the united nations disarmament yearbook - … united nations disarmament yearbook contains a review...

Dq)artment for Disarmament Affairs New York, 1998

The United NationsDISARMAMENT

YEARBOOK

Volume 22: 1997

NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document

UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATION Sales No. E.98.IX.1

ISBN 92-1-142226 ISSN 0252-5607

Copyright €) United Nations, 1998 All rights reserved

Manufactured in the United States of America

C O N TE NT S

The entries for resolutions in the Contents contain two page references: the first (in italics) is the page in appendix IV where the text of theresolution is reproduced, and the second is the page in the chapter whereaction in the First Committee and General Assembly is discussed.

Note........................................................................................ vii

Chapter I Nuclear disarmament issues............................ 1Introduction.......................................................................................... 1

Developments and trends, 1997 ........................................................... 3

Disarmament Commission, 1997 ......................................................... 22

General Assembly, 1997 ...................................................................... 23Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation...................................... 2352/38 K— Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate

elimination of nuclear weapons, 285 .............................................. 2352/38 L—Nuclear disarmament, 287 ................................................ 2452/38 M—Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations and

nuclear disarmament, 2SH)............................................................... 2552/39 C—Convention on the Prohibition of the Use

of Nuclear Weapons, 307 ............................................................... 2652/38 O— Advisory opinion of the International Court

of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Useof Nuclear Weapons, 295 ............................................................... 27

52/36—Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use orthreat of use of nuclear weapons, 266 .......................................... 29

52/41—The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, 313 ---- 3052/414—Con^mhensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, 323 ................... 31

Nuclear-weapon-free zones............................................................... 32S2/4S—Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty

for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin Americaand the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), S IS ............................... 32

52/46— African Nuclear-Weapon-Fm Zone Treaty* 319 ................. 33S2/34—Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone

in the region of the Middle East, 262 ............................................ 3332/35—Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone

in South Asia, 265 ......................................................................... 3452/38 S— Establishment of a nuclear-we^n-free zone

in Central Asia, 3 0 1 ....................................................................... 3552/38 N—The nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere

and adjacent areas, 293 ................................................................. 3652/44—Implementation of the Declaration ofthe Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, 316 .................................... 37

Nuclear waste.................................................................................... 3852/38 I—Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes, 282 . . . 38

Conclusion............................................................................................ 38

Chapter II The review process of the Non*Proliferation IVeaCy............................................................. 41

Introduction.......................................................................................... 41

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 NPT Review Conference 42

Conclusion ........................................................................................ 54

Annex: Decision 1: Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty (1995)......................................................................... 55

Chaftb III The Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions.................................................................................... 57

Introduction.......................................................................................... 57


General Assembly, 1997 ....................................................................... 7152/38 T—Status of the Convention on the Prohibition

of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, 302 ............. 71

ii

52/47—Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological)and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, 321 ....................... 72

Cmclusion.................................................................................... 73

Chapter IV Global approaches to conventionalweapons Issues.............................................................................. 7S

Introduction............................................................................................. 75



General Assembly, 1997 ....................................................................... 8952/38 R—Transparency in armaments, 299 ...................................... 8952/38 B—Transparency in armaments, 273 ......................................... 9152/32—Otjective information on military matters,

including transparency of military expenditures, 259..................... 9452/38 G—Consolidation of peace through practical

disarmament measures, 280 ........................................................... 9452/38 J-^mall arms, 283 ................................................................. 95

Conclusion........................................................................................... 97

Annex I: Recommendations of the study on stnall a n n s ..................... 98

Annex II: Composite table of replies of Governments for the Register of Conventional Arms: 1996 ..................................... 101

Chapter V Antipersonnel m ines................................................ 105

Introduction ............................................................................................ 105

Developments and trends, 1997 ............................................................. 107

Ottawa Convention................................................................................ 112

General Assembly, 1997 ......................................................................... 12152/38 A—Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,

Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Minesand on Their Destruction, 272 ......................................................... 121

52/38 H—Contributions towards banning anti-personnel landmines, 281 ................................. 122

S2/42—Coavenlion on Plohibitions or Restrictioiis on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious orto Have Indiscriminate Effects, 315 .............................................. 125

CoMclnsum............................................................................................ 126

C hapter VI Rcgioaal and other appraachcs........................... 127IntmductUm.......................................................................................... 127


General AssemUy, 1997....................................................................... 141S2/38 P—Regional disarmament, 296 .............................................. 141S2^8 Q—Conventional arms control at the r^ional

and subregional levels, 298 ........................................................... 14152/39 B—Regional confidence-building measures. 3 0 4 ................... 14252/38 C—Assistance to States for curbing the illicit irafTic

in small arms and collecting them, 274 ........................................ 14352/39 A—United Nations R^ional Centre for Peace

and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, 303 ............................. 143Conclusion........................................................................................... 144

C hapter Vll Other issues ............................................................. 14SIntroduction .......................................................................................... 145

Outer space issues .............................................................................. 145Conference on Disarmament, 1997.................................................... 145General AssenMy, 1997 ................................................................... 147

52/37—Prevention of an arms race in outer space, 269 ................... 147

Relationship between disarmament and development........................... 147

General Assembly, 1997 ................................................................... 147

52/38 D—Relationship between disarmament and devdcpment, 276 . . . 148

Role of science and technology........................................................... 149

General AssemUy, 1997 ................................................................... 149

52/33—The role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament, 261 ............................. 149

iv

Arms limitation and disarmament agreements .................................... 149

General Assembly, 1997 ................................................................... 14952/30—Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament

and non-proliferation agreements, 256 .......................................... ISO52/31— Verification in all its aspects, including the role of

the United Nations in the Held of verification, 258....................... 15052/38 E—Observance of environmental norms in

the drafting and implementation of agreementson disarmament and arms control, 277 ............................................ 151

Chapter VIII Instttutional asp ects............................................. 153

Introduction ............................................................................. 153



52/40 B— Report of the Disarmament Commission, 3 1 1 ................. 158Conference on Disarmament, 1997 ...................................................... 158

52/40 A— Repc of the Conference on Disarmament, 3 1 0 ............. 162

General Assembly, 1997 ....................................................................... 16252/40 C—Role of the United Nations in disarmament, 312 ............ 16252/38 F—Convening of the fourth special session of

the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, 278 ..................... 164

Annex: Agenda items of the First Committee...................................... 166

Chapter IX Studies, tnformatioii and train ing..................... 169

Disarmament studies programme......................................................... 169

United Nations Disamtament Information Programme ................... 170

Disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services..................... 172

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research ........................... 172

General Assembly, 1997 ....................................................................... 17352/39 D—United Nations Disarmament Information

Programme, 309 ............................................................................. 173

Annex: Publications ............................................................................ 173

v

APPENDICES

Appendix I Status of multOateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements .................................................... 177

Appendix II Convention on tlie Proliibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and TVansfer ofAnti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction ............... 227

A ppendix III Inter>American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and TVafBddng in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related M aterials........................... 242

Appendix IV Text of disarmament resolutians and decision — 256

A ppe n d ix V Table resolutions and decisions on disarmament questions........................................................ 324

Appendix VI Voting patterns of resolutions and decision on disarmament adopted by the General Assembly in 1997 ....... 340

An^NDix VII Abbreviations and acronyms ........................... 366

Selective In d e x ...................................................................... 368

vi

NOTE

The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook contains a review of the main developments and negotiations in the fleld of disarmament and arms regulation each year. The Centre for Disarmament Affairs has endeavoured to make the publication as concise as possible without diminishing its usefulness as a reference work. Background information is greatly condensed; thus readers may wish to consult previous editions of TTie Yearbook. No substantive introduction is provided in chapters dealing with subjects of a technical naUire.

Factual information in tabular form is provided in the appendices. The status of multilateral and regional disarmament agreements is presented in appendix I. >A th regard to resolutions on disarmament adopted by the General Assembly, texts are consolidated in appendix IV, information on sponsorship and voting is presented in appendix V and voting patterns are reproduced in appen^x VI. Ajqiendices II and III contain the texts of the Ottawa Convention on anti-personnel mines and the Inter-American Ccmvention on trafficking in firearms, respectively.

The Yearbook, produced under the general direction of Prvoslav Davinic, Directcff of the Centre for Disarmament Affairs, and Evgeniy Gorkovskiy, Deputy Director, was prepared by the following team: coordinator/editor Carolyn Cooper, contributors: Vladimir B<)gomolov, Michael Cassandra, Tam Chung, Francesc Claret, Hannelore H<^pe, Jenifer Mackby, Tamara Malinova, Olga Sukovic, and Jerzy Zaleski; research assistanceAangitage editing: Josefina Belamide-Zweig and Nancy Grossman; typesetting: Bertha Mae Ortiz.

vii

C H A P T E R I

Nudear disarmaiiieiit issues

Introduction

Nuclear disarmament issues have been discussed within and outside the United Nations since the very beginning of the nuclear age. As a result, a number of agreements have been signed by which the existing nuclear arsenals have been reduced, their deployment excluded from certain environments or regions, or their proliferation prevmted. Some legal a ^ c ts of the threat or use of nuclear weapons have tecendy been addressed.

At the bilateral level, the negotiations known as strategic arms reduction talks (START), between the Russian Federation and the United States, led to the signing of two treaties: START I and START II. The forniN, signed <mi 31 July 1991, provides for a significant reduction of the Russian and the United States strategic nuclear weapons over seven years.* The latter, signed on 3 January 1993, provides for the elimination of MIRW ICBMs and for the reduction of strategic nuclear warheads to no mme than 3,000 to 3,500 each by the year 2003. The START II Treaty was ratified by the United States S ^ te on 26 January 1996, while Russia has not yet ratified it.

The most important instrument conconing nuclear non-proliferation is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, on the

* For the text of START I, see The Yearbook, vol. 16: 1991, ^pendixn.

MIRV: Multiple indqiendently taigetable le-mtry vehicle; ICBM: In- tercontineiital ballistic nussile.

The text of START II is reproduced in The Yearbook, vol. 18: 1993, q>pendix IL

1

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 1997

basis of which a global non-ptoliferation regime has been established. (See chapter II.) The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is a crucial support of the non-proliferation regime and steps have been taken over the past few years to reinforce it.

The question of nuclear-weapon test explosi<»is represents one of the longest-standing issues on the disarmament agenda of the international OHnmunity. Until 1996, three treaties on nuclear testing, none comprehensive, had been concluded—the multilateral Partial Test-Ban Treaty (PTBT) of 1963 and the two bilateral treaties on limitation of yields of nuclear tests fw military and peaceful purposes between the former USSR and the United States. The most recent global instrument concerning nuclear tests is the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban IVeaty (CTBT), ccmcluded and opened fen: signature in 1996, which {»<diibits any nuclear-weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion in any envir<Munent The 'Reaty has beoi signed by a large number ctf States, and eight had ratified it by the end of 1997.

There has been no progress on other nuclear issues, such as a cut-off convention on the production of fissile material, security assurances to non-nuclear-weiyxMi States and multilateral negotiations

the broad subject of nuclear disarmament in the international community’s nmltilateral negotiating body, the Coiference on Disarmament (CD), because of contiiuiing strong differences of views among Stales ccMicenung pricxities and ajquroadies.

A number of regions have promoted non-proliferation and nuclear-free status through the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones; Latin Amoica and the Caribbean, through the Tteaty of Tlale- lolco (concluded in 1967); the South Pacific, through the Treaty

The text of the Treaty is lepioduced in Status of Multilateral Arm Regulation and Disarmament Agreements, 4th edition: 1992 (United Nations publication. Sales No. E.93.IX.11) (hereafter referred as Status), vol. 1.

Namely, Treaty on the Limitation of Utiderground Nuclear Weapon Tests (1974) and Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (1976). Both treaties entered into force in 1990, following years of negotiations on verification protocols.

The text of the Treaty is reproduced in Status, 5th edition: 1996 (United Nations publication. Sales No. E.97.IX.3).

2

Nuclear disarmament issues

Rarotonga (concluded in 198S); Southeast Asia, through the Bangkok Treaty (concluded in 1995); and Africa, through the Pelindaba Treaty (c(Hicluded in 1995). (For the status of these treaties, see appoidix L) Proposals for zones in other parts of the world, such as the Middle East, Central and Eastern Eur<^, Coitral Asia and South Asia have been put forward by interested States, but none so far has been realized.

This chapter deals with a wide range of issues relating to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferaticm, such as the START treaties, the CTTBT, a fissile material cut-off, IAEA safeguards, nuclear-weapon- free zones and security assurances, and other sy^woaches, among them the legal aspect of the use of nuclear weapons, as considered by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In addition, the chapt^ deals with the subject of radiological weapons and radioactive waste. For a discussion of nuclear issues at the NPT Preparatory Committee for the 2(XX) Review Conference, see diapter II.

Devel<^ments and trends, 1997

A number of States in the general debate in the CD, the Disarmamoit Commission and the First Commitee welcomed the progress made in bilateral nuclear reductions, expressed the h (^ for eariy ratificatim of START II by Russia, and called for further deep cuts in nuclear arsenals under the proposed START in.

In 1997, the year following the conclusion of the CTTBT and its opening f<w signature, the CD did not succeed in defining its priorities and agreeing upon a programme of work. Mudi of the debate in the plenary and informal meetings of the sessi(m focused on nuclear disarmament. A number of member States welcomed the conclusion of the CTBT as an important step towards the total eliminati<Mi of nuclear weapons and called for complete nuclear disarmament, recal- lii^ article VI of the NPT and the ICJ advisory opinicm. Others, however, considered that the CD should start negotiation on a cut-off conventicHi as a priority issue and that the best way to handle the question of furdier reducti(ms oi nuclear weapons was through bilateral negotiations. A number of countries, in particular Canada and Japan, favoured the creation of a mechanism of some kind to allow for substantive discussion of nuclear disarmament and the identifica- ti(m of issues for negotiation, and the Islamic Republic of Iran sug-


gested that a special coordinator be appointed to seek the views on the most appropriate arrangement to deal with the subject^

Hie non-aligned States continued in their efforts to establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament.^ In June, on behalf of 26 delegations belonging to the Group of 21, Mexico presented a {voposed mandate for an ad hoc committee,’ under which woricing groups would be established to negotiate as a first step a universal and legally-binding multilateral agreement committing all States to the objective of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, an agreement on further steps required in a {diased programme with timeframes leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and a convention on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices, taking into account the report of the Special Coordinator on this item *’ and the views relating to the sc (^ of such a conventicm.

These pn )Osals did not command c(Misensus, and the Conference did not establish an ad hoc committee under this agenda item in 1997. Four of the five nuclear-weapcm States did not favour multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament at this time. The United States held the view that nuclear disarmament was, in fact, taking place and that the most expeditious way to ensure continued progress was for the United States and the Russian Federation to continue bilateral oegotiatitms. It further believed that a treaty on cut-off would

CD/144S (Japan). CD/14S0 (ban) and CD/14S6 (Canada).

* In 1996, the Group of 21 had pressed a mandate to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons within a q>ecified framewoik of time (CD/1388). Subsequently, 28 m enders of the Group had proposed a programme of action to this Old, in three phases (CD/1419).

’ CD/1463, submitted by: Algeria, Bangladesh, Brazil, Cameroon, Ccdombia, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Kenya, Mexico. Mongolia. Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic, Venezuela, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe. In this proposal a draft mandate for an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament previously submitted by Egypt was incorporated (CD/14S3).

In 199S, the CD establi^ed an ad hoc committee to negotiate a treaty “banning the production of fissile material.. . . ” on the basis of Ambassador Shannon’s report (CD/1299 of 24 March 1995).

4

Nuclear disamament issues

be a vital multilateral step in the path towards nuclear disarmament The Russian Federation stressed that at the meeting in Helsinki in March, the two sides had agreed to end>ark on negotiations for START III inunediately after START II entered into force, so as to ensure that as early as the coming decade the nuclear arsenals of the two countries would be reduced to about a fifth of their size during the cold war. The United Kingdom also believed that bilateral negotiations offered the best hope for further progress on reductions in nuclear forces and that the CD should focus on negotiating a cut-off treaty. France, too, ccmvinced that nuclear issues must remain at the centre of attention of die CD, advocated the rapid initiation and conclusion of a cut-off treaty. China supported the proposal submitted by the Group of 21.

Controversy over these matters and other items on the CD agenda as well as attempts by some States to establish links betwem different issues led to a complete deadlock in the CD and were later reflected in the debate in the First Committee and during the adoption of the corresponding resolutions by the General Assembly. (See pages 23-26.)

Although the question of negotiating a Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons has been on the disarmament agenda for a long time, it has recently become more urgent in the view of some States in the light of the impasse in the CD, a slowing down of the reduction of the nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia, and the ICJ advisory opinion concerning an oUigation to conclude negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament The commencement of negotiations on such a convention was also pressed by a number of NGOs.“

AlOiough the subject of radiological weapons has been on the agenda of the CD for a long time, no negotiations have been held since 1992. As far as the issue of radioactive waste was OHicemed, it was dealt with in the framework of the IAEA and the United Nations General Assembly adopted its traditional resolution on the subject

It See document A/C.i/52/7, to which a draft text of a model Nuclear Weapons Convention is annexed. The text was drafted by an international consortium of lawyers, scientists and disarmament experts led by the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy. The draft convention encompasses the prohibition of the devdopment, testing, production, stocl^iling, transfer, use and threat of use and elimination.

5


Issues related to START and other bilateral agreements

The United States and the Russian Federation continued to implement START I, which had entered into force on 5 December 1994, by dismantling and destroying warheads at the rate of approximately 2,000 a year. By the end of 1997, both parties had reduced their nuclear-^livery vehicles below the limits set for December 2001, although Russia encountered some delays in dismantling. In addition, the dismantling of missiles in Ukraine continued.

There were some positive developments concerning START II, although Russia had not ratified the Treaty by the end of the year. In a joint statement on parameters on future reductions in nuclear forces,* issued in Helsinki on 21 March, President Clinton and President Yeltsin agreed that once START II entered into fcM’ce, the two States would immediately begin negotiations on a START III agreement, which would include, among other things, establishment of lower aggregate levels of their strategic nuclear warheads; measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the destruction of the warheads; placement in a deactivated status of all strategic nuclear delivery vehicles that would be eliminated under START II; and postponement of the deadline for their elimination. In another joint statement,*’ the two Presidents recognized the fundamental significance of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the necessity for effective theatre missile defence (TMD) and reaffirmed the principles of their joint statement of 1995,* which would serve as a basis for reaching agreement on demarcation between ABM systems and TMD systems.

The Russian Duma did not act on START II as noted above, because of a number of concerns regarding strategic arms reductions: Russia would have to build additional single-warhead missiles to maintain parity while destroying its MIRVed ICBMs; compliance costs would have to be addressed; START IPs security benefits would have to be ensured as soon as possible through deactivation of strategic

The text of the joint statement is reproduced in documents CD/1460 and NPT/CONF.200/PC.I/6.

Also rq>roduced in document CD/1460.

CD/1327.

6


nuclear-delivery vehicles slated for elimination by the end of 2003; and the viability of the ABM Treaty should be preserved.

Attempts to address these concerns were made by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin in Helsinki and later through the signing, on 26 September in New York, of a number of supplementary agreements to the START II Treaty and to the ABM Treaty and other documents. On the basis of the Protocol to START II and a Joint Agreed Statement , the two countries agreed to shift the final implementation date by five years, from the first day of 2003 to the last day of 2007.** All systems scheduled for elimination under START II will have to be deactivated by the end of 2003, either by removing the nuclear re-entry vehicles from the missile or by taking other jointly agreed steps. The two countries also agreed to negotiate, after START II enters into force, a START III agreement that will lower the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads permitted each nation to 2,000 to 2,500, also by the end of 2007.

To deal with newly developing theatre missile defence systems, the United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine signed, also on 26 September, a series of agreements to help distinguish between permitted TMD and limited national missile defence (NMD) systems.* Thus, the ABM Treaty was multilateralized to include most of those countries on whose territory key elements of the former Soviet ABM system—i.e., early-warning radars and test ranges— are

US State Department Fact Sheet, 26 September, as quoted in Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 18, September 1997, pp. 32-33.

The 1993 Treaty provided for a ten-year reduction period. If the Treaty enters into force in 1998, the new protocol will re-establish ten years as the inq>lementation period.

Exchange of Letters on Early £)eactivation between the US Secretary of State and the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs of 26 September. US State Department Fact Sheet, 26 September.

Memorandum of Understanding on Succession to the ABM Treaty and several related documents: First Agreed Statement Relating to the ABM Treaty; Second Agreed Statement Relating to the ABM Treaty; a Joint Statement on the Annual Exchange of Information; Agreement on Confidence- Building Measures; Regulations of the Standing Consultative Commission and statements by each party with respect to systems to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles. US State Department, Office of the Spokesman, 26 September.

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deployed. The successor States “collectively” assumed the rights and obligations of the tomer USSR, which means that they are permitted only a single ABM system deployment area and a total of no more than IS ABM launchers at ABM test ranges among the four of them.

In order to give concrete substance to their shared commitment to build a stable, peaceful and undivided Eur<^, NATO and Russia signed the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security*® in Paris on 27 May, establishing a NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council to provide a forum for consultations, coordination and, to the maximum extent possible, where appropriate, for joint decisions and joint action with respect to security issues of common concern in Europe.

Issues related to the CTBT

The Secretary-General, as depositary of the CTBT, submitted a report to the General Assembly on the status of the Treaty,^ indicating that, between January and 29 October, the date of issuance of his report, 10 more States had signed it and S more had ratified it. (For the complete status of the Treaty, see appendix I.)

The Preparatory Comndssion for the CFBT Organization

The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), established on 19 November 1996, met in its first session from 20 to 22 November 1996 in New York. It was able to reach agreement on its agenda, provisional rules of procedure, provisional financial regulations, provisional staff regulations and the Host Country Agreement with Austria. (The Treaty designates Vienna as the seat of the Organization, once it enters into force.) Three days proved, however, to be insufficient to agree on several other crucial issues, among them, the setting-up of the Commission’s Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS), thus necessitating the resumption of the session from 3 to 7 March 1997 in Geneva.

In March, the resumed Preparatory Commission decided, inter alia, to aiq)oint Mr. Wolfgang Hoffmann (Federal Republic of Germany) as its Executive Secretary until 2 March 1999; establish

A/52/161-S/1997/413, annex, appendix.

^ A/52/545, annex.

8


the PTS to assist it in preparing for the implementation of the Treaty’s verification system; establish two working groups—on administrative and budgetary matters and on verification issues, respectively; and adopt a programme of work and budget for the remainder of 1997. The PTS officially started work in Vienna on 17 March.

With a view to taking all necessary measures to ensure the rapid and effective establishment of the global verificatim regime foreseen in the Treaty, the Preparatory Commission held three more sessions in 1997, while its two working groups and a financial advisory group also met between sessions to prepare for plenary sessions. At its second session, from 12 to 16 May, the Commission, inter alia, adopted the plans recommended by its verification working group for the commissioning of the International Data Centre (IDC), which is to receive, collect, process, analyse, report on and archive data from the International Monitoring System (IMS) facilities, and the specifications on the seismic, infrasound, radionuclide and hydroacoustic stations of the IMS (a worldwide network of 321 monitoring staticxis); in addition, it tasked the PTS with implementing the steps to acquire the global communications infrastructure.

At its third session, from 15 to 19 September, in reviewing its programme and budget for 1998, differences over how fast to establish the operaticMial veriflcation system became pronounce. While some signatories called for the establishment of the system at the earliest possible date, others favoured a measured pace or felt such a pace to be unavoidable. Agreement was reached at the Commission’s fourth session, from IS to 18 December, to approve a programme of work and budget for 1998 ($US S8.4 million).

