Political Studies (1994), XLII, 676-689

The Structure of Opinion in American Political Parties

RICHARD HERRERA AND MELANIE K. TAYLOR* Arizona State Unitjersity

Scholars have long recognized the implications of the patterns of beliefs held by elite and mass partisans for a functioning democracy.’ The study of mass-elite linkages originally took the form of a bifurcation of party activists into leaders and followers.* More recent attempts to study mass-blite linkages are more inclusive and recognize the importance of ‘middle-level’ activists.’ One device used to describe and explain mass-elite relationships is the ‘opinion structure’ of political parties, the foremost vehicle for representation in democracie~.~

An opinion structure is a portrait of a political party’s substantive opinions on political issues once the party’s members are stratified by their level of activism. The description of a party’s opinion structure, therefore, requires a measurement of the ‘center of gravity’ for different strata of partisans.’ Once

We would like to thank Peter Esaiasson, John Geer, Cheryl L. Herrera, Ruth Jones, and Warren Miller for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Thanks also to John Kessel for the use of data from the 1988 Presidential Campaign Activists Study. Some data were made available by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. We are responsible for the analyses and interpretations presented here. ’ See, for example, R. Michels, Political Parties (New York, Free, 1962, originally published in 1915); M. Duverger, Political Parties, Barbara North and Robert North (trans.), (New York, Methuen, 1954); A. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York, Harper and Row, 1957); V. 0. Key, Politics. Parties and Pressure Groups (New York, Thomas Y. Crowell, 5th edn, 1964): H. McClosky, P. Hoffmann. and R. O’Hara, ‘Issue conflict and consensus among party leaders and followers’, American Politico1 Science Review, 54 (1960). 46-27; J. May, ‘Opinion structure of political parties: the Special Law of Curvilinear Disparity’, Politicul Studies, 21 (1973), 135-51; J. Kirkpatrick, The New Presidential Elite, Men and Women in National Politics, (New York, Russell Sage Foundation and the Twentieth Century Fund, 1976); R. Putnam, The Compurative Study of Political Elites (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall, 1976); W. Miller and M. K. Jennings, Parties in Transition. a Longitudinal Study of Party Elites and Party Supporters (New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1986); H. Kitschelt, ‘The internal politics of parties: the Law of Curvilinear Disparity revisited’, Political Srudies, 37 (1989). 400-21; W. Miller, Without Consent (Lexington. Kentucky, University Press of Kentucky, 1988).

* See, for example, Michels, Political Parties; Duverger, Political Parties; McClosky et a/., ‘Issue conflict and consensus among party leaders and followers’, pp. 406-27.

’See. for example, B. Berelson, P. Lazarsfeld and W. McPhee, Voting (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1954); Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites; H. McClosky and J. Zaller, The American Ethos (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1984); W. R. Neuman, The Paradox of M a s Politics (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1986); Kitschelt, ‘The internal politics of parties: the Law of Curvilinear Disparity revisited’, pp. 400-21; E. Carmines and J. Stimson, Issue Evolution. Race and the Transformation of American Politics. (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1989). ‘ May, ‘Opinion structure of political parties: the Special Law of Curvilinear Disparity’,

’ D. Butler, ‘The paradox of party difference’, The American Behavioral Scientist; 4 (1960), 3. pp. 135-51.

,S Political S l d b Aswziation 1994. Published by Blackwell Publishers. 108 Cowley Road. Oxford OX4 IJF, UK and 238 Main Strat. Cambridge. MA 02142, USA.

Research Note 677

the opinions of the groups are assembled, questions about consensus or disagreement among activists, the condition of information conduits, and whether the upper echelons of the parties are loosely or tightly coupled with regular partisans can be addressed. The answers to these questions have important consequences for political representation and the flow of information to and from elites and masses. The central place of parties in the formation and use of public opinion by democratic governments heightens the importance of understanding the structure of opinions within political parties.

