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MAY 2016

The Surge to Stabilize:Lessons for the UN fromthe AU's Experience in Somalia

WALTER LOTZE AND PAUL D. WILLIAMS

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

WALTER LOTZE is a Senior Researcher at the Centre for

International Peace Operations and an Associate

Researcher with Stellenbosch University. He was previously

a Special Adviser with the African Union Mission in

Somalia. None of the information used for this report is

drawn from classified materials that the author may have

had access to in conducting his duties while in AMISOM.

E-mail: [email protected]

PAUL D. WILLIAMS is Associate Professor and Associate

Director of the Security Policy Studies program of the

Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington

University, and a Non-Resident Senior Adviser at the

International Peace Institute.

E-mail: [email protected]

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors would like to acknowledge financial support

from a SOAR award provided by the Elliott School of

International Affairs at the George Washington University,

as well as comments received at the IPI seminar on “UN

Peace Operations in Violent and Asymmetric Threat

Environments” on February 11, 2016.

IPI owes a debt of gratitude to its many donors for their

generous support. In particular, IPI would like to thank the

French Ministry of Defence for making this publication

possible.

Cover Photo: AMISOM and the Somali

National Army recapture Buur-Hakba

from al-Shabaab, February 23, 2013. UN

Photo/Stuart Price.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this

paper represent those of the authors

and not necessarily those of the

International Peace Institute. IPI

welcomes consideration of a wide

range of perspectives in the pursuit of

a well-informed debate on critical

policies and issues in international

affairs.

IPI Publications

Adam Lupel, Vice President

Albert Trithart, Assistant Editor

Suggested Citation:

Walter Lotze and Paul D. Williams, “The

Surge to Stabilize: Lessons for the UN

from the AU's Experience in Somalia”

New York: International Peace Institute,

May 2016.

© by International Peace Institute, 2016

All Rights Reserved

www.ipinst.org

CONTENTS

Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

From War-Fighting to Stabilization:The AMISOM Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

PREPARING FOR STABILIZATION OPERATIONS

AN EXPANDED MANDATE AND A NEWFEDERAL GOVERNMENT

AL-SHABAAB’S SHIFTING STRATEGY

A SURGE TO BREAK THE STALEMATE

AMISOM’s Expansion Operations:Ten Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

LACK OF A SHARED STABILIZATION STRATEGY

LAG IN NON-MILITARY RESPONSES

SEPARATION OF SECURITY AND POLITICALDIMENSIONS

FRAGMENTED COMMAND AND CONTROL

RESILIENCE OF AL-SHABAAB

NON-ARRIVAL OF FORCE ENABLERS

CONTINUED INSECURITY OF THE SOMALIPOPULATION

DIFFICULTY BRINGING PEACE DIVIDENDS

RIFTS BETWEEN ASSUMPTIONS AND REALITY

DIFFICULTY PROVIDING LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

AMISOM’s Consolidation Operations From“Clear-Hold-Build” to “Hold-Protect-Stabilize” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

A NEW STRATEGY FOR AMISOM

AL-SHABAAB STRIKES

SHIFTING THE AMISOM STRATEGY AGAIN

Lessons Learned from AMISOM’sExperience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Abbreviations

AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia

AU African Union

CIMIC Civil-Military Cooperation

IED Improvised Explosive Device

PCC Police-Contributing Country

TCC Troop-Contributing Country

TFG Transitional Federal Government

UN United Nations

UNPOS UN Political Office for Somalia

UNSOA UN Support Office for AMISOM

UNSOM UN Assistance Mission in Somalia

UNSOS UN Support Office in Somalia

iii

1

Executive Summary

In recent years, a growing number of UnitedNations peacekeepers have been mandated tocarry out “stabilization” tasks. This report investi-gates what lessons can be identified for UNpeacekeepers from the African Union’s (AU)attempts to stabilize Somalia. We provide a criticalanalysis of how the AU Mission in Somalia(AMISOM) evolved from principally a war-fighting operation to an operation focused onimplementing a stabilization agenda.

Although AMISOM began to take on variousstabilization tasks in late 2011, the mission did notdevelop a working definition of the term until 2013,at which point it defined stabilization as “any post-conflict/-combat activities undertaken in order tofacilitate and promote early recovery of the popula-tion and institutions in a locality that has beenrecovered from Al Shabaab.”1 This report focuseson the four major offensive and consolidationoperations AMISOM conducted on the basis ofthat definition from early 2014 until the presentday: Operations Eagle, Indian Ocean, Ocean Build,and Juba Corridor.

Overall, we argue that AMISOM’s attempts toimplement an effective stabilization strategy acrosssouth-central Somalia suffered from a number ofpolitical and operational challenges:• The Somali Transitional Federal Government

(TFG) and AU did not have a shared stabilizationstrategy in place when AMISOM and the Somalisecurity forces launched their expansionoperations.

• The speed of AMISOM’s military operations faroutpaced the speed of the other stabilizationresponses.

• The security and political dimensions of thesurge in AMISOM troop levels in January 2014and the resultant stabilization operations wereseparated from one another.

• AMISOM was badly hampered by a fragmentedsystem of command and control combined withweak multidimensionality.

• The expansion operations were not able to signif-icantly degrade al-Shabaab’s key fighting capabil-

ities because the militants melted into thepopulation, drew back, or redeployed in Somalia.

• The force enablers and multipliers that AMISOMdesperately needed, including military helicop-ters, never arrived.

• The expansion operations did not alwayscontribute to a tangible increase in security orperceptions of security for the Somali civilianpopulation.

• Neither AMISOM nor the Somali governmentwas able to consistently deliver significant peacedividends to the growing civilian populationcoming under their control.

• A key assumption underpinning the securitystrategy developed for the AMISOM surgeproved faulty—namely, that the Somali NationalArmy would play a supporting and then leadingrole in the fight against al-Shabaab.

• Providing logistical support to the expansionoperations was very difficult.On the basis of this analysis, we identify nine

lessons that emerge from AMISOM’s ongoingattempts to stabilize Somalia:1. Missions must be appropriately configured to

fulfill their mandate.2. The political and military elements of a

stabilization strategy must be in sync.3. Extending state authority is not synonymous

with peacebuilding, at least in the short term.4. Territorial expansion is less important than

degrading the capabilities of spoilers.5. Strategic coordination among relevant partners

is a crucial, mainly political task.6. Lack of coordination can have negative political

and military effects.7. Effective stabilization requires positive relation-

ships between peacekeepers and the localpopulation.

8. There can be no successful exit without buildingcapable, legitimate, and inclusive nationalsecurity forces.

9. UN organizational frameworks and bureau-cratic culture are not suited to supporting war-fighting operations.

1 AMISOM, Provisional Guidelines on Stabilisation Activities, AMISOM internal document, 2013, p. 1.

2 Walter Lotze and Paul D. Williams

Introduction

This report examines what lessons the AU’s experi-ence in Somalia might hold for the UN as more ofits peacekeepers are given mandates involving“stabilization” tasks. Although the UN’s missionsin Haiti since 2004, the Democratic Republic of theCongo since 2010, Mali since 2013, and the CentralAfrican Republic since 2014 all have the word“stabilization” in their name, the UN still has noexplicit definition of or framework for thisconcept.2 When US-led multinational coalitionshave undertaken stabilization operations inAfghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere, they have tendedto fall back on definitions of stabilization found inthe national doctrines of some of the key partici-pants. But in both Afghanistan and Iraq, theseoperations occurred after an invasion by largenumbers of modern forces with enormous budgetsand dedicated stabilization programming. Theseare quite different circumstances from UNpeacekeeping operations.

In that sense, the AU Mission in Somalia(AMISOM) arguably offers a more useful point ofcomparison for several reasons. First, AMISOMhas always operated with the consent of a hostgovernment that was weak and perceived as il -legitimate by large segments of the local popula-tion. Second, AMISOM has always operated inparallel with both external militaries and thenascent Somali security forces. Third, AMISOMdid not start out as a stabilization force; it was onlyafter 2011 that it slowly took on an increasinglycomplex set of stabilization tasks, some of whichresemble those mandated to the UN missions inthe Central Africa Republic, the DemocraticRepublic of the Congo, and Mali.