With the authorization of the Commission, a training programme was initiated at the prototype IDC in Arlington, Virginia. In addition, two regional workshops were held in the framework of a training programme aimed at providing a technical overview of the Treaty and its verification regime (IMS, IDC and on-site inspection (OSI)) from 10 to 14 November at the Instituto Nacional de Prevencidn Sfsmica (INPRES) in San Juan, Argentina, and from 1 to S December at the Council for Geoscience in Pretoria and the Atomic Energy Corporation in Pelindaba, South Africa. With the goal of providing advice to the Preparatory Commission on the technical issues involved in OSIs and of developing guidelines and procedures for an OSI manual, a workshop was held in Vienna from 31 July to 4 August. It

9


is planned to continue such training and orientation progranunes in 1998 and, upon the decision of the Commission, non-State signatories, whether they host IMS facilities or not, will be invited.

On 22 September, President Clinton submitted the CTBT, signed by the United States in September 1996, to the Senate for ratification, noting that the conclusion of the Treaty was a signal event in the history of arms control, creating an absolute prohibition against the conduct of nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosion anywhere.2*

Although the CTBT had not entered into force by the end of the year, the signing of the Treaty by the five nuclear-weapon States strengthened their unilateral moratoriums on testing^ and their commitments on the basis of protocols attached to treaties concerning nuclear-weapon-free zones.

During the year, the United States conducted two subcritical experiments at the Nevada Test Site (on 2 July and on 18 September), stating that they were scientific experiments to obtain technical information in support of the Department of Energy (DOE) programme to maintain the safety and reliability of the United States nuclear

Letter from President Clinton to the Senate, The White House, 22 September, as quoted in Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 18, September 1997,p. 43.

The unilateral moratoriums of the five nuclear-weapon States were declared at different times. The former USSR conducted its last nuclear test on 24 October 1990 (The Russian Federation maintained the moratorium); the United Kingdom’s last test was on 26 November 1991 and the United States, on 23 September 1992. China conducted its last test explosion on 29 July 1996 and declared a moratorium on further testing effective the next day. France conducted its last nuclear test explosion on 27 January 1996 and announced the end of its testing programme two days later (France had not conducted nuclear tests from 15 June 1991 to 5 September 1995). See The Yearbook, vol. 21: 1996, p. 3. See also the note of the Secretary-General, “Notification of nuclear tests” (A/52/88) and annex and appendices I and II conveying a communication from Australia to which it attached data on nuclear explosions detected from January to September 1996. Australia stated that, in view of the signing of the CTBT, in the future it would submit data only if a test was actually detected.

23 US Department of Energy Press Release, R-97-064, 2 July and R-97-094, 18 September, as quoted in Disannament Diplomacy, no. 17, July/ August 1997, p. 25, and no. 18, September 1997, p. 47, respectively.

10


weapms stockpiles without nuclear testing. Although it is ccmsidered that these types of tests are not prohibited by the CTBT, a number of countries expressed concerns regarding them^ and stressed that ongoing laboratory nuclear tests might hinder the process of ratification of the Treaty.

TWenty-four September marked the first anniversary of the can ing for signature of die CTBT. In a statement on the eve of the anniversary, the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission’s PTS noted that the Treaty banned all nuclear-weapon test explosions and, by constraining any significant development of nuclear weapons, laid the ground for further advancing nuclear disarmament. *

A month later, on 23 October, the Executive Secretary addressed the First Committee. He stated that, as the installation of a global verification regime by the time of the Treaty’s entry into force was one of the important mandates of the Organization, the Secretariat had undertaken a number of measures to build up the International Monitoring Syustem. After explaining the work of the Preparatory Commission and its subsidiary bodies, Mr. Hoffmann concluded by stressing the efforts being unctertaken to prepare for entry into force of the Treaty— an agreement which, properly monitored and enforced, would contribute to ending the qualitative arms race, thereby encouraging much deeper cuts in nuclear arsenals than had been achieved thus far.

Fissile material cut-off

Although in 1997 the Conference on Disarmament did not agree to establish an ad hoc committee to negotiate a fissile material cut-off treaty, the issue was extensively addressed during the plenary and informal meetings of the Conference. Differences among States c(xi- ceming fissile material were reflected in two different approaches: one advocating a cut-off convention as a separate measure, and the other, a measure to be taken within a programme for nuclear disarmament. Also, there were differences regarding scope, i.e., whether the convention should deal only with future production of fissile material or encompass the existing stockpiles.

2“* Indonesia circulated a statement of concern (CD/1469).

^ Press release DCF/316, 23 September.

11


From the very outset of the session, the Western Group, supported by a number of Eastern European countries, called for the immediate re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee and the commencement of negotiations on a convention as a stand-alone measure not linked to other measures of nuclear disarmament, using as a basis the 199S report of the Special Coordinator and the mandate contained therein.^ Germany formally proposed such actioa These States reiterated that the mandate was flexible enough to permit addressing the security concerns of all States and provided a good basis for negotiations on a measure that many regarded as complementary to the CTBT and an essential contribution to the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament. The United States, the United Kingdom, France and Austria pointed out that a cut-off treaty would codify the unilateral policy declarations of nuclear-weapon States on the cessation of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons in the form of an international and verifiable obligation. Some Western countries—in particular Austria and Japan—felt that negotiations on a fissile material cut-off could be accompanied by an examination, conducted within the framework of some kind of mechanism established by the Conference, of other nuclear disarmament measures that could be negotiated in the CD.

The non-aligned countries—in particular Egypt, Mexico and Pakistan— for their part, considered a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear w ei^ns as part and parcel of the overall process of nuclear disarmament and also stressed the importance of addressing the issue of existing stockpiles of fissile material in any negotiations. India reiterated its conviction that the issue of stockpiles, the inclusion of tritium and the problem of surplus stocks could be clarified by placing the mandate for an ad hoc committee on a cut-off treaty within the multilateral nuclear disarmament process. Such a treaty could be a useful and necessary step, but only within a framework of a negotiated, phased programme fen: the elimination of nuclear weapons. Views of the non-aligned countries on this subject were, as mentioned above, (see page 4) formalized in a proposal submitted by Mexico

CD/1299. The report is known as the Shannon leport, after Gerald Shannon of Canada, who conducted the consultations.

12


on behalf of 26 delegations belonging to the Group of 21.^In view of the divergence of views on an ap[HX)priate mechanism

to deal with the subject, neither the formal proposal of Germany to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee nor the above-mentioned proposal by States belonging to the Group of 21 commanded consensus.

During the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the NPT, there was considerable discussion concerning fissile material and, in particular, the negotiation of a cut-off treaty (see page 45). In the First Committee, Norway pointed out that a cut-off agreement would be an important means of reducing the availability of fissile material, and reiterated its proposal, submitted at the Preparatory Committee, for a series of transparency measures to be taken to facilitate the negotiation of such an agreement. Also speaking in the First Conunittee, Russia noted that its decision to gradually remove from nuclear military programmes up to 500 tons of highly enriched uranium and up to 50 tons of weapons-grade plutonium was an effective contribution towards rendering the process of nuclear disarmament irreversible.^

At the bilateral level, the United States and Russia signed a joint statement on material protection, control and accounting during a meeting of the Gore-Chemomyrdin Commission (6-7 February). On 23 September, the United States-Russian Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement was signed, which entered into force immediately. The agreement marked the first time that the two States had placed limits on the materials for nuclear warheads themselves rather than on their delivery vehicles, as was done in the START and INF treaties. Under it, Russia and the United States agreed not to restart any of their plutonium production reactors that had already been shut down; by the year 2000, Russia would convert, with United States assistance, its three operating reactors so that they would cease all production of weapons-grade plutonium; plutonium produced henceforth until the reactors were converted, and any uranium recovered from the spent fuel of the converted reactors, would not be used in nuclear weapons; and fresh fiiei for the converted reactors would incorporate

27 CD/1463.

^ This initiative was put forward by President Yeltsin in his address to the 40th anniversary session of the IAEA General Conference, in September.

13


uranium derived from dismantled nuclear weapons, thereby helping to reduce that stockpile as well. The agreement also provided for an extensive monitoring regime. ^

On 30 September, representatives of the United States, Russia and the IAEA met in Vienna to review the progress made over the year in the trilateral initiative^^ to consider practical measures for the application of IAEA verification to weapons-origin fissile material. The Joint Group addressed the scope and purposes of IAEA verification, the location, types, and amount of weapons-origin fissile material potentially subject to IAEA verification and other questions. During the year, Russian and United States experts exchanged visits and invited IAEA experts for a joint demonstration of verification and monitoring technologies. *

IAEA safeguards

The Committee on Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System^ completed its mandate and transmitted the draft Model Protocol Additional to Safeguards Agreements for consideration and approval of the Board of Govemors,^ and on IS May, the Board approved it. This Protocol represents the first major change in the IAEA’s safeguards system in 25 years and identifies new technologies and new methods to strengthen safeguards and improve efficiency. The strengthened safeguards verification system of the IAEA will focus on three elements: (a) increased access

^ Fact Sheet on US-Russian Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement, White House Office of the Vice-President, 23 September, as quoted in Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 18, September 1997, p. 37.

The trilateral initiative was launclied on 17 September 1996 by the Russian Minister of Atomic Energy, the US Secretary of Energy and the Director General of IAEA.

IAEA Press Release, PR 97/26, 30 Sq>tember.

The Committee was established by the Board of Governors in 1996 to draw up a draft model protocol to supplement the existing safeguards inspection agreements between the IAEA and non-nuclear-weapon States and to defme the nature of additional information and additional access to nuclear- related locations that are to be inspected. It held two meetings in 1997, from 20 to 31 January and from 2 to 4 April.

35 GOV/2914, attachment 1.

14


to information about a State’s nuclear activities; (b) broader access to nuclear sites and other locations within a State, involving no-notice inspections and greater freedom of movement for inspectors; and (c) maximum use of new and available technologies to inaease detection capacity and, in due course, to reduce the frequency of on-site inspections. The five nuclear-weapon States expressed their intention to apply those measures provided for in the Model Protocol that each of them identified as capable of contributing to the non-proliferation and efficiency aims of the Protocol and as consistent with their obligations under tte NPT.

The General Conference requested all States having IAEA safeguards agreements to accept the measures provided in the Model Protocol and to sign additional protocols promptly.’^

With regard to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the General Conference considered the report by the Director GeneraP^ on the implementation of the agreement between the Agency and the DPRK for the application of safeguards in connection with the NPT, in which he pointed out that there continued to exist a fundamental difference of view between the Agency and the DPRK regarding the current status of the safeguards agreement, and although there had been improvement in the means of communication and the DPRK had also accepted the designation of additional inspectors, cooperation remained limited. On 3 October, the CcHiference adopted a resolution in which, among other things, it ex[»:essed concern over the continuing non-compliance of the DPRK with the lAEA-DPRK safeguards agreement, called upon the DPRK to comply fully with it and to cooperate fiiUy with the Agency in implementing it.^

The Nuclear Monitoring Group of the IAEA, assisted by and in coordination with the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), continued to implement an ongoing plan for nKmitoring and verifying Iraq’s conq>liance with relevant Security Council resolutions. The deterioration in the relations between Iraq and UNSCOM, which resulted in a number of Security Council resolutions and presi-

^ By the end of 1997, six States had signed a Protocol Additional to their safeguards agreements (Armenia, Australia, Georgia, Philippines, Poland and Uruguay).

IAEA General Conference document GC(41)/17.

IAEA General Conference resolution GC(41)/RES/22.

15


dential statements, ' also affected the work of the IAEA inspection teams. The IAEA General Conference adopted, on 3 October, a resolution^ on the inq>lementation of United Nations Security Council resolutions relating to Iraq, by which it stressed Iraq’s obligation to hand over without further delay currently undisclosed nuclear- weapon-related equipment, material and information and to allow IAEA inspectors unconditional and unrestricted rights of access, in acccM'dance with Security Council resolution 707 (1991).

The question of the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East continued to be discussed in the United Nations and the IAEA, especially in the light of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the NPT 1995 Review Conference.^ Both the United Nations General Assembly and the IAEA General Conference ad< ted resolutions on the subject calling for accession to the NPT by the ncm-party in the region and the placing of all unsafeguarded nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards.'*®

Nuclear safety and radioactive waste

On 29 September, in Vienna, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management was opened for signature.** The Joint Convention applies to spent fuel and radioactive waste resulting from civilian nuclear reactors and applications and to spent fuel and radioactive waste from

See Security Council resolutions S/1997/1115 of 21 June, S/1997/1134 of 23 October and S/1997/1137 of 12 November; and presidential statements S/PRST/1997/49, S/PRST/1997/51, S/PRST/1997/54 and S/PRST/1997/56.

^ GC(41)/RES/23. See also the consolidated reports of the Director General of the IAEA to the Security Council (S/1997/297 of 11 April and S/1997/779 of 8 October).

The text of the resolution can be found in The Yearbook, vol. 20: 1995, pp. 28-29.

^ See General Assembly resolution 52/41 (page 313) and IAEA resolution GC(41)/RES/25.

By 31 December, the following States had signed the Convoition: Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Indonesia, freland, Kazakhstan. Republic of Korea, L^anon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Morocco, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine. United Kingdom and United States.

16


military (x defence programmes if and when such materials are transferred permanently to and managed within exclusively civilian programmes, or when declared as spent fuel or radioactive waste for the purpose of the Convention. The obligations of the contracting parties with respect to the safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste management are based to a large extent on the principles contained in the IAEA safety fundamentals document “The Principles of Radioactive Waste Management”.

The International Advisory Committee on the Study of the Radiological Situation at the Atolls of Mururoa and Fangataufa, established in 1996 by the IAEA at the request of France, was asked to assess the radiological situation at the two atolls and involved areas from the point of view of radiological safety; ascertain whether there were any radiological hazards to people, and make reconunendations on the form, scale and duration of any monitoring, remedial action or other follow-up action that might be required. The Committee set up a number of task groups and working groups. The final drafts of their technical reports were completed by the end of the year, and a meeting of the Committee is scheduled for February 1998, at which it is expected to approve the study. An international conference on the study is planned for the middle of 1998, at which the results will be discussed by the scientific community and other interested parties.'*

The Group of Seven (G-7) and the Russian Federation, at a meeting held in Denver, United States, on 22 June, adopted a final communi- qu6‘*3 in which they reaffirmed their commitment, made at the 1996 Moscow Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security,'* to give absolute priority to safety in the use of nuclear energy and noted that further substantial progress was still required in Central and Eastern E u n ^ and in the newly independent States, especially by strengthening regulatory

The Committee is composed of ten prominent scientists from ten member States plus ex-officio rq>resentatives from WHO, UNSCEAR, the South Pacific Forum and the European Commission (GOV/INF/815- GC(41)/INF/6).

US Government wel)site.

** The documents of the Moscow Summit on Nuclear Safety, including the programme regarding illicit trafficking, mentioned t>elow, were circulated as a document of the General Assembly (A/S 1/131).

17


authorities, enhancing reactor safety and improving safety culture. With respect to the effective management of fissile material no longer required fcHT defence purposes, they pledged that they would continue their cooperation through concrete initiatives, in particular the French- German-Russian project to build a pilot plant in Russia to produce mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel from weapons plutonium, and related United States-Russian cooperation on the conversion of weapons plutonium. The eight States also noted that they had taken steps to implement the agreed “Programme for preventing and combating illicit trafficking in nuclear material”, ad(q>ted in Moscow.

When the General Conference of the IAEA convened in the fall, it welcomed the confirmaticn by the participants of the Denver Summit of their commitment to implement the [programme for preventing illicit trafficking. It also welcomed the activities in the fields of prevention, response, training and information exchange that were undertaken by the IAEA Seaetariat in support of eflbrts in this area.'*

Although the CD did not establish an ad hoc conunittee to deal with radiological weapons, during plenary meetings, some delegations reafHrmed or elaborated their respective positions on the subject, as previously expressed and recorded in the annual reports of the Conference.

Related export controls

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) held its plenary meeting in Ottawa on 8 and 9 May, the first plenary meeting of the Group in North America, attended by representatives of 34 member States.^ The Group noted its c(Mitinuing efforts to promote greater transparency and openness in its activities through increased and improve dialogue with non-member States. In connection with its outreach programme, the Group hosted an international seminar on the Role of Export Controls in Nuclear Non-Proliferation from 6 to 7 October, in Vienna, at which the question of transparency was the main focus.

See IAEA General Conference resolution GC(41)/RES/17.

^ Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Bnland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania. Russian Federation, South Africa, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States. The ^ropean Commission is a pmnanent observer.

18


The 29 member States'* of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) held a plenary meeting from 4 to 6 November in Tokyo. While reaffirming that the regime was an essential mechanism to prevent proliferation of missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, they expressed concern over efforts in some parts of Asia and the Middle East to develop, acquire and deploy missiles. Thus they stressed that they would continue to call for restraint and vigilance in missile-related exports in their bilateral contacts with non-members, and they sq)pealed to all States and authorities to support the MTCR’s non-proUferation aims and adopt its guidelines fa: sensitive missile-related transfers, and they encouraged regional security f(»ums and institutions to give attention to the role of export controls.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

A number of positive developments took place with respect to existing nuclear-weapon-free zones (for details on status, see appendix I), or to some new initiatives. There was, however, no progress on two long-standing proposals for zones in South Asia and the Middle East. The vast majority of States supported the concept of nuclear-weapon- free zones during the debate in the Conference on Disarmament, the Disarmament Commission and the First Committee, especially those belonging to regions where they have already been established. For discussion at the NPT Preparatory Committee, see page 48.

With respect to the existing nuclear-weapon-free zones, the States parties to the TIatelolco Treaty marked, on 14 February, its 30th anniversary by a special session of the General Conference of OPANAL, and by holding an international seminar on the topic “Nuclear-weapon-free zcmes in the next century” in Mexico City on 13 and 14 February. The countries of the region continued to take concrete steps during the year to consolidate the regime of military denuclearizati(Hi established by the Treaty.

The following States are members of the MTCR: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany. Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Sweden. Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States. Turkey, which joined the MTCR in August, attended for the first time.

19


As for the Treaty of Rarotonga, the United Kingdom ratified, on 19 September, all three protocols to the Treaty. The status of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty remained almost unchanged from 1996. The Bangkok Treaty entered into force on 27 March, after the required number of instruments of ratification had been deposited.^ Consultations between the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and various nuclear- weapon States continued during the year; however, differences between the two groups persisted, and as of the end of the year, none of the nuclear-weapon States had signed the Protocol to the Treaty. At an ASEAN meeting in December, ASEAN officials were encouraged to finalize the revision of the Protocol so as to enable all the original signatories to ratify the Treaty and the nuclear-wes^n-States to sign the Protocol.

The removal of nuclear wesymns from the territory of Kazakhstan and the signing of the NPT by it and the other four States of Central Asia had created a new culture of nuclear security in the region. Owing to these positive steps and to developments in adjacent regions, an earlier initiative launched by Kyrgyzstan to estabUsh a nuclear-free zone in the region was endorsed by the General Assembly in 1997 (resolution 52/38 8).“*’ However, the revival of the old proposals for a nuclear-free zone or space in Central and Eastern ^ o p e , advocated by Belarus and Ukraine, did not meet with the approval of some States because of the evident interest of many Central and Eastern European States in joining NATO. Among the nuclear-weapon States, China and Russia expressly supported the establishment of such a zone or space.

The large number of States belonging to the existing nuclear- weapon-free zones maintained that the Antarctic Treaty and the treaties of TIatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba were gradually freeing the entire southern hemisphere and adjacent areas from nuclear weapons, and called upon the parties to these treaties to promote the nuclear-weapon-free status of the hemisphere. The resolution that these States sponsored, which was subsequently adopted as resol-

According to article 16, the Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of the seventh instrument of ratification and /or accession.

In this connection, see the Almaty Declaration (A/52/112, annex) and the Tashkent statement (A/S2/390, annex).

20


ution 52/38 N, remained controversial (see page 36) and was not acceptable to the Western nuclear-weapon States, and a large number of Western and Eastern European States (including Russia) abstained.

Security assurances

Although the issue of negative security assurances was discussed at the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 NPT Review Conference (see page 48), in the CD and in the First Committee of the General Assembly, the positions of States remained virtually unchanged. In the Conference on Disarmament, the members of the Group of 21, " believing that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, it was in^rative to have in place effective international arrangements and that the assurances thus far given and reflected in Security Council resolution 984 (1995) fell short of the expectations of the non-nuclear- weapon States, advocated the re-establishment of an ad hoc committee on negative security assurances. China shared this position, although it viewed the 1992 mandate^ being proposed for such an ad hoc committee as outdated and weak. Towards the end of the session. South Africa, recalling its prc^sal made at the Preparatory Committee, stated that the appropriate venue for discussion of security assurances was the strengthened review process of the NPT, and that, therefore, it opposed the establishment of an ad hoc committee on this item in the CD.

The Italian Foreign Minister expressed the view that one of the most promising goals was that of addressing the issue of strengthening positive and negative assurances, and Ukraine noted that the drawing up of a multilateral treaty on the subject was acceptable to almost all members of the CD and could offer a way out of deadlock. A number of Western delegations expressed some doubts and reservations with regard to the wording of the 1992 mandate for an ad hoc committee on security assurances, and a large number of delegations suggested that the current mandate should be updated.

Russia, referring to the assurances that it and other nuclear States had given to the States parties to the NPT, noted that, in addition, the regional arrangements set out in nuclear-we^n-free zone treaties

See documoit CD/1462.

See document CD/1121, containing the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee in 1992.

21


had gone a long way towards providing the assurances that the nonnuclear States had been pursuing for many years.

Advisory opinion o f the International Court of Justice

The International Court of Justice advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, issued on 8 July 1996, was referred to in the debate in the CD and the First Conunittee. A large number of States, especially non-aligned, referred to the opinion in support of their positions concerning nuclear disarmament and io^lementation of article VI of the NPT. However, a number of countries, especially some nuclear-weapon States, considered that the draft resolution on the advisory opinion either misinterpreted it or quoted selectively from it. As a result, the resolution on the subject (52/38 O) was adopted with a considerable number of States voting against it (including four nuclear-weapon States) or abstaining (see page 27).

Disarmament Commission, 1997

Upon the recommendation of the General Assembly, the Disarmament Commission began, at its 1997 session, to consider an agenda item entitled “Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region cm- cemed”. The item was considered and reported on by Working Group

which focused its work on four broad areas: general overview and introduction, scope, principles and objectives, and recommendations. As had been the case in the First Committee, varying national security concerns on the part of some States were very evident, although the vast majority supported the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones as contributing to the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime and regional and global security. Some progress was, nevertheless, achieved. It was decided that at the next session the Commission would consider, among other things, the following aspects: scope of the discussion, as well as topics relating to nuclear-weapon-free zones as means for enhancing peace, security and stability; the characteristics of the region concerned, including the geographical definition of the zone; the relationship between nuclear-weap(m-free zones and

See Official Records of the General Assembly, F^-second Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/52/42).

22


existing treaties or agreements; the role of verification; and consultation and negotiating processes and elements conducive to the establishment of such zones.

General Assembly, 1997

The General Assembly too(c action on 14 draft resolutions and one decision dealing with the subjects discussed in this chapter and adopted all resolutions on 9 December.

Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation

On 6 November, the representative of Japan, on behalf of the sponsors,introduced a draft resolution entitled Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, which had already been slightly revised.

On 7 November, Pakistan submitted amendments to the draft text to address its concerns, as set out below in its explanation of vote. However, at the last meeting, on 17 November, it announced that it would not press its ameiidments to a vote.

On the same date, the Committee took action, adopting the ninth preambular paragraph (welcoming the adoption of the CTBT) by a recorded vote of 141 to 1 (India), with 4 abstentions; operative paragraph 1 (referring to the importance of universal adherence to the NPT) by a recorded vote of 142 to 3 (India, Israel, Pakistan), with 1 abstention (Cuba); and the draft resolution as a whole by a receded vote of 138 to none, with 9 abstentions.

