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The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will RiseAuthor(s): Christopher LayneSource: International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring, 1993), pp. 5-51Published by: The MIT PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539020 .

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The Unipolar llusion ChristopherayneWhyNew GreatPowersWillRise

The Soviet Union'scollapse ransformedhe nternationalystem rom ipolarityo unipolarity.To be sure, the UnitedStateshas not mposed "universalmonarchy" nthe nternationalystem. here re other tates hat re formidable ilitarily(Russia)or economicallyJapan nd Germany).1 owever, ecause only heUnited tatespossesses imposing trengthn all categoriesfgreatpowercapability,t enjoysa preeminent ole n internationalolitics.2 ollowingtheGulfWar nd theSovietUnion's ollapse,many ommentatorsuggestedthatAmerica hould adopta newgrand trategyhatwouldaim atperpet-uating nipolarity.3eliefhat nipolarityavorsheUnited tates, nd henceshouldbemaintained,esonatednofficial ashingtonswell.Thisbecameapparentn March1992,when the nitial raft fthePentagon'sDefenseChristopherayneeachesnternationaloliticstUCLA.I amgratefulo the following or heir erceptivend helpful ommentsn the drafts f thisarticle: ohnArquilla,Ted Galen Carpenter, erryAndrewChase, JohnMearsheimer,enSchwarz,AlanTonelson,KennethWaltz, nd an anonymouseviewer. amalso indebted oHarryKreislerInstitute f nternationaltudies,UC Berkeley)ndJed nyder WashingtonStrategyeminar) or rovidingtimulatingntellectualorums hathelpedrefinemy hinkingaboutunipolaritynd promptedme to write his rticle.1. Germany, apan nd Russia certainly ave thepotential o be great owers.GermanyndJapan annot oday e considered reat owers, owever, ecause heyack he equisite ilitarycapabilities,speciallytrategicuclear rsenals hatwouldgive hem eterrenceelf-sufficiency.Notwithstandingussia's stillformidable uclear nd conventional ilitaryapabilities,co-nomicdifficultiesnd domestic olitical ncertaintiesave undercutts greatpower status.Chinawillbe a strong ontender or reat ower tatusf t can maintaints nternalohesion.Buoyed y tsvibrant conomy, hinahas embarked n a majormodernizationnd expansionof tsair, naval, and groundforces, ncludingts power-projectionapabilities. icholasD.Kristof,ChinaBuilds ts Military uscle,Making omeNeighbors ervous,"NewYork imes,January1, 1993, . Al.2. I define unipolar ystem s one in which singlepower s geopoliticallyreponderantbecause ts capabilitiesre formidablenough o preclude heformationfan overwhelmingbalancing oalition gainst t.3. Analysts f uchdiverse iews s the iberalnternationalistoseph. Nye,Jr.,ndneocon-servatives harlesKrauthammernd JoshuaMuravchickgree hat unipolarworld s highlyconducive o Americannterests. ee Joseph . Nye,Jr., ound oLead:TheChangingaturefAmericanowerNew York: asicBooks, 990);CharlesKrauthammer,TheUnipolarMoment,"ForeignAffairs: merica nd the World,Vol. 70, No. 1 (1990/91) nd "What's Wrong WithThe'Pentagon aper'?"Washingtonost,March 3, 1992;JoshuaMuravchick,AtLast,Pax Ameri-cana,"NewYork imes, anuary4, 1991, . A19.Internationalecurity, ol. 17, No. 4 (Spring1993)? 1993 ythePresidentnd Fellows fHarvard ollege nd theMassachusettsnstitutefTechnology.

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Internationalecurity7:4 6

PlanningGuidance DPG) forFiscalYears 1994-99was leaked to the NewYork imes.4pecifically,hedocument tated hat, Wemust ccount uffi-ciently or he nterests fthe arge ndustrial ations o discourage hemfrom hallengingur eadership r seeking o overturnheestablished olit-ical or economic rder" nd that"we must maintain he mechanisms ordeterringotentialompetitorsromven spiringo largeregionalrglobal ole."5The initialdraft f theDPG was controversial,nd a subsequentdraftdeleted he anguage eferringothegoalofpreservingnipolarity.6ever-theless, he availableevidence uggests hatthe DPG accurately eflectedofficialiews aboutunipolarity.or example, he 1991Summer tudy rga-nizedby thePentagon's irectorfNetAssessment efined "manageable"world s one in which heres no threatoAmerica'superpowerole.7 hemainrisk o Americanecurity,hestudy rgued, s that f"Germany nd/orJapan isconnectingrommultilateralecurityndeconomicrrangementsand pursuing n independentourse.8 Duringate 1992 ndearly 993, he

Pentagon'sJoint taff as preparing "new NSC 68" intended oestablishan intellectualrameworkorAmerica's ost-ColdWargrand trategy.neofthisdocument's ey themes s that multipolar orld s, by definition,dangerouslynstable.There s as yetno evidence hat heClinton dmin-istration's iew of unipolarity illdifferrom heBush administration's.9Althoughhere reshadings fdifferencemong hevarious roposals orperpetuatingnipolarity,t s fair o speakof a single trategyfpredomi-4. Patrick. Tyler,U.S. Strategylan Calls for nsuring o RivalsDevelop,"NewYork imes,March , 1992, . Al.5. "Excerpts romPentagon's lan: Prevent heRe-emergencefa New Rival',"NewYorkTimes, arch , 1992, . A14 emphasis dded).6. See LeslieH. Gelb, They're idding," ewYork imes, arch , 1992, . A15;Williamfaff,"Does AmericaWant oLead Throughntimidation?"osAngelesimes, arch 1, 1992, . B7;and the comments fSenatorJoseph iden D-Del.) and theBrookingsnstitution'sohn .Steinbruneruoted nMelissaHealy, Pentagon ool toSharingts Power," osAngeles imes,March , 1992, . A8;Patrick . Tyler, Pentagon rops Goal ofBlocking ewSuperpowers,"NewYork imes,May24, 1992,p. Al; MelissaHealy, PentagonMaps Post-ColdWarDefensePlans," osAngelesimes, ay24, 1992, . Al; Barton ellman, On SecondThought,WeDon'tWant o RuletheWorld,"WashingtonostNationalWeeklydition, une -7, 1992, . 31.7. UndersecretaryfDefense Policy), 991 Summertudy, rganized y theDirector, etAssessment, eld atNewport, .I., August -13, 1991, . 17.8. Ibid.,p. 73.9. Post-electionnalyses tressed he ikelihood f substantialontinuityetween he Clintonand Bush foreignolicies.At his first ost-electionewsconference,resident-electlintonreferredo theresponsibilitiesmposed n theUnited tates yvirtue f tsposition s the solesuperpower."Excerptsrom resident-Elect'sewsConferencenArkansas," ewYork imes,November3, 1992, . A8.


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andI argue hat he strategyfpreponderances unlikely o be successful."Itwillbe difficultor heUnited tates o maintain heColdWar tatus uobecause structuralhangehas destroyedhebipolar oundationfthepost-1945 nternationalystem. conclude y outlining newgrand trategyhatcouldaccomplishhetwomaingeopoliticalasksfacingheUnited tates ntheyears head: (1) managing hepotentiallyifficultransitionrom ni-polarityomultipolarity;nd (2) advancingAmericannterestsnthemulti-polarworld hat nevitably illemerge.WhyGreat owers ise-The Role fSystemiconstraintsWhetherheUnited tates anmaintaintsstandings the olegreat owerdepends largely n whethernew greatpowerswillrise.To answer thatquestion,we need to understand hy tates ecomegreat owers.'2 his s11. In a sense, thisarticle xtendsMearsheimer'sxamination f post-ColdWarEurope'sgeopoliticalutureotheglobal evel.SeeJohnMearsheimer,Back o theFuture:nstabilitynEuropeAfter heCold War," nternationalecurity,ol. 15,No. 1 (Summer990), p. 5-56. tshouldbe notedthatMearsheimernd I cometovery ifferentolicy onclusionsegardingtheAmericanmilitaryommitmentoEurope andno doubtwewould notagreeon some oftheother olicy ecommendationsade n this rticle), otwithstandinghesimilarityf ouranalyses.12. As KennethWaltzwrites, reat owers re defined ycapabilities:States, ecause theyare na self-helpystem, aveto use theirombinedapabilitiesnorder o serve heirnterests.The economic,military,nd other apabilitiesfnations annotbe sectored nd separatelyweighed. tates renotplaced nthe oprank ecause hey xcel nonewayor another. heirrank epends nhow they core n allofthefollowingtems: ize ofpopulationnd territory;resourcendowment; ilitarytrength;olitical tability;ndcompetence."enneth . Waltz,Theoryf nternationaloliticsReading,Mass.:Addison-Wesley,979), . 131. Becauseof theircapabilities, reat owers end to behavedifferentlyhanother tates.Jack evywrites hatgreat owers redistinguishedromthers y: 1) a high evelofmilitaryapabilityhatmakesthem elativelyelf-sufficienttrategicallynd capable fprojectingower eyond heirorders;2) a broad concept f security hat mbraces concernwithregional nd/or lobal powerbalances; nd 3) a greaterssertivenesshan esserpowers n definingnd defendingheirinterests. ack evy,War ndtheModern reat ower ystem,495-1975Lexington:niversityPress fKentucky,983), p. 11-19.Recentlyherehave been several uestionable ttemptsoredefinereat ower tatus. orexample, oseph . Nye,Jr.,nd SamuelP. Huntingtonrgue hat nly heUnited tateshasthe soft" ower esourcessocio-culturalnd deologicalttractivenesso othertates) hatNyeandHuntingtonlaim re a prerequisitefgreat ower tatus.Nye,Bound oLead;Huntington,"TheU.S.-Decline orRenewal?" oreign ffairs,ol. 67,No. 2 (Winter988/89),p. 90-93.This rgumentasthreeweaknesses. irst,t s far rom lear hat thers iewU.S. culture ndideology n thesame positive ight hatNyeandHuntingtono. America's acial, conomic,educational,ndsocialproblems aveeroded thers'dmirationor heUnited tates. econd,it is not unusualforgreatpowers to see themselvess cultural r ideological ole models;examplesnclude ineteenth-centuryritainndFrance, re-1914 ermanynd, ofcourse, heSovietUnion.Finally, hen tcomes osetting reat owers part rom thers, oft owermay


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a criticalssue because theemergenceor disappearance) fgreat owers anhave a decisive ffect n internationalolitics; consequential hift n thenumber f great owers hanges he nternationalystem's tructure. altzdefines "consequential"hift s "variationsn number hat ead to differentexpectationsbout the effect f structuren units."''3 xamples re shiftsfrom: ipolarityo either nipolarityrmultipolarity;nipolarityobipolarityormultipolarity;ultipolarityo bipolarityrunipolarity;rom multipolarsystemwith hree reat owers o one of four r more orviceversa).'4Throughoutmodern nternationalistory, herehas been an observablepattern f great oweremergence. lthough eorealism oes not, nd can-not,purport o predict he foreign olicies f specific tates,tcan accountfor utcomes nd patterns f behavior hathappen recurrentlyn interna-tional olitics.Greatpoweremergences a structuallyriven henomenon.Specifically,t resultsfrom he interactionf two factors: 1) differentialgrowth ates nd (2) anarchy.Although reat oweremergences shaped by structuralactors,nd cancause structuralffects,tresults rom nit-levelctions. n otherwords,feedbackoop of orts satwork: 1) structuralonstraintsress ligibletatesto becomegreatpowers; 2) such statesmake unit-level ecisionswhetherto pursuegreat ower status n response o these tructuralonstraints;3)ifa unit-level ecision o seek great ower statusproduces consequentialshiftnpolarity,thas a structuralmpact.Rising tateshave choices boutwhether o become greatpowers. However, state's freedom o choosewhether o seekgreat ower tatus s inreality ightlyonstrainedystruc-tural actors. ligible tates hatfail oattain reat ower tatus repredict-ablypunished. f policymakersf eligible tates re socialized o the nter-be a helpful upplemento the ther nstrumentsf tatecraft,ut tateswith herequisite ardpower apabilitiesper Waltz'sdefinition)re great owers egardless f whetherhey standfor n idea with ppeal beyond their] orders."Another opular ntellectualashion olds thatJapan nd Germany illcarve ut niches ninternationalolitics s the first global ivilian owers."Hanns Maull, GermanyndJapan:The New CivilianPowers,"Foreign ffairs,ol. 69, No. 5 (Winter 990/91),p. 91-106.Ascivilian owers, t is argued, heywilleschewmilitarytrengthn favor f economic ower,work hroughnternationalnstitutionsopromote lobal ooperation,nd "furnishnternationalpublicgoods, such as refugee esettlement,ational isaster elief, evelopmentfeconomicinfrastructure,nd humanresourcesmprovements."oichi unabashi, Japan ndAmerica:GlobalPartners," oreign olicy, o. 86 (Spring 992),p. 37. In the real world,however, nedoes not find raditionalreat owers nd "civilian" reat owers.One finds nly tates hatare great owers nd those hat re not.13. Waltz, Theory f nternationalolitics, . 162.14. Ibid.,pp. 163-170.