Finally, as an African force, AMISOM’spersonnel bear much closer resemblance to manyUN operations than the largely Western coalitionforces assembled in Afghanistan and Iraq. Also likeUN operations, AMISOM had to define itsstabilization agenda on an ad hoc basis and learnon the job. Not only did the AU have no officialdoctrine on stabilization, but its doctrine on “peacesupport operations” also said nothing about theconcept. Nor was the need for stabilization

operations foreseen in any of the roadmapsdeveloped to guide the African Standby Force,which focused on more traditional conceptions ofmultidimensional peacekeeping and humanitarianmilitary intervention. The AU has now recognizedat a strategic level that it needs to address thisdeficit, but the deficit remains.

Given the many challenges AMISOM faces, thelessons it offers do not simply generate “bestpractice” that the UN might emulate. Rather, thelessons of AMISOM highlight the real dangers andchallenges inherent in stabilization efforts thatmust be considered in planning, mandating,resourcing, implementing, and reviewing UNpeace operations.

To address these issues, the report is organizedinto four sections. The first section provides anoverview of AMISOM’s evolution from a war-fighting to a stabilization agenda. The secondsection analyzes AMISOM’s expansion operationsin 2014 and 2015 and identifies ten challenges thatbedeviled these efforts. The third sectionexamines why the consolidation operations thatfollowed this expansion achieved, at best, a mixedrecord. Finally, we identify nine lessons fromAMISOM’s experience in Somalia that might beof use to the UN as it clarifies its own approach tostabilization.

From War-Fighting toStabilization: The AMISOMApproach

AMISOM first deployed to Mogadishu in March2007. It was mandated by the AU and then the UNSecurity Council to provide protection to Somalia’sfledgling Transitional Federal Government (TFG)and its institutions as they sought to establishthemselves in Somalia (see Box 2 for AMISOM’scurrent mandate as of July 2015). The TFG hademerged out of a peace process that took placelargely in Kenya beginning in the early 2000s andthat was heavily influenced by Somalia’s largediaspora population.

What began as a small protection contingent of1,600 Ugandan troops deployed to enable the

2 David Curran and Paul Holtom, “Resonating, Rejecting, Reinterpreting: Mapping the Stabilization Discourse in the United Nations Security Council, 2000–14,”Stability 4, no. 1 (2015).

THE SURGE TO STABILIZE 3

3 For an overview up to January 2014, see Bronwyn E. Bruton and Paul D. Williams, Counterinsurgency in Somalia: Lessons Learned from the African Union Missionin Somalia, 2007–2013 (MacDill Air Force Base, Florida: JSOU Press, 2014).

4 For the official Kenyan government narrative of the campaign, see Pius T. Migue et al., Operation Linda Nchi: Kenya’s Military Experience in Somalia (Nairobi:Kenya Defence Force, 2014).

5 AMISOM has not provided a public monthly tally of its personnel. This figure therefore depicts multiple snapshots of the mission strength compiled by theauthors from official AU and UN sources.

withdrawal of a much larger Ethiopian force alsodefending the TFG quickly turned into a war-fighting operation. By the time the Ethiopian forcesleft Mogadishu in January 2009, AMISOM wascomprised of some 3,500 Ugandan and Burundiantroops (see Figure 1 and Box 1). They foughtalongside TFG forces in messy urban warfare thatinvolved regular combat, street-by-street anddistrict-by-district, to wrest control of Mogadishufrom local strongmen and al-Shabaab fighters.3

After two years of bloody urban warfare, inAugust 2011 AMISOM and TFG forces succeededin pushing the majority of al-Shabaab’s fighters outof Mogadishu. In October 2011 Kenyan forceslaunched Operation Linda Nchi (Swahili for“protect the nation”), crossing the border intosouthern Somalia.4 Two months later Ethiopianforces again entered Somalia to open up anadditional front against al-Shabaab. By late 2012,Kenyan and Ethiopian forces had captured the

Figure 1. Number of AMISOM troops authorized and deployed, 2007–20155

Box 1. AMISOM’s major troop-contributing countries (TCCs) and police-contributing countries (PCCs)

Major TCCs and date troops arrived: Major PCCs and date police arrived:

Uganda, March 2007 Uganda, August 2012 (Formed Police Unit) Burundi, December 2007 Nigeria, September 2012 (Formed Police Unit) Djibouti, December 2011 Kenya, June 2012 Sierra Leone, April 2013 (withdrew December 2014) Ethiopia, January 2014


strategic towns of Kismayo, Belet Weyne, andBaidoa in south-central Somalia, and about 4,000Kenyan forces had been integrated into AMISOM.Meanwhile, AMISOM forces consolidated theirhold on central Mogadishu and pushed to the city’souter limits and beyond. It was at this stage that theAU decided it needed to support the stabilizationof the capital city and address the security situationbeyond Mogadishu, as well as to assist the TFG inconsolidating political control in areas recoveredfrom al-Shabaab.PREPARING FOR STABILIZATIONOPERATIONS

As military successes against al-Shabaab in Somaliacontinued, preparations were made to strengthenthe police and civilian components of the missionand to relocate these to Mogadishu. This shiftaimed to transform AMISOM from a purelymilitary into a more multidimensional operationthat could also support the stabilization of

Mogadishu, and potentially of south-centralSomalia once the security situation permitted. In2007, a small civilian team had already beenestablished in Nairobi, mostly to engage with theTFG and coordinate with the UN Political Officefor Somalia (UNPOS) and the UN Country Team.In 2011, steps were taken to strengthen this teamand construct facilities in Mogadishu in anticipa-tion of a redeployment. That same year, planningalso began for the redeployment of the small policecomponent of AMISOM, which until then hadprimarily been training Somali police officers innorthern Kenya. The idea that AMISOM could play a stabilizationrole also gained traction with the UN. In September2011, the UN Security Council welcomed theimprovement of security in Mogadishu andrequested that AMISOM work with theTransitional Federal Institutions of Somalia todevelop a stabilization plan for the capital city. The

6 AU Peace and Security Council Communiqué 356 (February 27, 2013), AU Doc. PSC/PR/COMM(CCCLVI); UN Security Council Resolution 2232 (July 28, 2015),UN Doc. S/RES/2232.

Box 2. AMISOM’s mandate (July 2015)6

a. Take all necessary measures, as appropriate, and in coordination with the Somalia National Defence andPublic Safety Institutions, to reduce the threat posed by Al Shabaab and other armed opposition groups;

b. Assist in consolidating and expanding the control of the [Federal Government of Somalia] over itsnational territory;

c. Assist the [Federal Government of Somalia] in establishing conditions for effective and legitimategovernance across Somalia, through support, as appropriate, in the areas of security, including theprotection of Somali institutions and key infrastructure, governance, rule of law and delivery of basicservices;

d. Provide, within its capabilities and as appropriate, technical and other support for the enhancement ofthe capacity of the Somalia State institutions, particularly the National Defence, Public Safety and PublicService Institutions;

e. Support the [Federal Government of Somalia] in establishing the required institutions and conduciveconditions for the conduct of free, fair and transparent elections by 2016, in accordance with theProvisional Constitution;

f. Liaise with humanitarian actors and facilitate, as may be required and within its capabilities, humani-tarian assistance in Somalia, as well as the resettlement of internally displaced persons and the return ofrefugees;

g. Facilitate coordinated support by relevant AU institutions and structures towards the stabilization andreconstruction of Somalia; and

h. Provide protection to AU and UN personnel, installations and equipment, including the right of self-defence.

council also noted the important role an effectivepolice presence could play in stabilizing Mogadishuand stressed the need to continue developing aneffective Somali police force. In this regard, thecouncil welcomed the AU’s plans to develop apolice component within AMISOM to that end.7

In February 2012, the Security Council adoptedResolution 2036, which, among other things,specified three dimensions of stabilization whereAMISOM should take on more of a role. First, itcalled for AMISOM to support delivery of stabiliza-tion plans developed by the IntergovernmentalAuthority on Development (IGAD) and the SomaliTFG in areas already secured. Second, it called forAMISOM to establish an operational policecomponent to help stabilize Mogadishu. Third, thecouncil indicated that, in its future decisionmaking, it would take into account how far Somalisecurity forces and AMISOM had consolidatedsecurity and stability throughout south-centralSomalia on the basis of clear military objectivesintegrated into a political strategy.8

