the tallboy and other bomb

8/13/2019 The Tallboy and Other Bomb

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The Tallboy Bomb - A Lancaster Delivered Earthquake

In the spring of 1942 the Nazis were building reinforced concrete submarine bases that were bomb-proof against any existing weapons. t thistime the largest penetrating bomb a!ailable to "omber #ommand weighed a mere 1$$$ pounds.

s early as the fall of 194$% the brilliant &ic'ers rmstrongengineer and designer of the (ellington "omber % "arnes(allis% had demonstrated in his research how extra-large%

penetrating bombs could create an earth)ua'e li'e pressurewa!e that would destroy nearby structures by displacingtheir foundations. (allis was en!isioning a weaponweighing 2$%$$$ pounds that would be dropped from analtitude of 4$%$$$ feet% and reach the speed of sound. *nownas the +,allboy%+ there was no aircraft in the foreseeablefuture that could carry it so the design was put on hold.

ollowing the success of (allis s +"ouncing "omb+ in the

/ambusters 0aid% his ,allboy design was re!iewed. ,herewas still no aircraft capable of carrying the original design to4$%$$$ feet but the ancaster was now operational and had

pro!en itself able to carry a 12%$$$ pound weapon. (allisre!ised his design% including offsetting the tailfins by fi!edegrees. ,his impro!ed the weapons stability significantly.0eleased from the optimum height of 1 %$$$ feet the bombtoo' 3 seconds to reach the ground% impacting with a speedof 5$ miles per hour. /uring the night of 6une % 1944 thefirst ,allboy was dropped% causing extensi!e damage to the7aumur 0ailway ,unnel% pre!enting enemy reinforcementsincluding tan' units from reaching the beaches of

Normandy.

Related Articles
http://www.bombercommandmuseum.ca/wellington.htmlhttp://www.bombercommandmuseum.ca/wellington.htmlhttp://www.bombercommandmuseum.ca/wellington.html


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"attleship ,irpitzancaster "omber

8$th nni!ersary of ,irpitz 7in'ing

Frank Hawkins looks up at a

tallboy in position in a Lancaster's bomb bay.The aircraft's bomb doors were modified

so that they could close around the weapon's 38" ( ! cm diameter.

n example of the ,allboy s effecti!eness occurred when they were used against the underground &-1 assembly and launch facilities at(izernes% rance. ne caused a landslide that completely bloc'ed an entrance to the underground storage area and on a second raid% additionallandslides were caused that completely bloc'ed the remaining four entrances. ,he earth)ua'e-effect of the weapon was demonstrated onnumerous other occasions such as when a +near miss+ of sixty feet was sufficient to destroy the railway bridge at "ad eynhausen.
http://www.bombercommandmuseum.ca/tirpitz.htmlhttp://www.bombercommandmuseum.ca/lancbomber.htmlhttp://www.bombercommandmuseum.ca/event_2004a.htmlhttp://www.bombercommandmuseum.ca/event_2004a.htmlhttp://www.bombercommandmuseum.ca/tirpitz.htmlhttp://www.bombercommandmuseum.ca/lancbomber.htmlhttp://www.bombercommandmuseum.ca/event_2004a.html


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" y the end of the war% a total of 54 ,allboys had been dropped on hea!ily reinforced &-1 and &-2 assembly and launch sites% submarine pens%tunnels% oil refining and storage sites% !iaducts% canals% and bridges. Its most spectacular success was with the sin'ing of the "attleship ,irpitz .

, he ,allboy was 21 feet in length and 3 inches at its maximum diameter. Its hardened steel case had a thic'ness of more than 4 inches in thenose. ,he tail of the bomb was made of aluminum. ,he weapon was filled with 52$$ pounds of ,orpex explosi!e and the actual detonationcould be delayed up to sixty minutes.
http://www.bombercommandmuseum.ca/tirpitz.htmlhttp://www.bombercommandmuseum.ca/tirpitz.htmlhttp://www.bombercommandmuseum.ca/tirpitz.htmlhttp://www.bombercommandmuseum.ca/tirpitz.html


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This Tallboy mock#up was built by $ohn %orel and &ndy Lockhart. t was un eiled durin) the museum's commemoration of the *i+tieth &nni ersary

of the *inkin) of the ,attleship Tirpit-.The museum's Tallboy was made possible throu)h a donation by * L $ohn ,irrell %./. (0et'd

and his wife F 1 /orothy ,irrell 0.2. (0et'd of al)ary. /r. ,irrell ser ed as a medical officer with the 0oyal anadian &ir Force durin) 44

and his wife /orothy was a nurse with the 0 &F.


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/ uring :arch% 1945 a larger !ersion of the weapon% the 22%$$$ pound +;rand 7lam+ became operational. (ith a length of 25 feet% 5 inches anda diameter of 48 inches% this bomb re)uired the complete remo!al of the ancaster s bomb bay doors. total of 41 ;rand 7lams were droppedduring the closing days of the war.

5rand *lam

1


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Guide to 'bunker-busting' bombs

The Guided Bomb Unit-28 (GBU-28), often known as a "bunker buster", wasdeveloped durin the ! ! Gulf #ar for penetratin fortified $ra%i &ommand &entresdeep under round'

These relativel simple, et devastatin l effe&tive weapons are now bein used

a ainst under round positions in f hanistan'

*arried b B-2 stealth bombers and +-! fi hters, the GBU-28 is a , lb laser-uided, &onventionall -armed bomb fitted with a .,. lb penetratin warhead'

The operator illuminates a tar et with a laser and the bomb uides itself on to themark'

The BB*/s defen&e &orrespondent 0onathan 1ar&us sa s the U armed for&es havebeen in&reasin l interested in developin a new ran e of weapons to hit deeplburied tar ets'

Bunker busters &an bedelivered b B-2 stealthbombers


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"The need arose durin the air &ampai n a ainst $ra%, but strate i& &on&erns in the3orean peninsula and elsewhere have added to the ur en& of developin su&hs stems," he said'

"The &on&ern is driven b the fa&t that as the power of surveillan&e and satellites stems in&rease, so an enem is likel to bur vital assets below round'

Mountain missile bases

"The meri&ans, for e4ample, believe that ke elements of 5orth 3orea/s nu&learpro ramme ma be under round' nd the utilit of &ave networks and subterrananpassa es for roups like al-6aeda is obvious'"

The U 7efen&e e&retar , 7onald umsfeld, said in a media briefin on Thursdathat "a lot of &ountries have done a lot of di in under round" - it was not uni%ue to

f hanistan'

"$t does make mu&h more &ompli&ated the task of dealin with tar ets be&ause, asou/ve known from photo raphs ou/ve seen of 5orth 3orea, it is perfe&tl possibleto di into the side of a mountain and put a lar e ballisti& missile in there and ere&t itand fire it out of the mountain from an under round post'"

9e said e%uipment su&h as that used to di the *hannel Tunnel &ould &ut holes fta&ross and 2 ft deep in a da '

eferrin to the atta&ks in f hanistan, he added: ";ou bet, to the e4tent we see aood deal of a&tivit , a lot of so-&alled adits and tunnel entries and e4ternal

indi&ation of internal a&tivit , we have tar eted them'"

Gulf War

Bunker busters were developed e4tremel %ui&kl durin the air &ampai n in the Gulf#ar in ! ! after it be&ame &lear that e4istin weapons were provin ineffe&tivea ainst under round tar ets'

