the stratton roundtable

The Stratton Roundtable

Looking Back, Looking Forward:

Friday, May 1, 1998Hay-Adams HotelWashington, D.C.

Organized by:

Center for the Study of Marine PolicyNational Ocean Service, NOAAOcean Governance Study Group

Lessons from the 1969 Commissionon Marine Science, Engineering,

and Resources

Proceedings

The funding support of the National Ocean Serivce, NOAA which made this Roundtable possible is gratefulyacknowledged. Thanks are due also to the Delaware Sea Grant College Program and the Graduate College ofMarine Sudies, University of Delaware for their support of the Roundtable reception.

The Stratton Roundtable is a part of the National Dialougues on ocean and coastal policxy initiated by theNational Ocean Service of NoAA, The Roundtable has been organized as a collaborative effort of the Centerfor the Study of Marine Policy, University of Delaware; the National Ocean Service, NOAa; and the OceanGovernance Study Group. Many thanks are due to the flooloinw individuals for their assistance in the planningand conduct of the Roundtable. National Ocean Service, NOAA: Nancy Foster, Daniel J. Basta, TedLillestolen, Daniel R. G. Farrow, Robert Kifer, Michael Henderson, James Truesdale, Alison Hammer, ThomasF. La Pointe, John Paul Tolson, and J. Brian Johnson. Ocean Governance Study Group: Steering CommitteeMembers Biliana Cicin-Sain, Robert W. Knecht, Jack ARcher, David Caron, Richard Delaney, M. CaseyJarman, Harry N. Scheiber, and Jon M. Van Dyke. Center for the Study of Marine Policy, Graduate College ofMarine Studies, University of Delaware: Dean Carolyn A. Thoroughgood, Catherine Johnston, RosemarieHinkel, Jorge A. Gutierrez, Nigel Bradly and Kathy Thoroughgood.

Acknowledgments

Editors’ Note

The views expressed in the contributions making up this volume are those of the authors and not neces-sarily those of the organizers (the National Ocean Serivce, NOAA, the Center for the Study of MarinePolicy and the Ocean Governance Study Group).

Note on the report cover: The names of Stratton Commission members shown on the front cover are notedon the inside of the back cover.

Cover design: Denise-Pilar Yver

THE STRATTON ROUNDTABLE

Looking Back, Looking ForwardLessons from the 1969 Commission

on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources (1969)

Proceedings

Edited by Robert W. Knecht*, Biliana Cicin-Sain* and Nancy Foster ***Center for the Study of Marine Policy, University of Delaware

**National Ocean Service, NOAA

Organized by the Center for the Study of Marine Policy, the National OceanSerivce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the Ocean

Governance Study Group, with funding support from theNational Ocean Service, NOAA, and the Delaware Sea Grant College Program

1998

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

² Executive Summary i

² Roundtable Program v

² Setting the Stage: Then and Now 1 Robert W. Knecht*, Biliana Cicin-Sain* and Nancy Foster**

*Professors and Co-Directors, Center for the Study of Marine Policy, University of Delaware**Director, National Ocean Service, NOAA

² Background on the Stratton Commission 3 Rosemarie Hinkel

University of Delaware

² The Origins of the Stratton Commission 9John A. KnaussChair, Panel on Environmental Monitoring and on Management

and Development of the Coastal Zone, Stratton Comission, and former NOAA Administrator

² Creating the Stratton Commsission - A Reprise 13Edward Wenk, Jr.

Director, Marine Sciences Council

² Timing and the Work of the Stratton Commission 25Samuel A. Lawrence Staff Director, Stratton Commission

² Issues for a New Ocean Policy Commission: The Changing 29Regime of the High Seas Lewis M. AlexanderDeputy Staff Director, Stratton Commission

² The Stratton Commission: A Historical Perspective on Policy 31Studies in Ocean Governance, 1969 and 1998 Harry N. ScheiberStefan Riesenfeld Professor of Law and HistoryBoalt Hall School of Law, University of California, Berkeley

Page

² The Great Ocean Commissions: Cornerstones for Rejuvenating 39Marine Science and PolicyMary Hope KatsourosH. John Heinz III Center for Science, Economics and the Environment

² The Stratton Commission and Future Development 41 of US Management Policy for Its EEZRoger E. McManus President, Center for Marine Conservation

² The Need to Re-Consider U.S. Coastal Policy 47Jack H. Archer and Richard DelaneyUniversity of Massachusetts

² Our Ocean Future (Executive Summary) 49 Presented by Charles A. Bookman John H. Heinz III Center for Science, Economics and the Environment

² The “Ocean Community” Then and Now 53 Jack BotzumNautilus Press

² Ocean and Coastal Trends, 1969-1998 55Daniel J. Basta et al.National Ocean Service, NOAA

² Appendices

1. The Marine Resources and Engineering Development Act of 1966 63

2. Comparison of Congressional Oceans Act Bills 71

3. Description of Dialogues on National Ocean Policy 77

4. Flow Chart on Dialogues on National Ocean Policy 81

5. Draft Announcement of Workshop on “The Present Context 85 of National Ocean Policy and Future Trends” (Fall 1998)

6. Information on the Ocean Governance Study Group 91

7. Biographical Information on Roundtable Participants 97

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Background

On May 1, 1998, members and staff of the StrattonCommission, whose work in 1969 led to the foundingof NOAA, enactment of the 1972 Coastal ZoneManagement Act, and other important advances inocean and coastal management, met with today’socean and coastal leaders. They discussed theestablishment and accomplishments of the 1960scommission, current proposals for a new oceancommission, changed conditions, and lessonslearned. This is a synopsis of that meeting.

Thirty Years Ago

Impelled by national concern for U.S. leadership inscience and education, and growing worries about thecondition of valuable coastal areas and livingresources, a congressionally mandated, presidentially appointed commission assessed the nation’s stake inthe oceans and recommended ocean and coastalpolicy for the United States. The commission setpriorities for federal ocean activities that continue toguide this nation. Many of the issues that wereaddressed 30 years ago remain with us today,although the environmental and managementcontexts have changed in dramatic ways.

Today’s Influences and Concerns

A new environmental awareness in thenationindeed, in much of the worldnowinfluences virtually all aspects of governmentalpolicy. Secure energy supplies have an importantplace on the geopolitical agenda. Advances in

international law have extended the jurisdictions ofcoastal nations 200 miles offshore for purposes ofmanaging resources. More generally, a remarkableframework of international agreements isincreasingly governing international commerce aswell as environmental management.

A New Ocean Commission - An Opportunity for the Nation

Against this backdrop, the U.S. Congress isconsidering the establishment of a new commissionon the oceans, to once again assess what is at stake and to recommend actions that will rejuvenate thenation’s ocean and coastal policies and programs, and realign them for the future. The Senate has endorsedsuch a plan, and the idea is progressing in the House of Representatives.

The Roundtable

Believing that a review of events leading up to thefirst ocean commission, its work and itsaccomplishments would inform and enrich thepresent debate, the National Oceanic andAtmospheric Administration, in partnership with theUniversity of Delaware and the Ocean GovernanceStudy Group, organized a roundtable bringingtogether the principals involved in the firstcommission and today’s leaders, who are developingthe proposal for a new national commission. On May1 1998, 36 leaders from federal and stategovernments, industry, environmental organizationsand academia met to (1) discuss lessons learned fromthe process of organizing and implementing the firstocean commission; (2) discuss the 1998 proposalsand policy context and how they differ from those ofthe 1960s; and (3) make recommendationsconcerning the scope and implementation of a newocean commission.

Summary

Lessons from the First Ocean Commission(1969)

In the late ‘50s and early ‘60s, studies and reports on the oceans, in combination with concerns about

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THE STRATTON ROUNDTABLEMay 1, 1998. Washington, D.C.

The 1969 Oceans Commission Led to:

♦ 1972 Coastal Zone Management Act

♦ U.S. National Oceanic and AtmosphericAdministration

♦ International Decade of OceanExploration

science competitiveness launched by the space race(and the associated soul searching), created politicalmomentum and a propitious climate to explore oceanissues at the federal level.

Political champions are important. Interested andcommitted congressional leaders and staff pushed theoceans cause because of their personal enthusiasm,and not necessarily in response to a groundswell ofpublic opinion or at the behest of constituents. Seniorofficials in the Executive Branch of government alsodevoted time and energy to ocean issues. This interestgave the Commission momentum. Its recommen-dations were widely anticipated.

Careful selection of commission members andstaff is crucial. Those close to the processemphasized the central importance of the selection ofcommission members. The quality of the members’varied backgrounds and expertise, and especially the

exceptional talent of the commission chairman andthe dedicated staff, were largely responsible for thecommission’s success.

Adequate time and resources are necessary. Thirty months elapsed between the approval of thelegislation for the commission and the commission’spresentation of a final report. Participants weredoubtful that the work could have been completed any sooner.

The commission should not be constrained by thepolitical process. A commission to study long-termaspects of the issues and a Marine Sciences Council in the Executive Office of the President to coordinateday-to-day issues were established simultaneously asthe result of a political compromise. Nevertheless,the council helped facilitate the commission’s workwithout inhibiting or constraining it. Whether thiswould be the case in the current context is uncertain.

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Stratton Commission Roundtable Attendees

Members and Staff of the Stratton Commissionand Marine Sciences Council (1969)

Lewis Alexander, University of Rhode IslandJohn A. Knauss, University of Rhode IslandSamuel A. Lawrence, University of MarylandEdward Wenk, Jr., University of WashingtonRobert M. White, Washington Advisory Group

Roundtable Participants

Jack H. Archer, University of MassachusettsStephanie Bailenson, Senate CommerceCommitteeJames Baker, NOAADaniel J. Basta, National Ocean Service, NOAACharles A. Bookman,The Heinz CenterJohn R. Botzum, Nautilus Press, Inc.Biliana Cicin-Sain, University of DelawareWarner Chabot, Center for Marine Conservation,Monterey, CAPenny Dalton, Senate Subcommittee on Fisheriesand OceansRichard Delaney, University of Massachusetts,Boston

Sylvia Earle, SeaWebTim Eichenberg, Center for Marine ConservationNancy Foster, National Ocean Service, NOAASusan Garbini, National Research CouncilLinda Glover, United States NavyMary Hope Katsouros, The Heinz CenterThomas Kitsos, Department of InteriorRobert W. Knecht, University of DelawareAnthony MacDonald, Coastal States OrganizationChristopher G. Mann, House Committee onResourcesRoger McManus, Center for Marine ConservationBarbara Jean Polo, American Oceans CampaignJohn Rayfield, House Subcommittee on Fisheries,Wildlife and OceansJackie Savitz, Coast AllianceDaniel Sayre, Island PressHarry Scheiber, University of California, BerkeleyRobert Stewart, National Ocean IndustriesAssociationCarolyn A. Thoroughgood, University of DelawareJohn Twiss, Marine Mammal CommissionEli Weissman, Office of U.S Representative FrankPallone, Jr. (NJ)Stanley Wilson, NOAA

Timing of the final report is a factor. The timing ofthe commission’s report was important. Thecommision was faced with the choice of delivering itsreport to a “lame-duck” President who had supportedits work, or waiting to share it with his successor,perhaps of a different political party and perhaps lesssupportive. Either choice presented politicaldifficulties, which were especially thorny due toseveral recommended changes in governmentalorganization. In the end, implementation of the reportfell to the new Administration (and to the Congress)with the Commission scoring successes with some,although not all, of its recommendations.

The Policy Context Then and Now

Following a decade of studies and congressionalhearings, both the Congress and Administration wereready to accept forward-looking ideas concerning theoceans. Though no immediate crisis faced the nation,the perceived “science-math gap” with the SovietUnion, along with the space race, fueled interest inexploring and developing the oceans and theirresources.

Americans’ view of marine issues has changed. Inthe 1960s, marine resources were viewed asessentially infinite, and efforts were made to expandtheir use and accelerate development to grow theeconomy. Marine resources are now understood to befinite, even fragile. The interconnectedness of allresources on or near the coast, and even far upstream,has become apparent.

Growth in population and trade raise new issues.Nowadays, the global reach of economies sparksconcern for national competitiveness in theinternational arena. Moreover, among the mostprofound changes has been the encroachment ofhumanity on the seas. The increase in coastalpopulations stresses coastal and marineenvironments. A hopeful trend, however, is people’sgrowing understanding of the resources, in part as aresult of sustained research.

The approach to managing marine resources ischanging. The traditional playersfederal and stategovernmentshave been joined by regional andlocal governments as well as by industry and theenvironmental community. The States, especially, are

assuming larger roles. In today’s world, solutions andinnovations may be devised and used by allstakeholders, including multiple levels ofgovernment and the private and nonprofit sectors. Inthe future, management programs will increasinglyrecognize the limits of the federal budget, theconstraints on states, and the power for change thatcan be achieved through market forces.

The issues today are no less pressing. While thesituation today is markedly different from that of 30years ago, national ocean policy issues are no lesspressing. What kind of governance regime isappropriate for our 200-mile-wide, rich and extensive Exclusive Economic Zone? What approaches offerthe greatest promise of restoring important fisheries?What policies are needed to improve the managementof shorelines? Of coastal watersheds? Of ports? Ofthe nation’s offshore energy and mineral resources?What investments are necessary to continue thebenefits to society from advances in ocean sciences?These issues, and others like them, could be usefullyaddressed in a structured review of current U.S. ocean and coastal policies.

Findings and Questions Concerning a New Ocean Commission

The following findings and questions for a newnational ocean and coastal policy review have beengleaned from the papers, presentations anddiscussions at the roundtable:

• The commission needs a broad mandate, andshould be independent

• The quality of the membership of the StrattonCommission had much to do with itseffectiveness. Will the commission appointmentprocess set out in the recently mandated OceansAct result in top-caliber participants in thecommission?

• The Stratton Commission chose not to addresspolicy issues related to national security andmarine transportation. If these topics areincorporated into the slate of ocean and coastalissues, how will they affect a new commission?

• A mechanism or set of arrangements is needed that will encourage and facilitate federal agencies to

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support the work of the commission withoutinhibiting or constraining it.

• It will be very important to obtain and maintain theinterest and support of the White House and theCongress, and to energize the public during theCommission’s tenure. Once the commission issuesits report, it will be especially important to makesure that its work remains on the agenda, and that itsrecommendations are given serious attention inboth the Executive Branch and Congress.

• The commission will need to undertake acomprehensive analysis of federal ocean programs,e.g., relevant trends, performance indicators, andorganizational issues.

Continuing and Building the National Dialogue

What is the National Dialogue? The StrattonRoundtable was one of several 1998 “Year of theOcean” events to focus national attention on the needto address U.S. ocean policies and programs in thenext century.

As a critical element of its mission to enhancecoastal stewardship, NOAA’s National OceanService plans to provide opportunities for an ongoing“National Dialogue” concerning ocean and coastalpolicy. NOAA, together with its fellow stewards,seeks to explore all of the issues with all interestedparties. A national dialogue can characterize theissues and trends, and can engage the interestedpublic in discussions concerning their perceptions ofpriorities and approaches to solutions.

Milestones toward a National Dialogue on Oceanand Coastal Policy. Recent milestones include theYear of the Ocean Discussion Papers, federal oceanagencies report, February 1998; Our Ocean Future,report of The Heinz Center, May 1998; the StrattonRoundtable, Washington, DC, May 1998; and theNational Oceans Conference, Monterey, CA, June1998.

Upcoming National Meetings. Two upcomingmeetings will address major environmental,economic and other trends that have shaped oceansand coasts activities and policies over the pastgeneration, and that are forecast to do so in the future.

The meetings will be held in Washington, DC inSeptember 1998, and Berkeley, CA in October 1998.For information, contact R.W. Knecht or B. Cicin-Sain, phone (302) 831-8086; fax (302) 831-3668.

NOAA invites you to co-host a National Dialogueworkshop. Beginning in the fall of 1998, NOAAplans to pursue the National Dialogue in a structuredworkshop format, and is actively seeking partners toengage in the process. To co-host a national dialogueworkshop with NOAA, contact Dr. Nancy Foster,National Ocean Service, 1305 East West Hwy., 13thFl., Silver Spring, MD 20910; phone (301) 713-3074,ext. 154; fax (301) 713-4269.

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Check out NOAA’sState of the Coast Report

http:/state-of-coast.noaa.gov

NOAA’s State of the Coast Report,an interactive Web site on coastalissues, is an important supportingelement of the National Dialogue. Itprovides a powerful capability toshare the latest information on coastaland ocean trends. The on-line reportalso will be used to post results fromnational dialogue meetings, and tocontinue discussions using interactive information technology.

THE STRATTON ROUNDTABLEDrawing Lessons from the Work of the Commission

on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources (1969)

Friday, May 1, 1998Hay-Adams Hotel. Washington, D.C.

Organized by the Center for the Study of Marine Policy, the National Ocean Service, NOAA and the Ocean Governance Study Group,

in collaboration with other governmental and non-governmental partners

ROUNDTABLE PURPOSE

The Roundtable will focus on the lessons learned in the Stratton Commission’s review of national ocean policywhich was conducted between 1966 and 1969—the last time a comprehensive examination of ocean and coastalactivities and policy took place. Former members of the Commission and its staff and other invitees will review andassess the way in which the Commission conducted its work and the outcomes achieved with a view toward providing recommendations for the (expected) new ocean policy commission and for other efforts at national ocean policyassessment.

To promote informal discussion, the Roundtable will involve only about 20 participants. To facilitate thedissemination of the “lessons learned” from the Roundtable, two products will be prepared: 1) a compendium of short papers reflecting the perspectives of Commission participants, staff, and observers, and 2) a short video based oninterviews with the former members and staff of the Stratton Commission.

ROUNDTABLE AGENDA

8:45

q Coffee in the John Hay Room.

9:00-9:10

q Welcome and introductions. Background and goals of the meeting Robert W. Knecht, University of Delaware

9:10-9:15

q Welcome on behalf of NOAA Sally J. Yozell, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oceans and Atmosphere

9:15-10:30

q The Stratton Commission: Its Work, Outcomes, and Significance: General Reflections of the Participants Moderator, Biliana Cicin-Sain, Ocean Governance Study Group

q Participants in the Stratton Commission ProcessJohn A. Knauss, Chair, Panel on Environmental Monitoring and on Management andDevelopment of the Coastal Zone

Robert M. White, Chair, Panel on Marine Science Edward Wenk, Jr., Director, Marine Sciences CouncilSamuel A. Lawrence, Stratton Commission Staff DirectorLewis M. Alexander, Stratton Commission Deputy Staff Director

10:30-10:45

q Coffee break

10:45-11:15

q A Historical Analysis of the Role, Function, and Impact of the Stratton CommissionHarry Scheiber, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law

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11:15-11:30

q The Stratton Commission: Then and Now Mary Hope Katsouros, Heinz Center

11:30-12:00

q Comments and Discussion by Roundtable Participants

12:00-1:00

q Luncheon, John Hay Room

1:00-2:00

q The Stratton Commission: What Worked Well, What Worked Less Well?

General discussion

Moderator: Thomas R. Kitsos, Minerals Management

Service, formerly with Merchant Marine and Fisheries

Committee

• Preparatory work (if any)

• Appointments to the Commission

• Staffing

• Issue selection

• Panel structure

• Field hearings

• “Lessons” that can be applied to a new commission

2:00-2:30

q The Changed Context of the Late 1990s: Forces that Have Affected and Will Affect National Ocean Policy Moderator: Jack H. Archer, University of Massachusetts

2:30-2:45

q Ocean Policy Issues Today: Outcomes of the 1998Heinz Center WorkshopsCharles A. Bookman, Heinz Center

2:45-3:15

q The Vision for the Oceans Act of 1998 Moderator Nancy Foster, Director, National OceanService, NOAA

Penny Dalton, Senate Commerce Committee John Rayfield, House Resources CommitteeChris Mann, House Resources CommitteeAnd other staff members of the relevant committees

Comments:Robert Stewart, National Ocean Industries AssociationRoger McManus, Center for Marine ConservationAnthony McDonald, Coastal States Organization Jack Botzum, Nautilus Press

3:15-3:30

q Coffee break

3:30-4:30

q Recommendations for a new National Ocean PolicyCommissionModerator: Richard Delaney, Urban Harbors Institute

Dr. Knauss, Dr. White, Dr. Wenk, Dr. Alexander and Dr. LawrenceComments by other Roundtable Participants

Some questions for discussion:·ð Are there some types of preparatory work that could

help a new commission get off to a quicker start?·

ð How can a commission benefit from access to theresources of the federal government and still conduct an independent assessment?

ð Is some kind of a federal (or national) ocean policycouncil needed to work with the commission or should this await the commission’s recommendations?

ð At what stage is public reaction to a commission’s work most helpful—at the early formative (input) stage or later when the commission’s thinking becomes moreconcrete?

4:45-5:00

q Concluding Comments by Roundtable ParticipantsModerator, Robert W. Knecht, University of Delaware

5:00

q Social Hour, Federal Suite(hosted by Dean Carolyn A. Thoroughgood, Graduate College of Marine Studies and Director, Delaware Sea Grant College Program)

5:00-6:00

q Personal video interviews of Stratton Commissionparticipants and analysts (organized by Dan Basta, NOAA/NOS)

vi

SETTING THE STAGE: THEN AND NOW

² Robert W. Knecht*, Biliana Cicin-Sain* and Nancy Foster** ²

*Center for the Study of Marine Policy, University of Delaware** National Ocean Service, NOAA

The United States has the largest and probablyrichest 200-mile ocean zone (formally the ExclusiveEconomic Zone) of any nation in the world. Greatfisheries lie off New England, the Pacific Northwestand Alaska, and in the Gulf of Mexico; large offshoreoil and gas deposits exist in the Gulf and off Californiaand Alaska; stunningly beautiful beaches linevirtually all of our shores. And, 95% of the trade thatkeeps our nation prosperous is carried on those oceansthrough great ports like New York-New Jersey, LosAngeles-Long Beach and Houston and New Orleans.

Yet, for the most part, we have not done well by ouroceans. We have used them as sewers only stoppingthe practice when the consequences becameintolerable. We have seen many of our fish stocks fallto disastrously low levels both because too many ofus want to fish and because we carelessly destroy thecoastal habitats upon which these valuable resourcesdepend. And, we have seen the national program toexplore and develop offshore hydrocarbon depositsreach virtual stalemate in many regions of the countrydue to intergovernmental conflicts over policy andpractice.

But there are some bright spots. Thirty-two yearsago, the Congress enacted legislation that focusedunprecedented attention on our coasts and oceans andled to the establishment of both a vice president-ledMarine Sciences Council and the blue ribbon StrattonCommission and led to the seminal report of thatcommission in 1969 - Our Nation and the Sea. Thismeeting was prompted by the fact that similarlegislation is pending in Congress today and again itoffers the prospect of focusing high level attention onthe oceans and their value to the American people.

We have, of course, seen many changes since themid-1960s. The Stratton Commission’s good workled directly to the establishment of the nation’s oceanagency - NOAA - and to the enactment of innovative

coastal zone management legislation. In addition, thedecade following the Stratton Commission’s reportsaw a great many new ocean and coastal programsenacted into law - programs dealing with marinemammals, ports and harbors, water quality, marinesanctuaries, ocean dumping, fisheries, offshore oiland gas, and on and on. And, a substantial increase inthe interest and capacity of the coastal states andterritories to deal with coastal and, increasingly, oceanissues was stimulated by this spate of oceanlegislation.

The latter half of the 30-year period since Strattonhas seen a corresponding burst of activity at the globallevel. Growing concern, especially in scientificcircles, about two emerging problems - the prospectthat mankind’s activities were beginning to change theworld’s climate and, as well, dangerously acceleratethe loss of species and biological diversity, coupledwith the realization that many of our societies wereliving unsustainably, led to another seminal event - theUnited Nations Conference on Environment andDevelopment (the Earth Summit) held in Rio deJaneiro in 1992. Like the decade of the 1970sdomestically, the decade of the 1990s has seeninternational agreements on climate change andbiodiversity, it has seen a comprehensive Law of theSea Convention finally enter into force, and it has seensubstantial international programs developed that dealwith integrated coastal management, land-basedsources of marine pollution, and with the protectionand sustainable use of coral reefs.

1998 is a far different time than 1968. The issuesof Sputnik and the science-math gap with the USSRwhich catalized the earlier inquiry have been replacedby issues of international competitiveness,globalization of world trade, north-south relations,climate change, and loss of biodiversity. But theoceans are related to these new issues as they were tothe older ones. How we organize to deal with them


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and the national goals and policies that we set remainof critical importance to the nation.

The “Year of the Ocean” offers a splendid platformfor beginning the new review. The set of issue papersproduced by federal agencies, the Heinz Centerprocess, and the National Ocean Conference all helpset the stage.

The present meeting - the Stratton Roundtable - andthe follow-on dialogues that are planned for the falland beyond, are the result of collaboration between ascholarly group concerned, since its establishment in1991, with improved ocean governance - the OceanGovernance Study Group, an academic institutionlong involved with ocean policy in the United Statesand close enough to try to do something about it - theCenter for the Study of Marine Policy, GraduateCollege of Marine Studies, University of Delaware,and a government agency interested in enhancing itseffectiveness as a coastal and ocean steward -theNational Ocean Service of NOAA. Of course, wehope that these activities will also contribute to the“Year of the Ocean” and to setting the stage.

What remains, of course, is for a good Oceans Actto be passed and a well-qualified, well-supported, andwell-led ocean policy commission to be put in place.We look forward to that development.

Organization of this Volume

The Stratton Roundtable, convened on May 1, 1998,is the first of a series of Dialogues in National OceanPolicy to be held in 1998-1999 on important nationalocean policy issues. The Roundtable brings togethera number of former members of the StrattonCommission and its staff, as well as participants fromthe Congress, Administration, state governments,industry, environmental interests, and academia todiscuss what lessons can be learned from the StrattonCommission which may be applicable to a futureocean policy commission.

In this volume may be found, first, a series ofreflections on the work of the Stratton Commissionand its significance, followed by a number ofcontributions which analyze current challenges inocean policy, describe changes which have takenplace since the 1960s, and highlight future trendswhich will affect ocean policy in the next century.Various appendices describe the current ocean policybills, the process of conducting the Dialogues onNational Ocean Policy, as well as future dialogues onocean policy changes and future trends, and provideinformation on Roundtable participants and on theOcean Governance Study Group.


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BACKGROUND ON THE STRATTON COMMISSION

² Rosemarie Hinkel ²

Center for the Study of Marine PolicyGraduate College of Marine Science

University of Delaware

Introduction

The United Nations has designated 1998 as theInternational Year of the Ocean, focusing attention on ocean governance worldwide. In the United States,several initiatives in the realm of ocean governanceare being considered by Congress. Three similarbills, S.1213, H.R. 2547, and H.R. 3445 have beenintroduced as “Oceans Acts.” S.1213 has passed inthe Senate, while H.R. 2547 and H.R. 3445 arepending in the House. The purpose of the Acts is todevelop a coordinated and comprehensive ocean andcoastal policy for the nation. One of the salientsimilarities of these bills is that each one calls for thecreation of a Commission on Ocean Policy.