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national ystem's onstraints,heyunderstandhat ttaining reatpowerstatuss a prerequisitef heir tates re to be secure ndautonomous.15Thefate hatbefellnineteenth-centuryhina llustrates hatcanhappento aneligible tatewhen ts eaders gnore tructuralmperatives.utnineteenth-century hina is a rather ingular xceptiono thepattern fgreatpoweremergence. armore ypicals post-1860taly, state hat ried ard oattaingreat ower statusnotwithstandinghat t"had more ncommonwith . .a smallBalkan tate r a colony han GreatPower" nthat twas econom-ically ackward, inancially eak, andresource-poor.16DIFFERENTIAL GROWTH RATESThe processof greatpower emergences underpinned y the fact hat heeconomic and technologicalnd military) owerofstatesgrows t differ-ential,not parallel ates.That s, in relative erms, ome states re gainingpowerwhileothers re losing t. As RobertGilpinnotes,overtime, thedifferentialrowth n the power of various tates n the system auses afundamentaledistributionfpower n thesystem."117he result, s PaulKennedy as shown, sthat ime ndagainrelative economic hifts eraldedtherise of new GreatPowerswhichone day would have a decisive mpactonthemilitary/territorialrder.18 The ink etween ifferentialrowthates15. KennethN. Waltz, A Reply o My Critics"nRobert . Keohane, d., Neorealismnd tsCriticsNew York:ColumbiaUniversityress, 986), . 343.16. R.J.B. osworth,taly,he east f heGreat owers:talian oreignolicy eforehe irstWorldWar Cambridge: ambridge niversityress,1979),p. 2. In mid to latenineteenth-centuryChina, some attemptswere made at "self-strengthening"-adoptionf Westernndustrial,technological,ndmilitarynnovations. owever, he nitiativeor uch ffortsamemore romregional trongmenikeLi Hongzang hanfrom hecentral overnmentnPeking. conomicproblems esultingrom nfavorableemographics,nd social nd cultural actors,speciallyPeking's nabilityomobilize he elitefor centrally-directedeform rogram, ndercuthemodernizationffort. Late imperialChina experienced profoundtructuralreakdownbrought n by traditionalorces hatpropelled ynasticycles.At thisunfortunateuncturebetween ynastic reakdown nd foreignntrusion,he eadership imply acked he nternalresources o protect hina from ther xpansive ationsn search fwealth nd glory." uneGrasso, ay orrin,nd MichaelKort,ModernizationndRevolutionnChinaArmonk,.Y.:M.E.Sharpe, 991), . 69.17. RobertGilpin,War nd Changen World oliticsCambridge: ambridge niversityress,1981), . 13. Theroleofunevengrowth ates n therise fgreat owers s closely onnectedolongcycle xplanations.ee Joshua . Goldstein, ongCycles: rosperitynd WarntheModernAge New Haven: YaleUniversityress,1988);GeorgeModelski, ongCyclesnWorld olitics(Seattle: niversityfWashingtonress, 987); nd William .Thompson,Dehio,LongCycles,andtheGeohistoricalontext f Structuralransition," orld olitics, ol. 45,No. 1 (October1992), p. 127-152.18. Paul Kennedy, heRise ndFall ofGreat owers:conomichangendMilitary onflictrom1500 o2000 NewYork:RandomHouse, 1987), . xxii.


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andgreat oweremergence as importantmplicationsor nipolarity. ni-polaritys likely o be short-livedecause new great owerswillemerge stheunevengrowth rocessnarrows he gap between hehegemon nd theeligible tates hat re positioned oemerge s itscompetitors.There re at least three ther espectsn whichgreat oweremergencesaffected y differentialrowth ates. First, s eligible tatesgain relativepower, theyare more ikely o attempto advance their tandingn theinternationalystem.As Gilpinpointsout, "The critical ignificancef thedifferentialrowth fpower mong tates s that t lters he ostof hangingthe nternationalystem nd thereforehe ncentives or hanging he nter-national ystem.19Second,Gilpin bserves, ising ower eads to ncreasingambition. isingpowers seek to enhance heir ecurity yincreasing heircapabilitiesnd their ontrol ver heexternal nvironment.20hird, s Ken-nedy explains, isingpower eads also to increased nternationalnterestsand commitments. ftentimesorgreatpowers, geopoliticalnd militarycapabilities re the consequenceof a processthatbeginswith economicexpansion. conomic xpansion eads tonew overseas bligationsaccesstomarketsnd rawmaterials,lliances, ases), which henmust e defended.21THE CONSEQUENCES OF ANARCHY: BALANCING AND SAMENESSBecause t s anarchic, he nternationalolitical ystems a self-helpystemin which states'foremost oncernmustbe with survival.22n an anarchicsystem, tatesmustprovide or heir wn securitynd they acemanyrealorapparent hreats.23nternationaloliticshus s a competitiveealm, factthat n tself onstrainsligible tates oattain reat ower tatus. pecifically,there retwo manifestationsf this ompetitivenesshat hape great oweremergence: alancingnd the "sameness ffect."24

BALANCING. The competitivenessf nternationaloliticss manifestednthe tendency f states o balance.25 alancing as especiallytrong xplana-19. Gilpin,War ndChange, . 95.20. Ibid.,pp. 94-95. As Gilpinnotes,rising owercan tempt state o seek change n theinternationalystem,which an triggerhegemonic ar." This problems discussednmoredetail ntheconclusion.21. Kennedy, ise ndFallofGreat owers, . xxiii.22. Waltz, heoryf nternationalolitics,p. 107,127.23. KennethN. Waltz, The Origins f War n Neorealist heory,"n Robert. Rotberg ndTheodoreK. Rabb, ds., TheOriginndPreventionfMajorWarsCambridge: ambridge ni-versity ress, 989), . 43.24. The phrase sameness ffect"s fromWaltz, heoryf nternationalolitics,. 128.25. Fordiscussion f hedifferencesetween andwagoningnd balancing ehavior,eeWaltz,


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tory ower n accountingor hefactshat nipolarityends o be short-livedand thatwould-behegemons nvariablyailto achieve asting ominance.Structuralealismeads to theexpectationhathegemonyhouldgeneratetheriseof countervailingower n theform f newgreat owers.The reason statesbalance s to correct skeweddistributionfrelativepower n the nternationalystem. tates rehighlyttentiveochanges ntheir elative owerposition ecauserelative owershifts ave crucial e-curity mplications.26t is theinteractionf differentialrowth ates-themaincause of changes n the relative istributionfpoweramong tates-andanarchy hat roduces mportantffects.n ananarchic,elf-helpystem,statesmust lwaysbe concerned hat therswilluse increased elative a-pabilities gainst hem.By enhancing heir wn relative apabilitiesr di-minishinghoseof an adversary,tatesgeta doublepayoff:reater ecurityand a widerrangeof strategic ptions.27he reverse s truefor tates hatremain ndifferento relative owerrelationships.hus, as Gilpin ays,theinternationalystem's ompetitivenessstimulates,nd maycompel, stateto ncrease tspower; t the east, tnecessitateshat heprudenttate reventrelative ncrease n the powers of competitortates."28y definition,hedistributionf relative ower na unipolar ystems extremelynbalanced.Consequently,na unipolar ystem,he tructuralressuresneligibletatesto increase heir elative apabilitiesnd becomegreatpowersshouldbeoverwhelming.ftheydo notacquiregreat owercapabilities,heymaybeexploited y thehegemon.Of course, n eligible tate'squestfor ecuritymaygiverisetothe ecurityilemma ecause actionsntended o bolster tsownsecurity ayhave theunintendedonsequence fthreateningthers.29Itcanbe arguedonthebasis ofhegemonictabilityheorynd balanceofthreatheoryhat "benign"hegemonmight e able toprevent ewgreatpowersfrommergingndbalancinggainst t.30 heseargumentsre un-persuasive.Although egemonictabilityheorys usually mployedn theTheoryf nternationalolitics, p. 125-126; tephenM. Walt,TheOrigins fAlliancesIthaca:Cornell niversityress, 987), p. 17-33.26. Waltz, Theory f nternationalolitics, . 126.27. Gilpin, War nd Change,pp. 86-87.28. Ibid.,pp. 87-88.29. John erz, Idealist nternationalismnd theSecurity ilemma,"World olitics, ol. 2, No.2 (January950), p. 157-180.30. On balance fthreatheory,ee Walt,TheOrigins fAlliances,p. 17-26.Foran overviewof thebenevolentnd coercive trands fhegemonictabilityheory,eeDuncanSnidal, TheLimits fHegemonic tabilityheory,"nternationalrganization,ol. 39, No. 4 (Autumn 985),pp. 579-614.


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context f nternationalolitical conomy,tcan beextended o other spectsof nternationalolitics. he logicof collective oodsunderlyinghe notionof a benignhegemon ssumesthatall stateswillcooperate ecause theyderiveabsolutebenefit rom hecollective oods thehegemonprovides.Because hey rebetterff,he rgumentoes,others houldwillinglyccepta benignhegemon nd evenhelptoprop tup if t s declining. owever,as MichaelC. Webb and StephenD. Krasner ointout,thebenignversionofhegemonictabilityheoryssumes that tates reindifferento the dis-tribution frelative ains.31This is, as noted,a dubiousassumption.AsJoseph rieco oints ut,because tatesworryhat oday's lly ouldbecometomorrow'sival, they ay closeattentiono howcooperationmightffectrelativeapabilitiesn thefuture."32oreover,f tabilitys equatedwith hedominanttate's ontinuingreeminence,he tabilityfhegemonicystemsis questionable nce thehegemon'spowerbeginsto erodenoticeably. sGilpin oints ut,overtime hegemon eclines romtsdominant ositionbecause: 1) thecosts ofsustainingtspreeminenceeginto erode the he-gemon's conomic trength,hereby iminishingtsmilitarynd economiccapabilities; nd (2) thehegemonic aradoxresultsn the diffusionf eco-nomic, echnological,nd organizationalkills oother tates, hereby aus-ing hehegemon o ose ts comparativedvantage" ver hem.33requently,theseothers re eligible tates hatwillriseto great ower status nd chal-lengethehegemon's redominance.This astpoint uggests hat nunipolarystems,tates o indeedbalanceagainst hehegemon'sunchecked ower.Thisreflectshe fact hat n uni-polarsystems here s no clear-cut istinctionetweenbalancing gainstthreat ndbalancing gainst ower.This sbecause thethreatnheresnthehegemon's ower.4 n a unipolarworld,othersmustworry bout the he-31. MichaelC. Webb and StephenD. Krasner,Hegemonic tabilityheory:An EmpiricalAssessment," eviewf nternationaltudies, ol. 15,No. 2 (April 989), p. 184-185.32. JosephM.Grieco, Anarchynd theLimits fCooperation: Realist ritique f heNewestLiberalnstitutionalism,"nternationalrganization,ol.42,No. 3 (Summer988), . 500 em-phasis noriginal).33. Gilpin,War ndChange, p. 156-210.34. Traditionalalance-of-powerheory ostulates hatstates lignagainstothers hatareexcessivelyowerful. tephenWaltrefined alanceof powertheory y arguing hat tatesactually alance gainst hreatsatherhan gainst owerper e.However,Walt'sbalance-of-threatnalysis s more mbiguous han tmight eem atfirst lance.Forexample, e admitsthat very ost-1648id for uropean egemony as repulsed y balancingoalition. riginsofAlliances,p. 28-29.Why? ecausewould-be egemons erepowerfulrbecause heywerethreatening?e doesnot saydirectlyutone suspects hathisanswerwouldbe "both."Walt