The GBU-28 was not even in the plannin sta es when 3uwait was invaded in ! 'The U ir +or&e asked for ideas a week after militar operations started'

The first bunker buster was built on ! +ebruar ! ! usin surplus 8-in&h artillertubes' The pro


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Success

$nitial development and testin proved that the bombs &ould penetrate more than 2

ft of &on&rete, while a fli ht test demonstrated the bomb/s abilit to penetrate morethan ! ft of earth'

The first operational bombs were delivered to the Gulf on 2= +ebruar ' >nl twobunker busters were dropped in 7esert torm, both b +-!!! fi hter-bombers'

>ne bomb hit its tar et, &onfirmed b the air&raft/s onboard video &amera whi&hrevealed smoke pourin from a bunker entran&e about si4 se&onds after impa&t'

fter >peration 7esert torm, the ir +or&e made modifi&ations and undertookfurther testin '

$n ! =, the U spent ?!8'.m on produ&in more than !@ GBU-28s, a si n that theweapon had be&ome an inte ral part of the U arsenal'

lthou h spurred b the &ampai n a ainst $ra%, our &orrespondent sa s strate i&&on&erns in the 3orean peninsula and elsewhere have added to the ur en& ofdevelopin su&h s stems'

The meri&ans, for e4ample, believe that ke elements of 5orth 3orea/s nu&learpro ramme ma be under round'

round-support teamprepares to atta&h a /bunkerbuster/


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9>1A UB * $BA

ARCHIVE 9A C

A *9:
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Buried truth:

Debunking the nuclear bunker buster By Benjamin Phelan

According to Defense Department estimates, there are perhaps 10,000 underground military installations in the world. Most, nodoubt, are crude ammo dumps, but some are literally subterranean fortresses. The most dazzling is the complex beneath ussia!s

"amantau Mountain, begun under #rezhne$ but completed only recently% tunneled sideways into the &rals southeast of Moscow,the complex sits below thousands of feet of 'uartz, insulated from an American ()#M attac*. )hina, too, has an extensi$e systemof underground bun*ers and command shelters, including hundreds of fortified missile silos, complete with li$ing 'uarters, thatare scattered throughout its +. million s'uare miles. (n -orth orea the reliance on tunnels and bun*ers is e$en more obsessi$e.&nderground weapons factories there are belie$ed to employ as many as /0,000 wor*ers% the nation has tunneled under the DMand into outh orea, has dug in upward of 10,000 pieces of artillery along the border, and e$en has built underground airstrips.(ran possesses an underground uranium2enrichment plant at -atanz that can be expanded or altered in secrecy. 3ibya!s $astchemical2weapons plant at Tarhunah, though now apparently in disuse, is still standing, still underground, and could be 'uietlyreopened by a lapsed 4addafi. 5ithout satellite sur$eillance showing its construction and burial, the world might still be ignorantof yria!s As2 afirah chemical2weapons factory. These installations, and countless others un*nown around the world, constitutethe last class of targets that America!s current arsenal cannot credibly threaten with swift annihilation.

ince the )old 5ar, the &. defense community has become obsessed with the problem of bun*ers and how to destroy them. Thesolution put forward has, of course, been expensi$e new weaponry. oon after the attac*s of eptember 11, /001, the #ush

Administration made a push for new nuclear programs, the most conspicuous of which was the obust -uclear 6arth 7enetrator8 -679, designed to destroy deeply buried bun*ers. During the first presidential debate this fall, :ohn erry made much of hisopposition to the program. ; ight now the 7resident is spending hundreds of millions of dollars to research bun*er2bustingnuclear weapons,< he said. ;5e!re telling other people, ="ou can!t ha$e nuclear weapons,> but we!re pursuing a new nuclear weaponthat we might e$en contemplate using. -ot this president. (!m going to shut that program down, and we!re going to ma*e it clear tothe world we!re serious about containing nuclear proliferation.d ne$er heard of a ;-o. /1d been interested in was, in fact, a roc*et, and its fuze number did end with ;/1


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Figure 1 - The Disney bomb, grounded and mounted. The fins are at the rear of the weapon; thethicker part of the bomb houses the rocket motors. And that guy in the centre looks an awful lotlike he's wearing a Royal Na y uniform. !ould it be the "!aptain #dward Terrel, RN" referred to

in the $ikipedia article% (Source: allegedly T.Burakowski and A.Sala, Rakiety i pociski kierowane, 1960, np).

5hile short on detail, this ga$e me something more to go on. ( found a reference to a 7olish boo* published in 1@?0 by T.#ura*ows*i and A. ala, entitled Rakiety i pociski kierowane , or oc*ets and guided missiles % and another to ;& TAJ Armament Memorandum -o. +21++, dated /P :anuary 1@ Et appear to exist on the 5eb. A big help was an off2hand annotation in a comment on a modelling blog which pro$ided a lin* to an old issue of Flight magazine. The page, dated May +0th 1@ ?, did not use the ;Disney< designation O but itdid refer to a E002pound roc*et2assisted bomb carried by the #21 Jlying Jortress. (t also noted that ;An official film of =7roCect uby>shows that the missile resembles the Berman =7.).> series carried by :u2P s and 2PPs, though the roc*et motor, detachable from the warhead, appears e$en longer.s how the different weapons stac*ed up in numerical terms

Table % - Bombs use& in the Pro"ect #$uby# tests '(rom the )ro"ect re)ort, )* +%

Bomb Weight Length* Length Overall L/D W/D C/W**M1 ! S"# $ lb %&%' &%' !&) %& $ +1)% Model 1)% lb ,&$%' 1!& %' &% ,&- n/aDi.ney -% lb ,& %' 1 &$%' &, $ & 11+

allboy 1$0 lb 1 ' $1' !&! &! -!+rand Slam $$0 lb 1$&%' $%&%' !&! 1 &- -$+

"ma2on $$0 lb 1$&%' $%&%' -& 1%&$ $!+*Length i. 3or the 4arhead .ection only5 the tail .ection. add negligible 4eight**C/W i. 4eight o3 e67lo.ive 3ill a. a 7ro7ortion o3 overall 4eight

As you might expect, the next se$eral dozen pages pro$ide test results and data for the bomb trials. 1/P bombs were dropped at Jarge, and1++ at Kelgoland. Most of the bombs used were, it turns out, Disney bombs. This was due to the re'uirement to test them both with, and without, roc*et assist. And as expected, in the pre2laser guidanceQB7 era, on target was something of a fluid concept.
http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-VwJICO_P4Ks/T2SWqSnftyI/AAAAAAAAAlo/rsUjNo287LQ/s1600/Slide4.JPG


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Figure - .m)act recor&s (or Pro"ect #$uby# tests, Farge Submarine Assembly Plant 87roCect uby eport, p. 10@9

,he roc'et assist system was probably the most fascinating aspect of the /isney. It wasachie!ed by adding a long tail section to the bomb body and stuffing it with 19 3

Table 2: Comparison of unassisted/rocket-assisted Disney bomb kinetic energies(calculated)

Ma..(8g9 elocity(m/.9;inetic

oc8et

"..i.t $ !%! 1$-&) ,With >oc8et "..i.t $ --) 1, &,1)?ncrea.e $)+ ) +

3et>s fast2forward to the end. The trials demonstrated that without roc*et assist, the Disney 8 wishV 9 bomb was capable of penetrating ana$erage of 10>E< into reinforced concrete, with a standard de$iation of P10< of concrete, with a standard de$iation of 1 @ thic* concrete floor and burying itself completely in the sand underneath the facility.

