61.

12. Daniel N. Posner and Daniel J. Young, “TheInstitutionalization of Political Power in Africa,”Journal of Democracy 18, no.3 (July 2007): 126–40.

13. Herbst, “The Institutionalization of Democra-cy in Africa,” p. 63.

14. Ibid.

15. “There is hope,” The Economist,October 9, 2008.

16. Ibid.

17. Thomas Nagel, Secular Philosophy and the ReligiousTemperament: Essays 2002–2008 (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 2010), p. 113.

18. Larry Diamond, “The Democratic Rollback:The Resurgence of the Predatory State,” ForeignAffairs 87, no. 2 (March/April 2008): 36–48; andJames Traub, The Freedom Agenda: Why America MustSpread Democracy (Just Not The Way George Bush Did)(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2008).

19. Quoted in Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Free-dom (New York: W.W. Norton and Company,2003), pp. 18–19.

20. Ibid., p. 17.

21. Ibid., p. 17.

22. Ibid., p. 69.

23. World Bank, “Key Economic Indicators,”December 10, 2009, www.worldbank.org.

24. Ndulu et al., p. 3.

25. Zakaria, p. 97.

26. World Bank, “Key Economic Indicators,”December 10, 2009, www.worldbank.org.

27. Peter Lewis, “Growth without Prosperity: Demo-cracy, Poverty and Inequality in Africa,” inDemocratization in Africa: What Progress towardInstitutionalization? (Washington: National Intelli-gence Council, 2008), p. 67.

28. Ibid.

29. James Gwartney and Robert Lawson, EconomicFreedom of the World: 2009 Annual Report (Vancouver:Fraser Institute, 2009), pp. 19, 22.

30. Larry Diamond, “The Democratic Rollback,”pp. 36–48.

31. Ibid.

32. Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the PoorestCountries Are Failing and What Can Be Done about It(New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 71.

33. “There is hope,” The Economist, October 11, 2008.

34. Ibid.

35. United Nations Development Programme, Hu-man Development Report 2006: Beyond Scarcity; Power,Poverty, and the Global Water Crisis (New York: PalgraveMacmillan, 2006), p. 276 and Table 1.

36. Larry Diamond, “The State of Democracy inAfrica,” p. 1.

37. Ibid.

38. The World Bank made such an explicit link-age for the first time in 1989. See Meredith, pp.376–77.

39. Ndulu et al., pp. 16–17.

40. Lewis, 67n77.

41. Ibid, p. 23.

42. Ndulu et al., p. 6.

43. Meredith, p. 25.

44. World Bank, “World Development IndicatorsOnline,” December 24, 2008, www.worldbank.org.

45. “Zambia Seizes ‘Chiluba Millions,’” BBC News,May 9, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7392911.stm.

25


46. Transparency International, “Corruption Per-ception Index 2008,” June 6, 2009, http://www. transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2008.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

49. Collier, p. 66.

50. Open Society Justice Initiative, “Africa,” March19, 2008.

51. Lewis, p. 69.

52. Ibid., p. 67.

53. Larry Diamond, “The State of Democracy inAfrica,” p. 2.

54. Ndulu et al., pp. 110–11.

55. Quoted in Milton Shain, ed., Opposing Voices:Liberalism and Opposition in South Africa Today(Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2006), p. 69.

56. See, for example, Siegmar Schmidt, “Democra-cy Without Development? Unbalanced Transfor-mations in Eastern and Southern Africa,” StrategicInsights 4, no. 12 (2005).

57. Jerry Z. Muller, “The Enduring Power of EthnicNationalism,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 2 (2008): 18.

58. Ibid.

59. Robert Guest, The Shackled Continent (Washing-ton: Smithsonian Books, 2004), p. 111.

60. Ndulu et al., p. 103. In that study, resource-richcountries are defined as countries generating morethan 10 percent of their GDP from primary com-modity rents.

61. Ibid.

62. Freedom in the World 2009 (Washington: Free-dom House, 2009).

63. Jeffrey Herbst, “Mbeki’s South Africa,” ForeignAffairs, November/December 2005.

64. Blake Lambert, “Ghana Looks to Capitalize onOil Discovery, Avoid Petro-Curse,” World PoliticsReview, July 9, 2007, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=903.

65. Guest, p. 63.

66. “Some Transparency, No Accountability: TheUse of Oil Revenue in Angola and Its Impact on

Human Rights,” Human Rights Watch 16, no.1(A) (January 2004): 1.

