The Stockholm International Peace ResearchInstitute is an independent international institutefor research into problems of peace and conflict,

especially those of arms control and disarmament.It was established in 1966 to commemorate

Sweden’s 150 years of unbroken peace.

The Institute is financed mainly bythe Swedish Parliament. The staff andthe Governing Board are international.

The Institute also has an Advisory Committeeas an international consultative body.

The objectives of SIPRI’s research are• to promote transparency in security and

arms control• to contribute to conflict prevention and resolution• to disseminate information to the broader public.

SIPRI publishes its research findings in booksand on the Internet at http://www.sipri.org.

This booklet illustrates the type offacts and data you will find in the 845-page

SIPRI Yearbook 2002Armaments, Disarmament and

International Security

which may be obtainedthrough all the main bookshops orfrom Oxford University Press, UK.

On the Internet, order from OUP through SIPRI athttp://www.sipri.org/pubs/bookorder.html.

For information about recent SIPRI publications, seehttp://editors.sipri.org/recpubs.html.

About the

‘Like many organizations, research institutes,researchers and individuals in the field of security,the Department for Disarmament Affairs has setstore on the reliability and credibility of the researchand publications emanating from SIPRI, particularlythe Yearbook that the Institute has published formany years. As an independent institute forresearch on problems of peace and conflict,disarmament and arms control, founded in 1966,SIPRI’s primary research has always beenconsistently objective, timely, comprehensive andclear.’

Jayantha Dhanapala

United Nations Under-Secretary-Generalfor Disarmament Affairs

SIPRI Yearbook

The SIPRI Yearbook has been published since1969. It brings together objective data and state-of-the-art analysis, offered by SIPRI’s own staff andother experts, on all major aspects of arms control,peace and security. The pattern of the Yearbookcontents varies from year to year to take account ofkey developments and concerns in the yearcovered. Thus, the SIPRI Yearbook 2002 is heavilyinfluenced by the cataclysmic terrorist attacks of11 September 2001. It aims to explain the fullsignificance and worldwide repercussions of theseevents, and it discusses how arms control and othersecurity policies may need to be retooled to dealwith the new transnational threats to society.

Putting this unique compendium into the hands ofgovernments, scholars and others who care aboutpeace is a contribution in itself to transparency,democratic debate and good policy making. Withthese aims in mind, SIPRI has in recent yearsproduced Russian, Ukrainian, Chinese and Koreaneditions of the Yearbook.

Major armed conflicts• There were 24 major armed conflicts in 2001—

conflicts over control of government or territory inwhich at least 1000 battle-related deaths wererecorded for any single year.

• Only 1 of these conflicts—between India andPakistan—was interstate. All the others were inter-nal conflicts.

• Over 1000 people were killed in each of 11 con-flicts in 2001. For 9 of them, over 1000 battle-relateddeaths were also recorded for 2000.

• Eleven of the conflicts have been active for over8 years, mainly because neither side has been ableto prevail by force.

• Eleven of the conflicts have spilled over inter-national borders. They threatened to destabilizeneighbouring states through the burden of refugees,cross-border movement of rebels (and occasionallynational military forces), and the undermining oflegitimate economic and political structures throughthe illicit trade in resources and arms.

• The general pattern of conflict in 2001 was con-sistent with that of previous years, but the prioritiesand perceptions of many states changed as a resultof the 11 September terrorist attacks on the USA.The campaign against terrorism directly influenced asmall number of conflicts and brought to the fore

such issues as the militarization of responses to ter-rorism, the global role of violent sub-state actors,and the connection between intra- and interstateconflict.

The 24 conflicts in 2001AfricaAlgeria*Angola*Burundi*Congo, Democratic

Republic of theRwanda*SomaliaSudan*

AmericaColombia*PeruUSA*

AsiaAfghanistan*India—2 conflicts (Kashmir*)India–PakistanIndonesiaMyanmarPhilippines—2 conflictsSri Lanka*

EuropeRussia*

Middle EastIranIraqIsraelTurkey

* These 11 conflicts each caused 1000 or moredeaths in 2001—5 were in Africa and 3 in Asia. Theconflict in the USA refers to that between theal-Qaeda network and the USA, the only new con-flict registered for 2001.

Multilateral peace missions

• There were 51 peace missions in operation in2001, as compared to 55 in 2000. For the first timesince 1996, no new United Nations missions wereinitiated.