( wish some of the photos from the report were of decent 'uality, but they!re Cust awful. Kowe$er, in one of life!s little ironies, a few yearsago a Disney bomb 2 still fuzed and armed, but unexploded 2 was disco$ered stuc* in the roof of the 6perlec'ue blochaus, an infamous relictof 55(( located about +0 *m southeast of )alais. The Jrench $ideo about the disco$ery and the bomb!s subse'uent disarming andremo$al pro$ides a pretty good idea of the penetrating capabilities of this weapon.

86perlec'ue, incidentally, was infamous because it was one of the launch sites for R1 flying bombs. That!s rele$ant to this discussion, in anoddly tangential way, for reasons that ( will explain later.9

The failure of the Disney bomb to explode when it struc* the 6perlec'ue bun*er tells us a lot about the stability of the filler 2 which in turnconfirms the explosi$e sensiti$ity tests at Kelgoland in 1@ ?. All of the explosi$e mixtures trialled pro$ed to be relati$ely resistant to shoc*%in only a few cases were low2order detonations obser$ed. The mixtures trialled included 0Q+0 hellite 8picric acidQdinitrophenol9%?0Q/0Q1? DUQAluminum 7owderQ5ax% ?PQ/0Q1/ DUQAluminum 7owderQ5ax% T-T% /0Q?0Q/0 DUQT-TQAluminum 7owder mixed
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TjQr0M-8i1M&feature=player_embedded#!http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TjQr0M-8i1M&feature=player_embedded#!http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-nvjNIFSRp04/T2SW9N48PTI/AAAAAAAAAlw/oSm0BbI1Rdc/s1600/Slide5.JPGhttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TjQr0M-8i1M&feature=player_embedded#!


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with wax and carbon blac*% and 7icratol 8E/ Dunnite, or ammonium picrate, and P T-T9.

The uby tests also re$ealed serious flaws in all of the weapons. -one of the bombs were capable of penetrating the thic*est 8/+>9 section ofthe Jarge roof. The Amazon had a maximum penetration of 1E>10 < maximum penetration expected from theDisney bomb. At maximum stri*ing $elocity the dreaded Brand lam could only penetrate >P< of concrete% the American 8forged9 Tallboypenetrated E>P 0 crater in the Jarge roof, then bounced out and was found E>away9, and minimize the distance to be penetrated. Jinally, the report recommended identifying and using the most powerful explosi$efillers a$ailable.

;(nclosure 1 < is an interesting addendum to the report. (t details the physics calculations for bomb penetration, comparing the standardformulae used in & and & research, and comparing their predictions to the results achie$ed in the 7roCect uby tests. The report notesthat predictions of penetration for the unassisted Disney bombs were a maximum of 1/>?< and an a$erage of 10>?E


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8 ource -A Aofficial go$ernment website 9

Jor example, this fellow a Berman ex2pat with a promising future who *new a thing or two about roc*ets, named 5erner $on #raun.

And th-th-th-that's all, olks!

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Nukes for NATOBy Rebecca GrantContributing EditorExtendeddeterrencewill go on, and the F-35 fighterwill take up the burden.

For more than 60 years, nuclear-armed fighters have been a key part of the US deterrence calculus,particularly in Europe. Indeed, providing the umbrella of "extended deterrence" to NATO nations hasbeen a mission performed by generations of USAF air crews, maintainers, and security forces.

It now appears that, before long, the iconic nuclear fighter role, performed in recent years by the F-15Eand F-16, will pass to a new heavyweightthe F-35 Lightning II.

As the Obama Administration sees it, nuclear weapons delivered by fighters will continue to play animportant role in the nations international affairs. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, released in April,reaffirmed the requirement for tactical nuclear weapons in US defense strategy.

The United States, it said, will "retain the capability to forward deploy US nuclear weapons on tacticalfighter-bombers ... and proceed with full scope life extension for the B61 bomb, including enhancingsafety, security, and use control."
http://science.nasa.gov/science-news/science-at-nasa/2000/ast26may_1m/http://science.nasa.gov/science-news/science-at-nasa/2000/ast26may_1m/http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Documents/2010/July%202010/0710nato.pdfhttp://afaprintmagazinearticleclick%28%27magazinearticlerollup%27%29/http://afaprintmagazinearticleclick%28%27magazinearticlerollup%27%29/http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-94REPNNMQAY/T2SYBGYsEFI/AAAAAAAAAmA/QzpYFxUiaOo/s1600/Slide7.JPGhttp://science.nasa.gov/science-news/science-at-nasa/2000/ast26may_1m/http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Documents/2010/July%202010/0710nato.pdfhttp://afaprintmagazinearticleclick%28%27magazinearticlerollup%27%29/


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Lightning II fighters complete a test flight. TheF-35 will inherit the nuclear deterrence mission.(Photo by a!id rais"

The Air Force, the NPR made clear, will "retain a dual-capable fighter . .. as it replaces F-16s with theF-35." The NPR also announced final retirement of the nuclear-capable Tomahawk cruise missile

(TLAM-N), a theater-range nuke. The Army long ago eliminated its theater nuclear missiles. Thus,USAF will do all of Washingtons heavy lifting for extended tactical deterrence.

Several NATO countries have the technical capability to deliver US nuclear warheads with nuclear-certified fighters. Each munitions storage sitesome were completed as recently as 1998cansecurely house a score or more of warheads in NATOs central and southern regions.

NATO members Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway formally requestedthat the alliance discuss potential withdrawal of US weapons from the continent as the alliance reviewsits strategic concept. Other nations, including several formerly under Soviet domination, disagree. Theysay such weapons are critical symbols of the US military commitment to Europe.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton rebuffed the call. "First," she said, "we should recognize that, as longas nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance."

In short, the policy of extended deterrence is alive and well, but meeting the NPRs guidance over thelong run will hinge on success with the F-35 and the B61 bomb refurbishment.

The Air Force has a long and successful track record with extended deterrence. In fact, fighterscarrying tactical nuclear weapons have been around nearly as long as NATO itself.

#n F-$5% ta&es off from '#F La&enheath)ritain. In recent years the nuclear fighterburden has fallen on F-$* and F-$5% aircraftbut they+re getting old. (, #F photo by #$Perry #ston"

In the late 1940s, war plans for a confrontation with the Soviet Union in Europe first depended on B-36intercontinental bombers attacking Soviet targets. But planners conceded that the strategic bombing


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would not prevent the battle-hardened Red Army from trampling much of Europe if Stalin chose toinvade. With Europe demobilized, atomic weapons were seen as vital to the ground force engagement.

A new forward defense war plan code-named Ironbark incorporated a limited form of tactical atomicweaponry for NATO from 1950 onward. At first, when plans anticipated that much of Europe would beoverrun, it was mainly a mission for Navy attack aircraft. Up to 16 aircraft carriers on NATOs flankswould use nuclear weapons against invading Soviet forces.

