THETRUTHABOUT

GRENFELLTOWER

AReportby

ArchitectsforSocialHousing

On Thursday, 22 June, 2017, in response to the Grenfell Towerfirethepreviousweek,ArchitectsforSocialHousingheldanopenmeeting in the Residents Centre of Cotton Gardens estate inLambeth. An edited film of the meeting, made by Line NikitaWoolfe with the assistance of Luc Beloix on camera andadditional footage by Dan Davies, has been produced by hercompany Woolfe Vision and may be viewed here. Thepresentationswegavethateveningarethebasisofthisreport,towhich we have added our subsequent research as well as thatcollated from the numerous articles on the Grenfell Tower firepublishedinthepressandelsewhere,towhichwehaveattachedthe weblinks, with the original documents included whenevertheyareavailable.

July2017

ContentsIntroduction

1. TechnicalCausesoftheGrenfellTowerFire

GrenfellTowerBuildingRegulationsGrenfellTowerCladding

2.ManagementDecisionsresponsiblefortheGrenfellTowerFire

GrenfellTowerManagementGrenfellTowerRefurbishmentGrenfellTowerResponsibilities

3. PoliticalContextfortheGrenfellTowerFire

GrenfellTowerRegenerationGrenfellTowerAppearanceGrenfellTowerProfits

4. TheFireSafetyofCouncilTowerBlocks

GrenfellTowerPrecedentsGrenfellTowerWarningsGrenfellTowerResidentsGrenfellTowerDeregulation

5.TheProgrammeofEstateRegeneration

GrenfellTowerOpportunismGrenfellTowerPoliticsGrenfellTowerCommunity

6. AccountabilityfortheGrenfellTowerFire

GrenfellTowerInquiryGrenfellTowerInquestGrenfellTowerLegacy

InMemoriam

IntroductionOntheSaturdayaftertheGrenfellTowerfireweranintoamemberoftheTenantsandResidentsAssociationforCottonGardensestate,whichincludesthree20-storeyblocks,and she toldus that shehad receivedover50 calls from residentsworried about thesafetyoftheirhomes.Wedecided,therefore, tocallameetingontheestatetotryandanswertheirquestionsandthoseofresidentsfromotherestatesalarmedbythereportsinthemediaaboutthesafetyofcouncilestatetowerblocks,andgivethemanyadvicewecanonhowtheycanputpressureontheirlandlordstoimprovethatsafety.Todoso,we started looking at the causes of the Grenfell Tower fire – not only the technicalcausesbutalso themanagementstructuresandpoliticaldecisions that led to them. Inaddition, we ourselves have been alarmed by the increasingly loud and widespreadnarrativebeingspreadinthemediathatcouncilestatesareinherentlyunsafeandthattheproperresponsetothisdisasteristodemolishallcounciltowerblocks.Asanyresidentwhohasbeenconsultedby their localcouncilon the ‘regeneration’oftheirestateknows,theirresponsestoseeminglyinnocuousquestionsaresimilarlyusedto justify thedemolitionof theirhomes.Asanexampleofwhich,oneof thequestionsput to residents of Central Hill estate by Lambeth council at the beginning of theirconsultationwas ‘wouldyou likeanewkitchen?’Two-and-a-half-years later the samecouncilused theanswers to these consultations to justify thedemolitionof theentireestate.Inthesameway,opinionsaboutlivingincounciltowerblocksvoicedinthewakeof the Grenfell Tower fire are not made in a political vacuum. It is entirelyunderstandable that a resident pulled from the hell of the Grenfell Tower fire andshovedinfrontofacameracrewshouldcallforthedemolitionofsimilartowerblocks;itissomethingverydifferentforajournalistwhohasneverlivedonanestatetodothesameinanationalpaper,asitisforapoliticianwhohaspromotedLondon’sprogrammeof estate demolition to describe tower blocks as ‘criminally unsafe’ on a newsprogrammewatchedbymillions.ThisreportmakesnoclaimtobethetruthabouttheGrenfellTower fire,but it isacontributionto theattemptto find it,whichalsomeansexposingandrefutingtheliesbeingspreadaboutitscauses.Intryingtofindthattruth,therefore,weshouldbeawareofthedifferencebetweenvoicingourpersonalopinionsandformulatingconclusionsbasedonwhatweknow.We wanted to use this meeting, therefore, to counter the misperceptions andmisinformationbeingpropagated in themedia,notonlyabout theGrenfellTower firebutaboutthecouncilestateitbelongsto,andtobegintoorganiseoppositiontotheuseofthisdisasterandthehundredsoflivesithasclaimedtofurtherpromotethealreadywidespreadprogrammeofestateregenerationthatthreatensthehomesofhundredsofthousandsofLondoners. Inorder to cover these issues inwhat turnedout tobe two-and-a-halfhours,themeetingwasdividedintofoursections,eachwithaclearobjective:1)tosharewhatweknowcollectivelyaboutthetechnicalcausesoftheGrenfellTowerfire;2)toexposethemanagementstructuresandpoliticaldecisionsthatallowedthese

technicalconditionstobeinplace;3)toadviseresidentsofcounciltowerblocksonthesafetyorotherwiseoftheirhomes,andwhatchangesneedtohappeninordertostopsuch a disaster ever happening again; and4) to organise opposition to theuse of theGrenfellTowerfiretopromoteLondon’sprogrammeofestatedemolition.Inwritingupourpresentations,however,wehaveexpandedthisreportintothesixpartsoutlinedinthecontentspage.

Part1.TechnicalCausesoftheGrenfellTowerFireASHvisitedGrenfellTowerontheThursdayafterthefire,whichstartedshortlybefore1am on Tuesday, 14 June. The neighbouring Silchester estate is under threat ofdemolitionbyKensingtonandChelseacouncil,andweknowresidentsinthecampaignwho live on Silchester Road, 100 metres north-west of Grenfell Tower. We werethereforeabletopassthepolicecordonandgetacloselookattheburned-outbuilding.The residents showed us photos of the tower that they had taken from their backgarden,andtoldusthatthefire,whichbeganinafridge-freezerofaflatonthenorth-eastcornerofthefourthfloor,spreadupthecornercladdinginacolumnofflamethatreachedtheroof,twentyfloorsabove,within15minutes.Itthenmovedlaterallyacrossthecladdinginadiagonalline,movingaroundbothsidesofthebuilding,meetingatthesouth-east corner, and eventually encasing the entire tower in flames. Footageconfirming this account was taken by fire-fighters approaching the scene, and thequestiontheyaskeachotherseveraltimesindisbeliefis:‘Howisthatpossible?’

GrenfellTowerBuildingRegulationsAbuildingisthesumofitsparts,andworksholistically.Anychangestoitsconstituentcomponentswillthereforealterthefirestrategiesthatareintrinsictothedesignofthebuilding.Allworkstobuildings,whetherrefurbishmentornewbuild,needtopassthe2010BuildingRegulations.Theseregulationsareupdatedregularly,andparticularlyinresponsetoincidencesoffire,whicharecontainedinApprovedDocumentB,whichwasproducedin2006andamendedin2010and2013.ThereareseveralwaysthatdesignsgetBuildingRegulationsapprovalfromlocalauthorities.1)Thedrawingscanbesenttothe localauthorityandbeapprovedby theirBuildingControldepartmentaspartofaFullPlansapplication,whichgenerallytakesaround8weeks.2)Alternatively,itisalsopossibletosubmitaBuildingNoticetothelocalauthorityandstartconstructiononsite48 hours after the submission and potentially long before the designs are completed.Thedifference is, theFullPlansapplication receivesdesignapproval from the councilbefore construction starts, whereas the Building Notice receives a CompletionCertificateoncetheworksarecompleted.Inbothroutestoapproval,thebuildingworksare inspected throughout construction by an in-house inspector from the council’sBuildingControldepartment.AccordingtothePlanningPortal,withaBuildingNotice:

‘Plansarenotrequiredwiththisprocesssoit’squickerandlessdetailedthanthefullplansapplication.Itisdesignedtoenablesometypesofbuildingworktogetunderwayquickly;althoughitisperhapsbestsuitedtosmallwork.’

Therearealsoworks forwhichaBuildingNotice isexcluded, includingbuildingworkwhich is subject to section 1 of the Fire PrecautionsAct 1971, forwhich a certificateissuedunder thisActby the fireauthority iscompulsory.UnderaBuildingNotice, the

localauthority issimply informedabout theworksandmonitors itas itprogresses toensuretheworkcomplieswithBuildingRegulations.BuildingRegulationsareupdatedinordertoaccommodatetheuseofnewtechnologies,so alterations or additions to existing buildings that, like Grenfell Tower, have beenstandingfor40yearsmustfirstensurethatanyworkdonetothatbuilding–whetherremedial, cladding or refurbishment – works in conjunction with that building anddoesn’tcompromisethebuilding’sexistingintegrity.Thismeansthefiresafetyandriskmeasures need to be re-analysed and the new conditions under which they functiontaken into account. In the case of Grenfell Tower, the new works appear to havecompromised the existing fire safety of the building. In an interview about the fire,ArnoldTarling,anAssociateDirectorofHindwoodsCharteredSurveyorsandamemberof the Association for Specialist Fire Protection who has also advised the All-PartyParliamentaryFireSafetyandRescueGroup,gaveadetailedaccountofwhathethoughthad happened in the Grenfell Tower fire (illustrated in this BBC diagram below) andwhytheBuildingRegulationsdidn’tpreventithappening:

‘There was an initial source of fire. That cause is entirely irrelevant to whathappenedlater.Whathappenedisthefiregotoutofaflat,maybefromanopenwindoworthroughabrokenwindowfromtheheat.Andthenitstartedheatingthepanellingandtheinsulationabove[yellowinthediagrambelow].Thatthensetachainreaction,inwhichthepanelstartedtoburn.‘Thepanels,beingaluminium,meltat600degreesor thereabouts.But theFireBrigadecannotputoutanyofthefiresbehindthesepanels,becausethere’smetalthere. You also have a wind tunnel effect sucking the flames up between theinsulation and the external cladding,melting the solidpolyethylene above, andcontinuingthefirerightuptheheightofthebuilding.‘The cladding system is combined polyaluminum sheets with a filler ofpolyethylene. And that is what has caused the problems, because thepolyethylenemelts at a very low temperature and it catches fire. It is basicallylikeacandlewhichissandwichedbetweentwosheetsofmetal.‘The building regulationswe have in this country are not fit for purposewithregardstothisformofcladding.Allthatyourequiretomeetthestandardsisthattheoutsidesurfaceshouldn’tallowthespreadofflames.WhatisgoingonbehindthemetalortheothersurfaceisentirelyirrelevanttoBuildingRegulations.’

ThisaccountofthecombustionofthecladdingpanelsandinsulationwascorroboratedbyDeputySuperintendentFionaMcCormack,whoisoverseeingthepoliceinvestigationinto the fire. She confirmed that preliminary tests of the insulation samples collectedfromGrenfellTowershowedtheycombustedsoonafterthetestsstarted,andthatthe

claddingpanelsalsofailedthesafetytests–withtheinsulationproving,shesaid,‘moreflammablethanthecladding.’Close-upphotographsofGrenfellTowerafterthefire,whenboththeinsulationandthepanelling had mostly burnt away, show some of the metal fixings for this claddingsystem,asseeninthedetailedplanbelowfromthemanufacturers’,Arconic.Inpractice,moisture penetration at these points can corrode steel-reinforced concrete structuresandconsiderablyshortenthelifeofthebuilding;andinsuchinstancescladdingnotonlydoesnotfixinternalissues,suchasthethermalperformanceofthebuilding,butactuallymakesthemworse,whilealsocreatingnewproblems.ThemostlethalofthenewproblemscreatedbytheattachmentofcladdingtoGrenfellTowerwasthatthepanelsappeartohavecircumventedthefirestopsthatwerepartofthefiresafetymeasuresoftheoriginaldesignofthetower.Asinalltowerblocks,thesefirestops sub-divided the building into discrete compartments separated by fire-resistantwalls,floorsanddoorswhicharedesignedtoslowthespreadoffirefromonecompartment to another through their resistance to collapse, the transfer of heat andpenetration of fire. Under ApprovedDocument B (fire safety) of Building Regulations2010itstates:

‘Ifafire-separatingelementistobeeffective,theneveryjoint,orimperfectionoffit, or opening to allow services to pass through the element, should beadequatelyprotectedbysealingorfire-stoppingsothatthefireresistanceoftheelementisnotimpaired.’

In2015theLondonFireBrigadewassoconcernedaboutthefailuresofcouncilstotakeresponsibilityfortherisksconsequentuponrefurbishedhigh-riseblocksthat it issuedall33 localauthoritieswithanaudit tool toaid theminconductingariskassessment.AccordingtotheObserver,only2ofLondon’s33councils–EnfieldandKingstonuponThames–confirmedtheyhadappliedtheauditinfull.PartoftheLondonFireBrigade’scampaign Know the Plan, which was launched in response to their fears thatcompetitiontoreducecostshadledtotherefurbishmentofestatesbeingsignedoffbycouncil’swithoutadequatescrutiny,theauditstates:

‘LondonFireBrigadeisconcernedaboutthearrangementsinplaceforprotectingthefiresafetyprecautionsofabuilding,especiallyifithasbeenrefurbishedorifanymodificationormaintenanceprojectshavebeencarriedout.IntheBrigade’sexperience, buildings can and do become compromised in fire safety terms byworks carried out. These works can be high or poor quality; they might becarried out for very desirable reasons; but sometimesmany different types ofworkscanunintentionallydamagethefiresafetyarrangementsofabuilding.’

The question we need to ask, therefore, is how the refurbishment of Grenfell Towercompromisedtheeffectivenessofthefirestopstothedegreeitdid,totheextentthatfiredoorsandwallsthatshouldhavecontainedtheinitialfireintheflatinwhichitstartedforatleastanhourinsteadallowedthefiretospreaduptotheroofwithin15minutesandthenengulf theentirebuildingwithinthenext2hours.Apreviousfire inGrenfellTower that started in a lift lobby in April 2010, long before the refurbishment, wascontained within the designed fire compartments without any resulting injuries, letalonelossoflife.Sowhatwasitthatmadethisfire,sevenyearslater,sodeadly?

GrenfellTowerCladdingIn2016,aspartoftherefurbishmentoftheLancasterWestestatetowhichitbelongs,GrenfellTowerwasfittedwithexternalcladding.Thisconsistedofthreelayers:1. A 150mm-thick layer of Celotex RS5000 thermal insulation (yellow in the diagramabove)fixedontotheprecastconcretepanels(browninthediagram)andthereinforcedconcreteframe.WefoundcharredremainsofthisinsulationmateriallyingeverywherearoundthebaseofGrenfellTower,togetherwiththethinfoilsheetsthatcoveredit.TheArchitects’Journalhasindicatedthatinthedesignsforthecladdingthisinsulationlayerhadatimberbacking.Celotex,whichismadefrompolyisocyanurate(PIR),hasaClass0fireperformancerating,thehighestratingamaterialcangetintheBuildingRegulations.However,asArnoldTarlingsaid,thisratingindicatessurfacespread,notresistance,anditsHealthandSafetyDatasheetnotes:

‘The productswill burn if exposed to a fire of sufficient heat and intensity. Aswith all organic materials, toxic gases will be released with combustion. Firefighters should attack the fire according to the combustiblematerials present,andusebreathingapparatus.’

Celotex is manufactured by Saint Gobain UK, and the Times has revealed that thecompany’s technical director, Mark Allen, sits on the Building Regulations AdvisoryCommittee, anon-departmentalpublicbody that advises Sajid Javid, theCommunitiesandLocalGovernmentSecretary,onmakingBuildingRegulationsandsettingstandardsforthedesignandconstructionofbuildings.FollowingthefireSaintGobainconfirmedthat they had supplied Celotex RS5000 for use at Grenfell Tower, and not CelotexFR5000 (FR indicating fire resistant) as had been specified in the August 2012Sustainability and Energy Statement that was published as part of the PlanningApplicationby theengineeringconsultants for therefurbishment,MaxFordham.SaintGobainhassinceannouncedtheywillbediscontinuingthesupplyofCelotexRS5000‘foruseinrainscreencladdingsystemsinbuildingsover18metrestall.’2.Acavityorgapof50mmbetweenthefirstlayerofthermalinsulationandthecladdingpanelsinordertoallowanybuildupofmoisturetoevaporate.

3. An outer layer of cladding (grey in the diagram) consisting, on the ground floorcolumns,ofBCMglassreinforcedconcrete(GRC),thenfromthemezzaninetotheroofofReynobondaluminiumcompositematerial (ACM) rainscreencassettepanels.This is asandwich of two coil-coated aluminum sheets, each 0.5mm thick, fusion bonded to a6mm-thick core, the purpose ofwhich is to give strength and rigidity to the panel. Acompany director for Omnis Exteriors, the company that supplied the Reynobondpanels,hastoldtheGuardianthatthecompaniesthatrefurbishedGrenfellToweraskedthemtosupplyReynobondPEcladding,whichis£2cheaperpersquaremetrethanthealternative Reynobond FR, which stands for ‘fire retardant’, and which contains amineral core. The cheaper Reynobond PE contains a polyethylene core, which burnsslowly,evenafterbeingremovedfromaflame.ThePrincipalDesignerfortherefurbishmentofGrenfellTowerwasStudioEArchitects,which has subsequently removed all information from its webpage on therefurbishment. Before they did so, however, Julian Phillips, an architect withconsiderableexperienceoffiresafety,tookthisscreengrabofaphotograph(above)ofthecladdingandsent it toASH.What itclearlyshows is that inadditionto the50mmgapbetweentherain-screenpanellingandtheinsulation,thereisaconsiderablylargervoidbetweenthatandthetenconcreterotatedpillarsthatrunupthebuilding,notonlycreating a series of full-height vertical voids for smoke and flames, but completelybypassingthehorizontalfirestopsateachfloor,therebyrenderingthemuseless.ThisisconfirmedbytheplandetailinStudioE’sdrawingsforthecladding(below).At the fourcornersof the tower thecladding formed largeboxesaround theconcretepillars,creatingevenlargercavitiesfortheheatedair,whichwouldaccountforthefiremoving up from the fourth to the twenty-fourth floor in just fifteenminutes. And asJulianPhillipsobserved,whatevercavitystopstherewerebetweenthecladdingandtheconcretewallwereonlyassecureaswhattheywerefixedto–which,giventherapiditywithwhichthe firespreadupthecladding,doesn’tappear tohavebeenmuch.Onthecontrary, it appears that the fire stopsat each floorof the tower stoppedshort at theinsulation,anddidn’textendintotheplaneoftherainscreenpanels(asillustratedintheGuardiandiagrambelow).A further effect of the cladding was that its installation appears to have moved theposition of the windows in the tower block outwards, creating a gap between thewindowframeandtheconcretewallthroughwhichsmokecouldpass.InadetailedblogpostbytechnicaldesignerandhousingcampaignerIanAbleytitled‘MindthePlanningApproved Interface Gap at Grenfell Tower’, a photograph (below) reproduced from aGrenfellTowerRegenerationNewsletterdatedAugust2014showscladdingsamplesinsitu. Again, the extent of the void between the cladding and the concrete walls isrevealed,butalsohowfarbacktheexistingwindowsaresetasaresult.