• The missions were conducted or led by:

the UN (15 peacekeeping operations)UN operations not officially defined by the UN as

peacekeeping operations (4)the OSCE (13)the CIS (3, of which 1 was carried out by Russia);NATO (4)the EU/WEU (3)the OAU (3); andother organizations or ad hoc state coalitions (6).

• In December 2001, 39 466 military and 7642civilian police personnel were deployed in the 15 UNoperations, an increase of 9375 (25%) over 2000.There were 64 fatalities in these operations. Thetotal cost of the missions was $1931.5 million, adecrease of $508.8 million (21%) from 2000.

• By comparison, 32 missions were conducted byregional organizations and multinational coalitionsother than the UN in 2001. The known total cost ofthese missions was $298.1 million and there were40 fatalities.

The military dimension of theEuropean Union

• The EU has pursued its ‘Headline Goal’ for theEuropean Security and Defence Policy since 1999:to be able by 2003 to deploy a corps-level EuropeanRapid Reaction Force for crisis managementmissions—the ‘Petersberg tasks’.

• US policy after the 11 September 2001 attacksbrought home to the EU the reality of its role in thetransatlantic relationship. Europe will be pressuredto improve its military capabilities in both the EU andNATO.

• New ESDP responsibilities were called for,including emphasis on preparation for operationalreadiness, taking full account of the terrorist threat toEuropean forces and civilian populations, andimprovement of the early-warning process.

• The issue of EU access to NATO’s assetsremained unresolved, and the duplication of effortsby the EU and NATO has not been sufficientlyaddressed. A synergistic, rational approach todefence spending is lacking in Europe.

• The ESDP was declared ‘operational’ in 2001and 3 permanent bodies were established. Definingthe ESDP and building public support for increasedspending will pose a challenge in the coming years.

The challenges of security sector reform

• States aspiring to democratic governance andstrong economies require capable administrativeand political structures. They need a well-governedsecurity sector—comprising the civil, political andsecurity institutions responsible for protecting thestate and its citizens.

• Security sector reform helps to reduce the riskthat state weakness or failure will lead to disorderand violence. Supporting such reform should be apriority objective for governments and scholars alike.

• When states cannot manage developmentswithin their borders, the conditions are created fordisorder and violence and the spillover of conflicts toother states.

• Fresh demands are now being placed on thearmed forces, intelligence services and law-enforcement services of states to help in identifyinggroups and individuals engaged in terrorist acts.There is a risk that security sector reform willbecome subordinate to anti-terrorism activities incountries where development of this cooperation isseen as particularly important. Reform may also beimpeded by an increase of the political influence andinstitutional autonomy of security services.

Sanctions applied by the EU and the UN

• In 2001 the European Union and the UnitedNations continued to work to improve the effective-ness of sanctions as an instrument for managinginternational security problems. Sanctions are nowapplied not only to target states but also to non-stateentities and, increasingly, to individuals.

• The EU has been developing sanctions toadvance its objectives in the process of democrati-zation and human rights. EU sanctions achievedsome success in South-Eastern Europe when theywere used as part of a broader set of security-building measures.

• The UN sanctions regime against Iraq was modi-fied in 2001 in response to concerns about thehumanitarian impact on the Iraqi people. The UNSecurity Council could previously block any ship-ment to Iraq unless it was for humanitarian pur-poses. Under the new system only sales of items onan agreed list may be blocked.

• Before 2001 UN mandatory sanctions againstcertain states, including Afghanistan, were part ofthe international response to acts of terrorism. Afterthe 11 September terrorist attacks, the SecurityCouncil agreed on extensive measures aimed at allentities or persons engaged in supporting or carry-ing out terrorist acts.

Military expenditure• World military expenditure in 2001, based on

adopted budgets, amounted to $839 billion (in cur-rent dollars). This figure represents 2.6% of worldGDP and an average of $137 per capita.

• The trend in world military spending haschanged from a significant reduction over the period1987–98 to an increase of 7% in real terms over theperiod 1998–2001.

• When actual expenditure figures for 2001become available, the world increase is likely to begreater—owing primarily to an increase in theUSA—because of additional expenditure generatedby the 11 September terrorist attacks and the ensu-ing ‘war on terrorism’. Several countries have alsoadopted significant increases for counter-terrorismactivities in their defence and internal securitybudgets for 2002.

• Five countries accounted for over half of worldmilitary spending in 2001—the USA (36%), Russia(6%), and France, Japan and the UK (5% each).