67. See more about the Kimberley Process Certifi-cation Scheme at http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/background/index_en.html.

68. See more about the Extractive Industries Trans-parency Initiative (EITI) at http://eitransparency.org/eiti/summary.

69. Guest, p. 150.

70. Craig Burnside and David Dollar, “Aid, Poli-cies, and Growth,” The American Economic Review90, no. 4 (September 2000): 847–68.

71. William Easterly, Ross Levine, and David Rood-man, “New Data, New Doubts: A Comment onBurnside and Dollar’s ‘Aid, Policies and Growth,’”NBER Working Paper 9846, 2003, http://www.nber.org/papers/w9846. See also Harold Brumm,“Aid, Policies, and Growth: Bauer Was Right,” CatoJournal 23, no. 2 (2003), http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj23n2/ cj23n2 -1.pdf.

72. See details on the UN Millennium Develop-ment Project website at http://www.unmillenniumproject.org. For Sachs’ remarks see “UN: Rich Coun-tries Must Double Aid to Impact Poverty Fight,”January 18, 2005, http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/documents/USAToday01-18-05.pdf.

73. “G8 leaders Agree $50bn Aid Boost,” BBC, July8, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4662297.stm.

74. Stephen Brown, “Foreign Aid and DemocracyPromotion: Lessons from Africa,” EuropeanJournal of Development Research 17, no. 2 (June2005): 184.

75. Ibid., p. 185.

76. See details about the MCA indicators at http://www.mcc.gov/selection/indicators/index. php.

77. Peter Pham, “A Challenge from Senegal,”Washington Times, January 4, 2009, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jan/04/a-challenge-from-senegal/.

78. For a description of the New Partnership forAfrica’s Development’s (NEPAD) aims, see http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/inbrief.php.

79. Kwasi Prempeh, “Presidents Untamed,” Jour-nal of Democracy 19, no. 2 (2008), p. 111.

80. “Opportunity Knocks,” The Economist 389, no.8601 (October 11, 2008): 33–36, http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?story_id=12376610.

26


81. Ibid.

82. Prempeh, p. 112.

83. Sonya Sceats, “Africa’s New Human Rights Court:Whistling in the Wind?” Chatham House BriefingPaper, March 2009, p. 13.

84. Amnesty International, The State of the World’sHuman Rights: 2008 Report (London: Peter BenesonHouse, 2008), p. 3.

85. Ibid.

86. Ian Taylor, “Why NEPAD and African PoliticsDon’t Mix,” quoted in Stephen Brown, “ForeignAid and Democracy Promotion: Lessons fromAfrica,” European Journal of Development Research17, no. 2 (2005): 179–98.

87. Balefi Tsie, “The Political Context of Botswana’sDevelopment Performance,” Journal of SouthernAfrican Studies 22, no. 4 (1996): 599–616, p. 599.

88. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of AfricanAffairs, “Botswana,” December 8, 2008, https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1830.htm.

89. “Botswana,” The CIA World Factbook, December8, 2008, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bc.html.

90. Francis Nyamnjoh, “Might and Right:Chieftaincy and Democracy in Cameroon andBotswana,” Council for the Development of SocialScience Re-search in Africa, December 2002,http://www.codesria.org/Links/conferences/gen_assem bly10/nyamnjoh.pdf.

91. John Comarroff and Jean Comarroff, “Post-colonial Politics and Discourses of Democracy inSouthern Africa: An Anthropological Reflection onAfrican Political Modernities,” Journal of Anthro-pological Research 53, no. 2 (1997): 123–46.

92. Gloria Somolekae, “Democracy, Civil Societyand Governance in Africa: The Case of Botswana,”African Training and Research Centre in Adminis-tration for Development, 1998, http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/CAFRAD/UNPAN009287.pdf.

93. Scout Beaulier, “Explaining Botswana’s Suc-cess: The Critical Role of Post–Colonial Policy,” CatoJournal 23, no. 2 (Fall 2003), p. 236, http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj23n2/cj23n2-6.pdf.

94. World Bank, “World Development IndicatorsOnline,” December 2009, www.worldbank.org.

95. Beaulier, p. 235.

96. Godwin Murunga and Shadrack Nasong’o,Kenya: The Struggle for Democracy (New York: ZedBooks, 2007), p. 29.

97. Ibid., p. 30.

98. Joel Barkan, “Kenya After Moi,” Foreign Affairs,January/February 2004, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59535/joel-d-barkan/kenya-after-moi.