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gemon's apabilities, ot ts ntentions.hepreeminentower's ntentionsmay be benign odaybut may notbe tomorrow. obertJervisutsto theheart fthematter henhe notes, Minds an be changed, ew eaders ancome o power, alues can shift, ewopportunitiesnddangers an arise."35Unlessthey reprepared o run the risk fbeingvulnerable oa change nthe hegemon's ntentions,ther tatesmustbe prepared o counter ts ca-pabilities.Moreover, ven a hegemon nimatedby benignmotivesmaypursue policiesthatrun counter o others' nterests. hus,as Waltzsays,"Balance-of-powerheoryeads one toexpect hat tates,fthey re free odo so, will flock o the weaker side. The stronger,ot the weakerside,threatenshem fonlyby pressing tspreferredolicies n other tates."36Invariably,hevery act hat thers elieve state s excessively owerfulredounds o its disadvantage y provokingthers o balance against t. Itwas precisely or this reason that,responding o Sir Eyre Crowe's 1907"Germandanger"memorandum,ord Thomas Sanderson ounseledthatLondonshould tryhardto accommodate ising reatpowerswhile simul-taneouslymoderatingts own geopoliticalemands. howing ommendableempathy orother tates'views of Britain's olicies nd itspower,he ob-served that t would be unwisefor Britain o act as if everychange ninternationaloliticsmenaced ts nterests.Ithas sometimeseemedto methat o a foreigner.. theBritishmpiremust ppear n the ight f somehuge giant prawling verthe globe,withgouty ingersnd toes stretchinginevery irection, hich annot eapproachedwithoutliciting scream."37does not downplay he mportancef power as a factorn inducing alancing ehavior; esimply ays t s not theonly actorp. 21). Indeed,power nd threat lendtogetherlmostimperceptibly.otethat wo ofhis threat ariables, eographic roximitynd offensiveapa-bilities, orrelateloselywithmilitary ower.When Walt aysthat tatesdo notnecessarilybalance gainst hemostpowerful ctor n thesystem e essentiallys equating owerwithGNP. When he says that tatesbalance gainst hreat e is saying hat hey alance gainstmilitaryower coupledwith ggressivententions).bviously, ower s more han ustGNP.What tates ppearto balance against n realitys actualor latentmilitaryapabilities.n aunipolarworld, hehegemon's ossession factual r atentmilitaryapabilities illresultnbalancing egardless fits ntentions.f, n a unipolarworld, apabilitiesmattermorethanintentions,heU.S. monopoly n long-rangeower-projectionapabilities-thats, tsprepon-derance fmilitaryower-probably illbeviewedbyothers s threatening.35. Robert ervis,Cooperation ndertheSecurity ilemma,"World olitics, ol. 30, No. 2(January978), . 105.36. KennethN. Waltz, The Emergingtructuref nternationalolitics," aperpresented ttheannual meeting f the American olitical cienceAssociation, an Francisco, alifornia,August 990, . 32.37. "MemorandumyLordSanderson,"n G.P. Gooch and HaroldTemperley,ds., BritishDocumentsn theOrigins f heWar, 898-1914, olume II (London:His Majesty's tationeryOfficeHMSO],1928), . 430.


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It is unsurprisinghatcounter-hegemonicalancinghas occurred venduring eriodsof perceivednipolarity. fter he 1962Cuban missile risis,fornstance, rench olicywas driven ythebelief hat he scalesofpowerin theU.S.-Soviet ompetition ereweighted oo heavily nAmerica's avor.French resident eGaulle saidthat heUnited tateshadbecome hegreat-est power nd that t was driven automatically"o extend ts nfluencend"toexercise preponderanteight,hat s tosay, hegemonyver thers."38DeGaulle's policywas animated y the need to redress hisperceivedm-balance.As EdwardKolodziej bserves,In the losing ears fGaullist ule,the ossibleevelopmentf unipolarystem ecameneofthemajor oncernsftheFrenchovernment."39ne ofthe most mportantuestions oncerninginternationalolitics oday s whether hispattern fbalancing gainst hedominant ower na unipolar ystemactualorperceived)willrecurnthepost-ColdWarworld.SAMENESS. As Waltzpoints ut,"competitionroduces tendencyowardsameness f he ompetitors";hats, toward mitatingheir ivals' uccessfulcharacteristics.40uch characteristicsncludenotonlymilitarytrategies,ac-tics,weaponry, nd technology,utalso administrativend organizationaltechniques.fothers o well ndevelopingffectivenstrumentsfcompe-tition, state must emulate ts rivalsor face theconsequences f fallingbehind.Fear drives tatesto duplicate thers' uccessful oliciesbecausepolicymakersnowthat, s Arthur teinobserves, failuren theanarchicinternationalystem an meanthedisappearanceftheirtates.41From hisstandpoint,t is to be expected hat n crucial espects, reatpowerswilllook and act verymuch like. t is also to be expected hat ameness-effectimperatives ill mpel ligible tates o becomegreat owers nd toacquireall thecapabilitiesttendanto that tatus.As Waltz bserves,Ina self-helpsystem,hepossession fmost utnot llofthecapabilitiesf great owerleaves a statevulnerable o otherswho have the nstrumentshat he esserstate acks.42Additionalight s shed on the samenesseffect y the "secondimagereversed" erspective, hichposits linkage etween he nternationalys-

38. Quoted n EdwardA. Kolodziej, renchnternationalolicy nder eGaullendPompidou:hePoliticsfGrandeurIthaca:CornellUniversityress, 974), . 91.39. Ibid.,pp. 90-91 emphasis dded).40. Waltz, heoryfnternationalolitics,. 127.41. Arthurtein,Why ations ooperate:ircumstancendChoicen nternationalelationsIthaca,New York: ornellUniversityress, 990), p. 115-116.42. Waltz, Emergingtructure,". 21.


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tem's tructuralonstraintsnd a state'sdomestic tructure. harlesTilly'sfamous phorism, War made thestate, nd the statemade war" neatlycaptures he concept.43illy hows howtheneed toprotect gainst xternaldanger ompelled tates n earlymodern uropetodevelopadministrativeandbureaucratictructureso maintain,upply, ndfinance ermanent il-itary stablishments.utthere s more o t than hat.As is discussed elow,theevidence rom 660-1713 nd 1860-1910 uggests hat reat ower mer-gencereflects n eligible tate'sadjustmento the internationalystem'sstructuralonstraints. ttoHinzeobserved hat heway nwhich tates reorganized nternallyeflectstheir osition elative o each other nd theiroverall osition n the world" nd that throughoutheages pressure romwithout as beena determiningnfluence n internaltructure."4Great owers re similar ecausethey renot, ndcannot e, functionallydifferentiated.his s notto saythatgreatpowers re identical. heymayadoptdifferenttrategiesnd approaches; owever, ltimatelyhey llmustbe able toperformatisfactorilyhesamesecurity-relatedasksnecessaryosurvive nd succeed n thecompetitiveealm f nternationalolitics. hesameness ffecteflectsheenormous ressurehat he nternationalystemplaces on greatpowers to imitate hesuccessful olicies f others.Hinze'sdiscussion fPrussia-Germanynd England s illustrative.heir espectivedomestic, olitical nd economic ystems eveloped dissimilarly,n largepartbecauseeachwas affectedifferentlyy nternationalressures. Mari-timeEnglandwas far more secure than continental ermany.) ut,as istrueforall greatpowers, n other rucialrespectsPrussia-GermanyndEnglandwereverymuchalike. That s, both wereorganized orwarandtrade n order o maximize heir ecurityn a competitiventernationaln-vironment.ResponseoUnipolarity:660-1714In thisand the following ection, use historicalvidence o testmy hy-pothesesaboutgreatpower emergence. uch a testshouldbe especiallyusefulbecause therehave been two prioroccasions n historyimilar o43. Charles illy,Reflectionsn theHistoryfEuropean tateMaking,"n Charles illy,d.,The Formation fNationalStates n Western urope Princeton:PrincetonUniversity ress, 1975),p. 42.44. OttoHinze, Military rganizationnd theOrganizationf he tate,"n FelixGilbert,d.,TheHistoricalssays fOttoHinze Princeton:rincetonniversityress, 975), . 183.


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today'sunipolarmoment. rance n 1660 nd GreatBritainn 1860were asdominantnthe nternationalystem s theUnited tates stoday.n neithercase, however,did unipolarityast beyond fifty ears. France'sunipolarmoment nded when Britain ndAustria merged s great owers;Britain'swhenGermany, apan nd theUnited tates scended ogreat ower tatus.If the emergence f those greatpowers correlates trongly ith unevengrowth ates, he sameness ffect,nd balancing gainsthegemonic ower,it can be expected hat he present nipolarmomentwill be displacedbymultipolarityithin reasonably hort ime.FRENCH HEGEMONY IN A UNIPOLAR WORLDIt is generally greed that n 1660,when Louis XIV ascendedthe Frenchthrone, rancewas Europe's sole greatpower,"thestrongestnd richeststate n theworld"; t was "a rare situation fpreeminence.45 France'sdominant osition eflected er ownstrengthnd the relativeweaknessofEurope'sother tates. n 1660,Francewas Europe'smostpopulous state,hadEurope'smost fficiententralizeddministration,as (by he tandardsof theage) rich griculturally,nd had thepotentialo developa dynamicindustrial ase.46 n contrast,rance's ivalswere declining owers Spain),or besetby nternal roublesEngland), r ackedFrance's apabilitiesrthemeansto mobilize hemHabsburgAustria).47France chievedhegemonictanding y developing hemeansto mobilizeits ssetsand convert hem nto ffectiveiplomatic, ilitary,nd economicpower.48ranceunderLouisXIV was responsibleorwhatG.R.R.Treasurecalls the"etatisation"f war:"themobilizationfthetotal esources fthestate, f he conomy,s wellas ofmanpower."49nderWarMinister ichelLe Tellier, nd his son and successor ouvois, hearmywas broughtndertheadministrativeontrol f the central overnmentnd a standing rofes-sionalmilitary orcewas created.The Military evolutionwas completedand the French rmywas drasticallyltered nd improvedn such areas as45. G.R.R. Treasure, SeventeenthenturyranceLondon: Rivingtons, 966), pp. 257-258.Agree-ing that France was Europe's only great power in 1660 are Derek McKay and H.M. Scott, TheRise of theGreatPowers,1648-1815 (London: Longman, 1983); JohnB. Wolf, Toward EuropeanBalance fPower,1620-1715 Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970), p. 1.46. McKay and Scott, Rise of theGreatPowers, p. 14-15.47. Treasure, Seventeenthentury rance, p. 210-215, surveys the relativeweakness of France'sEuropean rivals.48. McKay and Scott,RiseoftheGreatPowers, p. 14-15.49. Treasure, Seventeenthentury rance,pp. 219-220.