• In the group of low-income countries, thedefence burden—military expenditure as a share ofGDP—is more than twice as high as the world aver-age.

US military expenditure

• The USA began a major military build-up afterthe terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, thefourth such build-up since World War II. In late 2001the US Congress authorized a supplementaryappropriation of $40 billion to be applied to anti-terrorism in FYs 2001 and 2002. The US budget forFY 2003 contained an increase of $48 billion inbudget authority for defence, a sum that is largerthan the entire defence budget of each of the othermajor military spenders—Russia, France, Japanand the UK.

• The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review articu-lated broad objectives for the technological trans-formation of the US military but contained nobudgetary or military policy guidance. Disputes willtherefore continue to dominate the budgetaryprocess.

• The defence budget for FY 2003 continuesalmost all the so-called legacy programmes thatwere developed in the context of the cold war.

• The 11 September attacks raised the profile ofthe issue of NATO burden sharing. The gapbetween US and European spending for defencereflects a difference in perceptions of the role ofmilitary strength for promoting peace and security.

Arms production

• The 1990s was a decade of profound changeand restructuring of the arms industry in most partsof the world.

• The arms industry was significantly downsized inthe first half of the decade, but this process sloweddown considerably in the latter half of the decade.

• Since the late 1990s arms procurement hasstabilized and in a number of countries there haseven been slight growth. Restructuring of the armsindustry has been driven by large companies tryingto secure their strong positions in the world marketthrough acquisitions and international cooperationarrangements.

• The process of concentration has produced sev-eral extraordinarily large companies, with annualarms sales of $5–19 billion. In Europe, concentrationhas moved from the national to the internationallevel. Internationalization in Europe is seen as a pre-requisite for Europe both to become competitive withthe USA and to establish military industrial partner-ships with US companies.

• Increased concentration and internationalizationof arms production may require international meas-ures to ensure transparency and accountability inarms production in the future.

• The value of the combined arms sales of the top100 arms-producing companies in the OECD mem-ber states and the developing countries (excludingChina) was $157.6 billion in 2000.

The 5 largest arms-producing companiesin the OECD countries in 2000

Aggregate value of arms sales, $66.7 billion

1 Lockheed Martin (USA) $18.6 billion2 Boeing (USA) $16.9 billion3 BAE Systems (UK) $14.4 billion4 Raytheon (USA) $10.1 billion5 Northrop Grumman (USA) $6.7 billion

• Russian arms production has been increasingsince 1998. The efforts to transform the Russianarms industry are beginning to produce changes inits structure, ownership and dynamics.

The 5 largest arms-producing companiesin Russia in 2000

Aggregate value of arms sales, 46.2 billion roubles

1 PK Antey R 12.8 billion2 KnAAPO R 11.4 billion3 Severnaya Verf R 10.5 billion4 Baltiysky Zavod R 6.5 billion5 IAIA R 5.0 billion

International arms transfers

• The global SIPRI trend-indicator value of inter-national transfers of major conventional weapons in2001 was more than $16 billion, an increase of 7%over 2000.

• In 2001 Russia was the largest arms supplier,with a 24% increase over 2000. The USA ranks asthe second largest supplier.

• The level of global arms transfers for the 5-yearperiod 1997–2001 dropped from the previous 5-yearperiod, mainly because of the reduction in deliveriesby the USA. The USA was the dominant supplierand Russian the second largest in 1997–2001. Thetwo largest recipients were Taiwan and China.

• For 1997–2001 the most important arms trans-fers in terms of volume were between Taiwan andthe USA and between China and Russia.

• The actual financial value of the global armstrade in 2000—the latest year for which figures areavailable—was $27–33 billion, an estimate basedon official government and industry data on armsexports.

• India and Pakistan are both major recipients ofarms, ranking 5th and 10th respectively, for theperiod 1997–2001. Both states have receivedweapons or have weapon acquisition plans thatcould be destabilizing.

The top 5 exporters of major conventionalweapons in 1997–2001

Shares of world exports

1 USA 44%2 Russia 17%3 France 10%4 UK 7%5 Germany 5%

The trend in transfers of major conventionalweapons, 1987–2001

5 000

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15 000

20 000

25 000

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35 000

40 000

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88

19

89

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The columns show annual totals.The curve shows 5-year moving averages, plotted at thelast year of each 5-year period.