Theconcomitantre-positioningofthewindowswasproposedinchangestothedesignmade by Studio E Architects and planning consultants IBI Group and accepted byKensingtonandChelseacouncilplannersinJanuary2015(applicationNMA/14/08597).The Studio E drawing (below) shows the existingwindow position in black,with theproposedwindowpositionindicatedinred.Thismeantpullingthewindowsforwardoftheoriginalconcretestructure.Itwasproposedthattheexistingwindowframecouldberetainedundertheproposedlinings,andthatthenewwindowcouldbelocatedwithinthe rainscreen system, attached to the support of the concrete structure on brackets.Thiscreatedagapbetweenthenewwindowframeandtheexistingconcretestructure,showntobepartiallyfilledwithdifferentinsulationtothatintherainscreenpanelling.As IanAbleywarns, this is only adrawing at theplanning stageof the refurbishmentprocess,and thereforeasnapshot in time;but theplannedseparationof thewindowsfromtheconcretemeantthatthisgapwouldhavebeentechnicallycriticalforthespreadofthefirefromtheinitialsourceintheflattothecladding:

‘The several materials and products within the interface gap became the onlyconstructionstoppingafireinsideaflatfromreachingtheinsulatedcavity,insidetherainscreenbuildup,andthenthecladdingontheoutsideof thebuilding. Iffiregotinsidethecavitythroughtheinterfacegapbetweenwindowandconcreteonlynon-combustiblecladdingandinsulationwouldresistignition.‘If a firehappened in a flat compartment, it is likely too that thewindowglasswouldshatterandfallaway.Firecouldflarethroughtheopeningandscorchthecladdingexternally.Thecladding facemight resist somespreadof flame.But ifexposedforlongenoughonlyanon-combustiblecladdingwouldresistignition.Aflatfirehappened.‘Once inside therainscreen,havingbypassed thewindow, the firecouldspreadvia variously combustible products. Firewould bypass any cavity fire barriersinstalled.Itwouldspreadupwardsandacross,fromwindowtowindowopening.Fireinthecladdingandinvolvingtheinsulationmightbeabletobreakbackintoflatsateverylevelthroughthesameinterfacegaparoundthewindowframes’

Finally, inaddition to thecladding, there isalso thequestionofhow the fire safetyofGrenfell Tower was compromised by the maintenance of its interior – somethingresidentscomplainedaboutsince2013,longbeforeitsexternalrefurbishmentin2016,andtowhichwewillreturninPart4ofthisreport.Thismaintenancework–orlackofit–undoubtedlycontributedtothespreadofthefireinternallyandthedifficultyresidentshad in escaping from the building; but from our analysis of how the fire spread webelieve that it was not the cause of the rapidity with which it engulfed the building,making it impossible for the London Fire Brigade to fight it effectively. Rather, thetechnical conditions thatmade the fire inGrenfell Tower so deadly to its inhabitants,

consuming thebuildingwith a speed and ferocitywhich the approaching fire fightersdidn’t believe was possible, was a direct result of its refurbishment, which not onlycircumventedthefirestopsateachfloor level,but inadditioncreatedachimneyeffectbetweenthecladdingandtheinsulationthatsweptthesmokeupthebuilding.Footageof the fire(below)takenbywitnessesshowsthatthischimneyeffectwasstrongest inthecolumncladdingrunningupthebuilding,wherethegapbetweentheinsulationandthe concrete was at its largest. This chimney effect heated up the panelling beforesetting it on fire and ignited the flammable insulation, which in turn releasedthehydrogen cyanide that would have overcome most of the inhabitants before theflamesreachedthem.InaninterviewwiththeArchitect’sNewspaper,afirefighterfromtheLondonFireBrigadesaid:

‘If the claddinghadn’t been there then the firedefinitelywouldn’t have spreadthat quickly. Usually, in tower fires, the concrete levels act as a sealed lock tocontainthefire,butthishasnothappenedhere.’

But if this tells us something about how the residents of Grenfell Tower died, it stilldoesn’ttelluswhy itwasthatthis24-storeytowerblockintheNottingBarnswardofNorthKensingtonwasfittedwithacladdingsystemthatarchitectandfiresafetyexpertSamWebbdescribedtotheGuardianas‘adisasterwaitingtohappen’.

2.ManagementDecisionsresponsiblefortheGrenfellTowerFireGrenfellTowerispartoftheLancasterWestestate,therestofwhichismadeupofthree5-and6-storeyfingerblocksbetweenwhichlielandscapedgardens.BeforethecounciltookthelandawayfromthemtobuildthenewKensingtonAldrigeAcademysecondaryschool–forwhichtherefurbishmentthatkilledtheresidentswasofferedasaformofcompensation–therewereseveralfootballgroundsandothergamescourtstothenorthofthetower.Whenconstructionwascompletedin1974theoriginalestatewouldhavebeenaparadisetothetenantsfortunateenoughtobehousedthere.Andratherthanaghetto for the poor that council estates have subsequently been denigrated as, thecommunity includedamixofsocialclasses.GrenfellTowerwasbuilt toParkerMorrisStandards, with the top 20 storeys containing 120 flats. Built around a central corecontaining the lift, staircaseandvertical risers for the services, each floorhad four2-bedroomandtwo1-bedroomflats,makingatotalof200bedrooms.Communalfacilitiesincludedanurseryon the first floor (ormezzanine level)and theDaleYouthamateurboxingclub,whichmovedintothegroundfloorofGrenfellTowerin2000.Aspartofitsrefurbishmentin2016,bothnurseryandboxingclubwererelocated,respectively,tothegroundandthirdfloor(orwalkwaylevel),andanadditionalsix4-bedroomandone3-bedroomflatsaddedonthefirstandfourthfloors.ThisbroughtthetotalnumberofflatsinGrenfellTowerupto127,andthenumberofbedroomsto227.InaninterviewinJune2016withConstantineGras,anartistwhowascommissionedbytheKensingtonandChelseaTenantManagementOrganisationtomakeafilmabouttherefurbishment, Nigel Whitbread, the architect of Grenfell Tower, said of its originalconstruction:

‘Ronan Point, the tower that partially collapsed in 1968, had been built like apack of cards. Grenfell Towerwas a totally different form of construction, andfromwhatIcanseecouldlastanother100years.I’mverymuchagainstknockingthingsdownunnecessarily.Ihadheardthattherehadbeenproblemsafewyearsagowiththeheatingandthatitwasnogood,andtalkofthewholeblockhavingtocomedown.AndIthought:ifmyheatinggoeswrong,Idon’twanttopullmyhousedown!’

GrenfellTowerManagement

In1996theentirecouncilhousingstockoftheRoyalBoroughofKensingtonandChelseawas transferred to the Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation(KCTMO),whichcurrentlymanages9,459properties,ofwhicharound6,900aretenant-occupiedand2,500leaseholdproperties,andfromwhichitcollects£44millioninrentand£10million in service charges every year. TheKCTMO is unique in also being anArmsLengthManagementOrganisation(ALMO),whichmeansthatactivitiesbetweenitand the council are viewed by Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs as non-trading

activity,soanyprofitarisingfromitwillnotbetaxable.KCTMOhasaboardwhichatthetime of the Grenfell Tower fire comprised eight residents, three council-appointedmembersandtwoindependentmembers.Theiridentitieshavenowbeenremovedfromthecompanywebsite,butatthetimeofthefiretheyincluded:

• FayEdward, theChairandResidentBoardMembersince2012andrecipient intheQueen’sNewYear’sHonoursList 2015of theBritishEmpireMedal. ItwasshewhoawardedthecontractforthefatalrefurbishmentofGrenfellTower;

• Conservative councillor Maighread Condon-Simmonds, the Lady Mayor of theRoyalBoroughofKensingtonandChelseauntilMay2017;

• Labour councillor Judith Blakeman, who sits on the council’s Housing andPropertyscrutinycommittee,andwhoinDecember2015dismissedcallsbytheGrenfellActionGrouptoinvestigatetheKCTMO;

• Council-nominated Board Member Paula France, a former employee at thegovernment’sHomesandCommunitiesAgencywhohasheldseniorpositionsinCircle,ThirtyThree,LookAhead,NetworkHousingandShepherd’sBushhousingassociationsandnowrunsherownconsultancybusiness;

• Independent Board Member Simon Brissenden, a Management ConsultingProfessionalwho untilMarch of this yearwas employed to deliverHealth andSafety Compliance in the Asset and Investment portfolio for Genesis HousingAssociation;

• Independent Board Member Anthony Preiskel, since 2012 a Non-ExecutiveDirectorofthegovernment’sHomesandCommunitiesAgency.

TheKCTMOisnotaco-operative,whichmeansthatalthoughitwascreatedunderthegovernment’s Housing (Right to Manage) Regulations 1994, it was set up undercorporatelaw.Andalthoughthehousingstockitmanagesisstillownedbythecouncil,as an ALMO (the only UK TMO, apparently, that is also an ALMO) it is exempt fromFreedomof Informationrequests(notthatcouncilsanswertheseeither,orwhentheydo the informationrequested is redacted).Thedistinctionbetweenpublicandprivatemeansverylittlethesedays,andonelookatwhositsonthisboardshowsthatit’srunby housing professionals fronted by politicians with the acquiescence of compliantresidents– in other words, the same privatised management structure being put inplaceforeveryotherestateregenerationschemeinLondon.

GrenfellTowerRefurbishmentAs thisdiagramfromtheGuardian illustrates (below),ArteliaUK,whichspecialises incostmanagement, was contracted by KCTMO to be projectmanagers on the GrenfellTowerrefurbishment,whichwascarriedoutin2016.Onitswebsitepageonresidentialservices,Arteliasaysthatit‘workscloselywithourclientstounderstandwhatsuccesslooks like to them and howwe canmake that success a reality’; and among its pastexperienceslists‘refurbishmentprojectsforlocalauthorities.’OnitspageonHealthand

SafetyManagementArtelia says it’smanagement results ina ‘safer,better,more cost-effectiveproject.’AndonitspageonDesignandConstructionManagementArteliasays‘we take full responsibility for architects, engineers, contractors and suppliers in aseamlessprocessthatdrivesoutinefficiencies.’Again,itcitesitsexperienceinworkingonprogrammes‘wherecontinuousreductioninconstructioncostsisconsideredanon-negotiablecontractdeliverable.’Onthepagedescribingits‘involvementintheGrenfellTower refurbishment project’ Artelia says that it was appointed as the ‘Employer’sAgent, Construction, Design and Management (CDM) Co-ordinator and QuantitySurveyor.’ArteliadescribestheGrenfellTowerfireasa‘tragicevent.’On the Designing Buildings Wiki page it says that the Construction, Design andManagementCo-ordinator(CDM)roleisto:

• ‘Advise the client on matters relating to health and safety during the designprocessandduringtheplanningphasesofconstruction.’

• ‘Notifythehealthandsafetyexecutiveoftheparticularsspecifiedinschedule1oftheregulations.’

• ‘Advisetheclientastotheadequacyofresources.’• ‘Co-ordinatehealthandsafetyaspectsofdesignwork.’• ‘Adviseonthesuitability,co-ordinationandcompatibilityofdesigninrelationto

healthandsafety.’• ‘Advise on the adequacy of the construction phase plan before construction

worksbegin.’• ‘Advise on the adequacy of any subsequent changes to the construction phase

plan.’• ‘Prepareorcompilethehealthandsafetyfileandissueittotheclientattheend

oftheconstructionphase.’

Sofar,therefore,Arteliaseemstobethecompanyresponsibleforthehealthandsafetyof the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower, its design, planning, compatibility with theexistingbuilding,constructionandmaterialsused.However,on6April2015,theyearbeforetherefurbishmentofGrenfellTowerbegan,theConstruction,DesignandManagementRegulationswere changed,with the roleoftheCDMCo-ordinatortransferredtoaPrincipalDesigner,which isresponsible forthepre-construction phase, and a Principal Contractor, which is responsible for theconstructionphase.UnderthenewCDMregulationstheclient,whichinthisprojectwasKensington and Chelsea TMO, is responsible for ‘ensuring that both the PrincipleDesigner and Contractor are complyingwith their duties, and formaking Health andSafetyExecutivenotification.’However,asanarticleonthesechangespublishedintheArchitects’ Journal observes: ‘thismaybedifficultwhere theprincipaldesignerhasnodirectcontractualauthorityover[theotherdesigners].’ Ineffect, thearticleconcludes,the role of the CDM Co-ordinator has been abolished. As Quantity Surveyor for the

project, therefore, Artelia was responsible not for ensuring Health and Safetyregulationsweremetintherefurbishment,butforreducingthecostsofrefurbishment.ThePrincipalDesignerandPrincipalContractorontherefurbishmentofGrenfellTowerwere, respectively, Studio E Architects and Rydon, a construction, development,maintenanceandmanagementgroup. In response to theGrenfellTower fire, StudioEArchitects, which as we said has removed its webpage on the Grenfell Towerrefurbishment,haswrittenthatitwillbe‘readytoassisttherelevantauthoritiesasandwhenwearerequired.’Despitethefataldesignfaultwhich,aswehaveseen,effectivelyturned the cladding into a vast chimney for the flames, Studio E also describes theGrenfell Tower fire as a ‘tragic incident.’ Rydon, which also describes the fire as a‘tragedy’, has also removed itswebpage on the refurbishment, and replaced itwith astatementaboutGrenfellTowersaying:

‘RydonMaintenanceLimitedcompletedapartialrefurbishmentofthebuildinginthesummerof2016forKCTMOonbehalfoftheCouncil,whichmetallrequiredbuildingregulations–aswellasfireregulationandhealthandsafetystandards–andhandovertookplacewhencompletionnoticewasissuedbyRoyalBoroughofKensingtonandChelseabuildingcontrol.’

ThisCompletionCertificatefortherefurbishmentworkonGrenfellTower,issuedon17July,2016byJohnAllen,theKensingtonandChelseaBuildingControlManager,reads:

‘The Council hereby certifies under Regulation 17 that as far as could beascertained, after taking all reasonable steps, the building work carried outcomplied with the relevant provisions. This certificate is evidence, but notconclusiveevidence,thattherelevantrequirementsspecifiedbelow[Schedule1]havebeencompliedwith.’

This isequivocalenough.But theKensingtonandChelseacouncilwebsitepageontherefurbishmentwork toGrenfellTower (applicationFP/14/03563)also lists thestatusas: ‘Completed Not approved’. No date is given for this decision. However, in an‘ImportantUpdate’tothispage,thecounciladdsthisaddendum:

‘People searching for application FP/14/03563 please note that the status“CompletedNotapproved”doesnotmeanthattheworkwasnotapprovedundertheBuildingRegulations.The formal signingoffof theworkwasprovidedbyaCompletion Certificate and not by a Full Plans decision notice,which was notrequired in this case. The system status “Not approved” appears because adecision notice was not issued. However, a completion certificate was issuedsigningofftheworksundertheBuildingRegulations.’

So, who is responsible for fitting Grenfell Tower with flammable insulation and acombustiblecladdingsystemthatactedasachimneyforthefire?

GrenfellTowerResponsibilitiesIn response to the Grenfell Tower fire, ASH received several e-mails from a seniorarchitectwhowishestoremainanonymous,butwhogaveuspermissiontopublishhiscomments,whichweincludeatlengthhere:

‘If,ashasbeenreportedintheGuardian,thedesignofthecladdingwasdifferenttothatwhichwasdetailedinplanningdocuments,werethearchitects(StudioE),inchargeoftherefurbishmentworksunderatraditionalbuildingcontract?Thatisunlikely.IntheclimateofPrivateFinanceInitiativedesign-and-buildcontracts,thearchitectsareengagedonly toaddgloss to theprojectmarketing– toraisetheRight-to-Buyvalueofthepropertyunderthecoinageof“architectdesigned”.If the architects were not in charge of enforcing compliance with contractspecifications, then theywouldhave been cut to the boneby the contractor tomaximiseeverypennyofprofit.PFI contractsareboughtandsoldon theopenmarketlikeanyothercommodity.‘RegardlessoftheroutetocompliancewithBuildingRegulations,oncompletionof the works the conformance authority, in this case Kensington and ChelseaBuilding Control, must issue a Completion Certificate, without which therefurbishedbuildingcannotbeinsured–forexample,forfire.

Afurthere-mailcontinued:

‘There are two things here: 1. The insulation fixed over the existing externalwalls;and2.Thecladdingfixedontopofthat,withagapbetweenthetwo.Thecladdinghasamaterialwhichisthesandwichfillbetweenthetwolayersofthinaluminium.Ifwearetalkingaboutthesecondissue,thecladding,nooneintheirrightmindwouldspecifythecombustibletype,partlybecauseofcaselaw,wherearchitectswhodidspecify that lost theirdefenceatappeal in theHighCourt in2003.Youmightaswellcladthebuildinginten-poundnotesdippedinNapalm.‘The Principal Designer (in this case Studio E Architects)would normally seekwrittenadvicefromthesupplier–withaquoteforsupply–thatthematerialisfit for purpose. In this case it is inconceivable that the manufacturer ofReynobond (Arconic Europe) would not recommend their “A2 Fire Solution”,comprising an incombustible sandwich core that conformswith European firecertificationEN13501-1,classA2.‘However, inPFI anddesign-buildprojects, thedesigner isnot in chargeof thejob. Instead,anunregulatedyes-man,oryes-woman, isemployedtodelivertheproject. The contractor (in this case Rydon) submits a price, and the publicemployer(inthiscaseKCTMO)willselectthelowestintheinterestofthepublic

purse.Thecontractor(Rydon)hasinmindwaystocutcoststomaximiseprofiton tightmargins,while thedesigner (StudioEArchitects)wants toprotect thequalityofthebuild.Sotheprocurementprocesscanbeadversarial.‘The local authority (Kensington and Chelsea council) has a statutory role toinspectandapprovethatthematerialsandconstructionconformtoregulations.Frequently, these days, private firms can do this, and are generally better andmore efficient than a local authority. In the case of Grenfell Tower the RoyalBoroughofKensington andChelsea (RBKC)BuildingControlwere responsible,but the contractor chose not to submit Full Plans of construction details forapproval; rather, they relied on site inspections – presumably in order toaccelerate the project, but, one might argue, also in order to avoid having tocommit construction details and material specifications documentation to therecord.‘Because of the nature and scale of the project, it is unusual for the BuildingControl department to accept BuildingNotice at all. Itwould have been betterhad they insisted on Full Plans submission, especially because there werearchitectural drawings available. So there is a question that points to a“chemistry”betweenthecontractorandtheBuildingControldepartment.‘Aroundtheworld–forexample,inFrance–itismandatorytohavearegisteredarchitect and/or Maitre d’ouvres, or Architect of Record, in charge of allconstructionprojectsoveraminimumthresholdsizeof70m2.InBritainthatisn’tthe case. The perception is that an architect’s appointment adds onerousunnecessarycost,sothedeliveryofthebuildingworksisreliantonthetrustandintegrity of the builder, and on effective Building Control site inspection thatwhat is carried out is compliant. In this case, and countless others procuredunderPrivateFinanceInitiativeterms,thatfailed.‘Since PFI was introduced by Thatcher we have a legacy of hundreds, if notthousands, of sub-standard buildings – schools, hospitals, police stations, etc –thatthetaxpayerisstillpayingextortionaterentsforunderthetermsofthe30-yearlease-backdealthatisPFI.Thisisherlegacyofcosyrelationshipsbetweenlocal authorities, quangos and their chummy contractors. It is a culture of de-regulation,ofprivateprofitbeforepublicgood.ThomasDanSmith,theLeaderofNewcastle City Council from 1960 to 1965, went to gaol in 1974 for dodgydealingswith local authorities inpropertydevelopment, albeit fromadifferentmotivation; but what the public must demand and get now over the GrenfellTowerfirearecriminalconvictions,andsoon.’

3.PoliticalContextfortheGrenfellTowerFireSomuchforthoseresponsibleforthedeadlyrefurbishmentofGrenfellTower;butwhywasitdeemednecessarytocladthetowerinthefirstplaceandwhomadethatdecision?

GrenfellTowerRegeneration

InFebruary2009,eightyearsbeforetheGrenfellTowerfire,UrbanInitiativesStudio,apracticespecialisinginurbandesign,planningandchangemanagement,wasappointedbythe Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea to create a masterplan for theregenerationofNottingBarnsSouth,an18hectaresiteinNorthKensingtoncontainingtheSilchesterandLancasterWestestates,includingGrenfellTower.6monthslatertheyproduced Notting Barns South: Draft Final Masterplan Report, which included thefollowingobservationsandrecommendations,beginningwiththisExecutiveSummary:‘Theareasuffersfromhousingstockinneedofongoingandexpensiverefurbishment,arange of social deprivation and other issues often associated with large post-warhousingestates.Thiscontextmeansthatlandvaluesareartificiallydepressedclosertothecentre.TheFar-sightedOptionaimstomaximiseoverallvalueinthelongtermandcreate a high quality new neighbourhood. This requires a number of significantinterventions. We estimate that the project could deliver significant returns to thecouncil. Inorder topresent themost attractiveoffer in a competitivebiddingprocessthe winning consortium would need to adopt the most optimistic approach to costand/orvalues.’To back up the necessity of the council adopting their proposals, the report alsoaddresses what it calls Issues and Opportunities, the former of which include thefollowing:

‘Althoughadiversepopulationintermsofage,ethnicandreligiousbackgrounds,theareaislimitedintermsofitseconomicprofileandispredominantlymadeupof social housing tenants. Theward of Notting Barns South suffers substantialissues of deprivation relating to employment, health and crime, however, theintensityofdeprivationvaries.TheLancasterWestestate(east)iswithinthe10percentmostdeprivedareasinthecountry,andsimilarlycrimeismoresevereintheeastofthestudyarea.’