AN EXPANDED MANDATE AND A NEWFEDERAL GOVERNMENT

By September 2012, a process of elite selection hadreplaced the TFG with a new Federal Governmentled by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud.Officially, this brought to an end the politicaltransition in Somalia that had started in 2004. Alsoin September, AMISOM and Somali security forcestook control of Mogadishu and its outer suburbs.Less than a month later, the AU Peace and SecurityCouncil requested that the AU Commissionundertake a strategic review of AMISOMoperations to determine how best the missioncould further contribute to stabilizing Somalia andsuccessfully implement the priorities set by the newSomali government.9

Shortly thereafter, the UN Security Council alsocalled for expanding the stabilization component of

AMISOM’s mandate. Specifically, the councilrequested that AMISOM, within its capabilities,assist in the implementation of Somalia’s newlydeveloped National Security and Stabilization Plan.At the AU’s request, the Security Council alsoextended logistical support for AMISOM’s civiliancomponent, underlining the importance of thesecivilians deploying swiftly to areas liberated fromal-Shabaab to assist with stabilization efforts.10

The AU Commission delivered its strategicreview of AMISOM in February 2013. Thisprompted the AU Peace and Security Council tocomprehensively revise AMISOM’s mandate forthe first time since the mission had deployed nearlysix years earlier. The revised mandate taskedAMISOM with facilitating and coordinatingsupport from relevant AU institutions andstructures for the stabilization and reconstructionof Somalia.11

The AU recognized that the situation on theground was rapidly evolving and that AMISOMoperations needed to be adjusted accordingly. Notonly had AMISOM swiftly expanded its presencebeyond Mogadishu, but the Kenyan and Ethiopianforces that intervened in late 2011 had also drivenal-Shabaab out of the strategic towns of Baidoa,Belet Weyne, and Kismayo. With the integration ofDjiboutian troops into AMISOM in December2011 and of Kenyan forces in mid-2012, themission established sector headquarters in thesetowns and sought to build its military presenceacross a string of smaller settlements and strategiclocations, forcing al-Shabaab to operate fromdifferent, often smaller towns.12 Ethiopian forcescontinued supporting AMISOM while remainingoutside of its command, especially in the areasaround Baidoa and Belet Weyne (AMISOM’ssectors 3 and 4; see Figure 2 for a map ofAMISOM's sectors). To support the Somali authorities in stabilizing


7 UN Security Council Resolution 2010 (September 30, 2011), UN Doc S/RES/2010. See also Yvonne Akpasom and Walter Lotze, “The Shift to StabilisationOperations: Considerations for African Peace Support Operations,” Conflict Trends 2 (2014).

8 UN Security Council Resolution 2036 (February 22, 2012), UN Doc. S/RES/2036.9 AU Peace and Security Council Communiqué 337 (October 11, 2012), AU Doc. PSC/PR/COMM(CCCXXXVII).10 UN Security Council Resolution 2073 (November 7, 2012), UN Doc. S/RES/2073. Since 2009, the UN has provided a logistical support package to the AU mission

via the UN Support Office to AMISOM (UNSOA). UNSOA covered the delivery of rations, fuel, general stores, and medical supplies; engineering and construc-tion of important facilities; health and sanitation; medical evacuation and treatment services and medical equipment for AMISOM medical facilities; communica-tions and information technology; information support services; aviation services for evacuations and troop rotations; vehicles and other equipment; and capacitybuilding. UN support did not extend to the provision of ammunition, which continued to be arranged with bilateral partners.

11 AU Peace and Security Council Communiqué 356 (February 27, 2013), AU Doc. PSC/PR/COMM(CCCLVI).12 At this stage, AMISOM had four sectors. Sector 1, centered on Mogadishu, was covered principally by troops from Uganda and Burundi. Sector 2 was headquar-

tered in Kismayo in southwest Somalia and was principally covered by the re-hatted Kenyan force. Sector 3 centered on the town of Baidoa and comprisedUgandan and Burundian troops supported by Ethiopian forces operating outside of AMISOM. Sector 4 focused on the town of Belet Weyne northeast ofMogadishu and contained Djiboutian soldiers supported by Ethiopian forces operating outside of AMISOM.


Figure 2. Maps of Somalia

Mogadishu and to assist in developing the SomaliPolice Force, the AU Peace and Security Councilalso authorized AMISOM to deploy a 540-strongpolice component, primarily to Mogadishu butwith a few individual police officers initiallydeployed to Belet Weyne and Baidoa. This movewas also intended to signify and further promote ashift from military-security operations towardrule-of-law operations and to free up militarypersonnel for redeployment to the sector locations. To this end, AMISOM deployed two FormedPolice Units from Uganda and Nigeria toMogadishu in August and September 2012, respec-tively. They were intended to increase theprominence of public policing efforts and topartner with the Somali Police Force on routinepatrols, cordon and search operations, roadblocks,and other measures designed to instill publicconfidence and empower policing efforts in theSomali capital. In addition, AMISOM slowly beganrelocating its civilian personnel from Nairobi to asmall mission headquarters in Mogadishu,providing limited political affairs, civil affairs,humanitarian liaison, and public informationcapabilities. The AU intended to slowly transformAMISOM from a military fighting machine into amultidimensional peace support operation focusedon supporting the stabilization efforts of the Somaliauthorities and providing much-needed support tothe Somali security forces. With the selection of a new Federal Governmentof Somalia, numerous international actors changedthe optics of their approach, inasmuch as they wereno longer dealing with a transitional government.Therefore, when the UN Security Council passedResolution 2093 in March 2013, it gave the newSomali government more responsibility for thesecurity and stabilization of areas recovered fromal-Shabaab and moved AMISOM into more of asupporting role.13 A few months later, the UN alsoadjusted its approach to Somalia to take account ofthe new circumstances: it replaced UNPOS, whichhad primarily operated from Nairobi, with thelarger UN Assistance Mission in Somalia(UNSOM), based in Mogadishu. UNSOM’s

mandate was to provide good offices and supportto the Somali government’s peace and reconcilia-tion efforts and to coordinate international supportto the development of the Somali security sector.14

AL-SHABAAB’S SHIFTING STRATEGY

But the AU and the UN were not the only actors toadjust their strategies in line with the new politicaldispensation; al-Shabaab adapted too, and faster.Whereas al-Shabaab had engaged the TFG andAMISOM forces in conventional and urbancombat operations in Mogadishu for almost fiveyears, the loss of Mogadishu and the strategictowns of Baidoa, Belet Weyne, and Kismayo in2011 and 2012 led it to swiftly change tactics.Rather than engage AMISOM and Somali NationalArmy (SNA) forces directly, al-Shabaab switchedto fighting a war of destabilization using principallyasymmetric tactics. These tactics included hit-and-run and harassment attacks against the SNA, theSomali Police Force, and AMISOM bases andsupply routes; assassinations; suicide bombings;improvised explosive devices (IEDs); grenade,mortar, and rocket attacks; and sniping. Al-Shabaab also stepped up its intimidation of govern-ment officials, security personnel, and, increas-ingly, the civilian population in areas undergovernment control. Its ability to infiltrate theSomali security forces and intelligence servicesenabled it to be particularly effective. In addition, while most al-Shabaab fighters hadbeen expelled from the larger urban centers bymid-2013, the group often left behind sleeper cells(usually formed of personnel from its clandestineintelligence wing, Amniyat) and was still able tomove freely across large swathes of south-centralSomalia. This meant it could still exercise signifi-cant influence over local populations living in theseareas and extract sufficient resources from themthrough taxation and other revenue streams—notably, illicit forms of commerce—to maintainhighly effective operations against the FederalGovernment and AMISOM.15

The net result was that AMISOM and SNA forcesbecame stretched across their area of operations,with vulnerable supply routes and remote forward


13 UN Security Council Resolution 2093 (March 6, 2013), UN Doc. S/RES/2093.14 UN Security Council Resolution 2102 (May 2, 2013), UN Doc. S/RES/2102.15 See, for example, Matt Bryden, “The Decline and Fall of Al-Shabaab? Think Again,” Sahan Report, April 2015, available at

www.sahan.eu/wp-content/uploads/Bryden-Decline-and-Fall-of-Al-Shabaab.pdf .