The Commission is to report to the President andthe Congress on a comprehensive national ocean andcoastal policy. The Commission would undertake the following activities as a means of developing thefindings and recommendations of its report:

1. review and suggest any necessary modificationto United States laws, regulations, and practicesnecessary to define and implement such policy,consistent with the obligations of the United Statesunder international law;

2. assess the condition and adequacy of investmentin existing and planned facilities and equipmentassociated with ocean and coastal activitiesincluding human resources, vessels, computers,satellites, and other appropriate technologies andplatforms;

3. review existing and planned ocean and coastalactivities of Federal agencies and departments,assess the contribution of such activities todevelopment of an integrated long-range program

for oceanography, ocean and coastal resourcemanagement, and protection of the marineenvironment, and identify any such activities inneed of reform to improve efficiency andeffectiveness;

4. examine and suggest mechanisms to address theinterrelationships among ocean and coastalactivities, the legal and regulatory framework inwhich they occur, and their interconnected andcumulative effects on the marine environment, andidentify any such activities in need of reform toimprove efficiency and effectiveness;

5. review the known and anticipated demands forocean and coastal resources, including andexamination of opportunities and limitations withrespect to the use of ocean and coastal resourceswithin the exclusive economic zone, projectedimpacts in coastal areas, and the adequacy ofexisting efforts to manage such use and minimizeuser conflicts;

6. evaluate relationships among Federal, State, andlocal governments and the private sector forplanning and carrying out ocean and coastalactivities and address the most appropriate divisionof responsibility for such activities;

7. identify new opportunities for the developmentof or investment in new products, technologies, ormarkets that could contribute to the objectives of[the Oceans] Act;

8. consider the relationship of the ocean and coastalpolicy of the United States to the United NationsConvention on the Law of the Sea and otherinternational agreements, and actions available to

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the United States to effect collaboration betweenthe United States and other nations, including thedevelopment of cooperative international programs for oceanography, protection of the marineenvironment, and ocean and coastal resourcemanagement; and

9. engage in any other preparatory work deemednecessary to carry out the duties of the Commission(S.1213).

The Oceans Act provides a significant opportunity toanalyze and enhance national ocean and coastal policy.Given the central role a Commission on Ocean Policywill play in this reexamination, it seems fitting toreview the work and accomplishments of the first suchcommission, the Commission on Marine Science,Engineering, and Resources, the so-called StrattonCommission. The work of the Stratton Commission,which was completed in 1969, was the firstcomprehensive examination of U.S. ocean policy everconducted. This paper will review historical factorscontributing to the creation of the StrattonCommission, the purpose of the Commission,appointments to the Commission, issue selection andpanel structure, the work of the Commission, andproducts and outcomes of the Commission.

Historical Factors Leading to the Creation of the Stratton Commission

The historical spark that catalyzed the chain ofevents culminating in the creation of the StrattonCommission occurred on October 4, 1957 when theSoviet Union successfully launched “Sputnik” intospace. This development left the United Statesstruggling to understand why its own space programlagged behind the Soviets as well as scrambling tofind a frontier on which to compete with the Soviets.U.S. science and math education received a great dealof scrutiny and much of the blame for the trouble with the space program. In March, 1959, PresidentEisenhower established the Federal Council forScience and Technology (FCST) with ExecutiveOrder 10807. The Council was created to enhancescience and technology planning, to foster greatercooperation between federal agencies, and to advisethe President regarding federal programs that hadimpacts upon multiple federal agencies (Abel, 1981).

In 1959, the National Academy of Sciencespublished a timely report, Oceanography 1960-1970.This report delineated a set of national aims, elucidatedmethods by which to achieve these aims, and advanceda set of goals for the near future (Abel, 1981).Furthermore, the Academy’s report called for asignificant increase in federal support for marinesciences (Knecht, Cicin-Sain and Archer, 1988). TheNational Academy of Sciences Committee onOceanography (NASCO) was subsequently asked togive a special briefing to the FCST. U.S. policyseemingly found its “new frontier,” and oceanographywas one of the first issue areas addressed by the FCST(Abel, 1981).

In response to the recommendations put forth by theNASCO, the FCST formally created the InteragencyCommittee on Oceanography (ICO) and incorporatedit into its structure on January 22, 1960. The ICO hasbeen identified as significant for a variety of reasons.The ICO symbolized an innovative method of federaladministration. It also presented the FCST with avehicle through which to address Congress.Furthermore, the ICO stimulated significantinteraction between academic institutions and federalagencies. The ICO was longer lived than all of itsantecedents and is generally considered to haveheralded the beginning of the U.S. “National OceanPolicy Program (Abel, 1981).”

In the mid-1960s, two Congressional initiativesregarding ocean policy were put forth. In 1965,Senator Magnuson introduced S.944, calling for theestablishment of a national oceanographic council atthe cabinet level. Also in 1965, Representative Rogersintroduced H.R.9064, calling for the creation of aNational Commission of Oceanography to examine the capacity for a top-rank national oceanographicprogram. These initiatives coalesced on May 24, 1966when the Senate and the House agreed on the MarineResources and Engineering Development Act of 1966.This Act created a cabinet-level council (NationalCouncil of Marine Resources and EngineeringDevelopment), as per the Magnuson initiative, butstipulated that it would be temporary. The Act alsoestablished a commission (Commission on MarineSciences, Engineering, and Resources (COMSER)) toguarantee continued high-level review of the oceanprogram. This unprecedented legislation (P.L.89-454)

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was signed by President Johnson on June 17, 1966(Abel, 1981).

The Mission of COMSER

The new Commission was assigned a great deal ofresponsibility. The task with which COMSER wascharged was four-fold. The Commission was:

...asked to examine the nation’s stake indevelopment, utilization, and preservation of ourmarine environment; review all current andcontemplated marine activities, and to assess theiradequacies to achieve the national goals set forth inthe act; and on the basis of its studies andassessments, to formulate a comprehensive, long-term national program for our marine affairsdesigned to meet present and future national needsin the most effective possible manner...And,finally,...to recommend a plan of governmentorganization best adapted to the support of theprogram and to indicate the expected costs(COMSER, 1969).

Appointments to the Commission

The Marine Resources and EngineeringDevelopment Act called for a Commission appointedby the President of 15 members from federal and stategovernments, industry and academia, augmented byfour congressional advisors. The business of actuallypreparing the list of nominees for COMSER fell to the Secretariat of the National Council of MarineResources and Engineering Development.Membership was to involve representatives ofindustrial applications of the sea, academicdisciplines including economics, law, foreign affairs,science, engineering, and geography (Wenk, 1972).By October, 1966, the Council had completed thenomination process and submitted its list to the WhiteHouse. After a few changes were made to the list,President Johnson approved the nominees inDecember, 1966; the appointments were announcedby the White House on January 9, 1967 (Wenk, 1972.) Dr. Julius Stratton was appointed Chairman of theCommission. A former president of theMassachusetts Institute of Technology, Dr. Strattonwas serving as the Chairman of the Board of the FordFoundation at the time of his appointment to the

Commission. Samuel Lawrence of the Office ofManagement and Budget became the Staff Directorfor the Commission, and Harold Goodwin of the SeaGrant Program served as Chief Editor of theCOMSER report (Abel, 1981). A complete list ofCommission members may be found in Appendix 1.

Issue Selection and Panel Structure

Except for the question of governmentreorganization, which the Commission chose toapproach as a committee of the whole, the StrattonCommission began its work by dividing itself intoworking panels. Designed to cover the major issuesfacing ocean management at that time, seven panelswere established. The issue areas were basic science;environmental monitoring and management, anddevelopment of the coastal zone; manpower,education, and training; industry and privateinvestment; marine engineering and technology;marine resources; and international matters. Eachpanel was comprised of an Executive Secretary andtwo to four Commissioners. Panel members may befound in Appendix 2. The panels functioned as theprincipal vehicle for evaluating the status of marineaffairs in their respective areas. The panels alsorecognized specific problems and opportunitiesrelevant to their issue areas and recommendedmeasures to be taken (COMSER, 1969).

The Work

Each panel held hearings across the country andmost panels heard testimony from more than 100witnesses representing federal and state government,research institutions and industry. Furthermore, eachpanel contacted hundreds of individuals throughcorres-pondence and interviews (COMSER, 1969).As a whole, the Commission’s fact-finding hearingsincluded more than 1,000 people. The scope and paceof the work soon exceeded the capacity of the originalstaff. The Marine Sciences Council initiallyunderwrote transfers of limited funds in order toprovide the Commission with a larger staff. SamuelLawrence managed to augment the Commission’soriginal staff beyond the extent of directcongressional appropriations by borrowingindividuals from government agencies. TheCommission’s staff eventually reached 35, triple theinitial allocation of the Budget Bureau (Wenk, 1972).

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After the hearings and interviews, the panelsconducted primary evaluations of their issue areasand developed material to be presented to the fullCommission. Contractors and consultants alsoprepared reports and materials for the considerationof the Commission. The full Commission held a totalof 19 meetings, each lasting from two to four days.After nearly two years, COMSER produced its finalreport. The four volume report, titled Our Nation andthe Sea, was published in January, 1969 (COMSER,1969; Abel, 1981).

Outcomes and Impacts

“Our Nation and the Sea” emphasized three mainissues that confronted U.S. efforts to effectivelyutilize ocean resources. The first of these was the idea of the ocean as a “new frontier” for resourcedevelopment. Second, the report recognizedemerging threats to the coastal environment fromoverexploitation and pollution. Third, and mostnoticeably, the report presented a detailed plan toreorganize Federal ocean and coastal programs.While Our Nation and the Sea made hundreds ofrecommendations, the third section of the report,“Management of the Coastal Zone,” received themost attention. In this chapter, the Commissionadvised the creation of a new, independent agency tocoordinate marine-related activities. TheCommission proposed that the new agency becomprised of the U.S. Coast Guard, theEnvironmental Science Service Administration, theBureau of Commercial Fisheries, the National SeaGrant Program, the U.S. Lake Survey, and theNational Oceanographic Data Center. Despiteopposition from several cabinet-level departments,the idea of a new ocean agency was advanced byPresident Nixon in his Reorganization Plan NumberFour. Sent to Congress in July, 1970, the planproposed the establishment of a National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Nixon’s plan differedfrom the Commission’s recommendations in threefundamental areas. First, the plan placed NOAA inthe Commerce Department, thus ignoring theCommission’s recommendation that the agency begranted independent status. Second, the Coast Guardwas not included. Third, functions centering aroundmarine technology were not conferred to the newagency (Bowen, 1981). The Stratton Commissionalso recommended the establishment of a nationalcoastal zone management program. The Federal

Coastal Zone Management Act was passed in 1972,and remains the basis of Federal and state policycoordination in the coastal zone.

Many of the factors and pressures that led to thework of the Stratton Commission are still extanttoday. Population pressure, pollution, andoverexploitation of resources are still prevalent issues in the realm of coastal management. The nationcontinues to lack an overarching National OceanPolicy. The “general disarray” of Federal oceanmanagement has been complicated by theintroduction of multiple, sectoral acts, such as theMarine Mammal Protection Act, the OuterContinental Shelf Lands Act Amendments, theMagnuson Act, and many others. The StrattonCommission was the first commission tocomprehensively review the status of U.S. oceanpolicy. In the 30 years that have passed since theStratton Commission reported on its findings, thepolitical, economic, social, and regulatory contexts inthe U.S. have changed significantly. Given theattention focused on marine issues due to theInternational Year of the Ocean a new examination ofthe status of U.S. ocean policy is both timely andappropriate.

Literature Cited

Abel, Robert. “The History of the United States Ocean Policy Program.” In Hoole, Francis, Robert Friedheim,and Timothy Hennessey, eds. Making Ocean Policy: The Politics of Government Organization and Management.1981.

Bowen, Robert. “ The Major United States FederalGovernment Marine Organization Proposals.” In Hoole,Francis, Robert Friedheim, and Timothy Hennessey,eds. Making Ocean Policy: The Politics of GovernmentOrganization and Management. 1981.

Commission on Marine Science, Engineering, andResources. Our Nation and the Sea: A Plan for NationalAction. Washington, D.C.: United States GovernmentPrinting Office, 1969.

Knecht, Robert W., Biliana Cicin-Sain, and JackArcher. “National Ocean Policy: A Window ofOpportunity.” Ocean Development and InternationalLaw (19) (1988): 113-142.

Wenk, Edward Jr. The Politics of the Oceans. Seattle,WA: University of Washington Press, 1972.

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Appendix 1

Members of the Stratton Commission

Chairman:Julius A. Stratton ChairmanThe Ford Foundation

Vice Chairman:Richard A. Geyer HeadDepartment of OceanographyTexas A&M University

David A. Adams Commissioner of FisheriesNC Department of Conservation and Development

Carl A. Auerbach Professor of LawUniversity of Minnesota

Charles F. Baird Under Secretary of the Navy

Jacob Blaustein DirectorStandard Oil Company (Indiana)

James A. Crutchfield Professor of EconomicsUniversity of Washington

Frank C. DiLuzio Assistant SecretaryWater Pollution ControlU.S. Department of the Interior

Leon Jaworski AttorneyFulbright, Crooker, Freeman, Bates and Jaworski

John A. Knauss DeanGraduate School of OceanographyUniversity of Rhode Island

John H. Perry, Jr. PresidentPerry Publications, Inc.

Taylor A. Pryor PresidentThe Oceanic Foundation

George E. Reedy PresidentStruthers Research and Development Corporation

George H. Sullivan, M.D. Consulting ScientistGeneral Electric Reentry Systems

Robert M. White AdministratorEnvironmental Science Services AdministrationU.S. Department of Commerce

Congressional Advisors:Norris Cotton U.S. Senator

Warren G. Magnuson U.S. Senator

Alton A. Lennon U.S. Representative

Charles A. Mosher U.S. Representative

Staff

Executive Director:Samuel A. Lawrence

Deputy Director:Lewis M. Alexander

Assistant Director, Organization andManagement:Clifford L. Berg

John P. AlbersWilliam S. BellarDavid S. BrowningLincoln D. CathersTimothy J. ColemanJohn J. DermodyRobertson P. DinsmoreKenneth H. Drummond

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Andrew G. Feil, Jr.Harold L. GoodwinAmor L. LaneH. Crane MillerHomes S. MooreSheila A. MulvihillMerlyn E. NattoLeon S. PocinkiStuart A. RossCarl E. RudigerWilliam J. RuheCarleton Rutledge, Jr.Robert J. ShephardR. Lawrence Snideman II

Supporting Staff:William L. BanksMargaret R. BickfordLois A. BrooksJosephine V. HaleyLouise A. JonesLinda J. KueblerHelen I. MehlJean H. PetersonEmily G. Reeves Joanne M. Schirk

Appendix 2

Membership of the Commission’s WorkingPanels

Panel on Basic ScienceRobert M. White, ChairmanJohn A. Knauss

Panel on Environmental Monitoring and onManagement and Development of the CoastalZone

John A. Knauss, ChairmanFrank C. DiLuzioLeon JaworskiRobert M. White

Panel on Manpower, Education, and TrainingJulius A. Stratton, ChairmanRichard A. Geyer David A. Adams

Panel on Industry and Private Investment Richard A. Geyer, Chairman Charles F. Baird

Taylor A. PryorGeorge H. Sullivan

Panel on Marine Engineering and TechnologyJohn H. Perry, Jr., ChairmanCharles F. Baird

Taylor A. PryorGeorge H. Sullivan

Panel on Marine ResourcesJames A. Crutchfield, ChairmanDavid A. Adams

International PanelCarl A. Auerbach, ChairmanJacob BlausteinLeon Jaworski

8


THE ORIGINS OF THE STRATTON COMMISSION

² John A. Knauss ²

Chair, Panel on Environmental Monitoring and on Management and Development of the Coastal Zone, Stratton Comission, and former NOAA Administrator

The Stratton Commission report of January, 1969was the culmination of an effort that began almostexactly ten years earlier with the February, 1959publication of the NASCO report, Oceanography1960-1970. NASCO was the 10 member NationalAcademy of Science’s Committee on Oceanography,chaired by the Cal Tech geochemist Harrison Brownwhose members included Maurice Ewing, ColumbusIselin and Roger Revelle, the directors of the threemajor oceanographic institutions, Lamont, WoodsHole and Scripps.

The timing was propitious. NASCO was formed inNovember, 1957, one month after the launch of thefirst Russian satellite, which served as a wake-up callfor the need for a more aggressive US science policyand the needs of US science. President Eisenhowerestablished the position of President’s ScienceAdviser and appointed MIT president, James R.Killian to the post. The NSF budget doubled in twoyears.

However, even in propitious times Academy reportscan gather dust. Harrison Brown and his colleagues,presumably with the blessing of NAS presidentDetlev Bronk, took its report to Congress. They werewell received. Members of Congress and their staffswere flown by the Navy to Lubec, Maine for theannual summer meeting of NASCO at the welcominghome of its most astute political member, SumnerPike, a banker and former member of the AtomicEnergy Commission.

Ed Wenk, whose book The Politics of the Oceancovers this period, describes in some detail the effectof the NASCO report. Regular calls were made onCapitol Hill by Brown and other NASCO members.Hearings were held and resolutions on the importanceof oceanography were passed with near unanimity.Next came legislation. One authorized the Coast andGeodetic Survey to conduct activities beyond the

narrow coastal area it had been limited to for the firstcentury of its existence. Another gave the Coast Guardexplicit authority to conduct oceanographic research.

And in due time both the House and the Senate tookup the question of how the Administration wasorganized to meet the challenges of the NASCOreport. Whether in response to NASCO, or as part ofthe general upgrading of science after Sputnik, theEisenhower Administration had taken its informal,but effective, Coordinating Committee onOceanography and renamed it the IntergovernmentalCommittee on Oceanography (ICO), upgraded thelevel of the membership, and formalized its statusunder the new (Sputnik generated) Federal Councilfor Science and Technology (FCST). Membershipwas now at the level of the heads of the Bureau ofCommercial Fisheries and the Coast and GeodeticSurvey and Assistant Secretary of Navy for R and D.Effective as the new ICO might be, it did not satisfythe new ocean buffs in Congress.

However, Congress had difficulty at first indeciding what they did want, and the Administration(Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson), as might beexpected, was not enthusiastic about Congress tellingit how to organize itself. After some false starts, theSenate led by Washington’s Warren Magnuson, chairof the Commerce Committee, decided what wasneeded was a high level Council consisting of theSecretaries and heads of those departments andindependent agencies with significant oceanresponsibilities. The House (in part, at least, becauseof concern that the Administration might veto such abill because it told the Administration how it shouldget its act together) pushed for an independentcommission to review the situation and report back tothe President and Congress.

Neither was prepared to give, and in due time, ofcourse, we got both. In June of 1966 Congress passed,


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and President Johnson signed, PL 89-54, the MarineResources and Engineering Development Act,establishing the cabinet-level National Council onMarine Resources and Engineering Developmentchaired by the Vice President and the Commission onMarine Science, Engineering and Resources, the latterto be forever known after its chair, Jay Stratton,former president of MIT and, at that time, chairmanof the Ford Foundation. Included in the compromisewas the agreement that the Council would go out ofbusiness 120 days after the Commission submitted itsreport to the President and to Congress. Implicit in thelegislation was the assumption that if the Commissionthought that the Cabinet-level council was thepreferred way to organize marine affairs within theadministration, and so recommended, Congresswould then pass legislation making the Councilpermanent.

As might be guessed, there was not much enthusiasmwithin the various parts of government for thislegislation. Apparently, there were no supporterswithin the administration, and the Navy, in particular,was very much opposed. Wenk relates the followinganecdote, which he was able to verify, for at least onereason President Johnson signed rather than vetoed thebill. He and Magnuson had been close colleagues in theSenate, and Johnson had been best man at theMagnuson wedding. While the bill was sitting on thePresident’s desk, Mrs. Magnuson queried the Presidentat a White House reception as to whether he wouldscuttle a bill that her husband had worked so hard on,to which the President is reported to have replied,“Honey, for you I’ll sign it."

In the seven years since the submission of theoriginal NASCO report Congress had expanded itsvision. The NASCO report, of course, was aboutoceanography, however, broadly that term may bedefined, and Public Law 89-54 places heavy emphasison marine science, but the mandate of both Counciland Commission included not only oceanography, butmarine resources and engineering and themanagement of those resources. Most importantly,the Commission was given the politically chargedtask, “Recommend a Governmental organization planwith estimated cost."

It was Jay Stratton’s genius that insisted thatNASCO not take up that issue until we had broadly

reviewed the field of marine affairs and thegovernment’s role. The military use of the ocean wasnot part of the Commission’s mandate and theCommission made a conscious decision to ignoremarine transportation, even more a political morassthen than now. With those exceptions the Commissioninterpreted its charge broadly, as can be seen in theforward to its report, Our Nation and the Sea;

“First, the Commission was asked to examine theNation’s stake in the development, utilization, andpreservation of our marine environment.

“Second, we were to review all current andcontemplated marine activities and to assess theiradequacy to achieve the national goals set forth inthe act.

“Third, on the basis of its studies and assessment,the Commission was to formulate a comprehensive,long-term, national program for marine affairsdesigned to meet present and future national needsin the most effective possible manner.

“And finally, we were requested to recommend aplan of Government organization best adapted to thesupport of the program and its expected costs."

The Commission recommended the formation ofNOAA as an independent agency. NOAA, of course,was established, but not as an independent agency, nordid it contain all of the pieces recommended by theStratton Commission. The Coast Guard remained inthe newly formed Department of Transportation.

The birth of NOAA did not come easily. Just asmany reports from the National Academy gather dust,the recommendations of many PresidentialCommissions are ignored. The Stratton Commissionreport faced an additional challenge. The report wasthe product of a commission appointed by aDemocratic president, but it was left to his Republicansuccessor to implement.

What saved the Commission’s recommendationsfor a NOAA was Congress. There appeared to be noparticular enthusiasm for the recommendations withinthe new Nixon administration, but the ocean partisansof both parties in both the House and the Senate keptup the clamor. And they picked up additionaladvocates, including Representative George Bushfrom Texas and a relatively junior senator from NorthCarolina, Fritz Hollings. The latter is widely believed


10

to be responsible for getting the report a respectfulhearing within the White House.

Does this history have any lessons for today?Perhaps. First, the gestation period for the StrattonCommission was long. It began with the NASCOreport of 1959, and it rode a wave of enthusiasm forsupport of science generated by Sputnik and a true

awakening of interest in ocean matters by a group ofdedicated members of both the House and the Senate.The Stratton Commission was fortunate in itsleadership, and it was lucky. Its recommendationswere pushed by a relatively small group of membersfrom both parties and both houses of Congress whoultimately prevailed.


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CREATING THE STRATTON COMMISSION—-A REPRISE

² Edward Wenk, Jr. ²

Marine Sciences Council

Introduction

In the 105th Congress, both the U.S. House ofRepresentatives and the Senate are considering billsto usher in another Stratton Commission, born again.That part-time advisory body became an icon amongocean aficionados as a symbol of commitment to thehealth of the nation’s marine interests. As authorizedby P.L. 89-454 in 1966, the original commission wascharged with identifying what priority—measured byfunds and leadership—is this nation and itsgovernment to give affairs of the sea. PresidentJohnson appointed Julius A. Stratton, formerpresident of MIT as chairman, thus the appellation.

Their report entitled Our Nation and the Sea wasreleased January 9, 1969. It set forth 120recommendations to strengthen this nation’s stake inthe sea with policies and programs to tap the potentialof the oceans and integrate its benefits moreeffectively into the life of the nation. The Commissionwas assigned a broad set of issues, but deserves creditespecially for recommendations to restructure manyexisting functions and bureaus into a single,high-visibility and powerful agency. Two years later,and considerably altered, their proposal led to thecreation of NOAA.

Now, thirty years later, many concerns addressedby that Commission have reappeared. Given itsextraordinary reputation, several bills have beenintroduced to emulate the Stratton exercise: S. 1213by Senator Hollings, H.R. 2547 and H.R. 3445 byseveral members of the House. On the premise thatthese will pass and be signed into law, the origins andperformance of the original Commission deservestudy to identify factors that would promote futuresuccess.

Congressional staff, NOAA, a number ofstakeholders and think tanks have studied thatproposition and with one exception would restart

Stratton-mode engines. Although carefully craftedand compelling, these surveys suffer from threeproblems, of amnesia, of myths, and of addictions.There is amnesia about the politics of the oceans andabout advances made by presidential leadershipassisted by an advisory Council chaired by the VicePresident and created by the same legislation. Thereare romantic notions about the scale and lastinginfluence of the Stratton Commission. Asanthropologist Joseph Campbell has argued, mythspreserve continuity of the human experience, but theycan excessively raise expectations. Addictions torhetoric of four decades ago in support of a newinitiative may inadvertently block appreciation ofmajor changes in the nation’s mood to a commercialculture and aspirations for wealth, to partisanlegislative behavior and globalization.

To add another perspective, this study focuses on(1) The legislative history of PL 89-454 creating theCommission, (2) the context which is crucial tounderstanding the dynamics of policy design andimplementation; and (3) the process of appointing anoutstanding cadre of Commission members who werecritical to the success of the Stratton Commission.Despite Tolstoy’s injunction that “The only thinghistory teaches us is that it teaches us nothing”, thereare vital lessons to be extracted from pastachievements that could help reduce risk of failure. In(4) are added personal observations toward that end.

Chronology of Key Events

The Stratton Commission provides a deep learningexperience for both branches of government eventhought its product was rejected by the President whoappointed it and by his successor. It all began onNovember 10, 1957 with creation by NAS PresidentDetlev Bronk of a Committee on Oceanography(NASCO) that catered many subsequent politicalevents. Dr. Harrison Brown was named chairman. Itwas sponsored by five federal agencies, the Navy’s


13

Hydrographic Office, its Office of Naval Research,the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, the Coast andGeodetic Survey and the Atomic Energy Commissionthat was then disposing of low level radioactive wasteat sea. They collaborated with oceanographers in deepconcern over evaporation of naval research fundingafter World War II. Their landmark report deliveredFebruary 15, 1959 was entitled, Oceanography,1960-1970 (1) , with five general and twenty specificrecommendations. The primary thrust was to doublefunds over ten years for basic research, appliedresearch, and surveys so as to nourish a relativelyfeeble enterprise and equip it with modern ships andtools.

Paradoxically, while Sputnik had jump startedresearch in almost every other field, oceanographycontinued to languish and the NAS report was notenthusiastically received by President Eisenhower’sscience advisor. Undismayed, Brown and colleagueswith street smarts had already paved the way to tickleCongressional interest, especially of Senator Warren G.Magnuson of Washington State who chaired theCommerce Committee and Representative Herbert C.Bonner from coastal North Carolina who chaired theHouse Merchant Marine and Fisheries. Bothcommittees were likely to have jurisdiction and theirstaffs had been invited to attend NAS deliberations,especially those held during crises.

