the state of sovereignty

8132019 The State of Sovereignty

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullthe-state-of-sovereignty 122

TerritoriesLaws

Populations

Edited by

Douglas Howlandand

Luise White

t hest a teof

sOVEREIGNTY





The State of Sovereignty Territories Laws Populations

is Volume 3 in the series

21st Century Studies

Center for 21st Century Studies

University of WisconsinndashMilwaukee

daniel j sherman general editor

Terror Culture Politics Rethinking 983097983089983089

Edited by Daniel J Sherman and Terry Nardin

Museums and Difference

Edited by Daniel J Sherman



CONTENTS

acknowledgments vii

983089 Introduction Sovereignty and the Study of States 983089 Douglas Howland and Luise White

983090 Sovereignty on the Isthmus Federalism US Empire and the Struggle 983089983097 for Panama during the California Gold Rush Aims McGuinness

983091 The Foreign and the Sovereign Extraterritoriality in East Asia 983091983093 Douglas Howland

983092 Wilsonian Sovereignty in the Middle East The King-Crane Commission 983093983094 Report of 983089983097983089983097 Leonard V Smith

983093 Colonial Sovereignty in Manchuria and Manchukuo 983095983093 David Tucker

983094 Alternatives to Empire France and Africa after World War II 983097983092 Frederick Cooper

983095 The Ambiguities of Sovereignty The United States and the Global Human 983089983090983092

Rights Cases of the 983089983097983092983088s and 983089983097983093983088sMark Philip Bradley

983096 What Does It Take to Be a State Sovereignty and Sanctions in 983089983092983096 Rhodesia 983089983097983094983093ndash983089983097983096983088

Luise White

983097 Legal Fictions after Empire 983089983094983097 John D Kelly and Martha Kaplan

983089983088 Sovereignty after Socialism at Europersquos New Borders 983089983097983094

Keith Brown

983089983089 Environmental Security Spatial Preservation and State Sovereignty in 983090983090983090 Central Africa

Kevin C Dunn

983089983090 The Paradox of Sovereignty in the Balkans 983090983092983091 Aida A Hozic

983089983091 The Secret Lives of the ldquoSovereignrdquo Rethinking Sovereignty as 983090983094983089 International Morality

Siba N Grovogui

list of contributors 983090983095983095index 983090983096983089



983089983090The Paradox of Sovereignty in the Balkans

aida a hozic

Introduction Once Upon a Time in the East

Writing about the ldquobuffer statesrdquo of the Balkan Peninsula at the turn of thenineteenth century William Eleroy Curtis correspondent of the Chicago-

Record Herald and a seasoned world traveler used the Austro-Hungarian oc-cupation of Bosnia as the ldquoremarkable example of administrationrdquo over an

alien race1 Before the arrival of the Austrians said Mr Curtis the popula-tion which contained a much too high proportion of Mohammedans andTurkish outlaws was ldquonot 1047297t for liberty and if it had been granted to them bythe Berlin Conference as they demanded it would have been a curse insteadof a blessingrdquo (983090983095983092) Just a few short decades earlier according to Mr Curtisand the German sources that he had relied on Bosnia was a dangerous landwhere ldquobrigandage was a recognized professionrdquo where ldquomurder was not con-sidered a crimerdquo and ldquorobbery was as common as lyingrdquo and where people if

they ldquowere compelled to travelrdquo ldquowent in large parties fully armed or accompanied by an escort of soldiersrdquo (983090983095983093)

However wrote Mr Curtis thanks to the near-dictatorial powers of theAustro-Hungarian administrator Count von Kalay and the ldquoforbearance andtact shown by [Austrian] offi cialsrdquo ldquoto-day human life in Bosnia is as safe as inIllinoisrdquo (983090983095983093) Corruption and crime were eradicated Commerce and indus-try were encouraged Even different forms of entertainmentmdashtheatresparks operas museumsmdashall ldquoremarkably important in diverting [Bosnian]minds from politicsrdquomdashhave proven tremendously popular (983090983097983095) Meanwhilethe offi cials ldquohave suppressed the fanatics by the application of a punishmentwhich they dread more than deathrdquo (983090983097983097) Since killing a Mohammedan ldquois



244 | A IDA A HOZIC

simply to send him to the paradise he is seekingrdquo the Austrians realized that ifthey were to deprive him of a body that he could return tomdashin other wordsif his body was ldquoburned or cut into piecesrdquomdashhis killing could serve as a deter-rent to others (983090983097983097) Hence all Mohammedans ldquowho have been convicted of

murder or other capital crimes have been sentenced to death and cremationwhich so terri1047297ed the fanatics that they have left the country (983091983088983088) The inge-nious methods of punishment and all the other examples of good administra-tion that Mr Curtis dutifully noted during his travels through Bosnia were ashe said all the more worthy of attention since the United States had just atthat time puzzled over its own role in the Philippine Islands

A century later Bosnia and Herzegovina and the neighboring province ofKosovo are once again used as examples of administration over alien races2

However the latter-day examples are viewed with much more skepticismTheir diminishing relevance to the United States is now maintained only in-sofar as it can be linked to the sole superpowerrsquos entanglements in Iraq andAfghanistan In fact Bosnia and Kosovo are increasingly used as examples ofambitious yet failed experiments in state and regime-building whose lessonsmay be of crucial relevance to such projects elsewhere in the world Economicdevelopment has stalled war criminals are still at large corruption is ram-pant and organized crime like a ldquofast-spreading virusrdquo ldquodiverts resources

from the formal economy undermines the central power essential to makethe system work destroys the spirit of social collectivismrdquo3 The regionhas been turned into ldquomore than just another link in the chain of global crimeit has become an important bridge in criminal networks spanning from West-ern Europe to Asia and Africardquo4 As a result establishment of the rule of lawin the ldquobuffer statesrdquo of the Balkan Peninsula has taken precedence over ethnicreconciliation or democratization even as the accusations of the new Balkanldquorajrdquo particularly in Bosnia are being cast at international administrators5