In February 1951, the US Sixth Fleet, operating on permanent assignment in the Mediterranean,received AJ-1 Savage attack aircraft capable of carrying atomic bombs from the fleets aircraft carriers."We certainly need their atomic capabilities," declared five-star Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, who wasNATOs first Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

Meanwhile, Tactical Air Command was training the first cadre of F-84 pilots for nuclear alert in Europe.When atomic artillery in the form of the 280 mm howitzer arrived in Europe in the fall of 1952,Eisenhowers staff put the guns in their plans.

As a NATO strategy paper recounted: "To deter major war in Europe, nuclear weapons were integratedinto the whole of NATOs force structure, and the alliance maintained a variety of targeting plans whichcould be executed at short notice."

Just Acrossthe Border

The result was a mission known as Victor Alert. Fine-tuned command and control of NATOs extensivearsenal required continuous practice and exercises. Officers at US Air Forces in Europe becameexperts in the high-stakes task of moving nuclear weapons to aircraft to arm and get them airborneunder tight time lines.

A 1987 list compiled by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists identified nearly a dozen aircraft typescertified to drop nuclear bombs, not including strategic bombers. The F-100 pulled the mission foryears. The F-104G Starfighter was nuclear-certified for the air forces of Italy, Greece, and Turkey.

Two F-$$$ aircraft o!er '#F ,pper /eyford)ritain. ,nder some $012s nuclear war plans F-$$$ wings were tas&ed to uic&ly launch up to*2 aircraft. ( 4 photo"

For USAF, the main aircraft for nuclear operations were the F-4, F-111, F-16, and much later, the F-15E. The F-111 wings in England in the 1970s were tasked to quickly launch up to 60 aircraft undercertain war plans. F-111s could carry multiple B61 warheads.

During the 1980s, F-16s in "triple doc" squadronsthose tasked with air-to-air, air-to-ground, andnuclear missionssat Victor Alert at bases in Europe. Under NATOs quick-response mandates, twoaircraft from each squadron in a wing of three squadrons might be on alert, with B61s loaded, at alltimes. The aircrews had to demonstrate they could take off within 15 minutes of an alert order.


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weapon ultimately retired from RAF service in 1998. (Though the WE177s were dismantled, Britainretains D5 warheads for the Trident missile in its submarine fleet.)

NATO members Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy did not develop indigenous nuclearweapons programs. Instead, they maintained dual-certified aircraft capable of uploading US B61sduring a crisis.

Given this background, the requirement for nuclear weapons certification for F-35 was planned fromthe beginning.

A StrongCommitment

Air Force plans dating back to the 1980s called for the F-16s replacement to take over the tacticalnuclear role, and due to the effort involved in full nuclear certification, the Air Force wanted only onenuclear fighter type in its future arsenal. A nuclear-capable F-16 replacement also needed to be aninteroperable export fighter that NATO allies in particular could buy to maintain their extendeddeterrence role. Therefore, the F-22 was never intended to be a nuclear fighter, and was insteadoptimized for air-to-air operations and destruction of enemy air defenses.

"The NPR, ... in essence, reaffirms the alliance position to have nuclear weapons as part of the allianceforce structure," said Alston. "Those dual-capable aircraft historically have been the F-16 and the F-15E, and they will continue to be those aircraft until such time as the F-35 is deployed."

Full certification of the F-35 for the nuclear role will ultimately require an additional $339 million infunding. Key elements include special attention to internal wiring and avionics, with additional costs tocover the test and certification process. It will begin after early testing is complete, taking place as partof a stage called follow-on development.

Although F-35 costs are under scrutiny, the Pentagons commitment is strong. "I have no lack ofconfidence in us absolutely following through" on F-35 nuclear certification plans, Alston said. "TheDepartment of Defense has made it clear that were committed to doing this, to making the F-35 dual-capable," he said.

Just as important is funding a B61 life extension on a schedule synchronized with F-35 development.

"It will matter that the B61 life extension program moves forward and that we can have a life-extendedB61 to marry up to a nuclear-capable F-35," acknowledged Alston.

# , #F F-$2 lands at 6or7n #) pain in6arch $0* . The F-$2 was also nuclear-certified for the air forces of Italy 8reece andTur&ey. (Photo by )ruce #ro"

The B61 has seen so many variants that experts refer to it as the B61 family of weapons. Productiontook place from the 1960s through the 1980s. Some variants were converted to the B61 family after

beginning design under other monikers. The most recent variant was the B61 developed for use withthe B-2 bomber. Its ballistic shapewithout nuclear material, of coursewas tested in 1998.


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"One of the things the life extension program would do would be to reduce the number of variants ofthe B61," said Alston. "We dont need that number of variants. There are some aging problems with theB61, and the life extension program will overcome those."

Stable funding is critical because pipeline capacity for warhead refurbishment is very limited. As Alstondescribed it, the "life extension program drives infrastructure demands on the Department of Energy tobuild the production capacity. Their infrastructure is hurting. The Navy has the W76 system under wayright now. We couldnt do [the B61] at the same time, thats how limiting [it] is."

Modernizing the B61 will take steady investment. "Theres a considerable amount of infrastructure thathas to come through for the Department of Energy to be able to move forward on the B61," Alstonsaid.

At US Strategic Command, Gen. Kevin P. Chilton is adamant about the need for a B61 life extensionregardless of F-35 scheduling. "A lot of folks are linking 2017 to F-35. We need the B61 in firstproduction in 2017 regardless of the F-35 because the B61 also is a weapon that is used by the B-2,by our strategic deterrent," he told the House Armed Services Committee on April 14.

Despite the Administrations support, shifting policy winds could derail B61 modernization and perhapseven final certification of the F-35. For example, Congressional committees have tossed around cuts tothe B61 life extension program, although support for the W76 program for the Navy has been solid.

The NuclearUmbrella

The longer-term risk comes from those who were not happy about what they saw as a free pass fortactical nukes. One school of thought regards tactical nuclear weapons as a skeleton in the closetforgotten by the Obama Administrations nuclear strategy reviewand ready to haunt US foreignpolicy.

"So before anyone cracks open the champagne for Obamas vision of a nuclear-free world, dont takeyour eye off the little guys," warned David E. Hoffman in an article for Foreign Policy in April.

Yet as Hoffman noted, "Tactical nukes are going to be very, very hard to negotiate."

# )*$ nuclear bomb rests in a protecti!e hangarne9t to an F-$*. The )*$ is recei!ing a full-scope life e9tension. (, #F photo"

A large part of the reason for that is that DOD, the State Department, and NATO see continued utilityfor tactical nuclear weapons. Nuclear fighters provide extended deterrence beyond NATOs border.There is every possibility that, over the life of the F-35, Middle East states or Pacific region allies willconfront regional nuclear threats.

According to the NPR, the "nuclear umbrella" of extended deterrence included the strategic triad,nonstrategic forward deployed forces, and US weapons that "could be deployed forward quickly to

meet regional contingencies."


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buried 5$ feet C25$ metersD underground.

Nuclear Conception

,he "81-11 program initially began on 6uly 18% 1993% when then / @ /eputy ssistant 7ecretary for :ilitarypplication C/efense ArogramsD (inford @llis + strongly recommended + to the ssistant to the 7ecretary of /efense

C tomic @nergyD Barold 7mith that the "53 bomb be retired +at the earliest possible date.+ ,he nine-megatons behemoth% first deployed in 1982% did not meet modern nuclear safety design criteria% / @ said.