The ‘Special Law of Curvilinear Disparity’ One attempt to explain the dynamics between party activists and the rank and file and to explain the positions on issues taken by political elites, draws on rational-choice theory.6 That attempt, dubbed the ‘special law of curvilinear disparity’ by May, states that the varying purposes for which the activists participate in politics are the primary determinants of the positions they adopt on political issues.’ This approach, when applied to the opinion structure of political parties, predicts a curvilinear pattern of disparity among levels of party activists. As one moves up the strata of party activists, the disparity between the views on issues held by activists and party voters expands to its most extreme point with middle-level activists. As one proceeds to the highest levels of party activists (e.g., elected officials) the disparity between the electorate and activists narrows suggesting that the highest and lowest tiers of partisans hold similar views on issues and that the middle-level tier is the group most out-of-step with the party as a whole and certainly with reference to party voters. The reason is simple: middle-level party activists are not as concerned about the opinions of the rank and file, in contrast with elected officials who are motivated by electoral concerns. Figure 1 illustrates the pattern of opinions predicted for various strata of party activists.

The empirical examination of mass-elite linkages has a long history, but only recently have scholars begun to consider applying rational-choice theories to questions of representation. It is important to inspect, for example, whether some activists within political parties are like-minded about their role as representa- tives of the mass citizenry or whether their motivation for participating in partisan politics affects their ability to represent faithfully the will of the wider citizenry. One of the implications of rational-choice theories in studies of mass-elite linkages is that middle-level activists serve as an obstacle to communi- cation between elected representatives and their constituencies. While rational- choice theories have proven useful in other contexts, their utility in the study of mass-elite linkages is as yet untested in the American and many other cases.

Previous attempts to describe the structure of opinions within American parties and hence provide some answers to these queries fall short in testing adequately the hypotheses about opinion structures. First, there has been a lack of data from the relevant strata of party organizations to describe completely the structure of opinion in American political parties.’ Notably missing from

Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy. ’ May, ‘Opinion structure of political parties: the Special Law of Curvilinear Disparity’,

See Kitschelt, ‘The internal politics of parties: the Law of Curvilinear Disparity revisited’, pp. 135-51.

pp. 400-2 1 . (C Political Studies Asmiation, 1994

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/

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\ Mass

/

Figure I. Cundinear Structure of Opinion Disparity

these inquiries are the opinions of the national legislative tier of American party elites.' Second, previous studies of opinion structures, by focusing on the relative positions held by party activists at various levels, assume that infor- mation held by the activists about the positions of rank-and-file partisans is generally accurate. There is strong evidence, however, that such an assumption is unwarranted.'O This assumption has led to incomplete tests of the theory; namely, the examination of the stated positions on issues taken by activists without the inclusion of some measure of the intent of the activist in choosing a position.

Given the importance of testing the theory, the deficiencies of previous research utilizing American political parties, and the use of indirect tests,

McClosky et 01.. 'Issue conflict and consensus among party leaders and followers', pp. 406-27; Kirkpatrick, The New Presidential Elite, Men and Women in National Politics. The McClosky study, for example, extrapolates from samples of delegates to national party conventions to the highest level of the party structure. '"See, for example, W. Miller and D. Stokes, 'Constituency influence in congress', in

A. Campbell, P. Converse, W. Miller and D. Stokes (eds) Elections and the Political Order (New York, Wiley, 1966); R. Hedlund and H. P. Friesema, 'Representatives' perceptions of constituency opinion', The Journal of Politics, 34 (1972). 730-52; R. Erikson, N. Luttbeg and W. Holloway, 'Knowing one's district: how legislators predict referendum voting'. American Journal of Political Science, 19 (1975). 231-46; A. Clausen, S. Holmberg and L. dehaven-Smith, 'Contextual factors in the accuracy of leader perceptions of constituent's views', The Journal of Politics, 45 (1983). 449-72; and R. Herrera 'Are "Superdelegates" super?, Political Behavior, 16 (l994), 79-92. 6 Political Sludia Assaiation. 1994

Research Note 679

hypothesized patterns of opinion within the parties deserve examination. The purpose of this paper is to avoid the shortcomings of previous work, take advantage of the availability of data from multiple strata of party activists, and to examine comprehensively the structure of opinion within American political parties, in order to advance theories of mass-elite linkages.