Now, in fact, as shown by these two screen grabs (below) from the Indices ofDeprivation2015interactivemap,althoughLancasterWestestatedoesliewithinthe10percentmostdeprivedareas (left), its crimeratesaresharedby40percentofareas(right), and is in fact far lower than in surrounding areas where terraced housingpredominates.Thisaccordswiththe figuresoneveryestateASHhasresearched, fromBroadwaterFarmtoAylesburyandCentralHill.Behindtheunsubstantiatedandeasily-acceptedassertionsof reports like thisone, crime levelson council estatesare in fact

consistently lower than in the surrounding area, contradicting everythingwe are toldabout council estates and their communities by terrace-dwelling journalists anddeveloper-lobbiedpoliticians.Notonlyareestatesnot ‘breedinggrounds’ forcrime,asthey are characterised in both Fleet Street and Westminster, but the close-knitcommunities that formwithin them significantly reduce crime rates. As in just abouteverythingelsebeingsaidaboutcouncilestatesinthewakeoftheGrenfellTowerfire,estatesashomestoanti-socialbehaviour,crimeanddrugdealingisanothermyththatisbeing used by architects, developers, councils, journalists and politicians to promoteestatedemolition,privatisationandredevelopment.IntheUrbanInitiativesreport,particularattentionisgiventothedevelopmentoptionson the towers in the area, starting with the four 22-storey towers on the Silchesterestate:

‘Itwouldbeverychallengingfortheschemetoreprovidethisnumberofhomesshould they be demolished. Therefore our preferred approach is to assumeretentionandrefurbishment.Incertaincasesitmaybepossibletotransferthesetowerstoprivatesectordeveloperstoprovideprivatesaleorrentunits.’

GrenfellTower,bycontrast,hasnosuchreprieve:

‘We considered that the appearance of this building and the way in which itmeets thegroundblightsmuchof theareaeastofLatimerRoadStation. Italsoprovides no outdoor space for residents and is likely to be of a type ofconstruction that is hard to adapt. It does contain 120 homes. On balance ourpreferredapproachistoassumedemolition.’

The report goes on to outline the Phasing and Delivery of the proposed 15-20-yearmasterplan,fromwhichwehaveextractedthefollowing:

Phase1. ‘Includestheconstructionofthenewschoolimmediatelytotheeastofthe railway line on the existing Games Court and Kensington Sports car park.Adjacenttothestationtwoprivate12-storeytowersareerected.’Phase 2. ‘East of the railway the eastern part of LancasterWest is demolishedtogetherwithGrenfellTower.Thisbuildingblightsthearea,providesnooutdoorspace for residents and is difficult to refurbish. The remainder of Lancaster,which is being refurbished, is completed into a closed street block with infilldevelopment. By the end of this phase the regeneration of the Silchester andLancasterareaisalmostcomplete.’

Citing the area as providing no outdoor space for residents as a justification for thedemolitionofGrenfellTowerinPhase2isironicatbestgiventhatPhase1beganwith

building the Kensington Aldrige Academy– which was also designed by Studio EArchitects–onthatoutdoorspace, therebytaking itawayfromresidents;but likethestereotypesabout crime in thearea thisdoesn’thalt the concludingphases,when the‘Far-sightedOption’thataimsto‘maximisetheoverallvalue’oftheareacomesintoitsown:

Phase3. ‘Thisphase realises a largeproportionofhigh-end,high-valuemarkethousing.’Phase4. ‘Newhousingcanbenefitfromtheproximitytoandoverlookingofthepark,andmarkethousingisexpectedtorealiseincreasedvalues.’Phase5. ‘During thisphase610unitsaredevelopedorrefurbishedwithahighpercentageofprivateunits.’

Allofwhichleadstheauthorsofthisreport,MatthiasWunderlich,StuartGrayandDanHill,tothefollowingconclusions:‘Thefarsightedoptionforthemasterplanpresentedwithinthisreporthasthepotentialto transform the social and physical characteristics of Notting Barns in a positivemanner.Becauseof theexisting tenuremixandthedeclineofRight toBuy, theestatewill never become a more mixed and integrated community. This work shows howsensitive the potential residual land values are to residential sale values and, inparticular,tothepotentialvaluesforhighendflatsandhouses.Toachievethehighestvalues, the area will need to undergo significant change to improve its visualappearance.’

GrenfellTowerAppearanceFollowingthefinancialcrash,housepricesinLondonin2009hadfallenforthefirsttimein decades; and presumably for this reason, whichmay have dissuaded developmentpartners,KensingtonandChelseacouncildeclinedthe‘Far-sightedOption’(above)andchose, instead, what the report called the ‘Early Value Option’ (below). In its broadoutlines this is the masterplan which, updated in May 2016 by CBRE buildingconsultancy, continues to threaten the residents of the Silchester estate with thedemolitionandredevelopmentof theirhomes– themostrecentplans forwhichwereexhibited inApril2017–andhasalreadybuilt theAcademyon theplaying fields,butwhichalsorefurbishedLancasterWestestate,includingGrenfellTower.Thereasonfordoing so, however, had not changed from that which targeted it for demolition as a‘blight’onthearea–thatis,itsappearance.The 2014 planning application (ref. PP/12/04097/Q18) for the refurbishment ofGrenfellTowerreads:

‘Thematerialsproposedwillprovide thebuildingwitha freshappearance thatwillnotbeharmfultotheareaorviewsaroundit.Duetoitsheightthetowerisvisible from the adjacent Avondale Conservation Area to the south and theLadbrokeConservationArea to theeast.Thechanges to theexisting towerwillimprove its appearance especially when viewed from the surrounding area.Thereforeviewsintoandoutoftheconservationareaswillbeimprovedbytheproposals.’

Theplanningconsiderationslistedinclude:‘Theimpactoftheworksontheappearanceofthebuildingandarea,andviewsfromtheadjacentconservationarea.’Thematerialsused on the external faces of the building used were chosen ‘To accord with thedevelopment plan by ensuring that the character and appearance of the area arepreservedandlivingconditionsofthoselivingnearthedevelopmentsuitablyprotected’.While the windows and doors were chosen ‘To ensure the appearance of thedevelopment is satisfactory. The re-cladmaterials and newwindowswill represent asignificant improvement to the environmental performance of the building and to itsphysical appearance.’ The application concludes: ‘The changes to the externalappearanceofthebuildingwillalsoprovidepositiveenhancementstotheappearanceofthearea.’On thewebpage (nowremoved from their site)whereGrenfellTowerwas listedas acasestudy,Rydonwrote:‘Rainscreencladding,replacementwindowsandcurtainwallfaçadeshavebeenfittedgivingthebuildingafresher,modernlook.’AndNicholasPaget-Brown,thenowex-LeaderofKensingtonandChelseaConservativecouncil,isquotedonthecouncilwebpageontherefurbishmentassaying:‘Itisremarkabletoseefirst-handhowthecladdinghasliftedtheexternalappearanceofthetower.’StudioEArchitects’webpageonGrenfellTower–again,senttousbyanarchitectbeforeit was taken down– shows an artists’ impression (below) for the client of what therefurbishmentwouldlooklike,completewiththewhite,middleclassresidentsdrawntoattract investors into the area, and who are so at odds with the racial and classdemographicofthetowerrevealedbythehundredsofphotographsofmissingresidentsputuparoundtheburntoutcarcassofthebuildingbyfamiliesandfriends.ThisistheexternalviewoftheGrenfellTowerforwhichthepeoplewholivedinsidethebuildingdied.

GrenfellTowerProfitsNicholas Paget-Brown became the Leader of Kensington and Chelsea Conservativecouncil inMay2013,when residentsofGrenfellTower first began complaining aboutfire safety in their block. He has been a councillor in the borough since 1986, andpreviously occupied the position of Cabinet Member for Community Safety,

RegenerationandtheVoluntarySector,inwhichcapacityhewasresponsiblefordrivinga range of capital investment projects in North Kensington. A former City marketingmanagerfortheinternationalnewsagencyReuters,Paget-BrowniscurrentlyManagingDirectoratPelhamResearch,whichanalysesgovernmentpolicyandoffersmanagementbriefingsonpublicpolicyforbusinessesandlocalauthorities.The Deputy Leader of the council, also appointed in May 2013, as well as CabinetMemberforHousing,PropertyandRegeneration, isRockFeilding-Mellen,whoownsa£1.2million3-storeytownhouseintheward.HavinglosttheSt.Charlesward,wherehehadbeencouncillorsince2006,Feilding-MellenwasparachutedintotheHollandwardin2010.HewassubsequentlymadeCabinetMemberforCivilSociety,whichmeanthewasresponsibleforthecouncil’spoliciesoncommunitysafety,economicdevelopment,the voluntary sector and community engagement. Until becoming Deputy Leader,Feilding-MellenalsosatontheMajorPlanningDevelopmentCommittee. Inadditiontohis responsibilities on theKensington andChelsea council, Feilding-Mellen is also theLeader’s Committee Deputy, Lead Member for Economic Development andRegeneration,LeadMemberforHousing,andLeadMemberforEmploymentandSkillsfor London Councils, the cross-party local government association, think-tank andlobbyistforGreaterLondon.HeisalsoamemberoftheGreaterLondonAssembly.InhissparetimeFeilding-MellenisalsotheDirectorofpropertydevelopersSociallyConsciousCapitalLtd,DirectorofSCCLongniddryLtd,DirectorofVilniusInvestmentManagementLtd, and Director of UAB May Fair Investments, a real estate company registered inLithuania.In 2016 both Nicholas Paget-Brown and Rock Feilding-Mellen attended MIPIM, theworld’s leading international fair forpropertyprofessionals inCannes,whereLondoncouncils–amongotherlandlords–agreedealswithpropertydevelopersforthelandonwhichresidentsintheirboroughsarestillliving.InthewakeoftheGrenfellTowerfire,both Paget-Brown and Feilding-Mellen have resigned from their Cabinet positions,althoughnotascouncillors,theformersayinginhisresignationstatementthathehasto‘acceptmyshareofresponsibility fortheseperceived failings’.BothmendescribedtheGrenfellTowerfireasa‘tragedy’.Nicholas Holgate was appointed Chief Executive and Town Clerk of Kensington andChelsea council inDecember 2014. A career public servantwhowas previously ChiefOperating Officer at the Department for Culture,Media and Sport, Holgate joined theborough in 2008 as Executive Director for Finance, Information Systems andProperty.In2016-17Holgate’ssalarywas£187,780,withabonusofbetween3and10percentbasedonperformance.Forthishewasexpectedtowork4½daysperweek.InthewakeoftheGrenfellTowerfireHolgatewascompelledtoresignbySajidJavid,theSecretaryofStateforCommunitiesandLocalGovernment.However,theDailyTelegraphhasreportedthatHolgatewillbeentitledtocompensationforlosinghisjob,understoodtobeequivalenttoatleastsixmonths’pay,oraround£100,000.

Robert Black, a former Executive Director of Services at Circle Housing Group, wasappointed Chief Executive of the Kensington and Chelsea TMO in 2009. He too hasresignedinthewakeoftheGrenfellTowerfire–accordingtoanannouncementbytheKCTMOboard,‘inorderthathecanconcentrateonassistingwiththeinvestigationandinquiry.’TogetherwithBarbaraMatthews,theExecutiveDirectorofFinancialServicesand Information andCommunicationTechnology, YvonneBirch, ExecutiveDirector ofPeopleandPerformance,andSachaJevans,ExecutiveDirectorofOperations,Blackwaspartof a teamof ‘keymanagementpersonnel’which, according to the latest accountsfiled by theKCTMOwithCompaniesHouse, collectively earned£760,000 last year. InaccountsforthefinancialyearendingMarch2016,KCTMO’sincomewas£4.42million,withaturnoverjustover£17.6million.TheTimeshasreportedthatdocumentsfromJuneandJuly2014revealthatKCTMOsentan ‘urgent nudge e-mail’ to Artelia UK, the project managers on the Grenfell Towerrefurbishment, saying that they had a meeting the next morning with CouncillorFeilding-Mellen,whowasoverseeingtherefurbishment.Thee-mailreads:‘IhavebeenremindedthatweneedgoodcostsforCllrFeilding-Mellenandtheplannertomorrowat8.45am!’Thee-mailwentontolistthreeoptionsforreducingthecostofcladding.Oneof these was to use panels made of combustible and flammable aluminium with apolyethylenecoreratherthananon-combustiblezincwithamineral-richfire-retardantcorethatwasproposedbyStudioEArchitectsandapprovedbyresidentsin2012.Thisswap,whichwasmadeaftertender,couldmean,thee-mailsays,‘asavingof£293,368’.Asked about these e-mails, Artelia responded that it is ‘bound by a duty ofconfidentialityinitscontractwithKCTMO.’Accordingtoareport intheGuardian, theBCMglassreinforcedconcrete(GRC)panelsthat were used to clad the columns on the ground floor of Grenfell Tower have thehighestfireratingofA1,andhavebeenusedonluxuryapartmentcomplexes,includinghighrises.However,industrysourcessaidglassreinforcedconcretepanelscostaroundtwiceasmuchas thepolyethylenealuminiumpanelsusedon the restof thebuilding,andwouldhaveincreasedtherefurbishmentcostsbyatleast£1million.TheReynobondPEpanelsusedonGrenfellTowerareprohibitedonhigh-risebuildingsin theUSAand, according to theDepartment forCommunitiesandLocalGovernment,also breach theUK’s Building Regulations 2010,which restrict their use on buildingsover 18 metres tall. Arconic, the company that manufactures Reynobond PE, haspublishedguidelineswarningthatthePEcladdingisunsuitableforbuildingsabove10metres tall, and even the FR cladding is only suitable up to 30metres, afterwhich itadvises that the non-combustible A2 model should be used. Despite this, e-mailsobtained by Reuters show that in July 2014 Deborah French, Arconic’s UK salesmanager, and executives at the contractors involved in the bidding process for therefurbishment contract, were involved in discussions about the use of cladding onGrenfellTower,which is60metrestall.Askedaboutthesee-mails,Arconic,whichhas

sincediscontinuedthesaleofReynobondPEonhigh-risebuildings,repliedthat‘itwasnotitsroletodecidewhatwasorwasnotcompliantwithlocalbuildingregulations.’Inits2016brochureon‘Firesafetyinhigh-risebuildings’,Arconicwarned:

‘Whenconceivingabuilding,itiscrucialtochoosetheadaptedproductsinordertoavoidthefiretospread(sic)tothewholebuilding.Especiallywhenitcomestofacadesandroofs,thefirecanspreadextremelyrapidly.’

The reductions in cladding costs were among savings of £693,000 required by thePrincipal Contractor, Rydon, which won the contract in June 2014 by undercuttingestimatesfromtheoriginalcontractor.TheLeadbitterGrouphadestimatedtheprojectin2012atacostof£11.3m,considerablyhigherthanKensingtonandChelseacouncil’starget budget of £9.7million. Rydon offered to do the refurbishment for £8.7million,and were awarded the contract, according to a report by Kensington and Chelsea’shousingandpropertyscrutinycommittee,followinga ‘valueengineeringprocess’.LastyearRydonmadeapre-taxprofitof£14.3milliononrevenuesof£271million,andpaidinvestors a dividend of £2 million, the largest slice of which went to Rydon’s ChiefExecutiveandlargestshareholder,RobertBond,whoalsoearnedasalaryof£424,000,apayrisefrom£392,000theyearbefore.In 2015Harley CurtainWallwon the £2.6million contract from Rydon to install theReynobondPEpanels.Butafterbeingpursuedforalmost£2.5millionbyHMRevenue&Customs for involvement in alleged tax-avoidance schemes the company went intoadministrationlaterthatyear,beforetheworkhadbeencompleted.However,ManagingDirector Ray Bailey was allowed to purchase his old business for just £24,900 andcontinue trading under the new name of Harley Facades. The company has sinceremovedalldetails about the contract from theirwebsite ‘asamarkof respect to thepeopleofGrenfellTower.’Atthetimeofthefire,KensingtonandChelseaConservativecouncilhad£283millioninits reserves–although ithas sinceclaimed that theHousingRevenueAccount,whosemanagementisdelegatedtotheKCTMO,onlycontained£21million.Thisdidn’tstopthecouncil from offering rebates to borough residents who were paying the top rate ofcouncil tax. According to figures released under the Freedom of Information Act andpublishedintheObserver,asofspring2016theConservativecouncilhasmoved1,668homeless households living in temporary housing outside the borough – the jointhighest figure in England alongside fellowLondon councilNewham,which is Labour-run.Ofthosehouseholds,902hadbeen‘temporarily’rehousedoutsideKensingtonandChelsea borough for at least a year – the second highest such figure in the country.Hundreds more have been sent to outer London boroughs such as Barking andRedbridge, or outside London altogether, to Kent and Essex.The latest figures forKensingtonandChelseacouncilrevealthat,asofMarch2017,thecouncilonlyhas433properties for let in a borough with around 1,000 homeless households living in

temporaryaccommodation.Italsohad2,677householdsonthehousingwaitinglistin2014, a drop from 8,493 households just a year earlier. This reduction, which isrepresentative of London councils, follows the introduction of the 2011 LocalismAct,which radically changed both the criteria by which households qualify for councilhousingandthedutyofcarethecouncilhastohousethem.AsurveybyInsideHousinginMarch 2016 found that,since the Localism Act came into effect in June 2012, 159Englishcouncilshadstruck237,793peopleoff theirwaiting listsandbarreda further42,994newapplicants.Meanwhile,aBBCreporthasrevealed that,underSection106agreements,KensingtonandChelseacouncilaccepted£47.3millionfromdevelopersinlieuofaffordablehousingin2016alone,withjust336affordableunitshavingbeenbuiltintheboroughsince2011.In contrast to this demand for housing, the failure to build it, and the relocation ofhomelesshouseholdsoutsidetheborough,thelatestfiguresforKensingtonandChelsearevealthat,asofApril2017,thereare1,399vacantprivatedwellingsintheborough.Ina report published by the council’s Housing and Property Scrutiny Committee in July2015,itwasfoundthatofthe941dwellingsthenclassifiedasunoccupied–two-thirdsthe currentnumberonly twoyearsago– around50had stoodempty forbetween11and15years.Andas shownbyPrivateEye’s interactivemapofproperties inEnglandandWalesacquiredbyoverseascompaniesbetween2005and2014,mostoftheseareregisteredtocompaniesbasedintaxhavensliketheVirginIslands.There was nothing wrongwith either the original design or build of Grenfell Tower.Four decades of developer-led housing policy, government cuts to local authoritybudgets,thefinancialisationofhousingintheUK,themanageddeclineofourestatesbycouncils preparatory to their demolition and redevelopment as properties for capitalinvestment,theprivatisationofcouncilhousingmanagementthroughALMOs,TMOsandthestocktransferofcouncilestatestohousingassociations,theunaccountabilityoflocalauthoritiesincreasinglyrunasprivatefiefdomsbycouncillorswhoarelittlemorethanlobbyists for the building industry, and the recourse to Private Finance Initiatives tobuild housing whose safety is subordinate to the profits of developers, builders,architectsandestateagentsgettingrichontheUK’shousingcrisis– that’swhatkilledtheresidentsofGrenfellTower,notitsarchitecture.