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selection f officers,ecruitment,eapons, tactics, rainingnd logistics.FinanceMinister olbert aboredto strengthenrance'sfinancial nd eco-nomicbase to providethe wherewithal o support ts enhancedmilitarycapabilities. hesemilitary,conomic, nd financialnitiatives ere madepossible ythe dministrativeeformshat trengthenedhecentral overn-ment's ower ndmade tmore fficient.50Although rancewas Europe'sonlygreat ower n1660, y1713EnglandandHabsburgAustria, s well as Russia,hademerged s great owers.Therise ofEngland nd HabsburgAustria-that s, the internationalystem'stransformationrom nipolarityo multipolarity-isirectlyraceable o an-archy nd its consequences: he sameness effect nd balancing.BecauseFrenchdominance hreatened heir ecuritynd autonomy, ngland andAustria esponded y: 1) organizing he GrandAlliances hat,n the NineYears'War nd WaroftheSpanish uccession, ought ocontain rance ndcountertspower; nd 2) reorganizinghemselvesdministratively,ilitary,andeconomicallyoacquiregreat ower apabilitiesomparableoFrance's.Treasure bserves hat, France's xampleforced hangeon other tates";DerekMcKay nd H.M. Scott oint utthat, ocompetewith rance, rance'sopponents hadbeguntocopythe Frenchmodel."'51 heincreasing owerofgovernments as a response o external anger: Internationalompeti-tion ndwar," says William oyle, "werethe mainspurtodomestic nno-vation."52 he dangerto their ecurityosed byFrenchhegemony orcedEngland nd Austria o emulate rance nd todevelopthecapabilitieshatwould enablethem ostandon an equal geopoliticalooting ithFrance.England'srise to greatpowerstatuswas a direct esponseto France'spreeminentositionn internationalolitics. he EnglishKingWilliam IIwas concerned ithmaintainingngland's ecurityyestablishingbalanceofpowertopreserve thepeace, iberties,ndwell-beingfEurope,whichhappened nhis ifetimeo be threatenedy overgrownrench ower."53n50. Forbrief iscussions f the dministrative,ilitary,ndeconomic asesofFrench ower,seeJohn .Wolf, he mergencef heGreatowers,685-1715New York:Harper ndBrothers,1951), p. 97-103, p. 181-187; reasure,eventeenthenturyrance, p. 231-244, 88-320; ndWilliam oyle, The Old Europeanrder, 660-1800Oxford: xfordUniversityress, 1978),pp. 244-245.Ultimately,fcourse, iscal eforms ereonly artiallyuccessfulndFrancewasunable obear hehugefinancialosts f heNineYears'War nd War f he panish uccession.51. Treasure,eventeenthenturyrance,. 241;McKay nd Scott, ise f heGreatowers,p. 41-42.52. Doyle,TheOld Order, . 265.53. G.C. Gibbs, TheRevolutionn Foreign olicy,"nGeoffreyolmes, d., BritainfterheGloriousevolution,689-1714London:Macmillan, 989), . 61.


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rising o great ower tatus, nglandwas balancingt least s much gainstFrance'shegemonic ower s against heFrenchhreat.ndeed,thedistinc-tionbetweenpower and threatwas blurred.54 fter 688,Englandwas atwarwithFrance lmost ontinuouslyor wenty-fiveears nd theextent fits militarynvolvement n the continentncreaseddramatically.nglandmaintained sizeable tanding rmyndthe argestnd most owerful avyin theworld.The mperativesfwar meant hat he tatehad to mprovetsabilityo extractndmobilizehenation'swealth nd,as inFrance, ngland'sadministrativeapabilities ere greatly xpandedfor hispurposebetween1688 nd 1713.France's egemonic hallenge as themost owerfultimulusto thegrowth fpoweroftheEnglish tate: ngland became,ikehermainrivals, fiscal-militarytate, ne dominated ythetaskofwagingwar."55HabsburgAustria, oo, emerged s a great ower nresponse o France'shegemonic ower, nd also theOttoman hreat oAustria's asternnterests.The goals ofAustria'swestern olicywere"establishmentf a recognizedgreatpowerposition nd thefight gainst hesupremacyfFrance.56 Inthiscontext, orAustria, he stakes n the War of theSpanish Successionweresurvival nd emergences a greatpower.57ike Britain nd France,Austriaundertook dministrativeeforms imed at increasing he state'swarmakingapabilities.Thecentralizingrive f heHabsburg overnment,latentnthe ixteenthnd consciousn the eventeenthenturies, as basedupon a desire to consolidate ower forthe purposeof statesecurity."5854. SecretaryfStateCharlesHedgessaid,"We are awake ndsensibleo the oogreat rowthofourdangerous eighbor,nd aretaking igorousmeasures or hepreservationfourselves,and the eaceofEurope."And nJune 701,KingWilliamII nstructedheDukeofMarlboroughtocommence egotiationsor n anti-Frenchoalitionfor hePreservationf theLiberties fEurope, hePropertynd Peace ofEngland, nd for educing heExorbitantower fFrance."Quoted nJohn . Hattendorf,Alliance, ncirclement,nd Attrition:ritish rand trategyntheWar ftheSpanish uccession,"nPaul Kennedy, d., Grandtrategyn War ndPeace NewHaven:Yale Universityress, 991), . 16.55. JohnBrewer, heSinews fPower:War,Money,ndtheEnglishtate, 688-1783London:UnwinHyman, 989), . 27.56. Robert . Kann,A Historyf heHabsburgmpireBerkeley:niversityf Californiaress,1974), p. 77-78.57. Ibid.,pp. 84-85.58. ThomasM. Barker, ouble agle nd Crescent:ienna'second urkishiege nd tsHistoricalSettingAlbany: tateUniversityfNewYork ress, 967), . 19. n the dministrativephere,efforts ere tepped p to subjectHungarythebulk fwhich nly ameunder irm ustriancontrolfterheOttomans eredefeatedn1683) o Vienna's ontrolothatAustria oulddrawupon itsresources; central rgan, heHofkanzlei,as establishedo conduct oreign nddomesticffairs;heHofkammeras established o exert entralontrol ver the finances fHabsburgAustria's ossessions; nd theHofkreigsratas created oadminister ustria's rmycentrallyndremodeltas a standing rofessionalrmy nFrenchines.See Wolf, mergence


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Austriawas considerablyess successfulhanFrance ndEnglandncreatingadministrative echanisms orthe efficient obilization f nationalre-sources.Nevertheless,tremains he case that he need for ecurityn theface fFrench egemony orced ustrialike ngland) oth oemulate ranceandtobalance gainst t norder o attain reat ower tatus.59

Responseo Unipolarity:860-1910In 1860,Britain as in a position f apparently nequaleddominance n aninternationalystem hathasbeencharacterizeds unipolar.60ecause twasEurope'sarbiter nd possessor ofa worldwide nd unchallenged olonialempire, Britainould nothave been metwith n overwhelmingalancingcoalition.61 Indeed,Britain's ominancewas so pronouncedhat twas ablein theearly1860s argely o turn tsback on European ecurityffairsndwithdrawnto "splendidsolation" hat asteduntil he urn fthecentury.Britain's egemonywas a function f ts navalpower, tscolonial mpire,and itsoverwhelmingconomic nd financialtrength.62he Royal Navywas as strong s those of the nextthree r fournavalpowerscombined.Britain'sevel of per capita ndustrializationas more han wice hat ftheof heGreat owers, p. 126-137;R.J.W. vans, TheMaking f heHabsburg onarchyOxford:Clarendonress, 979), p. 148-150.59. Although ussia's riseto great ower tatus aralleled ngland's ndAustria's, do notdiscuss t at ength ecause t wasunconnectedo thewars gainst rench egemony.60. Thephrase unequaleddominance"s from aul Kennedy, ise nd FallofGreat owers,p. 152. MichaelDoyle describes he nternationalystemn 1860 s "unipolar-peripheral";hatis, in theextra-European orld,Britain's ower was unchallenged. oyle, EmpiresIthaca:CornellUniversityress,1986),p. 236.Buildingn Doyle,FareedZakariadrops hequalifierand describes hemid-nineteenthenturynternationalystems unipolar. akaria, RealismandDomestic olitics:A ReviewEssay," nternationalecurity,ol. 17, No. 1 (Summer 992),pp. 186-187.61. Zakaria, Realismnd Domestic olitics," . 187. There s empiricalupport or akaria'sstatement.William . Moul's measurementfthepowercapabilityhares fEurope'sgreatpowers onfirmsritain'segemonictanding.n1860,Britain'sharewas43.8 percent, hilethe ombinedhares fPrussia, rance,Austria, ussia nd talywas 56.2percent. rancewasthe econd-rankedower t 19.7percent.Moul,"Measuringhe Balances fPower':A LookatSomeNumbers," eviewfnternationaltudies,ol.15,No. 2 (April 989), . 120.62. Thisdiscussion,nd thefiguresited, rebasedonKennedy, ise ndFallofGreat owers,pp. 152-157.ntheUnited tates here s a spirited ebate bout he ontemporarymplicationsofBritain's ecline. or contrastingiews na policy ontext,ee Nye,BoundoLead, p. 49-68,which ejectsheBritishnalogy's elevance;nd DavidP.Calleo,Beyondmericanegemony:The uturef heWesternllianceNewYork: asicBooks, 987), p. 129-149, hich ees a strongparallel etween hePaxBritannica'semise nd the ikely emise f thepost-1945axAmeri-cana.


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TheUnipolarllusion21

next anking ower France), nd Britainn 1860 ccounted or 3.2percentofworldmanufacturingutput a bitmore hanAmerica's hare n1945).In thefollowing iscussion, look at the great oweremergencef Ger-many, heUnitedStates, nd Japan butnot taly's ttempted iseto greatpower status), nd analyzehoweach was affectedyrelative owershiftsand theconsequences fanarchy. ermany's ise o world ower tatuswasmost bviously direct esponse o Britain's egemony, hile ntheAmer-ican andJapanese ases theconnectionetween nipolaritynd great oweremergence,hough ess direct,s still iscernible.BRITISH HEGEMONY IN A UNIPOLAR WORLDBritain'sreeminenceast a shadow over he nternationalystem. y 1880,itwaswidely andcorrectly)erceivedhat heEuropean reat ower ystemwas evolving nto system fthree r four world"powers what oday recalledsuperpowers).63nternationaloliticswas profoundlyffectedythistrend, hich lerted olicymakersothe ecurityndeconomic onsequencesof therelative istributionfpower nthe nternationalystem.After880,therewas among statesmen a prevailing iew oftheworldorderwhichstressed truggle,hange, ompetition,heuse offorcendtheorganizationofnational esources o enhance tatepower."M4ritain as the first orldpowerand itwas the modelthatother ising owers ought o imitate sthey limbed ogreat ower tatus. n otherwords, he ameness ffect asverymuchnevidence. peaking fGermany, apan,nd taly, aulKennedysays:Inallthree ocieties herewere mpulses o emulate heestablishedowers.Bythe 1880sand 1890seachwas acquiring verseas erritories;ach, too,began tobuilda modern leet ocomplementts standing rmy. achwas asignificantlement n thediplomaticalculus f theage and,at the eastby1902,hadbecome n alliancepartner fan olderpower."'63. SeeKennedy, ise ndFallofGreatowers, p. 194-202. his ransformations llustratedythegreat owers' espectivehares f otal ndustrialotentialnd worldmanufacturingutput.In 1880Germany,rance, nd Russiaweretightlyunched nd well behind othBritainndtheUnited tates nterms fboth otalndustrialotentialnd shares fworldmanufacturingoutput.However,by 1913 Britain, he UnitedStates, nd Germany ad widelydistancedthemselvesrom herest f hegreat ower ack. nterms f otal ndustrialotentialnd shareofworldmanufacturingutput, hird-placeermany eldnearly 2:1advantage verRussia,thenext ankingower.64. Ibid.,p. 196.65. Ibid.,pp. 202-203.