+Euic' oo'+ study of alternati!es to the "53 was completed in /ecember 1993 and cited a formal 7,0 ,# :re)uest for a program to replace the bomb.

,he go!ernment had 'nown about safety issues in the "53 +for twenty years%+ 7andia /irector Aaul 0obinson stated in199 . "ut the brute force of the weapon was considered the only means for holding a few high-priority 7o!ietunderground targets at ris'% so public safety was disregarded. Not until the late 19 $s did the planners considerreplacing the "53 with an earth-penetrating weapon> the 7trategic @arth Aenetrating (eapon C7@A(D. ,he 7@A(

program% which examined a spectrum of penetrator designs with relati!ely large nuclear yields% ad!anced through AhaseII before it was cancelled in 199$ Cdespite cancellation% some 7@A( wor' continued as late as 199 D.

Next on the nuclear drawing table was the (81% a nuclear earth-penetrator warhead based on a retrofitted "81- bomband modified for deli!ery in a missile. ,he (81 was proposed as the warhead for the ,iger C,erminal ;uided and@xtended-0angeD II missile Clater renamed @xtended 0ange "omb C@0"D% ad!anced tactical air-deli!ered weapon%, 7: C,actical ir-to-7urface (eaponD% and briefly the 7 : C ir- aunched 7tand- ff :issileD. ,he (81

program recei!ed Ahase III authorization in 199$ as an interim solution to the target set of the 7@A(% but when the, 7: was canceled in 1992% the (81 was canceled as well% according to a 7andia report .

B61-11 Chronology

1993

6ul 18> 0ear dmiral (. ;. @llis% / @ /efenseArograms% as's ,7/C @D to retire and ifnecessary replace "53 +at the earliest possibledate.+

/ec 1$> / @ Euic' oo' study identifies baseline design as modified "81- with nosefrom cancelled (81 program.

199

7ep 22> Nuclear Aosture 0e!iew recommends"81-11.

7ep> A//FN7#-3$ directs de!elopment of "81-11.

No!> "81-11 +"81- loo'-ali'e+ conceptde!eloped.

/ec> 7 F EE% A@ F7,% G appro!e "81-11concept.

1995

6an 1 > N(#77# appro!es baseline design andrecommends appro!al.

eb 8> Nuclear (eapons #ouncil appro!es "81-11 concept.

pr> #ongressional committees are briefed.

6ul 1 >Congress appro!es re"uest to startB61-11 e##ort$
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6ul> N(# as's ir orce to lead "81-11 AroHectfficers ;roup CA ;D to implement proHect.

6ul> 7 formally tas's "81-11 A ; toimplement the proHect and report bac' in 9$days.

ug 2> /esigners informed by / @ that#ongress had appro!ed.

ug 4> / @ directs lbu)uer)ue and Nationalabs to begin wor' on the "81-11 program.

ug > "81-11 *ic'-off meeting held at*irtland ".

7ep 1> irst draft of :ilitary #haracteristicsC:#D and 7toc'pile to ,arget 7e)uence C7,7D.

7ep 8> / @ holds first all-agency "81-11meeting. irst time people in productioncomplex see the "81-11 concept.

7ep > irst draft "81-11 :# circulated forcomments.

7ep 15> Arogram authorized.

7ep> ,he "81-11 program is first mentioned in public.

ct 3> 7N F/ @ proposes accelerating irstAroduction ?nit by nine months from ugust199 to /ecember 31% 1998.

ct 1 > "81-11 re)uirements finalized.

No! 15> Barold 7mith informs N(# that A?should be accelerated.

No! 21> ,7/C @D selects ption 2 C(81-li'edesignD as leading candidate and as's / @ to+de!ote full resources to this design.+

/ec> inal design selected.

1996

eb> A? deli!ery formally accelerated to/ecember 31% 1998.

pr> Barold 7mith states that "81-11 could be+weapon of choice+ against ibya

No! 2$> light test certification passed.

/ec> "81-11 is accepted as +limited stoc'pile

item+ pending further flight tests.

199%

6an> irst "81-11 enters stoc'pile.

No!> ,he "81-11 enters ser!ice with the 5$9(ing at (hiteman " in :issouri.

199&

ct> , 338 begins.

1999

ct> , 349 begins.

'(((


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7ep> , 349 completed and certified.

/ec> , 349 recommended for acceptance tothe N(#77#.

7andia led inter-agency group +to understandmore fully the weapon s penetrationcapabilities.+

'((1

,he "81-11 was certified to meet allre)uirements% resulting in its acceptance as a+standard stoc'pile item.+

/ec 31> ,he Nuclear Aosture 0e!iew 0eportstates that the "81-11 +has a !ery limited ground

penetration capability+ and +cannot sur!i!e penetration into many types of terrain in whichhardened underground facilities are located.+

'(('

6ul> , 338 completed.

ct> , 35$ begins.

Ahase 8.3 study begun for the refurbishment ofthe #7 CsecondaryD.

'((5

7ep> , 35$ completion expected.

ct> , 35 start scheduled.

'((&

7ep> , 35 completion expected.

)anaging *olitical +pposition

"uilding nuclear weapons was not popular in the early 199$s. fter disclosure in the "ulletin of the tomic 7cientists in1992 that the / @ and nuclear weapons laboratories were wor'ing on mini-nu'es% #ongress decided in No!ember 1993

one month after the ir orce was as'ed to study the "81-11 to ban any +research and de!elopment which couldlead t o the production by the ?nited 7tates of a new low-yield nuclear weapon% including a precision low-yield nuclearweapon.+

s a result% the "81-11 proHect which was nic'named +,he /uc'+ because it had identical flight characteristics to theexisting "81- bomb was not submitted to the Nuclear (eapons #ouncil CN(#D for appro!al at the time. ,he

ssistant 7ecretary of /efense for International 7ecurity Aolicy C 7/FI7AD was concerned that #ongress would notsupport it. #on!eniently% the #ongressional election in No!ember 1994 changed committee chairmanship to one morefa!orably inclined to reopening the nuclear weapons production line% so the ssistant 7ecre tary of /efense +re-energized JtheK proHect with a strong recommendation that the effort be completed before #ongress changed again.+

,hese e!ents occurred at the same time that the #linton administration completed the Nuclear Aosture re!iew in7eptember 1994. ,he NA0 was widely portrayed as reducing the role of nuclear weapons and /eputy 7ecretary of/efense 6ohn /eutch assured #ongress that +there is no re)uirement currently for the design of any new warhead thatwe can see.+ Be explained that +almost all+ nuclear modernization programs had been terminated. 7ome remained% oneof which was the "81-11. In fact% the the NA0 Implementation :emo itself specified the "53 be replaced by a modified"81- carried by the "-2.

nce the / / was con!inced that opposition in #ongress had eroded% things mo!ed fast. ,he "81-11 proHect was
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submitted to the N(# which appro!ed it on ebruary 8% 1995.

:eeting with congressional committees and their staffs followed with briefings gi!en in pril 1995 to the National7ecurityF/efense and @nergy and (ater /e!elopment 7ubcommittees of both the B #F7 # and B N7#F7 7#.