The Opinion Structures of American Parties

Data In this section, the views on issues held by multiple strata of partisan activists are compared. This task requires the assemblage of data from all segments of the universe of partisans. Those data must also contain items that allow us to draw inter-strata comparisons. One of the problems with relying on previous tests of the theory is the lack of adequate data used to conduct those tests.” In an attempt to remedy this we employ evidence from American political parties in 1988 using four data sets, one of which includes members of Congress.

Beginning with the lowest tier, our first source of data is the 1988 American National Election Study. These data allow the citizenry to be separated into different strata of party followers. We subdivided the mass sample into ‘partisan voters,’ and ‘voters in primary elections’ for two ‘low’ tiers.’* Partisan voters are respondents who voted in 1988 and who consider themselves strong, weak or independent Democrats or Republicans. Primary voters are those individuals who voted in their party’s presidential primaries. The third stratum of party activists includes those who participated in the 1988 presidential campaigns. The population of activists sampled are Republican and Demo- cratic county chairs, as well as Bush and Dukakis county campaign chairs. The source for their views is Kessel’s ‘Study of Presidential Campaign Activists,’ collected in the Fall of 1988.13 The fourth level of party activists is composed of delegates to the Democratic and Republican national party conventions convened in 1988. The source for these data is the 1988 Convention Delegate Study conducted by the Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan.I4 Members of the United States House of Representatives constitute the top echelon of party activists for this study. A survey of members of the US House of Representatives collected in the Spring of 1987 is the source for these data.15

“ Kitschelt, ‘The internal politics of parties: the Law of Curvilinear Disparity revisited‘, pp. 404-5. ’’ Various stratifications of the mass citizenry were made including various degrees of active partisans, voters, nonvoters, etc. These alternative subdivisions did not alter the portrait of the mass strata presented here. ’’ J. Kessel, Presidential Campaign Politics (Pacific Grove, California, Brooks/Cole Publishers, 4th ed.. 1992).

I4For information about the 1988 CPS Convention Delegate Study, see R. Herrera. ‘The understanding of ideological labels by political elites: a research note’, Western Political Quarterly, 45 (1992). 1021-35.

I s Since this is the only survey utilized here that was not conducted in 1988, there may be some concern about its use. Based on previous analysis, we feel confident that the views of the members of the House of Representatives are quite stable and that the disparity in the dates of data collections do not pose a problem. See E. Smith, R. Herrera and C. Herrera, ‘The measurement characteristics C Political Studies Arwxiation. 1994

680

U.S. House Members

I Party Delegates

Research Note

Campaign Activists

Prirnay Voters

Partisan Voters 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

I Defense Spending - - Minority Aid ___ ~~~

Figure 2. Mean Position on Ideology, Defence Spending, and Minority Aid Sources: 1988 ANES, 1988 Presidential Campaign Activists Study, 1988 CPS Delegate Study, 1987 US House Study.

This unique combination of data sets is possible because of the comparable question-wording across all four surveys (See Appendix A) and the proximity of data collections.’6 In all, we can compare five strata of party activists for both the Republican and Democratic parties from these four data sets. They provide a rare opportunity to examine the structure of opinion in American political parties.

Results The mean scores of the five levels of party activists are arrayed for their self-designated positions on political ideology, defence spending, and aid to

Footnote continued of congressional roll call indexes’, Legislative Studies Quarterly, 15 (1990), 283-95, for a complete description of the sample.

l6 There is a slight difference in the question-wording used in the surveys. The survey of House members and the CPS Convention Delegate Study both omitted the quasi-filter, ‘or haven’t you thought much about this’. The probable effects of the quasi-filter on surveys of elites was checked elsewhere and no discernable effects were found. See C. Herrera, R. Herrera and E. Smith, ‘Public opinion and congressional representation’. Public Opinion Quarterly, 56 (1992), 185-205. The item on defence spending is altered a bit in the ‘Presidential Campaign Activist Study’ questionnaire. Specifically, the two phrases about increasing spending and decreasing spending are presented in reverse order from the NES, CDS, and Congressional survey formats. f Political Studies Auociation. 1994

Research Note 68 1

minorities in Figure 2.’’ The patterns suggest that the opinions do not follow a curvilinear path.