99. Ibid.

100. World Bank, “World Development IndicatorsOnline,” June 30, 2009, www.worldbank.org.

101. John Githongo, “Kenya’s Fight against Cor-ruption: An Uneven Path to Political Accountabili-ty,” Cato Institute Development Briefing Paper no.2, March 15, 2007.

102. Jeffrey Gettleman, “Disputed Vote PlungesKenya Into Bloodshed,” New York Times, December31, 2007.

103. “Kibaki Named Victor in Kenya Vote,” BBCNews, December 30, 2007.

104. “When Not Imploding Is not Enough,” TheEconomist, September 4, 2008.

105. “Key points: Kenya Power-sharing Deal,”BBC News, February 28, 2008.

106. “Huge Financial Cost of Kenya Cabinet,”BBC News, April 17, 2008.

107. In addition, “the President appoints high-courtjudges and electoral commissioners, has the power todissolve Parliament, and controls the federal budget.”See Stephanie Hanson, “Under-standing Kenya’sPolitics,” Council on Foreign Relations, January 25,2008, http://www.cfr.org/publication/ 15322/.

108. Murunga and Nasong’o, pp. 46–47.

109. Ibid., p. 42.

110. Ibid., p. 227.

111. In the Transparency International’s Corrup-tion Perceptions Index for 2008, Kenya ranked 147out of 180 countries—the same position asBangladesh, Russia, and Syria.

112. Joel Barkan, “Kenya’s Great Rift,” ForeignAffairs (January/February 2008).

113. James Gwartney and Robert Lawson,Economic Freedom of the World: 2009 Annual Report.

114. International Research and Exchanges Board

27


(IREX), Media Sustainability Index 2008 (Washing-ton: IREX, 2008), p. 180.

115. Roxana Romero, Mwangi Kimenyi, andStefan Dercon, “The 2007 Elections, Post-Conflict Recovery and Coalition Government inKenya,” Centre for the Study of African Economies,September 26, 2008, p. 3.

116. Ibid.

117. U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of AfricanAffairs, “Background Notes on Zimbabwe,”November 28, 2008, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/ 5479.htm.

118. David Coltart, “A Decade of Suffering inZimbabwe,” Cato Institute Development PolicyAnalysis no. 5, March 24, 2008, p. 14.

119. Ibid.

120. U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of AfricanAffairs, “Background Notes on Zimbabwe.”

121. Steve H. Hanke, “New Hyperinflation Index(HHIZ) Puts Zimbabwe Inflation at 89.7 SextillionPercent,” Cato Institute, February 9, 2009,http://www. cato.org/zimbabwe.

122. James Gwartney and Robert Lawson,Economic Freedom of the World: 2009 Annual Report.

123 . IREX, Media Sustainability Index 2008, p. 406.

124. World Bank, “World Development IndicatorsOnline,” August 24, 2009, www.worldbank.org.

125. Jeffrey Herbst, “Mbeki’s South Africa,”Foreign Affairs 84, no.6 (November-December 2005).

126. Freedom in Sub-Saharan Africa 2009: A Survey ofPolitical Rights and Civil Liberties (Washington:Freedom House, 2009).

127. Brian Pottinger, The Mbeki Legacy (Johannes-burg: Zebra Press, 2008), p. 72.

128. Ibid., p. 230.

129. Roger Southall, State of the Nation (Pretoria:Human Science Research Council, 2007), p. 1.

130. “Dropping the Helmsman,” The Economist,September 27, 2008.

131. Chris Alden and Garth Le Pere, South Africa’sPost Apartheid Policy—From Reconciliation to Revival(New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 12.

132. Pottinger, p. 273.

133. Ibid., pp. 5–6.

134. Ibid., p. 133.

135. International Association for the Evaluationof Educational Achievement, “Progress in Inter-national Reading Literacy Study,” PIRLS 2006International Report, http://pirls.bc.edu/pirls2006/intl_rpt.html.

136. International Association for the Evaluationof Educational Achievement, “Trends in Interna-tional Mathematics and Science Study,” TIMSS2003 International Reports, http://timss.bc.edu/timss2003i/intl_reports.html.