,he initial contact to #ongress was made to 7enators ,ed 7te!ens and /aniel Inouye and 0epresentati!es #. (. C"illDLoung and 6ohn A. :urtha. ,he / @ tal'ing points did not mentioned the earth-penetrating capability% but describedthe program as an effort to +impro!e the o!erall safety posture of the nation s nuclear weapons stoc'pile.+ ,hischaracterization was deri!ed from the Nuclear (eapons #ouncil decision on the "81-11 program as being +in supportof the Aresident s decision CA//FN7#-3$D to enhance the safety of the nation s nuclear weapons stoc'pile.+

,he ffice of :anagement and "udget C :"D was also briefed. n pril % 1995% 0obert #i!ia'% the Arogram@xaminer in the :" @nergy and 7cience di!ision% was briefed by 6erry reedman% /eputy ssistant to the 7ecretaryof /efense for tomic @nergy CNuclear :attersD% and @!eret "ec'ner% / @ cting 7ecretary for /efense Arograms.#i!ia' indicated that he wanted to understand what they were doing and +was a bit uneasy with the potential for this to

be !iewed as de !eloping a new warhead. + reedman and "ec'ner assured that it was +not new warhead de!elopment+and that +nuclear components are not being modified.+ ,he meeting lasted only half an hour.

,he Hustification for the "81-11 program was the need to +impro!e the o!erall safety posture of the nation s nuclearweapons stoc'pile%+ but / @ did not say explicitly say that the "53 was unsafe. re)uest for a M3.3 millionreprogramming authorization in pril 1995% for example% contained the cryptic sent ence> + lthough it is currentlysafe...the "53 does not meet c urrent safety criteria.+ ,he purpose of the +replacement+ program% the re)uest stated% wasto +a!oid new warhead production.+

No one argued with that% and on 6uly 1 % 1995 -- two years after the / @ and / / began planning and designing the"81-11 -- #ongress officially appro!ed production of the nuclear earth-penetrator.

s so% less than two months after the ?nited 7tates with a renewed pledge to nuclear disarmament ensured anunconditional extension of the nuclear Non-Aroliferation ,reaty in :ay 1995% production of the "81-11 began.

The ,or +##icially Begins

/ / acted the same day #ongress appro!ed the "81-11 program. ,he Nuclear (eapons #ouncil CN(#D as'ed the irorce to head the "81-11 AroHect fficer ;roup CA ;D and the 7ecretary of the ir orce as'ed the "81-11 A ; to

implement the proHect and brief the N(#77# in 9$ days on status and milestones.

,he / / also formally as'ed / @ to Hoin in the Hoint proHect to replace "53 with the "81-11. / @ followed up onugust 4 by issuing the guidance that directed lbu)uer)ue perations ffice and the National aboratories to begin

wor' on the "81-11 program. ,he program guidance to the labs explained that the ir orce "81-11 A ; wouldo!ersee the program% / @ lbu)uer)ue perations ffice would coordinate and lead the day-to-day field acti!ities%

os lamos and 7andia would contribute as designers of the "81 and roles in the A ;% and awrence i!ermore would pro!ide peer re!iew of the de!elopment acti!ities.

:any of the characteristics of the "81-11 program were agreed to prior to #ongressional appro!al. /uring a meeting on/ecember 8% 1994 % for example% between the / /% / @% the ir orce% and the nuclear labs C7andia and o s lamosD%agreement was rea ched on modifying the "81- bomb% that the "-2 would be the carrier% and that the replacementweapon would be chosen from four different design options. ,he " 3 bomb was also considered as a candidate% but"81- was chosen because it was the +most mature+ Cnote that for the 0N@A% the / @ chose the " 3 rather than the"81D.

,he official "81-11 'ic'off meeting was held at *irtland ir orce "ase on ugust % 1995. ,he all-day meetingdetermined the program group struct ure and the charter for each of the se!en wor'ing groups> system engineering% cost%testing% en!ironments% logistic support% mission analysis% and suretyFreliability. t the meeting% the ir orce ga!e a

briefing on the "81-11 program that summarized the milestones% obHecti!es for the meeting% and showed the follo wingdrawing of the baseline concept ual design>
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.nitial .llustration o# B61 Con!ersion

t the "81-11 'ic'off meeting on ugust % 1995% the ir orce presented thiscomparison of the "81- CtopD and the "81-11 bombs. ,he "81-11 design waschanged later in the program% adding a drag-cone to the rear and more than 4$$ lbsto the weight.

ccording to the meeting minutes % the +baseline design meets weight% #; and roll momentum re)uirements for the "81-

.+ ,he pitch and yaw were +about 1$ high%+ howe!er% but +calculations indicate the deli!ery profile and #@A will not be affected.+ ,he next step in the program would be de!elopment of the :ilitary #apability C:#D and 7toc'pile-to-,arget-7e)ue nce C7,7D document s as well as classification guidance for the weapon. :# and 7,7 re!iew was

performed by an @n!ironments (or'ing ;roup under the "81-11 A ; to reflect the +uni)ue re)uirements of the "81-11.+

,he four different design options were based on four different !ariables> mission capability% cost% "-2 ris'% andscheduleFcomplexity. :ission capability was rated from +unsatisfactory+ to +best%+ and the other three !ariables wererated from +low to highest.+ ,rade-off was necessary if% for example% mission capability was the best but the ris' Cread>

program disturbanceD to the carrier high.

,he progress of the "81-11 A ; in determining which of the options was best is e!ident from se!eral briefings gi!en inthe fall of 1995. In the first briefing% gi!en on 7eptember 29 % the four different design options are outlined and a notional

plan for weapons and aircraft testing stretching through 6une 199 . lthough the briefing includes !alues for cost% "-2ris'% and scheduleFcomplexity% the mission capability is not rated. ,hat happened in the second briefing% presented to:aHor ;eneral 6oe rsz on ctober 23 % which determined that two of the four design options had an +unsatisfactory+mission capability Csee tableD.

B61-11 /esign +ption 0ariables

actors+ption 1 O +ption '

+ption 3 +ption OO

:ission capability ?nsatisfactory ?nsatisfactory ;ood "est#ost Bighest Bigh ow ow"-2 0is' owest ow :oderate Bigh

7cheduleF#omplexity Bighest Bigh :oderate owO "aseline option. OO 7elected option.7ource> "riefing% 7 F EE% +" 5 0eplacement Arogram Aresident to :aH ;en 6oersz%+ ctober 23% 1995% slides 4- . Aartiallydeclassified and released under I . J#lic' to downloadK

,he fact that unsati sfactory mission capability was an issue in the design wor' was 'nown e!en before #ongressappro!ed the program. 7hortly after appro!al was secured% / @ s "81-11 Arogram :anager at a' 0idge% 0ichard#awood% remar'ed in an interoffice memorandum from ugust 1995 that the initial design definition for the "81-11case and associated hardware was +pretty soft and structurally ade)uate for only soft targets. Now that the programappears to be secure perhaps they ll get serious about the design%+ he remar'ed.