On the merits of the case by Harrison Brown, SenatorHubert Humphrey was the first to publicize the report.Other initiatives swiftly followed, championingincreases in funds for oceanographic research tostrengthen the nation’s undersea defense in light of thenear-hysterical response to the Soviet surprise. Thatrationale was later superseded, with a shift to concernsover fundamental weakness in oceanographic researchcapabilities and the failure to identify a broader stakein the oceans by a nation that had been settled by seaand neglected its heritage.

After the February 15, 1959 release of the NASCOreport, the following key events led to the birth of theStratton Commission

1959

February 17Special Subcommittee on Oceanography created in

House MM&F and opened hearings, March 5 on theNASCO report.

April 13Overton Brooks, chair of House Science andAstronautics Committee, introduced bill forcategorical oceanographic research grants in NSF.

June 22Senate Resolution 136 introduced by SenatorMagnuson to strengthen oceanography based on theNASCO report; unanimously passed

September 5Magnuson introduced S. 2692, the Marine Sciencesand Research Act of 1960 that became the springboardfor sustained interest and his later bills. Coordinationof civilian research was assigned to NSF. PassedJune,1960.

1960

July 1Brooks released report prepared by the CongressionalResearch Service, Ocean Sciences and NationalSecurity (2) to nail down S&A jurisdiction incompetition with MM&F. [MM&F won]. The reportinterpreted “National Security” broadly as more thanmilitary and rationalized support for research as morethan “beating the Soviets.” Instead, it focused on suchfunctions as fishing, shipping, offshore oil and gas,in addition to basic research. Based on the report, theCommittee recommended double the NASCOproposed increases in funding, and it drew a bead onmanagement weaknesses in the Executive Branch thatresulted from the frantic expansion of research afterSputnik and fragmentation in numerous agencies. Itproposed elevating responsibility for leadership andcoordination to the tip of the pyramid; to the President.

1961

February 9Magnuson introduced S. 901 similar to S. 2692

February 13Oceanographic Act of 1961 introduced by Rep.George P. Miller, to create a Cabinet-Level Councilto help the president coordinate oceanic research.[Ironically, this concept from CRS was later adopted


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by the Senate but for various reasons the Housereversed its position and rejected the implementingCouncil machinery.]

March 29President Kennedy accepted proposals from hisscience advisor’s office and transmitted to Congressa sharply increased add-on to oceanographic funding,thus taking the edge off Congressional legislation toenergize oceanography. Their focus then shifted toissues of waste and duplication.

1962

June 18John Dingell introduced the Oceanographic Act of1962, H.R. 12601 to establish national policy inmarine affairs, coordinated by the Office of Scienceand Technology newly created in the ExecutiveOffice of the President.

September 27Senate passed S. 901 with language of H.R. 12601,then passed by the House. It was pocket vetoed byPresident Kennedy when his advisors noted that OSTwas a staff agency and not appropriate to fulfill a linefunction. Clearly, Congress was chagrined

1963

June 12Alton Lennon introduced Oceanographic Act of1963, H.R.6997 after negotiations with thePresident’s science advisory staff so as to overcomeobjections to the one pocket vetoed

1964

March 19At the initiative of its staff director, the president’sFederal Council on Science and Technology selectedits Interagency Committee on Oceanography (ICO)as a show case for effective coordination, andsubmitted FCST’s first report to Congress todemonstrate techniques of effective coordination inall fields of science. (3)

July 9Magnuson introduced S.2990 to create a NationalOceanographic Council at Cabinet level, based on a

study from the newly created Science PolicyResearch Division of the Congressional ResearchService.

1965

January 11Lennon introduced H.R.2218 similar to earlier H.R.6997

February 1Magnuson reintroduces bill to create Council, now S.944. On advice from CRS, the bill focused on futuresocial benefits rather than science, mindful ofJohnson’s growing disdain for scientists because oftheir vocal opposition to the Vietnam war.

June 15Paul Rogers introduces H.R. 9064 to establish aNational Commission on Oceanography. Thisinitiative resulted from frustration in the House thatother initiatives had failed to rally support in theSenate, while the House rejected the concept of aCouncil because the one already mandated for SpaceAffairs had seldom met; it was largely staffed byfriends of the Vice President who had been made itschair instead of the President.

August 5Senate passes S. 944 as amended, House passes itsversion with H.R. 9064 attached.

August 19Senator Claiborne Pell introduces Sea Grantlegislation to help fund research.

1966

June 17Marine Resources and Engineering DevelopmentAct of 1966 passed by both Houses June 2 and signedinto law by President Johnson as P.L.89-454. It setgoals for a long-term, comprehensive policy formarine affairs, and mandated leadership in thePresident with advice and assistance of an interimcabinet-level Council chaired by the Vice President.It also created a Commission on Marine Science,Engineering and Resources with a broad charter toevaluate national needs and national capabilities, andrecommend appropriate governmental structure, not


15

just to enhance coordination but also to elevate thestature of marine affairs among federal bodies. Theorganizational medium was to be the message.

The Johnson administration did not support the bill.In fact, his science advisor released a report, EffectiveUse of the Sea (5) that was intended to block thelegislation. The Bureau of the Budget opposed it,haunted by the notion of a “wet NASA” sluicing intothe treasury. The Navy was quietly trying to sabotageit with stories of a certain veto, nervous about losingits status as the big boy on the block. With Magnusonone of the bill’s parents, and with his close friendshipwith Johnson —Johnson was best man at hiswedding— in no way would the bill be vetoed. Butafter signature, there was high uncertainty aboutimplementation. It could have been ignored, used towarehouse political cronies, or taken seriously.Johnson adopted the latter course, mindful especiallyof Magnuson’s hard work.

July 13President Johnson ordered Vice President HubertHumphrey to activate the Council and deliver the firstannual report in six months.

August 17Humphrey called first of monthly Council meetings.Wenk was appointed by the President as ExecutiveSecretary

October 15Sea Grant Bill enacted as P.L.89-688 as a title inP.L.89-454

October 15Department of Transportation created by P.L. 89-670with transfer of Coast Guard from Treasury

1967

January 9President Johnson appointed members ofCommission [details later] Johnson asked Humphreyto manage appointments to the Commission and thistask was delegated to the Council’s ExecutiveSecretary. Humphrey agreed on a strategy to field thestrongest possible membership, widely representingnational interests and not just parochial marineinterests.

March 9President Johnson submitted first annual report toCongress as required P.L.89-454. Nine initiativeswere announced on international cooperation, fishprotein concentrate, Sea Grant, new data systems,estuarine studies, continental shelf surveys, oceanpredictions, deep-ocean technology and sub-polarresearch, with 13 percent increase in funding.

1968

January 17In a State of the Union Address, President Johnsonproposed what was then elaborated in a specialmessage of March 8 as the International Decade ofOcean Exploration developed by the Council.

March 11President Johnson submitted second annual reportwith new emphasis on coastal zone management andfurther increases in civilian budgets.

August 3Nation’s estuaries to be studied by P.L. 90-454

OctoberDraft of Stratton report submitted to Council in accordwith law. It was reviewed by an ad hoc committeechaired by the staff director with representatives ofdepartments at Assistant Secretary level. Theyargued it through to the point of unanimous support.Subsequently, the Secretary of Transportationordered his representative to recant and askedPresident Johnson to fire the Council’s staff director.

1969

January 9Stratton Commission released report Our Nation andthe Sea recommending consolidation of numerousfederal agencies into new independent NOAA, andappointment of presidential advisory committee.President Johnson refused to receive the reportpersonally, even from friends on the Commission,because it proposed to transfer the Coast Guard. Thiswas the crown jewel of the Department ofTransportation, a department he had fought for yearsto establish over objections of powerful lobbies thatwanted the status quo because of their easy access.


16

January 17President Johnson released third annual report,emphasizing new legislation for coastalmanagement, promoting the IDOE and improvingframework of international sea law

January 20President Nixon inaugurated. He reappointed theCouncil’s director.

April 5President Nixon appointed Commission onExecutive Organization with Roy L. Ash namedchairman. It would soon recommend against theStratton proposal for NOAA.

August 8Senator Magnuson requested Council staff to draftbill on coastal-zone management, introduced asS.2802.

SeptemberCouncil’s director writes directly to President Nixon,not through Vice President Agnew, to advocatecontinued review of Stratton report.

October 10President appoints special task group to examineorganizational issue; report delivered December 18favored a weak National Marine Agency. Reportwas not released until July 9, 1970 because it wouldanger Congressional advocates of NOAA.

November 18H.R. 14845 for coastal management introduced onbehalf of Nixon Administration, identical to S. 2802except responsibility assigned to Interior.

1970

January 1National Environmental Policy Act signed into law,PL91-190.

AprilTo counter stonewalling by the NixonAdministration, Senator Hollings, Stratton and Wenkmet with Attorney General Mitchell who was onintimate terms with President Nixon to enlist hissupport for a new agency. He could not support a

new cabinet-level entity, but agreed to supportcreation of a new body within a department, with thehorsepower that Mitchell admitted the FBI had inJustice.

July 9President Nixon proposes to establish NOAA inDepartment of Commerce by Reorganization PlanNo. 4 of 1970. In the absence of Congressional veto,it became law.

1971

January 28President Nixon appointed Robert M. White to headNOAA. That delay signaled his anger atCongressional end runs.

August 15National Advisory Committee on Oceans andAtmosphere (NACOA) created by P.L. 92-125, asproposed by Stratton Commission.

1972

The Council is disestablished on recommendation ofNOAA and Commerce Secretary on grounds ofweakness under Vice President Agnew. With thedemise of the Council, the ocean community lost afriend in high places.

Analysis

This calendar of key events exposes the meanderingof policy development, generation of basic conceptsand set in motion by the political process with itsidiosyncrasies. The initial impetus fromoceanographic scientists was sustained by a fewmembers of Congress having research constituents,but mainly from their exceptional personal interest.The field had not been preempted by jurisdictionfences; it was unplowed, and there was room to grow“heroes”.

Second, rationales evolved from outdistancing theSoviets in a new arena to support for oceanographiclaboratories, to a worry over splintering among somany different agencies, to the lack of a clear visionfor the oceans and of Executive Branch leadershipexcept for the Navy. That the Congressional


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perspective had matured is dramatically revealed byin bill titles, the shift from “oceanography” to “marineresources and engineering development”. By 1964,concepts from the report commissioned by OvertonBrooks had been adopted, with the focus onapplications in addition to research. Hearings revealweak lobbying by most private marine interests ascompared to the usual energies of advocates. Theaerospace industry was stirring, however, overanxiety about tapering of the space effort, but theylacked experience in lobbying as an industry. Mostadvocacy focused on securing contracts amidstcompetitive bidding. Although a new MarineTechnology Society took an interest, along with anactivist maritime press, the awareness of politicalconsiderations was naive.

Third, the House of Representatives and the Senatewere stubborn in each grasping their original conceptssuch that differences were resolved only by weldingthe Council and Commission concepts in one bill.This led to myths that the two organs werecompetitive. Such a misunderstanding resulted fromamnesia about the organic act that recognized thePresident as band leader, with the Council in aday-to-day role to advise and assist until itsauthorization expired. The Commission’s main taskconcerned governmental structure.

In the absence of strong outside lobbies, the Councilbecame a maritime presence in the White House.Between Humphrey’s leadership, a creative staff inthe armory assembling ammunition and a receptiveJohnson, things happened. The Council’s reportswere read by top officials in other governments thatsoon were attempting to knit together their ownsplintered maritime agencies. The Commission, onthe other hand, was expected to take a long view ofnational purpose less influenced by an immediateagenda and political tactics and to wrestle with theorganizational issue that could not be resolved withinthe Executive Branch itself because of territorialimperatives.

The President continues to have that mandate today,even though it has not been energetically exercisedsince 1972. The action-forcing provision for annualreports has been ignored by both Branches ofgovernment. There have been few hearings as duringCouncil life.

Many ocean interests refer back to theKennedy-Johnson years as the golden age of marineaffairs. Apart from presidential messages in the annualreports, some 28 initiatives were submitted by theCouncil to the President and adopted. Thatcommitment by a president has enormous significancebecause of the president’s role as chief executive officerto set budget priorities, trigger new starts and integratefar flung agency sectors. Presidential statements weresymbols of national priority.

If there is any single individual who helped to elevatethe strength and visibility of marine affairs, it is VicePresident Humphrey. He was chairman par excellenceof an activist Council, he visited many oceanographiclaboratories, rode their ships, sent prestigious messagesto state and professional events of note, and had acongenial press.

The Context

Legislative issues never erupt in a vacuum. Mostoften, they are triggered by crisis or pressure groups.Whatever the trigger, they are embedded in a contextof social, economic, political and geopolitical factorsunconnected to the issues at hand but which provide theatmospherics and set the stage for policy decisions. Tostudy the Stratton Commission required the legislativehistory behind the parent PL 89-454, the MarineResources and Engineering Act of 1966. 1n the1956-1966 run-up to enactment, these factors wereinfluential:

Crisis: The Cold War with the Soviet Union wasperceived by the nation as a sharp nuclear threat, asimmering and continuing crisis. Regarding warfighting capabilities, especially in terms of a bombergap then missile gap, people asked , “Who’s ahead?”The October 4, 1957 Sputnik event added urgency tothe sense of a life-threatening competition. Whenocean-related issues were pushed for the first time ontothe legislative stage in 1959, arguments were advancedeven by Harrison Brown with a well-tested ploy ofnational defense. So did Congressional sponsors ofnew legislation. In truth at that time, there was nosignificant underwater threat to the preeminence of theU.S. Navy.


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Pressure Groups: It is a paradox that the field ofmarine affairs flourished in the absence of a palpablecrisis or powerful interest groups. The first advocateswere oceanographers concerned over shrinkage ofnaval research funding after World War II. Leadersof three major institutions led the parade, using as aspringboard the NASCO study by the NationalAcademy of Sciences. For a short time, publicsupport came from the President of the NationalAcademy of Sciences, Detlev Bronk, until othermembers of the Academy complained. By 1964, thevoices of science were replaced by the aerospaceindustry, worried about leveling off of funds for spaceexploration that might follow after the planned lunarlanding. Some in the industry were also teased byNavy initiatives to build up subsea technologyfollowing loss of the submarine Thresher, April 19,1963. This interest group then found expressionthrough founding of the Marine Technology Society,but at that time contractors were in such competitionwith each other that they couldn’t mount a collectivecampaign. In any event, their interest was inmerchandising hardware, not in uses of the sea TheStratton Commission heard and tried to respond tothese interests with proposals for a massive deep watertechnology initiative. It was never accepted by eitherbranch of government. The military-industrialcomplex today is far stronger and more effective.

Offshore oil interests were quite powerful but notinterested in the marine environment as such. Indeed,they were satisfied with existing partnerships with theDepartment of Interior. Fishing interests weresplintered by species and by geography. Coastalresidents at the time were primarily concerned withbeach preservation.

The environmental movement began to stirfollowing Rachel Carson’s book, Silent Spring,published in 1962, but awareness of threats to inshorewaters and wetlands did not arise until the late 1960s.In short, offshore oil, shipping, and fishing seemedsatisfied with existing arrangements. Seabornepassenger travel was in decline because of jet serviceoverseas. Water related recreation was spotty.Environmentalism was in its infancy but the generalpublic was treated to extraordinary underseaadventures by the photography of Jacques Cousteau,accompanied by his poetry on human connections tothe sea.

Political Realities: Soon after Congress becameaware of marine policy issues, several members sawopportunities to expand jurisdiction. In the House, acompetition arose between Bonner of MerchantMarine and Fisheries and Overton Brooks whochaired Science and Astronautics. S&A had a platefull with a fledgling space program, but MM&F waslooking for new challenges or face extinction. Claimswere staked by both, arousing some media interest.Soon followed a flurry of bills focused on expandedresearch, the diffusion of civilian research throughmany different small agencies, and the need forcoordination and leadership. Members willing toinvest political capital to push legislation generallywere from districts with oceanographic researchinterests.

Marine policies did not arouse partisan support ortactics. Indeed, success of the Council resulted fromits even-handed approach to both Houses and bothparties. Although the Council was a creature of theSenate, there was high respect for initiatives of theHouse and a commitment to meet their goals as well.This led to the unprecedented step of the VicePresident submitting testimony at one of theirhearings. Indeed, it was the Council that includedfunds for the Commission in its initial budget, withoutwhich the Commission would have had to wait manymonths and appeal to Congress for funds to get started

On the Congressional side, virtually all legislationhad support from minority members initially andthrough enactment.

Even though Executive Branch agencies hadsponsored the NAS study on the decline of research,none became conspicuous advocates. Eisenhowerand his science advisor rejected increased funding.Indeed, he was already furious at the damage to hisbalanced budget, declaring that the power of themilitary-industrial complex after Sputnik was bad forthe nation’s economic health. The agencies handswere tied.

Under Kennedy, that coolness changed. He wasconstitutionally more adventurous and invitedproposals for new starts. He had a personal history ofsailing and naval service during World War II that ledto his affection for maritime issues. His one-shot


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increase in funding was welcomed by civilianagencies, and temporarily cooled Congressionalardor, but that soon changed when Members began atraditional war dance about waste and duplication andinsisted on better integration of so many smallactivities. By 1964, also, Members had shifted theirfocus to policy issues, rather than programs, a majorstep of maturity.

That elevation in issues continued under PresidentJohnson. Among other things, the Council knew he washostile to science because the scientific community waspecking at his Vietnam policy. On the other hand,Johnson entertained new starts as did Kennedy whenrationalized in terms of social and economic benefit,not science for its own sake. Council staff persuadedhim to support the IDOE because of its potentialcontribution to world order, plus a focus on such issuesas food from the sea and environmental managementthat had come on the political screen.

Although Nixon accepted some leftover Councilproposals that were already developed under Johnson,he drew a conservative cloak, barring more initiatives.

Role of Staff: Throughout the development ofmarine affairs and legislatively based policy, staff werehighly influential. Dan Markel in the Senate and JackDrewry in the House were especially attentive. Frompreparation of the Brooks report, through drafts of billsfor Magnuson, Lennon, Rogers, and others, creativeefforts of CRS staff were welcomed. Within theExecutive Branch, staff stewardship played a role inenhancing credibility of the ICO, the congenialrelationship with President Kennedy and later VicePresident Humphrey, the barrage of new initiativesfrom the Council and the gentle nudging forreorganization by two presidents in the face of standardopposition by OMB.

Media: Maritime interests seldom earned headlinesexcept with disasters of a major oil spill such as withthe Torrey Canyon, or loss of life on ferries. Themaritime press was splintered by industries, shipping,oil and gas, fishing. The editors of two marinenewsletters, however, were aggressive and perceptivein following developments in marine affairs andreported in a mode that helped stakeholders recognizewhat was happening behind closed doors. As much as

any other factor, the newly minted marine affairs mediasustained interest by partisans that otherwise mighthave faded from lack of focus for collaborationIndustrial users of the sea never were fully on board.

Appointments to the Commission

The organic legislation provided for a membership offifteen from federal and state governments, industryand academia, augmented by four Congressionaladvisors. With agreement to recommend a prestigiousCommission, one with genuine horsepower, theCouncil’s staff sorted out some 900 nominations.

The process began with a shopping list of marineinterests including scientists, but there were otherconsiderations. Looking ahead to submission of thereport to the President and Congress, it was essential toseek individuals from states represented by committeechairs and also by the minority members; home statesof the President and Vice President, individuals havingclose rapport with the President, having mediaexperience, having wide geographical representation,having a national, prestigious stature. To satisfy allthese requisites while limited in number ofappointments, required that individuals shouldsimultaneously meet several qualifications.

Meanwhile, the trade press were angrily attacking theCouncil for blocking appointments in the belief that thetwo bodies were in competition. The more volatilemembers of the press kept gnawing at that issue untilthe Commission reported.

The most critical appointment was that of chair. Bygood fortune, Humphrey was able to persuade the firstcandidate Julius A. Stratton to accept the key role.Apart from his personal gifts of character and intellect,Stratton brought the patina of president emeritus ofMIT and then chairman of the board of the FordFoundation. Few others could have been as effective inmustering interest and camaraderie of members,wholesome relationships with the Council, members ofCongress and the outside lobbyists who were salivatingover prospects of a major new infusion of funds for awide range of projects, especially of high technologyfor deep ocean exploration. The rest is history.


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Lessons Bearing on Success of a New Commission

1. Although rationales changed between 1956 and1966, when P.L. 89-454 became law marine affairswere linked to broad goals of social policy. Is this truewith pending bills?

2. Momentum thirty years ago was imparted by thenational excitement of the Soviet space surprise andby Kennedy-Johnson dynamism as much as bylobbies of stakeholder interest groups. How doestoday’s situation compare regarding lobbies andnational mood?

3. Powerful members of Congress of both parties,activists all, invested political capital because of theirpersonal enthusiasm rather responding to vestedinterests, to a popular ground swell or to aneffervescent media. How does Congressionaladvocacy compare?

4. Among factors that influence policy making andimplementation are attitudes and values of thePresident. Given today’s bi-polar Washington, howdoes the President stand?

5. This is vital because, while the Congress setspolicy directions, execution depends on ExecutiveBranch performance. Where do marine affairs standon their agenda?

6. Membership of the Stratton Commission hadmuch to do with its effectiveness. Does the pendinglegislation provide opportunities to recruit top caliberparticipants rather than make it easy for electedofficials to create a rubber stamp or pay off politicaldebts ?

7. When P.L.89-454 was passed, Congress expectedimmediate action by the Council to rectify perceiveddeficiencies. They were also impatient to see theCommission generate proposals for a new agencystrong enough to defend budgets amidst vigorouscompetition. What are the basic hopes of today’sCongressional advocates?

Personal Views on Creating a New Commission

I am an unequivocal advocate of a national oceanpolicy that relates the oceans to human affairs,

especially those having conspicuous nationalinterests. That condition engaged two Presidents ofthe United States during what some recall as the“golden age,” 1966-1971. Since then, all elements ofpublic and private involvements have grown in sizeand importance, but the central focus and grass rootsinterest has been lost. Creating a new StrattonCommission is a concept around which a new startcould be rallied, but its success critically depends onthe legislative charter now under review.

As an ancient mariner, I had the privilege of beingpresent at the birth of the Stratton model through foursuccessive appointments. As first science advisor toCongress in the Congressional Research Service in1959, I analyzed the NASCO report and maderecommendations for Congressional initiatives. Thenappointed to President Kennedy’s staff as director ofthe Federal Council for Science and Technology, Ichose the Interagency Committee on Oceanographyto showcase coordination among nearly 20 agencies.Congress then requested my return to found theScience Policy Research Division in 1964 where Ihelped advance the legislation leading to PL 89-454.On its enactment in 1966, I was appointed byPresident Johnson as Executive Secretary of theMarine Council created by that Act. One of my firstassignments for the President was to nominatemembers of the Stratton Commission, then to assist intheir work and vet their report through the Council.

Here are some lessons that bear on success of afuture commission:

(1) Marine Affairs deals with technology more thanwith science, recognizing technology as more thanplanes, trains, automobiles and ships. It as a socialdelivery system involving a network of public andprivate organizations that apply specializedknowledge to meet human needs and wants.Government has six roles: (a) contributing to vitalityof a capitalist economic system; (b) exercisingfiduciary responsibility for common propertyresources; (c) providing for the national defense; (d)funding public works beyond the financial capacity orrisk horizon of the private sector; (e) sponsoringresearch and education and engaging the globalizationprocess; and (f) protecting public and environmentalsafety through regulation.


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The pending legislation seldom reflects the role oftechnology and is relatively silent on the nationaldefense and related roles of the Coast Guard and ArmyCorps of Engineers. That omission as a key element ofnational ocean policy can stir bureaucratic animus.

(2) This time around, the Congress had such limitedhearings before advancing its commission bills thatthere is no authentic sense of a national constituency.On a broader scale, some say the national mood is“every person for themselves,” and “survival of the(economic) fittest.” In this atmosphere and with thehigh noise level in our society, marine lobbies are notconspicuous. Content analysis of newspaper and TVnews reveals low media concern except for highlylocalized problems or crises such as with ExxonValdez. The environmental movement is of majorimportance but it has lost the critical role occupied inthe late 1960s leading to the National EnvironmentalPolicy Act of 1969. There is no parallel with oceanconstituents that pressured the Stratton Commission fora more powerful agency in the federal constellation andfunding of aerospace contractors for deep underwaterexploration.

During the three years of Stratton Commission life,national attention was mustered by the Council withinitiatives by the President and Vice President.Without those episodes of high visibility such as in aState of the Union message, and without initiatives byCouncil staff after the Commission folded its tent, theCommission might have been totally ignored

(3) Although rare, amidst a repertoire of other issues,and in the absence of palpable lobbies or crisis, somemembers of Congress invested considerable time andexercised leadership over an extended interval toadvance marine affairs. There were continuinghearings over four years. That commitment isn’tobvious today. Instead, to those outside the beltway,the appearance is one of a partisan circus.

(4) The President as the nation’s systems managerplays a key role in identifying national priorities. Asnew legislation is considered, the President’s viewsare critical as to whether pending bills would besigned or vetoed, and if signed, whether implementedvigorously. Three decades ago, marine science lookeddoomed when it only ratcheted science budgets, until

it focused on technology. Even then, ExecutiveBranch enthusiasm was low and bills would have beenvetoed except for the close personal relationship ofMagnuson with Johnson. How a President reactsdepends significantly on such relationships and othersubtle factors, and on dispositions of presidential staff.With the present legislation, an approach to the WhiteHouse, probably through OSTP, is not evident.

This lack of attention to the President’s role is alsoreflected in neglect of the Council’s annual reports.There is no compendium of messages signed by thePresident on coastal zone management, seabed armscontrol, attention to Arctic affairs, restoration of theGreat Lakes, the International Decade of OceanExploration, Sea Grants, oil spill prevention andcleanup, acceleration of ocean surveys and databuoys, etc. All are documented in The Politics of theOceans published in 1972 and summarized in 1995 inMaking Waves.

(5) Meanwhile, several agencies more potent thanNOAA appear in opposition and will have their voicesheard in OMB and in their respective authorizationcommittees. Part of this opposition lies in thelegislation neglecting national defense as part ofocean policy and also foreign policy considerationsuch as in sections 4 (a) 5 and 6 in PL89-454 whichwere unexpected triggers for Johnson’s support.

(6) It is hard to measure performance of the StrattonCommission because there has been no evaluation ofresponse to its 120 recommendations. It is known thatthe package proposing massive funding for hardwarehas been ignored. The proposal for NOAA has beendiscussed. The Commission deserves exceptionalgrades for its diligence, perception of opportunities,comprehension of marine affairs and complexrelationships such as in Law of the Sea to other policyarenas. Leadership by Jay Stratton is a model.