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Kennedydoes not mention he UnitedStates n thispassagebuthe couldhave. AlthoughheUnited tatesdidnotneeda large rmyndwas able torefrain romoining greatpower alliance, tfollowed hesame pattern fbuilding powerfulmodern avy, cquiring verseas olonies,ndbecominga majorfactorn great owerdiplomacy.GERMANY S RISE TO WORLD POWERThe effect fdifferentialrowth ateswas an importantactornGermany'srise to greatpower status.As Paul Kennedyhas pointedout, Germany'seconomic rowthfter 860was "explosive."66etween 860 nd1913,Ger-many's hare ofworldmanufacturingutput osefrom .9 percent o 14.8percentnd its hareofworld rade rom .7percento 13percent.67n1913,Germany'shareof world xportswas 13percentcompared oBritain's 4percent).68ermany's ising owerfacilitatederlin's ecision oseekchangeinthe nternationalystem.As Kennedy bserves,Germany eitherlreadypossessed he nstrumentsfpower o alter he tatus uoorhad thematerialresources o create uch nstruments."69s KurtReiszler, oliticalonfidantofpre-WorldWar Chancellor ethmann ollweg, bserved,Weltpolitikastightlyinked o thedynamic rowthfGermany'sxport-drivenconomy.70Reiszler lso noted how Germany's emands forpower and prestigen-creasednproportiono tsrising trength.71redictably,ermany'sncreas-ing ambition eflected erlin's oncernwithprotectingtsdeepening takesinthe nternationalystem. ora rising ower uchbehavior s typical:Inorder o ncreasetsownsecurity,t willtry oexpand tspolitical, conomicandterritorialontrol;t willtry ochange he nternationalystemnaccor-dance with tsparticularnterests."72Germany's ise to worldpowerstatuswas a direct esponse o Britain'spreeminencen internationalolitics. TheGermans ame to resentBritishpowerand even British ffortso maintain heirpositionunimpaired."73Weltpolitik-Germany'sush for big navy, olonies, ndequalitywithBrit-66. Ibid.,p. 210.67. Ibid., pp. 149, 202; Paul Kennedy,TheRise oftheAnglo-Germanntagonism,860-1914(London:GeorgeAllen ndUnwin, 980), p. 44, 292.68. Kennedy, nglo-Germanntagonism,. 292.69. Kennedy, ise ndFallofGreatowers, . 211.70. Quoted n manuelGeiss,Germanoreignolicy, 871-1914London:RoutledgendKeganPaul,1976), . 9.71. Ibid.,p. 81.72. Gilpin,War ndChange,p. 94-95.73. William . Langer,TheDiplomacyf mperialism,890-1902,d ed. (New York:AlfredA.Knopf, 965), . 416.


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ain inpoliticalnfluencendprestige-wasdriven ysecurityoncerns ndwas a clearmanifestationf the sameness ffect. ermaneaderswere con-cerned hatunlessGermany evelopedcountervailingavalpower, ts n-dependencendinterestsn nternationaloliticswouldbe circumscribedyBritain.74hancellor hlodwigHohenlohe-Schillingfurstaid in 1896: "Un-lesswe areprepared oyield t all times nd to giveup therole ofworldpower, henwe mustbe respected. venthe mostfriendlyordmakesnoimpressionn internationalelationsf t s notsupported yadequate ma-terial trength. herefore, fleet s necessaryn theface of othernavalpowers."Notwithstandingheconsequences,nan anarchic orldGermanyhad littlehoicebut toemulateBritain ybuilding powerful avy.75Germany's ise to worldpowerstatus nd theresulting nglo-Germanantagonism erestructurallyetermined. nlessGermany cquiredworldpowercapabilities,twould have been vulnerable o states ikeBritain hatdid have them.76William . Langerpointsout thatGermany'sncreasinginternationalnterestsnd the need to defend hem nthe face ofBritain's74. GrandAdmiral lfred onTirpitz elievedGermanyouldnotremain great ower nlessitdevelopednto first-rankaritimeower.Volker . Berghahn, ermanyndtheApproachfWar n 1914 London:MacMillan, 973),p. 29. "Naval power,"Tirpitz aid, "is essentialfGermanyoes not wanttogo under"; vorLambi,TheNavy nd Germanower olitics, 862-1914 Boston:GeorgeAllen nd Unwin, 984), . 139.75. Quotation rom ambi,TheNavy ndGermanower olitics, . 114. Even SirEyreCrowe,theBritishoreign ffice'seading nti-Germanardliner,ecognized his nhis famous 907memorandum.rowe onceded hat twas for erlin, otLondon, odeterminehe ize ofthenavynecessary o defendGerman nterests.rowe lso understood hatBritishpposition oGermany's avalbuildupwould erve nly oaccentuateerlin's ecurityilemma:Apart romthequestion fright ndwrong, t may lso beurged hatnothing ouldbe more ikelyhananattemptt suchdictation,o mpelGermanyopersevere ithher hipbuildingrograms.""Memorandumy Mr. Sir]EyreCrow," nGooch ndTemperley,ocumentsntheOrigins ftheWar, . 418.76. Inthe atenineteenthndearly wentiethentury, ermany'snternationalehavior ifferedlittle rom ritain's rAmerica's. utunlike ritain, ermany'sutward hrustid notgo intoa geopoliticalacuum, nd unlike he United tates,Germanyacked secure trategicndeconomic ase ofcontinentalimension. ermany as hemmed n and itsrise ogreat owerstatuswas toorapid, nd toofreighted ithmplicationsor thers'nterests,o be accommo-dated.DavidCalleo,TheGermanroblemeconsidered:ermanyndtheWorld rder,870 othePresentCambridge: ambridge niversityress,1978),pp. 83-84.As W.E. Mosseobserves,Germany'sise ogreat ower tatus couldnotbut ffecthe nterestsndpolicies f ll others.It was boundto frustratendarouse heoppositionf ome t eastof heolder owers."W.E.Mosse,The uropeanowersnd heGermanuestion,848-1871:Withpecial eferenceoEnglandand Russia Cambridge: ambridge niversityress, 1958),p. 2. In a realsense, therefore,Germanywas bornencircled.Merelyby existing,t posed a threat o others.There s animportantessonhere.A statemustdecidefor tself hethero strive or reat ower tatus,but successhinges n how others eact. ome states such as pre-1914 ermany)mayfacedifficultathto greatpowerstatus,while forothers e.g., theUnited tates) hegoing srelativelyasy.Environmentalactors,uch s geographicositioning,ave a lot o do with hedifficultieshatmay onfrontn eligible tate s it attemptso rise ogreat ower tatus.


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preeminence eant hatBerlinwas "virtuallyriven"nto mitatingondonby pursuing policy f naval and colonial xpansion.Giventhesecircum-stances, it s hard to see how Germanyould haveavoided collidingwithEngland."7TheAnglo-Germanivalry as a textbookxample f he ecuritydilemma. ecauseGermany's iseto worldpower tatus hallenged statusquo thatprimarilyeflected ritain's redominancend interests,Weltpolitikmade Britainesssecure nd prompted ondon o take ounteraction.hus,the Anglo-Germanivalryllustrateshat heprocessofgreatpoweremer-gencecan trigger Hertz/Avisynamicfa rising reatpower emerges stheclear hallenger oa preeminenttate'sposition.78Suchstates re fated oengage n intense ompetition.heeffect fGer-many's mergence ogreat ower tatus n Anglo-Germanelationss sug-gestive.n1880, or xample,Germany's owerposition measured yshareofworldmanufacturingutput nd total ndustrialotential) as similar othat f France nd Russia.79WhileLondonand Berlinwereon close termsduring he 1880s which at timesvergedon defacto lliance),France ndRussia were Britain'smain rivals.80 y 1900,however, heAnglo-Germanrivalry ad heated up and Germany ad bya decisivemargin stablished77. Langer, iplomacyf mperialism,. 794.78. Thecompetitionetween he argestndsecond-largest.S. automobile entalompanies(Hertz nd Avis, espectively)ecame amouswhenAvisran nadvertisingampaign ith heslogan,"We'renumber wo;we tryharder."The analogyof theAnglo-Germanivalry ocommercialompetition as apparent o Tirpitz,who wrote, theolder and strongerirminevitablyeeks to stranglehenewandrising nebeforet s too ate." PaulKennedy,TheKaiser nd GermanWeltpolitik:eflexionsnWilhelmI'sPlace n theMaking fGerman oreignPolicy," n John .G. Rohland NicolausSombart, aiserWilhelmI: New nterpretationsCam-bridge: ambridge niversityress, 982), . 149.79. In 1880, he otal ndustrial otential f hefour owerswas: Britain73.3,whereBritainn1900 s the ndexbenchmarkf 100),Germany27.4), France 25.1), Russia 24.5). The fourpowers'shares ofworld manufacturingutputwere:Britain22.9 percent),Germany 8.5percent), rance 7.8 percent), ussian 7.6 percent). ennedy, ise nd FallofGreat owers,pp. 201-202.80. This does not contradict y argumenthatGermany's ise to worldpower tatuswas abalancing esponse o Britain's egemony.nthe ontrary:uringhe 880s, erlin ndLondonwere ble to mantain cordial elationshipecauseGermany's elative owerhadnotrisen oa point hat hrust ermanynto hechallenger'sole. t should lso be noted hat uringhe1880s he Anglo-Germanelationship as indirect. ondonwas alignednot withBerlin tselfbutwithGermany's lfies,Austria-Hungarynd Italy. hisalignment as part f Bismarck'sintricatelliance cheme nd was meant o counter ussian mbitionsn the Near East andMediterranean,n objective hatoverlappedBritain'snterests. ismarck'system lso wasintended o solate rancewhile imultaneouslyeeping erlin n friendlyerms ith urope'sother reat owers.After 890, he tunningise nGermany'selativeower ecamemanifest.Inexorably, ermany as pushed downthepath to worldpower tatus, nd to confrontationwithBritain.


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itself s Europe's econd-rankingower. ndeed,Germany as closing n onBritainnterms f shareofworldmanufacturingutput ndtotal ndustrialpotential,ndby 1913,Germany ouldpassBritainnthese wo ategories.81The dramatic hange n thetwo states'relative owerpositions ueled hedeteriorationn Anglo-Germanelations, nd led to a shiftn Europeangeopoliticallignmentss London sought ntenteswith ts erstwhileivals,France ndRussia, s counterweightsoGerman ower.EMBRYONIC SUPERPOWER: AMERICA S RISE TO WORLD POWERIt has been arguedthatthe UnitedStatesdid notseektobecomea greatpowerbut rather ad that tatus hrust pon it.82 hisview does not holdup, however. y themid-1870s,heUnited tateswas contemplatingnewrole n world ffairs, owever entatively.83his outward hrust as under-pinned y theeffectfdifferentialrowth ates. nthedecades fter heWarBetween he States, he United tates cquired normous conomic apabil-ities ncluding rapidly xpandingmanufacturingnd industrialase, lead-ershipnadvanced echnology,highly roductivegriculturalector,bun-dantrawmaterials, mpleforeignand later nternallyenerated)apital.84In 1880, the United States at 14.7 percent) anked econdbehind GreatBritain at 22.9 percent) n world manufacturing utput. By 1913,the UnitedStates at32percent) elda commandingdvantagenshareofworldman-ufacturingroductionver Germany 14.8 percent) nd Britain13.6 per-cent).85 s Kennedyhas observed, iventheeconomic, echnological,nd81. In 1900, he total ndustrial otential f the four owerswas: Britain, 00;Germany,1.3;Russia, 7.6;France, 6.8.The four owers' hares fworldmanufacturingutputwere:Britain,18.5 percent, ermany, 3.2 percent, ussia,8.8 percent, rance, .8 percent. ennedy, iseand Fall ofGreatPowers,pp. 201-202.82. Ernest R. May, ImperialDemocracy: he Emergence f America s a GreatPower New York:Harcourt, race nd World, 961), p. 269-270.83. Milton Plesur, America'sOutwardThrust:Approacheso ForeignAffairs,865-1890 (DeKalb:NorthernllinoisUniversityress,1971)."Whether reat owerstatus ame n the1890sorearlier,t s certain hat heUnited tates id notmake hedecision or olonialismnd worldinvolvementn a sudden movement hichcaught he national sycheoffguard. he newdeparture ad tsrootsnthequietyears f heGildedAge." bid.,pp. 9-10. Edward . Crapolhas recentlyurveyedhe tate f hehistoriographyf atenineteenth-centurymericanoreignpolicy.Many ecent orks ake heview hat heUnited tates onsciouslyoughtworld owerstatus. rapol, Coming oTermswith mpire: heHistoriographyfLateNineteenthenturyAmerican oreign elations," iplomaticistory,ol. 16,No. 4 (Fall 1992), p. 573-597.84. See Kennedy, Riseand Fall ofGreat owers,pp. 178-182, 242-249.85. Ibid.,pp. 201-202.