www.sahan.eu/wp-content/uploads/Bryden-Decline-and-Fall-of-Al-Shabaab.pdf


operating bases, while al-Shabaab forces weredisplaced but not significantly degraded. By April2013, shortly after the adoption of UN SecurityCouncil Resolution 2093, AMISOM’s MilitaryOperations Coordination Committee had alreadyrecommended that the mission should notundertake any further expansion operations, as ithad reached its operational limits and its capacitywas overstretched.16

That same month, AMISOM issued its firstmission-wide guidance on stabilization in the formof the AMISOM Provisional Guidelines onStabilisation. These guidelines provided themission’s first definition of stabilization efforts as“any post-conflict/-combat activities undertaken inorder to facilitate and promote early recovery of thepopulation and institutions in a locality that hasbeen recovered from Al Shabaab.”17 Based on thisdefinition, all mission components would beengaged in stabilization activities, with the militaryfocused on securing areas under the control of al-Shabaab, the police working to enhance the rule oflaw and public order, and the civilian componentundertaking activities “in support of the militarygains in Somalia.”18 The overall aim of the stabiliza-tion efforts was to support the Federal Governmentin promoting safety, security, reconciliation, anddevelopment of local governance to foster“normalcy” in the areas secured from al-Shabaab. While the guidelines provided a useful definitionand overall strategic direction for the mission, theydid not provide guidance on how to implementthese tasks. By default, this was left to a workinggroup within AMISOM, which was tasked withinitiating quick impact projects with a ceiling of$10,000 each. As AMISOM struggled to implement itsstabilization agenda, a stalemate quickly developed:the Federal Government, with AMISOM support,controlled Mogadishu, Baidoa, Belet Weyne,Kismayo, and a few other strategic locations, whileal-Shabaab controlled, and could move freelythroughout, most of the remainder of south-centralSomalia. While the government worked to deployadministrations and its own security forces to the

towns under its control, it was not able to access themajority of the Somali population, which remainedunder al-Shabaab control. Al-Shabaab remained an active force capable ofderailing efforts to forge a political agreementbetween the Federal Government and the newlyemerging interim regional administrations, theregional units in Somalia’s move towardfederalism. Indeed, from early 2013, al-Shabaab’sdeliberate shift toward asymmetric warfare resultedin a significant deterioration of the securitysituation in south-central Somalia. Al-Shabaab’s income had initially dropped afterit lost Bakara Market in Mogadishu in May 2011and the strategic port of Kismayo in October 2012.Nonetheless, the militants retained control of anumber of ports, their ability to tax the civilianpopulation on their farms and along strategictransportation routes, and control of illicit trade incharcoal and sugar. Combined, these generatedmore than enough money to finance the group’sactivities. It was also enough to prevent the FederalGovernment from exerting its authority acrossSomalia and to frustrate most of AMISOM’s initia-tives to facilitate this authority.A SURGE TO BREAK THE STALEMATE

To reduce the threat posed by al-Shabaab, and inline with the recommendations of a joint AU-UNbenchmarking process, in late 2013 the AU Peaceand Security Council and the UN Security Councilauthorized a temporary surge in the AMISOMforce from 17,731 to 22,126 uniformed personnelfor a period of 18–24 months.19 A new Concept ofOperations (CONOPS) was developed forAMISOM on the assumption that the surge wouldenable it to expel al-Shabaab from its remainingstrongholds, which, in turn, would enable stabiliza-tion programs to be implemented. The AU Peaceand Security Council endorsed this CONOPS onJanuary 23, 2014. The new CONOPS envisaged a strategic end-state where a significantly weakened al-Shabaabwould enable the Federal Government to expandits authority across the country and create a stable

16 Authors’ confidential interviews, October 2013.17 AMISOM, Provisional Guidelines on Stabilisation Activities, AMISOM internal document, 2013, p. 1. 18 Ibid., p. 1.19 UN Security Council Resolution 2124 (November 12, 2013), UN Doc. S/RES/2124.

and secure Somalia whose citizens enjoyed accessto justice and the rule of law.20 To achieve this,AMISOM would pursue four strategic objectives:1. Secure the sovereignty and territorial integrity

of Somalia by supporting the government’sefforts to neutralize and weaken al-Shabaab andgradually expand its territorial control;

2. Enhance the capacity of defense and publicsafety institutions, enabling the Somali nationalsecurity forces to develop the required capacityto take full responsibility for Somali security by2020;

3. Support the establishment of effectivegovernance by assisting existing institutions andestablishing new ones in areas recovered fromal-Shabaab; and

4. Facilitate the conduct of general electionsscheduled for late 2016.21

The implementation of this strategy hinged onAMISOM and the SNA working side by side injoint operations to expand territorial control andthen to provide security in these newly recoveredareas. With the SNA still embryonic, this requiredAMISOM to place more emphasis on training andmentoring SNA forces in the initial phases so theycould develop the necessary capabilities to conductthe expansion operations. Accordingly, this strategy was to be implementedin four phases: (1) continuation of currentoperations while the surge capabilities weredeveloped, the mission was reconfigured, and theSNA was trained; (2) expansion operations; (3)stabilization; and (4) handover of security respon-sibilities to Somali actors and drawdown.22 Ineffect, AMISOM’s approach to stabilizing south-central Somalia strongly reflected the “clear-hold-build” counterinsurgency strategy developed by theUnited States in Iraq and Afghanistan, probably atleast in part due to the role played by American andBritish advisers working closely with AMISOMand its troop-contributing countries (TCCs). The assumptions were clear: AMISOM wouldwork with the SNA to enhance its capacity andjointly conduct clearing operations in areas held by

al-Shabaab. The SNA and Somali Police Force, withAMISOM support, would then hold these areaswhile the government and other actors came in,established governance structures, and deliveredtangible peace dividends. As the Somali securityforces improved, AMISOM would hand oversecurity responsibilities, freeing up forces for otheractivities as the mission increasingly slipped from afrontline into a supporting role. By January 2014,the surge forces had arrived, principally byofficially integrating Ethiopian soldiers who werealready deployed in Somalia (in AMISOM’s sectors3 and 4) into the mission. Now, the expansionoperations could begin.

AMISOM’s ExpansionOperations: Ten Challenges

AMISOM’s first expansion operation, OperationEagle, commenced in March 2014, followed by asecond wave of expansion under Operation IndianOcean in August 2014. Combined, these operationsdrove al-Shabaab forces out of more than twentytowns across ten districts in south-centralSomalia—an estimated 68 percent of the strategiclocations al-Shabaab had controlled at the start of2014. Once again, al-Shabaab forces withdrew frommost towns before the SNA and AMISOM arrived,nominally placing the newly secured districtsunder the control of the Federal Government.However, al-Shabaab often deliberately ransackedand booby-trapped the towns before leaving andretreated only so far as to be able to mount nightlyraids, harass the main transportation routes, orblockade the towns entirely. As the expansion andstabilization operations continued, and as al-Shabaab continued to adapt and respond to them,ten major challenges quickly emerged . Combined,they severely undermined the military gains.LACK OF A SHARED STABILIZATIONSTRATEGY

First, the Federal Government and AU did nothave a shared stabilization strategy when AMISOMand the SNA launched their expansion opera -


20 AMISOM, Revised Concept of Operations [CONOPS] for the African Union Mission in Somalia, AU internal document, January 23, 2014, p. 4.21 Ibid., pp. 4–5.22 Ibid., pp. 14–15.


tions.23 Moreover, military priorities generallydictated other actions. The Federal Government, inanticipation of the expansion operations, haddeveloped a stabilization plan by February 2014,one month before the start of Operation Eagle.24This plan was to be coordinated by Somalia’sMinistry of the Interior and Federal Affairs.However, it was not effectively factored into theplanning of military operations.25 Military planningwas thus undertaken largely in isolation from thestabilization planning undertaken by the FederalGovernment, the Somali Police Force, theAMISOM civilian and police components,UNSOM, the UN Country Team, and donors andnongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Complicating matters further, many actorscrucial to the stabilization efforts, in particular theUN Country Team, NGOs, and donors, werereluctant to be too closely associated withAMISOM. AMISOM was also reluctant to share itsmilitary planning with other actors, given the needto maintain operational security. As such, jointplanning both within AMISOM and betweenAMISOM and other actors proved very difficult.Communication and coordination were oftenweak, and establishing priorities and deliveringsupport to areas recovered from al-Shabaab provedchallenging. This combination of factors left allother actors scrambling to coordinate theirstabilization plans and responses after the militarycampaign had started.LAG IN NON-MILITARY RESPONSES