The proposed legislation, however, has an arcanesystem of appointments of members that opens thedoor to partisan selections and thus conflicts, to splitloyalties of members, and to insider lobbying.Providing for volunteer staff also increasesvulnerability to powerful lobbies. With so littlecontrol by the President over selection, there is a riskof veto. There is also a risk of findings that couldreflect partisan ideology, leading to privatization ofNOAA.


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The commission scope and implementation strategyalso deserve comment. When the Stratton report wasdelivered, some other presidential staff characterizedits “kitchen sink” approach, with far too manyproposals of vastly different scale of impact. Mostdealt with programs and not policies. It was alsocriticized as arriving two weeks before PresidentJohnson was leaving office when he was in no moodto consider any proposals. The Commission couldhave been more prescient and cut its scope to deliverthe report in time to lay the groundwork forpresidential mulling. The present broad scope couldinadvertently lead a new commission to try theimpossible, especially if it fails to stay on the policytrack.

(7) Section 8 of a pending bill would repealPL89-454. That would remove the present framework

for marine policy until a new one would be draftedand introduced perhaps two years after enactment, andput in force in a third year at the earliest. Indeed, thereis a chance that it might not be replaced at all. To besure, the existing policy has not kept up with changingtimes, partly from lack of interest and initiatives inboth branches of government and in the fragmentedand weak ocean constituency.

I believe, however, that repeal of the present policyis unnecessary because it does not inhibit whateverinitiatives are anticipated in other provisions. Indeed,one of the first tasks a new commission mightundertake would lie in updating existing law. In anyevent, the notion of a master policy covering alldimensions of marine affairs is as illusory as trying tohave a master policy for terrestrial affairs. Many ifnot most issues do not stop at land’s end.


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TIMING AND THE WORK OF THE STRATTON COMMISSION

² Samuel A. Lawrence ²

Staff Director, Stratton Commission

The task of the Commission on Marine Science,Engineering, and Resources was to formulate andadvance “an overall plan for an adequate nationaloceanographic program that will meet the present andfuture national needs.” The Commission’s attentionand energy necessarily were focused on the substanceof its task. Staff was employed to supportCommission activity, to help ensure accomplishmentof its mission, and to assist the Commission innavigating the unfamiliar terrain of Washingtonbureaucracy and politics.

It should be emphasized that the Commission wasa true working commission. The members werethemselves informed and committed. TheCommission members themselves prepared the lion’sshare of the text, which made up the seven panelreports. Staff assisted with the establishing of adatabase and the logistics of the panel process, indistilling the masses of material, and in preparing thesummary Commission report. But the product wasclearly that of the fifteen commissioners who were thesignatories to the final document.

Profile of the Commission Staff

The Commission report lists the names of 25professional, and 10 support, staff. Each of theseindividuals did meaningfully contribute to the effort.However, the majority of the group served for arelatively brief period. I would estimate over thetwo-year period, the average complement was in therange of 12-15 professionals, and 4-5 supportpersonnel. Of this number, only about half were paidfrom the Commission’s $1.5 million appropriation.The remainder were on loan from other federalagencies or (for four of the group for about sixmonths) a foundation that had been organized by oneof the Commission members.

The staff reflected a diversity of skills and interests.Most were drawn from middle management levels in

their organizations. In assembling the staff, the chiefcriteria were availability, flexibility, and an aptitudefor intensive, high pressure work. For a groupassembled quickly in such an ad hoc manner, the staffworked surprisingly well together and I thinksucceeded in meeting the expectations and needs ofthe Commission members.

Timetable for the Commission’s Work.

In retrospect, the timetable for the StrattonCommission’s activity appears quite compact andefficient - only 30 months from the approval ofauthorizing legislation to presentation of acomprehensive, actionable report. At the time, we feltchallenged to stay ahead of the rush of events, to beable to produce something at once thoughtful, timely,and relevant to the circumstances of a rapidlychanging technical and political environment.

A 30 month time line is about what one must planfor a job of this magnitude. In rough terms, here ishow the time related to COMSER’s activity was used:

• Six months (7/1/66-1/3/67) to select and appointthe Commission members. This is an absolutely keyelement of the process. The identification andrecruitment of a chair, establishing the advisoryrelationships between the commission and itscongressional and administration advisers, andachieving the desired skills, stature, and breadth ofinterests among the commission members are majortasks and crucial to success.

• Three to four months to ‘get organized’. Simplygetting on the calendars of busy people to establish aschedule of meetings can be daunting. Additionally,one must recruit a staff, establish an office, bring inphones and all the attendant paraphernalia etc. Thisperiod also includes the ‘getting to know each other’process among the Commission members. In the


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case of the Stratton Commission, it climaxed (as Irecall it) in May, with decisions as to the role andmemberships of the several panels.

• Six to eight months of substantive research. For theStratton Commission, the time lines achieved by theseveral panels varied considerably, as did theirmethods for surveying their fields of interest andgaining public input. Most had pretty well staked outtheir points of view by December 1967.

• Three to four months for documentation anddistillation of panel reports. Again, a task whichvaried substantially amongst the panels, but for whichtime must be recognized if the product of panel andsupporting staff, and contract work is to be brought toa standard which permits its publication.

• Three to four months to integrate all of the specialviewpoints, interests, and other baggage which maybe carried by participants in the process into somekind of coherent whole. The Stratton Commission didnot really ‘belly up’ to this task until spring of 1968.It required several, two day meetings to talk throughthe major issues, and determine the overall focus andapproach that the Commission wished to adopt in itsreport.

• Three to four months to validate and refine theproposed program, get it properly organized andwritten.

• Another month to actually achieve publication,along with all the logistics of finding appropriateillustrations, preparing appropriate transmittals andacknowledgments.

Presentation of the Commission Report

A central concern of the Commission, almost fromget-go, was the question of when, and hence to whom,it could most effectively and appropriately render itsreport. It was obvious that a report made in July 1968,as called for in the authorizing legislation, would ‘hitthe streets’ just as the nation’s political leadership waspreparing for the fall presidential and congressionalelections. Better either to defer to the end of the currentpresidential term or to seek permission to make thereport early in the succeeding term of office. I do not

recall the exact mechanisms for decision on this matter(or have the papers at home to permit me to researchit).

My recollection is that Dr. Stratton concluded that aDecember 1968 or January 1969 report would bestreconcile his obligation to the current administrationwith a chance to capture the attention of the next. Weconsulted on this matter with the Commission’scongressional advisors, emphasized our mutual desireto keep the report and its recommendations unentangledwith party politics yet to find a place in the stream ofpolitical action. The congressmen of both partiesendorsed delivery of the report to the outgoingadministration and promised that they would seek toensure that it not achieve a ‘dead letter’ status as a result.At the time, we had no way of knowing that the actualdelivery would be to a vice president who had onlyabout a week of remaining tenure in office, or thatHubert Humphrey, who had chaired the Marine ScienceCouncil and championed ocean causes, would be thedemocratic presidential candidate in the 1968 election.

Administrative Environment for a Stratton II

The timing issues which complicated the work ofthe 1967-69 Commission are likely to be even moredifficult for a commission formed during theremaining years of a Clinton presidency. This in partreflects the nature of the times. Although the countryis not today overwhelmed by the tumultuous issuesthat intruded into all aspects of national life in the laterJohnson years, it is seemingly preoccupied withmultiple layers of political trivia which make anygovernmental venture tortuous and unpredictable.Also, there have been a plethora of legislation andregulation enacted in the 30-year interval, which willcomplicate both selection of commissioners, and ofthe staff to be mobilized in their support.

The press can be expected to more aggressivelyprobe any possible suspicion of conflicts of interest,and the executive and congressional branches can beexpected to be less accommodating to one another’sinterests than applied only 30 years ago.Unfortunately these new circumstances couldconspire to undermine the possibility for theunanimity which was achieved by the StrattonCommission and which was an important element inthe recognition which its report received.


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Lessons Learned - What Lessons May We Draw from this Experience?

• Not to underestimate the time the job will take.

• Need to recognize that the landscape will likelychange significantly and unpredictably as the newCommission moves through its process.Forbearance, flexibility, and on-goingcommunication with those who ultimately willreceive, and need to deal with, the product of theCommissions work are essential.

• The most important elements of the activitysurrounding the Commission may be those which

precede its appointment, and those which follow thecompletion of its official task. In particular, if youexpect to make an impact, there must befollow-through.

• Then, most importantly, remembering thatdocuments do not decide things, people do. Peoplemust be energized through a continuing effort to seethat the subjects of the Commission’s work remainson the agenda and that its recommendations are givenserious attention in both the Executive Branch andCongress.


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ISSUES FOR A NEW OCEAN POLICY COMMISSION: THE CHANGING REGIME OF THE HIGH SEAS

² Lewis M. Alexander ²

Deputy Staff Director, Stratton Commission

One of the challenges a new national commissionon ocean policy might consider addressing involvesthe high seas, beyond the limits of nationaljurisdiction, where the international community ismoving gradually from a regime of the free seas to oneof a more managed high seas. This shift could haveserious consequences for the United States and othermaritime countries.

In this discussion I include two caveats. One is thatmy concerns do not include the regime of theInternational Sea-Bed Authority, which is a separateissue in itself. Nor should a new national commissionbe concerned with the Navy’s Freedom of Navigationprogram on the high seas. A Stratton II, like StrattonI, should probably not become involved inrecommendations on military matters of this sort.

It is my belief that some federal agency orcommission should be continuously monitoring highseas activities and management institutions andrecommending to the appropriate authorities suchactions as may seem necessary to maintain anequitable balance between the necessary freedoms ofthe high seas and those conservation and managementefforts that are important supports of the interests ofthe United Stats and other like-minded countries.

The Geographic Scope of the High Seas

If all coastal states made maximum exclusiveEconomic Zone (EEZ) claims in their coastal waters,about 70 percent of the world ocean would retain thestatus of high seas. Actually, the total areas of the highseas depends, in part, on the number of EEZ claims tobe made for certain rocks and islands that, accordingto Article 121 of the 1982 LOS Convention, “shallhave no exclusive economic zone or continental shelfof their own.” Remember, a single rock or islet,located more than 100 nautical miles from the nearest

national maritime limits, could generate a territorialsea/EEZ measuring over 33,000 square nauticalmiles, an area equal to that of the state of Ohio.Perhaps the United States should consider adopting apolicy of nonrecognition of “illegal” EEZ claims forrocks and islands incapable of habitation or aneconomic life of their own.

The high seas also includes the waters of theSouthern Ocean, although EEZs may, in time, beclaimed within parts of that Ocean around certainislands and island groups, such as the South Orkney,South Shetland, and Kerguelen Islands. Variousefforts have been made to treat the Southern Ocean asa zone separate from the rest of the high seas, witnessits designation by the International WhalingCommission 1994 as a sanctuary where all whaling isto be banned for ten years. Should this trend towardseparate treatment of the Southern Ocean beaccelerated?

To illustrate some of the concerns of high seasmanagement, listed here are three categories ofactivities where controversial situations may appear.

1. Environmental Protection and Preservation

Currently in place is the 1972 London Conventionthat defines dumping as the deliberate disposal ofwastes from ships and aircraft. The Conventionprohibits the dumping of certain wastes and requirespermits for the disposal of others. However, withrespect to some substances such as low-level nuclearwastes, there still appear to be uncertainties.

Another issue concerns vessel-source pollution andthe need for an international response to emergingproblems. Much has been made of the successes ofthe IMO conventions with respect to vesselconstruction, vessel safety, Traffic Separation


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Schemes and, of course, the 1973-78 MARPOL. Butnew problems arise, particularly with the movement ofvessels carrying hazardous cargoes through the highseas. In 1972, for example, there began the first of aplanned series of plutonium shipments by sea fromFrance to Japan for use in Japanese reactors. It wasreported that if a transport accident had occurred,plutonium might be released into the environment andwould remain a deadly contaminant for thousands ofyears.

There are also recurrent proposals, such asincineration at sea of highly noxious materials morethan 200 miles from land (and hopefully in areas ofprevailing offshore winds), or the seabed disposal ofhigh-level radioactive wastes, that represent potentialenvironmental dangers. Like the exclusive economicor fisheries zones, the high seas, particularly in theirmarginal areas, might become areas of increasingcontroversy and congestion.

2. The Conservation and Management of LivingMarine Resources

There are obviously a number of controversial, andat times politically explosive, issues concerning highseas living resources, among them whaling, straddlingand highly migratory stocks, anadromous species, anddrift nets. Which international organizations andtreaties should the U.S. strongly support and/or seek tochange? Even if an organization has been in place forsome time, it may not be operating at peak efficiency.The International Whaling Commission is such anexample. According to its charter, it was designed to“provide for the proper conservation of whale stocksand thus make possible the orderly development of thewhaling industry.” In the years since the imposition ofthe 1986 moratorium on whaling, little has been doneto promote the orderly development of the industry.Further, as John Knauss has written, even before themoratorium, the IWC “failed miserably in its primarygoal of maintaining sustainable populations.” Withrespect to high seas fisheries in general, Burke notesthat, among other things, there is a lack of adequatescientific data, enforcement systems, and allocation

procedures. Clearly, the protection of United States’interests in the conservation and management of highseas living resources requires constant monitoring andadvice on the part of federal agencies and commissions.

3. Protection of the Underwater CulturalHeritage

In recent years there has been considerable activity,particularly under the aegis of UNESCO, in support ofthe drafting of an international convention on theprotection of the underwater cultural heritage bothwithin national maritime limits beyond the territorialsea and on the deep sea bed. Although the United Statesis not now a member of UNESCO, it has participatedin these activities, including consideration of a draftconvention, prepared by the International LawAssociation. With respect to the deep sea bed, whatinternational agency would be responsible formonitoring archeology and other activities associatedwith the cultural heritage? The ISA has authority overmineral resources only. As technology comes to permitgreater attention to the cultural high seas resources, theU.S. government needs to prepare for the protection ofits interests beyond the EEZ limits.

Other Issues

There are, of course, other high seas uses andpotential management problems that exist or may exist— marine scientific research, the interdiction ofdrug-smuggling vessels, the eventual exploitation ofhydrothermal vents, including hypothermophiles; theseonly reinforce the need to approach the high seas as acoherent entity for purposes of management.

This brief summation is intended to demonstrate thecomplexities of high seas uses and managementproblems that, as technology advances, willundoubtedly increase. It is suggested that there is aneed for the establishment of an inter-agencyorganization that would focus on matters relating to theuse and management of activities on the high seasbeyond the limits of national jurisdiction.


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THE STRATTON COMMISSION : AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVEON POLICY STUDIES IN OCEAN GOVERNANCE, 1969 AND 1998

² Harry N. Scheiber ²

University of California, Berkeley

Introduction: 1

Nearly thirty years have passed since the WhiteHouse received the famed “Stratton CommissionReport,” the massive document entitled Our Nationand the Sea— the final report of the Commission onMarine Science, Engineering, and Resources,established under an act of Congress two and a halfyears earlier . 2 The influence of the StrattonCommission Report on U.S. policy proved to beuneven, though certainly of enormous importanceoverall. Some of its most notable recommendationswere almost immediately translated into law andpolicy; whereas in other respects, while the Reportgave new clarity of focus to continuing debates, it waswithout the resolution of issues on lines thecommission had wanted. Predictably enough, therewere other areas of policy in which a succession ofPresidents, the Congress, and the various oceanconstituencies and interest groups either resisted thecommission’s recommendations or else fell far shortof agreement on how to respond. Most significant forour purposes today is the fact that the StrattonCommission Report still stands, these many yearslater, as the last such major official enterprise chargedwith taking a full and comprehensive view of oceanpolicy and national needs. The inventory and analysisthat we seek to construct regarding the Commission’ssources of general effectiveness and specificachievements, and the lessons that are offered by therecord of areas in which it fell short, are the mostvaluable repository of data on which we can drawtoday for lessons that a “Stratton II” enterprise mightdo well to examine.

Winning Center Stage: The Factors UnderlyingSuccess

The Stratton Commission was able to arguepersuasively in 1969 that it spoke at a “time for

decision.” This was an accurate claim, if for no otherreason than that Presidents Kennedy and Johnson,and also the newly elected Richard Nixon, all hadgiven some significant priority to ocean policyquestions in their political campaigns and/or in policydevelopment initiatives while in office. Morespecifically, both the Johnson and Nixonadministrations proved willing to endorse explicitreforms in U.S. marine policy and, even moreforcefully, to set in motion concrete reforms ingovernmental organization affecting theadministration of ocean-related issues and functions.The Report thus dealt with issues that were at the timeof its preparation of relatively high political visibility,or at least had been acknowledged as important by keyactors in political life; and-thanks especially to thenotably pro-active involvement of Vice PresidentHumphrey and the genius of the Commission’sdirector and top staff-capable of gaining attention atthe highest levels of policy and lawmaking. Thenational government, in sum, was primed to listen,and, as it proved, was also poised to act.3 Scarcely ayear and a half would pass (a lightning flash, in termsof the normal patterns of decision in matterspotentially so controversial) before one of theCommission’s most critical and sensitiverecommendations-for creation of NOAA- became,albeit in modified and compromised form, a reality.Among the many other major recommendations onecan identify, in retrospect, a very respectable numberthat would become the focus of robust continuingdebate. With the passage of only a few years-that isto say, by the mid-1970s, in the midst of a new upsurgeof environmentalism and with some major changes inpolitics-important legislation would follow.

What makes particularly intriguing thisreceptiveness in Washington to the Commission’swide-ranging report, so threatening to some elements


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of the bureaucracy, is the fact that when the enterprisewas launched by an act of Congress in 1966 there was(as Wenk has pointed out) no catastrophe, no broadlyrecognized crisis, no exceptional urgency, in the notionthat the needs of the nation and of humankind withrespect to ocean science, marine technology, and theinterfaces of human economic activity and the oceanenvironment required comprehensive study-andpossibly comprehensive reorientation of both policyand governmental structures of implementation.Rather, the enterprise drew momentum initially fromthe sheer force of an idea, a core concept, and thededication of some politically powerful individuals toact upon concerns that had been articulated by thescientific establishment and elements of the “oceanpolicy community” as well as some user groups.4

Ultimately the Commission’s work drew impetus andeffectiveness also from the convergence of advantagesthat inhered in enjoying the attention of government’shighest level, inspired and skillful leadership by thecommission’s own leadership echelon, opportunitiesoffered and willingly seized by some Cabinet officialsand legislative leaders to transcend the ordinaryrivalries and routines of self-serving agency interests,and creative involvement of some powerfulprivate-sector interests in the process.

When we consider some of the important elements ofbackground context outside the internal dynamics ofgovernment itself, the factor that takes center stage inmost retrospective analyses is the impact of the Sputniklaunching and the Russian space program—in thecontext, of course, of Cold War rivalry andcompetition for military advantage and the attainmentof basic security objectives. Behind this event, whichhad sent a powerful shock wave through the politicalarena nearly a decade earlier, was the force of a seriesof commissions and special studies that had come outof the scientific community and pressed for moresystematic attention and financial support from thegovernment for oceanographic research.5

Traditionally, moreover, both in Europe and inAmerica, going back to the eighteenth century, theinterest of the naval forces in ocean studies had been adriving force and principal stated objective (if notnecessarily the real agenda, which of course was oftenbasic science) that won public support foroceanography.6 The United States in the “Sputnik”phase of the Cold War was no exception.

Increasingly in the years leading up to the StrattonCommission’s enterprise, proponents of an expandednational commitment to oceanography had becomeprogressively more committed explicitly to the largergoals of developing new technologies and toeconomic development. The commercial fisherieshad been the principal focus of such new orientationas had emerged with applied objectives, centeringupon management and conservation objectives aswell as exploration and more effective exploitation.7

By the mid-1960s, however, the focus had becomemuch broader and now encompassed the potential ofmining in the Continental Shelf and high seas areas,beyond what was already established in the offshoreoil drilling field. (Other economic activities and theirinterrelatedness were being debated, too, at least inacademic circles, by the mid-1960s, as will be notedmore fully below.) The example in the 1960s of theU.S. space program-which was regularly cited byproponents of reform in ocean policy as a model forthe exploration of the “inner space” of theoceans"-lent force and some useful glamour to theeffort to force reconsideration of oceans issues andmanagement. This was a time when the imperativesof the Cold War, especially with an increasingemphasis in naval planning on nuclear warfare basedupon submarine operations, undoubtedly were stillforemost in lending great urgency to a focus on theoceans.8 But the specific example of NASA-whichtook space, as one might take the oceans, as theorganizing principle for agency definition, withcomprehensive operational as well as scientific andpolicy responsibilities-was a constant reminder andmodel for those whose vision pointed toward creationof an agency (a “wet NASA”) with comparable scopeand importance of well-focused functions.

Another quite different factor in the backgroundneeds also to be taken into account. This was thewell-established tradition of “corporativism” (as wemay term it) that had brought industry, resourcemanagers, and scientists together in alliances to obtainpublic support for American scientific research onfisheries. This style of collaboration among theresource users, the biologists, and the managers (andthe politicians as well) had also been transferred afterWorld War II extensively to the arena of regulationitself. Thus many of the management programs forboth coastal fisheries and the programs underjurisdiction of a multilateral agency were specificallydesigned to include representatives of the industry as


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an integral part of their scientific and operationsoversight.9 This was the beginning, I think it fair tosay, of what became an important element of the“ocean community,” as it is called in politicalanalysis of the period we are discussing, as the corefisheries-oriented coalitions began to interactsystematically with other industrial-scientific-engineering clusters of interests and the politicalleaders who took a special interest in their variedconcerns and causes.

By the mid-1960s, the oceanographic institutes,schools and departments of fisheries science, fisheriesagencies, and industrial groups in the fisheries sectorshad begun to exchange ideas and get involved in thepolicy process in an increasingly systematized androutinized way. The published evidence of theseinteractions, together with the archival evidence of theperiod insofar as it has been analyzed to date, suggestthat the ocean-use industries were impelled in thisdevelopment by the rapid movement in internationalrelations to fashion a new legal order for the oceans.The debates and often-dramatic conflicts concerninglimits of the territorial seas, and the movement for acomprehensive Law of the Sea Convention that mightestablish a comprehensive global regime for theoceans—a regime, as the reformers hoped, whichmight fundamentally redefine the obligations andrights of nations in relation to ocean space andresources-was a matter of urgent common concern forthe leaders and interest groups in the emergent oceancommunity. It also brought them into an importantdialogue with the U.S. naval leaders and with the StateDepartment planners who had an agenda that mademultilateralism itself a top priority, sometimes in away that was at odds with the interests of Americanindustries or segments of industries (e.g., the salmonfishing fleet of the Pacific Northwest, which fordecades had pressed for unilateralist expansion of theU.S. offshore territorial boundary).10 The Law of theSea negotiations meant that U.S. domestic policy aswell as foreign policy initiatives (and adaptations)were driven in considerable measure by a need to keepabreast of, and if possible influence the basic directionof, the reformation of international law. Indeed, whenthe Stratton Commission considered these matters, itsReport would include repeated calls for assessmentof U.S. domestic policy options with a view towardpreparation for, or eventual alignment with, changesin the legal order of global marine relationships.

This emergence of an identifiable ocean communityof scientists, industrial elements, experts ingovernment, and politicians who shared commonground in their policy concerns was paralleled byanother movement: the trend toward recognition, bythe ocean community itself primarily, thatocean-related policy issues needed to be addressedfrom a variety of disciplinary perspectives. Adramatic example of how strong this trend hadbecome was to be found in a major California studyof that state’s ocean and coastal policies. The study,which appeared in 1965, had been directed by MilnerB. Schaefer, a marine biologist of exceptionaldistinction, and was undertaken by the Institute ofMarine Resources (IMR), based at the University ofCalifornia’s Scripps Institution of Oceanography. TheSchaefer IMR report was a brilliant success inchallenging very fundamentally both establishedpolitical-jurisdictional structures: this was in its basicpremise that the coastal waters and adjacent land areasshould be conceptualized—both for science and forpolicy purposes—as a social and ecological systemrequiring the exercise of state-level authorityinformed by systematic advising by scientists,lawyers, and social scientists. In this regard, Schaeferand his colleagues in the IMR project played a keyrole in shaping the core idea of “coastal zonemanagement” as a governmental and scientificenterprise-also reflecting, however, what Schaeferand others of equal prominence among the scientistsin the ocean community were then advising Congress,as it considered the question of shaping ocean policy.Schaefer urged the legislators to broaden their conceptof research support on scientific oceans issues toinclude support for related research in the socialsciences and in law. “It seems evident,” Schaeferwrote to Senator Warren Magnuson,

that in many cases the handicaps to rational,effective, and economically efficient development....of unutilized or underutilized resources ... lie to alarge extent in the area of economic and legalfactors, and therefore a thorough study of suchfactors, and consideration of possible means ofchanging them, will be highly important.11

In 1965 this idea of the coastal zone as amultidimensional and holistic unit for study andmanagement was still very new and (in the best sense)


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truly subversive: it represented a decisive andchallenging break from existing norms.12 In the sameway, the idea of ecosystem-oriented fisheries habitatstudies had been advanced in deepwater ocean scienceof the previous two decades—most notably, inCalifornia, by the CalCOFI-inspired ecosystemresearch in Pacific waters.13 Now the studies underSchaefer’s direction pointed to the need for bothscience and public policy to adopt a similar approachto the coastal land and water zones as a complexenvironmental system interacting with humansettlement and activities. Bringing interdisciplinaryintellectual resources to bear on a systematicphenomenon, in this way, was no less radical an ideafor ocean and coastal policy planning than theecological approach to habitat had been in fisheriesscience.14

For our purposes, the California study that Schaeferheaded is especially important because it offered auseful model for the approach to study and analysis ofmarine policy issues that would be taken by theStratton Commission. For as the Schaefercommission at IMR had done, the StrattonCommission dealt in depth with distinctive segmentsof ocean policy; and in doing so, Stratton (likeSchaefer) brought together in a common enterprisemany experts from a variety of disciplines in socialscience as well as from law, marine sciences, andengineering to examine in interdisciplinary ormultidisciplinary terms the full dimensions of eachsegment (fisheries, recreation, mining, etc.). And likethe IMR report, the Stratton Commission Report keptat the forefront of all its recommendations the needfor coordination, clarity of overarching objectives,and maximization of management-level integrationfor the governance of ocean resources and oceanspace. It is not coincidental, either, that some of themajor figures, including Schaefer himself, who wereinvolved in the IMR study’s directorate or advisorypanels, were also actively involved in the work of theStratton Commission.

None of this is meant to suggest that the successesof Stratton and his cohorts in seizing the moment innational ocean affairs were merely derivatory. Myintention is, rather, to recall-as we consider theconditions of the Commission’s achievements-thatthere was not only general impetus on several frontsin the 1960s to make U.S. ocean policy more coherent

and effective; there was also a growing recognition inscientific and policy circles of the need to approachocean (including coastal) policy issues in a morecomprehensive and focused mode. Because theSchaefer IMR study was already out in the publicdomain, it was available to serve the Strattoncommissioners and advisers as a model for its ownwork-and , at the very least, it indicates that theintellectual groundwork, and not only the politicalbackground, was already firmly established for theapproach that the Stratton Commission mobilized soeffectively in pursuing its mission.