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resource dvantages he United tates njoyed, here was a virtualnevit-ability o thewhole process" f ts risetogreat ower tatus.86In the atenineteenthentury,hehistorian rederickacksonurner otedthat ecause states evelop ignificantnternationaloliticalnterestss theirinternationalconomic nterests eepen, the UnitedStateswas already ntheway to becoming great ower.87uring heBenjamin arrisondmin-istration,heUnited tatesbeganengagingnwhatSecretaryfStateJamesG. Blaine (echoingWilliamPitt the younger) alled "the annexation ftrade."88 ocusing irst n LatinAmerica,U.S. overseas conomic nterestsexpanded aterto encompassAsia and Europeas well. LikeGermany,sAmerica's verseaseconomic takesgrew or were perceived o grow), tsinternationalolitical nterestslso increased.89aulKennedy bserves hatthe"growth f Americanndustrial owerand overseas radewas accom-panied,perhaps nevitably,ya more ssertive iplomacyndbyanAmer-ican-stylehetoricf Weltpolitik.90

Again ikeGermany,s America's takesnthe nternationalystem eep-ened,Washington eganacquiringhecapabilitieso defend ts nterests. searly s the1870s,proponents f navalexpansion rguedthat, acking nenlarged nd modernized leet, heUnited tateswould be vulnerable ndpowerlesso defendts nterests.91nthe1880s,AlfredhayerMahan rguedthat ttainmentfworldpower tatuswas thekey o America'security. isarguments boutthe"influencefsea power upon history" isplayed nintuitivenderstandingf the samenesseffect nd he prescientlyrguedthat, o become a worldpower,the UnitedStateswouldhave to emulateBritain's aval,colonial, nd tradepolicies.92merica's avalbuildupbeganduring heHarrison dministration1889-93)whenNavy Secretary racy86. Kennedy, Riseand Fall ofGreat owers,p. 242.87. Quoted in WalterLaFeber, The New Empire:An InterpretationfAmerican xpansion, 860-1898 Ithaca:CornellUniversityress, 963), p. 69-70.88. Quoted n bid.,p. 106.89. American olicymakerselieved hatoverseasmarkets eremore rucial o the nation'seconomic ealth han nfactwas true.By 1913, oreignrade ccounted or nly percent fGNP, comparedwith 6 percent orBritain. ennedy, ise ndFallofGreat owers, . 244.90. Kennedy, Riseand Fall ofGreatPowers,p. 246.91. J.A.S. Grenville and George B. Young, Politics, trategy,nd American iplomacy: tudies nAmericanoreign olicy, 873-1917 New Haven: Yale University ress, 1966), pp. 5-6.92. On Mahan's views, see Harold and Margaret prout, TheRise ofAmerican aval Power, 776-1918Princeton:rinceton niversityress, 944), p. 202-222; aFeber, heNew mpire,p. 80-95.


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persuadedCongress oauthorize onstructionf modern attleship leet.93Thisbuilding rogramignalled breakwith henavy's raditionaltrategyofprotecting merican ommerce,n favorof one challenging ivalsforcommandf he ea. Responding o an increasinglyompetitiventernationalenvironment,he navy chose "to make itselfntoa European-styleorcereadyfor ombatwiththenavies of the othermajorpowers."94 merica'snavalbuildupwas underpinnedy ts rising conomic ower.Naval expen-dituress a percentage f federalpending ose from .9 percentn1890 o19 percent n 1914 and Kennedyrecounts he shock of a famousBritishwarshipdesignerwhen he discovered uring 1904visitthatAmerica'sindustrial apabilities eresuch that he United tateswas simultaneouslybuilding 4battleshipsnd 13armored ruisers.95The extent o whichAmerica'sgreatpower emergencewas a direct e-sponse ounipolaritysunclear. t sapparent, owever,hat ritain'sreem-inencewas at least an important actor. he impetus orAmerica'snavalbuildup nd growing eopoliticalssertiveness asdeepening pprehensionaboutthe Western emisphere's ulnerabiltyo European encroachment,especiallyftheEuropeangreatpowersshiftedhefocusof their olonialrivalries romAsia to the Americas.96olicymakersecameconvinced hat"Americanlaims nLatinAmericawouldonlybe as strongs themilitaryforce ehind hem.Consequently,s Americantakes nCentral nd SouthAmericancreased, o did Americanmilitaryi.e.,naval] strength.97Thus,America's ise to greatpowerstatuswas a defensive eactionothethreatposed byothers o itsexpanding verseas nterests. ntil 898, he UnitedStatesregarded ritains the maindanger o itsstrategicnd commercialinterestsn the Western emisphere.98o doubt,Americaneelingsoward93. For brief iscussion, ee Kenneth .Hagan, This eople's avy: heMaking fAmericaneaPowerNew York: he FreePress, 991), p. 194-197.94. Ibid.,p. 186.95. Kennedy, ise ndFallofGreat owers, p. 243,247.96. The relationshipetween ecurity orries nd American oreignnd strategic olicy sexplorednRichard . Challener, dmirals, eneralsndForeignolicy, 898-1914Princeton:Princeton niversity ress, 1973); and Grenville nd Young,Politics, trategynd AmericanDiplomacy.97. LaFeber, ewEmpire,. 229.98. Kinley .Brauer as argued hat etween 815 nd1860,Americaneaderswere oncernedabout he mplicationsf Britain'sxpanding lobal nterests,nd various trategieserecon-templated o counter he threat osed by Britain's avaland economic ower nd itsformaland informalmpire.Although hese proposed trategicesponses o British owerdid not


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Britian ere ambivalent ecausenot onlywas theUnited tates hreatenedbyBritain's egemony utsimultaneouslytwas also a majorbeneficiaryfLondon'spreeminence. evertheless, ritain's redominance as toleratedonlyuntil he UnitedStateswas strong noughto challenget.Backedbygrowing aval power and unlimitedndustrialotential,n the mid-1890stheUnitedStates aunched diplomatic ffensivegainstBritain.n 1895-96, the United Statesprovoked crisiswith Britain verthe seeminglyobscure oundary ispute etweenVenezuela ndBritish uiana.99ondonwas compelled o back down and to acknowledgeAmerica'shemisphericprimacy. y 1903, Britain ad given n completely o American emandsconcerningontrol ver theproposed sthmian anal and theboundary e-tweenAlaska nd Canada. Shortly hereafter,ritainowed to thereality fAmerica's verwhelmingegional ower nd withdrewtsnaval nd militaryforces romNorthAmerica.JAPAN: EXTERNAL THREAT, INTERNAL RESPONSEJapan's reat ower mergence ifferedrom ermany'sndAmerica's. heeffect fdifferentialrowth ateswas nota factor. etween 860 nd 1938,comparativemeasuresof greatpowercapabilities utJapan t or nearthebottom fthelist.Forexample,between1860and 1938,Japan's hare ofworldmanufacturingutputrose onlyfrom .6 percent o 3.8 percent.100Japan'sgreatpower emergencewas, rather, riven yits extreme ulner-ability.ndeed, nthe1860s,Japan'svery xistences a nation-state as atrisk.Although apan's ecurity-drivenreat ower mergence as nota directresponse o unipolarity,eretoo Britain's reeminencead its effect.pe-cifically,twas Britain's efeat fChinain theOpiumWars, nd China'sconsequent oss of independence, hatprovided n object esson forthecome o fruitioneforeheWarBetween heStates, hey everthelessaid thegroundworkorAmerica's ubsequent ise to worldpower status.KinleyJ.Brauer,The United tates ndBritishmperial xpansion," iplomaticistory,ol. 12,No. 1 (Winter 988), p. 19-38.99. Forbrief iscussions f theVenezuela risis,eeJ.A.S.Grenville,ord alisburyndForeignPolicy t theCloseof heNineteenthenturyLondon: AthlonePress, 1964), pp. 54-73; May, mperialDemocracy,p. 35-55; aFeber, heNew mpire,p. 242-283;nd "TheBackgroundfCleveland'sVenezuelan olicy:A Reconsideration,"mericanistoricaleview, ol. 66, No. 4 (July 961),pp. 947-967.100. Kennedy, Riseand Fall ofGreatPowers, p. 198-209.


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reformersho ed theMeijiRestoration.101heyweredeterminedhatJapanwouldnot uffer hina'sfate.As ShumpeiOkamoto otes, heMeijireform-ers shared common urpose: ThroughoutheMeijiperiod, heaspirationand resolve haredby all thoseconcernedwith he fate f the nationwerethatJapan trive o maintaints ndependencen a worlddominated y theWesternowers."1102he reformers'im was neatly xpressednthesloganfukokuyohei-"enrichhe country,trengthenhe army"-which becamethe fficialrogram f heMeijigovernment,eared o achieving he trengthwithwhichJapan ould resist heWest.103Drivenbysecurityoncerns, apan's reat ower mergence eflectedhesameness ffect. o be secureJapanneeded to developthekindofmilitaryand economic apabilities hatwouldenable t to competewith heWest. nMeijiJapan, herefore,omestic oliticswas shaped by foreign olicy on-cerns.104 he era's governmentalnd administrativeeforms,or xample,were ntended o reorganize apan's entral overnmentaltructurelongWesternines; centralized overnment as seen to be necessaryfJapanwere toorganizetself o defend ts nterests rom oreignncroachment.105Similarly,he mperial dictabolishing he feudaldomains 1871) ustifiedtheactionbyobserving hatJapanneeded a strong entral overnmentf twas "tostandon an equal footing ith ountriesbroad.106Recognizinghe ink etween conomics ndnational ower, heMeijierareformersorked ard o expandJapan's ndustrialndcommercialtrength.Toshimichi kubo said in 1874:A country'strength epends on theprosperityf tspeople .. [which]nturn ependsupontheir roductiveapacity. ndalthoughhe amount fproductions determinedn largemeasurebythediligence fthepeople101. The ntellectualackgroundf heMeijiRestorationsdiscussed nW.G.Beasley, heMeijiRestorationStanford:tanford niversityress, 972), p. 74-139.102. ShumpeiOkamoto, heJapaneseligarchyndthe usso-JapanesearNew York: olumbiaUniversityress,1960), . 43.103.Beasley, heMeijiRestoration,. 379.104.See James . Crowley,Japan'sMilitaryoreign olicies,"nJamesW.Morley, d., Japan'sForeignolicy,1868-1941: ResearchuideNewYork:ColumbiaUniversityress,1974).Alsosee W.G. Beasley, heRiseofModern apanLondon:WeidenfeldndNicolson, 990),p. 21,where t s similarlyointed utthat heMeijiRestoration,nd itsconsequent eforms, erebasedon the ssumptionhat causalrelationshipxisted etweenmodernizationt home ndsuccess nforeign olicy.105. SeeBeasley, ise fModern apan, p. 68-69; nd TheMeijiRestoration,p. 303-304.106.Quoted n Beasley, heMeijiRestoration,. 347.