Second, the speed of military operations faroutpaced the speed of other stabilization responses.The Federal Government’s stabilization plan, forinstance, provided for the immediate deploymentof caretaker administrations in recovered districts,followed by an inclusive local process to agree oninterim administrations, which in turn wouldprepare and facilitate agreement on permanentadministrations. The plan also called for support tolocal-level social and political reconciliationprocesses and peace dividend projects. In terms oflocal-level security, the plan called for the recruit-ment of community volunteers to work with a

limited number of trained police. However, when the first towns were secured, thecaretaker administrations had not even beenselected or trained, and they were generallydeployed several weeks or months after locationshad been secured. In some cases, this raised serioustensions between local communities that hadappointed their own interim administrations andthe government-appointed administrations. Inaddition, when government security forces diddeploy, their arrival sometimes raised tensions withlocal populations and militias and, in severalinstances, resulted in the outbreak of new conflicts.Thus, as the expansion operations ended, they lefta very unequal degree of governance and securityin the locations recovered from al-Shabaab.SEPARATION OF SECURITY ANDPOLITICAL DIMENSIONS

A third challenge was that the security and politicaldimensions of the surge and the resultant stabiliza-tion operations were separated from one another.Since AMISOM’s initial deployment, the divisionof labor between the AU and the UN had beenclear. The AU, through AMISOM, was to take thelead on security operations—protecting the TFGand then the Federal Government, enhancing thecapabilities of the Somali security forces, andundertaking joint operations with them against al-Shabaab. The UN, working first through UNPOSand then through UNSOM, was to lead on thepolitical side—providing good offices and engagingwith the TFG to support the transition to theFederal Government, supporting the developmentof regional and local authorities, supporting theconsolidation of the state and state authority, andcoordinating international assistance to the Somalisecurity sector. This division of labor—at timesexplicit, sometimes less so—was based on anunderstanding of comparative advantage: it wasthought that the AU was best placed to conductenforcement operations in a highly volatile anddangerous context, while the UN was best placed toact as guarantor of the political process (i.e.,supporting implementation of federalism as set outin Somalia’s provisional constitution and encour-

23 It is important to note that, throughout the subsequent expansion operations, the SNA had no troops in AMISOM’s sector 2 because of disputes with the leader-ship over what in 2013 became the Jubaland Interim Administration.

24 Federal Government of Somalia, Stabilization Project Strategy, version 30, August 2014. 25 AMISOM, Operation Eagle after Action Review Workshop: Stabilisation of Recovered Areas, Gender and Human Rights. Report of Working Group 4, AMISOM

internal document, May 30, 2015.


aging reconciliation). While this approach proved quite successful inthe initial years of engagement in Somalia, it washighly problematic during the expansion andstabilization phase after late 2013. AMISOM andthe SNA were rapidly expanding their militaryoperations across south-central Somalia, while theUN focused its political engagement primarily onthe Federal Government in Mogadishu and theregional administrations emerging around Baidoa,Belet Weyne, and Kismayo. Thus, while the UNremained engaged at the federal and regional levels,AMISOM military operations were increasinglyengaging at the local level without the necessarylinkages to the regional and federal politicalprocesses. In addition, while the UN also worked inPuntland and Somaliland, AMISOM’s engagementwas limited to south-central Somalia, which causedsignificant challenges when al-Shabaab startedmoving forces into Puntland while developing astrong presence in Kenya. Thus, while the UN wasable to operate politically in Puntland, there was noequivalent security cooperation to address theexpanding threat posed by al-Shabaab. As both thesecurity and the political operations in Somaliaevolved along different trajectories, significant gapsarose and became increasingly difficult to bridge.FRAGMENTED COMMAND ANDCONTROL

A fragmented system of command and control,combined with weak multidimensionality, wasAMISOM’s fourth major challenge. As AMISOMwas a war-fighting operation, it was not surprisingthat its multinational Force Headquarters wouldnot exercise real operational control over theTCCs; this is to be expected in war-fightingcoalitions where force headquarters focus onproviding overall strategic command and directionand facilitating effective coordination between thenational contingents. In AMISOM’s case, however, even thesefunctions were limited, with the ForceHeadquarters in Mogadishu having limitedinfluence on the actions of the TCCs in theirrespective sectors. During AMISOM’s early years,this limited influence was exacerbated by the weakpolitical leadership demonstrated by successiveheads of the mission (the AU special representa-

tives of the chairperson of the Commission. Thisleft a succession of AMISOM force commanders asthe primary political points of contact with theTFG and then the Federal Government inMogadishu. Nevertheless, AMISOM’s militaryleadership in Mogadishu only ever held a coordi-nating, as opposed to a commanding, role over theoperation after it expanded beyond the city. Accordingly, the pace of operations, and theactions of the individual TCCs within their respec-tive sectors, proved challenging to coordinate, letalone control. This had a particularly direct andcounterproductive military effect by offering al-Shabaab relative sanctuary in the frontier areasbetween AMISOM’s sector boundaries. Al-Shabaab quickly exploited the inability ofAMISOM’s different TCCs to coordinate cross-sector operations, with a legacy that lingers to thisday. With regard to AMISOM’s stabilization agenda,the fragmented command-and-control system wascompounded by the military-heavy nature of themission; it had a relatively small police componentof 540 officers and an even smaller civiliancomponent of fewer than 100 international andnational staff. Setting up a multidimensionalmission headquarters following five years of anexclusively military presence in Mogadishu provedchallenging. Integrating civilian and policepersonnel into AMISOM operations provedequally daunting. As such, the civilian and policecomponents of AMISOM, more often than not,either worked in isolation from their militarycounterparts or scrambled to respond to theoutcomes of the military operations. Effectivelycooperating and coordinating with the FederalGovernment, UNSOM, and the UN Country Teamon stabilization programs thus became even morechallenging as well.RESILIENCE OF AL-SHABAAB

Fifth, the expansion operations were not able tosignificantly degrade al-Shabaab’s key fightingcapabilities. Instead of engaging the advancingSNA and AMISOM forces, al-Shabaab fightersmelted into the population, drew back, orredeployed elsewhere in Somalia, heading as farnorth as the Galgala mountains in Puntland, wherethey established new bases and training camps. Thenumber of al-Shabaab fighters captured or killed


26 UN Security Council Resolution 2036 (February 22, 2012), UN Doc. S/RES/2036, OP para. 6.27 Uganda had signed a letter of assist with the AU and UN to deploy three attack/tactical helicopters, two utility helicopters, and one medevac helicopter to

AMISOM.

remained low, and al-Shabaab military equipmentwas rarely seized or destroyed. Having retreated, al-Shabaab fighters often set up camp several kilome-ters outside the recovered towns, then returned toharass them with raids and set up roadblocks andtaxation points along the entry routes to continuecontrolling the local population. Al-Shabaab wasalso able to harass AMISOM’s supply routes, usinga combination of IEDs and ambush attacks. WhenOperations Eagle and Indian Ocean concluded inlate 2014, al-Shabaab’s fighting capabilities hadbarely been degraded. Moreover, al-Shabaabcontinued to recruit and train new fighters,increasingly from Kenya.NON-ARRIVAL OF FORCE ENABLERS