For Democrats, the three patterns follow a similar path as we move up the ladder of partisan activism. The ideological orientation of the activists in the Democratic party does not vary much at all as one proceeds up the tiers of activity. In all three cases, as the activists become more involved, they depart increasingly from the mass citizenry. While there is a hint of a curvilinear pattern, the differences between the strata do not fulfill expectations about the magnitudes of those differences. For example, only one of the differences between strata on the ideological self-placement item are statistically signifi- cant.’* On defence spending, the highest strata of activists, though they appear to be ‘curving’ toward the positions held by regular partisans, maintain a quite significant distance from them.I9 The same is true on the minority aid issue.

The patterns of positions held by Republican party activists are inconsistent. On political ideology, as we proceed upward to the highest echelons of the Republican party, the departure from the positions of citizens in general becomes increasingly large.zo On the issue of defence spending, though, Republican activists follow the pattern of ‘non disparity’ between mass and Clite strata.*’ Finally, on the minority aid issue, a ‘reverse’ curvilinear pattern is indicated. We should expect the middle strata of Clites to take more conserva- tive positions on this issue, not more liberal ones.

This display of the views of partisans on issues from different levels of activity provides a more complete array of the strata of Democratic and Republican party activists than was heretofore possible. From this test of the special law of curvilinear disparity, we find no evidence that the American parties follow predicted patterns of disparity between mass and Clite partisans.

The Perceptions of Activists

A Supplemental Test of the Efects of Electoral Incentives on Partisan Activists’ Views

The preceding analysis, however, is not a sufficient test of the theory of curvilinear disparity between levels of party activists because it fails to address directly the underlying premise of the theory. The linchpin of this application of rational-choice theory is that the motivations of the party activists (electoral or programmatic) cause variability in the proximity to voters. Given this

The standard seven-point scale is used to assess the direction and strength of a respondent’s disposition. In all of the analysis presented here, extremely liberal responses are coded as ‘1’ and extremely conservative responses are coded as ‘7’. The item on political ideology does not distinguish between social-cultural and economic liberalism/conservatism. Though this is a limitation of the surveys, there is evidence that this item does tap many dimensions. See P. E. Converse, ‘The nature of belief systems in mass publics’, in D. E. Apter (ed.), Ideology and Disconrent (New York, Free, 1964), pp. 206-61. See Appendix B for the actual means, standard deviations, and number of cases for each stratum.

’* The only difference that reaches statistical significance is between campaign activists and primary voters (p < 0.05).

l9 The difference is significant at p < 0.01. 20The differences between the top three tiers of activists and the two lowest strata are all

21 None of the inter-strata differences are statistically significant. statistically significant (p < 0.01).

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682 Research Note

premise, it is incomplete only to use the relative positions of activists vis-a-vis voters. Activists may misperceive the views of the voters and this may result in unintended differences between activist and voter. That is, activists may be trying to represent the views of regular partisans but be unable to describe accurately the views of those partisans.”

The special law assumes that both pragmatists and ideologues know where their party’s voters are located on a political spectrum and use that information to place themselves. Unless activists have generally accurate information about the spatial locations of their parties’ voters, however, they cannot be expected to choose positions that are congruent with those of the rank-and-file, except by chance. Differences observed between the positions of activists and regular partisan voters, then, may not be due to the activists’ lack of interest in matching the positions of voters but rather to inaccurate placement of regular partisans. We need, therefore, to control for the information about the party’s voters possessed by high-level activists.

We offer a supplement to the test proposed by May and modified by Ki t s~he l t .~~ We propose dividing activists into those motivated by winning elections (pragmatists) and those motivated by programmatic concerns (ideo- logues) and observe the difference between where they place themselves and where they believe their party’s voters to be.24 If the theory holds, pragmatists should place themselves closer to where they think voters are than do ideologues. Hence, pragmatists will use their perception of where voters are to determine their own positions; ideologues will not.