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engaged nmanufacturingndustries, deeperprobefor heultimate eter-minate eveals o instancewhen country's roductiveowerwas increasedwithout he patronage nd encouragementf thegovernmentnd its offi-cials.107Okubo,a key figuren the earlyRestorationovernments,ad visited u-rope, ncluding ismarckian ermany. is travels nderscored orOkubothecompetitive ature f nternationaloliticsnd "convinced imthathemustestablish orJapan hesame bases uponwhich he worldpowersoftheday hadfounded heirwealth nd strength.108Underhis direction,hegovernmentupported he xpansion fmanufacturing,rade,ndshipping.At all times, herewas a sense of urgency boutJapan's nternal ffortsoenhance ts national ecurity y becoming greatpower. Field MarshalAritomo amagata,one of the Meiji era's towering olitical nd militaryfigures,aid in 1898 hat fJapanwanted oavoid agging ehind heWest,"we cannotrelaxfor ven a dayfromncouraging ducation, reater ro-duction, ommunicationsnd trade."109From the beginning, lmost every spect ofMeiji policywas directedtoward afeguarding apan's ecurity nd to vindicatingtsclaimto equalstatuswith the Westernpowers. To this end, Field MarshalYamagatastressed, o effort ustbe sparedtoexpandJapan's rmy ndnavy nd torevisethepost-1853 nequal treaties hatthe Western owershad forcedupon Tokyo.Thesegoalshad largely eenaccomplished y1890.A risingJapan henbegantoprojecttspoweroutwards. he fear hat heEuropeanpowerswouldtry odenyJapan conomic ccess to China ed theJapaneseleadership o conclude hatJapanmust stablishtsownsphere f nfluenceon themainland.110apan found hat concernwithdefense ed easily oargumentsor xpansion."'11 apan's olicyed totheSino-Japanese arof1894-95 nd eventuallyo theRusso-Japanese arof 1904-05.Japan'smili-107.Quoted n Masakazu wata,Okubo oshimichi:heBismarckfModern apanBerkeley: ni-versityfCaliforniaress, 964), . 236.108.Ibid.,p. 175.109.Quoted in RogerF. Hackett, amagata ritomondtheRiseofModern apan, 838-1922(Cambridge: arvardUniversityress, 971), . 195.110.Crowley, Japan'sMilitaryoreign olicies," . 14.111.Beasley,RiseofModern apan, . 140.Beasley's bservationeemsentirelyorrect. earbegets xpansion. ndexpansion as tsownconsequences. sJohn ewisGaddis omments,"theprincipal ccupationalazard s a general ule fbeing great ower sparanoia .. andtheexhaustiontultimatelyroduces." Toward he Post-ColdWarWorld," n John ewisGaddis,TheUnited tates ndthe ndof heColdWar:mplications,econsiderations,rovocations(NewYork:Oxford niversityress,1992), . 215.


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tary uccesses n these onflictsstablishedt as the eading ower nNorth-eastAsia, and Japan's ictoryverRussia secured errecognitions a majorworldpower.112HISTORY, UNIPOLARITY AND GREAT POWER EMERGENCEThere s a strong orrelationetween nipolaritynd great ower mergence.Late seventeenth-centuryngland nd Austria nd late nineteenth-centuryGermanyalanced gainst hedominant ole nthe ystem.Moreover,venwhengreat ower mergence as notdriven rimarilyytheneedtocoun-terbalancehehegemon's ower, he hadowofpreeminence as an impor-tant actor.113his s illustratedytheriseoftheUnited tates ndJapan ogreat ower status n the ate nineteenthentury.t is, therefore,pparentthat general endency xistsduring nipolarmoments: everalnewgreatpowers imultaneouslynter he nternationalystem. he events fthe atenineteenthenturylso illustrate ow competitionrom stablished reatpowers ombinedwith hallenges rom ising reat owers odiminish rit-ain's relative owerand erode its primacy. uringthe last yearsof thenineteenthentury, ritain, he mostpowerful tate nthe system,was thetarget f others'balancingpolicies. "The story f European nternationalrelationsn the 1890s s the story ftheassaultof Russiaand Franceuponthe erritorialosition fBritainnAsiaandAfrica,ndthe tory fthegreateconomic uelbetween ngland nd herall-too-efficienterman ival."'114In the late nineteenth entury,he growth fAmerican,German, ndJapanesenaval power compelledBritain o forgotspolicy fmaintainingglobalnavalsupremacy.115ndeed, Britain as pressedhardby ts rivals nall fronts. y 1900, twas apparent hatLondon could not simultaneouslymeet theGerman hallenge crosstheNorth ea, defend ts mperialndcolonialnterestsrom rench nd Russian ressure,ndpreservetspositionintheWestern emisphere. ritain ithdrew rom heWestern emisphere112. Ian Nish, Japaneseoreignolicy, 869-1942London:Routledge nd Kegan Paul, 1977),p. 78.113. The shadoweffects a consequence f anarchy. he unbalanced istributionf power nthe hegemon's avor mplicitlyhreatensthers' ecurity. his s because statesmust eact othehegemon's apabilities atherhan to its ntentions.n a unipolar ystem,oncernwithsecuritysa compellingeason or ligible tates o acquire reat ower apabilities,ven f heyarenot mmediately enaced ythehegemon.114. Langer, The Diplomacy f mperialism,. 415.115. See Aaron L. Friedberg,TheWeary itan:Britain nd theExperiencefRelative ecline,1895-1905 Princeton:rincetonniversityress, 988), p. 135-208.


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Internationalecurity7:4 j 32

because London realized t lackedtheresources o compete uccessfullyagainst heUnited tates ndthat henavalforces eployednNorthAmer-ican waters ould better e used elsewhere.116 heAnglo-Japaneselliancewas driven, rom ondon'sstandpoint, ythe need to use Japanese avalpowertoprotect ritain's astAsian nterestsnd therebyllowtheRoyalNavy units n the Far East to be redeployed o home waters. Like therapproachmentithWashingtonnd the alliancewithTokyo, heententeswithFrance nd Russiaalso evidenced ritain's ecliningelative ower.By1907,Britain's eopolitical osition dependeduponthekindness f strang-ers." Over the onger erm,hegreat ower mergenceftheUnited tatesand Japan aved thewayforBritain's clipse, irsts hegemon nd then sa greatpower. n the 1930s,Japanesepower costBritaintsFar Easternposition, nd America's elative owerultimatelyose to a pointwhere tcould displaceBritain s hegemon. uch was theresult fBritain's olicy fbenignhegemony, policy hatdid notmerelybstain rom pposing, utactually ad theeffect f facilitatingheemergencefnewgreat owers.AfterheColdWar:American a UnipolarWorld.?The historicalvidence rom 660-1714 nd 1860-1914 tronglyupportshehypothesiserived rom eorealistheory: nipolarmoments ausegeopo-liticalbacklashesthat ead to multipolarity.evertheless,n principle,declining egemon oeshave an alternativeoa policy ftoleratingheriseofnewgreatpowers: t can actively ttempto suppress heir mergence.Thus, ifWashingtonwere prepared o contemplate reventivemeasures(includingheuse offorce),tmight e able tobeatbackrisinghallengers."17But, lthough reventionmay seem attractivet first lush, t s a stop-gapmeasure. tmayworkonce,butover time he effect fdifferentialrowthrates nsures hat ther hallengers ill ubsequentlyppear.Given tsprob-able costs and risks,preventions not a strategyhatwould lend itself orepetition.116. See C.J.Loweand M.L. Dockrill, heMirage f ower, ol. : Britishoreignolicy,902-14(London:RoutledgendKeganPaul,1972), p. 96-106.117.When hegemon inds tsprimacyhreatened,hebest trategys "toeliminatehe ourceoftheproblem." ilpin,War ndChange, . 191.


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THE STRATEGY OF PREPONDERANCEIn any event, he United tateshas chosen somewhat ifferenttrategyomaintaintsprimacy.ssentiallyheUnited tates stryingo maintainntactthe nternationalrder tconstructedn WorldWar I's aftermath.sMelvynLeffler ointsout, after 945Americantrategyimedat achieving "pre-ponderance fpower" nthe nternationalystem."18Washingtonought oincorporateWestern urope,WestGermany,nd Japan nto n American-led alliance; reate n openglobal conomy hatwouldpermitheunfetteredmovement f goods, capital and technology;nd create n internationalenvironmentonducive o America's emocraticalues. While ommittedorevivingWestern urope,Germany,ndJapan conomicallyndpolitically,Washingtonlso believedthat neithern integrateduropenor a unitedGermany oran independent apanmustbe permittedoemerge s a thirdforce r a neutral loc.""19 o maintaintspreeminencen the non-Sovietworld,Americantrategy sed bothbenevolent nd coercive ncentives.In attemptingo perpetuate nipolarity,he UnitedStates s pursuingessentiallyhe samegoals,and using he same meanstoachieve hem, hatit pursued n its postwarquest forpreponderance.120 he "newNSC 68"argues thatAmerican randstrategyhouldactivelyttempto mold theinternationalnvironmenty creating secureworld n whichAmericaninterests re protected.American llianceswithJapan nd Germany reviewed s an integral artof a strategyhat eeks: 1) topreventmultipolarrivalries;2) todiscourage heriseofglobalhegemons;nd (3) topreservecooperativend healthyworldeconomy. heforward eploymentfU.S.military orces broad is now viewedprimarilys a means ofpreservingunipolarity.fthe UnitedStates ontinues o extend ecurity uarantees oJapan nd Germany,tis reasoned, heywillhave no incentiveodevelopgreat owercapabilities.ndeed,fear hatJapan nd Germany illacquireindependentapabilities-thats, that heywillbecomegreat owers-per-118.Melvyn . Leffler,Preponderancef ower: ationalecurity,he rumandministration,ndthe oldWar Stanford:tanfordniversityress, 992).119. Ibid.,p. 17. Forsecond-imageheorists, merica's ejection f a preventive arstrategyisunsurprising.t hasbeen argued hatn addition onotfightingther emocracies,ecliningdemocraticowers lso do not engage n preventive aragainst ising hallengers. andallSchweller,Domestic tructurend PreventiveWar: Are DemocraciesMorePacific?"WorldPolitics,ol. 44, No. 2 (January 992), p. 235-269.120. As I discuss below, t was thebipolar tructuref thepostwar ystem hat allowedWashingtonopursue strategyfpreponderanceuccessfullynd therebymother he re-emergencefJapan ndGermanys great owers.


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vades the thinking f American trategists.or example, recentRANDstudy fAmericantrategyn thePacificaysthatWashington ustmanagerelationswithTokyo o maintain the currentlliance nd reduceJapaneseincentives ormajorrearmament."'12' RAND study fthefuture fU.S.forcesnEurope uggestshatAmerican ithdrawalromurope ouldresultin Germany eemergings "a heavyhandedrogueelephantnCentral u-rope" because it would driveGermanyn the "direction fmilitarization,nuclearization,nd chronicallynsecure olicies."'122Inevitably, strategyfpreponderance illfail.A strategyfmore r essbenign egemony oes notprevent he mergence fnewgreat owers.Thefate fnineteenth-centuryritain, hich ollowed uch strategy,s illustra-tive.A strategyfbenignhegemonyllowsothers o free-ride ilitarilyndeconomically. ver time, he effects to erodethehegemon's reeminence.A hegemon ends to overpayfor ecurity, hich eventually eakens theinternal oundation f ts external osition.Other tates nderpay or ecu-rity, hich llows them o shift dditional esources nto conomicallyro-ductive nvestments. oreover, enignhegemonyacilitateshediffusionfwealthand technologyo potential ivals.As a consequence,differentialgrowth ates riggerhiftsnrelative conomic owerthatultimatelyesultin the emergence f new greatpowers. No doubt, he strategyf prepon-derance ouldprolong nipolarityomewhat, s longas eligible tates al-culate hat he benefits ffree iding utweigh heconstraintsmposedonthem yAmerican egemony. vertime,however,ucha policywill ccel-erate he hegemon's elative ecline.There s another eason whya strategyf preponderance illnot work.Such a strategyrticulates visionof an American-lednternationalrder.GeorgeBush's NewWorldOrder ndBillClinton'spparentommitmentoassertive rojection fAmerica's emocraticnd human ights aluesreflectAmerica's esire to "press ts preferredolicies"on others.123 utthere smore to it than that. Other statescan justifiablynfer hatWashington's121. JamesA. Winnefeld, t al., A New StrategyndFewer orces:The Pacific imension, -4089/1-USDP SantaMonica,Calif.:RAND1992), . 111.122. RichardL. Kugler,TheFutureU.S. Military resencenEurope: orces ndRequirementsor hePost-Cold ar ra,R-4194-EUCOMINASantaMonica,Calif.:RAND, 1992), p. 11,16.123. AsWaltz oints ut,other tates annot rust nexcessivelyowerfultate obehavewithmoderation.he United tatesmaybelieve t s acting or henoblestfreasons. ut,he notes,America's efinitionfpeace, ustice, nd worldorder eflectsmericannterestsnd mayconflict ith he nterestsfother tates. With enign ntent,heUnited tateshasbehaved,and untiltspower sbroughtnto ome emblance fbalance,will ontinueobehave nwaysthat rightennd annoy thers."Waltz, America s a Model?"p. 669.