Sixth, the force enablers and multipliers thatAMISOM desperately needed never arrived. Basedon plans for the surge and the 2014 CONOPS,AMISOM’s military strength would rise to 21,586personnel (an increase of 4,395), while its policecomponent would remain at 540 personnel,including 120 individual police officers and three140-person Formed Police Units. In addition to2,550 additional combat troops, the surge ofmilitary personnel was authorized to includecritical enablers: a 220-person training team, a 190-person engineering unit, a 117-person signals unit,a 312-person port security unit, a 1,000-personlogistics unit, and a 6-person civilian casualtytracking, analysis, and response cell. However,while Ethiopia provided three additional 2,550-person infantry battalions and a 220-persontraining team, the remaining enablers either werenot deployed or were deployed as TCC assetsrather than mission assets. Regarding the police, the number of individualpolice officers was reduced in preparation for thedeployment of a third Formed Police Unit tofurther support the transition to policingoperations in either Mogadishu or Kismayo. Thisunit did not arrive as planned, however,temporarily reducing AMISOM’s overall policingcapacity. Regarding civilian capacity, the AUstruggled to recruit the additional civilianpersonnel authorized in 2013 to reinforce themission headquarters in Mogadishu and deploy to

the sector headquarters and areas recentlyrecovered from al-Shabaab. In effect, between 2014and 2015, there was no tangible increase of civilianpersonnel in AMISOM. As such, even after thesurge, AMISOM was configured neither forconducting expansion operations nor forundertaking or supporting the planned stabiliza-tion tasks. It is important to note that AMISOM had toconduct these offensive operations without a singlemilitary attack helicopter. In 2012, UN SecurityCouncil Resolution 2036 had authorized anaviation component of twelve military helicoptersfor AMISOM.26 AMISOM lost the scheduledprovision of six Ugandan military helicopterswhen, in August 2012, three of them crashed on theslopes of Mount Kenya while en route to Somalia.27These helicopters would have been incrediblyuseful, including by offering a means to rapidlystrike al-Shabaab (and hence degrade some of itskey combat capabilities), providing air cover fortroops, escorting convoys, enabling rapid responseto attacks, flying rescue/evacuation missions, andairdropping forces. Without them, AMISOM wasbadly under-resourced, especially in the context ofal-Shabaab’s shift to asymmetric operations.CONTINUED INSECURITY OF THESOMALI POPULATION

These challenges also led to a seventh majorproblem: the expansion operations did not tangiblyincrease security, or perceptions of security, for theSomali civilian population. Indeed, the joint SNAand AMISOM offensives indirectly increased thelevel of violence in several locations by pushing outal-Shabaab and leaving a power vacuum in itswake. Such situations were worsened by centraland regional authorities failing to match themilitary effort with rapid deployment of interimadministrations that could deliver basic services tothe local populations. Clan violence, largely overleadership and resources, often reemerged as asignificant threat, particularly in the newlyrecovered areas. The beginning of 2015 saw consis-tently high rates of clan violence, increasedhumanitarian challenges, political marginalizationof less powerful clans, and clan-related conflict

over power and resources. Throughout these areas, Somali civilianscontinued to bear the brunt of the violence. In2014, for example, an estimated two-thirds of allcasualties from IED incidents were civilians.28Civilians also suffered from predatory behavior byal-Shabaab, the SNA, and clan militias, rangingfrom illegal taxation and checkpoints to criminalityto increased human rights abuses. In perhaps theworst-case scenario, AMISOM and the SNAsometimes vacated towns they had recovered fromal-Shabaab, leaving civil administrators andordinary citizens who had cooperated with themparticularly vulnerable to reprisals.DIFFICULTY BRINGING PEACEDIVIDENDS

This continued insecurity was compounded by aneighth challenge: the Federal Government andAMISOM’s struggle to bring peace dividends to thegrowing civilian population coming under theircontrol. Al-Shabaab increasingly resorted todestroying critical infrastructure when abandoningtowns, taking generators and water pumps withthem, blowing up wells, destroying bridges,ransacking medical facilities and schools, and evenremoving doors from prison cells. In al-Shabaab’sformer headquarters of Barawe, militantscompletely gutted the hospital of its equipment,leaving a single SNA mobile clinic as the onlymedical facility available to the local population.29

Once AMISOM and government forces hadentered a town, al-Shabaab worked to blockade it,preventing all access by road and ensuring thatgoods could not enter and people could not exit.AMISOM did not have the necessary forces topicket the roads or conduct regular convoys, andthus in many instances the only option was todeliver supplies for the mission and humanitarianassistance by air. This made humanitarianoperations very costly and slow, given the smallnumber of helicopters operated by the UN. Inmany locations, al-Shabaab also cut off farmers’access to their fields. As shortages of food andmedical supplies rose, so too did the frustration ofthe civilian population. The conduct of hearts-and-minds activities was

also constrained by three factors. First, AMISOMhad very limited civil-military cooperation(CIMIC) capacity, with only a small CIMIC officeat the Force Headquarters in Mogadishu and ahandful of CIMIC officers in each sector. Second,the mission had a tiny budget for CIMIC andhearts-and-minds activities. Third, the AU did nothave adequate systems and procedures in place forAMISOM to assess local needs, identify relevantquick impact projects, and deliver those projects onthe ground. Projects were slow to be implemented,in some cases taking well over two years tocomplete, leading to frustration on all sides.Numerous attempts to streamline projects, workdirectly with bilateral donors, and work throughthe UN procurement system led to marginalimprovements. However, AMISOM’s ability toconduct hearts-and-minds operations was notcommensurate with the pace and scale of itsmilitary operations, especially in a context where itwas recovering areas that had been under al-Shabaab control for a relatively long period, insome cases almost ten years.RIFTS BETWEEN ASSUMPTIONS ANDREALITY

A ninth challenge was that a key assumptionunderpinning the security strategy developed forthe surge proved faulty. The temporary AMISOMsurge endorsed by the AU Peace and SecurityCouncil and the UN Security Council assumed thatthe SNA would be able to play a supporting andthen leading role in the fight against al-Shabaab. AsSomali forces assumed greater responsibility in therecovered areas, so the thinking went, AMISOMcould move into a supporting role that would freeup AU forces for other tasks. In reality, training, arming, and supporting theSNA forces proved challenging, which limited theiroperational capabilities. Often, AMISOMoperations had to be slowed down or scrappedaltogether when the SNA could not match theirpace. The SNA’s weaknesses stemmed fromtechnical and infrastructural gaps and problemsrelated to command and control, clan dynamics,and political leadership, which further erodedAMISOM’s effectiveness.30


28 Author’s confidential interview, April 2015.29 Author’s confidential interview, November 2014.30 For more details, see Paul D. Williams, “AMISOM under Review,” RUSI Journal 161, no. 1 (2016).


DIFFICULTY PROVIDING LOGISTICALSUPPORT

Finally, providing logistical support to theexpansion operations was very difficult. Thelogistical support package for AMISOM and, later,for SNA forces working directly with AMISOMwas the responsibility of the UN Support Office forAMISOM (UNSOA). The mutually agreed conceptof joint AU-UN logistical support had been basedon an integrated civilian and military supply chain;UNSOA would be responsible for delivering toAMISOM sector headquarters, and AMISOMwould be responsible for first-line support from thesector headquarters to forward operating bases. Tofacilitate this support, UN Security CouncilResolution 2124 had authorized the deployment ofcritical enabling units as part of the temporarysurge, including aviation assets and a transporta-tion company. However, critical shortfalls quicklyarose when these enablers never arrived, al-Shabaab consistently attacked the main supplyroutes, and UNSOA’s own budget constraints ledto gaps in the logistics chain. As a result, logistical support could not keep pacewith the expansion operations. This was entirelypredictable, given that UNSOA had alwaysstruggled to apply UN rules, regulations, and ratiosdesigned for standard UN peacekeeping operationsto a rapidly expanding offensive campaign in anextremely hostile environment. In its war-fightingand stabilization mode, AMISOM’s consumptionrate of everything from tires for armored vehiclesto blood supplies and coffins far surpassed that ofany mission the UN had ever before supported.Moreover, UNSOA had a budget approximatelyone-third of that typically authorized for a UNpeacekeeping operation of equivalent size.Critically, when the AMISOM surge and a supportpackage for the SNA were authorized, the supportpackage for UNSOA, which was designed toprovide the logistical support to these operations,was left unchanged.31

***As the expansion operations drew to a close in late2014, three facts became increasingly evident. First,while the military operations against al-Shabaabhad displaced most of its fighters from numerous

urban centers and enabled the Federal Governmentto expand its geographic reach, they had notsufficiently diminished the threat posed by al-Shabaab. Consequently, security—and publicperceptions of security—had not improved signifi-cantly, and levels of violence in south-centralSomalia as a whole had increased during thisperiod. Second, the military gains could not besignificantly consolidated due to the challengeshighlighted above. This undermined the progressachieved through expansion operations. Third,AMISOM had once again reached its operationallimits. Having rapidly expanded its number ofsmall forward operating bases throughout 2014,the mission (and UNSOA) now struggled tosupport its sprawling presence across south-centralSomalia.