Any attempt to discuss sovereignty in the Balkans must take into accountthe relationship between the Balkan states and the great powers as well as theways in which they have imagined each other and their relationship over timeTo the degree to which we can accept that sovereignty is a relationalconceptmdashwhich implies mutually recognized exclusive authority over a cer-tain territorymdashsovereignty in the Balkans has never been devoid of tensionsbetween equality and hierarchy power and recognition or between territori-ality expansiveness and liminality In this essay I will refer to these tensionsas a clustermdashas the paradox of sovereignty in the Balkans And although as Ishall try to show the paradox of sovereignty is by no means limited to south-eastern Europe I will then trace the ways in which crime criminality and



The Paradox of Sovereignty in the Balkans | 245

criminalization of cross-border practices and more recently of particularstates attenuated political consequences of such tensions in the past and howthey currently might be used to maintain the 1047297ction of the sovereign order inthe international system Sovereignty and criminality I will argue are not

just mutually constitutive but logically inseparable crime is what sovereigntyis made of

The Paradox of Sovereignty in the Balkans

Sovereignty as we now understand it is not a ldquothingrdquo or a set of attributesthat somehow naturally accrue to a state Rather it is as my colleague SamuelBarkin says a ldquonormative structure a set of overlapping ideas and mutually

accepted rules of behavior that together constitute the normative fundamentof the state systemrdquo6 Just what is and what is not an ldquoaccepted rule of behav-iorrdquo cannot be deduced from our de1047297nitions of sovereignty but it is also notan entirely subjective or historically and geographically isolated set of prac-tices If sovereignty is a charade then it is a charade that requires a number ofwilling players who somehow recognizemdashand refrain from challengingmdasheachotherrsquos signs And if the meaning of sovereignty is historically contingent it isalso dependent on the common understanding of itmdashas Jens Bartelson puts

it ldquosovereignty and knowledge implicate each other logically and produceeach other historicallyrdquo7

In the postndashWorld War II period the prevailing normative structure im-plied that sovereignty was a mutually recognized right of states to exerciseexclusive authority over particular territories This Westphalian model wasin Weberian terms the ldquoideal typerdquo sovereignty It suggested that states shouldrespect each otherrsquos sole authority in domestic affairs that they should refrainfrom intervention in each otherrsquos affairs that they should have control over

the 1047298ow of goods and bodies over their borders and that they should treateach other as equals in the international system8 However according to Ste-phen Krasner this ldquoWestphalian model has never been an accurate descrip-tion of many of the entities that have been regarded as statesrdquo 9 Statesrsquosovereignty has often been compromisedmdashthrough contracts and conven-tions which entailed invitations to external actors to in1047298uence domestic au-thority structures but also through impositions and interventions unsolicitedand often violent acts of intrusion into domestic affairs by more powerful ac-tors

There is hardly any moment in history when sovereignty in the Balkans hasnot been compromised In the nineteenth century ldquothe territorial boundaries



and the internal autonomy of every state that emerged from the OttomanEmpire in Europe was compromised by the major Euro pean powers usuallythrough imposition and coercion rather than contractingrdquo10 Whether the pre-text was particular constitutional arrangements economic policies or minor-

ity rights the great powers of Europe never shied from intervening intothe lives of the ldquosick children of the sick man on the Bosphorusrdquo Similarlyafter World War I the Treaty of Versailles and the prevailing norms ofself-determination fostered the creation of the 1047297rst Yugoslav state out of theremnants of the defeated and defunct Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Em-pires After World War II despite the pretense of sovereignty the Balkans wascarved by the Russian and Allied forces The brutal suppression of the Greekrevolution in the 983089983097983092983088s was the clear sign that Yalta rather than political pref-

erences of local actors determined the future of the states in southeastern Eu-rope

PostndashDayton Accord Balkans whose fate has been decided in severalsuccessive multilateral interventions is also hardly a paragon of the West-phalian order Slovenia Bulgaria Romania and Greece are all to a lesser orgreater degree integrated into the European Union whose conditionalityprinciples severely limit the nature of domestic authority and modify theirinterdependence sovereignty Bosnia and Herzegovina although recognized

as a sovereign state is a fractious polity with open borders to Croatia andSerbia and is essentially governed by the Offi ce of the High Representative(OHR) joint appointee of the United Nations and European Union Serbiaand Montenegro just ended their strange political unionmdashfor years theynominally formed a single sovereign state yet Montenegro had a separatecurrency independent government and foreign policy and overly zealouscustoms offi cers on its borders with Serbia Kosovo nominally still a part ofSerbia and de facto a partitioned country is under the control of the UN

Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) When Kosovars travel abroad they travelwith a UNMIK passport In case the passport is stolen or lost outside ofKosovo there is no legal authority that they can turn to for protection or torequest a document substitute Finally Croatia and Macedonia are also hop-ing to enter into the European Union In the case of Croatiamdashjust as in thecase of Serbiamdashwar crimes and their perpetrators still represent the mainobstacle to Europe In Macedonia where the issue of Greek recognition has1047297nally been settled low-level warfare between the Macedonian and Alba-nian populations continues to 1047298are and worry the European Union Evenmore importantly as all recent EU reports emphasize further reforms inthe areas of good governance rule of law and 1047297ght against corruption and

246 | A IDA A HOZIC




organized crime continue to be the main challenges for the Macedoniangovernment on its path to EU membership

One of the reasons why sovereignty in the Balkans appears paradoxical isthat it has been so frequently violated in the name of sovereignty itself In-

deed sovereignty in the Balkans seems so far off from the norm right nowthat it may seem better to conceive of it as a frontier zone nested betweenldquothree empiresrdquo with multiple and overlapping authorities fuzzy bordersand ever-present potentiality for outside military interventions11 And yet theparadox of sovereignty in the Balkans is really not all that different from theparadox of sovereignty elsewhere Since 983089983097983097983088 the number of independentstates recognized by the United Nations has increased from 983089983093983097 to 98308998309798308912 mdashbutso has the number of peacekeeping organizations military interventions pro-

tectorates and quasi-protectorates members of the European Union andextra-sovereign territories Sovereignty according to Krasner may not beanything but ldquoorganized hypocrisyrdquo a ldquocognitive scriptrdquo whose norms are per-petually breached challenged and decoupled from actions13 But evenaccording to Krasner the breachesmdashin Krasnerrsquos view the number of ldquotrou-bled societiesrdquo requiring outside helpmdashare now becoming too wide to keepwithin traditional sovereignty containers14 It is then legitimate to ask ifsovereignty is not being replaced by ldquohierarchic universalist and centered

order(s)rdquo15 The recent discussions about empire as a form of politicalorganizationmdashregardless of whether or not empire is the best description ofauthority in the contemporary international systemmdashare a good indicator of just how severely decoupled the principles of equity and the practices of hier-archy have become in the international system