Among those abstaining on the draft as a whole, Pakistan voted negatively on operative paragraph 1, which put the focus on nonproliferation instead of on nuclear disarmament. It could not support the draft resolution as a whole for the same reason and because it omitted mention of several relevant negative develc^ments and did not renounce the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. India voted against operative paragraph 1 because it had no intention of acceding to the NPT and against the ninth preambular paragraph because of its well-

Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmaik, Bnland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland. Ireland, Italy, Japan. Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands. New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Portugal, Romania, South Afirica, Spain and Sweden.

23


known position on the CTBT, it abstained on the text as a whole because it seemed to seek to translate the inequality of the NPT into customary law. Cuba abstained in the vote on the draft resolution as a whole and on operative paragraph 1 because it, like India and Pakistan, believed that the draft resolution, despite its title, focused on questions of non-proliferation. Algeria, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Nigeria, all of whom voted affirmatively on the separate votes, abstained on the text as a whole for the same reasons given by Pakistan and Cuba. Iran also believed that it was too early to welcome the extension of the NPT (seventh preambular paragraph), and Algeria, noting that the draft text did not give priority to achieving the elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework, stated that it would have voted for the amendments of Pakistan.

Among those supporting the draft resolution on all three counts, China noted that the current text was comprehensive and balanced, an improvement over those of the past two years. Bangladesh considered that the NPT and the CTBT constituted steps towards complete nuclear disarmament, but it would have liked to see a much sticmger thrust in that direction than was conveyed by the language contained in the current draft. Mexico stated that it would have voted in favour of the amendments had they been put to the vote.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 156 to none, with 10 abstentions. For the text of resolution 52/38 K, Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, and the voting pattern, see pages 285 and 351, respectively.

On 7 November, the representative of Myanmar introduced a draft resolution entitled Nuclear disarmament* on behalf of the sponsors. On 10 November, the First Committee adopted the draft text by a recorded vote of 97 to 39, with 17 abstentions.

At the time of its consideration of the draft resolution, the First Committee had before it a note by the Secretary-General on the subject (A/S2/414), pursuant to resolution S1/4S O.

Algeria, Angola, Bangladesh. Brunei Darussalam, Burundi. Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador. Egypt. El Salvador. Ethiopia. Fiji. Ghana. Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic oQ, Iraq, Kenya. Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Malaysia, Mexico. Mongolia.

24


Qiina, voting in favour, tield that it would never evade its obligations and responsibilities with regard to nuclear disarmament and that it, together with other nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, would like to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. Within the framework of negotiation of a treaty, specific measures, steps and a timetable should be defined.

Among those abstaining, Chile stated that, although it agreed with the text’s objectives, the imposition of a rigid time-frame for con^liance would impede the delicate negotiations on nuclear disarmament Japan also noted that the element of a time-bound framework did not command the support of all the nuclear-weapon States. Furthermore, the draft did not contain any reference to the NPT review process, which Japan considered one of the most effective, realistic and solid frameworks for the promotion of nuclear disarmament.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 109 to 39, with 18 abstentions. For the text of resolution 52/38 L, Nuclear disarmament, and the voting pattern, see pages 287 and 352, respectively.

On 7 November, the representative of the United States, on behalf of the sponsors,^ introduced a revised draft resolution entitled Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament. On 10 November, the First Committee adopted it by a recorded vote of 147 to none, with 8 abstentions.

Cuba, India and the Islamic Republic of Iran explained their abstentions. Cuba held that the draft text made no critical assessment of the current state of bilateral negotiations on nuclear weapons. Moreover, it reflected a partial and selective approach to the important

Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan. Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, N et Nam and Zimbabwe. Subsequent sponsors: Bhutan and Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Costa Rica. Croatia, Czech R^ublic, Denmaric, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Marshall Islands, Netherian^, New Zealand. Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States. Subsequent sponsors: Rrance, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Liberia and Uzbekistan.

25


matter it dealt with. India abstained for the following reasons: drawing attention to setbacks in arms control efforts, it noted that with the extended time-frames, the START process was slowing down further; it also noted that the process was only bilateral and needed to be part of multilateral and comprehensive negotiations leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework. It called for greater transparency, commitment to irreversibility and mulUlaterally verifiable de-alerting and de-activation procedures. The Islamic Republic of Iran pointed out that there was no reference to the Conference on Disarmament as the sole negotiating body in the field of disarmament and that the tone was self-satisfactory with regard to nuclear-arms negotiations. Moreover, Iran had no means of substantiating or verifying the reference in the eleventh preambular paragraph to significant reductions made by other nuclear-weapon States, and with regard to the fifth preambular paragraph, it could appreciate the imp(»:tance of the extensicm of the NPT only after the decisions taken in the 1995 Conference were fully implemented.

Pakistan, which voted in favour, stated that the Assembly should take into account both the positive and negative developments that had taken place in the context of negotiations for nuclear disarmament. The current text focused only on the positive developments and failed to mention issues that were a source of concern.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 161 to none, with 8 abstentions. For the text of resolution 52/38 M, Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament, and the voting pattern, see pages 290 and 353, respectively.

On 6 November, the representative of India introduced a draft resolution entitled Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons on behalf of the sponsors.®’ On 10 November, the First Committee adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 95 to 30, with 28 abstentions.

AmcMig those that abstained, Japan underlined that steady, step- by-step progress in nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament

Bangladesh, Bhutan. Bolivia. Botswana. Brunei Darussalam. Colombia, Cuba. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Ecuador. Egypt. El Salvador. Ethiopia. Haiti. India. Indonesia, Iran (Islamic R^ublic oQ. Kenya, Lao People’s Democratic Republic. Lesotho, Malaysia. Mexico. Myanmar. Nepal. Nigeria. Philippines. Sudan and Viet Nam

26


was the only way to achieve the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. It attached particular importance to the strengthening of the NPT regime and to the early commencement of negotiations on a cut-off treaty, as well as to concrete efforts by nuclear-weapon States towards nuclear disarmament.

China, which voted in favour, believed that the draft convention could become one of the bases for further negotiations. It reiterated its long-standing proposal that, before nuclear weapons were completely destroyed, the nuclear-weapon States should unconditicHially undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to use or threaten to use them against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones. It had reservations on some of the wording of the draft text and the draft convention, stating that, in accordance with the Charter, all countries had the right of self-defence.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 109 to 30, with 27 abstentions. For the text of resolution 52/39 C, Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Wec^ons and the voting pattern, see pages 307 and 359, respectively.

On 6 November, the representative of Malaysia, on behalf of the sponsors, * introduced a draft resolution entitled Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. On 10 November, the First Committee took action on the draft text as follows: the tenth i»eambular paragraph (on the need for the CD to commence negotiations on a programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons) was adopted by a recorded vote of 99 to 34, with 17 abstentions; operative paragraph1 (on the existing obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament), by a recorded vote of 139 to 5, with 9 abstentions; operative paragraph 2 (on the commencement of multilateral negotiations on a nuclear

Algeria, Bangladesh. Brazil, Brunei Darussalam. Burundi, Colombia, Costa Rica. Ecuador, El Salvador, Bjl, Ghana. Guyana, Honduras, India. Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Kenya, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malawi, Malaysia, Marshall Islands. Mexico, Mongolia, Myanmar, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Samoa, San Marino, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand. United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe. Subsequent sponsors: Egypt, Lesotho and Suriname.

27

n e UN Disarmament Yearbook: 1997

weapons convention), by a recorded vote of 96 to 34, with 23 abstentions; and the draft resolution as a whole by a recorded vote of 103 to 26, with 24 abstentions.

Belgium, Germany, Greece, the United Kingdom and the United States explained their negative votes on the draft resolution as a whole. Belgium, speaking also on behalf of the Benelux countries, Germany and Greece all voted in favour of operative paragr^h 1 because they attached great importance to the advisory opinion of the ICJ, but were unable to support the draft as a whole because they felt that it dealt with the Court’s opinion selectively and, in the view of Greece, misrei^esented its spirit and letter. The United Kingdom, which abstained in the voting on operative paragraph 1 because the draft coa- tained highly selective quotations from the Court’s advisory opinion, voted against the draft resolution as a whole and against operative paragraph 2 in view of that selectivity and on account of the unrealistic call in operative paragraph 2 for multilateral negotiations in 1998 leading to early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention. The United States pointed out that the references to article VI of the NPT and the principles and objectives decision document of the 199S NPT Conference, in the third and fourth preambular paragraphs, respectively, omitted mention of general and complete disarmament, thereby appearing to relieve non-nuclear-weapon States of any disarmament responsibilities. Furthermore, operative paragrai^s 1 and 2, taken to- geAer, attempted to turn the I d ’s advisory opinion into a legal edict that required inmiediate negotiations and their rapid conclusion in a multilateral forum. In the view of the United States, the Court’s statement regarding an obligation to conclude negotiations did not alter the subtance of the article VI obligation, since it inherently involved seeking a successful omclusion of negotiations.

Among those abstaining in the vote on the draft as a whole, Japan stated that it believed that it was more important for the international community to commence as early as possible negotiations on a cut-off treaty, which it considered the next realistic measure following the successful conclusion of the CTBT, rather than to commence in 1998 negotations leading to the conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention, as called for in the draft text. Japan voted in favour of operative paragraph 1 and abstained in the vote on the tenth preambular paragraidi and operative paragraiA 2.

28

Nuclear disarmament issties

A number of States voting afHrmatively on the draft resolution as a whole explained their positicm. Argentina stated that it would abstain on operative paragraph 2 because it believed that the commencement of such sensitive multilateral negotiations should itself be the subject of an agreement without any predetermined deadlines. Chile abstained in the vote on the tenth preambular paragraph because it believed that there was no need for a specific time-frame as a precondition for negotiating a multilateral instmment; that condition damaged the viability of such negotiations. Gabon, while welcoming the I d ’s advisory opinion, abstained on operative paragraph 2 because the wording, in its view, did not appear conducive to facilitating respect for that opinion. Sweden stated that it would vote in favour because it was imperative that the momentum in nuclear disarmament be maintained and further strengthened. Noting that both multilateral negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament and further effective measures by the nuclear-weapon States themselves bad an important role to play, Sweden would have wished to see that concept better reflected in the text. It pointed out that the Court did not, in fact, prescribe a particular forum for the achievement of global nuclear disarmament. Like Argentina, Sweden indicated that it would abstain in the vote on operative paragraph 2. South Africa welcomed the draft resolution, noting in particular the change made by the sponsors in the wording in the tenth preambular paragraph.

On 9 December, the General Assembly took action cm the draft resolution, at which time Chile withdrew its request for a separate vote on the tenth preambular paragraph. The Assembly adopted operative paragraph 1 by a recorded vote of 152 to 6, with 6 abstentions, operative paragraph 2 by a recorded vote of 106 to 34, with 24 abstentions, and the draft resolution as a whole by a recorded vote of 116 to 26, with 24 abstentions. For the text of resolution 52/38 O, Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, and the voting pattem, see pages 295 and 355, respectively.

On 5 November, the representative of Pakistan introduced a draft resolution entitled Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuckar-weapon States against the use or threat

29


of use of nuclear weapons on behalf of the sponsors.*® The First Committee took action on the draft on 10 November, adopting it by a recorded vote of 107 to none, with 48 abstentions.

Explaining its abstention, the Republic of Korea stated that, as in the previous year’s resolution, the current text did not take into account recent developments relating to security assurances and did not reflect its belief that negative security assurances should be provided only to States parties fully in conq>liance with the NPT. India, which believed that the only credible guarantee against nuclear weapons was their total elimination and had (»‘oposed the conclusion of an international agreement prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons as a step towards that end, voted in favour of the draft.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 116 to none, with 51 abstentions. For the text of resolution 52/36, Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and the voting pattern, see pages 266 and 342, respectively.

On 12 November, the representative of Egypt, on behalf of States Members of the United Nations that are members of the League of Arab States, introduced a draft resolution entitied The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.^ At the time of its introduction, the text had already been revised twice as a result of intensive consultations. On the same date, the First Committee took action on the draft text as follows. It first todc a separate recorded vote on the

Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Colombia, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Ghana, Guatemala, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of). Malaysia, Myanmar, Pakistan. Philippines, Sri Lanka. Sudan and Viet Nam. Subsequent sponsor: Ecuador.

^ At the time of its consideration of the draft resolution, the Rrst Committee had before a report of the Secretary-General (A/S2/4S4) conveying material forwarded by the IAEA, namely, the text of resolution GC(41)/RES/25 entitled “Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East” and of a presidential statement by which the General Conference requested the Director General to invite experts from the Middle East and other areas to a teachnical worlcshop on safeguards. veriHcation technologies and other related experience.

30


sixth preambular paragraph, which referred to the 1995 NPT Conference decision urging universal adherence to the Treaty, adopting it by a vote of 137 to 2, with 3 abstentions. It then adopted the draft as a whole by a recorded vote of 124 to 2 (Israel and United States), with 17 abstentims.

Israel cast a negative vote because another resolution that had ahready been adopted by consensus by the Conunittee—on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East— already covered all relevant topics of principle pertaining to the nuclear issue, rendering the current text superfluous and redundant; it stated that the only objective of the text was to single out and condemn Israel, with complete disregard for events in the region. Hie United States voted against the draft because it singled out Israel, which was unacceptable to the United States Government and did nothing to further arms ccmtrol.

India abstained in the vote on the draft resolution as a whole and voted against the sixth preambular paragraph because it could not support the call upon States not yet parties to the NPT to accede to it.

Among those supporting the draft, the Islamic Republic of Iran believed that Israel’s accession to the NPT would facilitate the establishment of a zone free from nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. Pakistan, which voted in favour because it endorsed the objective of promoting non-proliferation in the Middle East, expressed concern at the call in the sixth preambular paragraph for ac^rence to the NPT. Saudi Arabia stated that Israel’s accession to the NPT would have a positive influence on achieving peace among the States of the region and reinforce trust among the peoples of the Middle East.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 147 to 2, with 14 abstentions. For the text of resolution 52/41, The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, and the voting pattern, see pages 313 and 361, respectively.

On 6 November, the representative of Australia introduced a draft decision entitled Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, by which the General Assembly would decide to include the item in the provisional agenda of its next session. On 10 November, the First

31


Committee adopted the draft decision by a recorded vote of 148 to none, with 4 abstentions.

India, which abstained, expressed regret that the CTBT, in its present form, contained loopholes that were being exploited by some countries to continue their testing activity. Such activity, in its view, demonstrated the nuclear-weapon States’ continued reliance on nuclear weapons. India stressed that in order for the process of achieving global nuclear disarmament to be meaningful, it should be based only on genuine multilateral negotiations aimed at developing a phased [vogramme for the elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time framewcffk.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft decision by a recorded vote of 154 to none, with 4 abstentions. For the text of decision 52/414, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and the voting pattern, see pages 323 and 364, respectively.


The General Assembly adopted two draft resolutions relating to existing nuclear-weapon-free zones: Latin America and the Caribbean, and Africa. It also adopted traditional proposals for the establishment of zones in the regions of the Middle East and South Asia as well as a new proposal for a zone in Central Asia. Furthermore, it adopted a resolution on a nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere.

On 7 November, the representative of Mexico introduced a draft resolution entitled Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) on behalf of the sponsors.®' On 10 November, the First Committee adopted the draft resolution without a vote.

Israel stated that a nuclear-weapon-free zone should originate from within the region itself through free and direct negotiations among all the region’s constituents and should include mutual verifica-

Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada. Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. Subsequent sponsors: Bahamas and Suriname.

32


tion regimes. Moreover, a nuclear-weapon-free zone should take into account the specific characteristics of each region.

On 9 December, the General Assembly also adopted the draft resolution without a vote. For the text of resolution 52/45, Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty ofTlate- lolco), see page 318.

On 6 November, Kenya, on behalf of the Group of African States, introduced a draft resolution entitled African Nuclear-Weapon- Free Zone Treaty. On 10 November, the First Committee adopted the draft resolution without a vote.

Spain drew attention to operative paragraph 3, concerning Protocol III to the Treaty, and stated that its position on the matter had already been conveyed to the depositary of the Treaty. Nevertheless, Spain fully supported the objectives of the Treaty and was ccmvinced that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of agreements reached freely and by consensus among the States of the region strengthened international peace and security. Israel reiterated the position it had expressed with regard to the resolution on the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

On 9 December, the General Assembly also adc^ted the draft resolution without a vote. For the text of resolution 52/46, African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, see page 319.

On 7 November, the rejvesentative of Egypt introduced a draft resolution entitled Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East. ' At the same meetii^, the representative of Israel introduced two amendments, adding the phrase “the activities o f’ before the words “the multilateral Working Group”, in operative paragraph 4, and replacing the words “to actively pursue” with the words “to pursue” in operative paragraph 10—changes that would reflect the language of the corresponding resolution of 1996, resolution 51/41.

On 10 November, the representative of Egypt orally revised the draft resolution, incorporating the wording proposed by Israel,

At the time of its consideration of the draft resolution, the First Committee had before it a report of tlie Secretary-General (A/52/271) conveying the views of Egypt, Israel, Netherlands and the Syrian Arab Republic on the subject, pursuant to resolution 51/41.

33


which then withdrew its amendments. Subsequently, the draft text, as wally revised, was adopted without a vote.

The Islamic Republic of Iran regretted that it was unable to sponsor the draft resolution because of references to the peace negotiations, on which it had principled reservations. In its view, the main obstacle to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East was Israel’s refusal to join the NPT and to put its nuclear- weapon programme under IAEA s^eguards. Israel joined the consensus in spite of what it viewed as the inherent deficiencies of the text. It stated that the political realities in the region mandated a practical, step-by-step approach: beginning the process with confidence- building measures, establishing peaceful relations and reconciliation, and in due course complementing the process by dealing with conventional and non-conventional arms control. The Syrian Arab Republic would have favoured, in the ninth preambular paragraph, the inclusion of a reference to the Madrid agreements and to the formula of land for peace. Mth regard to operative paragraph 4, on negotiations and activities to promote mutual confidence and security in the Middle East, it stated that Israeli withdrawal from all its occupied Arab territories would encourage the strengthening of mutual trust and security in the region.

The General Assembly adopted the draft resolution, also without a vote, on 9 December. For the text of resolution 52/34, Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, see page 262.

On 6 November, the representative of Pakistan, on behalf of the sponsors,^ introduced a draft resolution entitled Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia.^ The draft text was adopted by the First Committee by a recorded vote of 139 to 3, with 8 abstentions.

India voted against the draft resolution because it did not fulfil any of the following United Nations-endCHrsed criteria: it did not ply to regions specifically defined with the consent of the States of the

Bangladesh and Pakistan.

^ At the time of its consideration of the draft resolution, the First Committee liad before it a note of the Seoetary-Genoal (A/S2/306) indicating that he had received no replies conv^ng the views of Member Stales on the question, pursuant to resolution 51/42.

34

Nuclear disarmament Issues

region; it did not taice into account the full range of the security concerns of all States; and it was not an arrangement likely to be freely arrived at among the States of the region.

Indonesia explained that it abstained in view of the fact that efforts towards the achievement of an agreement for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia were under way and had yet to be conclusively pursued.

Israel, which voted in favoui; maintained its position that a nuclear-weapon-free zone should originate from within the region itself through free and direct negotiations among all the region’s constituents and should include mutual verification regimes; the zone also had to take into account the specific characteristics of the region in question.

The General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 153 to 3, with 8 abstentions. For the text of resolution 52/35, Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia. and the voting pattern, see pages 265 and 341, respectively.

On 10 November, the representative of Uzbekistan, on behalf of the sponsors,introduced a draft resolution entitled Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. At the time of its introduction, the text bad already been revised with the deletion of a preambular paragraph reafHrming the right of all States to develop research into nuclear energy and the production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. At the same meeting, the First Committee adopted the revised draft without a vote.

The United States pointed out that its suppcHt for the draft followed not mly from its commitment to the MPT but from its longstanding policy of support in principle for nuclear-weapon-free zones, provided that; the initiative came from the States in the region; all important States participated in the zone; compliance provisions could be adequately verified; no existing security arrangements would be disturbed; zones would effectively prohibit the development or possession of any nuclear device; they would not affect existing rights under international law nor impose restrictions on the high seas freedoms of navigation. Israel reiterated the position it had expressed upon the adoption of the other draft resolutions on nuclear-weapon- free zones.

^ Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

35


On 9 December, the draft resolution was adopted by the General Assembly without a vote. For the text of resolution 52/38 S, Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia, see page 301.

On 7 November, the representative of Brazil, on behalf of the sponsors,^ introduced a draft resolution entitled The nuclear-weapon- free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas. Before adc^ting the draft as a whole, the First Conunittee first took a separate recorded vote on operative paragraph 3 (referring to resolutions on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and South Asia), adopting it by a vote of 130 to 1 (India), with 9 abstentions. It then adopted the text as a whole by a recorded vote of 109 to 4, with 36 abstentions.

The United States, speaking also on behalf of France and the United Kingdom, explained their negative votes on the draft as a whole. Since all land territory of the southem hemisphere, with the exception of a few small islands, was already covered by nuclear- weapon-free zones and the only new areas that such a zone could cover were the high seas, they could only conclude that the true aim of some sponsors was to create a new zone that covered international waters— a step that would be inconsistent with international law and should be unacceptable to all States that respect the Law of the Sea. Hie United States emphasized that their vote should in no way be interpreted as calling into question their firm commitment to the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba and the Antarctic, nor did they have objection in principle to the establishment of new nuclear-wei^n-free zones, which could make an important contribution to both regional and global security provided that they were supported

^ Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados. Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, BrazU, Brunei Darussalam, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cdte d’Ivoire, Djibouti. Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador. Ethiopia. Fiji. Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana. Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Jamaica. Kyrgyzstan. Liberia. Malaysia. Marshall Islands. Mexico. Micronesia (Federated States of). Mongolia. Mozambique, Namibia, New Zealand, Nigeria. Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sudan, Suriname, Thailand, Togo. Trinidad and Tobago, United Rq>ublic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela and Zimbabwe. Subsequent sponsors: Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Nicaragua and Tunisia.

36


by all States in the region concerned and were embodied in appropriate treaties that included provision for fiiU-scope IAEA safeguar<k.

Two States explained their abstentions. India had serious reservations about operative paragraph 3, referring to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, on which there was no consensus. Moreover, it felt that the second preambular paragraph referred to the elimination of weapons of mass destruction in a somewhat convoluted and oblique manner. Israel reiterated the position it had expressed regarding the other draft resolutions on nuclear- weapon-free zones; moreover, it, too, had reservations with regard to operative paragraph 3.

In explaining its vote in favour, China noted that the text referred to the applicable principles and rules of international law relating to rights of passage through maritime space and conveyed its understanding that the draft resolution did not seek to create any new legal obligations bey(xid the provisions of the existing nuclear-weapon-free- zone treaties.

On 9 December, the General Assembly took action on the draft resolution. It adopted operative paragraph 3 by a recorded vote of 159 to 1, with 4 abstentions, and the draft resolution as a whole by a recorded vote of 131 to 3, with 34 abstentions. For the text of resolution 52/38 N, The nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas, and the voting pattern, see pages 293 and 354, respectively.

In additicHi to adopting the resolutions on nuclear-we^n-firee zones, the General Assembly also adopted, by a recorded vote of 125 to 3 (France, United Kingdom, United States), with 40 abstentions, resolution 52/44, Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of P e a c e .By the resolution, the Assembly requested the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean to continue his dialogue on the Committee’s work with all of its members, the permanent members of the Security Council and the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean and to report at an early

For the report of the Ad Hoc Conunittee on the Indian Ocean, see Official Records of the General Assembly. F^-second Session. Supplement No. 29 (A/52/29).

37


date to the Assembly on his consultations and on other relevant developments.^

Nuclear waste

On 6 November, the representative of Kenya introduced a draft resolution entitled Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes on behalf of the sponsors.*’ At the time of its introduction, the text had already been revised to reflect the adoption of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (see page 16). On 10 November, the First Committee adopted the revised draft without a vote.