AMISOM’s ConsolidationOperations: From “Clear-Hold-Build” to “Hold-Protect-Stabilize”

A NEW STRATEGY FOR AMISOM

In November 2014, AMISOM temporarily haltedexpansion operations and moved into consolida-tion mode with Operation Ocean Build. Throughthis operation, AMISOM aimed to maintain andbuild upon the successes of earlier expansionoperations by focusing on stabilization, particularlyin areas recently recovered from al-Shabaab. Theplan was for stabilization to occur before anyfurther offensive operations in order to relievesuffering, win the consent of the local population,and extend the authority of the FederalGovernment.32

With Operation Ocean Build, AMISOM’sstrategy shifted from a “clear-hold-build” approachto a “hold-protect-build” approach. This newapproach more strongly emphasized consolidatingand stabilizing the areas now under the mission’scontrol. The intent was to promote stabilization byholding the key population centers and protectingtheir inhabitants, as well as by enhancing securityof movement along the main supply routes. Thiswould enable the Federal Government, the UN,

31 For additional details, see United Nations, Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2015/762, October 7, 2015.32 AMISOM Operations Order 08/2014, Operation Ocean Build, November 2014, p. 4.


and NGOs to project security, governance, andhumanitarian assistance and the subsequent peacedividends. AMISOM was also to devote moreattention to improving the SNA’s ability to supportthe Federal Government and contribute to jointoperations with AMISOM. Importantly, theapproach also emphasized monitoring clanconflicts, which had sometimes erupted after al-Shabaab forces withdrew. In the event of clanconflict, the Federal Government was to mediateand attempt to resolve tensions as quickly aspossible. Operation Ocean Build envisaged an end-state where the newly recovered areas werestabilized and their local populations protected,thus paving the way for further offensiveoperations against al-Shabaab.33

While Operation Ocean Build was underway, theAU and UN conducted a second jointbenchmarking exercise in April 2015. This exercisewas tasked with assessing the progress made duringAMISOM’s expansion operations andrecommending options for the way forward to theAU Peace and Security Council and the UNSecurity Council. The AU-UN team recommendedto both councils that they extend the surge periodbased on a strategy of three interlocking objectives:1. Enabling the political process to move at

varying speeds at the national, regional, andlocal levels;

2. Restarting offensive operations against al-Shabaab as soon as possible, while maintainingflexible offensive capabilities; and

3. Enabling consolidation efforts. To achieve these objectives, the AU-UN teamrecommended making AMISOM more efficient,including by bringing in the already authorized butabsent enablers and multipliers, placing greaterattention on developing the SNA’s capacity, andbetter supporting the Federal Government toextend its authority through regional and localadministrations. It also recommended securing themain supply routes, both to better facilitatelogistical support to AMISOM and the SNA and toenhance access by the civilian population, the

government, humanitarian actors, and others tothe areas recovered from al-Shabaab. Moreover,the team recommended supporting this agenda bymaking UNSOA’s support package more efficient.34

Both the AU Peace and Security Council and theUN Security Council endorsed this new strategy forAMISOM in mid-2015.35 Preparations forlaunching the next wave of offensive operationswere then set in motion. These partly involvedenhancing support to the SNA. After March 2015,this meant supporting the Federal Government’sGuulwade [Victory] Plan—a roadmap to a bettertrained, equipped, and supported SNA.36

Efforts were also put in place to enhance theSomali Police Force through the FederalGovernment’s Heegan [Readiness] Plan, launchedin June 2015. The initial focus was on developingpolice forces in Southwest and Jubaland States withAMISOM and UNSOM support. AMISOM andUNSOM also commenced planning for theestablishment of joint civilian teams in sectorlocations to better leverage their respectivecomparative advantages and better align support tothe government’s stabilization plan and the NewDeal Compact for Somalia. At the same time, aprocess to review UNSOA was initiated to assessoptions for strengthening its support to AMISOM,UNSOM, and parts of the SNA.AL-SHABAAB STRIKES

Before these efforts could gain much traction andthe renewed offensive could be initiated, al-Shabaab struck. On June 25, 2015, its forcesoverran an AMISOM forward operating base inLeego, killing fifty-four (mostly Burundian)soldiers and taking equipment, arms, and ammuni-tion. One month later, the Ethiopian and Kenyancontingents of AMISOM, working jointly withtheir SNA counterparts, launched Operation JubaCorridor, designed to push al-Shabaab out of itsremaining strongholds in the Gedo, Bakool, andBay regions of Somalia between the Ethiopian andKenyan borders. This operation’s official objectiveswere to “destroy, secure, consolidate and enhancethe stabilization process.”37

33 Ibid.34 Authors’ communications with members of the AU-UN benchmarking team.35 AU Peace and Security Council Communiqué 521 (June 30, 2015), AU Doc. PSC/PR/COMM(DXXI); UN Security Council Resolution 2232 (July 28, 2015), UN

Doc. S/RES/2232.36 The plan was endorsed by Somalia’s National Security Council on March 31, 2015.37 AMISOM Operations Order 01/2015, Operation Juba Corridor, June 2015, pp. 8–10.


While initially suffering heavy casualties and lossof territory, al-Shabaab quickly regrouped,increasing its attacks on government installationsand public venues such as hotels and cafés inMogadishu. On September 1st, the anniversary ofthe death of former al-Shabaab Emir AhmedGodane in a US missile strike, al-Shabaab overrananother AMISOM forward operating base inJanaale, killing an estimated nineteen Ugandansoldiers and taking an unknown number ofhostages.SHIFTING THE AMISOM STRATEGYAGAIN

In October 2015, a new CONOPS for AMISOMonce again adjusted the mission’s strategicobjectives. First, AMISOM would continueoffensive operations against remaining al-Shabaabstrongholds. Second, it would work to enablepolitical processes at all levels, including byproviding security to these processes. And third,AMISOM would enable stabilization efforts anddeliver programs to the Somali population to facili-tate wider peacebuilding and reconciliation,including by gradually handing over securityresponsibilities to the SNA and, subsequently, tothe Somali Police Force.38

AMISOM was to achieve these objectives in fourphases. First, until the end of 2015, it wouldcontinue its current operations while simulta -neously generating the critical missing enablersand multipliers and reconfiguring the mission.Second, AMISOM would wind down its expansionoperations. Third, it would launch a new phase ofstabilization and consolidation. Finally, it wouldgradually hand over security responsibilities toSomali forces in preparation for the electionsplanned for late 2016.39

AMISOM also revised its mission supportstructures. The review of UNSOA had concludedthat it was chronically under-resourced. Despitehaving pioneered innovative mechanisms that hadsignificantly improved the effectiveness ofAMISOM and UNSOM, UNSOA could not deliveron all the demands made of it.40 In line with thereview’s findings, the UN Security Council adopted

Resolution 2245 in November 2015, transformingUNSOA into the UN Support Office in Somalia(UNSOS). Under its new mandate, UNSOS wouldprovide more targeted support to AMISOM andbridge gaps left by the TCCs in limited areas. The Security Council also noted that the deliveryof supplies and services should take into accountthe tempo of AMISOM’s operations and otherrelevant factors that made the AU mission unlikeany “blue helmet” UN peacekeeping operation. Thecouncil further agreed with the UN secretary-general’s assessment that, although the SNA andSomali Police Force needed more support, andsupport should also be provided to security forcesin Puntland (where al-Shabaab was nowoperating), the UN was not the correct entity toprovide such support.41

By the end of 2015, AMISOM was simulta -neously continuing its expansion operations in theBay, Bakool, and Gedo regions of south-centralSomalia and attempting to mobilize the enablersand multipliers that had been authorized yearsearlier. It was also trying to reconfigure itself froma war-fighting to a stabilization force. Moreover,AMISOM, the UN, and donors were trying toboost the SNA’s ability to play the role envisagedfor it (i.e., taking the lead in securing Somaliawithin the framework of the Gulwaade Plan).AMISOM and UNSOM were also working toenhance the capacity of the Somali Police Force inMogadishu and to support the development oflocal policing capabilities in Southwest andJubaland States. The civilian components ofAMISOM and UNSOM also continued to supportthe Federal Government’s stabilization plan,though resources and capacity to do so werelimited. AMISOM also worked to provide better securityalong its main supply routes to improve access tothe areas recovered from al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaabcontinued to pose a serious threat to the civilianpopulation, the government, and the internationalpresence in Somalia. Clan conflicts, violentdisputes over resources, and predatory behavior bymany armed actors all contributed to a highly

38 AMISOM, Harmonised Strategic Concept of Operations [CONOPS] for the African Union Mission in Somalia, AU internal document, October 2015, p. 6.39 Ibid., pp. 17–18. 40 United Nations, Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2015/762, October 7, 2015, p. 4.41 UN Security Council Resolution 2245 (November 9, 2015), UN Doc. S/RES/2245.