Aside from the empiricalmdashand historically contingentmdashcontradictionsbetween the ldquoideal typerdquo sovereignty (itself subject to change) and its everydayincarnations sovereignty also has logical antinomies of its own Giorgio Ag-

amben views them as results of the sovereignrsquos ability to suspend laws andcreate ldquojuridically emptyrdquo states of exception to be at once both the law itselfand beyond law16 For instance ldquosovereigntyrdquo of the individual republics in theformer Yugoslavia was enshrined in their right to secession in essence theyhad the right to become something that they were notmdashindependent statesldquoSovereigntyrdquo of the former Yugoslavia depended on the right (and constitu-tionally mandated obligation) to maintain its territorial integrity in essenceits sovereign status entitled her to hold onto something that it had never pos-sessed The violence that ensued may be perceived as the product of theselogical antinomies as the manifestation of the ldquoglobal civil warrdquo that is ac-cording to Agamben indistinguishable from the permanent state of exception



in which we live17 Once again the Moumlbius-strip character of the formerYugoslavia is not as idiosyncratic as it seemsmdashin its absolute manifestationsovereign power cannot be spatially constrained The con1047298ict between theprinciple of sovereign equality which is dependent on the mutual recognition

of clearly delimited territories and the principle of sovereign power which isinherently spatially transgressive constitutes the essence of the sovereignparadox

The critical questions then which the sovereign paradox poses forusmdashin this particular historical moment and in the cognitive environmentin which it is now natural to assume that there is nothing natural aboutsovereigntymdashare how is this political 1047297ction still maintained and to what pur-pose How is this fantasy called sovereignty in which ideals of liberal indi-

vidualism seem reconciled with the quest for authority still reproduced Howis it still held believable in face of the 1047298agrant violations of its norms and inface of the logical antinomies of its (intersubjectively agreed upon) constitu-tive principles of recognition territoriality and equality Is one of the reasonsthat sovereignty persists the fact that it has becomemdashmuch like ldquouniversal hu-man rightsrdquo (to which it is often juxtaposed as a norm)mdashparticularly appeal-ing to those who have no other rights and no other means to enact them18 Oris it simply that sovereignty obscures the obscenity of power inequalities in

the international system so well that it is upheld by both the great powers andby the powerless as a desperately needed 1047298attering mirror But even if sowhat makes such 1047298attering representation credible

One of the possible answers which the Balkansmdashbut also many of thesimilarly ldquochallengedrdquo regions of Africa Asia and Latin Americamdashforceupon us is that crime criminality and criminalization of transborder activi-ties and ultimately of some states help alleviate the possible political conse-quences of the sovereign paradoxmdashwhether they would come in the form of

greater institutionalization of transnational movements or in the form of vio-lent challenges to the international order as is Crime criminality and crimi-nalization reproduce the sovereign order in two waysmdashby allowing for thedifferent spatialization of the international order one that does not contradictthe principle of territorial sovereignty per se and by making possible legaldifferentiation among at least nominally juridically equal sovereign states

Crime Criminality and Criminalization in the Balkans

Sovereignty and criminality are mutually constitutive States are not just ldquoor-ganized ma1047297asrdquo whose sole advantage over other criminal organizations is

248 | A IDA A HOZIC




mutual recognition and legitimation19 To the degree to which ldquostates are con-strained by this need for legitimacyrdquo20 sovereign states also have the capacityto substantively de1047297ne the legality and illegality of acts committed withintheir territories and across their borders but also acts of other states

However just as the meaning of sovereignty is not stable the meaningof crime can change over time As Ethan Nadelmann has argued acts suchas piracy slavery counterfeiting of national currencies hijacking of air-craft and traffi cking in controlled psychoactive substances may not havealways been regarded as illegal by the majority of actors in the internationalarena21 Within the past century however as a result of pressures of thepowerful members of the international society as well as varied moral andemotional factors they have all become subject to the powerful global pro-

hibition regimes and effectively outlawed Similarly acts regarded as per-fectly normal everyday practicesmdashtranshumance trade work away fromhomemdashcan easily become illegal with the emergence of new borders22 And vice versa acts of once-negligible economic signi1047297cance can overnightbecome economically opportune because of the differences in taxation le-gal prohibitions or simply availability on two sides of the same borderTherefore while trade can easily be impeded by protectionism custom du-ties and border controls it also thrives often as an illicit act precisely

thanks to such obstaclesIt is probably not strange then that illicit trade has historically 1047298ourished

in the Balkans where borders have changed frequently often through imposi-tions and interventions by outside actors It is also probably quite understand-able that although banditry and smuggling have a long history in the Balkanstheir relation to authority and society as well as their de1047297nitions have not beenconstant Ever since the Ottoman times when Balkan merchants controlledmost of the trade between Istanbul and Central and Western Europe infor-

mal and illicit trade networks have paralleled legitimate commerce Pecu-liarities of the Ottoman Empiremdashits division into a number of customs zoneswith different levels of import and export duties different taxation scales ofsea and overland trade strict regulation of internal trade and prohibition ofexports of provisionary staples to Europemdashcreated perhaps ironically nu-merous opportunities for arbitrage speculation and contraband trade Inshort they created an environment in which commerce could 1047298ourish Thusdespite all its 1047298awsmdashmost importantly its ever-enlarging 1047297scal de1047297citmdashtheOttoman Empire proved to be an ideal place for the ldquoconquering Balkan Or-thodox merchantrdquo who successfully captured the trade between central Eu-rope Russia and the Ottoman Empire itself23