We realize that this test is not, in itself, conclusive. There may, indeed, be reasons why activists would take markedly different positions on issues from where they believe their party’s voters to be on that issue (for instance, they may see their role as ‘trustees,’ or ‘leaders of ~pinion’).’~ For that reason, we endeavoured to measure concepts such as ‘ideological’ and ‘pragmatic’ motiv- ation in multiple ways. For example, we also operationalized pragmatists as elected officials and ideologues as party officials and used delegates’ stated reasons for partisan activity, (‘delegate-trustee’ designations, etc.) as measures of their motivation. In neither case were results obtained that were different from those presented here. While a close match between perceptions and positions does not guarantee the use of those perceptions in choosing one’s own position, systematic large differences make it difficult to argue that the perceptions make any measurable difference. For example, an activist who perceives a voter to be moderate (a ‘4‘ on the scale) about cooperation with

’’ P. Converse and R. Pierce, Political Representation in France (Cambridge, MA, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1986). pp. 501-6.

May, ‘Opinion structure of political parties: the Special Law of Curvilinear Disparity’, pp. 135-51; Kitschelt, ‘The internal politics of parties: the Law of Curvilinear Disparity revisited. pp. 400-21. ’‘ We have chosen to use these labels largely for convenience. We are aware of the many labels that have been used to describe party activists (e.g. amateurs, professionals). We do not know if the labels we are using signify the motivations of activists any more accurately than other labels nor are we concerned with engaging in that debate here. These labels are consistent with previous work by Kitxhelt, ‘The internal politics of parties: the Law of Curvilinear Disparity revisited,

*’ Arnold suggests also that high level activists (members of Congress) may anticipate shifts in the views held by constituents. We are unable to test for that possibility here. See R. D. Arnold, The Logic of Congressionul Action (New Haven, Conn. Yale University Press, 1990).

pp. 404-6.

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Research Note 683

Russia, yet places him/herself as very conservative (a ‘7’ on the scale) is probably not concerned about where that voter is when choosing their own position. Moreover, in this analysis, we are concerned less with the actual magnitudes of differences between perceptions and positions than with the differences between pragmatists and ideologues.26 In short, we accumulated as much evidence as possible to examine this question before reaching any conclusions.

The data required for this analysis are not the same as in our initial examination. Here we need data from middle- and highly-active partisans, who are motivated differentially, about their own views on issues as well as their perception of the positions held by their party’s voters on those same issues. Unfortunately, data are limited for this type of analysis. We do not have data on the perceptions of members of Congress about the positions held by partisan voters. We can, however, follow Kitschelt’s advice and categorize other high level activists as being motivated electorally or pr~grammatically.~’ We need not, therefore, use only the official positions held by a party activist (e.g. members of Congress, convention delegates) to characterize them as pragma- tists or ideologues; we may also use their self-described motivation for participation in politics,

With these considerations in mind, we draw on the survey of delegates to the 1988 Republican and Democratic national conventions mentioned above. These data offer an unusual opportunity to examine the views of different strata of partisan activists both according to their own positions and according to their perceptions of where partisan voters are located. We will use the three items employed earlier (Ideology, Defence Spending, and Minority Aid) plus questions on cooperation with Russia and the role of women in society (see Appendix A).’*

For this analysis, the 1988 Convention Delegate sample was divided into two groups of activists: pragmatists and ideologues. Those delegates who gave reasons for decisions they made at conventions with answers such as ‘playing down some issues if it will improve the chances of winning’ were considered pragmatists.” Alternatively, those delegates who responded with reasons like ‘selecting a nominee who is strongly committed on the issues’ were considered ideologues.

Figure 3 displays the patterns of differences expected if the theory is correct. We should observe significant differences between ideologues and pragmatists in the degree to which they choose positions close to where they believe their voters to be; that is, pragmatists should display smaller differences than

26 We did check the perceptual acuity of pragmatists and ideologues to see if electoral motivation affected the ability of the activists correctly to place their party’s voters. There were no significant differences between the two groups in that analysis.

27 Kitschelt, ‘The internal politics of parties: the Law of Curvilinear Disparity revisited‘,

Some may argue that using their perceptions of where ‘Democratic/Republican voters in the nation’ is an incorrect referent. We also used their perceptions of where ‘Democratic/Republican voters in your state’ as the referent. The results were the same as those reported here.

29 See Appendix A for a complete description of the questions and responses used to indicate pragmatists and ideologues. The categories are mutually exclusive. We compared the positions held by pragmatists to those of members of Congress as an additional check on the use of self-described motivation as a proxy for official position and found that the two groups’ positions were virtually identical in most cases.

pp. 409-1 1.