4.TheFireSafetyofCouncilTowerBlocksOut of the 600 tower blocks over 18 metres tall and fitted with cladding that areundergoingtestsinthewakeoftheGrenfellTowerfire,181council-ownedblocksin51local authorities across England have failed to meet the necessary standard of fireresistanceasof2July,witha100percentfailurerateonthosetested.InLondonalonethisnumberincludes3towerblocksintheboroughofBarnet,2inBrent,5inCamden,1each in Hounslow, Islington and Lambeth, 2 in Lewisham, 3 in Newham, 2 in TowerHamlets and 2 inWandsworth, a total of 22 tower blocks so far. Even then the tests,which are being carried out by the Building Research Establishment on behalf of theDepartment of Communities and Local Government, have been criticised forundertakingcombustibilitytestsonthealuminiumcompositematerialintherainscreenpanels, while experts have warned that what determines how a fire spreads is thecladding support system, the insulation it protects, and the fire breaks in the cavity.Whatrequirestesting,therefore,isnotonlythecombustibilityofthevariouscomponentmaterials,buthowtheyrespondtofirewithinthecladdingsystem.Inresponsetothesecriticisms, the government set up an independent Expert Advisory Panel that hasadvisedtheBREtoconduct6firetestson3differentcladdingsystems,comprisingcorefiller materials of unmodified polyethylene, fire retardant polyethylene, and non-combustible mineral wool, each in combination with 2 different types of insulation,polyisocyanurate foam and non-combustible mineral wool. Potentially and probably,therefore,thenumberoftowerblockswhosefiresafetyhasbeencompromisedbytheadditionofcladdingto theirexteriormaybeevenhigher.Andthereare fears that thetestswillhavetoextendbeyondthepublicsectorintoprivatetowerblocks,aswellasincludinguniversities,hospitalsandcarecentresfittedwithcladding.SohowcouldsuchawidespreadcompromiseofUKbuildingfiresafetyhavebeenallowedtohappen?

GrenfellTowerPrecedentsIn July2009a firestartedon the9th floorofLakanalHouse,a14-storeyblockon theSceaux Gardens estate in Camberwell, and quickly spread up 5 more floors of thebuilding,killing6people.Itlateremergedthattheblock,whichhadbeenrefurbishedbySouthwark council, had been fittedwith a similar rainscreen cladding system as thatwhichwaslaterappliedtoGrenfellTowerbyKensingtonandChelseacouncil.The2013inquest into the fire concluded that years of botched renovations had removed fire-stoppingmaterialbetweenflatsandcommunalcorridors,andthatthisallowedthefire,whichasinGrenfellTowerhadstartedwithanelectricalfault,tospreadbothverticallyand laterally,withtheexteriorcladdingpanelsburningthrough in just fourandahalfminutes.Achangeinthelawin2006meantSouthwarkcouncilwasresponsibleforfiresafety checks in its flats, butby the timeof the fire,3years later, the councilhadnotcarriedoutthesechecksatLakanalHouseoranyotherresidentialblock.Thisdidn’tstopthecouncil,however,frommanagingtocarryoutfire-safetychecksatbuildingswhereits own staffworked. In Februaryof this year, at SouthwarkCrownCourt, Southwark

council, for its culpability in the safety failings at Lakanal House, was issued with a£270,000 fine (reduced from £400,000 because it had pleaded guilty) plus £300,000costs–exactly£9,500foreveryresidentkilledinthefire.Nobodywasconvicted.Following the Lakanal House fire the coroner’s report, which was sent to theDepartment of Communities and Local Government in March 2013, made a series ofrecommendations to the government, including that theDepartment provide nationalguidanceto:

• ‘The“stayput”principleanditsinteractionwiththe“getoutandstayout”policy,includinghowsuchguidanceisdisseminatedtoresidents.’

• ‘Awareness that insecure compartmentalisation can permit transfer of smokeandfirebetweenaflatormaisonetteandcommonpartsofhigh-riseresidentialbuildings,whichhasthepotentialtoputatriskthelivesofresidentsorothers.’

• ‘Encourage providers of housing in high-rise residential buildings containingmultipledomesticpremisestoconsidertheretrofittingofsprinklersystems.’

• ‘ProvideclearguidanceinrelationtoRegulationB4oftheBuildingRegulations,with particular regard to the spread of fire over the external envelope of thebuilding and the circumstances in which attention should be paid towhetherproposedworkmightreduceexistingfireprotection.’

Inhisresponsetothecoroner’sreport,ConservativeMPEricPickles,thentheSecretaryofStateforCommunitiesandLocalGovernment,wrotethatfollowingtheLakanalHousefireanddeaths,in2011hisDepartmenthadpublisheddetailednationalguidancethat:‘TakesapracticalapproachtoensuringthatthoseresponsibleforthesafetyofresidentsandothersinpurposebuiltblockscantakeacomprehensiveandpragmaticapproachtomanagingriskeffectivelywithinthecontextoftheHousingAct2004andtheRegulatoryReform(FireSafety)Order2005.Itaddressesinsomedetailtherationaleforthestay-putprincipleandprovidesdetailedadviceonthefiresafetyinformationthatshouldbemadeavailabletoresidentsinthelightofthefindingsofariskassessment.’Noneofthisguidance,therefore,tookaccountoftherecommendationsoftheCoroner’sReportpublished in2013.To the coroner’s recommendation that sprinklersbe retro-fitted in high-rise residential buildings, Pickles responded that: ‘My officials haverecentlywrittentoallsocialhousingprovidersabout this.’Andonprovidingguidanceon Approved Document B (fire safety) of Building Regulations with regard to howexternalcladdingcanreduceexistingfireprotectionhewrote:

‘Thedesignoffireprotectioninbuildingsisacomplexsubjectandshouldremain,to some extent, in the realmof professionals.Wehave commissioned researchwhichwillfeedintoafuturereviewofthispartoftheBuildingRegulations.WeexpectthisworktoformthebasisofaformalreviewleadingtothepublicationofaneweditionoftheApprovedDocumentin2016/17.’

An article in Construction News has revealed that in January 2012 a final impactassessment, titled Removing inconsistency in local fire protection standards, waspublishedbyStephenKelly,whowassubsequentlyappointedChiefOperatingOfficerforGovernment and Head of the Efficiency and Reform Group, and Brian Martin, thePrincipalConstructionProfessional intheBuildingRegulationsandStandardsDivisionattheDepartmentofCommunitiesandLocalGovernment,thatrecommendedrepealing23 local building acts across England. Signed off by Andrew Stunell, then theParliamentary Under-secretary of State for the DCLG and now House of Lordsconstruction spokesperson, this document argued that the repeal of the acts was an‘appropriate deregulatorymeasure that reduces procedural and financial burdens onthe construction industry’. The assessment estimated that over a 35-year period,between£116,334and£357,400ofcapitalsavingscouldbeachievedbynotinstallingormaintainingsprinklers intallbuildings,andbetween£195,300and£600,000couldbesaved from not installing smoke extractors. In addition, it estimated that sprinklermaintenance could cost between £300 and £800 per building, and that implementingsafetymeasuresheldwithinthelocalactswouldaddupto£1.1milliontothecostsofabuildingovera35-yearperiod.BasedonfiguressourcedfromtheHomeOfficeonfireincidents between 1994 and 1999, and drawing on statistical research from a reportpublishedin2005bytheBuildingResearchEstablishment–thesameorganisationthatisconductingtestsonthecladdingsystemsofover600towerblocks–thefinalimpactassessmentconcluded:

‘Localactshavenostatisticallysignificantimpactasfaraslifesafetyaspectsareconcerned. For tall buildings therewas little benefit, as the inherent degree ofcompartmentationissufficienttopreventmostfiresgettingtoo“big”.’

In December 2012 Eric Pickles announced the repeal of Sections 20 and 21 of theLondonBuildingActs (Amendment)Act 1939,which contains legislation precisely onprecautionsagainst thedangerof fire inbuildingshigher than100 feetandtheuseofnon-combustiblematerialsandself-closingfiredoors.In August 2016 a fire broke out in Shepherd’s Court, an 18-storey tower block inShepherd’s Bush, and spread rapidly up the outside of the building. In response to aFreedomof Information requestby InsideHousing, theLondonFireBrigadehas sincereleasedtheresultsofitsinvestigationintothespreadofthefireandtheroleplayedbytheexternalpanels,whichwereinstalledduringwindowreplacementworkmorethan10yearsbefore.Thereportrevealedthatthepanelsweremadeof17-23mmplywoodboardcoveredbybluepolystyrenefoam,1mmsteelsheetanddecorativewhitepaint:

‘Asafiredevelopsandgrowsfurther,itispossiblethatawideflamefrontcouldendupactingonthesteelsheetofthepanel.Theheatfromtheflameswouldbeconductedthroughthesteelsheetandwouldthereforemeltawaythebluefoamlayerunderneath.Thiswouldoccurinaprogressivefashionasthefiredevelops

andwouldultimatelyleadtothesteelsheetnotbeingheldinplacebysufficientbondedbluefoam.Theweightofthesteelsheetwouldthenensurethatitwouldbecomedetachedfromtheremainderofthepanel(likelyfallaway)andexposethe heat damagedblue foamandplywood layers to the developed flame front.Thissituationislikelytohaveoccurredtothepanelsabovetheflatoffireoriginwhen the living roomwindowsof the flatof fireorigin failedduring the fireatthisscene.’

InsideHousing requested further information fromHammersmithandFulhamcouncil,including the panels’ fire protection rating, whether they are installed on any otherbuildings in the borough, plus a fire risk assessment for Shepherd’s Court – but thecouncil refused the FOI request. The panels still appear to be fixed to Shepherd’sCourt,withtheexceptionofsixfloorsononeside,wherefiredamageisstillvisibleandtarpaulinsheetsaredrapedacrossthebuilding;andidenticalpanelsappeartobeinuseonthreeneighbouringtowers,BushCourt,WoodfordCourtandRosefordCourt.

GrenfellTowerFireWarningsIn a 2014 report titled ‘Structural Fire Safety in New and Refurbished Buildings’ theLondon Fire Brigade warned of consequences of councils’ in-house Building Controldepartmentshavingtocompeteagainstprivatecontractors:

‘The fact that there iscompetitionputspressure intothesystem,bypotentiallydiminishing rigour in an effort towinwork. Some in-house teamsexpress fearthat their own council colleague project officers could choose other providers.Projectsaresignedoffbeforetheyshouldbebecauseofpressureforschemestobecompleted.’

Over a year before the Grenfell Tower fire, Kensington and Chelsea council had beenissuedwithfiresafetyEnforcementNoticesinDecember2015andJanuary2016fortwoofitsothertowerblocksfollowingafireatoneofthem,AdairTower,a14-storeyblockof78flats,thatbrokeoutinOctober2015.Havingexaminedthefiresafetyconditionsintheblock, theLondonFireBrigadeorderedKCTMO toprovide self-closingdevicesonfrontdoorsandtoimprovefiresafetyinescapestaircasesinbothAdairTowerandinasecond block,Hazelwood Tower, that was built to the same design. These, however,were only 2 of the 43 EnforcementNotices on its properties Kensington and ChelseacouncilhasreceivedfromtheLondonFireBrigadeoverthepastthreeyearssinceJuly2014.SincetheGrenfellTowerfire,theBBChasreportedthatadozenletterssenttothembytheAll-PartyParliamentary Fire Safety andRescueGroup reveal that since2010 foursuccessive government officials in the Department of Communities and Local

Government,beginningwithEricPickles,havebeenwarnedby them that residents inhigh-riseblocksareatrisk.In a letter to Liberal-Democrat MP Stephen Williams, then Parliamentary Under-secretary at the DCLG, dated March 2014,Ronnie King, the Honorary AdministrativeSecretary of the Fire Safety Group,wrote about installing automatic fire sprinklers incertaintypesofdwellingsinthewakeoftheLakanalHousefire:

‘Surely,whenyoualreadyhavecredibleevidencetojustifyupdatingasmallbutimportant part of the guidance in the Approved Document, whichwill lead tosavingoflives,youdon'tneedtowaitanotherthreeyears,inadditiontothetwoalreadyspentsincetheresearchfindingswereupdated,inordertotakeaction?‘It seems astounding to me that, although clarification was given by theDepartment at the inquest, that the composite panels under the external wallwindow sets of flats at Lakanal House were only required to be class “0” tocomply with Building Regulations, and need not have had the fire resistancerequired under the former Section 20 London Building Acts [removed by EricPickles];thatthisdangeroussituation(allowingfiretospreadexternallyintoflat79withinfourandahalfminutes)hasstillnotbeencorrectedintheApprovedDocumentguidance.‘Asthereareestimatedtobeanother4,000oldertowerblocksintheUK,withoutautomaticsprinklerprotection,canwereallyaffordtowait foranothertragedytooccurbeforeweamendthisweakness?’

AfterfurthercorrespondenceMPWilliamsfinallyresponded:

‘IhaveneitherseennorheardanythingthatwouldsuggestthatconsiderationofthesespecificpotentialchangesisurgentandIamnotwillingtodisrupttheworkofthisdepartmentbyaskingthatthesemattersarebroughtforward.’

TowhichtheAll-PartyParliamentaryFireSafetyandRescueGroupwrotethatthey:

‘Were at a loss to understand how you had concluded that credible andindependentevidence,whichhadlifesafetyimplications,wasNOTconsideredtobeurgent.Asaconsequencethegroupwishestopointouttoyouthatshouldamajorfiretragedy,withlossoflife,occurbetweennowand2017in,forexample,a residential care facility or a purpose built block of flats, where the matterswhichhadbeenraisedhere,werefoundtobecontributorytotheoutcome,thenthegroupwouldbeboundtobringthistoothers’attention.’

InDecember2015, theFireSafetyandRescueGroupwroteagain toConservativeMPJamesWharton, ParliamentaryUnder-secretary in theDCLG at the time,warning himabouttheriskoffiresspreadingontheoutsideofbuildingswithcladding:

‘Today’sbuildingshaveamuchhigher contentof readily available combustiblematerial.Examplesaretimberandpolystyrenemixesinstructure,claddingandinsulation. This fire hazard results in many fires because adequaterecommendations to developers simply do not exist. There is little or norequirementtomitigateexternalfirespread.’

The fourth and final minister to ignore the warnings was Conservative MP GavinBarwell,until the lastelectiontheMinisterofStateforHousingandPlanningandnowtheChiefofStaffinDowningStreet,towhomtheFireSafetyandRescueGroupwroteinSeptember 2016. The following month, at a Parliamentary debate on BuildingRegulations,Barwellsaid:

‘WehavenotsetoutanyformalplanstoreviewtheBuildingRegulationsasawhole,butwehavepubliclycommittedourselvestoreviewingPartBfollowingtheLakanalHousefire.’

At the time, the LakanalHouse fire had happened seven years ago, and the coroner'sreport was then three years old. In February of this year the Department ofCommunities and Local Government published a summary report of study into the‘usability’ofBuildingRegulations, includingApprovedDocumentsB(firesafety).Sincethen,DocumentBstillhasn’tbeenupdated,andnothinghasbeenpublishedlookingintothe technical content of the fire safety regulations. When asked about the review ofDocument B in the wake of the Grenfell Tower fire the government said work is‘ongoing’.

GrenfellResidentsItisameasureofhowdissatisfiedtheresidentsofGrenfellTowerwerewiththeKCTMOthat theysetup theirowncommunity representativesunder thenameof theGrenfellActionGroup.Thiswas formed in 2010 to oppose the constructionof theKensingtonAldridgeAcademyandtherebuildingoftheKensingtonLeisureCentre(KALCproject),which –with the first developmentopening in2013and the second in2015–wouldincrementallyconsumemostofLancasterGreen,theonlylocalgreenspaceavailablefortheresidentsoftheimmediatelyadjacentGrenfellTowerandthetwoblocksofGrenfellWalk. The grouphas since formed allianceswithnumeroushousing campaign groupsacrossLondon,includingArchitectsforSocialHousing.It’s hard to know exactlywhere to pick up the hundreds of complaints andwarningsissued to theKCTMOby theGrenfellActionGroupand recordedon their blog; but in

January 2013 they published a post drawing attention to the impact the loss of theLancasterRoad car-park to theKALCprojectwashavingon the fire safetyofGrenfellTower. Because vehicle access to Grenfell Tower is severely restricted, the LancasterRoadcar-parkhadservedavitalfunctionovertheyearsasparkingspaceforresidents,service and delivery vehicles, as well as backup parking area for the London FireBrigade.Withthelossofthecarparkthereisbarelyadequateroomtomanoeuvreforfireenginesrespondingtoemergencycalls,andanyobstructionoftheemergencyaccesszone, they warned, ‘could have lethal consequences in the event of a serious fire orsimilar emergency in Grenfell Tower.’ The post publishes some of the accumulatedphotographic evidence of the numerous occasions on which precisely this hadhappened.TheninFebruary2013,underthetitle‘AnotherFireSafetyScandal’,theGrenfellActionGroup published this extract from the most recent Fire Risk Assessment of GrenfellTower,conductedinNovember2012:

‘FromtheassetrecordsprovidedtomebytheTMO,theemergencylightingandfirealarmsystems, alongwith thedry riser, fire fighter lifts and thehose reelsinstalled in this building, are all subject to a maintenance contracts. Testing,servicing and maintenance is being carried out by professional third partycontractorsonaplannedpreventivemaintenanceprogramme,withrecordskeptcentrallybytheTMOatthe“Hub”andbythecontractorforallthesesystems.Notestcertificateshavebeenseentoconfirmthis.‘RGEServicesLtdareundercontracttotheTMOtoprovideportablefirefightingequipment, testing, servicing and maintenance. The fire extinguisher in thisbuilding, the basement boiler room, the lift motor room, the ground floorelectrical room plus other areas were out of test date according to thecontractors’labelontheextinguishers.Thelasttestdatewasonthe8thAugust2011.Somelocated intheroof levelareashad“condemned”writtenontheminlargeblackwriting,withalasttestdateof2009or2010.Thisseemstoindicatethatmonthlyoccupierinspectionsarenotbeingcarriedout.‘Itisnotknownifthecaretakerisundertakingthemonthlyoccupiers’testsoftheinstalled emergency lighting system, fire extinguishers and structural items asper the caretakers check list. This would include the external stairs and liftchecks, with the results being kept as a record of testing having beenundertaken.’

Thefollowingmonth,March2013,afollowupblogpostreportedthatneithertheFireRiskAssessmentnortheirreporthadreceivedanyresponsefromtheKCTMO.TheninMayGrenfellTowerexperiencedpowersurgesduringwhichresidentswitnessedsmokecomingoutoflightfittingsandotherelectricalappliances,includingcomputers,washing

machinesandtelevisions,someofwhichexploded.ThiswasreportedtotheKCTMOon11 May. The problems escalated on 29 May, when residents saw and smelt smokecoming from various electrical appliances, and eventually thewhole electrical systemwent into meltdown, with several key meters fused, and electrical appliances in 40individual residences damaged or destroyed. Among their fears for their safety, andangeratwhytheproblemofthepowersurgewasnottakenseriouslywhenitwasfirstreported,residentsvoicedparticularconcernsabout theemergency lightingsysteminthefirestairwellfromGrenfellTowerwhosetestingtheRiskAssessmentquestioned:

‘A single staircasewith no natural light is the only emergency exit route fromGrenfell Tower. The emergency lighting system in that stairwell should bethoroughly checked to ensure that neither the system itself, nor any of theindividual battery packs, has been damaged by the power surges of recentweeks.’

TheGrenfellTowerLeaseholdersAssociationfolloweduptheseconcernsbypresentingapetitiontotheKensingtonandChelseaHousingandPropertyScrutinyCommitteeatameetingthefollowingJuly.InresponseamemberoftheKCTMOpresentatthemeetingtold residents that ‘Therewasno smoke. Itwas in fact steamcausedbywater fromaleakdroppingontosomethinghot intheflatbelow.’TheCommitteerespondedtothepetition with an update which, dated 16 July 2013, more than twomonths after theearliestreportsofpowersurges,statedthat‘itistooearlytosaywhethertheproblemhasbeenfullyresolved,andwhereresponsibilityliesforthecause.Itispossiblethatthefaultthathasbeenrectifiedisnottheprimarycause.’Thisprimarycausewasthoughttohavebeenarcing inthemainssupplycable,butnoattemptwasmadetoexplainwhatcausedthearcing.Anddespitethepetitionbeingsignedby94GrenfellTowerresidentsout of the 120 households, Laura Johnson, the Director of Housing and author of theupdate,followedthislackofinformationwiththeclaimthat:

‘Therehasbeenaconsiderablevolumeofcommunicationfromasmallnumberofresidents inthe formofblogsandopen“roundrobin”e-mails,someofwhich isfrompeoplewhoarenotresidentsof theblock.Thiscommunicationcontainsalot of speculation about the cause of the problem. KCTMO has not respondeddirectlytothiscommunicationandhasfocusedonkeepingresidentsinformedofthefactsthroughdirectcommunication.’