In addition the Balkansrsquo peripheral position vis-agrave-vis both Europe andthe Ottoman Empire made the region ever more signi1047297cant to both Europe-ans and the Ottomans Southeastern Europe was the principal conduit inthe reluctant mutual courtship and perpetual contest between the two

worlds Being situated in this double periphery allowed the Balkans toemerge as a peculiar self-enclosed zone through which only the initiatedthe well-acquainted and the domesticated could travel Various forms ofbanditrymdashfrom uskoks of Senj to hajduks of Serbia to Albanian and Mon-tenegrin gangsmdashthreatened foreign merchants and kept them for the mostpart off the Balkan overland routes24 Thus disorder anarchy and dangerassociated with overland trade only further empowered the native Balkanmerchants eliminated their competition and led to the formation of

mini-merchant 1047297efdoms with their own protection forces and localizedforms of authority25

Finally the agriculturalmilitary foundation of the Ottoman Empirewhich exclusively favored Muslims left trade in the hands of foreigners or itsnon-Muslim population Diasporas and migrations within the Balkans butalso into Europe and Istanbul created natural bridges for merchants and al-lowed trade to 1047298ow through families friendships and ethnic or village tieswithout any major misgivings about trust or future exchanges In addition it

also constituted the Balkans into a complex web of overlapping communitiesfor whom the bounds of a nation-state could never be 1047297t Trade 1047298ourished forthose and among those who knew how to navigate the terrain of cultural dif-ference it antagonized those whose interests were 1047297rst and foremostterritorialmdashlandowners and peasants bureaucrats and their tax-paying sub- jects (self-identi1047297ed) foreigners and the natives

Contemporary Balkansmdashthough not a part of a vast agriculturalmilita-rized empiremdashexhibits many of these traits Multiple borders (Bosnia alone

has had at one point more than 983092983088983088 border crossings) different taxationsystems numerous refugee and diasporic communitiesmdashall create a set ofrelations both within the Balkans and between the Balkans Europe and Tur-key that seem exceptionally conducive to informal and illicit (contraband)trade The Yugoslav wars ironically have not only disseminated armsthroughout the region and perpetuated warlordism and private armies buthave also re-created the image of the region as the dangerous non-navigablespace for outsiders The presence of legions of global governance missionariesdoes not really change this picture On the contrary the foreigners createtheir own islands of sovereignty and tax exemptions around which informaland illicit commerce can 1047298ourish while their dependence on local interpret-

250 | A IDA A HOZIC




ers (language and otherwise) creates yet another layer of intermediaries be-tween the formal and informal economy

The most important aspect of the reemergence of the Balkan trade routeshowever rests precisely in the fact that they reconstitute the Balkans as a dual

periphery simultaneously included and excluded from Europe both part andparcel of the global economy and its illicit counterpart The Balkans now asthe example of goods traded in the areamdashcigarettes oil and textiles inparticularmdashclearly shows serves as a giant semi-regulated (or at least oftengovernment-protected) offshore territory where products that would other-wise have diffi culties entering European or Western markets get recycled laun-dered or refurbished and then brought (back) into the West Similar to off-shoretax havens recently described by Ronen Palan26 Balkan states act like ldquoparking

lot proprietors they could not care less about the business of their customersonly that they pay for parking their vehicles thererdquo27 They offer protection ser-vices and local hideouts to global merchant corporations or organized crimenetworks and help them create additional spaces of circulation for their goodswithout questioning their origin or worrying about their 1047297nal destination

The signi1047297cance of these historical parallels is not in some sort of mechanicalreproduction of actors and events although the recent wars in the former Yugo-slavia have perhaps correctly been described as the wars of bandits thugs and

hooligans28 Rather its signi1047297cance is situated in the meanings that have beencarried over and that continue to tint the interpretations of crime inside and out-side of the Balkans In the Balkan folklore bandits have often been turned intonational heroes precursors of the latter-day battles against foreign occupiersYugoslav communists in fact resurrected some of the myths about hajduksuskoks and various peasant rebels in order to create a historical context for theirstruggle against Nazism and to explain their own rule as the logical continuationof previous heroic struggles against invaders29 The historical record however

may have been more complicated especially when it comes to the relation be-tween the Balkan bandits and Ottoman authorities As Kemal Karpat has notedin his review of Peter Sugarrsquos History of Southeastern Europe most Balkan historiansromanticized the role of banditry and rarely placed it into a broader context ofthe Portersquos relation to peasantry in its peripheral lands30 Karen Barkeyrsquos assess-ment of Ottoman banditry as aborted peasant rebellions and her analysis ofmultiple ways in which the state assimilated and used bandits for its own pur-poses is probably much more historically accurate31 More recently GeorgeGavrilis has also convincingly shown how both the newly created Greek state andthe Ottoman Empire relied on bandits and former convicts for protection of theGreek-Ottoman border until the late 983089983096983095983088s32



Nonetheless particularly in Serbia banditry is remembered as an expres-sion of patriotism as an act of defense against foreign invaders as an act oftrickery and de1047297ance that can expose the ineptness and stupidity ofoutsidersmdashin short banditry is regarded as the enforcer of the boundary be-

tween the Orthodox community (which may in its grandiose understandingof itself include all South Slavs) and the rest of the world By the end of theeighteenth century the alliance between the hajduks and the Orthodox mer-chants grew suffi ciently 1047297rm so that hajduks allegedly played an importantrole in the First Serb Uprising of 983089983096983088983092 The uprising would eventually lead tothe Serbsrsquo independence from the Porte and the creation of the 1047297rst modernsovereign state in the Balkans This secured the hajduksmdashas well as the lead-ers of peasant rebellions throughout the Balkansmdasha place in the pantheon of

nationalism In such a context it becomes easier to explain why and howsmuggling in Serbia in the 983089983097983097983088s under internationally imposed sanctionsbecame ldquonormalrdquo and why and how ldquohigh-pro1047297le criminals such as Arkan be-came local celebrities and role modelsrdquo33 As Serbian anthropologist IvanColovic noted the prominence given to ancient political 1047297gures and contem-porary heroes who reincarnated their characteristics discursively altered thetime-space coordinates in Serbia of the 983089983097983097983088s Historical continuity betweenthe old and new avengers became the pillar of an alternate reality ldquoheavenly