,he ctober 23 briefing shows that +unsatisfactory+ mission capability was still an issue for two of the design optionsthree months later. Let in a briefing presented by #awood that same month % one of the design options appear to ha!e

been dropped lea!ing only three options for further consideration. ,he three remaining options were all based on
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con!erting the "81- % sim ilar to the preliminary cost estimate design% and i n!ol!ing modifying the +nose only.+

Computer 2imulation o# B61-11 .mpact

7andia National aboratories performed high-speed computer simulations to assess thestress on the "81-11 during impact in sand% soil% roc' and permafrost. ,wo of the initialdesign options had +unsatisfactory+ mission characteristics.

ollowing a con!ersation on ctober with "81-11 Arogram :anager at 7andia National aboratories /on :c#oy%#awood noted that :c#oy expected the +structural case re)uirements will firm up soon% perhaps by+ ctober 13% 1995.+,he design will be the more robust of the three under consideration%+ #awood noted% +with a solid nose and withgreater wall th ic'ness.+

#oinciding with the structural case re)uirements firming up% the / / suddenly informed the N(#77# on No!ember15 that deli!ery of the irst Aroduction ?nit C A?D "81-11 should be mo!ed up and +deli!ered as soon as possible% witha goal of /ecember 31% 1998.+ ,his was a considerable change that s)ueezed pr oduction by eight months. ,heaccelerated schedule in!ol!ed reprogramming M3.3 million from within the / @ s atomic energy defense weaponsacti!ities appropriations. #ongress was informed but had no obHections.

B61-11 )odel ,ind Tunnel Test

weapons engineer at 7andia National aboratories prepares a scaled-down model of a
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"81-11 for aerodynamic testing in a wind tunnel.

:oreo!er% / / felt the design wor' had progressed sufficiently to be able to select the option. n No!ember 21% 1995%only three months after the design wor' was officially begun% Berald A. 7mith informed the ssistant 7ecretary for/efense Arograms at / @% &ictor B. 0eis % that + ption 2 Cfull steel caseD be chosen as the leading candidate.+ &ictor0eis replied on /ecember 1 % stating that / @ was +limiting our de!elopment to the full steel case option C ption 2D.+

In his reply letter% 0eis also noted that he expected ption 2 would be !alidated by +the safe separation analysis to bereleased later this month.+ ,his concerned calculations performed by Northrop% the producer of the "-2 bomber% toexamine how "81-11 released and cleared the aircraft. "y the time 0eis told 7mith about the !alidation% the calculationshad already been successfully completed. Northrop told 7andia about them on /ecember % after which /on :c#oy at7andia informed #awood at / @ . :c#oy said +this means ption 2 Cthe (81-li'e designD is the selected design%although it won t be official until+ /ecember 19% 1995.

The ,61 Tiger .. )issile

Building on +ther /esigns

,he +(81-li'e design+ chosen for the "81-11 made it possible to base part of the "81-11 production on componentsand tools de!eloped for the (81 program. s mentioned abo!e% the (81 was canceled in 1992 when the missileintended to carry it was canceled.

,he "81-11 steel case +was essentially the same case% used for the (81 program.+ In fact% the "81-11 was so influenced by the (81 that (81 classification guidance was initially used until original classification authority was established forthe "81-11.

,he "81-11 consisted of +field retrofitting the "81- with a machines !ersion of the (81 integral steel case% remo!ingthe parachute and installing ballast aft of the bomb% shortening the earth-penetrating nose% and installing a

plastic...aeroshell co!ering to ensure identical standard "81- geometry.+

7ome weapon components were manufactured based on the design of (81 +blan's%+ but there was concern that +someof the (81 blan's will not yield an ade)uate product for the "81-11.+ ,his included the Aenetrator #ase and the,hreaded 0ing components.

In addition to (81% the production of the "81-11 also borrowed from another canceled nuclear program> the "9$nuclear stri'eFdepth bomb. 7ome of the tools de!eloped for the "9$ program were useable with some modification formilling of internal features of the "81-11 case.

*roduction o# the B61-11

,he "81-11 program% or the "53 0eplacement Arogram as it was formally called% was budgeted in 1995 to cost morealmost M3 .5 million% or M 5$.$$$ for each of the 5$ "81-11s produced. s the first post-testing weapons production%the production program for the "81-11 program encountered many +firsts+ that re)uired new or significantly changed
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production methods.

/ue to the !ery compressed production program% Aroduct 0ealization ,eams CA0,D were not created. It was also thefirst regular production weapons program to utilize a design process called (or'7tream% a small-build program thatoperate with small in!entories for duration of the program. No!ember 1995 o!er!iew of the L-12 productioncommitment describes many of the considerations that went into the "81-11 program and how the producers anticipatedto accomplish production.

,he "81- con!ersion did not in!ol!e the Aantex facility. Instead% con!ersion 'its were manufactured at the Nuclear(eapons #omplex facilities% principally at the *ansas #ity Alant and at the L-12 plant in a' 0idge. ,hese con!ersion'its% which included both the physics pac'ages and the #anned 7ubassemblies C#7 D% were then disassembled from the"81- +in the field+ and reassembled into the earth-penetrator case by military personnel. *it assembly too' place

between 6anuary and /ecember 1998% according to a detailed / @ production plan . ll "81- s were ta'en from theacti!e stoc'pile.

light Testing

,he choice of design ption 2 presented a problem due to the number of flight tests re)uired to certify the new designon the "-2. ,here was no time and money in the existing "-2 flight test program for the extensi!e testing re)uired for anew weapon% so the "-52 was used to conduct drop tests to certify that the "81-11 was de!eloped with identical

properties and interfaces to the "81- which was already cert ified on the "-2 C"loc' 2$D. ,his would limit the numberof flight tests re)uired on the "-2. :oreo!er% to compensate for addition flight testing costs to the "-2 program% the "-2

program would be reimbursed up to M5$$%$$$ from the "-52 flight test dollars .

B61-11 /rop Test

"81-11 drop test o!er the ?tah ,est and ,raining 0ange C?,,0D shows use ofroc'ets to control spin.

Initially% weapons testing was scheduled for the period between No!ember 1995 and /ecember 1998% followed by afour-month aircraft testing period in :arch-6une 199 . "ut due to the decision in late 1995 to accelerate completion ofthe irst Aroduction ?nit C A?D from ugust 199 to /ecember 1998% the initial testing program was cut short. totalof 13 full-scale drop tests were performed in 1998% three in las'a and 1$ at the ,onopah ,est 0ange in Ne!ada. ,he"81-11 passed its certification flight tests on No!ember 2$% 1998% in time for completion of the /?.

,he frozen soil proof test in las'a in 1998 was cancelled due to an aircraft system failure on the "-2. ,he test wasrescheduled for march 199 % when two "81-11s were successfully dropped by a "-2 bomber. ltogether% a total of 25
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drop tests were conducted from the "-2% "-52% "-1% and -18. ,he drops tested the "81-11 earth-penetration capabilityinto sand% hardpan% compact soil% roc'% concrete and permafrost% indicating a wide geographic range for potential targets.

2toc piling

our complete retrofit 'its were deli!ered to the ir orce in mid-/ecember 1998 and by the end of 1998% the "81-11was accepted as a +limited stoc'pile item+ pending additional tests. ,he "81-11 officially entered operational ser!icewith the 5$9th (ing at (hiteman ir orce "ase in :issouri in No!ember 199 .

,he introduction into the stoc'pile coincided with the "-2 achie!ing nuclear Initial perational #apability CI #D andreplacing the "-1 in the 7I A-9 warplan. ir #ombat #ommand C ##D informed the /efense 7cience "oard ,as'

orce on Nuclear /eterrence that +integration of the "81F11 JsicK has introduced a !astly new means of holding anenemy s buried% hardened and underground high-!alue targets at ris'.+ pproximately 5$ "81-11s were produced.