LaterthatmonthMariemElgwahryandNadiaChoucair,bothpresumedbyKensingtonand Chelsea council to be among the authors of theGrenfell ActionGroup blog,wereamong the residents sent letters from the council’s Legal Services accusing them ofbeing‘criticalofeverythingthattakesplaceatLancasterWestinrelationtoinvestmenton the estate’ and of making ‘direct accusations about unfounded criminal actions’.Stipulatingadeadlineof29July2013,theseniorsolicitor,VimalSarna,askedthatthey:

‘Removefromtheblogunfoundedaccusationsagainstnamedindividualswhichareyourpersonalopinionsandarelikelytobeconsidereddefamatoryandalsolikelytobeperceivedasharassmentbytheindividualsconcerned.’

BothMariemandNadiaareamongthestilluncountedmissinglostintheGrenfellTowerfire.InMarch2015nearly100residents,representingover50householdsinGrenfellTower,gathered in the Community Rooms to discuss the problems the Grenfell TowerImprovement Works were causing residents. These included the lack of meaningfulconsultation from the KCTMO and the concern that the contractor, Rydon, intendedpositioning boilers in residents’ entrance hallways; that exposed hot pipes wouldprovide a health and safety problem; andmore generally at the poor standard of thework. At the end of the month residents formed Grenfell Community Unite, and thefollowing month they sent a letter to the KCTMO requesting a public meeting withmembers,aswellasrepresentativesfromRydon,StudioEArchitectsandMaxFordhamengineeringconsultants.ClaireWilliams,theProjectManager,respondedwithaletterinwhichsherefusedtoacknowledgeGrenfellCommunityUniteandthereforetomeetwithitinapublicmeetingalongwiththeprojectcontractorandconsultants.Jump forward toNovember2016,and inapost titled ‘PlayingwithFire!’, theGrenfellActionGroupmadethisfateful–andnowfamous–observation:

‘It isatrulyterrifyingthought,buttheGrenfellActionGroupfirmlybelievethatonly a catastrophic event will expose the ineptitude and incompetence of ourlandlord, theKCTMO, and bring an end to the dangerous living conditions andneglect of health and safety legislation that they inflict upon their tenants andleaseholders.’

ThepostgoesontocitethefiresinAdairHousein2015andShepherd’sCourtin2016and theEnforcementOrders issuedagainst theKCTMO. It alsoquestions the advice –delivered, it says, by a temporary notice stuck in the Grenfell Tower lift and a singleannouncement in a regeneration newsletter – that residents should ‘stay put’ in theevent of fire. In response, in March 2017, the KCTMO finally installed fire safetyinstruction notices in the entrance hallway to Grenfell Tower and outside the lifts oneveryfloorofthebuilding.Putupjust3monthsbeforethefire,thesewouldhavebeentheinstructionsresidentswouldhavehadinmindonthenightofJune13-14:These instructions comply with the evacuation strategy contained in the Fire RiskAssessment of November 2012, which advises residents ‘to remain within their owndwelling during a fire incident unless the fire is in that dwelling or it is otherwiseaffected,inwhichcasetheyshouldimmediatelyevacuatethedwelling.’However–and

hereonceagainwecomebacktotheeffectsoftherefurbishmentofGrenfellTowerin2016–thisadviceisbasedontheassumptionthat:

‘The flat or maisonette will have a high degree of compartmentation andtherefore there will be a low probability of fire spread beyond the flat ormaisonetteoforigin,sosimultaneousevacuationofthebuildingisunlikelytobenecessary.’

In the building information for this assessment, which was conducted in 2012, theassessornotes:

‘As far as I amaware the construction and any refurbishments of this buildinghave gone through the Building Regulations process. Information has beengatheredfromthebuilding’soccupantsandemployeesoftheTMO,andfromananalysisofdocumentsprovidedbytheTMOthereisnoexternalcladdingonthisbuilding.’

The Metropolitan Police Force has since confirmed that an exploding fridge-freezerstarted the fire in Grenfell Tower. This cannot be divorced from the long history ofcomplaintsaboutsmokingandexplodingelectricalappliancesmadeagainsttheKCTMO.Residentshavealso reported that thecentral firealarm in thebuildingdidnotgooff,andtheywereonlyalertedtothefirebytheactionsofotherresidents–manyofthemMuslims awake during Ramadan – who banged on their front doors. The EveningStandardhassincerevealedthatthepropertyservicesgroupresponsiblefor installingthealarms,Lakehouse,whichlastyearposteda£31.7millionoperatingloss,iscurrentlyunderathree-yearinvestigationbytheMetropolitanPoliceFraudSquad.Thecompanyis under suspicion of providing defective safety equipment that was installed inhundreds of properties across London, with ten people having been arrested afterHackneyCouncilreceivedallegationsof ‘fraudandovercharging’ fromwhistleblowers.Survivorsfromthefirehavealsosaidthattheemergencylightsinthefireescaperoutedidnotcomeon–justastheGrenfellActionGrouphadfeared.Mostworryinglyofall,theLondonFireBrigadesaidontheThursdaymorningafterthefirethattheyhadnotbeenabletoputouttheflamesuntiltheyhadisolatedarupturedgasmains in the towerblock.Somemonthsafter therefurbishmentwascompleted inMay2016, theNationalGrid installed gas risers andpipes in the fire escape stairwelland landings. On 27 March residents had been assured by Sacha Jevans, Director ofOperations at KCTMO, that they would be boxed in with ‘fire-rated’ protection, butaccording to a report in the Guardian, two-thirds of the horizontal pipes were stillexposedwhenthefirebrokeouton14June.Inane-mailtoKensingtonandChelseaatleast threemonths before the disaster, Tunde Awoderu, Vice-chair of Grenfell TowerLeaseholders’Association,wrote:

‘Thisexposedgaspipethroughoutthebuildinghasputourlifeindangerandwedon’tfeelsecureinthebuildinganymore.Iftherewasagasleakononeofthosepipesandsomeonewassmokingthatwouldbetheendofthebuilding.’

Followingagas leak, theworkswereoriginallyundertakenby theNationalGrid’sgasdistributionarm;butinMarch2017thefirmwassoldtoinvestors,whichincludedtheQatari InvestmentAuthority,andrenamedCadentGas. Inresponsetoquestionsabouttheworksaspokespersonconfirmedthat ‘theriser in thestairwellhadbeenboxed inwhenthefireoccurred,andworkwasstillongoingtoboxinthelateralpipes.’Whattheruptureof this gasmainsdid to the spreadof the fire inside thebuilding canonlybeimagined,butitseffectswerethereforeveryoneoutsidethebuildingtosee.A further possible contributing factor was that Max Fordham, the engineeringconsultants on the Grenfell Tower refurbishment, in its Sustainability & EnergyStatement from 2012, recommended ‘partially removing the fire stopping betweenfloors and replacing it after the new pipeworkwas installed’ as part of the option toinstallnewcentralheatingpipeworkwithinallsixservicerisersinthebuilding.Itisnotclearwhether this recommendationwasactedupon, and the companywebsitemakesnomentionofGrenfellTower.DespitethiscatalogueofcriminalnegligencetowardsthefiresafetyofGrenfellTowerintheyearsandmonthsleadinguptothefire,westillbelievethatthespreadofthesmokeand flamesthrough,upandacross thecombustiblecladdingsystemand its ignitionofthe flammable insulationwere the twoprimary causes of the rapid spreadof the fireoverthebuilding’sfirestopping;andthatthelackofsprinklers,thefailuretoinstallself-closing firedoors, theabsenceofaworkingcentral firealarm, theevacuationstrategyadvicebasedonabsentconditions,themalfunctioningofemergencylightsintheescapestairwell,theinstallationofanunprotectedgasmainsupthatstairwell,andthedifficultythe Fire Brigade had gaining access to the tower block were all contributing butsecondary factors towards an already deadly fire. Nevertheless, the responsibility forthislackoffiresafetyinsideGrenfellTowerlieswiththosewho,ateverylevelofdesign,management, maintenance and repair, failed for year after year to ensure these firesafetyconditionsneveraroseand,whentheydid,thattheywerequicklyaddressedandfixed.SowhyweretherepeatedfearsandwarningsofresidentsandtheGrenfellActionGroupignoredinthefaceofthemountingevidenceoftheriskoffireinGrenfellTower?

GrenfellTowerDeregulationInaninterviewwiththeGuardianaftertheGrenfellTowerfire,architectandfiresafetyexpertSamWebb,whositsontheAll-PartyParliamentaryFireSafetyandRescueGroup,said:

‘Wearestillwrappingpostwarhigh-risebuildingsinhighlyflammablematerialsandleavingthemwithoutsprinklersystemsinstalled,thenbeingsurprisedwhentheyburndown.Ireallydon’tthinkthebuildingindustryunderstandshowfirebehaves inbuildingsandhowdangerous itcanbe.Thegovernment’smaniaforderegulationmeansourcurrentsafetystandardsjustaren’tgoodenough.’

In February 2014, Conservative MP Brandon Lewis, then theParliamentary Under-secretary of State for Communities and Local Government but the future Minister ofState for Policing and the Fire Services, in a Parliamentary debate on Fire SprinklersWeek, explained at length how the coalition government’s ‘One-in, two-out’ policy onnewregulation–whichmeant that foreverypound thatnewly-maderegulationcostsbusinesses,existingregulationswhosecompliancecostsbusinessestwopoundsmustberemovedormodified–wouldbeappliedtoBuildingRegulationsrelatingtofiresafety:

‘Many in the fire sector have at times argued for more regulation to requiresprinklers in domestic properties. Since taking office in 2010, the coalitionGovernmenthavebeenveryclearabouttheirpolicyonsprinklers,butIwanttoput iton the recordagain. Sprinklerswork.Weknow that.Noonecandeny it.Theyareaneffectivewayofcontrollingfiresandofprotectinglivesandproperty.That is why they are required in certain higher-risk premises, under BuildingRegulations,andwhyallguidancethatwemakeavailabletosupportcompliancewith the fire safety order highlights sprinklers as an effective risk-mitigationmeasure.

‘However,notallbuildingscarrythesamelevelofrisk.Thosewithresponsibilityforensuringfiresafetyintheirbusinesses,intheirhomesoraslandlordsshouldandmustmakeinformeddecisionsonhowbesttomanagetherisksintheirownproperties.Inourcommitment tobethe firstGovernment toreduceregulation,we have introduced the one in, two out rule for regulation.In that context,Members will understand why we want to exhaust all non-regulatory optionsbeforeweintroduceanynewregulations.‘TherearealwayscallsforGovernmenttochangeBuildingRegulations,andthatis often the default position of those who see regulation as an easy answer.However, it is not the only answer. We should intervene only if it is entirelynecessary, and only as a last resort. Although we have not carried out afundamentalreviewofBuildingRegulationsforfiresafety,werecognisethatitisimportanttomaintainandupdatestandards.Nodoubt,theuseofsprinklerswillformpartofthatwork.‘We believe that it is the responsibility of the fire industry, rather than theGovernment,tomarketfiresprinklersystemseffectivelyandtoencouragetheirwider installation.The cost of fitting a fire sprinkler system may affect house

building–somethingwewanttoencourage–sowemustwaittoseewhatimpactthatregulationhas.’

Accordingtoareport intheGuardian,onthesamemorningastheGrenfellTowerfirethe Red Tape Initiative convened a pre-arranged meeting of a panel to investigatehousing regulations. Formed in April 2017 to take advantage of the opportunities forderegulationofferedbytheUKleavingtheEuropeanUnion,theRedTapeInitiativeisanextremely well-connected cross-party organisation. Chaired by Conservative MP SirOliverLetwin, the formerMinisterof State forGovernmentPolicywhoafter the1985riotshadco-authoredtheinfamousmemoaboutBroadwaterFarmestate,theinitiativeincludedon its advisorypanelConservativeMPMichaelGove, until hewas appointedSecretaryof State forEnvironment,FoodandRuralAffairs threedayspreviously, andhasbeenofferedthesupportofConservativeMPGregClark, theSecretaryofState forBusiness, Energy and Industrial Strategy. Undeterred by the tower of smoke issuingfrom the inferno in West London, the housing panel met to consider a documenttitledThe EU’s Impact on the UK Housing and Construction Industry. TargetingConstruction Products Regulation (EU 305/2011) as ‘expensive and burdensome forsmallbusinesses’,thedocumentwaswrittenbyAlexHackett,theExecutiveDirectorofthe new Conservative-led lobbying firm Hanbury Strategy, which was set up by theDirector of Communications for the Vote Leave campaign, Paul Stephenson,whowasalso the former Director of Strategy for the former Prime Minister David Cameron.Among the expensive burdens this document wished to see removed from EUregulationsistherequirementthat:

‘Constructionworksmustbedesignedandbuiltinsuchawaythatintheeventofan outbreak of fire the generation and spread of fire and smoke within theconstructionworksarelimited.’

TheRedTapeInitiativehascloselinkstoPolicyExchange,theneo-liberalConservativethink-tanksetupby,amongothers,MichaelGove,andwhich isratedoneof the threeleasttransparentUKthink-tankswithregardtowhereitsfundingcomesfrom.Amongthose sitting on the advisory panel of the Red Tape Initiative is Archie Norman, theformerConservativeMP,CEOofAsdaandfounderofPolicyExchange;aswellasCharlesMoore, the former editor of the Telegraph and the Chair of Policy Exchange; whilepresentontheRedTapeInitiativehousingregulationspanelthemorningoftheGrenfellTower fire was Richard Blakeway, Chief Adviser to Policy Exchange’s Housing andUrbanRegenerationUnit,whowasalsoDeputyMayorforHousing,LandandPropertyat the Greater London Authority for eight years, as well as Chair of the Homes forLondonboard,andiscurrentlyaBoardDirectorattheHomesandCommunitiesAgency.PolicyExchange isperhapsmost famous forproducingananti-Muslimreport in2007titledTheHijackingofBritishIslam:HowextremistliteratureissubvertingmosquesintheUK,whichwassubsequentlyaccusedofmanufacturingevidence,andwhosewidespreadcoverage in the right-wing press was potentially responsible for the attack on the

Finsbury ParkMosque,which the report falsely identified as a distributor of Islamistliterature,ontheMondayaftertheGrenfellTowerfire.Lesswell known is that in January 2013 Policy Exchange produced the reportCreateStreets, which recommended that all the high-rise estates built in London between1950sandearly1980s–butpresumablynot theBarbicanestate–bedemolishedandreplacedwithmid-riseblocksbuiltonLondon’sso-called‘traditional’streetplan.Tothisend they estimated that 360,000 council homes (housing around amillion residents)shouldbedemolished.In2012PolicyExchangehadalsopublishedareporttitledEndingExpensiveSocialTenancies thatrecommendedacceleratingthesaleofhigh-valuesocialhousinginLondon,usingthereceiptstobuildaffordablehousing,andmovingprevioustenantstotheperipheryofthecapital.Tobackupitsargumentthereportasserted–butproduced no proof – that ‘the majority of social tenants are either totally or largelyreliantonbenefits.’AsameasureofthepoliticalinfluencePolicyExchangeexerts,fouryears later this recommendation on the sale of high-value social housing becamelegislationenshrinedinUKlawunderchapter3,part4oftheHousingandPlanningAct2016.We should sit up and listen, therefore, when in the wake of the Grenfell Tower fire,PolicyExchangepublishedanarticle titledOnly takingpoliticsoutofGrenfellwill solvehousing crisis, in which Susan Emmett, the think-tank’s Head of Housing and UrbanRegeneration,argued:

‘Against the febrile backdropof theGrenfell tragedy, SadiqKhan, themayor ofLondon,hassignalledtheneedforfurtherurbanandestateregenerationinthecapital. He is right to prompt councils to look beyond refurbishing old councilstockandseekfundamentalchangetobringforwardabiggernumberofhigherquality homes and better places. Rethinking land use around big estates toinclude traditional streetpatterns,mid-risebuildings,mansionblocks, terracedhousing andwell-designed public spacewith greenery not only contributes tohigherdensitiesthatbigcitiesneedbutneighbourhoodscommunitieswant.’

5.TheProgrammeofEstateRegenerationThevictimsof theGrenfellTower firewerekilledbyaprogramme that threatens theresidents of every council estate in London – the programmeof estate ‘regeneration’.Justaswehaveseen thisprogrammebeing implementedbyLabourandConservativecouncilsalike,sowearenowseeingthesamecross-partymanipulationofthisdisasterto promote further estate demolition from journalists and politicians from both theConservative and Labour parties. Sir Simon Jenkins, a former editor of the EveningStandard, the Times and the Economist, and currently a journalist for the EveningStandardandtheGuardian,wroteinthelatterpaper:

‘Residential towers are antisocial, high-maintenance, disempowering,unnecessary,mostlyugly,andnevertrulysafe.’

AndrewGimson, a biographer of Boris Johnson and journalist for theDaily TelegraphandtheEveningStandard,wroteinthelatterabouthisvisittothesiteofthedisaster:

‘We saw in plain view the blackened shape of Grenfell Tower, standing amongseveralothertowersofseeminglyidenticaldesign.AndIcouldnothelpreflectingthat I would not ever want to live in any of those towers. I prefer my littleterracedhouse.So,iftheycan,domostpeople.Thosetowerswereindeedbuilt,for themostpart, for thepoor,not the rich.Thearchitectswhodesigned themandtheplannerswhogaveconsentforthemveryseldomchosetoliveinthem.They were a shoddy, second-rate solution, masquerading as some sort ofprogress. Grenfell Tower was the expression of a zeitgeist that seemedunstoppable.Butcan’twenowstopit,teardowntheserepulsiveblocksandgetbacktobuildingthedecent,modeststreetswherepeopleactuallywanttolive?’

In his eagerness to tar every council estate with his aesthetic distaste, Gimson wasperhapsunaware that twoof theresidentswhodied in theGrenfellTower fire,GloriaTrevisan andMarco Gottardi, were in fact architects. But their presence on the 23rdfloorofGrenfellTowerdidn’tfitGimson’ssneeringnarrativeofcouncilestatepoverty.His claim,however, that architectsdon’t live in council estatesor towerblocks, is thekindof ‘commonknowledge’Architects forSocialHousing–manyofwhosememberslive inboth– isused tohearing in themouthsofpoliticiansseekingexcuses toknockthemdownandgive the land theystandon to theirpartners in thebuilding industry.DavidLammy,forexample,theLabourMemberofParliamentforTottenham,wroteintheGuardian:

‘Thereare700towerblocksof11storeysormoreinthecapitalalone,thevastmajorityofwhichwerebuiltinthe1960sand1970s.TheconditionsinGrenfellToweraremirroredinhousingestatesacrossthecountry.Fordecadeswehaveconsigned people to live in overcrowded conditions that are not just

unacceptable but that, in many cases, are criminally unsafe. Families live inhutches,nothouses.’

TowhichheaddedinaninterviewonBBCRadio4’sTodayprogramme:

‘Manyofusacrossthecountryhavebeencaughtupinanelection,knockingonhousingestatedoors rightacross the country, travellingup to the top floorsoftowerblocks,andweknowaspoliticiansthattheconditionsinthiscountryareunacceptable.Those70sbuildings–manyofthemshouldbedemolished.’

Not to be outdone by a Labour MP’s enthusiasm for estate demolition, Iain DuncanSmith, ConservativeMP for Chingford andWoodford Green –who in the three yearsbetweenJanuary2011andFebruary2014,asSecretaryofStateforWorkandPensionsoversawthedeathof2,650peoplewhohadbeenfoundfitforworkfollowingdisabilitybenefitassessmentsbyAtosHealthcare–spokeinParliamentabouttheGrenfellTowerfirewiththefollowingsuggestion:

‘IaskthePrimeMinistertoaddonefurtherremittothePublicInquiry:tolookatwhetherthewholeprocessofretrofittingoldtowerblocksisviableatall,andatwhether there is a better way to house and support tenants in these areaswithout the use of the many incredibly badly designed and very faulty towerblocks.WillsheaskthePublicInquirytolookcarefullyatwhetheritisfeasibletobringsomeoftheblocksdownandprovidemorefamily-friendlyhousing?’