Serbiardquo in which no crimes against non-Serbs could ever be regarded assuch34

But Serbs were not alone in their revisions of criminality Both in Bosniaand Croatiamdashin part because of the arms embargoes but also because of thewarfare that unfolded as a succession of sieges and then the creation of theUNndashcontrolled ldquosafe zonesrdquomdashblack marketeering smuggling looting andgrand-scale theft of oil and weapons were also regarded as heroic acts35 Placed within the local contexts many of these acts were not viewed as

illegalmdashindeed their legality and legitimacy were only reinforced by the factthat they were regarded as illegal by the outside world The issue has of latebecome particularly dramatic in the treatment of indicted war criminalsmdashstillsheltered and protected by local populations in Serbia and Croatia preciselybecause of their de1047297ance of the International War Crime Tribunalmdashbut alsoin the treatment of many mujahedeen who came to Bosnia to 1047297ght on the sideof Allah were given Bosnian citizenship and are now sought as potential ter-rorists

The point I am trying to make here is not that criminality in the Balkansmight be a relative issue Rather it is that criminality in the former Yugoslaviaduring and after the wars may have also been a way of de1047297ning authority and

252 | A IDA A HOZIC




the boundaries of community not only vis-agrave-vis the ethnic othermdashindeedthere is a lot of evidence that smugglers had no inhibitions to trade with eachother across ethnic and national linesmdashbut also vis-agrave-vis the legal and juridi-cal order imposed by the international community Criminals and their net-

works created alternate maps to those drafted by politicians and internationalnegotiators they brokered passages and links between the newly formedstates and the world where there had been none they patrolled the routes andcruelly eliminated all those who did not ldquobelongrdquo and they 1047297lled the crevassesof the sovereign systemmdashwhat Samuel Barkin calls the interstices ofsovereignty36 mdashwith economic activity

For its part international communitymdashin the Balkans this means Euro-pean Union and then less so the United States and the Bretton Woods

institutionsmdashhas become in the words of Bulgarian political scientist IvanKrastev ldquoobsessedrdquo with corruption and crime37 Their actions dovetail theacts of the Balkan criminals by creating a wall between Europe and its civili-zation other Criminality has been added to the repertoire of traits whichcon1047297rm that ldquoinhabitants [of the Balkans] do not care to conform to the stan-dards of behavior devised as normative by and for the civilized worldrdquo38 Thecrime in the regionmdashtraffi cking of women and drugs cigarette smugglingoil trading money laundering sheltering of war criminalsmdashare all used as

reasons to keep the Western Balkans out of Europe even if they are preciselythe venues through which the Balkans is currently integrated into the Euro-pean and world economies Furthermore they are used as the pretexts tobuild sovereign states in the Balkans in the way they are now commonlyunderstoodmdashwith centralized police and military authorities low taxationfor foreign investors and easily tradable property Mostly the Balkans statesare expected to carefully control their borders and act as the ldquobuffer statesrdquofor the European Union when it comes to the issues of migration heavily

taxed products or illegal substances And if they are reluctant to do it theEuropean Union is ready to take the taskmdashwith its restrictive trade and visaregimes strict membership conditionality and cultural intolerance

Sovereignty and Criminality

The question of sovereignty of the Balkan statesrsquo liminalitymdashtheirneither-here-nor-there position in Europemdashthen raises the issue of the Bal-kans anomaly to what degree if at all is the Balkans an area of deviant law-lessness corruption and crime Ronen Palanrsquos argument about tax havensseems quite pertinent to this question Commercialization of sovereigntymdashsale



of sovereign space in exchange for provision of protection services anonym-ity and evasion of taxesmdashis not in his view just a simple response to the in-creased regulation and levels of taxation in advanced industrial countriesRather Palan argues commercialization of sovereignty is a pragmatic solution

to an inherent contradiction between a statersquos increasing insulation in law onthe one hand and internationalization of capital (particularly via multina-tional corporations) on the other The key to this solution is an element of juridical 1047297ction rather than factmdashthe strategy of tax havens is based on thepremise that legal entities can establish a presence in their territories withoutactually relocating Thus says Palan not only are tax havens and their as hecalls them ldquoprostitution of sovereign rightsrdquo endemic to the state systemthey are also constitutive of a ldquovirtual state systemrdquo that feeds off the juridical

and political infrastructure of the ldquorealrdquo state system and enables the smoothfunctioning of the global economy39

James Mittelman and Robert Johnston offer a similar analysis of the rela-tionship between states and organized crime The emerging ldquocourtesan staterdquoas they call it (analogies to prostitution in both analyses are quite interestingin themselves) 1047297nds itself in a subservient position to the more powerful in-terests in the global political economy and while offering services to itswealthy clients advanced industrial countries (often as Mittelman and John-

ston stress quite literally in forms of export sex industry) it neglects theprovision of social services for its underclass Organized crime steps into thisvoid and acts as an intermediary between the two worlds Therefore accord-ing to Mittelman and Johnston organized crime can be seen as a manifesta-tion of a Polanyian double movement the consequence of expanding globaleconomy and the search for forms of social protection40

What both of these analyses share is a sense that the clash between eco-nomic liberalization and the statersquos embeddedness in a set of laws generates its

own perversions that in turn allow the global economic system to continue tofunction The best example of such a statemdashboth endemic and deviantmdashinthe Balkans may be Bosnia and Herzegovina entirely a construct of the inter-national community and liberal economic order That is while the interna-tional community in Bosnia insists on those attributes of statehood that wouldenable international capital to 1047298ow through it freely (hence eg standardiza-tion of business regulations and taxation regimes with advanced industrialcountries that would allow global merchants to operate in Bosnia just as easilyas in eg Singapore) local merchants continue to perpetuate internal barri-ers and legal idiosyncrasies that strengthen their own position As a result thestate operates as a no-manrsquos land combining elements of both legality and il-

254 | A IDA A HOZIC




legality in which informal markets and illicit trademdashas a way of connectingBosnia to world marketsmdashcontinue to thrive