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unipolar spirationswill result n the deliberate pplication fAmericanpowerto compelthemto adhere to the UnitedStates'policypreferences.For example, n a February 991addressto the New YorkEconomic lub,Bush said thatbecause the United tateshad taken he eader'srole n theGulfmilitarily, merica'srenewedcredibility ould cause GermanyndJapan obemore orthcomingntheir conomic elations ithWashington.24Severalweeks ater,Harvard rofessor oseph . Nye,Jr. uggestedhat hedeploymentfUnited tatesforcesnEurope nd Japan ouldbe used as abargaininghip n tradenegotiations ith hose ountries.125uch "leveragestrategy"s no mere bstraction.nFebruary 992, hen-Vice resident anQuayle inked he continuance f America's ecurityommitmento NATOwithWestEuropean oncessionsntheGATTnegotiations.126The everage trategys thehegemonictabilityheory's ark ide. t callsfor heUnited tates o use itsmilitaryower ocompel ther tates ogiveinon issueareas whereAmerica as lesspower. t s a coercivetrategyhatattemptso takeadvantage f theasymmetriesn greatpowercapabilitiesthatfavor heUnited tates.The leverage trategys notnew.Washingtonemployedtfrom ime otime n ntra-allianceelationsuringheCold War.However,American olicies hat thers oundmerelyrritatingn a bipolarworldmayseemquite threateningn a unipolarworld.Forexample,Japanalmostcertainlymustrealize that ts lackof power projection apabilityrenders t potentially ulnerable o leveragepolicies based on America'spresent bilityo controlheflow fPersianGulf il.ProponentsfAmerica'spreponderanceavemisseda fundamentaloint:other tatesreact o thethreat fhegemony, ot to thehegemon'sdentity. mericaneadersmayregard heUnited tates s a benevolent egemon, ut others annot ffordto take uch a relaxed iew.REACTION TO UNIPOLARITY: TOWARDS A MULTIPOLAR WORLDThere s ampleevidence hatwidespread oncern xists oday boutAmer-ica's currentlynchallenged ominancen internationalolitics.127n Sep-124. Quoted n NormanKempster, U.S., Allies MightHelp Iraq RebuildAfterWar,BakerSays,"Los AngelesTimes,February 7, 1991, . Al.125. William . aton, Democrats roping or mageBuildingssues," os Angeles imes,March9, 1991, . A14.126. William uohy,QuayleRemarkspark uropean larm n Trade s. Security,"osAngelesTimes, ebruary1,1992, . A4; CraigR. Whitney,Quayle, nding uropean rip, obbies orNewTradeAccord," ew YorkTimes,February 2, 1992, . A4.127. t has beensuggested hat hePersianGulfWardemonstrateshat ther tateswelcome,rather hanfear, merica's ost-ColdWarpreeminence. owever, his implys notthecase.


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tember 991, rench oreignMinister olandDumas warned hatAmerican"might eignswithout alancingweight"ndhe andEuropeanCommunityCommission resident acquesDelors called for heEC to counterbalancetheUnited tates.128ome European olicy nalysts ave said that heSovietUnion's collapsemeansthatEurope s now threatenedmainly yunchal-lengedAmericanscendancyn world olitics.129hisviewpoint as echoedinJapan n the GulfWar's aftermath. number fcommentators orriedthat heUnited tates-a "fearsome"ountry-wouldmpose Pax Ameri-cana n which ther tateswouldbe compelled o accept oles as America'sunderlings.130 China, oo,has reacteddverselyo America's ost-ColdWarpreeminence.Chinese nalysts eactedwith reat larm oPresident eorgeBush's New WorldOrder'proclamations,nd maintained hat hiswas aruse for xtending .S. hegemonyhroughoutheglobe.FromChina'sper-spective, nipolarityasa farworse tate f ffairshan ipolarity.'' Similarsentimentsavebeenechoed n theThirdWorld.Althoughhereactionsfthese smaller tates re not as significants those ofpotential ew greatpowers, theyconfirmhatunipolarity as engenderedgeneraluneasethroughouthe internationalystem.At the September 992NonalignedMovementMeeting, ndonesianPresident uhartowarned that the NewWorldOrdercannot e allowed tobecome"a newversion f the same oldFirst,t was afterhe PersianGulf risis eganthat thers eganvoicing heir oncerns boutunipolarity.econd, o the xtenthat heGulfWar s anexample f tates andwagoning iththeUnited tates, t s easily xplainable. s Waltpoints ut,weakpowers hreatenedyapowerfuleighbor ill ften urn o an outside reat ower or efensiveupport.Walt,OriginsofAlliances,. 266. Third, s JeanEdwardSmith oints ut,the United tateshad to exertconsiderableressure n bothEgypt ndSaudi Arabia ogetthesenations oaccept heBushadministration'secision oconfrontraqmilitarilyfter he nvasion f Kuwait.Jean dwardSmith,George ush'sWarNew York:HenryHolt and Company, 992),pp. 63-95.Finally,tshouldbe rememberedhatduring hewar, heArab oalition artners estrainedhe UnitedStates romverthrowingaddam Hussein ndthat,nJulyndAugust 992, gypt, urkeyandSyria estrainedheUnited tateswhen t ppeared hat heBush dministrationasgoingto provoke militaryhowdown verthe ssue of UN weapons nspectors'ccess to Iraq'sAgriculturalinistry.128. Quoted n"France oU.S.: Don't Rule,"NewYork imes,eptember, 1991, . A8.129. RoneTempest, FrenchRevivePastime rettingboutU.S. 'Imperialism',"osAngelesTimes,ebruary5, 1989, . A9.130. See theviewsofWaseda UniversityrofessorakujiYoshimura,uoted n PaulBlustein,"In Japan, Seeing The War On A Five-InchScreen," Washington ost NationalWeekly dition,February5-March , 1991, nd of TokyoUniversityrofessor asusukeMurakami nd Op-position ietMemberMasaoKunihiro,n UrbanC. Lehner,Japanese ee A More Fearsome'U.S. Following mericanuccess n theGulf,"Wall treetournal, arch 4, 1991.131. DavidShambaugh,China'sSecurityolicy n thePost-ColdWarEra,"Survival, ol.34,No. 2 (Summer992), . 92.


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The Unipolar llusion 37

patterns f domination f the strong ver the weak and the richover thepoor."Atthis same meeting, N Secretary eneralBoutros-Ghaliarnedthat "the temptation o dominate,whetherworldwide r regionally, e-mains"; MalaysianPrimeMinisterMahathirMohammedpointedly tatedthat "unipolarworld s every it s threatenings a bipolarworld."''32As has been shown,the post-ColdWarworld'sgeopolitical onstellationis notunique.Twicebeforen nternationalistoryhere avebeen "unipolarmoments." othwere fleeting. n bothoccasions, heeffect f theentryfnew greatpowers n the nternationalystemwas to redress he one-sideddistributionf power n the nternationalystem. here s every easontoexpect hat hepattern fthe ate seventeenthnd nineteenthenturies illrecur. he mpact fdifferentialrowth ates as ncreased herelative owerofJapan nd Germanyn a way that learlymarks hem s eligible tates.As their takes n the nternationalystem eepen, so will their mbitionsand interests.ecurityonsiderationsillcauseJapan ndGermanyoem-ulatetheUnitedStates nd acquirethe full pectrumfgreatpower capa-bilities,ncluding uclearweapons.'33 t canbe expected hat othwillseekrecognitiony others f their reatpower status.Evidence onfirmingheexpectationfJapan's ndGermany's reat ower mergencelready xists.Germanys beginning o exert ts eadershipnEuropean ecurityffairs.It has assumed primary esponsibilityorproviding conomic ssistance otheformerovietUnionandEastern urope, nd took he ead insecuringEC recognitionfthebreakaway ugoslav epublicsfCroatia ndSlovenia.In a suresignthat he scopeof German eopoliticalnterestss expanding,Defense MinisterVolkerRuhe is advocating cquisition f large militarytransportircraft.1'4hancellor ohl's decision o meetwith utgoingAus-trian resident urtWaldheim uggests hatGermanys rejectingheexter-nalconstraintseretoforemposed n itsbehavior. ermanys alsoinsistingthathenceforthts diplomats who had previously pokenin Frenchor132. Quoted n CharlesB. Wallace, NonalignedNationsQuestionNew WorldOrder," osAngeles imes, eptember , 1992, . A4.133. The nuclearssue s beingdebated, lbeit ingerly,n Japan utnot n Germanyor t eastnot penly).Neverthelesst eems obe widely nderstood,n theUnited tates nd nGermanyand Japan, hat heir ccession o thenuclear lub s only matterf ime. eeDoyleMcManus,"ThinkingheOnce Unthinkable:apan, ermanyWithA-Bombs," osAngeles imesWashing-tonD.C. ed.), June 0, 1992, . A8. Fora discussion fa nuclearGermany'strategicmplica-tions, eeMearsheimer,Back o theFuture."134. Terrence oth, New GermanDefenseChief s Redefininggency'sRole," WallStreetJournal,ugust 4, 1992, . A10.


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English)willuse onlyGermanwhen ddressingnternationalonferences.135Finally, ermany's pen expression f nterestnpermanent embershipntheUN Security ouncil s another ndicationhatBerlin s moving owardgreat ower tatus. n makingGermany's osition nown, oreignMinisterKlausKinkel ointedly oted hat he ecurity ouncil hould e restructuredbecauseas now constitutedtreflects,otthepresent istributionfpower,but the nternationalrder hat xisted t the end of WorldWar I.136Notwithstandingegal nd historicalnhibitions,apansbeginningo seekstrategicutonomy. n importanttep s the decision odevelopthecapa-bility o gather nd analyzepolitico-militarynd economicntelligencen-dependently f the UnitedStates.137apanhas also begtin mporting ugeamounts fplutonium rom urope.Theplutoniums to be usedbyJapan'sfast reeder eactors,hereby nabling okyo ofreetself fdependence nPersianGulf il and American ranium. lutoniummports lus the acqui-sition f othermaterialsn recentyearsmeanthatJapanhas thecapabilityofmoving uickly o becomea nuclear ower.138After rolonged ebate,Japanhas finallyuthorized narmed apanesemilitaryersonnel o partic-ipate nUN peacekeeping perations. hismaywell be theopeningwedgeforJapan o develop militaryapabilitiesommensurate ithgreatpowerstatus.As a specialpanel oftheLiberal emocratic arty rguednFebruary1992, Now thatwe havebecome ne of hevery ew conomic owerhouses,itwould fly n the face of the world'scommon enseifwe did not playamilitaryolefor hemaintenancendrestorationfglobal eace.139AsJapanbecomesmore ctive nthe nternationaltage,militaryowerwillbeneededtosupport tspolicies nd ensure t snot ta bargaining isadvantagen tsdealingswith thers. nsurprisingly,apan asplans obuild full-spectrum135. StephenKinzer, ThusSprakeHelmutKohl AufDeutsch,"NewYork imes,ebruary3,1992, . A4.136. "Germanyeeks Permanent ouncil eat,"LosAngelesimes,eptember4, 1992, . A9;Paul Lewis, GermanyeeksPermanentNCouncil eat,"NewYork imes,eptember4, 1992,p. Al.137. Davi