Most dangerously of all, however, given his support for London’s estate demolitionprogrammeasLondonMayor,SadiqKhan–whoinlastyear’sDraftGoodPracticeGuidetoEstateRegenerationrenegedonhiselectionpromisesthatresidentsupportmustbeaconditionofestateregenerationandthatdemolitionwouldnotgoaheadifitresultedina lossof socialhousing, andhas steadfastly refused togive residents the rightofvetooverthedemolitionoftheirhomes–wroteintheGuardian(anditisthisstatementtowhichthePolicyExchangearticlereferred):

‘The greatest legacy of this tragedymay well end up being the skyline of ourtownsandcities.Inthepostwarrushtoreconstructourcountry,towerswentupin largenumbers,most ofwhich are still here today.Nowadays,wewouldnotdreamofbuildingtowerstothestandardsofthe1970s,buttheirinhabitantsstillhavetolivewiththatlegacy.Itmaywellbethedefiningoutcomeofthistragedythattheworstmistakesofthe1960sand1970saresystematicallytorndown.’

Itshouldbeclearfromourreportthatnoneoftheseclaimshaveanyfactualbasis–andworse, that in calling for the demolition of tower blocks on council estates they areactively concealing the truth about the political context for,managerial decisions thatledto,andthetechnicalcausesoftheGrenfellTowerfire.Butwhyarepoliticiansfrom

boththeLabourandConservativepartiessoeagertoseetheonlyhomesworking-classLondonerscanstillaffordtorent‘systematicallytorndown’?

GrenfellTowerOpportunismLet’sstartwithDavidLammy,whosincethefire–despiteithappeningontheothersideof town in a Conservative-run borough – appears to have been elected the LabourParty’sspokespersonfortheresidentsofGrenfellTower.Asevidenceofhisclaimthat700towerblocksacrossLondonare ‘unacceptable’andeven ‘criminallyunsafe’,DavidLammycitedtheBroadwaterFarmestateinhisownconstituency.Infact–ratherthaninthepoliticalrhetoricandtabloidjournalismabouttheestate–BroadwaterFarm,justliketheLancasterWestestate,hasafarlowercrimeratethanthesurroundingarea.Ina2003surveyofall theestate’sresidentsonly2percentsaid theyconsidered theareaunsafe, the lowest figure foranyarea inLondon. Italsohas the lowestrentarrearsofanypartoftheborough.Theestate’snotoriety,however,ashometoriotersin1985andagainin2011,placeditonthelistofestatestarredbyDavidCameronas‘sinkestates’inJanuary 2016, when he announced theEstate Regeneration National Strategy that istargeting100estatesacrosstheUK.AlongwithNorthumberlandPark,whichisalsoinLammy’sconstituency,BroadwaterFarmisoneof21estatesinHaringeythathasbeencondemned for demolition under the Haringey Development Vehicle into which–againstresident’ssimilarlyignoredwishes–HaringeyLabourcouncilhasenteredwithinternationalpropertydevelopersLendleaseaspartof a£2billion saleofpublic landandassets.Asanyoneengagedintryingtoresisttheprogrammeofestatedemolitionknows,therereally is no depth towhich politicianswon’t sink to push their privatisation schemesthrough under the guise of improving the lives of residentswhose homes and safetythey have neglected for years; but presumably Lammy doesn’t include the Barbicanestate,forinstance,inhislistofLondon’s1960sand70stowerblockshethinksshouldbe‘demolished’,orthedepositboxesintheskyLendleaseisthrowingupintheElephantandCastleontheruinsoftheHeygateestate–where1,200demolishedcouncilhomesarebeingreplacedwith2,535luxuryhomesofwhichamere82willbeforsocialrent–andwhichtheywillnodoubtbeerectingwithasimilarproportionofsocialhousingonthepubliclandtheyhavebeenhandedbyHaringeycouncil.Forhis efforts Lammywas subsequently elected to theChair of theCommunities andLocalGovernmentCommittee.InhisnominationstatementLammywrote:

‘In light of the Grenfell Tower fire it is my intention that the Committee willconductaninquiryintoBuildingRegulationsandfiresafetyintowerblocksandsocialhousingassoonaspossible.’

Allwell and good, but he said nothing about the estate regenerationprogramme thatmadethatfiresolethal,andthathascondemnedcouncilestatesinhisownTottenhamconstituency toprivatisation, demolition and redevelopmentunder a programme thatwill replicate everything that led to the Grenfell Tower fire. A former barrister atLincoln’s Innwho studiedatHarvardLawSchool, Lammyhasprevious in this sort ofcareerism. InMarch2016hewas fined£5,000for instigatingnearly36,000automaticphone calls urgingpeople tobackhis campaign tobeLondonMayor.Thisdidn’t stophim,onthedaybeforetheLabourCabinetvotedinfavouroftheHaringeyDevelopmentVehiclethatwillmakethousandsofhisconstituentshomeless,frombeingquotedintheObserver claiming: ‘I have always seen my primary job as being to represent myconstituentsorpeoplelikethem.’Lammyhastakencaretowriteseveralletterstothecouncilraisinghis‘concerns’aboutthe Haringey Development Vehicle, but none of them confront the reality of estateregeneration, which is designed to evict estate residents from their homes, and nomannerof tinkeringwith itsprocesseswillameliorate itseffects.Even if theyhad themindto–whichtheydonot–councilsthathandoverestatelandtopropertydevelopershavenoresponsetotheviabilityassessmentswhichtheirprivate ‘partners’produce–usuallycommissionedfromestateagentSavills–showingjusthowfewhomesforsocialrent their profitmarginswill permit. Lammy’s subsequent suggestion that, instead ofentering into a PFI deal with Lendlease, Haringey Labour council set up a SpecialPurposeVehiclethatwillallowittoactasahousingassociation,showsjusthowlittleheknowsabout,ourunderstands,thefailingsofsuchSPVsinLabour-runboroughs.UnderthenameofSouthwarkHousingCompany,orHomesforLambeth,orCroydon’sBrickbyBrick, orNewham’sRedDoorVentures, someof the greatest loss of social housing isresultingfromestatedemolitionandredevelopmentbytheveryprivatisationschemesLammyispromoting.ASH visited Grenfell Tower on the Thursday after the fire, and one of the things thatstruckusfromanarchitecturalpointofviewwasthat–evenaftertwodaysofburning–the 1970s reinforced concrete building was still structurally sound and intact. Incontrast, the 2010s inflammable insulation and combustible aluminium compositerainscreenpannellingthecouncilpaidaprivatecontractortoattachinordertoimprovethe view for property investors in the area lay in burnt fragments across theneighbouringgardensandstreets.Lammyisrighttosaythat‘theconditionsinGrenfellToweraremirroredinhousingestatesacrossthecountry’,butthoseconditionsaretheonesthathavebeenimposedaspartoftheirregenerationunderPFIandSPVschemesthatarehandingoverthemanagement,refurbishmentandredevelopmentofourpublichousingtoprivatecontractors.It’snotforustospeculatewhetherDavidLammyiscynicallymanipulatingthisdisastertofurtherhisowncareerorsimplyoutofhisdepth;butonceagainwehaveapoliticianwhohasnoknowledgeofwhathe is talkingabout tarringall council estateswith the

samebrushinordertopromoteLondon’sestatedemolitionprogramme.Asanyhousingcampaignerwilltellyou,that’snothingnew–butinthiscaseit’sdippedinthebloodofthe dead and homeless of Grenfell Tower.We strongly condemn the use of thisman-madedisasterbypoliticians, journalistsandthink-tankstopromoteaprogrammethatthreatenshundredsofLondonestateswiththesameprivatisedmanagementstructuresand developer-friendly regeneration schemes that caused it. Estates don’t needdemolishing and redeveloping by the private companies getting rich on the housingcrisis;theyneedmaintaining,refurbishingandmakingsafebythecouncilsthatarepaidbyresidentstodoexactlythat.If,asGrenfellTowerisrevealing,councilsareunwillingto carry out their duty of service to residents, other means of management must beconsidered.Wewillreturntothequestionofwhatattheendofthisreport.

GrenfellTowerPoliticsThe Grenfell Tower fire happened in a Conservative-run borough, but the series ofmanagementandpoliticaldecisionsthatledtothefire–theindifferenceoftheTenantManagement Organisation to residents, the contracting out of the refurbishment to aprivatecompanyspecialisingincostmanagement,thecostcuttingthatledtoflammableinsulation material being used, the negligence that led to the use of a combustiblecladding system that acted as a chimney for the fire, the ignoring ofwarnings by theLondon Fire Brigade and residents about inadequate fire safety in the block, and thefinancialmotivationsfortherefurbishmentitself–arebeingreplicatedacrossLondon.AndalthoughtheLabourPartyhassoughttoturnthisdisasterintoastickwithwhichtobeattheConservativegovernment,theestateregenerationprogrammethatcauseditisprimarilybeingimplementedinLabourboroughs,wheremorethan170estatesthatweknow of are under threat of privatisation, demolition and social cleansing by theregenerationschemesofLabour-runcouncils.If you’re wondering why both Labour mayor Sadiq Khan and Conservative MP IainDuncanSmitharesokeenon‘tearingdown’London’scouncilestatetowerblocks,a2-bedroomapartment inLambeth’sOvalQuarter,builtonthe305demolishedhomesofthe Myatts Field North estate in Brixton, is selling today for £595,000. The 58leaseholders were offered on average £114,500 compensation for their demolishedhomes,whichwasnothinglikeenoughtobuyahomeonthenewdevelopment,where503properties for private salewerebuilt on the cleared land, 105ofwhichwere forsharedownership.Notasingleadditionalflatforcouncilrentwasbuilt.Theremaining172councilhomeswererefurbishedtotheDecentHomesStandardby–ofallpeople–Rydon, the same company contracted by the Kensington and Chelsea TenantManagement Organisation to refurbish Grenfell Tower, and the same complaints byresidents there have beenmade against Lambeth council,which is Labour-run. Theseincludefaultyelectricsocketsanddangerouswiring–something,aswehaveseen,thatthe residentsofGrenfellTower complainedabout to theKCTMOsince theblock-widepower-surgeinMarch2013,andis likelytohavestartedthefirethatkilledthem.And

likethem,theresidentsofMyattsFieldNorthhavebeenignoredforthepastthreeyearsby Lambeth council, which has handed over the running of the estate to a privateconsortium, Regenter, which has in turn subcontracted out the servicing andmaintenanceoftheestatetoahousingmanagementcompany.AftertheLakanalHousefire,ArnoldTarling,thequantitysurveyorandfiresafetyexpertwho described the spread of the fire across the cladding on Grenfell Tower, visitedBrittanyPoint,oneofthreesurvivingtowerblocksontheEthelredestate,whichisalsoinLambeth,andwhich isrunbytheEthelredTMO.InaBBCreport,Tarlingdescribedthe tower block as a ‘disaster waiting to happen’, citing flammable expanding foamaroundwindowsthatwouldgiveoffathickblacksmokeifsetalight;a13-yeargapinrecorded fire-hose services; gaps underneath fire-resistant panels that render themuseless;andpanelscontainingapolystyrenewhichcouldmelt,giveoffsmokeandaddfueltoflames.TheChairoftheEthelredTowersResidents’AssociationcametotheASHmeetingonGrenfellTower,andthefollowingTuesdaytheTRAheldtheirAGM.AmongthemanyquestionsaboutthefiresafetyoftheEthelredestatetowerblocks,residentscomplained that – just as in Grenfell Tower – gas mains were running through theescape stairwell, and as part of the ongoing regeneration of the estate services havebeen left passing into the common stairwellwithout fire stopping. One resident said:‘The lack of proper procedures and services and communication in place here areexactly thesameaswhat led to theGrenfellTower fire.’Awomanwith fourkidswholivesonthe16thfloorofoneof towerblockssaid: ‘Thecouncilshouldn'thaveelderlyand babies and young children above the 8th floor.' Another said: ‘The system isfundamentally flawed.Subcontractors takeacutateverystage.Wearegettingapoorservice for large sums ofmoney.’Waving a printed copy of theBBC report, residentsangrily demanded to know whether anything had been done to fix the problemsidentifiedbyTarling8yearsago.Theofficers fromLambethLabourcouncil thatwerepresent at the AGM – which included Tim Davies, the Fire Risk Assessor – didn’trespond.Aswe said, Rydon has removed itswebpage on the deadly refurbishment of GrenfellTower;butithasleftupthepageonitsrefurbishmentoftheChalcotsestateinCamden– where several thousand residents have been made homeless while the samecombustible and flammable aluminium composite material Reynobond panels areremoved– and at the very bottom of the page it says: ‘Rydon is maintaining theproperties for the duration of the PFI contract.’ Camden council, in other words, hascontractedoutnotjusttherefurbishment,butalsothemaintenance,servicingandfire-safetyofresidents’homesontheChalcotsestatetothesameprivatecompanythatwastheprincipalcontractorontheGrenfellTowerrefurbishment,andwhichusedthesamesubcontractor,HarleyFacades, to install thepanels. Inprivatising the servicingof theChalcotsestatetheLabourcouncilhas,ifanything,createdanevenmoreunaccountablemanagementstructurethantheKCTMOcreatedbytheConservativecouncil,whichhadsimilarly contracted out the fire safety of Grenfell Tower to RGE Services. And itwas

anotherArms-LengthManagementOrganisation,HackneyHomes–whichwassetupbyHackneyLabourcouncil in2006 inorder to receive itsallocationof thegovernment’s£1.6billionDecentHomesprogramme–thatsignedoffthedefectivefiresafetyworkintheirproperties, includingtheinstallationofsmokeandfirealarms,byLakehouse,thecompanyresponsibleforinstallingthesamealarmsthatdidn’tgooffduringtheGrenfellTowerfire.Despitethis,LabourpoliticianslikeDavidLammyandtheirsupportersinthepressareattributing the responsibility for this disaster to the Conservative Party alone, whileabsolving the Labour Party of all complicity in estate regeneration. At the same time,undertheguiseofvarious‘grass-roots’fronts,LabouractivistsareturningthisdisasterintoabidtotakeovertherunningofKensingtonandChelseacouncil.AttheKensingtonand Chelsea council meeting on 19 July, the Leader of the Labour Group, CouncillorRobertAtkinson,declared:

‘The thing we must start with is to change the entire political culture of theborough of Kensington and Chelsea. I am now confident that at the councilelectionsnextMay theold regimewillbesweptaway,andanew listeningandunitedcouncil, ledbyLabourcouncillors,will take itsplace.Fromnowon, thiscouncilmustdothingswithitsresidents,andnottoorforthem.Previously,youTorieshavegonethroughthemotionsofpublicconsultationsand involvement,but as one of your own side said: “We hear butwe do not listen”. The Labouropposition in this council has repeatedly warned that your Tory housing andregenerationpolicieswerebreakingupourcommunitiesandexilingpeoplewhoinmanycaseshavelivedhereforgenerations.AssistedbytheMayorofLondon,Sadiq Khan,who has credibility and a democraticmandate,we need to get onwithrebuildingtheborough.’

Perhaps the only people capable of fully appreciating the bare-faced cheek of thisstatement are the tens of thousands of residents who, on the Heygate estate, on theFerrierestate,onWoodberryDown,onCressinghamGardens,onBroadwaterFarmandacross London, have been consulted by Labour councils prior to the demolition andredevelopmentof theirestates forprivateownershipandcapital investment,andwhohave looked in vain to the London Mayor to honour his election promise to giveresidents veto over the demolition of their homes. Councillor Atkinson was right todenounce what he called ‘the social cleansing practiced by this council in itsregenerationpoliciesandit failuretobuildnewhomesforallbuttheverywealthiest’,but his statement completely ignores the fact that exactly the same fire-safetyconditions, unaccountable council, privatised management structures and estateregenerationschemesthat ledtothefire inGrenfellToweralsoexist ineveryLabour-runboroughinLondon.

ThedisasteroftheGrenfellTowerfireistheveryworstthingthatcanresultfromestateregenerationcarriedoutnotforthebenefitofresidents,buttowingovernmentfundingthathasbeenwithdrawnfromcouncilbudgets,raiseresidualvaluesforcouncil-ownedland andmaximise profits for private companies under PFI deals; but these financialincentivesandthemanagementstructuresdesignedtorealisethemareinplaceineveryLondonborough.ManypeoplehavebeenwonoverbyJeremyCorbyn’sresponsetothisdisaster, which has been in stark contrast to Theresa May’s typically awkwardindifferenceandlackof leadership;but itwouldbewrongtothinkthatconditionsareanydifferentonestateregenerationschemesbeingimplementedbyLabourcouncils,allin accordance with Labour housing policy. Corbyn has given his direct backing andsupport to Lambeth Labour council’s estate privatisation programme, Homes forLambeth,andhasremainedresolutelysilentontheHaringeyDevelopmentVehicle–ashe has about the social cleansing of estate communities from their homes by theregeneration schemesbeing implementedbyLabour councils acrossLondon,whetherby SPVs or PFIs. To ignore this fact, or to try and suppress it for the sake of partypolitical allegiance, is not justmorally indefensible, it is a betrayal of the peoplewhodied in theGrenfellTower fireand the thousandsmorewhoaredemanding the truthaboutwhytheydid.A tragedy– which is how this fire is being described by politicians, councillors, themedia and the contractors and consultants responsible for its deadly effects – issomethingthathappenstosomeoneasaconsequenceoftheirarroganceandgreed.TheresidentsofGrenfellTowermayhavediedbecausetheywerepoor,ashaswidelybeenclaimed,butitwasn’ttheirpovertythatkilledthem.Thefirethatconsumedtheirhomesand lives isnot a tragedybut aman-madedisaster that shouldneverhavehappened.Unlike a tragedy, the victims of this fire are entirely innocent of the disaster theyforesaw.Itremainstobeseenwhetherthosewhosearroganceandgreedcauseditwillbeheldtoaccount.Butitisuptoustoensurethatsuchadisasterneverhappensagain,andthatthepoliticaldecisions,managementstructuresandtechnicalconditionsthatledtothefirearenotignoredandsuppressedastheywereeightyearsagoaftertheLakanalHousefire.