Arms control after the attacks of11 September 2001

• Events in 2001 led practitioners and observersto question the usefulness of arms control as aninstrument for managing security problems. The twokey events were the change in the US administra-tion and the 11 September terrorist attacks.

• During its first year the George W. Bush Admin-istration critically scrutinized and reassessed therole of arms control in US foreign, security anddefence policy, based on concern about responsesto violations of agreements and whether arms con-trol can modify the behaviour of key states.

• US policies stimulated wider discussion of howarms control can contribute to international security.Most would agree that there is a close correlationbetween states that sponsor or carry out terroristacts and those that seek to acquire nuclear,biological and chemical weapons and ballisticmissiles.

• While arms control remains one of the instru-ments used to manage international security, adap-tations will be required if it is to address the prob-lems of greatest current concern. The problemsinclude how to facilitate participation by the privatesector in arms control and how to apply arms controlto non-state armed groups.

Ballistic missile defence andnuclear arms control

• In December 2001 the United States gave for-mal notice of its intention to withdraw from the 1972ABM Treaty. As of 13 June 2002 the ABM Treaty isno longer in force.

• The US decision cleared the way for the USA todevelop a BMD system larger in scale and scopethan the limited system envisaged by the ClintonAdministration. The reaction from Russia, China andUS allies was restrained.

• In November 2001 Russia and the USA agreedto negotiate a new arms reduction treaty underwhich each state would by the year 2012 reduce itsstrategic offensive nuclear forces to 1700–2200operationally deployed nuclear warheads.

• On 24 May 2002 Russia and the USA signed theTreaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions. Thetreaty did not require that warheads removed fromservice be destroyed, raising concern over reducedconfidence and greater unpredictability in theirnuclear force postures.

World nuclear forces:numbers of warheads as of January 2002

Year of first Deployednuclear test warheads

USA 1945 7 600Russia 1949 8 331UK 1952 185France 1960 348China 1964 402India 1974 30–35Pakistan 1998 24–48Israel — c. 20

Total c. 17 150

The USA’s active deployed stockpile consists of6480 strategic and 1120 non-strategic warheads.

Russia’s active deployed stockpile consists of4951 strategic and 3380 non-strategic warheads.

The nuclear arsenals of India, Israel and Pakistanare thought to be only partly deployed.

• At the beginning of 2002 an estimated total ofabout 17 150 nuclear warheads were deployed by8 states. If all nuclear warheads are counted—including non-deployed spares, those in active andinactive storage, and ‘pits’ (plutonium cores) held inreserve—the total world stockpile consisted ofc. 36 800 warheads.

Tactical nuclear weapons

• Despite the political commitments made byRussia and the USA under the 1991–92 PresidentialNuclear Initiatives to reduce and consolidate theirinventories of tactical nuclear weapons, both statescontinue to maintain large stockpiles.

• Tactical nuclear weapon stockpiles are non-transparent and are not regulated by any legallybinding agreement. There is considerable uncer-tainty about both the number of weapons and theirdeployment locations.

• Because of their small size, transportability anddecentralized command and control arrangements,tactical nuclear weapons pose special dangers ofillicit diversion or use. After the 11 September 2001attacks, there has been particular concern that tac-tical nuclear weapons could be acquired by terroristgroups.

• Recent doctrinal changes have stimulatedrenewed interest in the military utility of tacticalnuclear weapons and created pressure to developnew types of weapons.

• There is an urgent need for Russia and the USAto ensure that tactical nuclear weapons are safelyand securely stored. They should also conclude alegally binding agreement regulating and reducingtheir inventories.

US and Russian nuclear warheadproduction complexes and the security of

nuclear facilities and materials

• There are 284 nuclear research reactors in55 countries and 472 power reactors (operating orunder construction) in 31 countries. The attacks of11 September 2001 suggest that the threat tonuclear facilities is very complex.

• There is no multilateral treaty requiring physicalprotection of these facilities or the nuclear materialused or stored for use by them. An internationaleffort is urgently needed to evaluate physical pro-tection standards and regulatory practices and toconsider whether new norms are needed.

• The current US–Russian programmes toimprove the security of Russian nuclear facilitiesand materials should be continued.

• The Russian and US nuclear warhead produc-tion complexes have undergone a radical down-sizing and restructuring but they retain facilities forthe design, testing and production of warheads.