138. “Voices of Anger. Phumelela and Khutsong:Protest and Conflict in Two Municipalities,”Centre for Development and Enterprise, May 8, 2007,http://www.cde.org.za/article.php?a_id= 246.


140. South African Institute of Race Relations, “FastFacts No. 8,” August 2007, http://www.sairr.org.za/research-and-publications/fast-stats-online/fast-facts-2007/fast-facts-no-8-august-2007.html.

141. The World Health Organization, “NationalHealth Accounts,” December 2009, http://www.who.int/nha/en/.

142. The World Health Organization, “WHOMortality Database,” December 2009, http://www.who.int/healthinfo/morttables/en/index.html.

143. United Nations Development Programme,Human Development Report 2000 (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 2000), p. 149; United NationsDevelopment Programme, Human Development Report2009: Overcoming Barriers—Human Mobility and Develop-ment (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 145.

144. World Economic Forum, “Global Competitive-ness Report 2008–2009,” November 14, 2008, http://www.weforum.org/documents/gcr0809/ index.html.


146. James Myburgh, “Who is Kgalema Motlan-the?” September 25, 2008, http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page71619 ?oid=104369&sn=Detail.

147. Transparency International,”Corruption Per-ception Index, 2009,” http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009.

148. Michael Gerson, “The Despots’ Democracy,”

28


Washington Post, May 28, 2008.

149. James Myburgh, “The Last Jacobins of Africa:Thabo Mbeki and the Making of the New SouthAfrica,” unpublished doctoral thesis (UnitedKingdom: University of Oxford, 2007), p. 69.

150. Ibid.

151. “The State, Property Relations and SocialTransformation,” Umrabulo 5, 1998, quoted inMyburgh, p. 117.

152. Leon, p. 620.

153. Meredith, p. 56.

154. F. W. de Klerk, “Threats to the NationalAccord,” Consensus 5, no. 2 (July 2008).

155. Meredith, p.14.

156. Robert Calderisi, The Trouble with Africa: WhyForeign Aid Isn’t Working (New York: PalgraveMacMillan, 2006).

157. Collier, p. 49.

158. Calderisi, p. 214.

29


STUDIES IN THE POLICY ANALYSIS SERIES

663. Defining Success: The Case against Rail Transit by Randal O’Toole (March 24,2010)

662. They Spend WHAT?: The Real Cost of Public Schools by Adam Schaeffer(March 10, 2010)

661. Behind the Curtain: Assessing the Case for National Curriculum Standardsby Neal McCluskey (February 17, 2010)

660. Lawless Policy: TARP as Congressional Failure by John Samples (February 4, 2010)

659. Globalization: Curse or Cure? Policies to Harness Global Economic Integration to Solve Our Economic Challenge by Jagadeesh Gokhale (February 1, 2010)

658. The Libertarian Vote in the Age of Obama by David Kirby and David Boaz (January 21, 2010)

657. The Massachusetts Health Plan: Much Pain, Little Gain by Aaron Yelowitz and Michael F. Cannon (January 20, 2010)

656. Obama’s Prescription for Low-Wage Workers High Implicit Taxes, Higher Premiums by Michael F. Cannon (January 13, 2010)

655. Three Decades of Politics and Failed Policies at HUD by Tad DeHaven(November 23, 2009)

654. Bending the Productivity Curve: Why America Leads the World in Medical Innovation by Glen Whitman and Raymond Raad (November 18, 2009)

653. The Myth of the Compact City: Why Compact Development Is Not the Wayto Reduce Carbon Dioxide Emissions by Randal O’Toole (November 18, 2009)

652. Attack of the Utility Monsters: The New Threats to Free Speech by Jason Kuznicki (November 16, 2009)

651. Fairness 2.0: Media Content Regulation in the 21st Century by Robert Corn-Revere (November 10, 2009)

650. Yes, Mr President: A Free Market Can Fix Health Care by Michael F. Cannon (October 21, 2009)


649. Somalia, Redux: A More Hands-Off Approach by David Axe (October 12, 2009)

648. Would a Stricter Fed Policy and Financial Regulation Have Averted the Financial Crisis? by Jagadeesh Gokhale and Peter Van Doren (October 8, 2009)

647. Why Sustainability Standards for Biofuel Production Make Little Economic Sense by Harry de Gorter and David R. Just (October 7, 2009)