GrenfellTowerCommunityBeyondthetechnical,managementandpoliticalcausesoftheGrenfellTowerfire,thereare the cultural and ideologicalones, including the fearof theblack communities thatliveoncouncilestates(criminals,singlemothers,drugdealers,rioters),fearoftheMuslimcommunities that live on council estates (foreigners, breeding families, religiousextremists, terrorists), and disgust with the working-class communities that live oncouncilestates(anti-social,workshy,state-subsidised,benefitscroungers).After theattackonLondonBridge less thana fortnightbefore theGrenfellTower fire,thenewspapercolumnistandformerradiopresenterKatieHopkins,oneoftheloudest

mouthpiecesof this fearanddisgust, called fora ‘final solution’ towhat thedisgustedhome-ownersinnearbyKensingtonRow–wheresomeofthesurvivorsofthefirehavebeenpromisedhousing–whowereworriedaboutthedevaluationoftheirmulti-millionpound properties, called ‘these people’. As its numerous precedents forewarned, theGrenfell Tower fire is an inevitable result of the national strategy of social cleansingthroughestateregeneration–astrategythatisthebasistothehousingpoliciesofboththeLabourandtheConservativeparties,butwhichcanonlybeimplementedbyLabourandConservativecouncilspolitically,economicallyandtechnicallyonthefoundationofcultural and ideological fear and disgust. Cladding is the blinkers on the eyes of theproperty-owningclasseswhodon’twanttoberemindedthatcounciltenantsliveamongthem.Thetruthis,poorpeoplediedbecauserichpeopledidn’twanttoseewheretheylived.Orwheretheydied.On Sunday 18 June, while an unknown number of working-class, black and MuslimbodieslayunrecoveredinthesmolderingcrematoriumofGrenfellTower,HollandParkOperawentaheadwithitsproductionofDonGiovannilessthanamileaway.TheOperareceived funding of £450,000 per year from the Royal Borough of Kensington andChelsea until 2015, when it received a final grant of £5 million. Picnic hampers foraudiencemembersareavailablefor£265.There is,however, onepositive to comeout of theGrenfell Tower fire disaster. FromConservative central government to Labour local authorities and the developers,contractors and consultants they employ, council estates have been universallyslandered as breeding grounds for anti-social behaviour, havens for crime and drug-dealing, homes to rioters and broken families.Whatwe have seen in response to theGrenfellTowerfire,bycontrast,isthestrengthoftheLancasterWestestatecommunityin the face of disaster, the valued place it occupies in the surrounding community ofNorthKensington,andthecourageanddignityofGrenfellTowerresidentsinthefaceofunimaginableloss.The Grenfell Tower firewas not an accident but an inevitable result of themanageddeclineofcouncilestatesasaprincipleofourhousingpolicy, thedeliberateneglectofmaintenance to homes preparatory to their demolition and redevelopment, and theunaccountability of councils, tenant management organisations and the privatecontractors they employ to the concerns and even the lives of residents. From thegovernment’s Estate Regeneration National Strategy and the London Mayor’s GoodPractice Guide to Estate Regeneration to the individual schemes of London’s councils,existingpolicyistodemolishourestates,evicttheirresidentsandredevelopthelandasluxuryapartmentsforhomeownershipandcapitalinvestment.If–aspoliticiansnevertireoftellingus–wemust‘learnthelessons’ofthisman-madedisaster,weshouldstartby stopping the social cleansing of communities like that of Grenfell Tower and startinvesting in themaintenance, refurbishment and security of London’s council estatesandtheresidentswhocallthemhome.Ourhomesneedmaintainingbyaccountableand

repesentative bodies, not managed decline by private management and developerstryingtoprofitfromthisdisaster.EverythingthatcreatedLondon’shousingcrisisisbeingreplayedatGrenfellTower.Thebodiesofthedeadhaven’tevenbeencountedyet,andalreadythisfireisbeingusedtopromotetheveryestateregenerationandprivatisationprogrammethatcausedit–andbythosewhohavethemosttogainfromitsimplementation.Ifwedon’tstopthisnow,onedaywemightbeforcedtoadmitthattheonlythingworsethanpeopleburningtodeath in their homes because of greed and corruption is the way their deaths wereshamelessly used to promote further greed and corruption. FromPrimeMinister andLondonMayor to local councillorandnational journalist, the servantsof the stateareworkingovertimetoreducethecomplexitiesofwhatcausedthisdisastertothesimpleequation that serves them best: ‘Council estates are dangerous: so we must demolishthem!’AnyonewhosupportsthisliedoessoonthegravesoftheGrenfellTowerdead.Asthisreportdemonstrates,thereasontheGrenfellTowerfirewasnotcontainedbythefire stops in the building and put out by the fire brigade as a matter of routine, butinstead spread up and across the tower in minutes, had nothing to do with it being‘badly designed’ or ‘faulty’ – as IainDuncan Smith claimed – or because the ‘buildingstandards’ofthe1970swereinadequate–asSadiqKhanequallyerroneouslysaid.Onthecontrary,itisthecurrentBuildingRegulations,whichhavebeensatonforfouryearsbytheDCLGagainstwarningsfromcoronersandfireexpertsinthewakeoftheLakanalHousefire,thatareinadequatetostopthecriminallynegligentrefurbishmentofcouncilblocksunderPFIandSPVschemes. If the conditions inGrenfellTowerare–asDavidLammyclaimed–‘mirroredinhousingestatesacrossthecountry’,itisonlyonthosetowhich inflammable insulation and cladding systems have been added by privatecontractorsunderpressurefromprivatisedmanagementorganisationstocutthecostoftheseschemes,evenwhenitputsthelivesofresidentsatrisk.Ifthe‘greatestlegacy’oftheGrenfellTowerfireisthattheonlyhousinghundredsofthousandsofLondonersandmillions of UK citizens can afford to live in is – in Sadiq Khan’s idiotic phrase –‘systematicallypulleddown’,wewillhavelearnednothingfromthisdisasterexcept–aswe sawwith Orgreave andHillsborough – how to turn another national tragedy intoanothernationalcover-up.It is in thenatureof capitalism tocapitaliseonanydisaster,whethernaturalorman-made, and turn it into a market opportunity. The culpability of the police in theHillsboroughStadiumdisasterin1989wascoveredupbytheConservativegovernmentof Margaret Thatcher and blamed instead on crowd behaviour. This lead to theintroductionofall-seaterstadiumsinthetoptwotiersofEnglishfootball,doublingtheentrancepriceovernight andpreparing theway for the social cleansingof theBritishworking class from its own game that we have today. In the same way, politicianslobbying for builders and developers are already trying to turn the effects of thecriminally negligent regeneration of an estate, which Kensington and Chelsea council

wanted to demolish in the first place, into a further reason to demolish every estatestandingonLondon’simmenselyvaluableland,furtherincreasingthesocialcleansingofworking-classcommunitiesfromLondon.ItisnotbychancethatwhentheHillsboroughdisaster thatkilled96peoplehappened, theFootballSpectatorsBill1989,whichgavetheSecretaryofStatethepowertomaketheseatingofspectatorsaconditionofissuinganauthoritythelicencetoadmitspectators,wasbeingreadinParliament.Inthesameway, the Housing and Planning Act 2016, the Estate Regeneration National Strategy2016andtheGLA’sGoodPracticeGuidetoEstateRegenerationwilldeterminehowtheGrenfellTowerwillbeinterpretedforthepublic.Ofthiswearecertain:itwon’tbelongbefore the first London council declares that the Grenfell Tower fire is proof thatrefurbishment of post-war housing is not a valid option, and that the only way toregeneratedeliberatelyrun-downcouncilestatesistodemolishandredevelopthem.

6.AccountabilityfortheGrenfellTowerFireInNovember2016,intheblogpostthatpredictedtheGrenfellTowerfire,theGrenfellActionGroupwrote:

‘It is our conviction that a serious fire in a towerblockor similar highdensityresidentialpropertyisthemostlikelyreasonthatthosewhowieldpowerattheKCTMOwillbefoundoutandbroughttojustice!’

Amongthethousandsandthousandsofmessageswrittenintributebooks,onmessagewalls,onplacardstiedtorailingsandonbannerscarriedonprotestsexpressingsorrowandlossandanger,theoverwhelmingdemandisforthetruthaboutwhathappenedandjustice for thevictims.Butwhat justicecanbalancethescaleof thisdisaster,andwhowillbefoundguiltyinitsscales?

GrenfellTowerPublicInquiryWell,evenbythetermsofthefatefulpredictionsoftheGrenfellActionGroup,ithasn’tbeenagoodstart.ThePrimeMinister,TheresaMay,whorefusedtomeetwithresidentswhenshevisitedGrenfellToweron thedayafter the fire, respondedbyannouncingapublic inquiry. A public inquiry is ordered by the government in order to investigatecertainevents,suchaswhenadeathordeathshaveoccurred,orissuesofseriouspublicconcern.TheMinistercallingtheinquiry–whichinthiscaseisSajidJavid,theSecretaryof State for Communities and Local Goverment – sets the ‘terms of reference’ thatdetermine the scope of the inquiry,making them aswide or narrow as he deems fit.Although findings and recommendations could be relevant to future civil or criminalproceedings, under the Inquiries Act 2005 an inquiry cannot rule on civil or criminalliability.AstheexplanatorynotespublishedwiththeActmakesveryclear:

‘Thereisoftenastrongfeeling,particularlyfollowinghighprofile,controversialevents,thataninquiryshoulddeterminewhoistoblameforwhathasoccurred.However,inquiriesarenotcourtsandtheirfindingscannotanddonothavelegaleffect.Theaimofaninquiryistohelptorestorepublicconfidenceinsystemsorservices by investigating the facts and making recommendations to preventrecurrence,nottoestablishliabilityortopunishanyone’

Inaninquiry,survivors,familymembersofthedeceasedandinterestedgroups–whichin this case would include the Grenfell Action Group – are called ‘core participants’;thesecanallbenefitfrompublicfundingforlegalrepresentation,andemploylawyerstoquestionwitnesses.Theconclusionsofaninquiryarewritteninareport,givenfirsttothegovernmentandthenpublishedforthepublic.Havingwidetermsofreferencecanprolong the time an inquiry takes to complete – with the Iraq Inquiry, for example,takingsevenyears–buttheinquirycanalsoproduceapreliminaryreportinarelatively

short period of time onmatters of immediate concern. In the Grenfell Tower Inquirythesewould include identifyinganyurgentaction thatneeds tobe taken towards firesafety standards in similar buildings aswell as how they have been compromised byestate regeneration schemes. In response to public complaints about the originaldeadline, theperiod for consultationon the termsof reference for theGrenfellTowerInquiryhasbeenextendedto28July2017.However,TheresaMayfollowedherannouncementupbyappointingSirMartinMoore-Bick,arecentlyretiredCourtofAppealjudgewhospecialisedincommerciallaw,toleadtheGrenfellTowerInquiry.AmongthecasestestifyingagainstMoore-Bick’ssuitabilityfor this role was his 2014 decision – later overturned by the Supreme Court – thatallowedWestminster council to rehouse a single mother with five children 50 milesawayinMiltonKeynes.ThedecisionhadbeenwelcomedbyDominicRaab–atthetimetheParliamentaryUnder-secretaryof State forCivilLibertiesandnow theMinisterofState for Courts and Justice – who also praised Moore-Bick’s decision to deport aforeign-born criminal whose young children lived in Britain as ‘some long-awaitedcommonsenseon theapplicationofArticle8 [of theEuropeanConventiononHumanRights]’.Thiswasbadenough,butthentheDirectorGeneralandSecretarytotheGrenfellTowerInquirywasnamedasMarkFisher,whounderIainDuncanSmith’smurderousregimewas Social Justice Director in the Department forWork and Pensions, where he wasresponsible for thepreventionofwelfaredependency.FisherhadpreviouslyoverseenthedesignanddeliveryoftheWorkProgramme,underwhich120,000peopleclaimingJobseekersAllowancewereforcedtowork30-hourweeksunpaidforamonthorhavetheir benefits sanctioned for half a year, aMandatoryWorkActivity scheme thatwasexploitedby534companies,charities,religiousgroupsandotherorganisations.Finally, Sajid Javid announced that the Chair of a new panel set up to advise thegovernment on its response to the Grenfell Tower fire has been named as Sir KenKnight,thegovernment’sChiefFireandRescueAdviserforEnglandbetween2007and2013. In his August 2009 report on the Lakanal House fire for the DCLG, Knight – aformerLondonFireCommissioner–wrote:

‘Itisnotconsideredaspracticaloreconomicallyviabletomakearequirementforthe retrospective fitting of fire suppression systems to all current high-riseresidentialbuildings.However it isamatter for individualhousingownersandlandlordstodecideifautomaticfiresuppressionisrequiredaspartoftheirfiresafetystrategybasedontheirfireriskassessment.’

Asifthatweren’tenough,inMay2013Knightwroteafurther,widelycriticisedreportrecommending£200mworthofcutstothefireservice.Sincethen,BrandonLewis,inhis

role as Minister of State for Policing and the Fire Services, repeatedly used Knight’sreporttodeflectquestionsaboutgovernmentcutstofiresafetybudgets.TheGrenfellTowercommunityhasnotbeenaloneinexpressingitsdoubtthatanyonewho looks for justice fromthreegovernment-appointedofficialswithsuchhistoriesofinjustice and even crueltywill look in vain.However, there is another issue,which isbroaderthantheintegrityorrecordsoftheindividualsappointedtothepublicinquiry.InthefaceofthemountingevidenceofcorruptionateverylevelofinvolvementintherefurbishmentofGrenfellTower it is important todistinguishbetween individualandsystemiccorruption.Asanexampleoftheformer,theblogoftheGrenfellActionGrouphas revealed that Councillor Feilding-Mellen, in his capacity as Cabinet Member forHousing, Property and Regeneration, was ultimately responsible for Kensington andChelseacouncil’s2015decisionto leaseNorthKensingtonLibrarytoNottingHillPrepSchool,therebytakingitoutofpubliccontrolanduse.However,atthetimeofthisdeal–whichwasstronglyopposedbythelocalcommunity–Feilding-Mellenhadtwochildrenonthe longwaiting list for the£5,800-a-termprivateschool,whichaspartof thedealwasallowedtoskipthefirstyear’srentof£365,000.This is justanotherexample–ofwhichtheGrenfellActionGroupblogexposesmany–ofthewayindividualsinpositionsof authority on Kensington and Chelsea council and the Tenant ManagementOrganisationhaveusedthatauthorityfortheirownpersonalbenefit.ThecorruptionthatledtotheGrenfellTowerfire,however,isofanotherkind.Eventocallit‘corruption’isnotstrictlyaccurate,astodosowouldimplythatitsworkingsarecorrupting an otherwise uncorrupt system; when what the Grenfell Tower fire isrevealing to those who didn’t know already is that the system that produced thisdisaster works by corruption. The corruption that has embraced everyone from themanufacturers of flammable insulation for people’s homes, to the architects thatincluded it in a cladding system the Fire Brigade had issued warnings about, to thecontractors that undercut their competitors towin the refurbishment contract, to thesubcontractorsthatinstalleditonGrenfellTower,totheprojectmanagersthatcutcostswith residents’ safety, to the Tenant Management Organisation that demanded thosecuts,tothecouncilthatprofitedfromthem,totheministerswhosatonreviewsoffiresafety regulations in tower blocks, all theway up to the council leaders and housingministersof thepoliticalparties–bothConservativeandLabouralike–aswellas theLondon Mayor, that have promoted an estate regeneration programme that placesincreased land values for local authorities and the profits of private contractors overresidents’ needs and safety – is quite clearly not a ‘regrettable chain’ of instances ofindividualfailings–asthepublicinquirywilldoubtlessfind–butratheranexampleofthesamesystemiccorruptionthathasproducedthehousingcrisisfromwhichsomanyprivatecompaniesandpublicservantsareprofitingattheexpenseandlivesofresidentslike those in Grenfell Tower, and inwhich the public inquiry has been called to helprestorethepublic’sconfidence.Assuch,althougheveryindividualculpableinthislethal

chain of greed and criminal negligence should be arrested, tried and, if found guilty,sentenced – rather than, as is currently happening, being allowed to resign on aseverancepackage–simplyremovingthemfromtheirpositions–asinfacthasalreadybeendoneatKensingtonandChelseacouncil–willdolittleornothingtostopthesamesystemic corruption that threatens the homes and lives of hundreds of thousands ofestateresidentsacrosstheUK.Police surveillance is a constant if you live on a council estate, in thehelicopters thathoveroverhead,inthearmedsquadsthatpatrolthegrounds,inthethreatsstuckuponevery noticeboard, in the strip lighting that turns everywalkway into a high-securityprison,intheCCTVcamerasthatrecordyoureverymove.Incontrast,thoseresponsiblefortheGrenfellTowerfirehavebeenleftfreetodestroytherecordsoftheirculpability,and everywitness and suspect can deflect public questions about their responsibilitywith the excuse of ‘not wanting to prejudice the Public Inquiry’, while politicians,corporateCEOs,BBCdirectors,newspapereditors,policecommissionersandhighcourtjudgesagree inadvanceexactlywhichminorofficialwillbe the scapegoat. Incredibly,theonlypeopletobearrestedsofarinrelationtothisfireareamanwho,findingabodybag left outsidehis frontdoor, tookphotographs and footageof thepartially exposedbodyandposted themon socialmedia; andanothermanwho tried to claim financialsupportbyfalselyclaiminghehadlosthiswifeandsoninthefire.Bothwereinsensitiveand reprehensible acts, no doubt, but hardly comparable to the actions of CouncillorRockFeilding-Mellen,whomthepoliceappearmoreintentonprotectingthanarresting.The first thing the announcement of a Public Inquiry into theGrenfell Tower fire hasdone – long before it is due to convene this September – is to have removed alltransparencyandaccountabilityfortheinvestigationfrompublicscrutinyandplaceditinthehandsoftheverypeoplewhoareresponsibleforthiscrime.Aswehaveindicatedthroughoutthisreport,muchoftheinformationgatheredhereisnolongeravailableonthewebsites of the private companies and public bodies involved. The same chain ofcorruptionthatledtohundredsofresidentsburningtodeathbecauserichpeopledidn’twanttoacknowledgetheirexistenceisbeingrepeatedinthechainofsecrecythatwill–likeeverypublicinquirybeforeit–absolvethelinksinthatchainofallresponsibilityforthose deaths. In this respect as in so many others, the Grenfell Tower fire is like amirror: the political decisions that created the conditions for the disaster are beingreflected in our responses to it.We believe that one of the wayswe can honour thememoryofthedeadistoidentifyandchangethesystemthatcausedtheirdeaths.Ifwedon’t,thiswillnotbethelastlossoflifeweseeonLondon’scouncilestates.

GrenfellTowerInquestIn response to the government’s announcement of a Public Inquiry there have beencriticismsofboth the time it is likely to take, the fact that its termsof referencehavebeensetbythesamepeoplewhoareresponsibleforthedisaster,andespeciallythatit

will not lead to criminal proceedings. This has led to the Grenfell Tower communitycallingforacoroner’sinquest,suchastheonecarriedoutaftertheLakanalHousefire.Unlike a public inquiry, an inquest is part of a legal investigation carried out by acoroner, the scope of which is to establish who, where, when and how a person orpersons died. As such, its scope is narrower than that of a public inquiry. Unlike aninquiry, an inquest must be open to public scrutiny to a degree sufficient to ensureaccountability. Coroners will identify ‘properly interested persons’ – which could befamilymembersof thedeceased–andallowthemtoquestionawitness;but theyarenotguaranteedfulllegalrepresentationorfunding.Sometimesacoronerwillcarryoutthe inquest alone and on other occasions they will call a jury to decide. However, acoroner cannot attribute criminal liability, but can only make recommendations, andthey have no power to enforce these recommendations. Under the Inquiries Act, aMinister has the power to suspend an inquiry in order not to prejudice thedetermination of any civil or criminal liability; while a coroner must suspend aninvestigation when certain criminal investigations are brought. After the inquest, thecoronerwillmakeastatementaboutthecauseofdeath,withdescriptionsrangingfromaccidental death – the verdict returned in 1991by theHillsborough Inquest,which ittookmorethan27yearstooverturn–tomisadventure,lawfulkilling,unlawfulkillingoranopenverdict.InresponsetoaquestionaskedinParliamentinDecember2009aboutwhenaninquiryinstead of a coroner’s inquest will be established in circumstances where an inquestwould normally be held, Lord Bach, who was then Parliamentary Under-secretary ofStateintheMinistryofJustice,replied:

‘ThecriteriaforconsideringtheestablishmentofaninquiryundertheInquiriesAct2005,whenacoroner’sinquestcannotbeheld,willbetheexistenceofhighlysensitivematters–including,forexample,interceptmaterial–whicharedirectlyrelevanttothepurposeoftheinquest,andwhichmaynotbedisclosedeithertoacoroneroracoroner’sjury,andwherethereisnoalternativewayofensuringthemattersareprotectedfrompublicdisclosure.’