• The Russian complex has not been adequatelyreduced because of insufficient funding and difficul-ties in finding alternative employment for displacedworkers. International cooperation could acceleratethe contraction and rationalization of this complex.

The military uses of outer space

• Space-based systems are becoming an increas-ingly important component of military power.

• The ‘weaponization’ of outer space hasreappeared on the arms control agenda, with grow-ing international concern that the USA’s ability todominate space and deny its use to other countrieswill give rise to a destabilizing arms race in space.This concern has become more urgent in the light ofthe Bush Administration’s plans for an expansiveBMD system architecture featuring space-basedcomponents.

• No country can rival or contest US space domi-nance or the advantages it provides to US terrestrialmilitary operations. At the end of 2001, the USA hadnearly 110 operational military spacecraft, over two-thirds of all the military spacecraft orbiting the earth.

• Russia, a distant second, had about 40 opera-tional satellites in orbit.

• The rest of the world—including Australia,China, Europe, India, Israel and commercial satelliteoperators—had only about 20 operational militarysatellites. Other states are beginning to use space-based systems to enhance their security, and com-mercial satellite imagery is providing new, revolu-tionary capabilities.

Chemical and biological weapondevelopments and arms control

• In 2001 the USA rejected a draft protocol tostrengthen the 1972 Biological and Toxin WeaponsConvention and proposed that the negotiating man-date of the ad hoc group which had drafted it be ter-minated.

• The USA rejected the protocol partly on theground that it would be inadequate to deal with thegrowing threat of the proliferation of biological andother non-conventional weapons to ‘states ofconcern’ and terrorists. Less than a month after the11 September terrorist attacks on the USA, lettersfilled with concentrated anthrax spores were mailedto members of the news media and politicians. As ofAugust 2002, the sender of the letters remainedunknown. The difficulties encountered in thecriminal inquiry, the treatment of people exposed toanthrax spores and the disinfection of contaminatedoffices added to the US sense of vulnerability.

• The OPCW, which implements the 1993 Chem-ical Weapons Convention, faced a budgetary short-fall in 2001. The problem is a symptom of a lack ofagreement on many implementation issues, whichwill be dealt with at the first CWC Review Confer-ence, in 2003.

Conventional arms control• The European model of conventional arms con-

trol measures is seen as a positive example, but itremains a low security priority elsewhere.

• In 2001 conventional arms control in Europefocused on the implementation of agreed measures,new bilateral CSBMs and the search for newapproaches to the European politico-military dia-logue.

• The 1999 Agreement on Adaptation of theCFE Treaty is being partially implemented by thesignatories, but it has not entered into force becauseof issues of Russian non-compliance.

• The negotiations under an annex of the 1995Dayton Agreement concerning the regional stabi-lization of South-Eastern Europe were concludedand a new agreement was adopted.

• More states became parties to the APM Conven-tion, and the second Review Conference of the‘Inhumane Weapons’ Convention extended applica-tion of the convention to domestic armed conflicts.

• The UN conference on the illicit trade in smallarms and light weapons adopted a Programme ofAction that illustrates, at least, the international com-munity’s political will to engage in the control ofthese weapons.

Multilateral weapon and technologyexport controls

• In response to the 11 September 2001 terroristattacks on the USA, new ideas on the role of exportcontrols in counter-terrorism were put forward in theAustralia Group, the NSG and the WassenaarArrangement.

• MTCR participating states agreed the text of anInternational Code of Conduct aimed at dis-couraging ballistic missile proliferation. A decisionon implementing the ICOC is expected in 2002. TheNSG continued to discuss how to respond to deci-sions by Russia related to nuclear supply that areconsidered to violate the NSG guidelines.

• 41 states now participate in 1 or more of the5 multilateral weapon and technology exportregimes, and 27 states participate in all of them.

Multilateral export control regimes andnumber of members as of 1 January 2002

Zangger Committee 35Nuclear Suppliers Group 39Australia Group 33Missile Technology Control Regime 33Wassenaar Arrangement 33

Arms control and disarmament agreementsand agreements on humanitarian law of

armed conflictin force as of June 2002

1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in Warof Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, andof Bacteriological Methods of Warfare(Geneva Protocol)

1948 Treaty for Collaboration in Economic, Socialand Cultural Matters and for Collective Self-defence among Western European states(Brussels Treaty)

1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishmentof the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention)