Two States that joined the consensus expressed reservations concerning operative paragraph 8, which refers to the Joint Convention. India noted that there were differences of opinion about what constituted waste, that spent fuel was a valuable resource, and not a waste, for many countries, and that the Joint Convention excluded military wastes. In its view, efforts to (sroduce a convention on the p'ohibition of radiological weapons should necessarily include military wastes in its purview, as the issue dealt with the military use of radiological weapons. Pakistan had not supported the adoption of the Joint Convention; it believed that, according to the mandate under which it was negotiated, the Convention should have dealt only with the safety of radioactive waste management.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution, also without a vote. For the text of resolution 52/381, Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes, see page 282.

Conclusion

After the opening for signature of the CTBT in 1996, and its signing by a vast majority of States, including the five nuclear-weapon States, the work of the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO and its subsidiary bodies to prepare for entry into force of the Treaty and to build up the International Monitoring System, together with the ongo-

^ A/52/29.

France, Kenya (on behalf of the Group of Afncan States) and Russian Federation. Subsequent sponsors: Costa Rica. Monaco and Niger.

38


ing NPT review process, were the most inqwrtant events in the multilateral nuclear field in 1997. Differences in priorities in nuclear disarmament between a majority of non-nuclear-weapon States and China, on the one hand, and the other nuclear-weapon States and some Western and Eastern Eurqpean countries, on the other, persisted in all disarmament forums. These differences were very prominent in the CD throughout the year. Although it was understood that the next step, after conclusion of the CTBT, would be negotiation of a treaty banning production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the linkage of that issue to agreement on other nuclear issues was crucial and no negotiations on any nuclear issues were initiated.

The reduction of nuclear weapons by the United States and the Russian Federation continued on the basis of existing treaties, and the question of ratification of START II by Russia remained on the agenda. To address this question and the delays encountered by Russia in dismantling its nuclear arsenal, the two States reached, in Helsinki, an understanding that once START II entered into force, they would immediately begin negotiations on START III, which would establish lower levels of their strategic nuclear warheads. Subsequently, a number of agreements and documents were signed by the two parties on the basis of which the deadline for elimination under START II was postponed. In addition, with the aim of preserving and enhancing the viability of the ABM Treaty, other documents were signed by which the Treaty was multilateralized to include Belams, Kazakhstan and Ukraine.

The IAEA made a major change in its safeguards system by adopting a model additional protocol to the existing agreements on safeguards, which is expected to increase its ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities. In the field of safety, the Agency opened for signature the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.

At the regional level, the consolidation of the regimes of the already established nuclear-weapon-free zones continued through further ratifications, and the Treaty of Bangkok entered into force. The General Assembly considered a new initiative aimed at the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Central Asia, and called upon all States to support it.

39

C H A P T E R II

The review process of the Non>Proliferation 'Hcaty

Introduction

At the 1995 MPT Review and Extension Conference,* the States parties to the Treaty adopted a package of decisions by which the Treaty was extended indefinitely, a new strengthened review process of the in^Iementation of the Treaty’s provisions was to begin in 1997 and, through the principles and objectives on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, benchmarks to measure the performance of all treaty parties, nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear weapon States, were established. The three decisions, together with the resolution on the Middle East, had a far-ceaching impact beyond the indefinite extensitm of the Treaty. The States parties ensured not only that the Treaty would be maintained as the core of the global nuclear-non- proliferation regime, but also that its indefinite extension would both reinforce and render permanent the international legal norm against the proliferaticm of nuclear weapons.

The first session of the Preparatory Committee was expected to set the stage for the inq>lementatic»i of the decision on strengthening the review process for the Treaty (reproduced in the annex to this chapter). What was foremost in the minds of those involved was to see how the conmiitment to embark upon a new, strengthened review process would be fulfilled. The questicMis that were raised most frequently in discussions between the Review Cc«ference and the first session of the Preparatory Committee related to what the strengthened review process should aim to achieve and how it could be achieved. How would it deal with procedural and substantive issues

* See The Yearbook, vol. 20: 199S, chap. L The three decisions and resolutions adopted at the Conference are reproduced in an annex to the chapter.

41


and how much time would it devote to them? What fonn would the outcome of the work take, i.e., what kind of document should the PreparatOTy Committee forward to the Conference?

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 NPT Review Conference

The Preparatory Committee convened for its first session from 7 to 18 April in New York, and was chaired by Mr. Pasi Patokallio of Finland. His election to the post was part of an understanding reached among delegations at the outset of the session, according to which the first session would be chaired by a representative of the Westem Group, the second by a representative of the Group of Eastern European States, and the third by a representative of the Group of Non- Aligned and other States parties. Furthermore, a representative of the Group of Non-Aligned and other States parties would also be proposed for the presidency of the 2000 Review Conference. Of the 186 States parties to the Treaty, 149 participated in the first session.^

Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Cdte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmaik, Djibouti, l&uador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic oO* Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States oQ, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swazilatxi« Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turicmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, ^et Nam, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

42

The review process of the Non-Proliferation Treaty

With the decision on strengthening the review process, the role that the Preparatory Committee was to assume differed significantly from that of the past. In accordance with paragraph 4 of the decision, the Committee was expected to focus primarily on questions relating to the substance of the Treaty, while also making procedural arrangements related to its own work and that of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. The agenda adopted by the Committee at the first sessic»i fully reflected this approach.’

Substantive work

The Committee held a brief general exchange of views on all aspects of the Treaty during which States parties focused on the following issues: (a) implementation of the decision on strengthening the review process for the Treaty; (b) the relaticHiship between the implementation of the Treaty’s provisions and the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament; and (c) the possible results of the work of the Preparatory Committee.

There was general recognition that the decision on strengthening the review process should be implemented in a balanced manner, giving due attention to all aspects of the Treaty’s operation. States parties were also committed to work for conaete results in the Committee. The Netherlands, speaking on behalf of the European Union, stressed that it was inqx>rtant to keep in mind the unprecectented nature of the review process and felt that the Committee’s flrst session should be approached with flexibility and prudence in order to avoid undue haste in shaping recommendations to the Review Conference before possible opti<Mis had been adequately considered. In making recommendations to the Review Conference, the preparatory (diase would have to take into account the fact that the Conference itself, apart from reviewing the (^ration of the Treaty, would have to be forward- locdcing. The preparatory process, while not overlooking the recent past, would have to be forward-looking as well. Mexico believed that the wcvk of the Preparatory Committee should focus on the discussion of substantive topics with a view to assessing the fulfilment of the conunitments contained in the Non-Proliferaticm Treaty, adiiev- ing the objective oi conq>letely eliminating nuclear weapons and identifying means and medianisms through which further progress to that

3 See document NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/32, para. 8.

43


end could be made in the future. China stressed that the task of the Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee was to promote the full implementation of the Treaty by reviewing past operation, affirming achievements, identifying areas where further progress was needed and seeking ways to improve its implementation. Canada pointed out that it would also be necessary to ensure that the strengthened review process was designed to generate dynamic, progressive and at the same time pragmatic recommendations to the 2000 Review Conference and to facilitate the attainment of that objective. This view was shared by a number of delegations. The United States ccn- sidered that it was crucial that the review process remained true to its fundamental purpose and did not deviate from what had been agreed in 1995, no matter how well intentioned “creative” interpreta- ti(His might be.

The question of the relationship between the provisions of the Treaty and the decision on principles and objectives on nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament was addressed by a number of States parties. Canada felt that the principles and objectives were a means to an end, not an end in themselves, and constituted the first step in an ongoing review process that should enable each review conference to produce further principles and objectives for successive phases in the life of an indefinitely extended Treaty. South Africa stressed that the Preparatory Committee should consider not only the current principles and objectives but also new principles, objectives and ways of promoting the implementation and universality of the Treaty. Japan stated that no attempts should be made to revise the principles and objectives agreed upon at the 1995 Conference, since they were the product of arduous negotiations. Instead, the Committee should strive to agree on a new set of objectives, taking into account views expressed in discussions that had been held prior to and during the Conference itself.

Discussing the possible result of the work of the Preparatory Committee, a large number of delegations favoured the elaboration of a document, either in the form of a chairman’s report or of a “rolling text”. Canada advocated a “rolling document” intended to capture views, evaluations and proposals— an inventory thereof—as an evolving basis for eventual negotiations on reconunendaticMis to

44


go forward to the 2000 Review Conference. China underlined that the outcome of the Preparatory Committee’s earlier sessions could only be preliminary, and that should be taken into account when the relevant repeats were drafted. The European Union believed that the most efficient method of reporting the results of its deliberations would be for the Chairman to prepare either a summary or a brief introduction to carry forward proposals from one session to the next, which might eventually evolve into the flnal recommendations of the Preparatory Committee to the Review Conference. It stressed that it remained important, however, to avoid protracted discussions over texts; a chairman’s summary did not need to be a consensus document. South Africa stressed that it was essential for the Committee to deliver concrete results in the form of a product. That would ensure that the results of the current session would be passed on to the next, so that, at the end of the process, recommendations could be made to the Review Conference. Ji^an felt that the flnal report to be submitted to the Conference should be prepared at the last meeting of the Preparatory Committee and should consist of two parts: the review of the Treaty and measures recommended for the future. Egypt believed that chairmen’s progress reports should be accompanied by concrete ideas in the form of texts aiming at achieving preliminary agreement on the review document to be adopted by the Review Conference. The Ckoup of Non-Aligned and other States parties to the NPT stressed that, for a successful outcome of the Review Conference, the Preparatory Committee meetings should elaborate substantive rolling texts to be submitted for consideration by the Conference, as a basis for its final document.

The Conunittee devoted most of its time to a substantive structured review of the operation of the Treaty, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted at the l^ S Coifrarence. In doing so, it based itself on the allocation of items to the three Main Committees of the 1995 Conference, allowing for a balanced consideration of the following issues: universality of the Treaty, non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States, establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, IAEA safeguards, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In the course of the deliberations,

See document NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I«9.

* See document NPT/CONF. 1995/1, annex V.

45


States parties put forward numerous proposals in which they reviewed developments since the 1995 Conference and outlined measures for further action.

Universality

The issue of universality of the Treaty was addressed by almost all States parties. While the accessions of 8 more States to the Treaty* was welcomed, all States not yet parties, particularly those operating unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, were urged to accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date.

Nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament

The inq)ortance of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and its signature by an overwhelming majority of States was underlined and hope for early ratification of the Treaty was expressed.

A number of Stales parties considered that with the CTBT having been opened for signature, it was important now to tackle the second objective of the programme of action on nuclear disarmament, as contained in the decision on principles and objectives, i.e., negotiations on a convention banning the production of fissile material fcv nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The fact that the Conference on Disarmament had thus far been unable to commence such negotiations was widely deplored.

The European Union called on all States to sign and ratify a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention, negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament, banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator on the item in 1995. In their joint statement,* the five nuclear-weapon States reaffirmed their readiness for immediate negotiations oa a non-discriminatory, universal and internationally and effectively verifiable conven-

Andorra, Angola, Chile. Comoros, Djibouti, Oman, United Arab Emirates and Vanuatu.

CD/1299. The statement contained a mandate for an ad hoc committee on a fissile-material cut-off.

* NPT/CONF.200(VPCJ/2.

46


tion banning the production of such material. They stressed that the resulting treaty would cap fissile niaterial stockpiles available for use in nuclear weapons and, by adding new constraints, would strengthen the international nuclear non-i»'oliferation regime and constitute a significant step towards the eventual achievement of nuclear disarmament. They also underlined that it was important that the States that were not yet parties to the NFT join the negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty in the CD on the basis of the 199S statement mentioned above. The Group of Non-Aligned and other States parties to the MPT supported the negotiation, in the CD, of a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material, pointing out that it would be a significant contribution to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation provided that it was non-discriminatory, effectively verifiable and universally applicable.^

Canada and N(xway advocated some form of confidence-building in order to pave the way for actual negotiations. Canada urged the nuclear-weapon States, pending the conclusion of a cut-off treaty, to affirm or reaffirm their commitment to cease forever the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and called for determined efforts on their part to reduce weapons-usable fissile material stockpiles and to place more of such material under IAEA safeguards.Norway saw merit in voluntary measures to increase transparency on holdings of weapons-^ade fissile material, plutonium and highly enriched uranium and believed that the successive implementation of transparency measures such as the following‘s would facilitate negotiations: the application of consistent and strict standards of accounting and secure handling and storage procedures for fissile material at the national level; the submission of information by all nuclear-capable States on their stocks, if any, of weapons-grade fissile material; the putting in place of cooperative international measures to clarify and confirm these declarations; the granting of permission, by nuclear-weapon States or any State submitting such information, for inspections of their holdings with the aim of ensuring that the inventory in storage could only be withdrawn

’ See document NPT/CONF.2000/PC.V10.

See document NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/4.

“ See document NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/13.

47


for non-weapons purposes; and agreed monitored net reductions from stockpiles.

The Group of Non-Aligned and other States parties stressed the need to commence negotiations on a phased {vogramme of nuclear disarmament and for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time, including a nuclear-weapon convention. *2 Specific reference was frequently made to the 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice and to the report of the Canberra Conunission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. The European Union attached great importance to the systematic and progressive efforts of the nuclear-weapon States to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating them, and to the general and complete disarmament of all States under strict and effective international control. Many States parties welcomed the recent steps undertaken unilaterally or bilaterally by the nuclear- weapon States to further reduce nuclear weapons, building on the progress already achieved. Reference was made to the joint statement on parameters on future reductions in nuclear forces issued by the Russian Federation and the United States at their summit meeting at Helsinki in March, which underlined the commitment of the two governments to begin negotiations on a START III agreement, once START II entered into force.

In their joint statement, menti<Mied above, China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States outlined their positions on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.* The five nuclear- weapon States reiterated their stroig support for the Treaty and their determination to continue to implement fully all its provisions, including those of article VI, and reaffirmed their determination to continue their pursuit of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and the pursuit by all States of general and conq)lete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

12 See document NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/10.

‘3 Sec document NPT/CONF.2000/PC.1/23.


>5 See document NPT/CONF.200(VPC.I/2.

48



Many States parties refened to the recent positive developments regarding nuclear-weap(m-free zones. The in^rtance of the consolidation of existing nuclear-weapon-free zones was underlined and the establishment of new zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned was encouraged. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan reaffirmed their commitment to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. Both Belarus and Ukraine referred to their initiatives for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central and Eastern Europe. Mongolia underlined the importance of single-State nuclear-weapon-free zones.**

Security assurances

States parties that addressed the subject referred to the relevant provision in the decision on principles and objectives and hoped that further steps would be considered to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear-weapons. The non-aligned States parties called for the Preparatory Committee to negotiate a legal instrument to be adopted by the 2000 Review Conference as a protocol to the NPT. Myanmar, Nigeria and the Sudan submitted a proposal for such a draft protocol.* South Africa considered that the argument that declarations made by nuclear-weapon States were sufficient or that those assurances should only be granted in the context of nuclear-weapon-free zones was not valid. It believed that the negotiation of legally binding security assurances within the Treaty, as opposed to other forums, would provide a significant benefit to the parties to the Treaty and would be seen as an incentive to those remaining outside to join.

Safeguards

The efforts of the IAEA to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of its safeguards system, in particular the recent progress


See document NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/19, submitted by Belarus.


•9 See document NPT/CONE2000/PC.I/16 and Cotr.l.

49


in the negotiation of a model protocol to give the Agency complementary legal authority to implement the measures incorporated in part2 of its “93+2 Programme”, were welcomed by the overwhelming majority of participants. Hope was expressed that upon approval of the Model Protocol by the IAEA Board of Governors, each State party would start negotiations with the IAEA to conclude such a protocol between it and the Agency. In their joint statement, the five nuclear-weapon States expressed support for a strengthened and more efficient safeguards system and declared their intenti(»i to apply those measures provided for in the Model Protocol that each of them identified as capable of contributing to the non-{Holiferation and efficiency aims of the Protocol, when implemented with regard to that State, and as consistent with that State’s obligations under article I of the NPT.^ A number of States also pointed out that nuclear material transferred from military uses to peaceful activities should be placed under IAEA safeguards. It was also stressed that full-scope safeguards were a necessary precoidition for the transfer of special fissionable material or material designed or prepared for the processing, use and production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States.2*

P eac^l uses of nuclear energy

The discussion as well as the various papers presented on peaceful uses of nuclear energy reveal a large area of agreement. The important role of the IAEA in implementing article IV, in particular through its Technical Cooperation Programme, was underlined. A number of States stressed the need for regular payments to the IAEA Fund for Technical Assistance and Cooperation. With regard to the issue of international standards for nuclear safety and security, some countries, particularly those of the South Pacific, expressed concern about the safety of marine transport of inadiated nuclear fuel, plutonium and radioactive waste.^ Most States strongly supported the early conclusion of and widest possible adherence to pertimnt international legal instraments, such as the Convention on the Hiysical Protection of Nuclear Material, the Nuclear Safety C<mventioa, and the Joint

20 See document NPT/CONF.2000/PC.V2.

See documents NPT/C»NE200(VPC.I/10. paras. 16. 17 and PC.1/23.

^ See documents NPT/CONF.200(VPC.1/U and 30.

50


Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. In this connection, some stressed that such ^plicable rules of international law should not impair navigational rights and freedoms.^

With regard to the issue of conversion of nuclear material to peaceful uses, some States parties, in particular the Central Asian States, the Marshall Islands and Norway, underlined the need to pay increased attention to the problems of safety and contamination related to former operations associated with nuclear-weapon programmes. They also called for expertise and assistance in the field of clean-up and disposal of radioactive contaminants in affected areas. ^

A number of States parties also referred to the role of export control regimes, calling for more transparency, dialogue and objectivity in export controls. It was also felt that unilaterally enforced restrictive measures, beyond safeguards required under the NPT, which prevent peaceful nuclear development should be removed.

Resolution on the Middle East

Non-aligned States in particular expressed concern at the situation in the Middle East and called for the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the Review and Extension Conference. They also hoped for recommendations by the Preparatory Committee on ways and means to get all parties directly concerned to undertake the practical and urgoU stq>s required for the establishment of a nuclear- weapon-free zone in the Middle East and stressed that Israel was the only country from the region to remain outside the NPT.^

* * *

The Preparatory Committee held a considerable debate about the form in which the outcome of the substantive discussion would be reflected and carried forward to the next session of the Committee. In order to determine the best course of action with regard to possible recommendations to the next session of the Committee and aft reconunen-

23 See document NPT/CONR2000/PC.I/9.

24 See documents NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/11, NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/18 and NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/28.

25 See documents NPT/CX)NF.2000/PC.I/5 and 10.

51


dations to the Review Conference, the Chairman convened consultations with a small number of delegations. As a result of the consultations, he presented a paper that was intended to serve as the basis for further work on draft reconunendations to the Review Conference. The paper consisted of two parts—one identifying points of general agreement on draft recommendations for the 2000 Review Conference, subject to review and updating at subsequent sessions and pending agreement on all draft recommendations at the last session; and the other listing the specific proposals put forward by delegations on the understanding that they did not commit the Preparatory Conunittee and were without prejudice to the position of any delegation. The list was not exclusive and delegations were free to submit new proposals or modify or withdraw old ones at any further session of the Committee.

Since there was concern regarding the status of the Chairman’s paper and the individual proposals by the delegations, the Committee finally agreed that the Chairman’s working paper and the official documents and other proposals put forward by delegations on the sets of issues would be taken into account during further work of the Committee.2® Colombia, speaking on behalf of the Group of Non- Aligned and other States parties to the Treaty, stated that the points identified at this stage, subject to review and updating at subsequent sessions of the Committee and pending agreement on all draft recommendations at the last session, were not draft recommendations for the 2000 NPT Review Conference. The draft recommendations would begin to be prepared at the second session of the Preparatory Committee on the basis of proposals put forward by delegations, and they would, in the view of the Non-Aligned Movement, be more substantive and extensive. The points reflected in the report on the first session might be utilized as reference. ’

During the consultations, proposals were put forward to allocate time for the discussion on and consideration of specific issues at the second session. Based on proposals put forward by South Africa, Egypt, Germany and Canada, respectively, the Chairman suggested that the Committee should allocate time for the following subject areas: {a) security assurances for parties to the NPT; {b) the resolution

26 NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/32, annex II and appendix.

27 SR. 15, para. 59.

52


on the Middle East, and (c) the provision, in paragraph 4 (b) of the principles and objectives, on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Mexico considered that the principal objective of the new process to review the NPT was nuclear disarmament and that this priority must be duly reflected in any consideration of substantive issues. It suggested therefore that nuclear disarmament should be the fourth issue to which additional time should be allocated. There was no consensus within the Committee on such an approach. As a compromise, the Chairman read out a statement, according to which the Committee would recommend that within the existing agenda and in accordance with the methods of work adopted at the first session, time should be allocated at its second session for the discussion on and the consideration of the subject areas suggested by him, without prejudice to the importance of other issues.^ Mexico expressed its reservation about the content of the Chairman’s statement and underlined the need for a clear commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Procedural issues

A number of decisi(His pertaining to the organization of the Committee’s own wOTk and that of the 2000 Review Conference were taken at the beginning of the first session.^ Specifically, the Committee agreed on the nomination of Poland, the candidate of the Group of Eastern European States, for the chairmanship of the second session. It also agreed that the persons elected, when not serving as chairmen, would serve as vice-chairmen of the Committee.

The Committee provisionally agreed, subject to further consultations by the Chairman, on the dates and venues for its further sessions and for the 2000 Review Conference itself. C<Misequently, the Chairman held a number of consultations in the period following the first sessi(»i, and agreement on the dates and venues was reached. The second session would take place from 27 April to 8 May 1998 in Geneva; the third session, from 12 to 23 April 1999 in New York; and the Review Conference, from 24 April to 19 May 2000 in New York.

2* See documents NPTAHONF.2000/PC.I/32, paragraph 17 and document PC.I/31.

29 NPT/CONR2000/PC.I/32, paras. 9 and 14.

53


With regard to its decision-making, the Preparatory Committee decided to make every effort to adopt its decisions by consensus. In the event that consensus could not be reached, the Committee would then take decisions in accordance with the rules of procedure of the Review and Extension Conference, which would be applied mutatis mutandis.

In accordance with the Committee’s decision on participation of observers in its meetings. States not parties to the NPT, specialized agencies, intergovernmental organizaticMis and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were allowed to attend the open meetings of the Committee.^ While the nrodalities governing the attendance of observers were similar to those applied during the preparat(^7 process leading to the 1995 Conference, a significant change was made with regard to the attendance of non-govemmental organizations. Pursuant to the Conunittee’s decision, it was decided that time be made available at each session for representatives of NGOs to make (Hesentations. In fact, at the first session, nine speakers, representing the 113 NGOs attending the session, addressed the delegations.

Conclusion

The decision to strengthen the review process for the Treaty reflected the willingness of the States parties to be held accountable for their actions and to ensure that the un(tertakings contained in the Treaty and in the decisions adopted in 1995 will have greater prospects of being achieved. With the new review process the States parties have created a mechanism that allows them to look forward as well as back and to focus on the consideration of specific issues and identify areas for further {M-ogress.

At its first session, the Committee was able to lay the basis for a qualitatively different and improved review process. It established a framework that will allow it to continue its substantive work at the next session with a view to producing a sound and comprehensive set of recommendations for the 2000 Review Conference. The Chairman’s working paper and the documents and pr( )osals submitted by delegations provide good ground for further consideration of all aspects of the Treaty in a balanced and structured manner.

^ Brazil, Cuba, Israel and Pakistan attended the meetings as observers. The South Pacific Forum was granted observer agency status.