That is to say, Stratton Commission’s Report, incalling for “understanding of ecosystem dynamics,”no less than in suggesting designs for “comprehensive[management] systems,” reflected the strength andgrowing acceptance of new ideas that had alreadypenetrated marine science debate as well as policyanalysis discussion.15 It was one of the StrattonCommission’s major contributions to ocean policythat it brought these new modes of thinking into playin so effective a way at the highest level of the nationalpolicy process.

“Comprehensive Policy” and “Systems” (in the plural)

One of the most controversial reforms proposed bythe Stratton Commission did not go to substantivepolicy at all, but rather was its proposal for a newNational Ocean and Atmospheric Agency (NOAA).The new agency, intended to be an independent one thatwould assume supervision and coordination ofnumerous agencies formerly scattered throughout thegovernment-but in addition would have someimportant managerial functions- was designed (as theReport argued) “to mobilize and impart energy to thetotal undertaking” of a plan for national action.16 Thelist of functions that the Report recommended forassignment to NOAA was broad and revealed theserious intention to achieve a kind ofcomprehensiveness of management oversight andimplementation that had never before been envisionedfor ocean resources and problems. Among thesefunctions were oceans exploration and support of basicscience, development of marine fisheries and oversightof their management by a proposed set of regionalinterstate agencies formed by federal compact,promotion of marine education, and the administration


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coordination for purposes of reducing of conflicts inmultiple-use areas of resource management. Inaddition, the Report proposed that NOAA wouldprovide directly essential services that includedmapping and weather reporting to marine users and tothe general public, and the development and oversightof a marine minerals program.

For all its emphasis on coordination andcomprehensiveness of vision, policy concepts, andadministration, the Stratton Commission recognizedin explicit language the intractable realities ofsegmentation, declaring:

It is impossible to deal with development andmanagement issues in terms of marine resources asa whole, although general policy considerationsmust be accommodated.... There is no singlenational policy uniformly applicable to allresources, just as there is no single defense,economic, or foreign policy. Rather, there is only abody of experience and general objectives whichguide decisions on specific issues at specifictimes.17

This feature of the Report is often forgotten whenchampions of greater centralization of power overocean affairs hark back to the Stratton Commission asan advocate of an ideal that fell short of realization.The NOAA proposal, in its original form, is too easilyconflated with the much more abstract idea of a“comprehensive policy.” In fact, the organization ofthe Commission’s studies and also its final reportaddressed issues in segments; the reality that separatesectors existed and had to be considered, to somedegree, on their own individual terms (for fisheries,for recreation, for minerals, for scientific research, fordefense, for international law, etc.) was not lost fromsight or subordinated for cosmetic purposes to therhetoric of concern with holistic issues.

As I have argued in a previous OGSG meeting, inrevisiting the wide-ranging series of issues exploredby the Commission, it is important to keep the realitiesof segmentation in mind. Some room for play at thejoints—even zones of contradiction and a certainincoherence—will very likely need to be taken, nowas in 1969, as a political requirement of success inachieving policy reform and adjustment. The ideal of“coherence” will not always be attainable; some of the

problems before us in 1998 will have to be taken ontheir own terms, not only for political reasons but verylikely because the optimal approach to policy, by one“objective” non-political standard or another, e.g., onedictated by scientific analysis, may indicate thedesirability of segmented, single-sector solutionsrather than a dogmatic subordination of sectoralpolicy goals to the imperatives of“comprehensiveness.” 18

To elevate comprehensiveness in the abstract to thestatus of the single controlling and determinativeobjective is an alluring option that will probably needto be resisted in several important segments of marinepolicy evaluation and reform. It may be found that theobjective of attaining coherence will be much betterserved by accepting single-sector solutions when theevidence indicates their appropriateness, than bydashing headlong on a perhaps-quixotic coursetoward attaining comprehensive and whollyintegrated policy.

When we consider, then, the best design ofinvestigation for a Stratton Commission II, it seemsto me important to accept that the single-sectorapproach is not necessarily obsolete or suboptimal-orper se deplorable. It is manifestly essential, however,that a new commission should take into account theneed to attack head-on, as did the StrattonCommission, the problem of patently unnecessary(and damaging) administrative fragmentation ofresponsibility. And in light of the legacy of the1970s-that great array of specialized legislationcreating specialized agencies to oversee in acompartmentalized way specific areas of marineresources and issues (the Magnuson fisheries act, theMarine Mammal Protection Act, the EndangeredSpecies Act, and the rest)-it seems important that thenew commission should seek to identify the mostpromising avenues for more effective coordination, ata minimum, or outright administrative merger.

A final lesson to be drawn, in this context, from theStratton Report and its approach is the desirability ofa new commission’s revisiting the question of anecosystem design in shaping policy andadministrative institutions. The Stratton Commissionstressed the need for an ecosystem approach, but ifrevisited today each of its segment or sector reports


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and recommendations would look quite different froma 1969 perspective since we have gained so muchexperience since then in attempting to make ecosystemideas operational in administration. Unfortunately, itmust be conceded, a great deal of “ecosystemmanagement” design in the various agencies ofgovernment today amounts to little more than rhetoricalre-packaging or outright obfuscation. Prof. OliverHouck, among others, has concluded, for example, thatecosystem management systems have proved in thefield to be “amorphous and unenforceable;” 19 andsometimes they seem to be justified by their championsin terms that amount to little more than a design foravoiding definitive management decisions and keeping“stakeholders” happy.

These issues which have arisen in ecosystem analysisand management indicate that the opportunity for a newcommission to clarify the conceptual problems andpoint the way to policy solutions is all the more neededand capable of producing useful results. Similarly, onecan anticipate that objectives of sustainability andbiodiversity will need to be integrated fully into the fociof new sectoral studies as well as an overall report onpolicy, especially as they are mandated by the terms ofthe latest developments in international environmentallaw.

Looking Back: How the Commission Worked

One of the most interesting questions before aconference on prospects for a Stratton II concerns whataspects of the first commission’s organization andmode of investigation ought to be emulated, and whichif any rejected or modified. Without attempting toprovide answers, it is worth setting forth that the staffwas of exceptional quality-a factor no doubt moreimportant than mere size-but the 15 commissioners had15 professional staff and an additional ten supportpersonnel. There was correspondence with 600individuals in government, the academic institutions,and industry, in addition to the commission’s hearingformal testimony of 126 witnesses. Monthly meetingswere conducted; and a total of 19 plenary meetings,lasting two to four days, were held. In addition, specialpanels were established with assigned areas ofresponsibility. Without access to the records ofhearings and exchanges of working papers, etc., it isdifficult for the historian to judge effectiveness-except

by reference to the final product in the Report, whoseexcellence on so many counts is legendary. The timepermitted for preparation of the present work did notallow for archival research or more than preliminaryinterviewing, to probe some of these importantquestions. But a fuller analysis of the individualsegment reports and recommendations could, I think,provide important insights into the ways in which theStratton Commission’s organization, formalprocedures, and informal dynamics hold lessons for ustoday.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT: Research from which thisstudy is drawn has been supported in part by funds fromNOAA and from the State of California, through aproject grant from the California Sea Grant CollegeProgram to the Ocean Law and Policy Program, Centerfor the Study of Law and Society, University ofCalifornia, Berkeley.

1Author’s note: I want to acknowledge the seminalimportance of Edward Wenk, Jr., The Politics of theOcean (Seattle, 1972) as a source of information andinterpretations for any retrospective study, such as thisone, seeking to assess aspects of the origins, context, andeffectiveness of the Stratton Commission, either on itsown terms historically or as a case study offering lessonsfor the future. For a much longer-term view that providesessential historical perspective on both the commissionand the larger governmental enterprise in science,technology and policy in which it played so important arole for ocean affairs, the classic study by A. HunterDupree, Science in the Federal Government (New York,1957) remains invaluable; so too with respect to policyhistory and analysis are the various studies, over theyears, by leading scholars in policy process andespecially science policy and ocean policy, including,among others, Biliana Cicin-Sain, Robert Knecht, DonPrice, Warren Wooster, John A. Knauss, RobertFriedheim, Jack Archer, Gerard Mangone, Robert Abel,and William T. Burke. Though not specifically cited inthis conference version of the present study, theirwritings provide essential context and information forany study with purposes such as animate the present oneand the conference for which it is prepared. It should benoted that some sections of the present conference paperincorporate materials from an earlier brief presentationmade by the present author to the 1992 Honolulumeetings of the Ocean Governance Study Group.

2Our Nation and the Sea: A Plan for National Action(Washington, 1969).


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3 Wenk streses throughout his analysis in Politics ofthe Ocean the key importance of Vice PresidentHumphrey’s role, a view seconded in the statementprepared for this conference by John Knauss. At a latertime, the fortuitous advantage of one member’s havingdirect access to President Nixon’s most influentialadviser, Attorney General Mitchell, kicked in as a criticalfactor in getting the report prominently on the WhiteHouse agenda and assuring a more favorable presidentialreaction to its principal organizational recommendationthat (by all indications) it would have received otherwisefrom the Oval Office.

In a widely cited analysis of ocean policy history,Robert Abel states: “Viewed in retrospect, it would bedifficult to identify a more dynamic duo than VicePresident Humphrey and Dr. Wenk” as evidenced in theirrole in the cabinet level marine council, a group thatwould be of decisive importance in anticipating issues,paving the way politically for the Stratton Commission,and complementing the efforts of the commissioners andthe staffs and consultants that were responsible for thevarious segments of the Stratton study. Abel, “Historyof the U.S. Ocean Policy Program,” in Making OceanPolicy (ed. F. W. Hoole et al., 1981) 17.

4In their study of the auto industry and pollutioncontrol, Krier and Ursin emphasize that in the dynamicsof political and policy process leading to adoption of thesmog control regulatory regime, it was the sudden adventof smog alerts at an unprecedented level that galvanizedpublic opinion and overcame the “normal” process bywhich industry would stand firm and place the burden ofproof so heavily on environmentalists that the legislationcould be blocked. James Krier and Edmund Ursin,Pollution and Policy: A Case Essay on California andFederal Experience with Motor Vehicle Air Pollution,1940-1975 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1977).Stonewalling also figured heavily in the oil industry’sresistance to popular efforts to place offshore oil rigsunder strict regulation, but the Santa Barbara oil spilldisaster changed entirely the balance of power in thepolitical arena almost overnight. On this and otheraspects of change in legal process relevant to thisconference’s theme that characterized the 1960s andearly 1970s, see Harry N. Scheiber, “Technology andAmerican Legal Development, 1789-1986,” inTechnology, The Economy, And Society: The AmericanExperience, ed. J. Colton and S. Bruchey (New York,1987), pp. 83-125.

5The importance of these predecessor studies isstressed by both Ed Wenk and by John Knauss in theircontributions to this symposium.

6Margaret Deacon’s brilliant historical studies, as wellas the major works by Susan Schlee, document the earlierepisodes of upsurges of interest in oceanographic

enterprises. See Deacon, Scientists and the Sea,1650-1900: A Study of Marine Science (New York,1971); Schlee, Edge of an Unfamiliar World: A Historyof Oceanography (New York, 1973).

7See Harry N. Scheiber, “Modern U.S. PacificOceanography and the Legacy of British and NorthernEuropean Science,” in Stephen Fisher, ed, Man and theMarine Environment (Exeter Maritime Studies, No. 9.Exeter, U.K., 1994), 36-75.

8The defense industry interests played a part in thedebate of ocean policy that was probably impelled in partby concern about a possible decline of contracts in otherareas of military technology. A fuller discussion of thisaspect of the debate will be reserved for a later revisionof this paper.

9Scheiber, “Pacific Ocean Resources, Science andLaw of the Sea; Wilbert M. Chapman and the PacificFisheries, 1945-70,” Ecology Law Quarterly, 13 (1986)381-534.

10 Ibid.

11 Milner B. Schaefer to Sen. Warren Magnuson, May6,m 1964, copy in Wilbert M. Chapman Papers,University of Washington Libraries, quoted in Scheiber,“Success and Failure in Science-Policy Interactions:Cases from the History of California Coastal and OceanStudies, 1945-1973,” in National Research Council,Improving Interactions between Coastal Science andPolicy (National Academy of Sciences, 1995), 107-8.

12 Ibid. (“Success and Failure”), 108ff.

13On the emergence of ecosystem science, see HarryN. Scheiber, “From Science to Law to Politics: AnHistorical View of the Ecosystem Idea and Its Effect onResource Management,” Ecology Law Quarterly, 24:631-652 (1997); and id., “Pacific Ocean Resources,”supra note 9.

14“Success and Failure,” cited n. 10 supra.

15Report, at pp. 15, 173.

16Report, p.—- . In this and the following paragraphs,I incorporate directly materials from my 1992presentation to the Ocean Governance Study GroupSymposium volume, Ocean Governance: A NewVision-Analyses for Improved, Integrated Governance ofOceans and Coasts, ed. Biliana Cicin-Sain (Newark,Delaware, 1992), 19-21.

17Report, p. 83.


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18This is the place in policy evaluation in which webadly need a more rigorous approach to the uses ofscientific information and analysis in relation to socialand political analysis—a vexed topic which obtained afresh look from an NAS-NRC Ocean Studies Boardconference at Irvine on science, policy studies, andcoastal management (papers published in NRC,Improving Interactions, cited n. 10 supra).

19Oliver A. Houck, “On the Law of Biodiversity andEcosystem Management,” Minnesota Law Review, 81:869 (1997) (a study and critique of the U.S. ForestService ecosystem and biodiversity programs as theyhave been applied in the field). See also Scheiber, “FromScience to Law to Politics,” cited note 11 supra.


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THE GREAT OCEAN COMMISSIONS CORNERSTONES FOR REJUVENATING MARINE SCIENCE AND POLICY

² Mary Hope Katsouros ²

Heinz Center III Center for Science, Economics and the Environment

(Editors’ Note: This is an outline of Ms. Katsouros’talk.)

I. Purpose of the Paper

A. To compare and contrast the roles andoutcomes of a Year of the Ocean Commissionwith those of the Stratton Commission.

B. Concentrating on Marine Science and Policy

1. Discuss the many accomplishments of the late‘60s and ‘70s

2. Point out the central role of the Stratton Commission

3. Compare the late ‘60s, its paradigms, planningenvironment, stakeholders, with those of the late‘90s

4. Argue what it will take to make the first decadeof the new millenium as productive as the ‘70s

II. Discussion of the Accomplishmentsof the Late ‘60s and ‘70s

A. Marine legislation and activities

1. 1966 Sea Grant program established

2. 1966 Marine Resouces and EngineeringDevelopment Act

3. 1970 Formation of NOAA

4. 1970 Beginning of IDOE and World WeatherProgram

5. 1972 Coastal Zone Management Act

6. 1972 Clean Water Act

7. 1972 Marine Protection, Research, andSanctuaries Act

8. 1972 Marine Mammal Protection Act

9. 1973 Endangered Species Act

10. 1976 Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act

B. Late 1960s paradigms

1. Marine resources “infinite”

2. Expand use and accelerate development

3. “Grow the economy”

C. Marine Resources and EngineeringDevelopment Act (1966)

“Develop, encourage, and maintain acoordinated, comprehensive, and long-rangenational program—to protect health and propertyand enhance commerce, transportation, andnational security—and to increase utilization ofthese resources.”

IV. Central Role of the Stratton Commission

A. Commission objectives

1. Maintain our expanding national economy

2. Obtain the needed resources from the marineenvironment

B. Composition of Commission

1. 15 members appointed by the President fromFederal and State government, industry,universities, and laboratories

2. 4 advisory members from among the membersin the Senate and House of Representatives

C. Commission report

1. Published Our Nation and the Sea in January,1969

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2. 126 recommendations in 17 categories

V. Comparison of the Late ‘60s with the Late ‘90s

Can we expect similar results/outcomes from a1990s Ocean Commission?

A. Differences in stakeholders

1. 1960sa. Government (Federal and State)b. Industryc. Academia

2. 1990sa. Government (Federal, Regional, State,

Local)b. Industryc. Academiad. Environmental Community

B. Differences in paradigms

1. 1960sa. Marine resources infinite b. Expand use and accelerate developmentc. Growth

2. 1990sa. Marine resources finiteb. Balance use and conservationc. Sustainability

C. Differences in management paradigms

1. 1960sCo-manage oceanic and atmospheric

sciences2. 1990s

Co-manage physical, chemical, geological, biological systems; i.e. Earth as a system

D. Differences in governance approaches

1. 1960sa. Federal government often viewed as the solution to almost any problemb. Federal budgets and roles were expandingc. Marine resource governance largely a Federal responsibility

2. 1990sa. Solutions to America’s problems are often outside the Federal government’s purviewb. Federal budgets and roles are diminishingc. Marine resource governance is shared by many layers of government and stakeholders

VI. Discussion of Necessary Factors for aProductive First Decade of the New Millenium

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THE STRATTON COMMISSION AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. MANAGEMENT POLICY FOR ITS EEZ

² Roger E. McManus ²

President, Center for Marine Conservation

Introduction

Over the last several months the Steering Group forthe Year of the Ocean organized by the H. John HeinzIII Center for Science, Economics and theEnvironment has been conducting a series of meetingsand workshops to examine the state of U.S. marineresources and their management. The Group wascomprised of a wide spectrum of ocean interestsranging from federal and state governments to theresource production and transportation industries,academia and the environmental community. Manyof these interests were on opposing sides in past policydebates, but the Heinz Center process was remarkablein the shared sense of purpose by the participants toconfront marine policy issues the United States facesin managing its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Forlegal and political reasons the Group was constrainedfrom pursuing their work with the view to makeformal recommendations, but the consensus on majorthemes emerging from their discussion will be evidentfrom the upcoming release of their report and othervenues for discussion of its content and thedeliberations of the group.

Notwithstanding, the diversity of the group, allexpressed concern about the significant challengesfacing the country in managing the U.S. EEZ and itsresources. There was recognition and support for theconcept that the nation’s economy, the quality of ourmarine environment, and the productivity of ourmarine resources are inextricably linked. There wasskepticism expressed about the effectiveness of thecurrent approaches to resource management, whereneither management objectives nor the strategies toachieve them are well defined. There was concernabout the adequacy of management structure andpolitical will for establishing a more transparent andeffective management process. The inadequacy of

research funding, and efforts for public educationabout ocean issues was a frequent topic, and the needfor increased attention to those areas was supportedby the Group.

While analysis of the work of the StrattonCommission was not a significant topic for the HeinzGroup, the Group did characterize its own efforts as aproduct for use by the new Commission that would beestablished by the Oceans Act that has passed the U.S.Senate and is currently being considered by the U.S.House of Representatives. Further, when a HouseResources Committee staff member told the Groupthat the Committee leadership may want to constrainthe scope of the work for the Commission toimproving the existing government structure,members of the Group registered strong opposition tosuch constraints. The Group as a whole expressed theneed to make it clear that the Commission should notbe constrained in any way regarding the scope of itsdeliberations on U.S. marine resource managementneed and policy. As was clear from the testimonygiven by several members of the Heinz Group whotestified at the last House Hearing on the Oceans Act,the Group favors maintaining the independence of thenew Commission from any oversight by the ExecutiveBranch.

Early in 1996, the Center for Marine Conservation(CMC) commissioned a paper from Michael Weber(Weber, 1996), a former CMC Vice President forPrograms, to examine in part the potential forestablishing a new Stratton-type oceans commissionand other mechanisms for reforming U.S. marinepolicy for the EEZ on the occasion of the Year of theOcean. This paper was subject to limited distributionin Congress and the Executive Branch, and itsconclusions were the subject of presentations by Mr.Weber and others. Mr. Weber’s conclusions echo


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those of the Heinz Group. He strongly supported theneed for a new effort to update the work of the StrattonCommission, recognizing the difficulty of achievingthe political conditions for establishing a newCommission with needed authority and resources, andfor ensuring the effectiveness of its work. This paperdraws heavily on Mr. Weber’s work.

In his introduction, Mr. Weber noted: “A surveyof the last thirty years of ocean policy in the UnitedStates shows that changes in policy have been causedgenerally by external events, such as the PrinceWilliam Sound oil spill or overfishing by foreignfleets off New England. The principal and perhapsonly, exception to this rule is the so-called StrattonCommission, whose 1969 report Our Nation and theSea led to the creation of the National Oceanic andAtmospheric Administration (NOAA) andcontributed greatly to the passage of the Coastal ZoneManagement Act.” In the following I will emphasizethat while some of the conditions that made successof the Stratton Commission possible are present forthe proposed new Commission in the Oceans Act,others are lacking.

For example, while recent public polling suggeststhat the public is in strong favor of conserving marineresources and protecting the marine environment, weshould be concerned about the depth of understandingand commitment by both the public and policy makersfor a lengthy and possibly significant policy review.Evidence for such concern can be illustrated in tworecent experiences. First, during the course of theHeinz Group’s deliberations, in the International Yearof the Ocean, while plans were proceeding feverishlyfor a National Ocean Conference (originallypromoted as a White House Conference) in June, andCongress is preparing to pass major marine legislationin the Oceans Act, the White House chose to celebrateEarth Day with the President and Vice President ofthe United States working on a hiking trail in WestVirginia. Whether consideration was given to makingthe White House venue for Earth Day on the Coast, Idon’t know.

Alone such an incident would be insignificant, but formany of us who have worked to elevate the interest ofthe Executive Office of the President (EOP) in oceanissues, it was an additional confirmation, fromextensive experience, that these issues do not have high

visibility in the Executive Office of the President.NOAA staff have complained that is the case inpursuing their issues in this Administration’senvironmental agenda. On the other hand, recent staffchanges in the President’s Council on EnvironmentalQuality has increased dedicated staff time to marineenvironmental issues. One of the popular notionsregarding the reasons for the success of the StrattonCommission was that its work enjoyed significantsupport from the White House. If that is a requirement,we need to work hard to convince the ClintonAdministration that our issues are worthy of its concernand support.

Second, I was a guest on a recent radio talk showwhere I discussed the deliberations of the Heinz Group,and emphasized the problem that the United States ofAmerica had no plan for administration of the EEZ, andthat we lacked a lead agency for its managementcomparable to lead agencies for public lands. Onecaller who identified himself as a commercialfisherman, and a marine lawyer for 20 years, arguedthat such an agency existed, the “NationalOceanographic and Atmospheric Administration”(sic), and that NOAA essentially had omnibus legalauthority for the EEZ, including that for minerals andenergy development. This assertion of course isfactually wrong, and indeed in practice NOAAregularly does not assert leadership in ocean policywithin the Executive Office of the President.

Public understanding about the U.S. managementregimes and needs is not optimum for informed citizeninvolvement in developing effective marine policy.This is troublesome in that strong Congressionalsupport for the work of the Stratton Commission alsoseemed important to its success. Without aknowledgeable citizenry expressing their concern totheir elected policy makers, it is questionable whetherthe needed level of support will be forthcoming fromthe 105th and 106th Congresses.

The Stratton Commission

As Weber notes in his paper: “[T]he work of theStratton Commission and the White House MarineSciences Council in the late 1960s was the culminationof a process begun in the late 1950s with the conveningof the National Academy of Sciences Committee on


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Oceanography (NASCO), which issued severalreports on national interests and needs in oceanscience, technology, and resource development.According to Wenk (1972 and 1995), these reportsand the promotion of ocean interests in Congress bythe chairman of NASCO fostered the development ofa group of Senators and Congressmen who becameadvocates for the oceans in the 1960s, includingSenators Magnuson, Hollings and Bartlett, andCongressmen Bonner, Lennoh, Rogers, and Hanna.”“With the passage of the Marine Resources andEngineering Development Act of 1966, Congressestablished the Stratton Commission and the MarineSciences Council - the former to resolve the issue ofbureaucratic organization of Federal oceans efforts.The report of the Stratton Commission was eagerlyawaited by a growing group of members of Congress-a factor that contributed greatly to the actualimplementation of some of the Commission’s majorrecommendations.”

In examining what made the Stratton Commissionsuccessful and what would contribute to the successof future such efforts, Weber observed: “One theoryof policy change described by Knecht, Cicin-Sain andArcher (1988) holds that change occurs when threestreams of activity come together at the same time. Inthe first stream, problems come to the fore due to acrisis or poor performance by programs. Solutions tothese problems, meanwhile, develop in a kind ofprimeval policy soup made up of conferences,hearings, conversation, etc. Solutions survive if theyare technically feasible, suit dominant values and theprevailing national mood, can be funded, enjoypolitical support, and can respond to opposition. Butthese two streams will go nowhere without the energyof the political stream, which itself swings with thenational mood, national elections, the composition ofCongressional committees and interest groupcampaigns. All three streams can be influenced, butthey all must flow together if change is to occur.”

These “streams” came together for the StrattonCommission: a general lack of a federaladministrative regime for the oceans, high levelpolitical support by the White House and the Congressfor action, and solutions that survived in part in theensuing political debate. The success of the StrattonCommission effort once it was initiated is widely

attributed to its strong mandate, the energy and skillof its chair and staff, and the overall leadership of VicePresident Humphrey in promoting proactive revisionof U.S. marine policy to meet the emerging challengesto the nation.

In evaluating why subsequent efforts failed tosubstantially reform ocean policy, Weber (1996)identified several causes, including limits to the scopeof deliberations in those efforts and the lack oftop-level political support. These are issues thatconstrain the current effort to launch the proposed newCommission.

The Oceans Act

There are similarities and disturbing differencesbetween the work of the Stratton Commission and thecurrent situation that may greatly affect the success ofa new Commission. There appears to be emergingconsensus from the Heinz Center process and otherfora that the challenges facing U.S. management ofthe EEZ exceed the capacity of our present policy andmanagement regimes. That, coupled with publicsupport, although its understanding and the depth ofsupport could be strengthened, suggests the need tomake a course adjustment after 30 years.

Fortunately there is a core group of Congressionalleaders who parallel those that supported the work ofthe Stratton Commission. That group, however,needs to be strengthened in numbers and otherwiseassisted in fulfilling its role.

Unfortunately, there is a great danger that a newCommission will not be established, or be establishedby the 105th Congress unwisely with limitations onthe scope of its deliberations, or that it will beinadequately funded. A Commission that is notcapable of addressing issues that have been clearlyidentified as part of the needed agenda for such workwill not be the subject of investment by the growingand diverse oceans communities. Such a Commissionwill ultimately not receive the attention and supportof its work needed to ensure it will be considered asource for major policy change.

In addition, the need for securing leadership fromthe Executive Branch is confounded by three


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problems. First it is not clear that there is a stronginterest in the Executive Office of the President for thesubstantive issues and challenges, and therefore thecommitment to doing the work needed to support acomprehensive review of U.S. ocean policy and takeneeded action. While much effort was given, forexample, in preparation of the national conference inJune, it had the aura of event planning rather than aspart of an overall strategy for policy reform.