But there is another element of these analyses that may be worth men-tioning in the conclusion Both Palan and Mittelman emphasize that sovereign

exceptions are indeed endogenous to the international state system and thatlawlessness (or prostitution of law in their terminology) is an integral part ofthe contemporary global economy In this they come close to Giorgio Agam-benrsquos works on sovereignty which also stress that it is the exception and notthe law that constitutes the essence of sovereign power41 I have describedelsewhere how media representation of the Balkans over the past ten years orso has helped construe it into precisely such a zone of sovereign exception thathas made the extant sovereign order possible42 Here it would suffi ce to say

that that such politics of representation has had its counterpart in actual eco-nomic 1047298ows The Balkans as the alleged zone of lawlessness and corruptionmay indeed be an integral part of the world economy that sustains the func-tioning of the international state system rather than erodes it

Conclusion

So how and why is the political 1047297ction called sovereignty maintained Inter-

estingly enough most available answers these days focus on the changed cal-culus of the relations between the zones of order and the zones of lawlessnessConstitution of the outlawmdashof anyonersquos Balkansmdashrepresents the basis of ourunderstanding of sovereignty these days According to Agamben the paradoxof sovereignty 1047297nds its resolution through the spatial expansion of the juridi-cal ldquozone of indistinctionrdquo and the forceful localization of the ldquostate of excep-tionrdquo The ldquounstoppable progression of what has been called a lsquoglobal civilwarrsquo rdquo writes Agamben has turned ldquostate of exceptionrdquo into a dominant para-

digm of contemporary governance43 But the spread of this zone of indistinc-tion in which sovereign power encounters bare life without any form ofmediation has also forced a desperate search for the ways in which the ldquostateof exceptionrdquo can be localized By keeping it separate distant cordoned off itbecomes easier to maintain the 1047297ction of rights that can somehow protect usfrom the otherwise indiscriminate exercise of the sovereign power

According to Gerry Simpson who addresses the same paradox but on asystemic level the con1047298ict between formal juridical equality of sovereignstates and persistent power inequalities among them is resolved through theconstitution of states with a differentiated legal statusmdashoutlaw states crimi-nal states uncivilized states and lately terrorist states Such states can then



be either stripped of their traditional sovereign privileges or banished fromthe community of states Either way

[in an] encounter between a Great Power and an outlaw state the sover-

eignty norms associated with a traditional conception of internationallaw are suspended The legal scope for the use of force by the Greatpowers is widened while the territorial integrity and political indepen-dence of the outlaw state shrinks The result is a highly permissive envi-ronment in which the use of force can be more readily employed44

Stephen Krasner James Fearon and David Laitin provide justi1047297cations for suchsuspensions of sovereignty (which of course according to Agamben would be

just the supreme systemic manifestations of the sovereignty itself)45 Accordingto Krasner outlaw states may pursue aggressive policies produce weapons ofmass destruction and pose a threat both to their citizens and to the interna-tional society as such And since the ldquocurrent menu of policy instruments iswoefully limitedrdquo in dealings with the outlaw states alternative options whichtranscend traditional understandings of sovereignty such as shared sovereigntyor neo-trusteeship have to be explored Countries incapable of governing them-selves may trade their Westphalian sovereignty for international legal sover-

eignty In addition they may be forced to share sovereignty over their naturalresources Oil wealth appears to be particularly politically corrosive since itpermits states to buy off possible dissenters and build military power to destroythose who had not been bought off Domestic governance in oil-rich countriescould therefore be ldquoenhanced by creating oil trustsrdquo and relegating authority tointernational boards of governors Hence concludes Krasner the menu of pol-icy options needs to be expandedmdashtrusteeships or conservatorships need to belegitimated and shared sovereignty acceptedmdashif we are to adequately address

the problems of contemporary troubled societies46

Fearon and Laitin are primarily concerned with lessons that can be drawnfrom state-building missions in the Balkans for US engagements in Iraq andAfghanistan In their view too traditional sovereign arrangements in col-lapsed states are being replaced by variants of neotrusteeship or as they sayldquomore provocatively postmodern imperialismrdquo47 Mostly troubled by theproblematic results of state-building efforts in Kosovo and Bosniamdashand fullyaware of the fact that the presence of international administrators may hinderthe development of local institutionsmdashFearon and Laitin thus propose thatreconstructed states should pay for the international peacekeeping services

256 | A IDA A HOZIC




What is the future of ldquobuffer statesrdquo and what is the future of sovereigntyCrime and criminality may ensure that they are reproduced The zone ofindistinctionmdashthe space where the state of exception has become anormmdashnow governs most of our lives As a potentiality at least it lurks be-

hind the US Patriot Act Guantanamo Fallujah surveillance of terroristnetworks and immigrants occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq and plan Co-lombia it manifests itself in unauthorized strategic bombings in the abandon-ment of hurricane victimsmdashthe Superdome and the Convention Centertsunami and Pakistanmdashas much as in the killings in Congo savagery of thewars in the former Yugoslavia

The diffi culty of distinguishing between these acts exacerbates the gapbetween norms and practices of sovereignty by exposing the power inequali-

ties and the vulnerability of bare life But just like the camp was necessarilylocalized so are now the territories of wars and violence cordoned off ascriminal andor failed statesmdashallowing the very author who coined theterm ldquoorganized hypocrisyrdquo to speak about the necessity of failed states toexchange their domestic sovereigntymdashas well as the control over the naturalresourcesmdashfor international legal sovereignty in order to continue to exist

NOTES 983089 William Eleroy Curtis The Turk and His Lost Provinces (Chicago F H Revell

Co 983089983097983088983091) hereafter cited parenthetically in the text 983090 Actually Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia has now resurfaced as the

example of successful ldquopaci1047297cationrdquo of the local population See John R Schindler ldquoDe-feating Balkan Insurgency The Austro-Hungarian Army in Bosnia-Hercegovina983089983096983095983096ndash983096983090rdquo Journal of Strategic Studies 983090983095 no 983091 (983090983088983088983092) 983093983090983096ndash983093983090

983091 Ekavi Athanassopoulou ldquoIntroduction Fighting Organised crime in SEErdquo

Southeast Euro pean and Black Sea Studies 983092 no 983090 (983090983088983088983092) 983090983089983095 983092 Ibid 983090983089983095 983093 See for example David Chandler ldquoThe Problems of Nation-Building Imposing