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ANNEX Decision 1

Strengthening the Review Process for tfie TVeaty*New Yoric, 11 May 1995

1. The Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons examined the implementation of article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty and agreed to strengthen the review process for the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized.

2. The States party to the Treaty participating in the Conference decided, in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, that Review Conferences should continue to be held every five years and that, accordingly, the next Review Conference should be held in the year 2000.

3. The Conference decided that, beginning in 1997, the Preparatory Committee should hold, normally for a duration of 10 working days, a meeting in each of the three years prior to the Review Conference. If necessary, a fourth preparatory meeting may be held in the year of the Conference.

4. The purpose of the Preparatory Committee meetings would be to consider principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, and to make recommendations thereon to the Review Conference. These include those identified in the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, adopted on 11 May 1995. These meetings should also make the procedural preparations for the next Review Conference.

5. The Conference also concluded that the present structure of three Main Committees should continue and the question of an overlap of issues being discussed in more than one Committee should be resolved in the General Committee, which would coordinate the work of the Committees so that the substantive responsibility for the preparation of the report with respect to each specific issue is undertaken in only one Committee.

6. It was also agreed that subsidiary bodies could be established within the respective Main Committees for specific issues relevant to the Treaty, so as to provide for a focused consideration of such issues. The establishment of such subsidiary bodies would be recommended by the Preparatory Committee for each Review Conference in relation to the specific objectives of the Review Conference.

7. The Conference agreed further that Review Conferences should look forward as well as back. They should evaluate the results of the period

* Final Document of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, 1995 fNFT/CONF 1995/32).

55


they are reviewing, including the implementation of undertakings of the States parties under the Treaty, and identify the areas in which, and the means through which, further progress should be sought in the future. Review Conferences should also address specifically what might be done to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty and to achieve its universality.

56

C H A P T E R m

The Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions

Introduction

E ffo r ts o f t h e in ter n a tio n a l c o m m u n ity to curb proliferation and to prohibit the use of weapons of mass destruction have led to the conclusion of a treaty and two conventions, each of them dealing with a specific category of weapons. While the curbing of proliferatiCMi of nuclear weapons is addressed by the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 (discussed in chapter II), the two conventions—the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)^—encompass a comprehensive prohibition of these two kinds of weapons. After the two conventions entered into force, the efforts of the parties to these conventions as well as efforts within the United Nations concentrated on their implementation and prevention of proliferation of biological and chemical weapons.

As the BWC does not establish a specific verification mechanism, the parties to the Convention, between 1986 and 1991, in an effort to prevent and reduce the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts and suspicions and to improve international cooperation in peaceful biological cooperation, agreed upon and elaborated confidence- building measures involving data exchanges. Then, at a review confer-

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (General Assembly resolution 2826(XXVI), annex). Concluded in 1971, the BWC was opened fen* signature in 1972 and entered into force in 1975.

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. Concluded in 1992, the CWC was opened for signature in 1993 and entered into force in 1997.

57


building measures involving data exchanges. Hien, at a review conference in 1991, they decided to establish an open-ended ad hoc group of governmental experts (subsequently known as the VEREX Group) to identify and examine potenti^ verificati(si measures from a scientific and technical standpoint. At the request of a majority of the States parties, the depositary Governments (Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States) convened a special conference'* in September 1994 to consider the VEREX report. The Conference decided to establish an ad hoc group, open to all States parties, “to consider appropriate measures, including possible verification measures, and draft proposals to strengthen the Convention, to be included, as appropriate, in a legally binding instrument”. The Ad Hoc Group met for three sessions in 1995 and twice in 1996, and during this period the Fourth Review Conference was held, from 25 November to 6 December 1996. The Final Declaration of the Conference consists of a preamble, an article-by-article review of the Convention and a section on the Ad Hoc Group, in which the Conference agreed to encourage the Group “to review its method of woric and to move to a negotiating format”.

In 1992, after long and intensive negotiations, the CWC was concluded—the first treaty negotiated primarily in a multilateral cchi-

text to ban an entire category of weapons of mass destruction. Its scope, the obligations assumed by States parties and the system of verification envisaged for its implementation were unprecedented. The Cmvention was opened for signature in Paris in January 1993. On 31 October 1996, the 65 th instrument of ratification was deposited, thus paving the way for its entry into force on 29 April 1997, that

Four review conferences of the BWC have been held: 1980, 1986, 1991 and 1996. See The Yearbook, vol. 5: 1980, vol. 11; 1986, vol. 16: 1991 and vol. 21: 1996.

The Special Conference took place between 19 and 30 September 1994, see BWC/CONF/1, parts I, II and DI.

5 BWC/CONFJIIA^EX/9.

® For the text of the Final Declaration, see BWC/CONF.IV/9, part n. For the text of the Final Declaration, see The Yearbook, vol. 21: 1996,

appendix II.

58


is, 180 days after the deposit of that instrument of ratification, in accordance with article XXI of the Convention.

This chapter deals with develc^ments related to the BWC and the CWC and to the work of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), established by Security Council resolution 687(1991) to ensure the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of Iraq’s biological and chemical weapons programmes.

Developments and trends, 1997

Efforts within the Ad Hoc Group to strengthen the BWC through the elaboration of verification and confidence-building and transparency measures continued through the year in Geneva. In The Hague, after the CWC entered into force, two sessions of the Conference of the States parties were held and measures were taken to set up the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). At the same time, under the authority of the Security Council, UNSCOM continued to carry out its mandate regarding Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons progranunes, and to monitor its compliance with its obligations not to acquire proscribed weapons and capabilities. However, the UNSCOM inspections encountered numerous obstacles in carrying out their inspections, especially towards the end of the year.

On 28 April, Cuba c(mveyed to the Secretary-Goieral a report on the appearance in its territory of the thrips palnti plague and expressed the belief that its appearance related to the droppirig, in October 1996, of an unknown substance by an aircraft operated by the United States State Department. Subsequently, Cuba presented some technical considerations related to the activities of the aircraft, concluding that they ran counter to and violated the provisions of the BWC. A formal Consultative Meeting of the parties to the BWC was convened in Geneva from 25 to 27 August to consider the allegations. The Meeting agreed that the Chairman and Vice-Chairmen

« A/52/128, annex. ’ A/52/213, annex.

59


should consult in order as far as possible to clarify and resolve any outstanding issues.

Following these consultations and the receipt of a number of written submissions by State parties, the Chairman reported in writing to all States parties on 15 December that “due, inter alia, to the technical complexity of the subject and to the passage of time, it has not proved possible to reach a definitive conclusion with regard to the concerns raised by the Government of Cuba”. The report went on to emphasize that there was general agreement that the requirements of the Convention and of the consultative process had been fulfilled in an impartial and transparent manner, and that the Bureau had agreed that the experience of conducting the process had shown the importance of establishing as soon as possible an effective protocol to strengthen the BWC.

Biological weapons

The efforts being made to strengthen the BWC” were welcomed by States parties in the debates in the CD, the UNDC and the First Committee, but little comment of substance was made in view of the fact that the negotiations were in progress.

The Consultative Meeting was chaired by the United Kingdom, with vice-chairmen from: Brazil, Canada, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Netherlands, Nigeria and the Russian Federation. See document BWC/CONS/1.

” The Ad Hoc Group of Experts met three times in Geneva, from 3 to 21 March, from 14 July to 1 August, and from IS September to 3 October (the sixth, seventh and eighth sessions, respectively). As in previous years, Mr. Tibor Toth of Hungary chaired the three sessions. The following States parties participated in all three sessions: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmaric, Hnland, France, Germany. Greece. Hungary. India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of). Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States. The following States participated only in some of the sessions: Philippines (6th session); Armenia. Costa Rica, Senegal (7th session); Croatia, Ecuador, Jordan, Malaysia (7th and 8th sessions); Iraq, Malta and Sri Lanka (6th and 8th sessions); and Bolivia, Ghana, Panama and Viet Nam (8th session).

60

The Chemical m d Biological Weapons Conventions

Work of the Ad Hoc Group

The Group continued its consideration of the following issues, which, by the end of 1997, had been expanded to include; (a) definitions of tenns and objective criteria; (b) measures to promote compliance; (c) investigations annex; (d) measures related to article X; (e) legal issues; (f) confidentiality issues; and (g) national implementation and assistance. The work was conducted in seven groups, each led by a Friend of the Chair who assisted the Chairman in consultations and negotiations on the seven areas listed above. In order to assist the Ad Hoc Group, the Chairman submitted, at the beginning of the seventh session, a document entitled “Rolling Text of a Protocol to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their E)estruction”,‘ in which it was stated that the document was without prejudice to the positions of delegations and did not imply agreement on its scope or content. The results of discussions during the eighth session were incorporated into the rolling text in which brackets had been introduced to cover specific preliminary concerns of delegations, and it was recognized that further and detailed consideration of all elements would be required at the future sessions.

The rolling text resulting from the eighth session contains 23 articles, 8 annexes and S appendices. The main articles, additional to the standard ones on auAentic text, entry into force and other, are as follows: I. General Provisions; II. [Definitions]; III. Conq>liance Measures; IV. Confidentiality Provisions; V. Measures to Redress a Situaticm and to Ensure Compliance; VI. Assistance; VII. Scientific and Technological Exchange for Peaceful Purposes and Technical Cooperation; VTII. Confidence-Buildii^ Measures; IX. [The Organization] [and Implementatio) Arrangements]; X. National Implementation Measures; XL Relationship of the Protocol to the BTWC and Other International Agreements; XII. Settlement of Disputes; XIII. Review of the Protocol; XIV. Amendments; XV Duration and \Mth-

*2 BWaAD HOC GROUP/35.

BWC/AD HOC GROUP/38, annex I.

61


drawal; XVI. Status of the Annexes [and Appendices].The number of square brackets in the articles indicates that considerable differences remained to be resolved and that nothing in the text was agreed until it was all agreed.

At the end of the eighth session, it was decided that the work of the Group had to be intensified. The Group agreed to have three sessions of three weeks and one session of two weeks in 1998, working further on the rolling text, particularly on those issues and text where differences of view persisted.*^

Alongside their efforts to elaborate a verification mechanism. States parties continued their confidence-building measures and information exchange as agreed to at the Second and Third Review Conferences, in 1986 and 1991, respectively. Among the measures decided upon under article V is the declaration by parties concerning legislation and other regulations they have enacted both to implement the provisions of the Convention and to enable States parties to follow a standardized procedure in order to prevent or reduce the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts and suspicions, and to implement international cooperation in the field of peaceful bacteriological activities. By the end of 1997, 46 States parties had submitted reports to the

The eight annexes are concerned with: Declarations; [[Non-challenge] [Random] visits]; [Measures to strengthen the inq>Iementation of article m]; Investigations; Confidentiality provisions; Scientific and technological exchange for peaceful purposes and technical cooperation; Confidence-building measures; and [The[Technical] Secretariat]. The Hve aj^ndices are con- caned with information to be provided in declarations.

The dates of the three-week sessions are: from S to 23 January; 22 June to 10 July; and 28 September to 16 October. It was agreed, on 23 January 1998, that the two-week session will be split: 9 to 13 March and 21 to 25 September. See the procedural reports of tlie sixth session (BWC/AD HOC GROUP/34), the seventh session (BWC/AD HOC GROUP/36) and the eighth session (BWC/AD HOC GROUP/38).

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United Nations, including reports concerning their export and import of certain biological weapons-related materials.*®

Chemical weapons

The entry into force of the CWC was a major event in the field of disarmament in 1997, and a large number of States stressed its importance in their statements in the CD, the UNDC and the First Committee. Attention focused on the ratification process in the two largest possessors of CW—the Russian Federation and the United States. In addition, efforts were directed towards finalizing the preparations for the entry into force of the Convention and, after the CWC entered into force, creating the bodies provided for in the Convention.

At the sixteenth and final session of the Preparatory Conunission of the OPCW, held from 9 to 15 April, the Conunission adopted its final report for submission to the first session of the Conference of the States Parties and prepared a draft agenda for the Conference and the Executive Council. It also welcomed the initiative of the host country to put forward in the United Nations General Assembly a draft resolution that would permit a relationship to be entered into between the OPCW and the United Nations. On 22 May, the General Assembly adopted a resolution entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons” in which it invited the Secretary-General to take steps to conclude with the Director-General an agreement to regulate the relationship between the two organizations.*^

On 21 April, the Secretary-General urgently appealed, one week before the CWC would enter into force, to all States to take, in that final week, steps to allow the Convention to fulfil its promise and thus to foster a climate that would promote further advances in arms

Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States. See document CDA/BWC/1997/CBM and CDA/BWai977/CBM/Add. 1.

Resolution 51/230 of 3 June 1997. The agreement had not been finalized as of the end of the year.

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regulations and disamuunent. In addition, he had perscmily written to heads of key States urging them to complete their ratification processes promptly so that they might be among the original parties to the Convention.

As only those States that ratified the Convention before it entered into force would be considered original parties, it was important that Russia and the United States be among them. However, in spite of appeals to these and other States to ratify it as soon as possible, it became clear that Russia was not going to complete its ratification procedure before 29 A{»'il. Although President Clinton had initiated the process of obtaining the consent of the Senate in 1996, it took several months of negotiations on a package of conditions before the latter was willing to ratify it. Finally, on 24 April, the Senate apiffoved the CWC.*’

The CWC entered into force, in accordance with article XXI, on 29 April. By 31 December, 165 States had signed it and 106 States had deposited their instruments of ratification, among them, the five nuclear-weapon States.^ (For the status of the Convention, at the end of the year, see appendix I.)

In a joint statement on chemical weapons, * issued on 21 March in Helsinki, President Clinton and President Yeltsin reaffirmed their intention to take steps necessary to expedite ratification of the CWC; expressed their understanding that their participation in it was inqx)rtant to its effective inq>lementation and universality; and stated that they would continue their coc^ration in chemical disarmament.

The Russian Federation continued its prt^ramme of destruction of its chemical weapCHis. The law on ratificaticm of the CWC, signed by President Yeltsin on 5 November, stipulated that Russia would fulfil its obligations under the Convention in accordance with the principles of the present federal law, the federal law on destraction of CW, and its federal target programme on destruction of its CW

UN Press Release, SG/SM/6216 of 21 April.

The Senate Resolution of Ratification contains 28 conditions.

On 25 April, China and the United States ratified the Convention, and Russia did so on S November.

21 CD/1460.

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stockpiles.22 Russia allocated funds in 1998 for destruction, and it is expected that some of the costs will be absorbed by other countries. China and Japan continued their cooperation regarding the destruction of chemical weapons abandoned by Japan in China during the Second World War, agreeing to establish a joint working group to resolve the issue.

Activities of the OPCW

After the CWC entered into force on 29 April, the first session of the Conference of States Parties was held in The Hague, from 6 to 23 May. It was attended by 80 States parties, 3 States that had deposited their instruments of ratification but for which it had not entered into force,^^ and 33 signatory States.^^ In his opening remarks,^ the United Nations Secretary-General noted that the world was witnessing an historic event because an entire category of weapons of mass destruction was banned by the CWC. After pointing

See The CBW Conventions Bultetin no. 38, December 1997, p. 6.

According to paragraph 2, article XXI of the Convention, for a State whose instrument of ratification or accession is deposited subsequent to the entry into force of the Convention, it shall enter into force on the 30th day following the date of deposit of the instrument of ratification or accession.

Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Cdte d Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Rnland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Namibia, Netherlands, New 2^aland, Niger, Norway, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan and Zimbabwe; Cuba, Turkey and Singapore, which have ratified but the Convention has not entered into force for them; and signatory States: Bolivia, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Colombia, Congo, Cyprus, Estonia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Liechtenstein, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Slovenia, Thailand, Uganda, Ukraine, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen and Zambia.

25 UN Press Release, SG/SM/6232 of 6 May.

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out the main tasks before the newly created OPCW, he stressed that the key to effective implementation of the Convention remained its universal adoption, and urged all signatories to join the community of ratifying States.

The first session of the Conference approved the OPCW’s financial regulations and a Headquarters agreement, and took numerous decisions regarding various aspects of verification. The Conference appointed Mr. Jos6 Maurfcio Bustani of Brazil as the first Director-General of the OPCW, and elected 41 initial members of the Executive Council and a 20-member Confidentiality Commission. It also adopted a budget covering activities from 29 April to 31 December 1997. In the debate, a need for greater universality was widely acknowledged, and the importance of ratification by Russia, States in “regi(Mis of tension” and States with significant chemical industries was en^hasized.

The second session of the Conference took place in The Hague from 1 to S December and 82 States parties (among them, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Russia, for which the Convention entered into force on 3 and 5 December respectively), 18 signatory States and two observer States attended. ® In a message, the United Nations Secretary-General praised the Convention for playing an important role as a confidence-building measure, for providing for the exchange of technical know-how for peaceful purposes, and therefore acting

States parties: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Costa Rica, C6te d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Rq>ublic, Denmark, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Fmland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece. Hungary, Iceland, India, Iran (from 3 December), Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Oman. Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal. Rq>ublic of Korea. Romania, Russian Federation (from 5 December), Saudi Arabia. Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname. Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey. United Kingdom. United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan and Zimbabwe. States signatories: Bolivia, Cape Verde, Colombia. Cyprus, Gambia. Guatemala, Haiti, Holy See. Indonesia, Israel, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela. Botswana and Libya participated as observers.

66

The Chemical and Biological Vfeapom Conventions

as a spur to additional disarmament initiatives. In his inning statement, the Director-General provided an overview of the activities of the Organization and the 115 initial inspections and visits that had been conducted on the territory of 21 States parties. During the general debate the following issues were stressed: recent ratification by Iran, Pakistan, Russia and Nepal, and accession by Jordan; and the need to ensure that all States parties comply with all provisions of the Convention in a timely manner. The Conference a ^ te d the OPCW programme of work and budget for 1998. It also elected new members to the Executive Council for two-year terms, beginning on 12 May 1998.

The Executive Council held seven sessions during the year^ under the chairmanship of Mr. Prabhakar Menon of India. At its first session, the Council prepared an OPCW budget for 1997 to be ^ proved by the Conference, recommended the appointment of the Directc^-General, and adq>ted guidelines for transitional verification arrangements.^ At its following sessions, it considered reports by the Director-General on the status of implementation of the Convention, including a review of the receipt of initial declarations and the current status of processing them, and expressed its concern that a significant number of States had not yet submitted national declarations ami/or obligatory notificaticms. Ihe Council was also informed by the Secretariat of the number of inspections carried out. At its last session, the Council adc^ted the draft OPCW budget and programme of woric for 1998.

In a statement in the First Committee, the Director-General noted that the CWC was the first multilateral treaty to be simultaneously comprehensive, non-discriminatory and verifiable. It was conqvehen- sive in that it aimed to eliminate an entire category of weapons of mass destruction within specific predetermined time-frames; it was non-discriminatory in that all States parties to the Convention, without exception, relinquished the right to engage in any chemical-weapcm-

^ TThe first session was held from 13 to 23 May, second from 23 to27 June, third from 28 July to 1 August, fourth from 1 to S September, fifth from 29 Septemb« to 1 October, sixth from 28 to 31 October and seventh from 18 to 20 November.

2* In accordance with paragraph 51, Part IV(A) of the CWC’s Verification Annex.

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related activities; and it was veriflable in diat it provided for on-site inspections, including short-notice challenge inspections, to clarify and resolve any question concerning possible non-compliance. He stressed that the success of the Convention would depend on the success of the verification regime. In addition to implementing the verification system, another critical task was implementation of article XI, on economic and technological development. Stressing the need for a culture of transparency and universality of the Convention, he noted that some key States remained outside and that it was his utmost priority to facilitate ratification of the Convention by the Russian Federation.

UNSCOM^

The activities of UNSCOM related to verifying Iraq’s declarations concerning full, final and complete disclosures of its proscribed chemical, biological and missile programmes, as required by resolutions 687 and 707(1991), were further complicated during the year not only because of their inadequacies, incompleteness and lack of documentation in many areas, but also because Iraq’s authorities prevented UNSCOM inspection teams from having access to some of the sites designated for inspections and interfered with its air operations. Iraq also blocked the Commission from removing missile remnants fen: analysis in an attempt to verify Iraq’s assertion that all proscribed missiles had been accounted for.

In a joint statement^ on the Executive Chairman’s visit to Baghdad from 20 to 23 February, signed by him and the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, the Government of Iraq agreed to the removal of remnants of proscribed missile engines from Iraq for in-depth technical analysis by the Commission. The work done on the missile remnants after Iraq released them finally allowed the Commission to verify that the remnants accounted for 83 of 85 missiles declared destroyed by Iraq. Progress was thus made in respect to this part of the missile file.

^ See the most recent consolidated reports of the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM: S/1997/301, S/1997/774, S/1997/922 and S/1997/987. For information regarding the monitoring of Iraq’s nuclear activities, see page IS.

S/1997/152, annex.

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Until July 199S, Iraq had denied that it had any offensive biological warfare programme. Since then, it had submitted several versions of what it stated to be its full, final and complete disclosure on the programme. However, a number of inspections and missions carried out to verify Iraq’s proscribed activities, such as the declared production of bulk biological warfare agents, and to establish facts concerning its decision-making process for concealing its programme, revealed that the declarations did not provide a basis for proper verification. In his October report, * the Executive Chairman of the Commission expressed deep concern about Iraq’s refusal to make the facts known about its biological weapons progranunes and its blocking of efforts by the Commission to reach those facts. The Commission’s view that Iraq’s declaration was inadequate was endorsed by an international panel of experts in September. In the period 1991 to 1997, the Commission focused its work in the CW area on three main areas: (a) CW production capabilities; (b) CW, including stocks of chemical warfare agents, munitions and their components; and (c) other issues related to the prosaibed CW activities. While noting in his report that important progress had been made in the CW area, such as the recently completed destruction of chemical weapons- related equipment and materials, the Executive Chairman stated that it was still necessary to provide the Commission with much more material and more accurate material and with related access relevant to the special warheads for chemical and biological weapons agent delivery and VX questions so that it could verify Iraq’s declarations.

In the middle of the year, a number of incidents occurred during inspections connected with the investigation of Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons programmes. These incidents led to the adoption of two resolutions by the Security C o u n c i l , b y which it condemned the repeated refusal of Iraq to allow access to sites designated by the Commission and demanded that Iraq give immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to them. Iraq sought to challenge UN- SCOM at the Council in a number of ways, including refusing to permit inspectors of United States nationality to work in Iraq and

31 S/1997/774.

“ S/1997/RES/1115 of 21 June and S/1997/RES/1134 of 23 October. See also Statements by the President of the Security Council: S/mST/1997/49, S/PRST/1997/51, S/PRST/1997/54 and S/PRST/1997/56.

69


threatening to shoot down the Commission’s high altitude reconnai- sance aircraft. In the resolution adopted on 12 November, ’ the Council decided that States should prevent the entry or transit through their territories of all Iraqi officials responsible for or participating in instances of non-compliance with its resolutions. Due to Iraq’s refusal to cooperate, the Commission’s resident monitoring personnel were withdrawn for a period in November, until Iraq permitted UN staff of United States nationality to resume their work. At the request of the Security Council, the members of UNSCOM convened in emergency session on 21 November, at which time they considered each of the proscribed weapons areas and arrived at recommendations regarding each one, as well as measures of a general nature designed to enhance the fulfilment of the mandate of UNSCOM and lAEA.

As the relationship between Iraq and UNSCOM/Security Council further deteriorated, the Executive Chairman visited Baghdad from 12 to 16 December in an attempt to obtain assurances from the Government of Iraq that it would grant the Commission immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to all sites the Commission wished to inspect and to obtain greater clarity with respect to Iraq’s understanding of its obligations in this regard. In a report on this visit,’ the Executive Chairman informed the Security Council that Iraq would accept inspection of normal sites without restriction, but inspections of national security sites would be subject to restrictions, and inspections of presidential and sovereign sites would not be allowed. Iraq consider^ some sites, such as civilian sites and foreign sites in Iraq, as outside its jurisdiction. However, Iraq did agree to improve its co(^ration with respect to modalities for the inspection of sensitive sites and to permit more inspectors to operate in such sites. Diplomatic efforts made by certain Member States towards the end of the year did not succeed in resolving these issues.