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684 Research Note

0.6 e a n

D

I

!

I

0.4 f e r e n c

0.2 S

I j 1 Ideologues I

Pragmatists

j I

0 Figure 3. Expected Differences between Ideologues and Pragmatists

This graph shows the expected mean difference between where activists place voters and where they place themselves.

ideologues. Figures 4a and 4b show the differences observed between activists’ own position and the position they ascribe to their party’s voters.

Among Democrats pragmatists were more likely than ideologues .to choose positions congruent with those they believed the voters to hold. However, in none of those cases did the difference between ideologues and pragmatists reach statistical significance.m Likewise, the two sets of Clites in the Republican party are quite similar: the differences between ideologues and pragmatists are not statistically significant. In fact, in three cases (defence spending, co- operation with Russia, and the role of women in society), ideologues took positions closer to where they perceived Republican voters to be than did pragmatists.

See Appendix A for the question-wording of the items presented to the delegates. See Appendix C for the actual differences between perceptions and positions for the two parties’ sets of activists. L Politicdl Studies AsJatslion. 1994

Research Note 685

1.2

1

M e a 0.8 n

D i

f e r e n c 0.4 e

0.6

S

0.2

0

0 Ideologues I

I L I Pragmatists I

Ideology Defense Russia Minority Aid Women

Figure 4a. Difference between Activists’ Placement of Voters and Activists’ Positions - Democrats

Source: 1988 CPS Convention Delegate Study.

This inspection of the premise of the special law of curvilinear pattern yields scant support for the theory of Clite-mass opinion disparity. Those activists whose predisposition is toward winning elections do not seem more disposed to choose positions based on the views they believe their partisan electors to hold. In neither party does the electoral motivation of ilites appear to drive the positions they take. In addition, there are sizeable differences between the position taken by activists and their perception of the views held by voters.”

’’ Kitschelt has suggested that the permeability of party organizations contributes to the likelihood the party will be filled with pragmatists or ideologues. Specifically, as the party becomes more loosely caupled the incentives for ideologues to participate increases as there is the chance for their influence to be recognized in the party. The opposite would be the case in a less permeable party where circulation of elites is more tightly controlled. See Kitschelt, ‘The internal politics of parties: the Law of Curvilinear Disparity revisited’. pp. 400-21. G Political Studies Association, 1994

686 Research Note

1.2

1

M e a 0.8 n

D I

0.6 f e r e n c 0.4 e S

0.2

0

1

Ideology Defense Russia Minority Aid Women

Figure 46. Difference between Activists’ Placement of Voters and Activists’ Positions - Republicans

Source: 1988 CPS Convention Delegate Study.

Conclusion

We have applied the traditional test of the special law of curvilinear disparity to American political parties and also argued for supplemental tests of the theory that more directly assess its applicability. Rather than employ only a comparison of the views held by various tiers of party activists, we include a measure of the intent of partisans at the higher levels of activism.

Our results show that Republicans and Democrats do not display opinions that conform with the predictions of the special law of curvilinear disparity. Moreover, when the traditional test of the theory is supplemented with analyses of the intentions of activists, we find no evidence that American party activists’ opinion structure is as neat as predicted by a rational-choice approach. Perhaps, as Miller and Jennings state, ‘the ideological fit between campaign activists and rank-and file partisans tends to vary with the ascendancy of one .L Political Studies Arpocvalion. I994

Research Note 687

coalition or an~ther’.~’ Future investigations into mass-klite-linkages should probably take into account the nature of American parties as coalitions of activists tied more to candidates than to party organizations.

(First submitted: 12 August 1993; finally accepted: 18 February 1994)

Appendix A

Survey items The phrase ‘or haven’t you thought much about this?’ is an additional quasi-filter asked of voters. The following sentences are the additional questions asked of convention delegates: Using the same scale, where would you place each of the following? Republi- can/Democratic voters across the nation/state.

Ideology - We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on this scale?

Defence Spending - Some people believe that we should spend much more money for defence. Others feel that defence spending should be greatly decreased. And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between. Where would you place yourself on this scale? Russia - Some people feel it is important for us to try very hard to get along

with Russia. Others feel it is a big mistake to try too hard to get along with Russia. Where would you place yourself on this seven-point scale?