Bureaucratic lsquoRule from Aboversquo rdquo Cambridge Review of International Affairs 983089983095 (October983090983088983088983092) 983093983095983095ndash983097983089 European Stability Initiative Governance and Democracy in Bosnia and Herze-

govina Post Industrial Society and the Authoritarian Temptation Part of the Governance As-sessment of Bosnia and Herzegovina funded by the United Kingdomrsquos Department forInternational Development Berlin-Sarajevo (983090983088983088983092) International Crisis Group Bosniarsquos

Nationalist Governments Paddy Ashdown and the Paradoxes of State Building Balkans ReportNo 983089983092983094 BrusselsSarajevo (983090983088983088983092) International Commission on the Balkans The Balkans

in Europersquos Future Report of the Commission project funded by the Robert Bosch Stiftung



King Badouin Foundation German Marshall Fund of the United States Charles StewartMott Foundation Secretariat Centre for Liberal Strategies So1047297a (983090983088983088983093)

983094 Samuel J Barkin ldquoIllicit Economic Activity and the Interstices of Sovereigntyrdquo(unpublished paper University of Florida 983090983088983088983093)

983095 See Jens Bertelson A Genealogy of Sovereignty (Cambridge Cambridge Univer-sity Press 983089983097983097983093) 983093

983096 Stephen Krasner treats these four principles as four different types of sovereigntyWestphalian sovereignty domestic sovereignty interdependence sovereignty and interna-tional legal sovereignty See Stephen D Krasner Sovereignty Or ganized Hypocrisy (PrincetonNJ Princeton University Press 983089983097983097983097) Another frequent typology would categorize the1047297rst two principles as ldquointernal sovereigntyrdquo since they de1047297ne a statersquos exclusive authorityover domestic affairs whereas international legal sovereignty would be regarded as thecore of ldquoexternal sovereigntyrdquo See for instance Barkin ldquoIllicit Economic Activityrdquo and

Alexander Wendt Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge Cambridge UniversityPress 983089983097983097983097) Interdependence sovereignty ie control over cross-border transactions ismore diffi cult to categorize since scholars are divided on how essential border control andprecise mapping of borders really are for statesrsquo sovereign status

983097 Krasner Sovereignty 983089983095983089983088 Ibid 983089983093983093983089983089 Ole Waever ldquoImperial Metaphors Emerging European Analogies to Pre-Nation

State Imperial Systemsrdquo in Geopolitics in Post-Wall Europe Security Territory and Identity ed

O Tunander P Baev and V I Einagel (London Sage 983089983097983097983095) 983093983097ndash983097983091983089983090 Source UN (wwwunorg) By comparison the number of UN members in-creased from the original 983093983089 in 983089983097983092983093 to 983089983093983097 in 983089983097983097983088

983089983091 Krasner Sovereignty 983094983092ndash983094983093983089983092 Stephen D Krasner ldquoSharing Sovereignty New Institutions for Collapsed and

Failing Statesrdquo International Security 983090983097 no 983090 (983090983088983088983092) 983096983093ndash983089983090983088983089983093 Waever ldquoImperial Metaphorsrdquo 983093983097983089983094 Giorgio Agamben Homo Sacer Sovereign Power and Bare Life trans Daniel

Heller-Roazen (Stanford Calif Stanford University Press 983089983097983097983096) and State of Exception

trans Kevin Attell (Chicago University of Chicago Press 983090983088983088983093)983089983095 Agamben State of Exception 983090ndash983091983089983096 Jacques Ranciere ldquoWho is the Subject of the Rights of Manrdquo South Atlantic

Quarterly 983089983088983091 nos 983090983091 (983090983088983088983092) 983090983097983095ndash983091983089983088983089983097 Charles Tilly ldquoWar Making and State Making as Organized Crimerdquo in Bringing

the State Back In ed Peter Evans Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (Cam-bridge Cambridge University Press 983089983097983096983093) 983089983094983097ndash983097983089

983090983088 Samuel J Barkin ldquoThe Evolution of the Constitution of Sovereignty and the

Emergence of Human Rights Normsrdquo Millennium 983090983095 no 983090 (983089983097983097983096) 983090983090983097ndash983093983090983090983089 Ethan A Nadelmann ldquoGlobal Prohibition Regimes Evolution of Norms in In-ternational Societyrdquo International Or ganization 983092983092 no 983092 (983089983097983097983088) 983092983095983097ndash983093983090983094

258 | A IDA A HOZIC




983090983090 See Peter Andreas Border Games Policing the USndashMexican Border (Ithaca NYCornell University Press 983090983088983088983088) and George Gavrilis ldquoBorder Guards Bandits andDiplomats The 983089983097th Century Ottoman-Greek Boundary Regimerdquo presented at the con-ference on Colonial Experiences and Colonial Legacies Comparing Eastern Europe andSub-Saharan Africa Cornell University Ithaca May 983094ndash983095 983090983088983088983093

983090983091 Traian Stoianovich ldquoThe Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchantrdquo Journal of

Economic History 983090983088 no 983089 (983089983097983094983088) 983090983091983092ndash983091983089983091983090983092 See Catherine Wendy Bracewell The Uskoks of Senj (Ithaca NY Cornell Uni-

versity Press 983089983097983097983090) Peter Sugar Southeastern Europe Under Ottoman Rule 983089983091983093983092ndash983089983096983088983092 (Se-attle University of Washington Press 983089983097983095983095) and Traian Stoianovich Balkan Worlds The

First and Last Europe (New York M E Sharpe 983089983097983097983092)983090983093 For history of Balkan economies under the Ottomans see also Halil Inalcik and

Donald Quataert An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire 983089983091983088983088ndash983089983097983089983092 (Cam-

bridge Cambridge University Press 983089983097983097983092) Resat Kasaba The Ottoman Empire and theWorld Economy (Albany SUNY Press 983089983097983096983096) John Lampe and Marvin Jackson Balkan

Economic History 983089983093983093983088ndash983089983097983093983088 From Imperial Borderlands to Developing Nations (BloomingtonIndiana University Press 983089983097983096983090) Bruce McGowan Economic Life in Ottoman Europe Taxa-

tion Trade and the Struggle for Land 983089983094983088983088ndash983089983096983088983088 (Cambridge Cambridge University Press983089983097983096983089) and Michael Palairet The Balkan Economies c 983089983096983088983088ndash983089983097983089983092 Evolution Without Develop-

ment (Cambridge Cambridge University Press 983089983097983097983095)983090983094 See Ronen Palan ldquoTax Havens and the Commercialization of State Sovereigntyrdquo