33 S/1997/RES/1137 of 12 November.

34 S/1997/922, annex.

35 S/1997/987, annex.

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Australia Group

The Group^ held informal consultations in Paris from 6 to 9 October. The participants undertook to ensure the continued transparency of their national chemical and biological export c(mtroIs and reviewed national exporting licensing policies to ensure that relevant national regulations promoted CWC objectives. They also discussed relevant aspects of interest in chemical and biological weapons on the part of terrorists and agreed that this subject needed continuing attention. They reiterated their readiness to brief non-members on export controls and affirmed the importance of regional seminars as a means of widening contacts with other countries on these issues.


On 7 November, the representative of Canada introduced a draft resolution entitled Status of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction on behalf of the sponsors. ’ On 12 November, the First Committee adopted the draft resolution without a vote.

Egypt and the Syrian Arab Republic, which declared that they would have have abstained, had the resolution been put to the vote, explained their positions. Egypt held the conviction that all the States of the region should bear equal and reciprocal obligations deriving from the CWC, NPT and BWC and noted that Israel remained the only State in the region that had not yet adhered to the NPT. Mweover, Israel was the only State in the region that operated nuclear facilities that were not under IAEA’s full-scope safeguards. Fch: those reasons, Egypt did not consider itself part of the consensus that led to the adoption of the draft resolution. The Syrian Arab Republic gave the following reasons: the CWC lacked adequate procedures for ensuring that the verification system was not misused through challenges to it; the CWC did not state explicitly that its implementation would

^ Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy. Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden. Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States.

Canada and Poland.

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not be an obstacle to the economic and technological development of the parties, especially the developing countries; and the CWC did not set out comprehensive safeguards to deter the use or threat of use of chemical weapons against any party to the Convention.

Three other States explained their votes. India urged all States to implement all provisions of the CWC with an equal degree of transparency and commitment. It believed that issues relating to implementation of the CWC were best discussed in forums of the OPCW and also believed that it would be appropriate for that organization to consult on a draft resolution for the General Assembly in future years. Israel recalled that upon signing the CWC, it made clear that it would seek to ratify the Convention subject to its regional concerns as well as to its constitutional constraints and legislative timetable. While welcoming the fact that certain Arab States had signed or ratified the CWC, it noted that none of the chemical-weapons-capable Arab States had signed or ratified the Convention. According to Pakistan, despite its concerns and reservations regarding certain provisions of the CWC, it signed the Convention to underscore its conunitment to the objective of complete elimination of chemical weapons regionally and globally.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution without a vote. For the text of resolution 52/38 T. Status of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stoclq>iling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, see page 302.

On 30 October, the representative of Hungary, on behalf of the sponsors,^ introduced a draft resolution entitled Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stoclqfiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.

^ Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France. Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Luxembourg, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United lUngdom and United States. Subsequent sponsors: Belarus, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Iran (Islamic Rq>ublic of). Monaco and San Marino.

72

The Chemical and Biological Wecpons Conventions

On 10 November, the First Committee adopted the draft resolution without a vote.

On 9 December, the General Assembly also adopted the draft resolution without a vote. For the text of resolution 52/47, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, see page 321.

Conclusion

The most important event in the field of disarmament in 1997 was the entry into force of the CWC. By the end of the year, the two countries with the largest stocks of chemical w e^n s—the Russian Federati(m and the United States— were parties. After entry into force, the OPCW and its organs were established and its first Director- General was appointed. The OPCW’s verification mechanism was implemented and a number of inspections were carried out, as provided for by the Convention.

Efforts to strengthen the BWC continued throughout the year in the framework of the Ad Hoc Group. In its July session, the Chairman of the Group submitted a rolling text of a protocol, without prejudice to the positions of delegations, in which text for the main provisions was elaborated, although much of it in square brackets. Negotiations continued on the basis of the rolling text in the latter part of the year, and as of its last session in 1997, considerable differences remained.

UNSCOM continued its inspection activities in connection with the proscribed chemical and biological weapons and missile programmes of Iraq, as requested under various Security Council resolutions. However, towards the end of the year, the relationship between the Commission and Iraq deteriorated, and the question of free access to all sites in Iraq was unresolved.

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C H A P T E R IV

Global approaches to conventional weapons issues

Introduction

Q u e s tio n s o f t h e r e g u l a t i o n a n d r e d u c t io n op c o n v e n t io n a l a rm s

and armed forces have been on the disarmament agenda of the United Nations since the Organization was created, with varying degrees of emphasis. In the 1950s, the General Assembly dealt with the subject in the context of ways and means to achieve the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments and to achieve general and complete disarmament. Later, the emphasis tended to be on nuclear rather than on conventional arms. However, the need to address conventional disarmament in a systematic way was increasingly recognized throughout the 1980s, and developments in the 1990s have given impetus to this trend.

The relaxation of East-West tensions and the end of the cold war created new opportunities and new hopes for establishing stability at lower levels of armaments, but, in parallel, there has been a series of devastating intra-State conflicts in which conventional weapons have played a crucial role. In its attempts to address questions of conventional arms, the international conununity has adopted two approaches: the banning, reduction, or placing of restrictions on arms through treaties, on the one hand, and the promotion of transparency and confidence-building, on the other. These two approaches have been applied at the global and at the regional and subregional levels.

This chapter deals with issues concerning conventional weapons at the global level: efforts to curb the flow of small arms and light

* See The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970 (United Nations publication. Sales No. 70.IX.1), chap. 2. See, in particular, resolution 41(1) of 14 Decendjer 1946.

75


weapons, transparency, arms transfers and the Arms Register. The international community’s handling of issues connected with antipersonnel mines is dealt with in chapter V. Regional aspects of these subjects are discussed in chapter VI.

The issue of small arms and the related subject of practical disarmament reflects rising interest at the UN in establishing curbs on the flow of those weapons most coomionly used in conflicts with which the Organization deals and the control of which is seen as crucial to effective peace-building. The UN Register of Conventional Arms, established in 1992, has evolved as a unique instrument for aeating transparency in military matters at the global level. It is seen not as a control mechanism, but as a conHdence-building measure designed to improve security relations among States and to prevent an excessive and destabilizing accumulation of conventional arms.


Although, in practice, questions of conventional arms have been most effectively dealt with at the regi(xial level, in 1997, the subject was prominent in global forums as well. Having adopted guidelines for international arms transfers in 1996,’ the Disarmament Conunission began to develop guidelines on arms control/limitation and disarmament with a view to assisting the United Nations and relevant international organizations, as well as regional organizations and governments. Among possible measures it considered voluntary, global and non-discriminatory codes of conduct for transfers of conventional weapons and post-conflict moratoriums on the transfer and manufacture of small weapons.

The Register covers seven categories of conventional arms— battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, laige-calibre artillery systems, attack helicopters, combat aircraft, warships, and missiles and missile launchers.

’ Guidelines for international arms transfers in the context of General Assembly resolution 46/36 H of 6 December 1991 (A/51/42, annex I). The guidelines are reproduced in The Yearbook, vol. 21: 1996, chap. IV, annex n.

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Indeed, much attention in the conventional field focused on curbing the flow of small anns— in particular the illicit trade^—and also on the application of practical disarmament measures to post-conflict situations. The successful completion of the expert study on small arms, mandated in 1996, gave rise to proposals for further steps. In the General Assembly, the president of Colombia outlined a five-point strategy for confronting the grave problem of arms proliferation: (a) a declaration by the developing countries of a two-year moratorium on trade in high-technology weapons; (b) expansion of the UN Register of Conventional Arms to include light weapons, production and storage; (c) a moratorium by arms-producing countries on the sale of high-technology weapons in regions of conflict; (d) verification of all multilateral commitments in this area; and (e) discussion of the regulation of trade in light arms and high-technology weaponury at a fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Meanwhile, effects continued to strengthen the two global mechanisms for promoting transparency: the Register of Conventional Arms and the standardized reporting instmment for military expenditures. A further report on the continuing operation of the Register was submitted and the General Assembly again called for consultations on necessary changes to the content and structure of the standardized reporting system for military expenditures in order to strengthen and broaden participation.^

* See in this connection the report of the Secretary-General on measures to curb the illicit transfer and use of conventional arms (A/S2/229), to which information received from the EU was attached.

A/S2/316. An earlier report on the subject had been submitted in 1994 (A/49/316).

In 1996, by resolution Sl/38, the General Assembly had made a similar request, but owing to the difficult financial situation, it had not been possible to hold the necessary consultations with other international t>odies receiving such data. See the report of the Secretary-General (A/S2/302), which contained information received from the Netherlands. In 1997, the following 27 States reported their military expenditures (A/S2/310): Argentina, Armenia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark. Ecuador, France. Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Luxembourg. Mexico, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States.

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Small arms

In 1997, the Panel of Govommental Experts ^;^inted by the Seaetary- General completed its study‘s of the problems related to the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of small arms and light weapons. The subject had been gaining prominence over the past several years as it became clear that, in one way or another, virtually every part of the United Nations system was dealing with the direct and indirect consequences of recent armed conflicts fought mainly with these weapons. In the foreword to the study, the Secretary-General identified these weapons as the primary or sole instruments of violence in the internal conflicts dealt with by the United Nations, which were taking a heavy toll in human life.

In the course of its work, the Panel tocdc into consideration the views of Member States, heard presentations by experts and conducted three regional workshops, in Pretoria, San Salvador, and Kathmandu. It also reviewed the conclusions and findings of other United Nati<Mis bodies, such as the Vienna-based Commissioi on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, which prepared the United Nations International Study on Firearms Regulation. Other intergovernmental organizations were also actively engaged in dealing with the issue of small arms. The Organization of American States (OAS) adopted the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials.

The Panel studied the causes of the excessive and destabilizing accumulations of arms, the modes of their transfer and their illicit trade. In an effort to gain a clearer understanding, members visited Africa, Central America and South Asia and, based on United Nations reports on its peace-keeping operations, commissions of inquiry and the three regional workshops mentioned above, outlined regional realities with respea to small arms and light weapons. The Panel included in its report the statements issued at the conclusim of the three workshops.

In its assessment, the Panel related the phenomenon of the excessive accumulation and use of small arms and light weapons to the increasing occurrence of intra-State conflicts and violence, the

A/52/298, submitted pursuant to resolution 50/70 B.

* Pretoria (23-25 September 1996), San Salvador (16-17 January 1997) and Kathmandu (22-23 May 1997).

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Global roaches to conventional weapons issues

handling of small arms by private and irregular groups, and the connection between the illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons and drug-trading and criminal activities. The Panel arrived at a series of recommendations on how to reduce this trend in specific regions of the world where such weapons had abready accumulated and on measures to prevent such accumulations and transfers from occurring in the future (see annex I, page 98).

Cognizant of the political momentum created and the manifest interest of the international community in the issue of small arms and light weapons, the General Assembly adopted a resolution welcoming the report of the Panel, endorsed its recommendations and called upon Member States to implement them. Resolution 52/38 J also cleared the path for future action and follow-up on the issue (see page 95).

As a first follow-up action, the Secretary-General would establish a study group on the problems of ammunition and explosives in all their aspects. Second, another expert study would be established to follow-up on the progress made in the implementation of the recommendations of the current report, among which were recommendations for national, regional and global measures to reduce and prevent illegitimate use and illicit trade. Third, Member States would give their views on the report’s recommendation concerning the convening of an international conference on the illicit arms trade.

Practical disarmament

For several years there has been growing concern to reduce human suffering by consolidating the peace process, that is, by preventing the re-emergence of armed conflicts in areas where they have been halted, through the application of practical disarmament measures. At its 1997 session, the Disarmament Commission began work on guideUnes on conventional arms control, focusing on the measures that would facilitate consolidation of the peace process, for example: disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, buy-back programmes and curbs on the illicit arms trade. The Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms also considered the issue, as did UNIDIR in its study series on the management of arms in peace processes.

Reflecting the interest in this matter on the part of Member States and the general public, the Secretary-General submitted a report on

79


the consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures, in which he stressed the importance of various elements to the maintenance and consolidation of peace and security in areas that have suffered from conflict, and underlined the role of the United Nations in providing a political framework for such practical disarmament measures.

The Secretary-General noted that, in this process, the adoption of an integrated approach to practical disarmament measiures was crucial, particularly in post-conflict situations. Thus weapons-related issues must be considered as an integral part of peace accords. Provision must be made for the retrieval, storage and safeguarding of weapons belonging to demobilized personnel, the destruction of ammunition, and weapons buy-back programmes. It was important to promote an exchange of information on national and subregional experiences at all stages, including in the reintegration of former combatants into civilian life, the harmonization of national legislation to monitor transboundary traffic in illicit arms and the pooling of information about acts of criminality across national frontiers.

It was also necessary to generate better public understanding of practical disarmament measures through the collection and dissemination of information about the direct and indirect consequences of the excessive accumulation of weapons, and the need to encourage greater transparency in military matters and seek wider adherence to tools for confidence-building, such as periodic reporting of military expenditures and the establishment of registers for specific categories of conventional arms. The Secretary-General believ^ that the in >lementation of these measures would greatly benefit from the intema- ticMial community’s readiness to assist the affected States in their efforts to consolidate peace. Subsequently, the General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for the establishment of a group of interested States to facilitate this process and to build upon the momentum generated.

Register of Conventional Arms

The two main events in the area of transparency in 1997 were the issuance of the annual report on the Register for the calendar year

® A/52/289, submitted pursuant to resolution 51/45 N. The views of Canada and of the EU were contained in the report.

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1996*® and the report on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development.**

Annual report on the Register for the calendar year 1996

The report of the Secretary-General for the calendar year 1996 contained data and information on imports and exports in the seven categories of conventional arms provided by 93 governments. An index by State of the type of badcground information submitted by governments was also included in the report.*’ In addition, a number of Member States conveyed to the Secretary-General their views on the continuing operation and further development of the Register and on transparency measures related to weapons of mass destruction.* A composite table for 1996, listing all the ie(dies received by the Secretary- General and indicating whether each reply contains data on inqwrts or exports or on both, and whether relevant explanations and badcground information are included, is annexed to this chapter; see page 101.

Work of the Group of Governmental Experts on the Register

The Group, meeting in three sessions between March and August, reviewed the first five calendar years of operation of the Register

*® See A/52/312, and Corr.l and 2, and Add. 1-4. Electronic copy of the report is available on the UN Web on the Internet: http://www.un.org (link to “Peace and Security - Disarmament”). Information for the calendar year 1996 may be submitted until the close of the fifty-second session and will be issued as further addenda to document A/S 2/312.

** See A/52/316.

* Including a “nil” report submitted by Cook Islands. Participation remained at the same level as previously.

*’ The background information is available, in full, at the Department for Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat for consultation.

* The views of the following States were annexed to the report on the Register for 1996; Israel, Mauritania (in its capacity as Chairman of the Arab Group for the month of September 1997 on behalf of the States members of the League of Arab States), the Netherlands (on behalf of the European Union and the associated countries) and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

81

http://www.un.org


and exatnined various proposals to further develop it in order to make it more efficient and effective and to encourage wider participation.

In reviewing the operation of the Register for the calendar years 1992 to 1996,'* the Group noted that the level of participation remained one of the highest compared with that of similar international reporting instruments, such as the UN system for standardized reporting of military expenditures,' and that it was consistent, with over 90 States reporting annually. So far, 138 Governments had participated in the Register at least once by reporting. Of the 185 Member States of the United Nations, 49 had never submitted a report Of the 49, at least10 in each year were reported by other States as either an importer or an exporter. The Group reaffirmed the value of submitting “nil” reports since they help to complete the overall picture of arms transfers and contribute to the confidence-building process provided by the Register. It considered that non-participation might be due to political and administrative factors, as well as lack of resources or awareness of the operation of the Register. Moreover, it suggested that some States might not be convinced that the Register alone was relevant to their security concerns. Other measures related to weapons and equipment not covered by the seven categories had particular importance in certain regions in ensuring that the whole spectrum of security concerns was taken into account, in particular in those regitms in which the threat of military confrontation still existed. In some cases armed conflict situations or severe political crises hampered reporting. The following table reflects a significant variation in participation among different regions, based on United Nations regi(mal groupings.

Included data submitted up to and including 15 August 1997.

*6 See A/52/310.

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Participation by region, based on United Nations regional groupings'*

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996**

African States 12 of 51 13 of 52 10 of 53 9 of 53 8 of 53

Asian States 23 of 47 25 of 47 26 of 48 27 of 48 22 of 48

Eastern European States 14 of 19 13 of 20 15 of 21 16 of 21 17 of 21

Latin American and Caribbean States 17 of 33 15 of 33 18 of 33 14 of 33 16 of 33

Western European States 24of24 24of27 25 of 27 26 of 27 26 of 27

Not members of a regional group 3 of 5 2of5 2of3 2of3 2of3

* See A/52/316, p. 14, para.l3. Table includes Member States only.Updated to include submissions to the Register as at the end of March

1998.

While the failure to report one side of a transfer constituted ttie major discrepancy during the period under review, it was also acknowledged that some discrepancies occurred because of the lack of a common definition of a transfer—a situation due in part to differing nati(xial practices regarding the implementation of rules, regulations and procedures for exports and imports. To assist in clarifying submissions, the Group recommended that Member States designate an official point of contact for governments on matters directly relating to the Register and that they be encouraged to explain their national criteria for defining a transfer in their annual reports. Noting the increasing number of States indicating designations, models or types in reporting transfers of equipment, the Group concluded that the reports containing this information added qualitatively to the data and information in the Register and encouraged States in a position to do so to provide such information.

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In its analysis, the Group observed that many governments were making their submissions to the Register long after the due date of 30 April; some transfers were not reported until more than a year after e event. Ihe Group recommended changing the aimuai reporting date from 30 April to 31 May in order to assist States in preparing accurate reports. It was stressed, however, that prompt reporting would facilitate early dissemination of data and information for governments and timely issuance of the annual report of the Secretary-General.

As regards the further development of the Register, the Group discussed three different dimensions: adjustments and technical aspects of the seven categories of weapons currently covered, including the provision of qualitative information; the addition of possible new categories and types; and expansion of the scope to include data on military holdings and procurement through national production at the same level of commitment as transfers.

Working on the assumption that the existing deHnitions of the categories of equipment were satisfactory, the Group studied the implications of the proposed technical adjustments and the provision of qualitative information in some of the categories of equipment in order to determine whether such improvements could increase participation in the Register, as well as the value and clarity of data and information being reported. The Group analysed from a technical standpoint the following proposed adjustments: \a) lowering the calibre of artillery systems from 100 millimetres to 75 millimetres; {b) lowering the tonnage of warships from 750 metric tonnes to 400 metric tonnes; (c) disaggregating missiles and missile launchers; and {dt) lowering the range of missiles from 25 kilometres to 10 kilometres and including ground-to-air missiles. Although the Group could not agree on the prcf>osed technical adjustment, it welcomed the increasing use of the “Remarks” column of the form to indicate details of types and models, as noted above, and expressed the hope that this trend would continue.

No new categ(Mies of conventional weapons were pressed for the Register. However, the question of the relationship between the existing categories and the possible addition of new categories was discussed, as was how that relationship could be of relevance to the purpose of the Register. In this context, the Group noted the work being done by the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms. In the context of the question of transparency, a proposal was made

84


to add the category of weapons of mass destruction. In considering this proposal, the Group reviewed the nature of the Register, regional security concerns and the related existing international legal instruments. No consensus, however, could be reached on this matter.

The Group reaffirmed the goal of early expansion of the Register by the inclusion ctf data on military holdings and procurement through national production. It welcomed the increasing number of States voluntarily reporting such additional background information and noted that most of the data reported pertained to the seven categories of the Register. The Group recommended the inclusion of data and information on military holdings and procurement through national production in the annual consolidated report to the General Assembly, with the understanding that States providing that data might request that they not be published. While the Group could not reach agreement on including such data on the same basis as for transfers, they nevertheless studied technical and practical aspects linked to the terms “military holdings” and “procurement through national production” as far as they related to the Register.

The number of States reporting additional bacl^ound information'''

1992 J22a 1994 1995 1996'*

Holdings 23 25 25 27 31

Procurement through national production

15 18 20 19 25

National policies 31 19 14 14 15

♦ See A/52/316, p. 15, para. 16.

Updated to include submissions to the Register as at the end of March1998.

For details concerning this discussion, see paragraph 36 of the report of the Secretary-General.

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The Group concluded that, in order to further develop the Register, another comprehensive review of its operaticm would be needed at an appropriate time.**

Consideration of transparency in the General Assembly

In the course of the fifty-second session of the General Assembly, widely different views on the future development of the Register were evident. Canada, the EU and the United States expressed their disappointment at the failure of the Group to reconunend the inclusion of data on military holdings and procurement through national production on the same basis as transfers. Non-aligned States, for instance, Cuba, Egypt, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Mexico, continued to advocate that the scope of the Register be broadened to include weapons of mass destruction, while Colombia stressed the need to include light weapons.

The persistent divergence of views was reflected in the adoption of two competing resolutions entitled ‘Transparency in armaments”. The traditi(Mial draft resolution, submitted by the Netherlands on behalf of 93 States, requested the Secretary-General to inclement the recommendations of his report on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development that fell within his competence. The new draft resolution, submitted by Egypt on behalf of six sponsors, sought to link transparency in conventional weapons and transparency in the fields of weapons of mass destruction and transfers of equipment and technologies directly related to the development and manufacture of such weapons. (See pages 89 and 91 for action on the Netherlands draft and on the Egyptian draft, respectively.)

Wassenaar Arrangement

Members of the Wassenaar Arrangement held a series of working group and expert group meetings throughout the year to coordinate their national export control policies, promote transparency in the export of

The recoimneiKlations of the Group are listed in paragraph 64 of thereport.

The full title is the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies; the decision to set it up was taken in December 199S. The membership was the same as in 1996 (33 States).

86

Global approaches to conventional wecqtons issues

conventional weapons and dual-use equipment and prevent their destabilizing accumulation. Several expert group meetings were held in Vienna to discuss control lists and the installation of a database to automate data exchanges. Representatives met in June to discuss their 31 March exchange of information on transfers of conventional arms and dual-use technology. It was recognized that participation in the exchange had improved greatly since the first exchange, in September 1996, although not all members provided data. At a meeting in December, participants discussed ways of broadening membership in the Arrangement and strengthening its ability to control transfers of weapons. At its last plenary meeting, it became clear that it was not possible to resolve outstanding differences, among them, expansion of reporting categories and existing imbalance in reporting requirements or to appoint a permanent head of the Vienna-based secretariat.

Conference on Disarmament, 1997

In 1997, delegations addressed the issue of transparency in armaments during plenary and informal meetings of the Conference on Disarmament, and their statements revealed, once again, the divergence of views on the scope of the item, the most appropriate way to deal with it and the mandate of a possible ad hoc conunittee. The proposals submitted to the Conference envisaged various approaches: establishing a committee to consider means of promoting transparency,^ addressing transparency as a part of the broader issue of conventional disarmament, * and appointing a special coordinator to seek views of the numbers of the CD.^ None of these proposals commanded consensus.

The Western and Eastern European countries wished the CD to continue considering the subject of transparency in armaments as a means of ensuring a proper balance between the nuclear and conventional items on the agen^, and also believed that it could contribute to the further improvement and strengthening of the United Nations Register. They thus called for the re-establishment of the apprcqnlate ad hoc conunittee.

CD/1450 (Islamic Republic of Iran).CD/1456 (Canada).