42 Paul D. Williams, “Three Things We Learned from Last Week’s al-Shabaab Attack in Somalia,” Washington Post, January 19, 2016, available at www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/01/19/three-things-we-learned-from-last-weeks-al-shabaab-attack-in-somalia/ .

insecure environment in Somalia and, in someinstances, to an escalation of conflict. Increasingly,AMISOM struggled to conduct effective offensiveoperations against al-Shabaab, which expanded itsarea of geographic control, and to provide securityand support to stabilization programs in recoveredareas while securing and supporting its own forces. This was demonstrated most tragically onJanuary 15, 2016, when al-Shabaab overran a thirdAMISOM forward operating base at El Adde inSomalia’s Gedo region near the Kenyan border.42More than 100 Kenyan soldiers were killed inprobably the deadliest day for AMISOM since itsdeployment in 2007. This and other al-Shabaabattacks highlight that, although the militants are nolonger a major political force in debates aboutSomalia’s process of federal governance, theyremain capable of waging a deadly war of destabi-lization and harassment in both Somalia and Kenyaand of destabilizing political and securityprocesses. At the start of 2016, AMISOM was simultane-ously working to expand, strike al-Shabaab,reconfigure, hold recovered towns, and stabilizethese towns, despite not being configured,equipped, financed, or supported to carry out anyof these tasks fully. Whether AMISOM candiminish the threat posed by al-Shabaab anddeliver stabilization dividends in preparation forthe selection of a new government planned for late2016 will prove to be a major test of the mission’scredibility.

Lessons Learned fromAMISOM’s Experience

1. Missions must be appropriately configured tofulfill their mandate: A military-heavy missioncannot be expected to deliver stabilization,which requires significant police and civiliancapabilities. Moreover, a mission configured toundertake offensive operations and counter -terrorism tasks will not be well suited toimplementing stabilization programs. Peaceoperations will struggle to fully succeed if theyare not given appropriate means to achieve theirmandated tasks. AMISOM was forced to

operate for years without some critical enablersand multipliers that rendered it almostimpossible to significantly degrade al-Shabaab’smain combat forces.

2. The political and military elements of astabilization strategy must be in sync:Successful stabilization requires military actionsthat support a viable political strategy. This willbe very difficult to achieve if the military and thepolitical dimensions of stabilization areseparated from one another and carried out bydifferent, uncoordinated actors. Developing thesecurity sector is not an apolitical task, andensuring nonviolent political processes requiresa degree of security engagement.

3. Extending state authority is not synonymouswith peacebuilding, at least in the short term:A peace operation mandated to extend stateauthority in a context where the state is notwidely accepted as legitimate will not always beviewed as an impartial force. In such circum-stances, extending state authority is likely togenerate conflict. Success will therefore dependon the ability to conduct effective reconciliationand peacebuilding processes with aggrievedactors at the same time as extending stateauthority.

4. Territorial expansion is less important thandegrading the capabilities of spoilers:Stabilization efforts focused on expandingterritory and denying the opponent territorialcontrol are unlikely to work where the opponentadopts asymmetric tactics. Extending amission’s responsibilities over new territorywithout degrading the opponent’s combatcapabilities risks overextending mission forcesand leaving supply routes increasingly vulner-able. The opponent may simply adapt to losingterritory by becoming more mobile and flexible.Mission planning and resource allocationshould therefore focus on separating opponentsfrom the local population and degrading theircombat capabilities rather than traditionalobjectives of territorial control.

5. Strategic coordination among relevantpartners is a crucial, mainly political task:Implementing complex stabilization agendas

www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/01/19/three-things-we-learned-from-last-weeks-al-shabaab-attack-in-somalia/


43 For details, see Paul D. Williams with Abdirashid Hashi, Exit Strategy Challenges for the AU Mission in Somalia, Heritage Institute for Policy Studies, February2016, available at www.heritageinstitute.org/exit-strategy-challenges-for-the-au-mission-in-somalia/ .

involving numerous partners in the face ofconcerted hostility from some local actorsrequires strategic coordination. This coordina-tion is principally a political question ofdeveloping shared planning assumptions, threatanalysis, and operational responses. Moreover,where missions engage in essentially war-fighting activities, the headquarters of multi -national forces are unlikely to exercise realcommand and control over TCCs. Instead, theirprincipal function should be ensuring unifiedpolitical leadership and strategic coordinationamong the TCCs.

6. Lack of coordination can have negativepolitical and military effects: The lack ofcoordination between some of AMISOM’sTCCs had significant negative political andmilitary effects. The inability of the ForceHeadquarters to ensure that all of AMISOM’sTCCs followed the mission’s mandate led manySomalis to view the mission in a negative light asproviding cover for rogue TCCs. In militaryterms, when a mission loses local support, itspersonnel, particularly those in exposed forwardoperating bases, become especially vulnerable toattack. Moreover, lack of coordination betweensome of AMISOM’s TCCs prevented theexecution of cross-sector operations, whichenabled al-Shabaab fighters to find sanctuary inthe boundaries between AMISOM’s sectors.

7. Effective stabilization requires positiverelationships between the peacekeepers andthe local population: Implementing complexstabilization agendas requires the support oflocal populations. Locals are best placed toidentify insurgents and inform a peaceoperation of militants’ movements and routines.Peacekeepers who do not develop positiverelationships with local populations risk, at best,operating without optimal information and, atworst, driving locals to collaborate with theinsurgents. To date, AMISOM’s experience withsmall forward operating bases has not alwaysprovided a good model for forging positive tieswith the local populations—nor has its decisionto withdraw from some settlements recentlyrecovered from al-Shabaab. The role of effective

and trusted public communications also cannotbe underestimated.

8. There can be no successful exit withoutbuilding capable, legitimate, and inclusivenational security forces:43 For too long,AMISOM’s international partners put too littleemphasis on building effective Somali nationalsecurity forces. Sometimes donors werereluctant to invest much money, and sometimesthe UN Security Council was unwilling toauthorize UN support where it was neededmost. Furthermore, when mechanisms weredeveloped to build local security forces, theytended to put technical aspects above the needto forge a political settlement between theFederal Government and the interim regionaladministrations about how best to build a legiti-mate and inclusive national army out of themany armed groups scattered across Somalia.Without consensus on a national securitystrategy or a shared vision for how to undertakethe required military integration, Somaliacannot build multi-clan units and generatemulti-clan support—it can only build multipleregional or clan-based armies.

9. UN organizational frameworks and bureau-cratic culture are not suited to supporting war-fighting operations: It is never ideal to separatemilitary commanders from their logisticalsupport, as has been the case in AMISOM. Theestablishment of UNSOA had a major positiveimpact on AMISOM’s logistical capabilities, butit was always apparent that the UN’s organiza-tional culture, technical frameworks, andprocurement rules would be insufficient to meetall of AMISOM’s needs. This put UNSOApersonnel in an impossible situation. WhenAMISOM operated in just one city (until early2012), UNSOA could just about cover over mostof the cracks. But when AMISOM’s area ofoperations was extended across the whole ofsouth-central Somalia, UNSOA was exposed asa chronically under-resourced mission that wasnot suited to operating in such an insecureenvironment. If peace operations are given war-fighting mandates, their personnel shouldrightly expect appropriate logistical support.

www.heritageinstitute.org/exit-strategy-challenges-for-the-au-mission-in-somalia/

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