1949 Geneva Convention IV Relative to theProtection of Civilian Persons in Time of War

1954 Protocols to the 1948 Brussels Treaty (ParisAgreements on the Western European Union)

1959 Antarctic Treaty

1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in theAtmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water(Partial Test Ban Treaty, PTBT)

1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities ofStates in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies(Outer Space Treaty)

1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weaponsin Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty ofTlatelolco)

1968 Treaty on the Non-proliferation of NuclearWeapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT)

1971 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacementof Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of MassDestruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floorand in the Subsoil thereof (Seabed Treaty)

1972 Convention on the Prohibition of theDevelopment, Production and Stockpiling ofBacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weaponsand on their Destruction (Biological and ToxinWeapons Convention, BTWC)

1974 Treaty on the Limitation of UndergroundNuclear Weapon Tests (Threshold Test BanTreaty, TTBT)

1976 Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions forPeaceful Purposes (Peaceful Nuclear ExplosionsTreaty, PNET)

1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military orAny Other Hostile Use of EnvironmentalModification Techniques (Enmod Convention)

1977 Protocol I Additional to the 1949 GenevaConventions, and Relating to the Protection ofVictims of International Armed Conflicts

1977 Protocol II Additional to the 1949 GenevaConventions, and Relating to the Protection ofVictims of Non-International Armed Conflicts

1980 Convention on the Physical Protection ofNuclear Material

1981 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions onthe Use of Certain Conventional Weapons whichmay be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or tohave Indiscriminate Effects (CCW Convention, or‘Inhumane Weapons’ Convention)

1985 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty(Treaty of Rarotonga)

1987 Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty)

1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces inEurope (CFE Treaty)

1991 Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation ofStrategic Offensive Arms (START I Treaty)

1992 Treaty on Open Skies

1992 The Concluding Act of the Negotiation onPersonnel Strength of Conventional ArmedForces in Europe (CFE-1A Agreement)

1993 Convention on the Prohibition of theDevelopment, Production, Stockpiling and Use ofChemical Weapons and on their Destruction(Chemical Weapons Convention, CWC)

1995 Treaty on the Southeast Asia NuclearWeapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok)

1996 Agreement on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Bosnia and Herzegovina

1996 Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control(Florence Agreement)

1997 Inter-American Convention against the IllicitManufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms,Ammunition, Explosives, and Other RelatedMaterials

1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction(APM Convention)

1999 Vienna Document 1999 on Confidence- andSecurity-Building Measures

2001 Concluding Document of the Negotiationsunder Article V of Annex 1-B of the 1995 GeneralFramework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia andHerzegovina

Agreements not in force as of June 2002

1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic MissileSystems (ABM Treaty), (in force until13 June 2002)

1993 Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation ofStrategic Offensive Arms (START II Treaty)

1996 African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty(Treaty of Pelindaba)

1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty(CTBT)

1999 Inter-American Convention on Transparency inConventional Weapons Acquisitions

2002 Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions

Acronyms

ABM anti-ballistic missile

APM anti-personnel mines

BMD ballistic missile defence

BTWC Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

BW biological weapon

CCW Certain Conventional Weapons (Convention), also called the ‘Inhumane Weapons’ Convention

CFE (Treaty on) Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

CIS Commonwealth of Independent States

CSBM confidence- and security-building measure

CTBT Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty

CW chemical weapon

CWC Chemical Weapons Convention

ECOWAS Economic Community of West AfricanStates

ESDP European Security and Defence Policy

EU European Union

FY fiscal year

GDP gross domestic product

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

ICOC International Code of Conduct

INF intermediate-range nuclear forces

MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty

NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group

OAU Organization of African Unity

OECD Organisation for EconomicCo-operation and Development

OPCW Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

OSCE Organization for Security andCo-operation in Europe

PNI Presidential Nuclear Initiative

PTBT Partial Test Ban Treaty

QDR Quadrennial Defense Review

START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

UN United Nations

WEU Western European Union

Governing Board

Ambassador Rolf Ekéus, Chairman (Sweden)

Dr Catherine Kelleher, Vice-Chairman (USA)

Dr Alexei G. Arbatov (Russia)

Dr Willem F. van Eekelen (Netherlands)

Dr Nabil Elaraby (Egypt)

Sir Marrack Goulding (UK)

Professor Helga Haftendorn (Germany)

Professor Ronald G. Sutherland (Canada)

The Director

Director

Alyson J. K. Bailes (UK)

Ingeniörskopia, Solna, 2002