22 CD/1462 (Group of 21).

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On the other hand, the non-aligned countries were dissatisfied with the mandate based on General Assembly 46/36 L. Some of them— for example, Egypt—did not object, in principle, to the establishment of the ad hoc committee provided that its mandate would be comprehensive, addressing transparency in terms of both conventional arms and weapons of mass destruction, and also encompassing stockpiles of armaments, national production, and transfers of high technology with military applications. Others, like Algeria, reiterated that, at present, the concept of transparency was vague and imprecise and that the former Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments had exhausted its mandate. In these circumstances, the Group of 21, recognizing the sensitivity of the issue, was in favour of appointing a special coc»'dinator to seek views of the members of the Conference cm this agenda item.

China also believed that the mandate of the former Ad Hoc Committee had been fulfilled and that it was not necessary to re-establish it at the current session. Nonetheless, this position did not preclude an exchange of views on the subject. China noted that it participated in the Register of Conventional Arms, and that it was not against transparency in principle, but felt that all transparency measures were treaty-specific.


The Disarmament Commission approved, on 21 April, its provisional agenda for the 1997 substantive session and decided to allocate to Working Group III the agenda item entitled “Guidelines on conventional arms control/limitation and disarmament, with particular emphasis on consolidation of peace in the context of General Assembly resolution 51/45 N”. The Woricing Group was chaired by Ireland. The Group held a general exchange of views and several working papers were submitted. Subsequently, a non-paper prepared by the Chairman on the basis of the ideas and papers put before the Group was submitted and it served as a basis for further discussion. After a number of revisions, the suggested scope/framework for the future guidelines comprised the following elements: introduction, general framework, principles, practical disarmament measures, and other conventional arms control/limitation and disarmament measures. While the text enjoyed support as a contribution to the elaboration of the guidelines.

88


it was felt that some elements contained therein required further elaboration and refmement. Thus it was annexed, as the Chairman’s paper, to the report of the Working Group without prejudice to the positions of delegations.23


In 1997, the General Assembly adopted five resolutions dealing with the topics discussed in this chapter; two of which were entitled Transparency in armaments.

On 6 November, the representative of the Netherlands introduced a draft resolution entitled Transparency in armaments on behalf of the sponsors.2'* On 14 November, the First Committee took action on the draft text as follows. It adopted operative paragraphs 5{b), on the convening of a group of governmental experts in 2000, and 7, referring to the Conference on Disarmament, by separate recorded votes of 127 to none, Mdth 8 abstentions, and 123 to none, with 14 abstentions, respectively. The Committee then adopted the draft resolution as a whole by a recorded vote of 132 to none, with 10 abstentions.

Eight States explained their abstentions in the vote. Algeria stated that the draft resolution favoured a framework that had shown only a limited ability to respond to the expectations of all States with regard to transparency. Cuba had serious reservations on operative paragraph

Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-second Session, Supplement No.42 (A/52/42), annex 111.

Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Armenia. Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Congo, Costa Rica, Cdte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Hji, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazal^stan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Marshall Islands, Monaco, Mongolia, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger. Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal. Republic of Moldova. Romania. Russian Federation. Samoa. San Marino, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia. Solomon Islands. South Africa, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom. United States and Venezuela. Subsequent sponsors: Andorra, Belarus, Dominican Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar and Saint Lucia.

89


7: in its view consideration of the item had been properly concluded within the framework of the CD. Egypt abstained due to the lack of progress in the expansion and further development of the Register, which remained limited to transfers of only seven categories of conventional arms and continued to ignore other types of conventional arms and weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, the Register did not adequately deal with the issues of military holdings and procurement through national production. It expressed regiet that further consultations that could have led to a single text on the agenda item were not possible. The Islamic Republic of Iran held that no concrete efforts had been made so far to expand the scope of the Register to include data on all categories of weapons; there was no evidence that it had led to self-restraint in the transfer of conventional arms, particularly on the part of the biggest suppliers of those weapons; and no rigorous efforts had been made to promote full regional participation in it on an equal basis, especially in regions such as the Middle East that accounted for most conventional arms transfers. Moreover, it believed that the CD had already fulfilled its mandate on transparency in armaments. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea noted that establishment of the Register had not decreased the global transfer of weapons; instead, it had encouraged inaeased competition in the export of weapons among the big Powers and the main producers of weapons. The Syrian Arab Republic drew attention to the fact that the draft text did not take into account the special situation in the region of the Middle East, where the Arab-Israeli conflict continued. Myanmar, which had reservations on operative paragraphs 5(b) and 7, believed that there was need to review and reassess the operation of the Register, and that it would be premature to further develop it at this stage. Moreover, it did not see any urgent need for the CD to take up the issue of transparency in armaments at a time when it ought to be concentrating on banning fissile materials, nuclear disarmament and other pressing issues. Saudi Arabia, like Egypt, abstained because the Register excluded weapons of mass destruction and the transfer of advanced technology with military applications.

China, which voted in favour of the draft as a whole and abstained in the voting on paragraphs 5{b) and 7, stated that countries had different political, military and security environments and therefore it was not realistic to formulate abstract or unified transparency measures applicable to all countries. Noting that less than half the membership

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of the United Nations participated in the 1996 Register, China considered it urgent to enhance the Register’s universality before addressing the issue of extending its scc^. Nigeria voted in favour of operative paragraph 5(b) and the draft resolution as a whole because it attached great importance to the question of transparency in armaments. However, it abstained in the vote on operative paragraph 7, expressing the hope that the obstacles regarding that agenda item would be overcome through consultations between the members of the CD. Sri Lanka voted in favour of the text as a whole, despite deficiencies in the draft, because it believed that further work on transparency was desirable; however, it abstained in the voting on operative paragraph 7, holding that the draft should have made reference to the need to reexamine the mandate for transparency in armaments that the CD decided upon in 1992. Sudan supported the draft, proceeding from its belief that transparency in armaments contributes to confidence-building and security throughout the world. However, it also believed that such transparency should extend to all types of armaments, including weapons of mass destruction.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 155 to none, with 11 abstentions. For the text of resolution 52/38 R, Transparency in armaments, and the voting pattern, see pages 299 and 357, respectively.

On 17 November, the representative of Egypt, on behalf of the sponsors,^ introduced another draft resolution entitled Transparency in armaments. At the time of its introduction, the draft text had aheady been revised with the following changes: in the fourth, fifth and sixth preambular paragraphs, and in operative paragraphs 2 and 3, the words “high technology with military applications” were replaced by the words “equipment and technologies directly related to the development and manufacture of such weapons”.

Before the draft was put to a vote, Oman stated that its position with regard to the two draft texts on transparency was consistent with that ex^vessed by the Arab Group regarding the inherent deficiencies that existed in the Register, particularly cm the need for it to be more comprehensive and to include information on weapons of mass de- structicHi as well as on conventional arms.

^ Costa Rica, Egypt, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia. Subsequent sponsors: Niger and Sudan.

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The First Committee first took separate recorded votes on the sixth preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 3 before adopting the draft resolution as a whole. The sixth preambular paragraph (on the need to achieve universality of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) was adopted by a vote of 80 to 34, with 25 abstentions, and operative paragraph 3 (requesting the Seaetary-General to seek the views of Member States on ways and means to enhance transparency in armaments) was adopted by a vote of 73 to 46, with 17 abstentions. The draft resolution as a whole was then adopted by a recorded vote of 81 to 45, with 16 abstentions.

A number of States explained their negative votes. Australia supported as a general propositicm the application of transparency and other confidence-building measures in the field of weapons of mass destruction. However, in its view, by inq>lying that transparency in conventional weapons was condition^ upon enhancing transparency in weapons of mass destruction, the draft resolution went too far. Canada, a firm advocate of the contribution that greater transparency could make in the fields of arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament. opposed the draft because it had concerns over some of its terminology and was uncertain regarding its specific meaning. The United States pointed out that by linking the concepts of transparency and conventional arms to transparency and weapons of mass ^ tra c tion—although there was no widespread agreement on how transparency could be applied to the latter category—the existence of weapons of mass destraction anywhere in the world could be used by any Member State as an excuse not to participate in the Register. Moreover, the United States felt that it was time to re-establish the ad hoc committee on transparency in armaments so that the concerns of States on the subject could be discussed in a more substantive manner than in a debate c»i a draft resolution in the First Committee. Both the Russian Federation and the United States advocated universality of the treaties cited in the sixth preambular paragraph, but voted against that paragraph because the text was so drafted as to distort the purposes, content and basic orientation of those treaties.The European Union expressed regret that Egypt, which had participated in the consensus of the Group of Experts, had submitted its own draft resolution, which focused on transparency in the context of weapons

92


of mass destruction in a way that went far beyond the Group’s consensus on this issue.

Three States explained their abstentions. Argentina did not consider it necessary to adopt another draft text on transparency and held that the development of transparency mechanisms in the sphere of weapons of mass destruction should not have the effect of diminishing the effectiveness of existing mechanisms designed to create transparency in conventional arms. In addition, it did not agree with the drafting of operative paragraph 2. China, which did not participate in the vote on the sixth preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 3, stated that countries with the largest and most advanced nuclear arsenals should continue to take the lead in reducing drastically those arsenals and in renouncing their multiple standards regarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons in order to create conditions for full transparency and the total destruction of nuclear weapons. India abstained on the draft resolution as a whole and voted against the sixth preambular paragraph because it was not a party to the NPT and had no intention of becoming one.

Among those voting in favour, Cuba expressed the hope that the Committee would be able to adopt in 1998 a single resolution on the issue that took into account the need for transparency to be integral in all its aspects. It also placed on record that its vote in favour of the draft resolution could not be interpreted as representing a change in its position vis-Jk-vis the NPT, which was the reason it abstained in the separate vote on the sixth preambular paragraph. In the view of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the principle of transparency in armaments applied to conventional weapons, high technology with military applications and weapons of mass destruction in all its aspects. Mexico expressed some doubts about the scope of the terms used in operative paragraphs 2 and 3 of the revised text but supported its overall sense of balance. South Africa, while voting in favour of the draft resolution as a whole, abstained on operative paragraph 3 because it did not believe that a linkage should be established between this draft resolution and the other draft on the subject.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 98 to 45, with 13 abstentions. For the text of resolution 52/38 B, Transparency in armaments, and the voting pattern, see pages 273 and 346, respectively.

93


On 5 November, the representative of Germany introduced, on behalf of the sponsors,^ a draft resolution entitled Objective information on military matters, including transparency of military expenditures. On 11 November, the First Committee adopted the ^ f t resolution without a vote.

Pakistan, while joining in the consensus, expressed the view that transparency by itself could not lead to reduction of military expenditures. Because States acquired defensive arms for their own national and regional security environments, the international conmiunity should address these national and regional security problems as a means of halting an arms buiid-up in various parts of the world. It was only through negotiations that balanced reductions could be achieved in various parts of the world. Israel, which supported the reduction of military expenditures, stated that detailed reporting on military expenditures would require a regional understanding and settlement.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution without a vote. For the text of resolution 52/32, Objective information on military matters, including transparency of military expenditures, see page 259.

On 6 November, the representative of Germany introduced a draft resolution entitled Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures on behalf of the sponsors. On 12 November, the First Committee adopted the draft resolution without a vote.

^ Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary. Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway. Poland. Portugal. Republic of Moldova. Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. United Kingdom and United States. Subsequent sponsors: Costa Rica, Ecuadc , Malta, Monaco, Slovakia, Turkey and Ukraine.

^ Argentina. Australia. Austria. Bangladesh. Belgium. Cameroon, Canada. Central African Republic. Chile. Congo. Costa Rica, Cdte d’Ivoire, Czech Republic. Denmaric. El Salvador. Ethiopia. Finland, France. Gabon. Georgia, Germany. Ghana. Greece, Guatemala. Hungary, Ireland, Italy. Japan. Lithuania. Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands. Mozambique. Netherlands. New Zealand. Nicaragua. Niger. Norway, Peru, Poland. Portugal. Republic of Moldova, Romania, Slovenia, South Afnca, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden,

./.

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On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution also without a vote. For the text of resolution 52/38 G, Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures, see page 280.

On 6 November, the representative of Japan, on behalf of the sponsors,2* introduced a draft resolution entitled Small arms. On 10 November, the First Committee had before it a revised draft text, in which a new fifth preambular paragraph had been added reafHrming the right of self-determination of all peoples; and minor changes in other parts of the text had been made.

On 13 November, Pakistan submitted an amendment to the draft by which operative paragraph 1 would have been replaced by a new text. However, on 14 November, Pakistan stated that it did not intend to press the amendment to a vote. At the same meeting, Japan, on behalf of the sponsors, orally revised the draft resolution by adding the words “bearing in mind the views of Members States on the recommendations” at the end of existing operative paragraph 1. Also at the same meeting, the delegations of the United Kingdom and the United States withdrew their sponsorship of the draft resolution, as orally revised. Subsequently, the First Committee took action on the orally revised draft, adopting the fifth preambular paragraph by a re- . corded vote of 120 to none, with 23 abstentions, and the draft resolution as a whole, by a recorded vote of 137 to none, with 8 abstentions.

The Russian Federation, which abstained in the vote, stated that it had intended to support the original draft resolution but considered the addition of the fifth preambular paragraph inappropriate; its major concern, however, was the revision to operative paragraph 1. Israel abstained in the vote on the draft, as orally revised, because, in its

the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, United Kingdom, United States and Uruguay. Subsequent sponsors: Angola, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Ecuador, Iceland, Monaco, Panama, Slovakia and Tuiicey.

^ Australia, Austria. Belarus, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, Germany. Guinea, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sweden, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, United Kingdom and United States. Subsequent sponsors; Benin, Guyana, Haiti and Niger.

95

T7x UN Disarmament Yearbook: 1997

view, the subject of the fifth preambular paragraph had no place in the context of a draft resolution specifically on small arms.

A number of States explained their votes in favour of the draft resolution. Algeria stated that its affirmative vote did not mean that it endorsed the report of the Panel, which had not yet been examined by its national experts. Brazil and Mexico shared the view that they supported the draft text with the reservation that they were endorsing recommendations, the contents and implications of which they had not had adequate time to study. China expressed serious reservations about the Panel’s reconunendation on extending to other regions an approach to solving the problems of one specific country or region and did not participate in the vote on the fifth preambular paragri^h because of inadequate time to study its implications. It warned against any possible attempt to use the excessive accumulation and illicit transfer of small arms as a pretext for changing the focus of international arms control and disarnuunent or for stripping small and medium-sized countries of the military means necessary for legitimate self-defence. Cuba noted that the revision of operative paragraph 1 enabled it to vote in favour of the draft text However, it made clear that its affirmative vote could in no way be interpreted as constituting a commitment by Cuba to automatic implementation of reconunenda- ti(»s that would appear in the final report of the Panel. Those recommendations would require careful consideration by Member States before any decisions on implementation were adopted. Egypt voted in favour because of its steadfast commitment to the pursuit of all efforts that could lead to a safer and more stable world. While encouraged by the reconmiendations of the Panel, Egypt would continue to monitor closely the issue of small arms to ensure that it was dealt with in a just, balanced, non-discriminatory and comprehensive manner. Singapore stated that it supported any measures aimed at stopping the illicit international trafficking and the destabilizing accumulation of arms and was prepared to participate in the work of a future group on the issue. However, it was of the view that proposals to reduce the illicit transfer of small arms and light weapons should not impinge on the national security interests of States. Furthermore, States had the right to use and procure all such arms and w e^ns for their legitimate defence. Pakistan supported the draft resolution with reservations. Referring to some reconunendations of the Panel—the call for a review of their inq)lementation and for a report on “fiuiher acticMis

96


recommended to be taken”—it held that the desire for such quick results instead of promoting progress could lead to impeding it. It also objected to the selective political approach adopted by the experts in identifying specific regions, even though there was no authoritative representation from these regions on the Panel. Pakistan considered that no recommendation on the issue of small arms should prejudice the right of peoples under foreign domination to seek their in^pen- dence and freedom from such occupation.

The United Kingdom, while strongly supporting both the work of the Panel and the recommendations made in the SG’s report on small arms, stated that it did not wish to see any caveat attached to the draft resolution’s endorsement of the recommendations contained in the report; it also expressed regret that it had been necessary to make the changes in operative paragraph 1. The United States wished to put on record that it had to withdraw its co-sponsorship of the draft because of the language proposed by Pakistan, which had been incorporated in the revision. The paragraph could be read to imply that the General Assembly endorsed only the portions of the experts’ report that fully coincide with the views of all Member States, a position which the United States rejected. However, it strongly supported efforts to address the problems posed by small arms and had participated in the 1997 Panel. The United States strongly supported the principle of self-determination but abstained in the vote on the fifth preambular paragraph because it felt that the mention of that principle in a draft resolution on small arms was not appropriate.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 158 to none, with 6 abstentions. For the text of resolution 52/38 J, Small arms, and the voting pattern, see pages 283 and 350, respectively.

Conclusion

During the year increasing attention was focused on the low end of the conventional weapons spectrum—small arms and light weapons— and on practical disarmament measures that could be applied to operations in which the United Nations is involved, especially in the peace-building phase. Through the study on small arms, which also examined the problem of illicit trafficking, and the work of the Disarmament Commission on conventional arms limitation, with an

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emphasis on the consolidation of peace, the United Nations began the delicate task of finding common ground in an area that touches the national security concerns of the majority of its Member States in a wide variety of ways. In the light of the mandates of the General Assembly at its fifty-second session, follow-up action to limit both weapons and conflict will be pursued actively in the coming year.

Taking into consideration some promising trends such as the level of participation, the increasing number of governments voluntarily reporting on military holdings and procurement through national production, and efforts to promote support for the Register through regional arrangements and agencies, it can be expected that the Register will expand its scope over time in order to become a truly global instrument reflecting the full military potential of States. As noted by the Seaetary-General in his foreword to the repot on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development, in a world in which security in isolation is no longer possible, transparency can minimize the risk of misunderstanding or miscalculation in military matters, thus contributing to trust and more stable relations among States.

ANNEX I

Recommendations of the study on small arms*

78. The Panel’s recommendations are con^rised first of measures to reduce the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transf^ of small arms and light weapons in specific regions of the world where such accumulations and transfers have already taken place. These are followed by measures to prevent such accumulations and transfers from occurring in future.79. The Panel reconunends the following reduction measures:

(a) The United Nations should adopt a proportional and integrated approach to security and development, including the identification of appropriate assistance for the internal security forces initiated with respect to Mali and other West Afncan States, and extend it to other regions of the world where conflicts come to an end and where serious problems of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons have to be dealt with urgently. The donor community should support this new approach in regard to such regions of the world;

(b) The United Nations should support, with the assistance of the donor community, all appropriate post-conflict initiatives related to disarmament and

* A/52/298.

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demobilization, such as the disposal and destruction of weapons, including weapons tum-in progranunes sponsored locally by governmental and nongovernmental organizations;

(c) Once national conciliation is reached, the United Nations should assist in convening an inter-Afghan forum to prepare, inter alia, a schedule to account for, retrieve and destroy the small arms and light weapons left unaccounted for in Afghanistan;

(d) In view of the problems stemming from an excess of small arms and light weapons left over from many internal conflicts and the lessons learned from the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations, two sets of guidelines should be developed in order to:

(i) Assist negotiators of peace settlements in developing plans to disarm combatants, particularly as concerns light weapons, small arms and munitions, and to include therein plans for the collection of weapons and their disposal, preferably by destruction;

(ii) Provide assistance to peacekeeping missions in implementing their mandates, based on peace settlements;

Former peace negotiators and members of peacekeeping operations of the United Nations should be consulted in the preparation of such guidelines. In this connection, consideration should be given to the establishment of a disarmament component in peacekeeping operations undertaken by the United Nations.

(e) States and regional organizations, where applicable, should strengthen international and regional cooperation among police, intelligence, customs and border control officials in combating the illicit circulation of and trafficking in small arms and light weapons and in suppressing criminal activities related to the use of these weapons;

(f) The establishment of mechanisms and regional networks for information sharing for the above-mentioned purposes should be encouraged;

(g) All such weapons which are not under legal civilian possession, and which are not required for the purposes of national defence and internal security, should be collected and destroyed by States as expeditiously as possible.80. The Panel recommends the following prevention measures:

(a) All States should in^>lement the recommendations contained in the guidelines for international arms transfers in the context of General Assembly resolution 46/36 H of 6 December 1991, adopted by the Disarmament Commission in 1996;

(b) All States should determine in their national laws and regulations which arms are permitted for civilian possession and the conditions under which they can be used;

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(c) All States should ensure that they have in place adequate laws, regulations and administrative procedures to exorcise effective control over the legal possession of small arms and light weapons and over their transfer in order, inter alia to prevent illicit trafficking;

(d) States emerging from conflict should, as soon as practicable, in^ose or reimpose licensing requirements on all civilian possession of small arms and light weapons on their territory;

(e) All States should exercise restraint with respect to the transfer of the surplus of small arms and light weapons manufactured solely for the possession of and use by the military and police forces. All States should also consider the possibility of destroying all such surplus weapons;

(f) All States should ensure the safeguarding of such weapons against loss through theft or corruption, in particular from storage facilities;

(g) The United Nations should urge relevant organizations, such as the International Criminal Police Oiganization (Interpol) and the World Customs Organization, as well as all States and their relevant national agencies, to closely cooperate in the identification of the groups and individuals engaged in illicit trafficking activities; and the modes of transfer used by them;

{h) All States and relevant regional and international organizations should intensify their cooperative efforts against all aspects of illicit trafficking mentioned in the present report that are related to the proliferation and accumulation of small arms and light weapons;

(0 The United Nations should encourage the adoption and in^lementation of regional or subregional moratoriums, where appropriate, on the transfer and manufacture of small arms and light weapons, as agreed upon by the States concerned;

(j) Other regional organizations should take note, and make use, as appropriate, of the work of the Organization of American States in preparing a draft inter-American convention against the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives and other related materials;

{k) The United Nations should consider the possibility of convening an international conference on the illicit arms trade in all its aspects; based on the issues identified in the present report;

(/) To assist in preventing the illicit trafiQcking in and circulation of small arms and light weapons, the United Nations should initiate studies on the following:

(i) The feasibility of establishing a reliable system for marking all such weapons from the time of their manufacture;

(ii) The feasibility of restricting the manufacture and trade of such weapons to the manufacturers and dealers authorized by States, and

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of establishing a database of such authorized manufacturers and dealers;

(m) The United Nations should initiate a study on all aspects of the problem of ammunition and explosives.

ANNEX nComposite table of replies of Governments

for the Re^ster of Conventional Arms: 1996*(Including a '"nir* report submitted by Cook Islands)

State

ExplanationData on Data on submitted in Backgroundexports imports note verbale information

Andorra nil nil noArgentina nil yes yesArmenia nil nil yesAustralia yes yes yesAustria yes nil yesAzerbaijan nil nil yesBelarus yes nil noBelgium yes nil yesBelize nil nil noBhutan nil nil noBrazil nil yes yesBrunei Darussalam yes noBulgaria nil yes yesCameroon nil nil noCanada yes yes yesChile nil yes noChina yes yes yes yesCroatia nil nil noCuba nil nil noCyprus nil yes noCzech Republic yes nil yesDenmark nil yes yesDominican Republic yesEcuador nil nil noEstonia nil nil no

* See A/S2/312, and Conr. 1 and 2, and Add. 1-4.