It seems that,whetherbypublic inquiryorcoroner’s inquest, the truthaboutGrenfellTower is unlikely to be revealed soon, if ever. This raises the question of what thecommunity itself can do, independently of the authorities who, at council andgovernment level,have failed them. Increasingly, residentsonestates threatenedwithregenerationbyequallyunaccountableauthoritiesuncheckedbygovernmentlegislationhave started proposing their own alternatives to demolition under the name of a‘People’s Plan’. Architects for Social Housing has designed several such designalternativesfortheWestKensingtonandGibbsGreenandCentralHillestates,tonamejust two.While the public inquiry to which the public is barred deliberates on whatterms of reference it feels inclined to investigate, nowmight be the time to set up a

‘People’s Inquiry’ in order to address in public the question so many people aredemandingbeanswered:whoisresponsiblefortheGrenfellTowerfire?Inwritingthisreport,ithasbecomeapparenttousthatinthecircumlocutionofficeofresponsibilityforthisdisastertherehavebeenindividualswhohaveactedmorally,whoknewthatsuchafirewouldhappen–inGrenfellToweroronanotherestate–andwhotried toprevent itwithwarningsandrecommendations.Amongtheseare thecoronerontheinquest intotheLakanalHousefire, theAll-PartyParliamentaryFireSafetyandRescue Group, and the London Fire Brigade. But all their warnings andrecommendationshavefallenonthedeafearsofpoliticiansandcivilservantswhohaveshown neither morality nor responsibility, each and every one of whom should beinvestigatedandquestionedabouttheirroleinthisdisaster.Thosepoliticianswhoaresubsequentlytryingtomakepoliticalcapitaloutofthisdisasterare,inouropinion,nolesslackinginmoralityifnotresponsibility.Between these two camps – the expertswhose job is toprevent such adisaster fromhappening, and the politicians whose job is to promote estate regeneration andredevelopmentnomatterwhatthecosttothehomesandsafetyoftheresidentsthatliveon them – is the third party in this disaster: the private contractors and consultantsemployed todesign,manufacture,buildandmanage the regenerationprocess,whoateverystepwereunderpressure fromtheclient–andwho in turnplacedpressureontheir subcontractors – to cut costs that incrementally created this ‘disasterwaiting tohappen’.Butwhereaspoliticians,civilservants,coronersandfire-safetyexpertsare–atleast theoretically– there to ensure the safety of the citizens over which they havejurisdiction,thesubcontractorsthatbuiltthisdeathtraphaveobligationsonlytotheirshareholders.Theirbottomlineisprofit,notsafety;anditisindicativeoftheinversionoftheseprioritiesinUKhousingingeneral,andintheestateregenerationprogrammeinparticular,thatthefire-safetyconditionsinsideGrenfellTowerthatplacedresidentsat risk,which theycomplainedabout forover threeyears, andwhich requiredurgentmaintenance and refurbishment, were ignored by the council and the TenantManagementOrganisation;whereastheappearanceofthetowerfromtheoutsidethathad been identified as artificially depressing the potential residual land values in theareareceivednearly£8.7millionforafacelift.Thisdoesnotmeanthatthelinksinthechainofculpabilitythatstartsatthesuppliersofflammablecladdingtoahigh-risetowerandlinkstogethereveryprivatecompanythatcontributedtoitbecomingtheGrenfellTowerconflagrationisfreeofresponsibility.ButthattheyareresponsibleforthedeathsoftheresidentsisbecausetheywereplacedinthispositionbythecontinuationofthatchainthroughthehandsoftheKensingtonandChelseaTenantManagementOrganisationandCouncil,andfromthereallthewayuptotheDepartmentofCommunitiesandLocalGovernmentthatplacedthederegulationoffiresafetystandards–which in theireyesrepresentedanunnecessaryobstacle to theprofits tobemadefromtheUKhousingboom–abovethesafetyofresidents,andthe

politicalparties,bothConservativeandLabour,whoatcouncil,mayoralandministeriallevelhaveunreservedlypromotedtheprogrammeofestateregenerationthatkilledtheresidentsofGrenfellTower.Thisisastartinglistofthemorethan60individualswebelieveshouldbeimmediatelyarrestedbythepoliceandtheirrecordsseized,investigatedfortheirroleintheGrenfellTowerfire,andwherenecessaryputontrialinacriminalcourt:PrivatecontractorsandconsultantsontheGrenfellTowerrefurbishment

• Mark Allen, Technical Director of Celotex, and member of the BuildingRegulationsAdvisoryCommittee

• DeborahFrench,UKSalesManager,Arconic• RayBailey,ManagingDirector,HarleyFacades• BobHolt,DirectorandExecutiveChairmanofLakehouseservices• BobGreene,TechnicalContractManager,RGEServices• RogerGreene,ManagingDirector,RGEServices• ChrisTrain,ChiefExecutive,CadentGas• AndrewMcQuatt,Partner,MaxFordhamengineering,andLeadEngineeronthe

GrenfellTowerrefurbishment• MarkPalmer,SeniorPartner,MaxFordhamengineering,andSeniorEngineeron

theGrenfellTowerrefurbishment• DavidLloydJones,FoundingDirectorofStudioEArchitects• AndrzejKuszell,FoundingDirectorofStudioEArchitects,and leadarchitecton

theGrenfellTowerrefurbishment• MarkMitchener,ManagingDirector,RydonConstruction• Jeff Henton, Managing Director, Rydon Maintenance, and Fellow of the Royal

InstituteofCharteredSurveyors• RobertBond,GroupChiefExecutive,Rydon,andFellowoftheCharteredInstitute

ofBuilding• PhilipJamesBoulcott,DirectorandCharteredQuantitySurveyor,ArteliaUK• IanBailey,DirectorandPublicSectorLead,ArteliaUK

Board Members and directors of the Kensington and Chelsea Tenant ManagementOrganisation

• SimonBrissenden,independentBoardMember,KCTMO• Anthony Preiskel, independent Board Member, KCTMO and Non-Executive

DirectoroftheHomesandCommunitiesAgency• PaulaFrance,council-nominatedBoardMember,KCTMO• Judith Blakeman, Labour councillor and council-nominated Board Member,

KCTMO

• Maighread Condon-Simmonds, Conservative councillor and council-nominatedBoardMember,KCTMO

• FayEdward,ChairandResidentBoardMemberoftheKCTMO• ClaireWilliams,ProjectManageronGrenfellTowerrefurbishment,KCTMO• LauraJohnson,DirectorofHousing,KCTMO• SachaJevans,ExecutiveDirectorofOperationsattheKCTMO• YvonneBirch,ExecutiveDirectorofPeopleandPerformanceattheKCTMO• BarbaraMatthews,ExecutiveDirectorofFinancialServicesandInformationand

CommunicationTechnologyattheKCTMO• RobertBlack,formerChiefExecutiveoftheKCTMO

CouncillorsandofficersonKensingtonandChelseacouncil

• JohnAllen,BuildingInspector,RoyalBoroughofKensingtonandChelseacouncil• VimalSarna,SeniorSolicitoratLegalServices,RBKC• MichaelClark,DirectorforCorporatePropertyandCustomerServices,RBKC• JonathanBore,ExecutiveDirectorforPlanningandBoroughDevelopment,RBKC• NicholasHolgate,formerChiefExecutiveandTownClerk,RBKC• Elizabeth Rutherford, former Member of the Housing and Property Scrutiny

Committee,RBKC• Adrian Berrill-Cox, former Member of the Housing and Property Scrutiny

Committee,RBKC• EveAllison,MemberoftheHousingandPropertyScrutinyCommittee,RBKC• WillPascal,MemberoftheHousingandPropertyScrutinyCommittee,RBKC• Matthew Palmer, Member of the Housing and Property Scrutiny Committee,

RBKC• KimTaylor-Smith,MemberoftheHousingandPropertyScrutinyCommitteeand

currentDeputyLeader,RBKC• Tony Holt, former Vice-chairman of the Housing and Property Scrutiny

Committee,RBKC• DavidNicholls,Vice-chairmanoftheHousingandPropertyScrutinyCommittee,

RBKC• Quentin Marshall, former Chairmanof the Housing and Property Scrutiny

Committee,RBKC• SamMackover,ChairmanoftheHousingandPropertyScrutinyCommittee,RBKC• RuthAngel,SeniorProjectManagerinHousingRegeneration,RBKC• CatherineFaulks,formerCabinetMemberforEducationandLibraries,RBKC• Emma Will, former Cabinet Member for Family and Children’s Services and

currentCabinetMemberforEducationandLibraries,RBKC• Paul Warrick, former Cabinet Member for Facilities Management and

ProcurementPolicy,RBKC• Timothy Coleridge, former Cabinet Member for Environment, Environmental

Health,LeisureandArts,RBKC

• MaryWeale, former Cabinet Member for Adult Social Care and Public Health,RBKC

• Tim Ahern, former Cabinet Member for Planning Policy and Transport,KensingtonandChelseacouncil,RBKC

• WarwickLightfoot,formerCabinetMemberforFinanceandStrategy,RBKC• Gerard Hargreaves, former Cabinet Member for Civil Society and Community

SafetyandcurrentChiefWhip,RBKC• Marie-ThereseRoss,Mayor,RBKC• Rock Feilding-Mellen, formerDeputy Leader and CabinetMember forHousing,

PropertyandRegeneration,RBKC• NicholasPaget-Brown,formerLeader,RBKC

MembersofParliamentandcivilservants

• StephenKelly,ChiefOperatingOfficerforGovernmentandHeadoftheEfficiencyandReformGroup

• BrianMartin,PrincipalConstructionProfessionalintheBuildingRegulationsandStandardsDivisionintheDepartmentofCommunitiesandLocalGovernment

• AndrewStunell,ConstructionSpokespersonintheHouseofLordsandformerParliamentaryUnder-secretaryofStateintheDepartmentofCommunitiesandLocalGovernment

• KenKnight,ChiefFireandRescueAdviserforEngland• RichardBlakeway,ChiefAdvisertotheHousingandUrbanRegenerationUnitat

PolicyExchange,andBoardDirectorattheHomesandCommunitiesAgency• Stephen Williams, former Liberal Democrat MP and Parliamentary Under-

secretaryofStateintheDepartmentofCommunitiesandLocalGovernment• James Wharton, Conservative MP, Parliamentary Under-secretary of State for

InternationalDevelopmentandformerParliamentaryUnder-secretaryofStateintheDepartmentofCommunitiesandLocalGovernment

• OliverLetwin,ConservativeMP,formerMinisterofStateforGovernmentPolicyandcurrentChairoftheRedTapeInitiative

• EricPickles,ConservativeMP,UnitedKingdomSpecialEnvoyforPost-HolocaustIssuesandformerSecretaryofStateforCommunitiesandLocalGovernment

• GavinBarwell,ConservativeMP,ChiefofStafftoPrimeMinisterTheresaMayandformerMinisterofStateforHousingandPlanning

• BrandonLewis,ConservativeMP,Ministerof State for Immigrationand formerMinisterofStateforPolicingandtheFireServices

In addition, we believe the Leaders, CabinetMinisters for Housing and Regeneration,Chairsof theHousingScrutinyCommittee,ChiefExecutivesandExecutiveDirectorsofeverycouncil thathas fitted inflammableandpotentiallydeadly claddingonover600towerblocksintheUKaspartofestateregenerationschemesshouldbequestioned;asshould the Ministers of State for Housing for the Conservative, Labour and Liberal

DemocratParties,and theLondonMayor;aswellas theChairsof the think-tanksandCEOs andManaging Directors of the property developers, builders, estate agents andarchitectural practices involved in promoting and implementing the programme ofestateregeneration.Only thenwillwebeable toestablishhowmanytowerblocksonhowmanyestatesarelivinginwhatSadiqKhancalledpotential‘deathtraps’,carryouttheactionsnecessarytoensurethesafetyofresidents,andindoingsoputastoptotheestateregenerationprogrammewhosemotivations,mechanismsandconsequencesforresidents–notonlythosewhoselivesithasalreadytaken,butalsothosewhosehomesitthreatens–theinfernoofGrenfellTowerhasilluminatedforalltosee.

GrenfellTowerLegacyWhenthebodiesofthedeadhavestillnotbeenrecovered,thesurvivorsofthisdisasterhave still not been rehoused, and the community of North Kensington is still inmourning, itmightbeargued thatnow is tooearly to talkabout the future.However,whilewemournandwaitonaPublicInquirythatwilltakeyearstodrawitsinevitableconclusions, the perpetrators of this disaster are acting, not only to cover theirresponsibility and culpability, but to determine the future of Grenfell Tower– whatSadiq Khan called the ‘legacy’ of the fire. Sajid Javid, the Secretary of State forCommunities and Local Government, has placed Kensington and Chelsea council’shousing, regeneration, community engagement and governance services under aGrenfellFireResponseTeam,whichisledbyagroupofchiefexecutivesfromcouncilsacrossLondon.ThespokespersonforthisteamisEleanorKelly, theChiefExecutiveatSouthwarkLabourcouncil,whichhasperhapstheworsttrackrecordofanycouncil inLondonfordemolishingestates,relocatingtheircommunitiesoutsidetheborough,andredevelopingthelandashigh-valuepropertiesforinvestmentbyoverseesandoffshorecompanies.ThisistheclearestindicationofhowthegovernmentintendstocapitaliseontheGrenfellTowerfire.In response to thedisaster, theConservativegovernmentofTheresaMayhaspledged£5,500 in emergency funds for every household that lost their home in the fire. Incontrast to this miserly sum, the public has been hugely generous. In addition to anestimated174tonnesofdonateditems,whicharebeinghandledanddistributedbytheBritishRedCross,anestimated£20millionincashhasbeendonated,with£5.5millionfrom the London Community Foundation/Evening Standard Dispossessed Fund; £5.1million from theKensington& Chelsea Foundation; £4.7million from the British RedCross;£4millionfrommorethan700individualappealsonthewebsiteslikeJustGivingandGoFundMe;and£500,000fromfourMuslimcharities.However,asof18 Julyonly£800,000ofthatmoneyhasbeendistributed,andatiny£158,000,lessthan0.8percentof the total, to amere16 survivors from theGrenfell Tower fire. It is crucial that thedonated funds are not siphoned off by Kensington and Chelsea council, predatorycharitiesandlegalfirmsorpropertydeveloperswithaneyeonthelandfromwhichtheruinofGrenfellTowerwillbedismantled.

WhattheGrenfellTowerfirehasexposedisthattheseparationbetweenthepublicandprivate spheres inUKhousingno longer exists in anyqualifiable sense, andany trustthat the duties of the former is independent of the interests of the latter has nofoundation inpractice.Fromourworkwithcouncil estate communities trying to savetheirhomes,andfromourownexperienceoflivingoncouncilestatetowerblocks,ASHhasbecomeincreasinglyinterestedinthepotentialofathirdsphereofactivity,whichisneitherpublic norprivate.What those commentators on council estateswho live– touseAndrewGimson’sdescription–intheir‘littleterracedhouses’donotunderstandisthatthemostimportantspaceonacouncilestatedoesnotfallintothecleardistinctionbetween private and public that terrace-dwellers cross every time they step outsidetheir home and into the street. In seeking to recreate the street life of working-classcommunities, post-war council estates designed communal spaces into theirarchitecture.Theseincludenotonlythecommunityhallsinwhichresidentsmeet–andwhichbecauseofthisarealwaysthefirstpartoftheestatetobeshutdownbycouncilsintent on demolishing it – but the internal hallways and external walkways betweenindividualhomes; thenumerous landingsoutside lifts; the lifts themselves–where inthefewsecondsit takestoascendordescendrelationshipswithneighboursaremadeandmaintained;andaboveall in theentrancehalls– inmanycases lateradditions toaddresstheteethingproblemsofthisnewformofcommunalliving–andinwhichtheconcierge, known to every resident and therefore knowing every resident, is thepresidingspiritoftheestate,settingthetoneforitscordiality,itsfraternityanditsethosofmutualsupport.Allofthisisunknowntothedwellersinprivately-ownedhomesandfenced-ingardens;but it is where the collective life of a council estate takes root and grows. Mostimportantly,itisaspacewhichisneitherprivate,andthereforesubjecttothepropertyortenantrightsoftheindividualorhousehold,norpublic,andthereforetheprovinceofthecouncil.Rather,itisacollectivespace,overwhichnoresidenthasrights,whichnoneofthemown,butforwhichtheyalltakeresponsibilityandshareinitsbenefits.Asthecorruption of the public sphere by the private accelerates under increasinglyaccommodatinggovernmentpolicy,mayoraldirectionandcouncilpractice,andthelivesofthoseunderthemanagementandcareofthesepublicbodiesareincreasinglyputatriskofeviction,homelessnessandevendeath,ASHbelievesthisthirdsphere,thespaceandactivityofcommunity,mustbereclaimed.Once the charred skeleton of Grenfell Tower is buried and the land cleared forredevelopment, itwill still be in the hands of Kensington and Chelsea council.Worsestill, the fire has brought about precisely that demolition of the ‘blight’ that GrenfellTower,intheeyesofthecouncilandtheTMO,represented,freeingupthelanditstandsonforthepotentialresidualvaluestheoriginalmasterplanfortheLancasterWestestateenvisaged activating through its redevelopment as ‘high end’ properties for homeownership and capital investment. Were this to come about – and under existing

ownershipandpolicy there isnothing to stop ithappening– itwouldbe thegreatestbetrayalofboththedeadandthesurvivorsoftheGrenfellTowerfire.Toopposethis,therefore,ASHproposesthataportionofthe£20milliondonatedbythegeneral public – andwhich the government should be invited tomatch – be used topurchasethelandonwhichGrenfellTowerstandsandplaceitinTrustforthesurvivorsand the surrounding community; and that in its place housing is built that is neitherownedbythecouncilnorrunbytheKCTMO,butownedandmanagedasaCommunityLand Trust or Housing Co-operative by the residents themselves. From the ashes ofGrenfellTower,andtheforcesofprivategreedandpubliccorruptionthatburntittotheground, a newCommunity estate could rise – as a home for the homeless of GrenfellTower, and as a model of communal housing for the hundreds of thousands ofLondonerscurrentlythreatenedbytheprogrammeofestateregeneration.

InMemoriamTheofficial figures fromtheMetropolitanPoliceForcearethat255peopleescapedfromGrenfell Tower on the night of the fire and around 80 died. This last figure is a roughestimatebasedontheongoingforensicinvestigationbytheDisasterVictimIdentificationunitthathassofarmade87‘recoveries’ofhumanremains.Policehavebeenabletospeakto residentswho lived in 106 of the flats in Grenfell Tower, and to establish howmanypeoplewereinthematthetimeofthefire.18oftheidentifieddeathswerefromtheseflats.Theremaining62deathswerefromwhattheMetsayare23flatsbetweenthe11thand23rdfloorsofthebuildingwhoseresidentstheyhavebeenunabletotrace.On14June,26separate999callstotheLondonFireBrigadeweremadefrompeoplewhosaidtheywereinsideoneofthese23flats.PendingthePublicInquirytheMetrecordsarenotavailabletothe public, but these figures are based on what they say were the 129 flats in GrenfellTower, whereas according to the 2012 planning application the building would havecontained 127 flats after its refurbishment.We hope this is amisunderstanding on ourbehalfandnottheirs.Theseofficialfigures,however,havebeenconsistentlyquestionedbythelocalcommunity,whosemembersarguethatatotalof335residentsin227bedroomsdoesn’treflectwhattheyknowaboutthedensityofoccupationinGrenfellTower–whichtheysayhousedmanyunregisteredresidents–orthemanyvisitorstheyarguewouldhavebeenpresentwhenthefirebrokeoutshortlybefore1amduringthemonthofRamadan,andthenumerousMuslimresidentsandtheirneighbourswouldhavebeenhavingtheirlate-nightmealandprayersbeforethenextday’sfast.Asof 20 July, 40peoplehavebeen formally identifiedby theMet inagreementwith theWestminster Coroner, Dr. Fiona Wilcox. At the request of their families, 22 of theseidentifiedpeoplehavenotbeennamed.TheMethasnotyetbeenabletoidentifytheotherremains, oranyoneelsewhomighthavebeenpresent inwhatDaveBarclay, the formerheadofthePhysicalEvidenceunitattheNationalCrimeFaculty,hassaidwouldeffectivelyhavebeenacrematorium,withtemperaturesupto2,000degreescentigradeatthetopofGrenfellTower.Inwriting this reportwehave tried to remainasobjectiveaspossible in the faceof thisterribledisaster,andnevertopresumetospeakonbehalfof,or inplaceof,theresidentsandcommunitydirectlyaffectedbytheGrenfellTowerfire.Weofferthisreporttotheminthehopethatitwillaidthemintheirstruggleforsomeformofjustice,andtheirsearchforthetruthaboutwhythis firehappened.Sincewehavenamedthoseweholdaccountablefortheirdeaths,wewillendbynamingthosetheykilledwhosenamestheirfamilieshavemade public, andwhomust stand here for thosewho are unnamed, thosewho are stillmissing,andthosewhowillneverappearonany listof thevictimsoftheGrenfellTowerfire:

• MohammadAlhajali,a23-year-oldman• Ya-HaddySisiSaye,alsoknownasKhadijaSaye,a24-year-oldwoman• AnthonyDisson,a65-year-oldman• AbufarsIbrahim,a39-year-oldman• KhadijaKhalloufi,a52-year-oldwoman• MaryMendy,a52-year-oldwoman• AbdeslamSebbar,a77-year-oldman• IsaacPaulos,afive-year-oldboy• Sheila,an80-year-oldwoman• GloriaTrevisan,a26-year-oldwoman• MarcoGottardi,a27-year-oldman• BerktiHaftom,a29-year-oldwoman• ZainabDeen,a32-year-oldwoman• HamidKani,a61-year-oldman• YahyaHashim,a13-year-oldboy• AliJafari,an82-year-oldman• MajorieVital,a68-year-oldwoman• LoganGomes,whowasstillborninhospitalon14June

Inmemoriam.ArchitectsforSocialHousing