Second, similar to the situation that called for strongleadership of Vice President Humphrey for thesuccessful Marine Sciences Council, there is a strongneed for Vice President Gore to assume such leadershipto follow through on the promise of the Oceans Act.[Gore seems uniquely suited to the task. Ocean researchand management is a highly technical exercise whichis within the apparent personal interests of the VicePresident, and the development and conservation ofocean resources promises exciting new opportunitiesfor the economy and health and well-being of theAmerican people. Unfortunately, the role of the VicePresident in this effort may be impeded in the highlypartisan, national political atmosphere from which wesuffer at the end of the century. There is reticence bymembers of the 105th Congress to give such apotentially highly visible platform to a Democraticcandidate for the Presidency. One solution would be toset up Executive Branch leadership in this effort byadministrative action, but others worry that taking suchan initiative before passage of the Oceans Act willthreaten its passage. This is a clear case of partisanpolitics getting in the way of the national interest.

Third, while human population demands on oceanresources and assaults of pollution on the marineenvironment are increasing at a worrisome rate andlevel, there are strong political and philosophical issuesthat interfere with the further development of solutionsand management regimes. In particular, the U.S.Department of State, and the Department of Defenseare very concerned that the principles underlying theLaw of the Sea and freedom of ocean navigation not betrammeled, or that operations important to nationalsecurity not be compromised by practices that mayrestrict current practices for ocean navigation or use.Notwithstanding substantive resource managementneeds, the concerns of State and Defense oftendominate high-level policy decisions, frequently

behind closed doors and out of sight of public process.There is recurring debate on the application of U.S.domestic law to the EEZ and to U.S. operations on thehigh seas, including with respect to the NationalEnvironmental Policy Act and the Endangered SpeciesAct. The recent decision by President Clinton to requestthe International Maritime Organization’s cooperationin protecting right whales was important in this contextin that it establishes priority for marine conservation inU.S. ocean policy, requiring navigational protocols forprotecting the marine wildlife. I expect the Departmentof Defense to work to undermine the policy and tosecure a defeat to the President’s proposal to the IMO,but in any case it is clear that we as a nation have toresolve conflicting perspectives on navigation anddefense if we are to make needed progress inestablishing effective management regimes for ourmarine territory and resources. The creation of theCommission by the Oceans Act is a major opportunityto start a national conversation on those issues, butunless the White House uses its authority to bring Stateand Defense to the table significant progress will not bepossible.

Federal Government Organization for EEZ Management

The most critical issue facing the Commission willbe how the United States of America will effectivelygovern its EEZ, including identifying what changes areneeded to ensure adequate administrative authority,financial resources, and political will to do the job. Foryears I have advocated for consolidation of marinemanagement authorities in NOAA as a means to a morecoordinated and effective management regime for theU.S. EEZ, but I have been swimming against thepolitical current. While there is considerable merit inestablishing a lead federal agency for EEZmanagement, with lead authority for managementcoordination and policy development, I no longerbelieve that effort can simply be achieved through anexpanded and strengthened NOAA.

When NOAA was finally established in the NixonAdministration, it was weaker in execution than inoriginal concept. The agency was charged with amajor role in developing atmospheric science, and ithas an excellent reputation for the quality of itsscientific work. There is, however, regular concern


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among its ocean constituents about the “wet side” ofNOAA, and its capacity and will to step up to the plateas a resource management agency.

The scientific culture of NOAA has resulted in greatadministrative stability. As a non-governmentorganization representative principally engaged inadvocacy for strengthened conservation policy, I canrelate that changes in administrations rarely result insignificant policy changes or procedures within theagency since my experience starting with the FordAdministration. NOAA exhibits remarkablebureaucratic stability, and NOAA personnel aregenerally regarded as dedicated people, well qualifiedfor their work, who produce quality products andservices.

Some of the disappointments with NOAA’sperformance may be attributed to its placement withinthe Department of Commerce. With the notableexception of Secretary Brown, and more recently withthe intercession of Secretary Daley regarding therecent right whale decision, Commerce leadershipgenerally appears to be disengaged from the agencyexcept when its efforts to carry out its stewardshipresponsibilities conflict with Departmental economicor political interests. NOAA’s program and budgetneeds are seemingly not priorities in the Departmentand its overseers in the Office of Management andBudget with substantially different interests, and thebureaucratic gap further isolates the agency’s policyconcerns from visibility within the EOP.

Unfortunately too, the sources of NOAA’s strengthsmay be the roots of its weaknesses. While NOAA wasestablished and functions well as an agency to developthe science, it is increasingly called to performstewardship and management responsibilities forocean places and resources. Scientists are trained tobe reluctant to come to closure on cause and effect,and on projecting policy in the face of a lack ofinformation. Such qualities make for good science,but can lead to gridlock in developing andimplementing management policy. NOAA struggleswith making and implementing managementdecisions, and its leadership is extraordinarilysensitive to political pressure from Congresscompared, for example, to those facing similarresponsibilities in the Departments of the Interior andAgriculture, and the Environmental ProtectionAgency.

NOAA regularly operates in violation ofadministrative law. While mounting administrativeresponsibilities and the lack of needed staff andfunding resources certainly contribute to this problem,the agency is consistently late in meeting legislativeand administrative deadlines. The agency is averse tomaking specific decisions within specific time frames.Their response to controversy is often to unduly orillegally prolong process, and process is frequentlyreinvented in the face of controversy. The results arethat decisions delayed, like justice, are directiondenied for effective and reliable managementregimes. And then, management decisions made arefrequently revisited in the heat of political pressure.

Failure to run an administratively tight ship makesthe agency a prime candidate for litigation, especiallyfor those who see significant public relations benefitin taking the agency to court, notwithstanding theremay be more traditional or better avenues for solvingmanagement problems. Perhaps the most troublesomeresult of the culture that has developed within theagency is a drift to a seeming preference to rely onlitigation for political cover in carrying out statutoryresponsibilities. Through the years NOAA staff andleadership have made it clear that they wouldwelcome more litigation on politically difficult issues.With litigation, the agency has an opportunity toabsolve itself of responsibility for undertakingpolitically unpopular administrative processes ormaking unpopular decisions. Once in this mindset theappeal may become inescapable; the agency can avoidpolitical blame and transfer it to a statute or to thestatute’s supporters, and it can then use the complexmilieu of administrative law and litigation to providegreater flexibility to chart an agency coursenotwithstanding statutory direction or stewardshipresponsibility. Threatening a wayward agency withlitigation loses its punitive and advocacy value if theagency welcomes intercession by the courts with theview to use that litigation to try to demonstrate that itis the demands of the law not the agency that is at fault.The checks and balances of our system of governmentare considerably eroded when adherence to law losesrelevance.

After supporting expansion and consolidation ofNOAA to fill a need for better leadership in oceanmanagement, I have concluded that this course will bean impediment to the goal of establishing the neededcapacity to govern our EEZ and proactively manage


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its resources to meet the challenges of the nextcentury. The new Commission should have theauthority to carefully examine this issue. And, if uponreview it concurs that a lead ocean agency is needed,I would argue that agency should essentially berecreated from current authorities, which are scatteredamong a number of agencies in addition to NOAA, toone that is explicitly given as its prime directive toprovide for stewardship of the nation’s marineresources, using, of course, the best scientificinformation available for making its decisions. Thismay from one perspective be a reorganization basedon the current NOAA, but a new mandate for futureleadership is required unless we are satisfied with thecurrent direction.

Management Strategies for the U.S. EEZ

As noted above, the United States lacks, and in theauthor’s opinion, needs a plan for its EEZ. Currentlythe EEZ is managed as what is in modern termsconsidered a commons (although the post-Hardinconcept of what constitutes a commons is in starkcontrast with the high degree of social organizationused to manage commons resources in the 18th century(Hanna, 1990)). Under the current managementregime, selected management functions for the EEZhave been dealt to a variety of agencies with inadequateprovision for resolution of conflicts. There is no formalcoordination and leadership of executive branchmanagement actions, and no overall framework forconducting general policy or resolving conflicts (otherthan the overarching foreign policy and defenseconcerns noted above that are aired in the NationalSecurity Council).

Increasingly, uses are being proposed for the EEZand its resources for which no agency has adequateauthority to control. In recent testimony before theHouse of Representatives (McManus, 1998), I noted,for example, the lack of adequate authority to addressthe development of pharmaceuticals from the ocean,products that may become the single mosteconomically valuable resources taken from the ocean.

Under current growth rates human population mayalmost double by mid-next century, with more peopleliving on or near the coasts than are alive today. Thepressures on the coastal and marine environment willbe enormous, and choices for meeting the needs of

people and trying to conserve marine biologicaldiversity will be critical to the future of humanity, andthe biosphere. For those concerned with protectionand conservation of nature, and the well-being ofpeople, the course is clear. We need to both increaseproduction and provision for direct human needs, andprotection for nature, and it is unlikely these needs willbe met by happenstance.

To fulfill its promise the Commission created by theOceans Act will have to address the need for a newgovernance framework. I predict there will be asurprising coalition of competing interests supportingthat work, but I worry that the recognition for the needfor reform is outpacing the interest or commitment ofour political leaders.

Literature Cited:

Hanna, Susan, S. (1990). The eighteenth-centuryEnglish commons: A model for ocean management.Ocean and Shoreline Management 14:155-172.

McManus, Roger E. (1998) Statement of Roger E.McManus on H.R. 2547 and H.R. 3445, the Oceans Actof 1997/1998 before the Subcommittee on FisheriesConservation, Wildlife and Oceans of the HouseResources Committee on March 19, 1998.

Weber, Michael. 1996. A CMC Anniversary InitiativeTo Promote Conservation of Living Marine Resources.Unpublished paper prepared for the Center for MarineConservation. 47 pages.

Cited in Weber:

Knecht, Robert W., Biliana Cicin-Sain and Jack H.Archer. 1988. National Ocean Policy: A Window ofOpportunity. Ocean Development and InternationalLaw, 19:113-142.

Wenk, Edward, Jr. 1972. The Politics of the Ocean.University of Washington Press, Seattle. 590 pages.

Wenk, Edward Jr. 1995. Making Waves:Engineering, Politics, and the Social Management ofTechnology. University of Illinois Press, Urbana,Illinois. 269 pages.


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THE NEED TO RE-CONSIDER U.S. COASTAL POLICY

² Jack H. Archer and Richard Delaney ²

University of Massachusetts

The recent “Stratton Roundtable” discussion inWashington, D.C. (May 1, 1998), in which weparticipated, was focused almost exclusively uponocean (EEZ) policy and issues. While acomprehensive reexamination of the many significantU.S. ocean policy issues and problems is certainlywarranted, we believe it is also critical to recognizethe need to re-consider U.S. coastal policies,programs, issues, and problems, which are not to besubsumed under the broad rubric of “ocean” policy.Consequently, we would endorse the establishment ofan independent national commission with sufficientexpertise and resources whose mandate would includea re-examination of coastal and ocean laws, policiesand programs, with specific emphasis upon thecomplex interactions involving the land-coast-oceanecosystem.

In the United States, we are almost 25 years intoimplementation of the federal-state-local coastal zonemanagement program, which now includesparticipation by 32 coastal states and territories. Morethan $1 billion in federal dollars and nearly an equalamount of state dollars have been expended to supportthis effort. Generally, and despite the lack of “hard”evaluative evidence, coastal management programsare thought to be successful, and, in fact, to serve assome kind of model for coastal managementinternationally. It is apparent that, whatever else onemight say about the U.S. coastal managementexperience, this unique program has become“institutionalized” if not bureaucratized as it hasreached middle-age.

Despite this success, our concern is that seriousenvironmental and natural resource managementproblems persist in the coastal areas of the UnitedStates and must be considered anew, perhaps fromvery different viewpoints than have prevailed inrecent decades, because, to put the matter as clearly

as we can, our current policies have not solved theseproblems, with potentially disastrous consequencesfor coastal areas and resources.

It is not difficult to compile a list of these problemsand consequences. To illustrate, we offer severalmajor issues and problems that seem to be intractablein terms of existing environmental and coastalpolicies. First, because of its ubiquity and theseriousness of its effects, is the problem of non-pointsource pollution, especially in coastal areas andwaters. Although in 1990 the Congress establishedthe so-called “6217" program to require coastal statesto develop strategies to deal with coastal non-pointsource pollution, the program has been beset withdifficulties, controversy, and lack of funding. Eightyears after its inception, the program has failed toachieve the expectations of its proponents. But, wehazard to say, “the technical” means to addressnon-point source pollution are not particularlydifficult to devise or perhaps even very costly toimplement, in societal terms, when the magnitude ofits adverse effects are considered.

The difficulties are largely matters of policy, law,and politics. For example, and for reasons we will notexplore here, the legal authority to address non-pointsource pollution under the Clean Water Act (CWA) isextremely limited; this is not to say that there is noauthority to do so under the CWA. But, for the federalgovernment to assert sufficient authority under theConstitution to deal with the problems of non-pointsource pollution would result in a massive shift ofcontrol over land and water uses from state and localgovernments to the federal. No one has proposed sucha direct and major re-structuring of political and legalauthority in the United States, and we would behorrified at any such prospect. On the other hand,states and local governments possess all the legalauthority necessary to address this problem — the


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most serious water pollution problem the nation mustconfront. The difficulties lie in the areas of theirwillingness and capacity to do so. Therefore, in ouropinion, a major task of any re-examination of U.S.coastal policy will be to devise a strategy to bring thiswealth of state and local authority into play, so to speak.We won’t anticipate the outcome of such are-examination, but we strongly believe that this issueis equally as important as any strictly “ocean” policyissue one might suggest as worthy of attention in anymajor policy review.

An important second example concerns wetlandsprotection. Here, the federal government claimssubstantial authority under the CWA to manageactivities affecting wetlands. Yet, the complexity andambiguity of the section 404 program of the CWAhave rendered it an ineffectual program to protectwetlands. In some respects, it has become a programto license their destruction. The consistencyprovisions of the Coastal Zone Management Act(CZMA) provide the means for states to supplementfederal authority under the CWA to protect coastalwetlands. Yet this consistency authority, as importantas it may be, is re-active (that is, it won’t support apositive, pro-active policy or program) and is subjectto review and nullification by the Secretary ofCommerce. Any study of national coastal policy mustaddress the adequacy of, and propose means tostrengthen, federal, state, and local authority andcapacity to protect wetlands.

A third issue of great importance in anyre-consideration of national coastal policy involves“updating” or modernizing federal laws andprograms, such as the CZMA, which were enacted inan era when we were first becoming aware of thefindings of modern ecological science. Although webelieve that the CZMA was an innovative piece oflegislation, and essentially sound environmentallyand politically in its state- and localgovernment-based approach to managing and

protecting coastal areas and resources, it does notembody a consistent ecosystem-focused view ofcoastal management. For example, the inlandboundaries of the “coastal zone” of the states, asdefined by the CZMA, vary widely from state to statebecause the CZMA permits almost unfettereddiscretion in federal and state managers to determinesuch boundaries. In no state do they include sufficientspace to incorporate areas such as watersheds anddrainage areas where human activities and ecologicalprocesses affect coastal lands, waters, and resources.This lack of ecosystem management perspective in theCZMA, as well as in the CWA and other federal andstate laws, demands attention in any re-considerationof U.S. coastal policy.

We could easily add to this list of coastal problemsand issues demanding and not receiving attention. Theyare not trivial or merely involve filling in the gaps ofcurrent policy. On the contrary, addressing themrequires some basic re-thinking of existing coastal law,policies, and programs within a more comprehensivere-examination of coastal-ocean governance and of theextensive linkages among landside activities and thehealth of the oceans.

Finally, we would like to suggest that, although amodern “ocean” policy for the United States mayrequire the expansion of federal agency authority, suchas in the EEZ, “coastal” policy does not. We wouldargue that the strategy adopted in the CZMA points usin the right direction in devising coastal policy —greater reliance upon state and local governmentauthority, greater involvement of local communitiesand citizens in decisions affecting the environment andallocating and protecting natural resources, and a moregenerous provision of federal assistance and funds tobuild state and local capacity. And it may be that this“coastal ” model is relevant to certain EEZ resourcemanagement issues. This minor heresy might be worthsome attention.


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OUR OCEAN FUTURE*(Executive Summary)

Presented by Charles A. Bookman

Project Manager, John H. Heinz III Center for Science, Economics and the Environment

The United States is surrounded by one of thelargest, richest, and most diverse marine territories ofany nation. From the Arctic Ocean bordering Alaskato the Atlantic, Caribbean, and Pacific oceans framingthe mainland, Americans enjoy and prosper from anabundance of marine resources and activities,including productive fisheries, global trade, coastalrecreation, mineral and energy production, anddiverse marine ecosystems. But today these resourcesand activities face an array of threats, which at bestmay result in lost opportunities and at worst can causeirreparable damage. Regrettably, the environmentalquality of marine areas and resources, and theeconomic value of vital ocean and coastal industriessuch as trade, tourism, and fishing (and thecommunities that depend on these activities), will bein jeopardy unless effective measures are takenimmediately to safeguard, protect, and restoreAmerica’s oceans and coasts.

After consulting with 200 ocean and coastal leadersfrom industry, government, academia, andenvironmental organizations, The Heinz CenterSteering Group for the Year of the Ocean hasconcluded that there is an urgent need for a systematicand comprehensive review of ocean and coastalpolicies and programs. Unless action is taken now,significant benefits to the economy and quality of lifewill be lost, and the United States will fall behind othernations in using and conserving the oceans and theirresources. An integrated vision, and a plan forachieving it, must be developed for U.S. marine areas,resources, and activities. A restructuring of national,regional, and local mechanisms for managing oceansand coasts may be necessary, along with newinvestments in science, education, and management.

On the positive side, a great diversity ofstakeholders, including all levels of government, areinterested in helping to develop and implementsolutions. Members of the Steering Group believe thatan independent commission mandated by the U.S.Congress and supported by the Executive Branch ofthe U.S. Government offers a means to rethink thenation’s stake in the ocean and decide how to addressthe related challenges and opportunities. Thecommission would be charged with makingrecommendations to rejuvenate the nation’s oceanand coastal policies and programs and realign themfor the future.

Ocean Issues Facing the Nation

The preeminent challenge for the United States is toachieve integrated management that balances the useof ocean resources with the conservation of thoseresources. Enormous economic and environmentalbenefits would result. This challenge can be met if thenation can overcome the obstacles that have blockedprogress in the past. The three principal obstacles arethe following:

The nation has underinvested in the physical andtechnological infrastructure necessary for the efficientuse of the oceans and coasts. Elements of thisinfrastructure include ports and waterways, researchlaboratories and facilities, and marine services.

The national and international institutions andmechanisms for governing and managing ocean andcoastal areas and resources are often fragmented andhave conflicting mandates. Insufficient effort hasbeen devoted to developing and applying theknowledge necessary for wise management.

* The Heinz Center, 1998. Our Ocean Future. Washington, D.C., John H. Heinz III Center for Science, Economics andthe Environment.


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The Steering Group defined the dimensions of theseobstacles and explored potential solutions in threenational meetings convened to focus on the followingbroad issues: managing the U.S. coasts for economicand environmental prosperity, protecting and restoringfisheries and other living marine resources, andadvancing and applying ocean science and technologyfor the use and conservation of the marine environment.

Managing the Coasts for Economic andEnvironmental Prosperity

Every American is affected by the oceans. As vast asthey are, the oceans can also be harmed by humans.Changes in oceanic conditions in the far Pacific candetermine whether the next growing season forMidwestern farmers will be wet or dry. Conversely,agricultural practices, sewage processing, automobileemissions, and other human activities generateby-products that contain nitrogen or other nutrientelements, which eventually find their way into theocean. Excess nutrients in coastal waters can triggerharmful blooms of marine organisms that adverselyaffect coastal water quality and fishery resources.Every year, some Americans have to change vacationplans because of beach closures, or endure “fishscares” in the seafood marketplace, because ofbroad-based concerns about environmental quality andpublic health.

The United States is by far the world’s largestmarketplace. American factories and stores depend onimported goods. Approximately 40 percent of the totalvalue of U.S. foreign trade (and a much larger share byweight, including half of the petroleum that fuels theeconomy) is carried by ship. These goods and productsare funneled through ports, which provide an essentiallink between land and sea. Yet the economicimportance of ports is increasingly transparent to theconsumer, who does not always appreciate the need toensure the efficiency and safety of marinetransportation. Many other activities, ranging frombeachfront development to ocean-dependentindustries, also have economic ramifications. All ofthese vital activities depend on the nation’s capabilityto manage marine activities, conserve and protectcoastal and ocean resources, and, ultimately,understand the sea.

To meet the challenge of protecting and conservingthe coastal environment, the United States will need tomanage the oceans and coasts in new ways. Theeconomic and other consequences of coastal storms anderosion need to be reduced, and sustainable economicgrowth needs to be achieved in marine recreation,marine resource development, global trade, and otheractivities. Progress in these areas increasingly liesbeyond direct federal control. A rich experience base isemerging on partnership approaches that build on theroles and capabilities of the private sector; theknowledge base provided by scientific researchers; andthe conservation and economic development tools oflocal, state, and federal governments. Solutions andinnovations today often require the participation of allstakeholders, including every level of government. Theprocess of learning to achieve progress throughcooperation more routinely and more effectively willbe a major undertaking, with important implications forgoverning institutions at every level.

Protecting and Restoring Fisheries and OtherLiving Marine Resources

The nation also faces a difficult challenge indeveloping a management regime that ensuressustainable fisheries and fishing communities whilealso protecting and nurturing marine biodiversity.Many U.S. fish stocks are still overutilized despitesome successful restoration efforts. Although thecommitment to conservation has been strengthened inrecent legislation, a great deal of work remains to bedone to ensure that this resolve is honored in practice.Fishery managers today need to muster the resourcesand political will to identify and protect essential fishhabitat, address the problems of overfishing and excessfishing capacity, minimize bycatch, address the futureof aquaculture and its potential impacts on the marineenvironment, and apply management techniques thatwork across jurisdictions and conserve ecosystemvalues such as the protection of biodiversity.

Advancing and Applying Ocean Science and Technology

Advances in ocean science and technology can beapplied to gain important new knowledge that will helpbuild a sustainable future. With new technologies andobserving systems, new levels of accuracy are


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becoming possible in the prediction of naturaldisasters and climate change. With new knowledge ofplate tectonics, scientists have begun to understandthe evolution of the Earth and the implications forpredicting earthquakes and the distribution of mineralresources. The recent identification of exotic lifeforms around deep-sea hydrothermal vents suggeststhat the oceans still harbor many undiscoveredtreasures, perhaps including clues to the origins of life.The growing understanding of the complexities,fragility, and resilience of ocean ecosystems positionshumanity to use the living resources of the sea withoutadversely affecting their sustainability. But to realizethe full potential of ocean science, new investments inresearch, education, facilities, and internationalcollaboration will be required.

Moving Forward

Americans care deeply about the oceans and coasts.The Year of the Ocean, 1998, provides a uniqueopportunity to reflect on, and chart, a new and moreeffective course for managing them. Essential roles inthis endeavor are already being performed byindustry, government agencies at all levels, researchand educational institutions, and nongovern-mentalorganizations. Buoyed by strong public interest, allare poised to continue to work together towardAmerica’s new ocean future. The best chance forachieving their shared vision lies in the establishmentof an independent com-mission composed of thenation’s ocean leaders, who can recommend the mosteconomically and environmentally beneficialdirections for U.S. ocean policy and programs in thenext century.


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THE “OCEAN COMMUNITY” THEN & NOW

² John R. Botzum ²

Editor, Nautilus Press Inc.

In its ninth year of existence, 1967, the newsletter,Ocean Science News, declared that the 1970s wouldbe “the decade of the ocean” and that federal spendingon ocean matters would rise “much at the same ratethat the space budget did in the first half of the 1960s.”The writer of those words was then-editor E.W.S.Hull, a World War II combat pilot with a classicaleducation and a bent toward writing about thingsphilosophical and oceanic. The author of this paperis the current editor of that publication, OSN (orpopularly the “blue sheet”), which now is in its 40thyear.

The publication itself had been founded during anearlier period of enthusiasm when the boomingaerospace companies looked at the oceans anddecided that ocean space could become as profitablefor them as outer space. Ocean Science News spentmuch of its earliest years reporting on the newunderwater submersibles which would explore thethree-quarters of the planet Earth which was less wellknown than the backside of the moon.

The hope of profits never came to fruition for themetal benders in the ‘60s, but looking toward the ‘70s,OSN could continue to be optimistic about the futureof the oceans, forecasting that again private industrywould lead the way toward the development of oceanresources, particularly in “food from the sea(aquaculture not commercial fishing), drugs from thesea, and offshore petroleum.” And ocean miningwould surely follow the lead of offshore oil which hadgotten started in the Gulf of Mexico some 15 yearsearlier.

But problems in the oceans were already evident,and their existence forecast a coming change in theoptimism about the future of the oceans for theprofitmakers. Remember, this was the time ofmercury-laden tuna fish.

Those problems were regarded as minor, however.The publication continued to talk hopefully about thethen aborning Stratton Commission which wouldrecommend in 1968 “national goals in the ocean andthe general means by which they are to be attained.”

By the end of 1969, OSN Editor Hull announced hewould take a partial leave of absence to attend the newUniversity of Rhode Island Master of Marine Affairsprogram -the subject matter of which was marinegeography, food & marine resource economics,oceanography, and basic ocean engineering. In thesecond semester the program would cover marinepolicy affairs, international sea law, geologicaloceanography, and estuarine oceanography.

As Editor Hull departed for Rhode Island, he couldpromise that the ‘70s, in contrast to the ‘60s, would be“bountiful and saltily wet” compared to the ‘60swhich had produced little more than “volumes ofdialogue”, i.e. the “organizational phase” for thedynamic ocean community of the future.

That the ocean publication was not alone in itsoptimism is evidenced by the November, 1969conference on “Oceanography - the Challenge toIndustry & Investment,” held by McGraw-Hill, thepublisher of Business Week Magazine. The cost toattend the affair in New York City at the OverseasPress Club: $400. Presumably it would be well worththe cost to get a head start on ocean futures.

So, born with the aid of such unlikely mid-wives asSpiro Agnew, the Vice President of the U.S. underRichard Nixon, and Maurice Stans, his Secretary ofCommerce, the new ocean era had begun with theStratton Commission, the formation of the Natl.Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration, and thecreation of the Natl. Advisory Committee on Oceans& Atmosphere. Needless to remind students ofbureaucracy, there were also plenty of other


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commissions, boards, and committees in on theaborning, including Natl. Academy of Science andBureau of the Budget efforts.

Skipping ahead to today’s effort almost 30 yearslater to repeat the Stratton Commission experienceand all it entailed, including a commission andperhaps a council, we find an entirely differentatmosphere within which a new ocean era (or reallythe first such era?) must operate.

For better or for worse (we have no intention ofexamining in detail the results of almost 30 years ofocean/coastal organization and reorganization), theocean community today is mature, and consequentlylacking in the verve and risk-taking we associate withyouth -which surely was present 25-30 years ago inthe ocean community. Remember some of thedreams of that time, underwater hotels, recreationalsubmersibles, offshore nuclear power plants, an oceancure for cancer, etc., etc.