B61-11 at ,hiteman Air orce Base )issouri

"81-11 shape on a loader inside a "-2 hangar at (hiteman ir orce "ase in :issouri. ,he "81-11entered ser!ice at (hiteman in No!ember 199 % coinciding with the "-2 replacing the "-1 in the 7I A. ourtesy nukephoto.com

lthough the "81-11 entered ser!ice with the 5$9th (ing in No!ember 1 99 % full certification of the weapons too'much longer. 7,0 ,# : was concerned about mission effecti!eness and as'ed 7andia National aboratories to

pro!ide operational analysis and planning tools for the "81-11. ,his effort included e!aluating +fratricide concerns%

optimizing deli!ery with the "-2% and wor'ing to maximize both aircraft sur!i!ability and weapon effecti!eness.+ Notuntil 2$$1 was the "81-11 certified as a +standard stoc'pile item+ meeting all re)uirements.

4ibya The irst B61-11 Target

i!e months after Barold 7mith called for an acceleration of the "81-11 production schedule% he went public with anassertion that the ir orce would use the "81-11 against ibya s alleged underground chemical weapons plant at,arhunah if the Aresident decided that the plant had to be destroyed. +(e could not ta'e J,arhunahK out of commissionusing strictly con!entional weapons%+ 7mith told the &ssociated 6ress . ,he "81-11 +would be the nuclear weapon ofchoice%+ he told $ane's /efence 4eekly.

7mith ga!e the statement during a brea'fast inter!iew with reporters after /efense 7ecretary (illiam Aerry had earlier

told a 7enate oreign 0elations #ommittee hearing on chemical or biological weapons that the ?.7. retained the option
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,he considerable difference is size between the enormous "53 CrightD and the "81-11 illustratesthe operational gains from +replacing+ the old +earth-digger+ with the new +earth-penetrator.+(hereas the "53 could only be carried on the !eteran "-52% the "81-11 is assigned to the "-2stealth bomber and has been test dropped from "-1" and -18 aircraft as well.

7afety was not the only reason for replacing the "53. n ir orce briefing from /ecember 1994 indicates that nuclearguidance issued by the #hairman of the 6oint #hiefs of 7taff had been changed and that the "-52 was no longerconsidered capable enough to penetrate hostile air defenses on a nuclear bun'er-buster mission with the "53. ,he ir

orce briefing states that +a more sur!i!able platform that a "-52 is needed+ to +meet 67#A direction+ and that theobHecti!e is to +increase A JArobability of rri!alK o!er target.+ ,he nuclear annex C nnex #D to 67#A C6oint 7trategic#apability AlanD 1993-1995 was updated three times between 6uly 1993 and the time of the ir orce briefingC/ecember 1994D.

,arhead 8ield And )ission Ade"uacy

:any of the statements gi!en by / @ and / / on the "81-11 program claim that no chang es were made to the "81-warhead. +,his modificatio n in!ol!es no change to the nuclear pa c'age of the "81- %+ / @ stated on 7eptember 2$%1995. &ice Aresident for National 7ecurity Arograms at 7andia National aboratories% 0oger Bagengruber% echoed in atele!ision inter!iew in 199 > +,he physics pac'age itself is identical.+

If +no change+ and +identical+ mean that the yield of the "81-11 is the same as the "81- % then these statements arefalse. ,he "81- has se!eral selecti!e yields Cpossibly fourD up to 38$ 'ilotons. s of :arch 1998% the "81-11 was alsoexpected to ha!e this capability% but at some point before :arch 2$$$ the yield was changed to 4$$ 'ilotons Ca 1$

percent increaseD. ,he selecti!e yield options were also canceled% ma'ing the "81-11 a single-yield weapon. ,hisincrease in yield may ha!e been a result of the limited earth-penetrating capability of the "81-11.

,he frozen soil proof drop tests conducted in las'a in :arch 199 suggests that the earth-penetration capability of the"81-11 is limited. /uring the test% two "81-11 shapes were dropped from a "-2 bomber at %$$$ feet. ,he two shapeshit the ground some 45 feet C15 metersD from each other. ,he ir orce said the "81-11 only pro!ed capable of

penetrating some 8-1$ feet C2-3 metersD into the frozen soil. t best the weapon would penetrate 15-25 feet C5- metersD. photo ta'en of the retrie!al of one of the bombs in las'a suggests the penetration depth was around 1 feet C8

metersD.

B61-11 Test /rop .n Alas a

,wo "81-11 shapes dropped by a "-2 bomber into the 7tuart #ree' Impact rea near airban's%las'a% on :arch 1 % 199 . ,he weapons were retrie!ed% indicating penetration depth of roughly 1

feet C8 metersD into frozen soil CleftD and with intact front casings but significant structural damage tothe rear section CrightD.

(hether the drop tests prompted changes to the design is un'nown% but / @ initiated two alterations to the "81-11 in199 C , 338D and 1999 C , 349. :oreo!er% in 2$$$ 7andia National aboratories followed up with an inter-agencystudy of the penetration capability of the "81-11. ne year later% in /ecember 2$$1% the "ush administration s Nuclear
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Aosture 0e!iew informed #ongress that the capability of the "81-11 was inade)uate and incapable of holding at ris'some deep and hardened targets>

,he "81-11 +cannot sur!i!e penetration into many types of terrain in which hardened underground facilities are located.;i!en these limitations% the targeting of a number of hardened% underground facilities is limited to an attac' againstsurface features% which does not does not pro!ide a high probability of defeat of these important targets.+

n the one hand this suggests that con!ersion of the "81- into an earth-penetrator left significant issues unresol!ed thatthe planners ha!e been trying to resol!e after the "81-11 was rushed into the stoc'pile in 199 . n the other hand% itsuggests that the mission of the weapon has e!ol!ed since the initial design was appro!ed. 7ince the ir orcedetermined in ctober 1995 that the "81-11 did +satisfy ?77,0 ,# : re)uirements%+ the NA0 s determination thatthat no longer is the case suggests that 7,0 ,# : has changed its re)uirements for the mission.

fter ten years and tens of millions of dollars spent on de!eloping the "81-11% the "ush administration is now trying to persuade #ongress that the solution to the unsatisfactory mission capability of the "81-11 is to build yet anothermodified bomb> the 0obust Nuclear @arth Aenetrator C0N@AD. ,he 0N@A will be built around a modified " 3 !ery-highyield bomb% the weapon that the "81-11 program reHected in fa!or of the more +mature+ "81- .

RN * The ollo:-+n To B61-11

,he "ush administration plans to spend M28 million on de!eloping the 0obust Nuclear @arthAenetrator the next two years. 7ince this slide was produced% a decision has been made to use the" 3 bomb. #ompared with the 4$$ 'iloton "81-11% the " 3 has selecti!e yields up to 1.2megatons.

t the same time the "ush administration is as'ing #ongress to pro!ide M28 million for 0N@A in 2$$8-2$$ % newalterations continue to be added to the "81-11> , 35$ for completion in 7eptember 2$$5 and , 35Crefurbishment of secondariesD from ctober 2$$5 with completion in 7eptember 2$$ .
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