646. How Urban Planners Caused the Housing Bubble by Randal O’Toole (October 1, 2009)

645. Vallejo Con Dios: Why Public Sector Unionism Is a Bad Deal for Taxpayers and Representative Government by Don Bellante, David Denholm, and Ivan Osorio (September 28, 2009)

644. Getting What You Paid For—Paying For What You Get: Proposals for theNext Transportation Reauthorization by Randal O’Toole (September 15, 2009)

643. Halfway to Where? Answering the Key Questions of Health Care Reformby Michael Tanner (September 9, 2009)

642. Fannie Med? Why a “Public Option” Is Hazardous to Your Health by Michael F. Cannon (July 27, 2009)

641. The Poverty of Preschool Promises: Saving Children and Money with theEarly Education Tax Credit by Adam B. Schaeffer (August 3, 2009)

640. Thinking Clearly about Economic Inequality by Will Wilkinson (July 14, 2009)

639. Broadcast Localism and the Lessons of the Fairness Doctrine by John Samples (May 27, 2009)

638. Obamacare to Come: Seven Bad Ideas for Health Care Reformby Michael Tanner (May 21, 2009)

637. Bright Lines and Bailouts: To Bail or Not To Bail, That Is the Questionby Vern McKinley and Gary Gegenheimer (April 21, 2009)

636. Pakistan and the Future of U.S. Policy by Malou Innocent (April 13, 2009)

635. NATO at 60: A Hollow Alliance by Ted Galen Carpenter (March 30, 2009)

634. Financial Crisis and Public Policy by Jagadeesh Gokhale (March 23, 2009)


ANNE APPLEBAUMWASHINGTON POST

GURCHARAN DASFORMER CEO, PROCTER

& GAMBLE, INDIA

ARNOLD HARBERGERUNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

AT LOS ANGELES

FRED HUGOLDMAN SACHS, ASIA

PEDRO-PABLO KUCZYNSKIFORMER PRIME MINISTER OF PERU

DEEPAK LALUNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

AT LOS ANGELES

JOSÉ PIÑERAFORMER MINISTER OF LABOR AND

SOCIAL SECURITY, CHILE

T he Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity was established to promotea better understanding around the world of the benefits of market-lib-eral solutions to some of the most pressing problems faced by develop-

ing nations. In particular, the center seeks to advance policies that protect humanrights, extend the range of personal choice, and support the central role of eco-nomic freedom in ending poverty. Scholars in the center address a range of economic development issues, including economic growth, international finan-cial crises, the informal economy, policy reform, the effectiveness of official aid agencies, public pension privatization, the transition from socialism to the mar-ket, and globalization.

For more information on the Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity, visit www.cato.org/economicliberty/.

Nothing in this Development Policy Analysis should be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of the

Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity or the Cato Institute or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of

any bill before Congress. Contact the Cato Institute for reprint permission. Additional copies of Development

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Avenue, N.W., Washington, DC, 20001, (202) 842-0200, fax (202) 842-3490, www.cato.org.

OTHER STUDIES ON DEVELOPMENT FROM THE CATO INSTITUTE

BOARD OF ADVISERS

“Reflections on Communism: Twenty Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall” by Paul Hollander,Development Policy Analysis no. 11 (November 2, 2009)

“Socialism Kills: The Human Cost of Delayed Economic Reform in India” by Swaminathan S.Anklesaria Aiyar, Development Briefing Paper no. 4 (October 21, 2009)

“An International Monetary Fund Currency to Rival the Dollar? Why Special Drawing RightsCan’t Play That Role” by Swaminathan S. Anklesaria Aiyar, Development Policy Analysis no. 10(July 7, 2009)

“The False Promise of Gleneagles: Misguided Priorities at the Heart of the New Push forAfrican Development” by Marian L. Tupy, Development Policy Analysis no. 9 (April 24, 2009)

“El Salvador: A Central American Tiger?” by Juan Carlos Hidalgo, Development Policy Analysisno. 8 (March 9, 2009)

“The Benefits of Port Liberalization: A Case Study from India” by Swaminathan S. AnklesariaAiyar, Development Policy Analysis no. 7 (December 3, 2008)

“Zimbabwe: From Hyperinflation to Growth” by Steve H. Hanke, Development Policy Analysisno. 6 (June 25, 2008)

“A Decade of Suffering in Zimbabwe: Economic Collapse and Political Repression underRobert Mugabe” by David Coltart, Development Policy Analysis no. 5 (March 24, 2008)


the state of liberal democracy in africa

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