Moreover, there were important events to come,which helped drive the nation’s interest in the oceansin the ‘70s: the formative years of NOAA were justahead, the U.N. Law of the Sea Conference was tobegin in 1973; and there were the federal bureaucraticrelationships among ocean-related agencies yet to beestablished. There were already important concernsabout how NOAA and the Environmental ProtectionAgency would fit together in terms of their mutualinterest in the coasts and oceans. In the bureaucracythere’s nothing like a turf war to capture one’sattention.

Because, as some observers realized at thebeginning, and more understand now, the oceans aretoo big to put in one agency, or for which one man canbe in charge. Land, sea, and air constitute the planet:should we have a czar for each? If the ocean is sickin one place, it is well in another. If it possessesresources easily accessible to humans in one place,they are almost impossible to gain in another. If theocean is friendly at one time, it is the enemy of humansin another time. With the oceans, the meaning is inthe detail.

At one of those early, and exciting, symposia heldby the Univ. of Rhode Island, an economist, a strangerto the ocean community and all its complexities, statedthat he didn’t understand how a group of people (the

ocean community) could be talking about the oceansthis or that. It’s everywhere, he explained; why, youmight as well be talking about the air and form an aircommunity, he suggested in exasperation.

Also, we the ocean community have caused manyof our own problems. One example: today’soverfishing goes back to the U.N. decision some40-50 years ago to promote the use of bigger and moreefficient fishing vessels in order to feed the world.

Today, it seems to me, the major issue for the oceancommunity is whether to preserve the oceans or to tryto do good work in them for the benefit and profit ofall humans.

Finally, we should recognize the dependence whichthe U.S. ocean community in particular has on thewhims of Congress, on the needs of the politician tocater to his constituencies. We are reminded thatdespite all the enthusiasm for matters oceanic in 1970,the Congress saw fit to kill the Natl. Council onMarine Resources & Engineering, a perfectlyrespectable federal body, if somewhat dull, which aDemocratic congresswoman from the state ofWashington (of all places) felt was a waste of thetaxpayer’s money. Rep. Julia Butler Hansen lookeddown on the executive secretary of the council, whowas appearing before her appropriationssubcommittee, and declared the council’s work“gobbledygook.”

Even now as we celebrate “Stratton-revisited,” thedetails of what actually will be accomplished or isintended to be accomplished is not at all clear.

The latest version of this effort has just passed theHouse fisheries subcommittee. While containing allthe “gobbledygook” of the original Hollings bill in theSenate, it includes a reference to the need to settle thecounter-productive themes of the Natl. MarineFisheries Service, namely “the relationship betweenthe fisheries development and fisheries conservationresponsibilities of NMFS.” This has been a favoritetopic of subcommittee chairman Jim Saxton (R-NJ)and its presence in the bill behooves all the plannersnow at work on a new “Stratton” to get to the detailsand leave the generalities to those who don’t reallygive a damn about the oceans; they are just in thebusiness for self-gain, whether they are truly evil orjust stupid.


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OCEAN AND COASTAL TRENDS, 1969-1998

² Daniel J. Basta et al. ²

National Ocean Service, NOAA

Introduction

This material outlines selected facts and trends oncoastal and ocean topics. It is provided as backgroundfor the May 1, 1998 meeting of former StrattonCommission members. Where possible, informationis compared between the periods of the late 60s andthe late 90s. In some cases data are only shown forcurrent or near-current conditions. These facts will beaugmented, refined, and incorporated into a morecomprehensive paper on coastal and ocean conditionsin anticipation of a late summer/early fall meeting onocean issues and policy.

Dredging

From the US Army Corps of EngineersDredging and Navigation Branch

• Over the last 30 years, the amount of materialdredged from U.S. ports and waterways by the USArmy Corps of Engineers and its contractors hasranged from a high of 392 million cubic yards in1970 to a low of 244 million cubic yards in 1992.

• While year to year volumes can fluctuatesignificantly, the long-term trend over the last 30years has been a gradual decrease in the amount ofmaterial dredged by the US Army Corps ofEngineers nationwide.

• Over the five year period from 1968 to 1972, “newwork ” dredging was about 425 million cubic yards.Over the most recent five year period from 1993 to1997, the figure was about 177 million cubic yards.

• The share of all dredging that is maintenancedredging has fluctuated year to year but has slowlyincreased over the last 30 years It currently

accounts for about 85 to 90% of all US Army Corpsof Engineers dredging.

Waterborne Commerce

From the US Army Corps of EngineersWaterborne Commerce Statistics

• The tonnage of U.S. waterborne commerce grewfrom 1.4 million tons in 1968 to over 2.2 millionstons in 1995, a 60% increase.

• Foreign cargo tonnage now exceeds domestic tonnage.

• Import tonnage has exceeded export tonnage consistently over the 30 year period.

• Petroleum and its related products have led allmajor commodity groups in tonnage consistentlyover the period (averaging about 875 million tonsper year between 1976 and 1995). Crude materialsis the second leading group with less than half asmuch tonnage.

Saltwater Recreational Fishing

From the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’sSurvey of Hunting, Fishing and WildlifeAssociated Recreation

• Between 1955 and 1970, the number ofAmericans, age 12 years old and older, thatparticipated in saltwater recreational fishing morethan doubled from 4.6 million to 9.5 million. Thesame was true for the number of days whichincreased from 58.6 million to 113.7 million.

• Between 1955 and 1970, the amount spent byAmericans for saltwater recreational fishingincreased about 71 percent when measured in 1990constant dollars (from $2.4 billion to $4.1 billion).


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• Between 1970 and 1985, the number ofAmericans, age 12 years old and older, thatparticipated in saltwater recreational fishingincreased 36 percent (from 9.5 million to 12.9million), while the number of days they fishedincreased about 50 percent (from 113.7 million to171.0 million).

• Between 1970 and 1985, the amount spent byAmericans for saltwater recreational fishing morethan doubled when measured in 1990 constantdollars (from $4.1 billion to $8.7 billion).

• In 1991, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Servicechanged their survey methodology thereby endingthe ability to compare the most recent estimates withpast estimates. The new methodology significantlyreduces the estimates for saltwater recreationalfishing. However, comparable data are nowavailable for 1991 and 1996.

• Between 1991 and 1996, the number ofAmericans, age 16 years old and older, thatparticipated in saltwater recreational fishingincreased 5.6 percent (from 8.9 million to 9.4million), while the number of days fished increased37 percent (from 75 million to 103 million).

• Between 1991 and 1996, the amount spent byAmericans for saltwater recreational fishingincreased 62 percent (from $5.0 billion to $8.1billion).

From NOAA’s National Marine FisheriesService, Marine Recreational Fishing StatisticsSurvey,

Note: The NMFS-MRFSS estimates excludeAlaska, Hawaii and Texas but do include foreignvisitors that fish. In addition, for some years, Pacificregion estimates are not available and when they are,in some years the State of Washington was notincluded. Also, methodologies for estimating trips andcatch changed in 1986. Party/headboat estimates aredone separately for the Southeast from North Carolinathrough Texas. Thus it is difficult to patch togethermuch in the way of long-term trends for catch andeffort at the National level. Below are someconclusions based on rough compilations ofinformation for the 1986 to 1996 period for theAtlantic and Gulf of Mexico regions and from 1985to 1996 for the Pacific region.

Catch

• Between 1986 and 1996, there has been asignificant decline in total catch (by weight ofharvest and total numbers) for every region of theNation.

• In the North Atlantic, catch by weight declined 74percent and catch by number declined 53 percent.

• In the Mid-Atlantic, catch by weight declined 59percent and catch by number declined 44 percent.

• In the S. Atlantic, catch by weight declined 18percent and catch by number declined 14 percent.

• In the Gulf of Mexico, excluding Texas, catch byweight declined 33 percent and catch by numberdeclined 18 percent.

• In the Pacific, 1986 estimates were not availableso we calculated the changes between 1985 and1996. Catch by weight declined 16 percent andcatch by number declined 21 percent.

Effort

• Fishing effort, measured in number of trips,declined in every region except the South Atlantic.

• In the North Atlantic, effort declined 9.7 percent.

• In the Mid-Atlantic, effort declined 12.4 percent.

• In the S. Atlantic, effort increased 12.9 percent.

• In the Gulf of Mexico, effort declined 14.3percent.

• In the Pacific, effort declined 21 percent.

• Between 1986 and 1996, there have beensignificant declines in both catch and effort fromparty/headboats from North Carolina throughTexas. Effort declined 31 percent, catch by weightdeclined 40 percent, and catch by number of fishdeclined 52 percent.

For all other types of marine recreation there is littleinformation available on a National basis. From the1994-1995 National Survey on Recreation and theEnvironment, a few estimates were made for activities


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in the marine environment. Estimates below arebased on a 1995 U.S. population of approximately 200million Americans age 16 years old or older.

• 45 million (22.5 %) visited an ocean, sound, or baybeach and about half of them (22 million) wentswimming.

• 2.6 million (1.3 %) went surfing.

• 14.5 million (7.2%) went snorkeling/scuba diving.

• 9 million (4.5%) went boating in the Nation’soceans, sounds, and bays.

Beach Closings

From: Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.“Testing the Waters -1997"

• During 1996, at U.S. ocean, bay, and Great Lakesbeaches, there were at least 2,596 individualclosings and advisories, 16 extended (6-12 weeks)closings and advisories, and 20 permanent (over 12weeks) closings and advisories. Including the daysof extended closings, the total comes to over 3,685closings and advisories.

• Since 1988, there have been over 18,590 closingsand advisories and 56 extended (6-12 weeks)closings and advisories.

• Approximately 83 percent of beach closings andadvisories in 1996 were based on monitoring thatdetected bacteria levels exceeding beach waterquality standards. An estimated 13 percent were inresponse to a known pollution event (without solelyrelying on monitoring results) and 4 percent wereprecautionary beach closures due to rain thatcarried pollution to swimming waters.

• Major pollution sources responsible for 1996beach closings and advisories included:

• Polluted runoff from non-urban areas-over 486closings/advisories

• Sewer spill and overflows-over 459 closings/advisories

• Urban stormwater runoff-over 407 closings/advisories. Combined sewer overflows-over 275 closing/advisories

• Almost every coastal and Great Lakes statereported having at least one beach wherestormwater drains are on or near bathing beaches.

Health Risks

From: Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.“Testing the Waters -1997"

• Toxic algal blooms such as Pfiesteria piscicida,which were discovered in North Carolina in 1991,have been found for the past six years to beassociated with fish kills in North Carolina coastaland estuarine waters.

Eutrophication

From NOAA’s National EstuarineEutrophication Survey

NOAA has made a preliminary assessment of theconditions and trends of eutrophication symptoms in137 of our nation’s coastal waterbodies. Informationwas collected regarding the concentration, spatialcoverage and timing (duration, months of occurrence,frequency) of extreme conditions of 16 water qualityparameters that are associated with eutrophication.The results show that there are problems in many ofour nation’s estuaries and that most problems occurduring the summer months, however, the expressionof the problem is different among estuaries of thedifferent regions. These results show:

• Extreme levels (>60 ug/l) of Chlorophyll a, ameasure of algal biomass that can lead to depletionof oxygen in bottom waters, are observed in 22 of137 of our nation’s estuaries, usually in the springand summer months.

• Hypoxia and anoxia, conditions of low dissolvedoxygen that can kill fish and/or make estuariesunsuitable for fish habitation, are presentlyobserved in a total of 72 estuaries, usually in thesummer time.

• Blooms of toxic “red tide” organisms that areresponsible for episodes of, for instance, paralyticand amnesic shellfish poisoning, occur in 61 of ournation’s 137 estuaries, usually in the summer time.

• Between 1970 and 1995, Chl a concentrationstrends increased in 24 of our nation’s estuaries and


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half of the increasing trends are observed inestuaries of the Gulf of Mexico.

• Between 1970 and 1995, toxic bloom occurrencesincreased in frequency in three estuaries and havedecreased in two estuaries.

• Between 1970 and 1995, the spatial extent ofhypoxic occurrences increased in 11 estuaries,while for 12 estuaries spatial coverage hasdecreased.

Agriculture

From the USGS Pesticide Use Data Base, USDASituations and Outlook Report, and the U.S.Census of Agriculture (USDOC).

• In 1968, approximately 22 million pounds ofpesticides were applied to agricultural lands incoastal watersheds of the U.S. Over 37 millionpounds are estimated to have been applied in 1992.

• In 1968, approximately 9 million pounds ofinsecticides, primarily the persistent and highlyaccumulative organochlorines such as DDT andToxaphene were applied to agricultural lands incoastal watersheds. In 1992, less than 7 millionpounds of insecticides were applied, the majority ofwhich were the less persistent and less accumulativeorganophos- phorus and carbamate compounds.

• In 1968, herbicides accounted for approximately48 percent of total agricultural pesticide application.Beginning in the 1970’s, the use of a group of newerherbicides including alachlor, atrazine andmetolachlor dramatically increased the agriculturaluse of this class of pesticide. In 1992, herbicidesaccounted for over 76 percent of total application.

• The number of farms in the U.S. has decreasedfrom 2.3 million in 1974 to 1.9 million in 1992according to the Census of Agriculture published byDOC. At the same time, the average size of farmshas increased from 315 acres in 1974 to 531 acresin 1992.

Point and Nonpoint Sources

From NOAA’s National Coastal PollutantDischarge Inventory

• In 1991 there were approximately 2,800 major and17,000 minor point source facilities in the Nation’scoastal watersheds.

• In 1972, the total annualized cost of waterpollution control in the U.S. including point andnonpoint sources and drinking water wasapproximately $10 billion. In 1995, that amounthad increased to $50 billion.

• In 1972, the total annual cost of environmentalprotection was estimated at $26 billion (0.87% ofthe GNP). In 1995, the total cost of environmentalprotection was estimated at $131 billion (2.53% ofthe GNP).

Fish Kills

From NOAA’s Fish Kills in Coastal Waters ,1980-1989

• Between 1980 and 1989, the number of annual fishkill events record by coastal states increased fromabout 280 to 450, due in part to better monitoring ofthe events. The number of fish killed in theseevents, however, decreased from 550 million in1980 to less than 50 million in 1989.

Shellfish

From the National Shellfish Register

• In 1971, there were a total of 14 million acres ofclassified shellfish growing waters, 10 million (73percent) of which were approved for harvest, and3.2 million (23 percent) closed due to human healthrisks. In 1995, there was a total of 21 million acresof classified shellfish growing waters, 15 million(69 percent) of which were approved for harvest,with 13 percent (2.8 million acres) closed to harvestdue to human health concerns.

• In 1995, the major pollution sources contributingto shellfish harvest included urban runoff, wildlife,upstream sources, and individual wastewatertreatment systems (e.g., septic systems).

Contamination of the Marine Environment

From NOAA’s National Status and TrendsProgram, Mussel Watch Program

• Results from annual collections and chemicalanalyses of mussels and oysters from sites located


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throughout the marine coast of the United Statesshow decreasing trends, on a national scale, forchemicals such as chlorinated hydrocarbons (e.g.,DDT and cPCBs), tributyl tin (antifoulant), andtrace elements (cadmium and arsenic), whose usehas been banned or greatly decreased.Concentrations of most other chemicals are neitherincreasing or decreasing.

Superfund Sites

From the US EPA ComprehensiveEnvironmental Response, Compensation andLiability Information System (CERCLIS)

• The US EPA has identified almost 8000 potentialsuperfund sites in the 31 states (includingWashington, DC) that border the nation’s coasts.

Toxic Releases

From the US EPA Toxic Release Inventory

• Over 1.6 billion pounds of toxic material werereleased on-site at facilities in coastal states in 1995.

Oil Spills

From the US Coast Guard Pollution IncidentReporting System

• The number of oil spills reported to the US CoastGuard decreased by about 30% from the early 70sto the late 80s. However, from the late 80s to theearly 90s, numbers of spills reported returned toprior levels (about 9000 per year nationwide).

• On average, about one-half of reported spills (andspill volume) occur seaward of the coastal baseline.

• The median size spill reported to the US CoastGuard decreased from about 15 gallons in 1974 toabout two gallons in 1993.

• National spill volumes fluctuate widely dependingon the occurrence or nonoccurrence of very largecatastrophic events (like the EXXON VALDEZ).There has, however, been a trend towards lowerspill volumes over the period from the early 70s tothe early 90s.

Oil Spill Response

From the US Coast Guard “US Oil SpillResponse Equipment at a Glance” reportproduced by the National Strike ForceCoordination Center

• There are almost six million feet of containment,protective, and fire oil spill response boom storedaround the country.

• There are almost five million barrels of storageavailable in approximately 320 vessels mooredaround the country.

• The almost 1400 skimmers in the U.S. have a totaleffective daily recovery capacity of almost 2.8million barrels.

Hazards

From the Insurance Institute for Property LossReduction report “Coastal Exposure andCommunity Protection, Hurricane Andrew’sLegacy”

• The total value of insured coastal propertyexposures increased from $1.86 trillion in 1988 to$3.15 trillion in 1993, an increase of 69%.

• Property exposures in all Gulf of Mexico andAtlantic Coast states (except Louisiana) more thandoubled in value from 1980-1993.

• From 1980-1993, the value of insured residentialexposures increased by 166%; commercialexposures went up 193%.

Population Summary

From the U.S. Bureau of the Census & NationalPlanning Association, Inc.

• The population in coastal counties has increasedfrom 110 million in 1970 to 138 million people in1994. This is an increase or 28 million or 26%.

• The states with highest rate of population increasebetween 1970 and 1994 include: Alaska (117%),Florida (Gulf - 108%), Florida (Atlantic -105%),Texas (70%), New Hampshire (62%), andWashington (61%).

• Coastal areas are the most developed in the nation.This narrow fringe-comprising 17% of the


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contiguous U.S. land area-is home to more than53% of the nation’s population. Further, this coastalpopulation is increasing by 3,600 people per day,giving a projected total increase of 27 millionpeople between now and 2015.

• Coastal areas are crowded and becoming more soevery day. More than 139 million people-about 53%of the national total-reside along the narrow coastalfringes. This population is expected to increase byan average of 3,600 people per day, reaching 165million by the year 2015. This rate of growth isfaster than that for the nation as a whole.

• Coastal areas are becoming more crowded everyyear in the United States. In 1970, an average of218 people were living on each square mile ofcoastal land (excluding that in Alaska). Thispopulation density increased to 273 persons persquare mile by 1994, and is expected to reach 327by 2015. Population densities are highest along theEast Coast, especially in the Northeast.

• The population on the coast outnumbers thepopulation of the nation’s vast noncoastal interiorby over 16 million people. The noncoastalpopulation, numbering about 122 million, isdistributed across the majority of the national landarea.

• The coast includes the nation’s most populouscities. In fact, 14 of the 20 largest cities are locatedin the coastal zone. The population in seven of thesecities exceeds one million people.

• Coastal counties lead in many demographicindicators. During the last decade, 17 of the 20fastest growing counties were located along thecoast. In addition, the coast accounts for 19 of the20 most densely populated counties in the country.Coastal counties are also undergoing moredevelopment than noncoastal areas, as they include16 of the 20 counties with the largest number of newhousing units under construction. With 18 of the 20leading counties in per capita income located alongthe coast, these counties are also among the nation’swealthiest (Bureau of the Census, 1994a).

• Many areas along the coast have grown rapidlyfrom a small population base in the past fewdecades. Rapid population growth has occurredsince 1970 in vacation and retirement communitiesin Florida, especially along its western coast. Rapid

rates of growth have also occurred in “exurban”counties such as Prince William (VA), Stafford(VA) and Calvert (MD), located along theWashington, DC metropolitan area’s outer fringe.Dare (NC), Dorchester and Berkeley (SC) andVirginia Beach (VA) Counties typify southeasterncounties where economic development andrelocating retirees are fueling rapid populationgrowth.

Population Trends

From the U.S. Bureau of the Census

• Coastal population growth includes both amovement toward the shore and the expansion of alarge population base. Coastal population grewrapidly in the 1960s and 1980s. In the 1960s,coastal population soared by 16%, from 95 millionpeople to over 110 million; in the 1980s, thepopulation grew another 11% (14 million).Population increases during the 1990s and between2000 and 2010 are projected to increase by about9% (12 to 13 million people) in each decade.

• The coastal portion of the U.S. population hasbeen, and will continue to be, relatively stable. It hasaveraged between 53% and 54% of the nationalpopulation total since 1960. This proportion isexpected to remain the same by 2015. Currently,53.2% of the U.S. population resides in coastalcounties.

Urban Population


• About 84% of the U.S. coastal county populationresided in urban areas in 1990.

• The coastal county urban population has increasedfrom 89 million in 1970 to 112 million in 1990. Theurban population was only 58 million in 1950.Consequently, the population residing in urbanareas almost doubled between 1950 and 1990.

• States that have the highest percentage of theircoastal population residing in urban areas include:Illinois (99%), California (95%), New Jersey(90%), Hawaii (89%), and New York (88%).

• States that have the lowest percentage of theircoastal population residing in urban areas include:


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Maine (45%), North Carolina (49%), SouthCarolina (54%), New Hampshire (54%), Georgia(56%), and Mississippi (58%).

• The largest urban populations in 1990 werelocated in: California (26.4 million), New York(16.2 million), Florida (12.7 million), Michigan (8.3million), and New Jersey (7.7 million).

• The states with low urban populations in 1990include: Minnesota (242,000), Alaska (449,000),Mississippi (509,000), Alabama (642,000), andDelaware (669,000).

Urban Land Area


• Coastal counties have 41,175 square miles ofurban land. This represents 8% of the U.S. coastalcounty land area (excluding Alaska).

• 84% of the coastal county population lives on 8%of the coastal county land area.

• The states with the greatest percentage of coastalland classified as urban include: Illinois(80%-dominated by Cook County), New Jersey(34%), Massachusetts (31%), Rhode Island (29%),and Connecticut (26%).

• States with the most coastal land classified asurban include: California (6791 square miles),Florida (5,018 square miles), New York (2,964square miles), and New Jersey (2,406 square miles).

• Excluding Alaska, states with the least coastalurban land include: Minnesota (180 square miles),Delaware (209 square miles), Rhode Island (298square miles), and Mississippi (308 square miles).

• The states with lowest percentage of coastal landclassified as urban (excluding Alaska) include:Minnesota (2%), Oregon (2%), North Carolina(3%), Georgia (3%), and Maine (3%).

• Urban land in coastal counties increased by almost33 percent (more than 10,000 square miles) between1970 and 1990.

• States that had the largest increase in urban landarea between 1970 and 1990 include: California

(3,036 square miles), Florida (2,945 square miles),New York (1,971 square miles), Texas (1,421square miles), New Jersey (1,341 square miles), andMichigan (1,021 square miles).

Land in Farms


• In 1992, 27% of the coastal county land area wasin farms. This was a decrease from 31% in 1982.(Both statements exclude Alaska.)

• Coastal farmland decreased from 158,000 squaremiles in 1982 to 138,000 square miles in 1992.

• States that had the largest decrease in farmlandinclude: Florida (-3,356 square miles), California(-3,170 square miles), Texas (-1,973 square miles),New York (-1,507 square miles), Michigan (-1,179square miles), and South Carolina (-1,037 squaremiles).

• States with the most coastal farmland include:Texas (27,511 m2), California (20,603 squaremiles), Florida (15,49 square miles), and Michigan(13,444 square miles).

Seasonal Housing


• About 1.7 million seasonal homes-approximately2,500 homes per county-are situated along the coast.

• The number of seasonal homes in coastal countiesincreased from about 746,000 units in 1970 to1,689,000 units in 1990. This represents an increaseof 943,000 vacation homes in 20 years.

• The heaviest concentration of seasonal housinglies along the Northeast Coast, particularly on thebarrier islands. In 1997, about 484,000 seasonalhomes (e.g., single-family homes, cottages,condominiums) are located along the northeasternseaboard. More than one-fifth of these seasonaldwellings are concentrated along the New Jerseyshore. Massachusetts (18%), New York (17%) andMaine (16%) also account for large shares of secondhomes along the Northeast Coast.


61

Housing


• Between 1970 and 1994, more than 18.9 millionhomes were constructed along the nation’s coast.Almost 60% of this total (11.3 million homes) weresingle family dwellings. The remaining 40% (7.6million homes) were townhomes, condominiums,apartments, duplexes, etc.-multi-unit dwellings.

• The most dramatic growth since 1970 hasoccurred in Florida and California, where anestimated 7.6 million housing units were authorizedfor construction. Nearly 40% of all new housingconstruction along the U.S. coast occurs in thesetwo states.

• As coastal areas become more crowded, sprawlingsuburban and exurban patterns often characterizedevelopment. In addition to the 5,800 housing unitsin multi-unit buildings that are built every week,about 8,700 new single-family homes areconstructed along the coast. Single-family housingdevelopments frequently include large homes onlarge lots. For example, almost one-third of all newhome construction is for houses with more than2,400 sq. ft of floor area (Bureau of the Census,1994b). Further, the median lot size in the UnitedStates is about 17,000 sq. ft.

Manufacturing

(Note: data for all counties in coastal states-not justcoastal counties)


• About 85% of all manufacturing establishmentsand employees are located in coastal states.California leads in the number of manufacturingestablishments and workers.

• California leads all coastal states in the value ofmanufacturing production, accounting for $132billion in 1987-about 11 percent of the nationaltotal. New York ($80 billion), Ohio ($72 billion),Texas ($64 billion), and Illinois ($63 billion)followed.

Employment



• Coastal states account for about 81 percent of allfederal, state, and local employees in the UnitedStates. California employs the greatest number ofpublic employees at all levels. It accounts for 13.8million federal, state, and local employees. About84% of the workers are employed at the state andlocal level.

Income



• The median household income in coastal statesincreased from about $9,700 1969 to $35,000 in1995. Household income in coastal states is slightlyhigher than in the interior US.

• The largest rate of increase in household incomebetween 1969 and 1995 occurred in the South. Themedian household income increased by more than300% in Mississippi, Virginia, Georgia, and NorthCarolina.

Water Use


From the U.S. Geological Survey

• Water withdrawals in coastal states have increasedonly slightly from a total of 276 billion gallons perday in 1985 to about 277 billion gallons per day in1995.

• Withdrawals in coastal states account for a littlemore than two-thirds of total U.S. withdrawals

.