Minority Aid - Some people feel that the government in Washington should make every effort to improve the social and economic position of Blacks. Others feel that the government should not make any special effort to help Blacks because they should help themselves. Where would you place yourself on the following scale?

Role of Women - Recently there has been a lot of talk about Women’s rights. Some people feel that women should have an equal role with men in running business, industry, and government. Others feel that women’s place is in the home. Where would you place yourself on the following scale?

Items used to separate pragmatists from ideologues All of you have attended at least one national presidential nominating convention. In thinking about decisions made at the conventions, which positions do you favor and which do you oppose?

- Counting service to the party heavily in nominating candidates - Working to minimize disagreement within the party -Playing down some issues if it will improve the chances of winning

Pragmatists

’* Miller and Jennings, Parries in Transition, a Longitudinal Study of Party Elites and Party Supporters, p 247. < Polmcdl Studies Association, 1994

688 Research Note

Ideologues -Standing firm for a position even if it means resigning from the party - Minimizing the role of the party organization in nominating candidates for

- Encouraging widespread participation in making most party decisions -Selecting a nominee who is strongly committed on the issues

O f f i c e

Appendix B Mean Positions on Ideological Self-Placement, Defence Spending, and Minority Aid by L a e l of Activist and Party

Standard Mean Deviation N

Ideology Democrats US House Members National Convention Delegates Presidential Campaign Activists Primary Voters Partisan Voters Republicans US House Members National Convention Delegates Presidential Campaign Activists Primary Voters Partisan Voters Defence Spending Democrats US House Members National Convention Delegates Presidential Campaign Activists Primary Voters Partisan Voters Republicans US House Members National Convention Delegates Presidential Campaign Activists Primary Voters Partisan Voters Miwrity Aid Democrats US House Members National Convention Delegates Presidential Campaign Activists Primary Voters Partisan Voters Republicans US House Members National Convention Delegates G Political Studin As30~18l10n. 1994

3.06 2.91 2.19 3.12 3.05

5.46 5.37 5.33 4.38 4.47

2.85 2.35 2.44 3.67 3.56

4.63 4.37 4.52 4.44 4.37

2.61 2.78 2.32 4.01 4.27

5.21 4.72

1.20 1.19 1.16 2.26 2.18

0.95 0.99 0.90 2.20 2.09

1.18 1.18 1.26 1.56 1.62

1.14 1.14 1.22 1.27 1.41

1.31 1.45 1.24 1.94 1.99

1.37 1.48

69 1248 130 440 583

44 822 223 265 558

69 1345 140 382 798

44 890 230 25 I 76 1

69 I332 138 I96 399

41 822

Research Note 689

Presidential Campaign Activists 4.19 1.38 223

Partisan Voters 5.05 1.54 382 Primary Voters 4.98 1.42 120

Sources : 1988 American National Election Study, 1988 Presidential Campaign Activists Study, 1988 Center for Political Studies Convention Delegate Study, 1987 United States House of Representatives Study.

Appendix C

Differences Between Activists’ Perceptions of National Partisans and Activists’ Positions by Type of Activist

Ideology Defence Russia Minority Aid Women

Democrats Pragmatists 0.34 0.84 0.56 0.43 1.03

(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.13) (0.10)

Ideologues 0.51 0.96 0.58 0.64 1.02 (0.13) (0.12) (0.14) (0.16) (0.12)

Pragmatists -0.15 0.52 0.29 0.23 1.01 (0.11) (0.14) (0.18) (0.16) (0.18) 127 51 12851 128 11 P811 12741

Ideologues -0.34 0.41 0.23 0.30 0.94 (0.13) (0.17) (0.22) (0.20) (0.22) I 1761 [I861 11851 11851 11811

13921 14131 14111 14 1 21 14091

13321 13521 13431 13441 13511 Republicans

~ ~ ~~

Entries are differences in means. Standard errors are in parentheses. The number of cases are in brackets. Source: 1988 Center for Political Studies Convention Delegate Study.

C Political Sludleo Associalion, 1994