International Or ganization 983093983094 no 983089 (983090983088983088983090) 983089983093983089ndash983095983094 and

The Offshore World (Ithaca NYCornell University Press 983090983088983088983091)

983090983095 Palan ldquoTax Havensrdquo 983089983093983090983090983096 John Mueller The Remnants of War (Ithaca NY Cornell University Press

983090983088983088983092)

983090983097 Ivo Žanic ldquoHajduci kmetovi askeri i vitezovi Simbolicni identiteti JNA ipostjugoslavenskih vojskirdquo Polemos 983089 no 983089 (983089983097983097983096) available at wwwffzghrhsdpole-mosvol _onehtml

983091983088 Kemal H Karpat ldquoSoutheastern Europe Under Ottoman Rule 983089983091983093983092ndash983089983096983088983092rdquo

(review of Peter Sugar) American Historical Review 983096983092 no 983091 (983089983097983095983097) 983095983097983096ndash983096983088983088983091983089 Karen Barkey Bandits and Bureaucrats The Ottoman Route to State Centralization

( Ithaca NY Cornell University Press 983089983097983097983092)983091983090 Gavrilis ldquoBorder Guardsrdquo983091983091 Peter Andreas ldquoCriminalizing Consequences of Sanctions Embargo Busting

and Its Legacyrdquo International Studies Quarterly 983092983097 (983090983088983088983093) 983091983091983093ndash983094983088

983091983092 Ivan Colovic ldquoThe Renewal of the Past Time and Space in Contemporary Po-litical Mythologyrdquo trans Nenad Stefanov and John Abromeit Other Voices 983090 no 983089

(983090983088983088983088) (also available at wwwothervoicesorg983090983089colovicpasthtml) and Politics ofIdentity in Serbia Essays in Political Anthropology trans Celia Hawkesworth (New YorkNew York University Press 983090983088983088983090)



983091983093 Peter Andreas ldquoThe Clandestine Political Economy of War and Peace in Bos-niardquo International Studies Quarterly 983092983096 (983090983088983088983092) 983090983097ndash983093983089

983091983094 Barkin ldquoIllicit Economic Activityrdquo983091983095 Ivan Krastev Shifting Obsessions Three Essays on the Politics of Anticorruption (Buda-

pest CEU Press 983090983088983088983092)983091983096 Maria Todorova Imagining the Balkans (New York and Oxford Oxford Univer-

sity Press 983089983097983097983095) 983091983091983097 See Palan ldquoTax Havensrdquo and Offshore World

983092983088 John Mittelman and Robert Johnston ldquoThe Globalization of Organized CrimeThe Courtesan State and the Corruption of Civil Societyrdquo Global Governance 983093 no 983089(983089983097983097983097) 983089983088983091ndash983090983095

983092983089 See Agamben Homo Sacer and State of Exception

983092983090 Aida A Hozic ldquoZoning or How to Govern (Cultural) Violencerdquo Cultural Values

983094 no 983089 (983090983088983088983090) 983089983096983091ndash983097983093983092983091 Agamben State of Exception 983096983095983092983092 Gerry Simpson Great Powers and Outlaw States Unequal Sovereigns in the Interna-

tional Legal Order (Cambridge Cambridge University Press 983090983088983088983092) 983091983091983094983092983093 Stephen D Krasner ldquoSharing Sovereigntyrdquo James D Fearon and David Laitin

ldquoNeotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak Statesrdquo International Security 983090983096 no 983089 (983090983088983088983092)983093ndash983092983091

983092983094 Krasnerrsquos conclusion is quite emphatic and it represents a radical departure

from his previous positions on sovereignty ldquoConventional sovereigntyrdquo writes Krasnerrdquohas never worked perfectly Its norms have frequently been violated But the problemsposed by failed outlaw weak and abusive states are more pressing than they have beenin the past States with the resources to act now have an incentive to do so Their abilityto act effectively would be enhanced by providing a wider menu of policy options whenintervention does occurrdquo See Stephen D Krasner ldquoTroubled Societies Outlaw Statesand Gradations of Sovereigntyrdquo paper prepared for a conference on failed states at Stan-ford University July 983090983088983088983090

983092983095 Fearon and Laitin ldquoNeotrusteeshiprdquo

260 | A IDA A HOZIC

















CONTENTS

acknowledgments vii










Luise White



Keith Brown


Kevin C Dunn



Siba N Grovogui





aida a hozic









244 | A IDA A HOZIC



























246 | A IDA A HOZIC






















248 | A IDA A HOZIC



















250 | A IDA A HOZIC




















252 | A IDA A HOZIC





















254 | A IDA A HOZIC








Conclusion















256 | A IDA A HOZIC



































258 | A IDA A HOZIC

















983090983088983088983092)























260 | A IDA A HOZIC




aida a hozic









244 | A IDA A HOZIC



























246 | A IDA A HOZIC






















248 | A IDA A HOZIC



















250 | A IDA A HOZIC




















252 | A IDA A HOZIC





















254 | A IDA A HOZIC








Conclusion















256 | A IDA A HOZIC



































258 | A IDA A HOZIC

















983090983088983088983092)























260 | A IDA A HOZIC





















254 | A IDA A HOZIC








Conclusion















256 | A IDA A HOZIC



































258 | A IDA A HOZIC

















983090983088983088983092)























260 | A IDA A HOZIC








Conclusion















256 | A IDA A HOZIC



































258 | A IDA A HOZIC

















983090983088983088983092)























260 | A IDA A HOZIC











256 | A IDA A HOZIC



































258 | A IDA A HOZIC

















983090983088983088983092)























260 | A IDA A HOZIC



































258 | A IDA A HOZIC

















983090983088983088983092)























260 | A IDA A HOZIC

















983090983088983088983092)























260 | A IDA A HOZIC
















260 | A IDA A HOZIC

the state of sovereignty

Documents