62

Appendix 1

The Marine Resources and Engineering DevelopmentAct of 1966


Appendix 2

Comparison of Congressional Oceans Act Bills


Com

pari

son

of S

enat

e an

d H

ouse

Ver

sion

s of

the

Oce

ans

Act

of

1997

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hip

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bers

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y th

e Pr

esid

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ion

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nal

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1 a

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Purp

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to d

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and

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tal a

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axto

n bi

ll no

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se v

ote)

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iona

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an C

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pari

son

of S

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of t

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nued

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(S12

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s pa

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pres

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se v

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ort

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nnin

g in

Jan

uary

199

9, a

nd b

ienn

ially

the

re

afte

r, s

ubm

it a

rep

ort

to C

ongr

ess

sum

mar

izin

g ag

ency

act

ivit

ies,

bud

gets

and

acc

ompl

ishm

ents

of

the

prev

ious

two

yea

rs r

elat

ed t

o oc

ean

and

coas

tal i

ssue

s

Budg

et C

oord

inat

ion

• E

ach

year

pro

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bud

get

guid

ance

to

Fede

ral

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genc

ies

and

depa

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ents

invo

lved

in o

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and

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s•

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h ag

ency

will

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tify

its

ocea

n an

d co

asta

l

act

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in it

s an

nual

app

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ons

requ

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The

Pres

iden

t

Appendix 3

Description of Dialogues on National Ocean Policy


Appendix 4

Flow Chart on Dialogues on National Ocean Policy


Oth

er

• • •Age

nda

for

the

21s

t Ce

ntur

y

Oth

er

Cons

titu

ents

Indu

stry

Inte

rnat

iona

lN

GO

s

Fede

ral

The

Curr

ent

Oce

an P

olic

y La

ndsc

ape:

S

take

hold

ers

and

Orga

niza

tion

s• E

nviro

nmen

tal m

ovem

ent

• E

nerg

y co

ncer

ns•

Glo

bal L

aw o

f the

Sea

Agr

eem

ent

• N

ew F

eder

al O

cean

Law

s•

Incr

ease

d st

ate

capa

city

, etc

.

Maj

or C

hang

es S

ince

the

Str

atto

n Co

mm

issi

on a

nd F

utur

e Tr

ends

:

Cont

inui

ng N

atio

nal D

ialo

gue

on C

oast

al S

tewa

rdsh

ip

Stra

tton

Co

mm

issi

on R

evie

w:Le

sson

s Le

arne

d

Draf

t Ve

rsio

n M

arch

2, 1

998

?Co

mm

issi

on o

n O

cean

Pol

icy

Issu

e Di

alog

ues

Dial

ogue

1

• • •

Dial

ogue

2

• • •

A s

erie

s of

mee

ting

s ad

dres

sing

the

m

ajor

pro

blem

are

as id

enti

fied

thro

ugh

prev

ious

act

iviti

es in

clud

ing

the

YOTO

/Hei

nz C

ente

r Pro

cess

, tha

t wi

ll:

• e

xam

ine

maj

or is

sues

;•

exp

lore

per

spec

tive

s;•

iden

tify

are

as o

f com

mon

alit

ies

an

d di

ffer

ence

s; a

nd•

see

k co

nsen

sus

on p

robl

em

de

finit

ions

and

pos

sibl

e po

licy

so

luti

ons.

YOTO

/Hei

nz C

ente

r Pro

cess

Scie

nce

& Te

chno

logy

W

orks

hop

Sust

aina

ble

Coas

ts

Wor

ksho

p

Fish

erie

s W

orks

hop

Oct

ober

A

ugus

tJa

nuar

yM

arch

June

Nov

embe

r

Inte

rnet

Foru

mDe

bati

ng C

oast

al

Stew

ards

hip

in

Cybe

rspa

ce ..

.

Usin

g th

e In

tern

et t

o so

licit

viewp

oint

s on

oc

ean

polic

y is

sues

from

a

wide

rang

e of

co

nsti

tuen

ts a

nd

the

gene

ral p

ublic

• C

omm

erce

• G

loba

l Se

curit

y •

Env

ironm

ent

• E

duca

tion

/Exp

lora

tion

• E

EZ S

tewa

rdsh

ip In

itia

tive

June

11, 1

2

Oce

ans

of C

omm

erce

, O

cean

s of

Life

Con

fere

nce

Stat

e an

d Lo

cal

App

endi

x 4

Flo

w C

hart

on

Dia

logu

es o

n N

atio

nal O

cean

Pol

icy

83

Appendix 5

Draft Announcement of Workshops on“The Present Context of National Ocean Policy

and Future Trends” (Fall 1998)


Appendix 6

Information on the Ocean Governance Study Group


Appendix 7

Biographical Information on Roundtable Participants


BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION ON PARTICIPANTS OF THE STRATTON ROUNDTABLE

Lewis M. Alexander is Emeritus Professor ofGeography and Marine Affairs at the University ofRhode Island. He founded the GeographyDepartment at Rhode Island in 1960; this was latertransformed into the Department of Marine Affairs.He also established the Law of the Sea Institute, andthen served as Director of the Center for OceanManagement Studies. In 1968-69, ProfessorAlexander was Deputy Director of the StrattonCommission, and he later served for three years as theGeographer of the State Department. He is the authorof a number of books, monographs and articles.

Jack H. Archer is a professor in the Environmental, Coastal and Ocean Sciences Department at theUniversity of Massachusetts, Boston. He is also anadjunct professor at the Vermont Law School. Heholds a JD from the University of California, Hastings School of Law and a Ll.M from the University ofWashington. Previously, he served on the staff of theMerchant Marine and Fisheries Committee in theU.S. House of Representatives and the NOAA Officeof the General Counsel. He is the author of manypublications, including a major book on the publictrust doctrine.

Stephanie Bailenson is a coral reef ecologistcurrently serving as a Knauss Sea Grant Fellow on theU.S. Senate Subcommittee on Oceans and Fisheries.Prior to receiving the fellowship, Ms. Bailenson spent 3-l/2 years looking at the impacts of sewage outfallsin coral reef and coastal areas.

Dr. James Baker is Administrator of the NationalOceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)and Under Secretary for Oceans and Atmosphere atthe U.S. Department of Commerce. In this position,he is responsible for the National Weather Service;the National Environmental Satellite Data andInformation Service; the National Marine FisheriesService; the National Ocean Service; and NOAA’sOffice of Oceanic and Atmospheric Research. Heserves as the United States Commissioner to theInternational Whaling Commission. He is the authorof the book Planet Earth—The View from Space,published by Harvard University Press in 1990, andhe has written more than 80 articles on climate,

oceanography, and space technology issues. He is afellow of the American Meteorological Society and of the American Association for the Advancement ofScience. He has served on numerous advisorycommittees for the Administration, the NationalAcademy of Sciences, and various internationalbodies.

Daniel J. Basta is founder and currently the Chiefof NOAA’s Strategic Environmental Assessments(SEA) Division. Creating the concepts and programsof the SEA Division and helping them grow andevolve has been the primary focus of Dan’s 17 years at NOAA. Dan’s experience prior to joining NOAAincludes positions at Resources for the Future inWashington, DC, the Environmental Studies Boardof the National Academy of Sciences, and JohnsHopkins University. Before returning to graduateschool to focus on environmental/natural resourcemanagement, Dan worked as an engineer in theaerospace industry. Dan has a BS in IndustrialEngineering from Hofstra University (’69) and anMS in engineering and policy sciences from the StateUniversity of New York at Stony Brook (’75).

Charles A. Bookman is currently a Visiting Fellowand project manager at the H. John Heinz III Centerfor Science, Economics and the Environment.Previously, he was Director of the Marine Board ofthe National Research Council. Mr. Bookman holds a master’s degree in marine affairs from the Universityof Rhode Island, and a bachelor’s degree fromColumbia University. He is an affiliate member of the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers,and a member and past director of the MarineTechnology Society.

Jack Botzum has been the senior editor of NautilusPress for the past thirty or so years and has providedthe ocean and coastal community with timelyinformation an all aspects of national ocean andcoastal policy in such newsletters as Ocean ScienceNews and Coastal Zone Management.

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Biliana Cicin-Sain is Professor of Marine Policy inthe Graduate College of Marine Studies at theUniversity of Delaware where she also holds jointappointments in the Department of Political Scienceand in the School of Urban Affairs and Public Policy.Professor Cicin-Sain serves as Co-Director of theCenter for the Study of Marine Policy and as Editor-in-Chief of Ocean and Coastal Management, aninternational journal devoted to the analysis of allaspects of ocean and coastal management. She chairsthe Secretariat of the Ocean Governance Study Groupand has written many articles and books on integratedcoastal and ocean management. Among her manyadvisory positions, she is a member of the MarineBoard and past member of the Ocean Studies Board,National Research Council, member of the Department of Interior’s Scientific Committee on the OuterContinental Shelf and a consultant to the UnitedNations and the World Bank. She completed a PhD. inPolitical Science at UCLA and was a postdoctoralfellow at Harvard University.

Penelope (Penny) D. Dalton is a Professional StaffMember for the Senate Oceans and FisheriesSubcommittee. Dalton, who advises CommerceCommittee Democrats on oceans and atmosphericissues, staffed the Sustainable Fisheries Act, anupdate of the Magnuson Fishery Conservation andManagement Act. Besides the fisheries legislation,Dalton worked on a successful Coast Guardreauthorization. During the 105th Congress, Dalton is monitoring the implementation of the SustainableFishery Act and the Coast Guard reauthorization.Dalton has worked on a range of successfullegislation since she joined the panel staff in 1987.She came to the panel from her post at the Universityof Maryland where she was responsible foridentifying long term university goals related toestuarine and marine resources. Dalton also servedtwo years in the Peace Corps in Kenya. Penny holds aBS (cum laude) from Dickinson College and attendedthe Rosenstiel School of Marine and AtmosphericScience, University of Miami and the University ofMaryland Chesapeake Biological Laboratory.

Richard Delaney is the Director of the UrbanHarbors Institute. The Institute was founded in 1989at the University of Massachusetts, Boston. It is apublic policy and scientific research institutededicated to public service, research and education.

The Institute conducts multidisciplinary research onurban harbor planning issues ranging from waterquality and coastal resource protection to harbormanagement and port planning. Previously, Mr.Delaney served as President of the Coastal StatesOrganization and as Director of the Massachusettscoastal zone management program.

Sylvia Earle is known around the world as adistinguished oceanographer, marine biologist,author, lecturer, and scientific consultant. Dr. Earle iscurrently the “voice for the oceans” for SeaWeb, theco-founder and Director of Deep Ocean Engineering,Inc., Chairman of Deep Ocean Exploration andResearch, and a Research Associate at theSmithsonian Institution. Formerly Chief Scientist ofthe National Oceanic and AtmosphericAdministration, she presently serves on the board ofDresser Industries, Inc., Oryx Energy, Inc., andvarious non-profit organizations including the WorldResources Institute, the Center for MarineConservation, the Natural Resources DefenseCouncil, the World Wildlife Fund, the Woods HoleOceanographic Institution, and the Divers AlertNetwork. Dr. Earle holds a B.S. from Florida StateUniversity and an M.A. and Ph.D. from DukeUniversity and has eight honorary doctorates. Theauthor of more than 100 scientific, technical andpopular publications (including the 1995 book SeaChange, published by G.P. Putnam Sons), and themother of three grown children, Sylvia Earle lives inOakland, California and oceans everywhere.

Tim Eichenberg is Program Counsel for the Centerfor Marine Conservation in Washington D.C. and co-chairs the Clean Water Network, a coalition of morethan 1000 organizations working to reauthorize theClean Water Act. Prior to coming to CMC, he servedas Legal Counsel to the California CoastalCommission, and Staff Counsel at the Marine LawInstitute at the University of Maine School of Law.He has taught environmental law, coastal law, andfederal wildlife law at the University of Maine andGolden Gate University Law Schools, and haslectured on the Clean Water Act at the EnvironmentalLaw Institute, the Washington College of Law atAmerican University, and the Graduate College ofMarine Studies at the University of Delaware. He was a Post-Doctoral Fellow in Marine Policy at the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, is a graduate of theWashington University School of Law and Earlham

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College, and is a member of the Bar in California andthe District of Columbia.

Nancy Foster, Ph.D., was recently appointed theAssistant Administrator for Ocean Services andCoastal Zone Management. Prior to that she served as the Deputy Assistant Administrator for the NationalMarine Fisheries Service (NMFS) in the NationalOceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S.Department of Commerce. She also served as theActing Assistant Administrator for Fisheries fromJanuary through October 1993. She began her careerwith the National Oceanic and AtmosphericAdministration in 1977, first with the Office ofResearch and Development, followed by 9 years asthe Deputy Director then Director of the NationalMarine Sanctuary Program and the NationalEstuarine Research Reserve Program. Most recently,Dr. Foster’s focus at the National Marine FisheriesService has been on the successful completion of thefirst comprehensive evaluation and reorganization ofthe agency since 1972. Her conservationaccomplishments were recognized by award of theDepartment of Commerce Bronze Medal (1991) foroutstanding contributions in advancing NOAA’smission through the establishment of the NOAARestoration Center and two Department ofCommerce Bronze Medals (1992). In l993, shereceived the highest wards of the Department ofCommerce—the Gold Medal—for leadership inproviding stewardship of the Nation’s living marineresources while Director of the NMFS Office ofProtected Species.

Susan Garbini is currently a Senior Staff Officerwith the Marine Board at the National ResearchCouncil (NRC) in Washington, D.C. A policyanalyst, historian, and writer, Ms. Garbini joined theMarine Board in 1989, and has directed studies ondiverse technical and scientific subjects includingmarine and ocean technology and policy, resourcedevelopment, environmental protection, and coastalmanagement. Prior to joining the Marine Board, Ms.Garbini was employed on a consulting basis by theWorld Resources Institute, the Carnegie Institution of Washington, and for the Office of Energy and MarineGeology at the U.S. Geological Survey as a sciencewriter and editor and policy analyst on projectsinvolving natural resources issues. Ms. Garbini wascoordinator of the Secretariat to the Office ofInternational Nuclear Programs at the Department of

Energy (DOE) and worked for Roy F. Weston, Inc. asa Senior Policy Analyst on the Technical SupportTeam to DOE’s Office of Civilian Radioactive WasteManagement. Ms. Garbini has a B.A. in History fromthe University of California, Berkeley; an M.A. inHistory of Science and Technology from theUniversity of California, Davis, and a Master ofPhilosophy degree in Public Policy (Science andNatural Resources Policy) from George WashingtonUniversity in Washington, D.C.

Mary Hope Katsouros is currently Senior Fellowand Vice President for Programs at the H. John HeinzIII Center for Science, Economics and theEnvironment. Previously, she served for many yearsas the Director of the Ocean Studies Board, NationalAcademy of Sciences, National Research Council. In 1995 the National Academy of Sciences awarded heran internal grant to study the role of ecosystemmanagement in developing sustainable marinefisheries. She has directed the publication of over 45National Research Council papers and studies onocean and coastal resource issues. Positions heldinclude advisor to the Department of State for Law ofthe Sea issues, and U.S. delegate to the Third U.N.Law of the Sea Conference. Ms. Katsouros receivedher BA from the George Washington University andher JD from the Georgetown University Center ofLaw. In 1996, the American Geophysical Unionrecognized her contributions to the Ocean Scienceswith its prestigious Ocean Sciences Award.

Thomas R. Kitsos is currently Special Assistant tothe Assistant Secretary for Lands and MineralsManagement, U.S. Department of the Interior. Formany years Dr. Kitsos was the Chief ProfessionalStaff Member at the Merchant Marine and FisheriesCommittee and played a major role in the enactmentand revision of major Federal ocean and coastal lawsin the 70s and 80s. He holds a Ph.D in politicalscience from the University of Colorado.

John A. Knauss is a former Dean of School ofOceanography at the University of Rhode Island. Heserved as a member of the Stratton Commission,chairing the panel on environmental monitoring,management and development of the coastal zone.He served as NOAA Administrator and is currentlyworking on a book about the role of technology in

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ocean policy, dividing his time between California andRhode Island.

Robert W. Knecht is Professor of Marine Policy inthe Graduate College of Marine Studies at theUniversity of Delaware. He is also Co-Director of theCenter for the Study of Marine Policy and holds jointappointments in the School of Urban Affairs andPublic Policy and in the Department of PoliticalScience. From 1972 to 1980, as NOAA AssistantAdministrator for Coastal Zone Management, hedirected the initial implementation of the FederalCoastal Zone Management Program. He has writtenmany articles on national ocean policy.

Samuel A. Lawrence served as the StrattonCommission’s Executive Director. He came to theCommission from the U.S. Bureau of the Budget,where he had staff responsibilities in reference tomaritime, economic development, and atmosphericscience matters. He subsequently served asAdministrative Vice President, Cornell University,and as NOAA’s Assistant Administrator forManagement and Budget (1979-84). Currently he isan administrative officer at the University ofMaryland, College Park. Dr. Lawrence has writtentwo books on U.S. merchant shipping policies andholds a Ph.D. in political science.

Chris Mann is a Minority Legislative Staff member for the House Committee on Resources. He holds aB.S. from the University of Illinois and has attendedthe Graduate School of Oceanography at theUniversity of Rhode Island. He was awarded theDean John A. Knauss Marine Policy Fellowship in1990.

Anthony MacDonald currently serves as theExecutive Director of the Coastal States Organization (CSO) in Washington, DC. Since 1970, CSO hasrepresented the interests of Governors of the coastaland Great Lakes states, and US Territories andCommonwealths on matters relating to coastalresource management, development and protection.Prior to joining CSO, Tony was the Special Counseland Director of Environmental Affairs for theAmerican Association of Port Authorities, whereamong his other responsibilities he served as adelegate for the International Association of Ports and Harbors to the London Convention on Dumping atSea. His other professional experience includes real

estate and environmental litigation in Washington,DC and New York City, and the Washingtonlegislative representative for the Mayor of the City ofNew York. Mr. MacDonald is a graduate ofMiddlebury College in Vermont and the FordhamUniversity School of Law in New York City.

Roger McManus is the President, Chief Executiveand Chief Operating officer of the Center for MarineConservation (CMC) in Washington, DC, a positionhe has held since 1984. CMC is a private, marineconservation and education charity which conducts avariety of programs for conserving coastal and marine habitats, preventing marine pollution, managingfisheries, protecting endangered species and othermarine life, and educating citizens and students. Mr.McManus previously served as Vice President forPrograms and as Endangered Species ProgramCoordinator at CMC. Prior to his work at CMC, heheld positions with the Council on EnvironmentalQuality, the Endangered Species ScientificAuthority, and the US Fish and Wildlife Service. Mr.McManus is a graduate of the University of Arizonaand Northern Arizona University.

Barbara Jeanne Polo is the Political Director ofAmerican Oceans Campaign, and Director of itsWashington DC office. AOC is a national nonprofitorganization dedicated to protecting and restoringcoastal and marine ecosystems through policyadvocacy, public awareness building and localactions. AOC’s efforts are focused on improvingcoastal and ocean water quality and sustaininghealthy fish populations. Prior to joining AOC in1996, Ms. Polo worked as an environmentalprotection specialist in the Wetlands Division of theEnvironmental Protection Agency; as professionallegislative staff for the Merchant Marine andFisheries Committee in the House of Representativesunder Chairmen Gerry Studds and Walter Jones; andas a research assistant for the Institute forEnvironmental Negotiation. She was awarded a Dean John A. Knauss Marine Policy LegislativeFellowship in 1992. She earned a Master of Urbanand Environmental Planning degree from theUniversity of Virginia.

John Rayfield is legislative staff for the HouseSubcommittee on Fisheries Conservation, Wildlife,and Oceans. He has been centrally involved with the1998 Oceans Act.

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Jacqueline Savitz is the Executive Director of theCoast Alliance, an organization that workds with anAlliance of over 300 groups around the country toprotect the coasts from pollution and development.Issues of interest to the Coast Alliance includenonpoint source pollution, clean-up and prevention of contaminated sediments, and discouragingdevelopment of sensitive coastal areas that are proneto flooding and storm damage. Prior to her positionwith Coast Alliance, Jacqueline worked as anenvironmental policy analyst with the EnvironmentalWorking Group in Washington, DC. There her focuswas on the public health effects of water pollution andair pollution. Jacqueline first worked as anenvironmental advocate with the Chesapeake BayFoundation, in Annapolis, Maryland, where sheserved for nearly five years as an environmentalscientist, focusing on toxic contamination issues.Jacqueline earned her master’s degree inenvironmental science with emphasis in toxicologyfrom the University of Maryland. She earned herbachelor’s degree in marine science and biology fromthe University of Miami, in Florida.

Dan Sayre is Editor-in-Chief of Island Press, aleading publisher of books about the environment forprofessionals, students, and general readers. Prior tojoining Island Press, he spent eleven years with JohnWiley and Sons, Inc., most recently as senior editorfor environmental engineering, design andmanagement. He received his BA in History fromYale University.

Harry N. Scheiber is the Stefan RiesenfeldProfessor of Law and History in the Boalt Hall Schoolof Law, University of California, Berkeley. He holdsa B.A. from Columbia and M.A. and Ph.D. degreesfrom Cornell. His writing on the history of oceanresources includes works on the relationship ofscientific developments to management, on fisheries,and on the policy process in domestic management inPacific Rim cooperation and rivalries. He is a member of the steering committee of the Ocean GovernanceStudy Group.

Robert Stewart is President of the National OceanIndustries Association. He joined the association in1987 to direct its government affairs program. Heheld the positions of Vice President and ExecutiveVice President before assuming his current position in 1990. NOIA is the only national trade association

representing all segments of the offshore industrywith an interest in the exploration and production ofhydrocarbon resources on the nation’s OuterContinental Shelf. Mr. Stewart began his career in thepetroleum industry as a regional attorney withresponsibilities for a seven state petroleum marketingregion. He served in the United States Air Force as aStaff Judge Advocate, leaving the military in 1964with the rank of Captain. He holds a bachelor of artsdegree from the University of Iowa and Juris Doctorfrom the university’s college of law.

Carolyn A. Thoroughgood received her Bachelorof Science degree (1965) from the University ofDelaware and her Master’s (1966) and Doctor ofPhilosophy (1968) degrees from the University ofMaryland. Dr. Thoroughgood has been Dean of theGraduate College of Marine Studies and Director ofthe Delaware Sea Grant College Program, Universityof Delaware, since 1985. Prior to her appointment asDean, she served as Acting Dean and Associate Dean. She was Executive Director of the Delaware SeaGrant College Program, September 1978 - August1984 and Associate Director for Planning andOperations, September 1976 - August 1978. She alsoserved as the Director, Marine Advisory Service,Delaware Sea Grant College Program. Dr.Thoroughgood’s research interests are in the fields ofnutritional biochemistry and seafood science andtechnology. She has published broadly in bothscientific journals and general audience literature.She is an active member of several professionalsocieties and organizations and serves on numerousUniversity councils and committees. She is listed inthe American Men and Women of Science and is amember of Sigma Xi and Omicron Nu. Her service tothe national marine community often requirescongressional testimony and staff assistance to keylegislative committees.

John R. Twiss, Jr., Executive Director of theMarine Mammal Commission since 1974, came tothe Commission from the National ScienceFoundation. There he worked in the polar regions,served as senior NSF Representative aboard theEltanin on Southern Ocean research cruises, andhelped establish the International Decade of OceanExploration program. In the late 60s, he was VicePresident of EPC Laboratories, manufacturers ofseismic profiling equipment and other oceanographicinstruments. A graduate of Yale, he is Chairman of

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the Board of the Student Conservation Associationand serves on a number of other boards.

Eli Weissman received his B.S. in EnvironmentalStudies from the University of Vermont in 1994,certification in Environmental Management from theUniversity of Washington’s Graduate School ofBusiness in 1996, and M.M.A. in Marine Affairs from the University of Washington in 1997. Mr. Weissmanis currently a National Sea Grant Fellow working onmarine and environmental issues for CongressmanFrank Pallone of New Jersey.

Edward Wenk, Jr. served as Director of the NationalCouncil on Marine Resources and EngineeringDevelopment, the Vice-Presidential level oceancouncil set up under the Marine Resources andEngineering Development Act of 1966. In this position Dr. Wenk played a key role in promotingcomprehensive national ocean policy. A long timeprofessor at the University of Washington, he is theauthor of The Politics of the Ocean (1972) whichchronicles the political dynamics present in the late1960s and the interplay between the White House,Congress, and ocean interests during that time.Professor Wenk has written a number of books andother works on the future of the oceans.

Stanley Wilson received his Ph D from the JohnsHopkins University in 1972 and since then has servedin three different federal agencies: first in ONR asProgram Manager for Physical Oceanography, thenin NASA as Head of the Oceans Program, and finallyin NOAA—initially as Assistant Administrator forthe National Ocean Service from 1992 until 1997, and most recently as Deputy Chief Scientist. Dr. Wilsonwas responsible for initiating the development of USplanning for the Year of the Ocean.

Robert White was a member of the StrattonCommission and Chair of the panel on marinescience. He subsequently became the President of theNational Academy of Engineering, NationalResearch Council. He is currently President of theWashington Advisory Group, LLC, a science,technology and enterprise consulting firm, and is aSenior Fellow at the University Corporation forAtmospheric Research and at the H. John Heinz IIICenter for Science, Economics and the Environment.Dr. White was the Carl T. Compton Lecturer at the

Massachusetts Institute of Technology for the 1995-1996 academic year, and President of the NationalAcademy of Engineering from 1983 until hisretirement in June 1995. Dr. White established one ofthe first corporations devoted to environmentalscience and services and served under five presidents,from 1963 to 1977, first as Chief of the WeatherBureau, and finally as the first Administrator ofNOAA in 1970. Dr. White holds a BA in geologyfrom Harvard University and M.S. and Sc.D. degreesin meteorology from the Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology. He holds honorary degrees from manyuniversities and is a a member of the French Legion of Honor and Academies of Engineering in Japan andAustralia.

Sally Yozell is the Deputy Assistant Secretary forOceans and Atmosphere of the Department ofCommerce’s National Oceanic and AtmosphericAdministration (NOAA). As NOAA’s DeputyAssistant Secretary, she is a principal policy advisoron matters concerning marine fishery management,environmental research and coastal ecosystemconservation. She participates in the development ofthe $2 billion annual budget for NOAA. Ms. Yozelljoined NOAA in September 1993 where she served as Director of Legislative Affairs until 1996. Sheworked previously in the office of Senator John Kerry where she was Deputy Legislative Director andenvironmental Legislative Specialist. She earned aBachelor of Arts in Political Science from theUniversity of Vermont and a Master’s degree inPublic Administration from Harvard University’sJohn F. Kennedy School of Government.

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Photo on Front Cover

Members of Stratton Commission (1969)

1. Leon Jaworski

2. Taylor Pryor

3. John Knauss

4. James Crutchfield

5. George Reedy

6. Robert White

7. Jacob Blaustein

8. John Perry

9. Hubert Humphrey*

10. Charles Baird

11. Julius Stratton, Chair

12. David Adams

13. Richard Geyer

14. Frank DiLuzio

15. George Sullivan

16. Carl Auerbach

17. Alton Lennon**

* Vice President and Chair of Marine Science Council

** Congressional Advisor from U.S. House of Representatives

Published by theNational Oceanic and Atmospheric Administrationin partnership with theCenter for the Study of Marine Policyand theOcean Governance Study Group

June 1998

the stratton roundtable

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