Monsicha Hoonsuwan

Critical Book Review

Professor Curt Cardwell

U.S. Interventionism

September 13, 2010

Facades of the Great Aberration

In the spirit of its recently acquired independence, the newborn United States of

America had neither adequate political nor military might to engage itself in what

Thomas Jefferson coined “entangling alliances” in the world’s affairs—especially in,

then, the shambolic European relations. In coherence with this fact was the belief carried

by many early U.S. settlers and political figures that the U.S. should remain neutral and

isolated from matters other than its own, extending mere commercial relations sans

political ties to foreign countries. In his famous Farewell Address, George Washington

promulgated the idea and, consequently, laid the groundwork for subsequent practices in

U.S. diplomacy. With a widespread credence in the U.S. unusual feat of faithfully

exercising isolationism throughout the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, William

Appleman Williams may appear radical, socialistic even, to scrupulously contest the very

essence of traditional U.S. diplomatic history in The Tragedy of American Diplomacy.

Integrating economic aspects of the U.S. to the studies of foreign relations, Williams

analysis provides an exceptional insight to the inherent flaws of the U.S. diplomacy—the

contradictions between the U.S. ideals and its uses of power—that surpasses any

superficial left-versus-right debates in international relations. Rarely, if ever, has the U.S.

been isolated from international affairs, as almost every single page of its diplomatic

history is marked by the self-righteous uses of power to intervene and expand its sphere

of influence for the sake of its ideology. The practice is profoundly ingrained in the U.S.

mindset—not only in those who make decisions, but also in the populace—that if the

country stops expanding, the U.S. would be rid, not so much of its wealth and prosperity,

but of its proud identity. For this reason, Williams concludes, the U.S. diplomacy is a

tragedy in itself.

The abundant uses of primary sources such as the presidents’, cabinet members’

and congressmen’s statements, coupled with Williams’ own thoughtful interpretation

provide an outrageous, yet convincing outlook—and arguably a simple generalization—

of the U.S. motives to expand, which eloquently challenges the traditional belief—the

myth of isolationism—held by the U.S. public. After reading The Tragedy of American

Diplomacy, one cannot help being skeptical of the U.S. real intentions when it steps into

other societies’ affairs and is forced to look inward at the U.S. domestic orders and

capitalistic ideology to find new solutions to problems that are previously solved by way

of expansionism. Williams’ famed book opens up a whole new sub-field within the

studies of history and U.S. foreign relations, one in which the U.S. economic ideals plays

the main villain in international affairs.

The Cuban crisis of 1959-1961 serves as William’s epitome of the underlying

tragedy concerning the U.S. diplomacy in the twentieth century, when the U.S. intervened

with good intentions but ended up provoking strong local oppositions that later disarray

established societal orders of the peoples it intervened. Williams’ diagnosis of the U.S.

foreign policy is not circumstantial. Rather, he goes beyond the conventional realist

analysis commonly applied in the studies of foreign relations and pinpoints the U.S. deep-

seated flaws evident in not only the Cuban case, but also in other diplomatic endeavors.

Williams argues that the U.S. generosity and advocacy of self-determination, although

commendable, produce the most devastating catastrophe when clashing with the U.S.

conviction that other societies cannot solve their problems unless they adopt the U.S.

values and system.

Having identified the three conceptions guiding the U.S. policy, Williams

investigated the U.S. policy from the colonial times until the Vietnam War to illustrate

how these ideas play out against the “legend of isolationism” throughout its history. From

the beginning, the U.S. had always sought the expansion of land as a means to solve

personal financial problems. This mindset developed from an individual level into a

wider scope as the society started to industrialize. Williams cited James Madison who

forewarned that once the continent had ran out of productive land, major crisis might

occur and suggested that expansion was “the key to preventing faction”—or class

conflicts—which could disrupt the “fabric of society.” Indeed, Williams brought up the

Crisis of the 1890s as a turning point when the U.S. public realized the need to expand

beyond the U.S. current borders to “sustain freedom and prosperity.” In other words,

Williams seemed to imply that the U.S. was at a crossroad where it had to choose

between a revolution down the path of socialism or expansionism to preserve its valued

characteristics: freedom and capitalism.

Centered to Williams’ arguments is the Open Door Policy implemented as a way

to spread out the U.S. system through its economic power without “the embarrassment

and inefficiency of traditional colonialism.” During the presidency of Theodore

Roosevelt, recognizing the relationship between economic expansion and overseas

reform, synthesized them into the strategy of the Open Door Policy, in a hope to

reconstruct other societies to make them more susceptible and cooperative to the

expansion of the U.S. economy. Attempting to solve domestic affairs, prevent revolutions

through the U.S. foreign policy, the Open Door Policy is nothing more than the U.S.

version of the “liberal policy of informal empire or free-trade imperialism.” Even during

the nation’s “Lost Weekend” of the 1920s, when the U.S. was believed to find comfort in

its isolation, Williams proposed that it was a crucial period during which the debate over

imperialism and anti-imperialism was rendered obsolete, while the argument over how

the U.S. should maintain and enlarge the U.S. authority in the revolution-laden world

came into focus. The rejection to joint the League of Nation, hence, was seen by

Williams as another response to the consensus to politically and economically expand the

U.S.

It was not the doctrine of isolation that the U.S. has faithfully practiced, but the

Open Door Policy, which has transformed from a “utopian idea into an ideology.” Even

Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the president who was thought to be revolutionary in trying

to steer the society toward socialism by establishing social programs, was criticized by

Williams as having “not abandoned the policy of the open door”; he merely created a

different version of it to save the corporate system essential to the Open Door Policy.

Even more striking is Williams’ denunciation of Wilson as being an interventionist, able

to do anything for people but “get off their backs and let them live their own lives.”

Meanwhile, Williams praised Herbert Hoover for adhering to the principle put forth in

Washington’s Farewell Address, placing more emphasis on the economic aspects of

foreign policy instead of the political ones.

It is clear that Williams’ has, at this point, flipped the traditional history upside

down and almost rewritten the new one—the one in which the U.S. has never retreated

back into isolationism. The Spanish-American War of 1898 was not the “great

aberration”, a period in which the U.S. embarked on a brief imperialistic campaign. The

U.S. entry into WWI and WWII was not a result of the U.S. concern in European affairs

or the pressure from the international community, but was a consequence of revolution

threat caused by economic downturn. Since the U.S. was so reliant on European states to

purchase its goods, it went into war attempting to install a stable economic system so it

could, again, ensure the flows of funds back into its economy. Finally, it is the history in

which the U.S. initiated and was hyper-enthusiastic to fight the Cold War with the Soviet

Union.

Implied in The Tragedy of American Diplomacy seems to be Williams’

suggestion that U.S. leaders should have taken a different path—a path that no leaders

have ever considered taking: revolution. Williams may have put too much blame on the

U.S. liberal capitalism, generalizing the problems of the U.S. foreign policy as merely

being economic that he downplays other factors involved in the international level of

analysis—the Stalinist regime being the example. Nonetheless, his arguments are more

than compelling. Whether one agrees with his message or not, it is unavoidable that one

will never look at the U.S. policy the same way again.