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ExplanationData on Data on submitted in Background

State exports imports note verbale information

Ethiopia nil noFyi nil nil noFinland yes yes noFrance yes yes yesGeorgia nil nil noGermany yes nil yesGreece yes yes yesGrenada nil nil noGuatemala nil nil noGuyana nil nil noHonduras nil nil noHungary nil yes noIceland nil nil noIndia nil yes noIndonesia yes noIran (Islamic nil yes no

Republic of)Ireland nil nil yesIsrael yes yes yesItaly yes yes yesJapan nil yes yesKazakhstan yes nil noLatvia nil nil noLiechtenstein nil nil noLithuania nil nil noLuxembourg nil nil yesthe former Yugoslav nil nil yes

Republic of Macedonia

Madagascar nil nil noMalaysia nil yes noMaldives nil nil noMalta nil nil noMarshall Islands nil nil no

102

Global approaches to conventional y^eapons issues

ExplanationData on Data on submitted in Background

State exports imports note verbale information

Mauritius nil nil noMexico nil yes yesMonaco nil nil noMongolia nil nil noNamibia nil nil noNetherlands yes nil yesNew Zealand nil nil yesNorway nil yes yesPakistan yes noParaguay nil nil noPeru nil yes noPhilippines nil yes noPoland nil yes yesPortugal nil yes yesRepublic of Korea nil yes noRomania yes yes noRussian Federation yes nil noSamoa nil nil noSaint Lucia nil nil noSeychelles nil nil noSingapore yes yes noSlovakia yes yes yesSlovenia nil yes noSouth Africa yes nil noSpain nil yes yesSweden yes yes yesSwitzerland yes yes yesThailand yes noTrinidad and Tobago nil nil noTuricey nil nil yesTurkmenistan yes noUkraine yes no

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State

ExplanationData on Data on submitted in Backgroundexports imports note verbale information

United Kingdom of yes yesGreat Britain and Northern Ireland

United Republic of nil nilTanzania

United States of yes yesAmerica

Viet Nam nil nil

yes

no

yes

no

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C H A P T E R V

Anti'personnel mines

Introdaction

O ver the past five or six years, determination has been growing to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines (APMs). At first the inq)etus came primarily from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and non-govemmental organizations (NGOs). Later, governments began seriously to address the deepening humanitarian crisis. In 1993, France requested the Secretary-Genial, as depositary to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), to convene a conference to review the treaty, with priority to be given to anti-personnel mines. That same year. Member States that ate members of the European Community requested that an item on mine clearance be inscribed on the agenda of the General Assembly and, on the initiative of the United States, the Assembly adopted a resolution calling upon States to agree to a moratorium on the export of anti-pers(xmel landmines. Subsequently, the United Nations established a voluntary trust fund to flnance information and training programmes relating to mine clearance and to facilitate the launching of mine-clearance operations.

In May 1996, the parties to the CCW amended its Protocol II,‘ on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of mines, booby-traps and other devices, by extending its scope of application to cover both international and internal armed conflicts, by prohibiting the use of non-detectable APMs (albeit with a nine-year deferral period from entry into force) and their transfer, and by prohibiting the use of non-self-destructing and non-self-deactivating mines outside marked

The text of amended Protocol II is rq>ioduced in Status, Sth edition: 1996 (Sales No. E.97.IX.3).

105


areas. In addition, it provided for broader protection for peace-keeping and other missions of the UN and required parties to enforce compliance with its provisions within their jurisdicticm. It also instituted annual conferences for review. The amended Protocol was a carefully crafted compromise between the humanitarian and security concerns of the parties and reflected the consensus that could be achieved at that time.

However, a number of governments, international agencies, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and other NGOs wished to move beyond the compromise represented by amended Protocol II towards a comprehensive ban on APMs. In October, the Government of Canada convened a Strategy Conference in Ottawa to further this objective. At the Conference, the Ottawa Group (some SO States) adopted a declaration formally recognizing the urgency of halting all new deployments of APMs; increasing resources for mine-awareness, clearance and victim assistance programmes; and concluding as soon as possible a legally binding international agreement to ban APMs, the first draft of which Austria undertook to produce. Hie Minister for Foreign Affairs announced that Canada would host a signing ceremony for such a convention in December 1997.

The Strategy Conference initiated and intensified a very wide range of effort and action that came to be known as the Ottawa process, which was directed towards; demining and demining capability- building, mine awareness programmes, victim assistance, rehabilitation and reintegration into society, relevant technologies, national moratoriums on exports, civil advocacy for a treaty banning APMs and the elaboration of such a treaty. The following section gives an overview of the momentum generated in favour of mine action, with the focus on the legal aspects and various approaches to alleviating the humanitarian crisis and to ensuring the widest possible support for an effective, legally binding regime. The subsequent section outlines the major steps in the elaboration of the total ban itself, the culminati(»i of the legal work of the Ottawa process in 1997.

The ICBL, begun in 1991, is a coalition of o v c t 1,000 NGOs in over 60 countries woiking to ban landmines.

The Declaration was circulated as document A/C. 1/S 1/10, annex I. Annex II of the same document contains the Chaiiman’s Agenda for Action.

106

Anti-personnel mines

Reflecting the mounting concern for the humanitarian crisis, the fifty-first session of the General Assembly, on the initiative of the United States, adopted a resolution (S1/4S S) by which it urged States to pursue an international agreement to ban APMs, rather than calling for national moratoriums on exports, as it had in an earlier series of resolutions. Hie 1996 resolution did not specify a forum for negotiation, but the Conference on Disarmament was seen as a possible body to carry out this task.


In the course of 1997, the text of a con^rehensive agreement banning APMs and mandating their destruction was drafted, negotiated and concluded, and the resulting Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stoclq)iiing, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction was opened for signature in Ottawa in December. This process was remarkable in the recent history of arms control and disarmament agreements not only because of its speed— apfHTOximately 14 months—but also because of the motivation of the principal players and the negotiating procedures they followed. The driving force behind the negotiati(Mis was the desire to address the extreme humanitarian and socio-economic costs associated with APMs. This clarity of purpose allowed for work to proceed quickly through a series of short negotiating sessions, a follow-up cc»iference in Brussels in June and a diplomatic conference in Oslo in September—^meetings that were held among a growing number of participants rather than in a permanent body with a fixed membership, such as the CD. Moreover, it thwarted attempts, like those that occurred in Oslo (see page 115), to diminish the scope of the draft convention.

Although the core group of States drafting the text worked hard to draw as many other States into the process as possible, they shared the conviction that the overriding aim was humanitarian and thus the treaty must be of a con^rehensive scope. Consequently, negotiations were conducted without the need to meet all the security concerns of a number of other States that felt they were not in a position to support a total ban immediately. Only States that signed the Brussels Declaraticm of June, which set out the essential elements of a complete ban and the objective of concluding it and opening it for signature before the end of 1997, could negotiate at the Diplomatic Conference

107


in Oslo in September, and the rules of procedure of that Conference allowed for adoption of the treaty text by a two-thirds majority vote.

While all States expressed the desire to address the suffering caused by mines, they bore in mind several considerations when determining their position vis-^-vis negotiations on APMs. A considerable number insisted that it was indiscriminate use that was at the root of the crisis, that APMs could be legitimately used for self-defence, and that the elimination of a category of defensive conventional weapons was a major disarmament measure even though the motivation for the endeavour was primarily humanitarian. In the context of self-defence, Australia, China, Egypt, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Korea, among others, noted the effectiveness of APMs in defending borders. Israel and Turkey pointed to the need to counter mine-deployment by terrorists within their territory, and the United States stressed its responsibilities on the Korean peninsula. Countries depending upon APMs for self-defence in such instances believed that alternative, non-lethal technologies would have to be developed and made available before a global comprehensive ban would be feasible. In this connection, Egypt raised the question of who should bear the cost of finding an alternative.

Because of the combination of humanitarian and security concerns, States adopted a variety of approaches' and some expressed preference for other forums in addition to the Ottawa process.

In the first part of the year, a very large number of States, among which were some that were participating in the drafting of the Ottawa Convention and some that were not, believed the CD had a role to play in moving forward restrictions on anti-personnel mines until such time as a global ban would become feasible, and advocated that the Geneva body initiate negotiations in an ad hoc committee. They noted that the major producers and users of these weapons were members of the CD, and would thus be brought into any negotiating process, whether for the complete elimination of APMs or for partial measures. Hungary and Japan, for instance, favoured work on an outright ban, while others, for instance, Australia, Finland, India and the United

* A number of States made statements on past and current measures taken by them. Kazakhstan circulated a statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the imposition of a moratorium on the export of APMs (A/52/335 and CD/1472).

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States, envisaged a phased ai^roach, beginning with work on a ban on export. States advocating a role for the CD argued that it would complement the effort launched by Canada.

As the Ottawa process gathered momentum, however, some of those States actively engaged in it reconsidered their position regarding a possible role for the CD. By the end of the CD’s session, it was apparent that if it were to engage in work on APMs, the parameters of that work would have to be decided upon after the opening for signature of the new Convention. By the time that the First Committee considered the landmines issue, it was not possible to call explicitly upon the CD to negotiate these matters, and instead, the Australian initiative referred to “contributions” towards banning these weapons.

Mexico, a member of the core group of the Ottawa process, saw no need for negotiation in the CD, and argued that the conclusion of a legally binding ban was a humanitarian endeavour, which required urgent action and expertise in humanitarian law—two criteria that, in its view, the CD could not meet.

China and Cuba, which stressed that the landmine crisis was caused by indisaiminate use and held that APMs were a legitimate weapon of self-defence, also did not believe that the CD was the appropriate body to take up the subject. China stated that the CD should concentrate on those arms control and disarmament issues that had a significant impact upon international security, and Cuba feared that negotiati(His in this area could detract £rom what should be the CD’s priwity, nuclear disarmament. The two States saw universal adherence to amended Protocol II of the CCW as the best way to combat the humanitarian problem.

There was, indeed, widespread agreement that amended ProtocolII offered a valuable forum for efforts regarding APMs, as the annual conferences of States patties it provided for could be used for advancing by phases. The General Assembly adopted by consensus resolution 52/42 urging rapid entry into force of the Protocol (see page 315). By the end of the year, 12 States had consented to be bound by the Protocol, leaving 8 more notifications of consent to be given before it could enter into force.

Throughout the year, events moved very rapidly, fwcing govemments, in a relatively short period of time, to take a stand regarding a comprehensive ban. On 27 June in Brussels, 97 States associated

109


themselves with a declaration that committed them to woik towards the achievement of a total ban within the year and to forward the text of a draft agreement to the Oslo Diplomatic Conference, to be convened on 1 September, for formal negotiation. In the following months, other States signed the Declaration. On 18 August, the United States announced its decision to participate in the negotiations in Oslo, stating that it would work with others to secure an agreement that achieved its humanitarian goals while protecting its national security interests. Following the Diplomatic Conference, which adopted the text of the Convention without a vote, pressure grew for governments—even those that had participated at Oslo—to come to a final decision before December, when the Convention would be opened for signature. During the First Committee, in October and November, it was evident that the decision process was continuing in a number of capitals, and several States that expressed only cautious support for the Ottawa Convention did, in fact, sign it six weeks later.

A feature of the Ottawa process was the partnership that developed between governments and NGOs. The drive to achieve a ban on APMs, which had originated in the ICRC and sectors of civil society and had been joined by certain governments at the 1996 Strategy Conference in Ottawa, played an indispensable role. Through numerous conferences and workshops in all parts of the world organized by the ICBL, working ia conjunction with regional organizations and governments, public attention focused on such issues as mine clearance and victim assistance, and public support grew for a general ban. Activity was particularly intense in Africa, a continent suffering severely from landmines. Non-governmental institutions had a very significant influence on public opinion and also played a very important part in traditionally governmental forums, namely, the actual cc»i- sultations and negotiations on the drafting of the Convention.

On 10 October, in recognition of the crucial part played by the ICBL, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to it and its coordinator, Jody Williams. The Secretary-General declared that the honour was a victory for all the vulnerable people who had been killed or maimed by those silent weapons and told Ms. Williams that “when non-

5 CD/1467.

Statement by the White House Press Secretary, 18 August.

110


governmental organizations come together and work with Governments, a lot can happen in a relatively short time”J

All States—^whether advocates of a ban on APMs or not, whether mine-contaminated or belonging to the donor community—agreed that mine clearance activity had to be intensified and would do much to alleviate the humanitarian crisis. China and Egypt stressed a particular problem in this area—the removal of abandoned mines laid by foreign Powers in earlier wars. Egypt recalled that the 1996 Review Conference of the CCW had recognized the important role that States involved in the deployment of those mines could now play through providing maps and information and appropriate technic^ assistance.

On 31 October, the United States announced its “Demining 2010 Initiative”, aimed at bringing together donors, demining experts and assistance recipients in an endeavour to expand demining and related programmes of assistance, to enhance the exchange of demining information and technology, and to optimize worldwide demining resources in order to eradicate landmines posing threats to civilians by the year 2010.’


Resolution S1/4S S, a United States initiative, did not specify the forum for negotiating an international agreement to ban anti-perscHuiel landmines, but in early January, the United States formally proposed such negotiations at the opening meeting of the CD’s 1997 session, considering that the CD offered “the most practical and effective forum” for achieving a global ban.‘<) On that occasion, Canada stressed that all efforts towards achieving a comprehensive ban should be complementary.

Because of difficulties in establishing its programme of work (see page 158), the CD was only able, at the end of June, to appoint

UN Press Release DC/2592 of 10 OctobCT.

* Final Declaration of the Review Conference, preamble (CCW/ CONF.I/16 (Part 1), annex C.

® US Government Fact Sheet.

CD/1441.

Ill


a special coordinator,the representative of Australia, to conduct consultations on a possible mandate for an ad hoc committee. On 28 August, as the CD neared the end of its session and on the eve of the convening of the Diplomatic Conference in Oslo, the Special Coordinator reported that a clear majority of delegations were in favour of, or at least not opposed to, commencing work in the CD on landmines, many of them favouring a phased a(^roach to elimination, beginning with work on exports, imports and transfers. However, it was commonly held that the CD’s role could not be precisely determined until early 1998, following the opening for signature of the Convention in Ottawa in December.

Ottawa Convention

An outline of the steps to be taken in 1997 to elaborate a legally binding agreement i»ohibiting APMs had already been set out at the Strategy Conference of October 1996. To lay the necessary groundwork, Austria undertook to elaborate a draft text of a convention, and a month later—in November—it produced the first draft and distributed it worldwide for comments. In addition, the Declaration of the Strategy Conference provided for a meeting in Brussels in June of 1997 to review the progress made by the international community in working towards a global ban.

Meetings preceding the signing o f the Convention

Informal consultations on the draft text distributed by Austria were held in Vienna from 12 to 14 February, which were attended by a growing number of States—111 in all—and representatives of the United Nations, the ICRC, the League of Arab States and the ICBL. Following a general exchange of views on the conceptual foundations of an APM ban, participants offered specific comments during an

The ai^intment was made under the agenda item “Conf>rehensive progranmie of disarmament” (CD/1466). Finland had suggested such a measure in January. In the Hrst part of the CD’s session, two draft mandates for an ad hoc committee had been submitted: (a) a mandate afRrming the ultimate objective of a global ban but providing for its achievement by a step-by-step approach (United Kingdom) (CD/1443) and (b) a mandate to undertake work on the various aspects of a ban simultaneously (Japan and Hungary) (CD/14SS). Neither was put to a decision.

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article-by-article review, during which a number of points were raised. Some believed that the definition of an APM was ambiguous; with respect to the scope of prohibition, some advocated a prohibition of production or transfer of APMs, while permitting use, while others advocated a more comprehensive prohibition—production, use, stockpiling and transfer— and would require their destruction. In the course of the meeting it becan^ evident that there were also differing views with respect to the issue of verification, covered in the draft by an article entitled “Challenge inspections”, and that it required further work. It was agreed that the treaty should contain explicit provisions on cooperation and assistance for mine clearance, demining and development of demining technology.

In the light of proposals put forward at the Vienna meeting and suggestions made prior to it, on a bilateral basis, Austria circulated a revision of the February text on 14 March. While the first draft had followed the definition in amended Protocol II to the CCW, i.e., “mines designed primarily to be exploded by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person”, the second draft dropped the word “primarily” but specifically exempted anti-vehicle mines equipped with antihandling devices. The second draft reprinted, unchanged, the text of the article on verification on the understanding that this aspect would be considered further at an expert meeting to be held in Bonn in April.

The meeting on verification measures, hosted by Germany from 24 to 25 April,* examined two different concepts of verification. On the one hand was the view, held by the core group of States of the Ottawa process, that the future convention, being primarily an instrument of international humanitarian law, would not require elaborate verification provisions that might entail lengthy negotiations. Canada suggested the establishment of a “cooperative implementation commission” to facilitate and to review compliance. On the other hand was the view, held by, among others, the United States, France and the United Kingdom, that tiie compliance provisions of existing treaties, such as the CWC, should be used as guidelines.

On 13 May, Austria circulated a third draft in preparation for the Brussels meeting. The article on verification and compliance was

AUended by some 120 delegations, plus representatives of the ICRC, the UN and the ICBL.

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changed by dropping the element of challenge inspections and by elaborating, instead, procedures for facilitation and clarification of compliance. In addition, the provisions in the article on transparency were amplified. These changes reflected the view that a cooperative system that encouraged compliance would be appropriate to an APM ban, one incorporating such elements as confidence-building, transparency, data exchanges, periodic reporting, and fact-finding missions.

As a follow-up to the Ottawa Conference, the International Ccxi- ference for a Comprehensive Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines was held in Brussels from 24 to 27 June, attended by more than ISO States. The Conference adopted the Brussels Declaration,!^ signed by 97 States,which set out the essential elements of a legally binding international agreement: a conq>rehensive ban on the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of APMs; the destruction of stockpiled and removed APMs; and international cooperation and assistance in the field of mine clearance in affected countries. The signatories of the Declaration welcomed the convening in Oslo on 1 September of a Diplomatic Conference to negotiate a legally binding international treaty banning anti-personnel landmines and affirmed their objective of concluding the negotiation and of signing such an agreement before

Declaration for the Brussels Conference on Anti-Personnel Landmines (CD/1467). See also the report on the first part of the Conference (CD/1467, Annex 3).

Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chad, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cdte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Rji, France, Gabon, Germany, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Monaco, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Moldova, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Senegal, Seychelles, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuiicmenistan, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

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the end of 1997 in Ottawa. It was agteed that the Austrian draft treaty of 13 May would be the basis for the negotiations in Oslo.

The Diplomatic Conference was held in Oslo from 1 to 18 September to formally negotiate the text of the treaty. Eighty-nine States participated,^ and another 32 attended as observers.^ In addition, a number of international institutions were represented as observer organizations. ^

During the negotiations, several difficulties were encountered. In the preamble, three elements were questioned (mention of assistance to mine victims, reference to the CD and the principle of nondiscrimination); some States had reservations concerning certain definitions, such as the definition of mines, of transfer, and of mined areas; the period of ten years for destruction of mines was seen as unattainable by several countries; problems were foreseen with regard to timely reporting; and while for some the verification provisions did not go far enough, others considered the opposite true. The United

The following States participated: Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, C6te d’Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Gabon, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, San Marino, Senegal, Seychelles, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, United Republic of Tanzania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

The following States participated as observers: Albania, Bangladesh, Belarus, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Greece, India, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Latvia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Lithuania, Morocco, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, Turkey and Ukraine.

UN, UNHCR, UNICEF. WFP, GAS, OAU, ICRC, IFRC, the Grand Magistry of the Sovereign Military Order of Malta, and the ICBL.

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States attempted to amend the draft treaty so as to allow it to use APMs on the Korean peninsula and to use anti-tank and anti-personnel mines in mixed canisters. In addition, it suggested two options for entry into force: 60 ratifications, including those of all five permanent members of the Security Council and 75 per cent of historic mine producers and users, or a nine-year transition period for the implementation of the treaty’s core provisions so as to give time for the development of alternative technologies. Some countries were willing to support at least some of these demands (for example, Australia, Japan, Ecuador, Poland, Spain and Venezuela), but the majority wanted an unambiguous, early ban, with no exceptions. After intensive consultations, the United States decided not to seek a vote on its proposals, thus paving the way for the formal adoption of the treaty without a vote.

Welcoming the adoption of the Convention, the Secretary- General stressed that “By this act, a standard has been set for moving towards the elimination of this ‘invisible enemy’, which kills innocent civilians every day and robs people of their means of livelihood”.**

On 26 September, a press conference was held at United Nations Headquarters in New York at which the Foreign Minister of Norway handed over to the Foreign Minister of Canada the text of the Convention. Speaking on that occasion, the Secretary-General stated that the treaty would be “a landmadc in the history of disarmament”, that Canada, by initiating the process, had set an example for all humanitarians, while Norway, by hosting the Oslo Conference, had underlined the partnership that was the essence for that worldwide effort The Secretary-General also welcomed the representatives of the ICRC and the ICBL, which had led the global successful grass-roots movement.*’

Opening for signature o f the Ottawa Convention

At the Conference held in Ottawa from 2 to 4 December, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction was signed

** UN Press Release SG/SM/6332 of 18 September.

*® UN Press Release SG/SM/6338 of 18 September.

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by 121 States. ** Several signatory and non-signatory States, representatives of international institutions and NGOs made statements during the Conference. In his statement, the Secretary-General stressed that a global alliance made up of individuals and governments, of grass-roots movements and global humanitarian organizations had contributed to the drafting of the Convention and that it would provide the final impetus for a universal ban, encompassing all mine-producing and mine-affected countries. The Prime Minister of Canada noted that for the first time, a global parmership of governments, international institutions and non-govenunental groups had come together to draft a treaty that would ban weapons that had been in military use in almost every country in the world, and that Canada had become the first nation in the world to ratify it. In her statement, the Cocwdina- tor of the ICBL observed that governments would not have responded to the NGOs’ call for a ban on a weapon in widespread use if the voice of civil society had not been raised to a very high degree. Governments had gradually become convinced, however, to take steps, and that had led to the signing of the Ccmvention by so many States.

While there was general feeling that the conclusicm of the Convention was a milestone event, some States, such as Australia and

Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Cdte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Bji, France, Gabon. Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana. Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Niue, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Seychelles, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Suriname. Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda. United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

UN Press Release SG/SM/6410/Rev. 1 of 3 December.

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Japan, considered that negotiations on a universal and effective ban on landmines should be started in the CD. Several States affected by anti-personnel mines (among them, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Ethiopia and Namibia) emphasized the need to mobilize resources to finance ail demining activities, to improve the technologies that would make it possible to destroy a maximum number of mines in a short time, and resources that would allow the social integration and rehabilitaticm of the victims. Guatemala, speaking on behalf of the Central American Group, reaffirmed the commitment of those States to make iheir region a zone free of anti-personnel mines by the year 2000. Members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, a region totally landmines-free, reaffirmed their support for the Convention and their readiness to sign and ratify it.

Some ncHi-signatory States, among them Cuba, Finland, Israel, Sri Lanka and Ukraine, stated that they could not, at this stage, sign the Convention because APMs were a legitimate means of self-defence, in particular against threats posed by terrorists, and that they were needed until effective alternatives were available. The United States reiterated that it would not sign the Convention because of its concern for the safety and security of its forces and the unique responsibilities it had around the world for the security of friends and allies. It also reiterated that it was its policy to end the use of all anti-personnel mines outside Korea by 2003, including those that self-destruct, and that, for Korea, the objective was to have alternatives ready by 2006.

A central component of the Ottawa Conference was the Mine Action Forum, a series of roundtable meetings of experts from governments, NGOs, academia, and the international development sector that were held to initiate the second part of the Ottawa process, which would aim at ensuring that the commitments entailed by the Convention would be met fully and as quickly as possible. Thus Ottawa II would focus on efforts to expand mine clearance and assistance to victims, to encourage all States to sign the Convention and to urge all signatories to ratify it without delay. The Fomm issued an “Agenda for Mine Action” to serve as a guide for the second phase, to maintain the momentum of the past 18 months and to facilitate coordination of eff»ts in the areas mentioned above.

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Basic provisions of the Ottawa Convention

Following the preamble, the main obligations of the States parties are elaborated in articles 1 to 9, while the remaining articles (10 to 22) contain traditional clauses pertaining to such aspects of a treaty as the settlement of disputes, meetings of States parties, and entry into force.

On the basis of article 1, each State party undertakes never under any circumstances: (a) to use APMs; {b) to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, APMs; and (c) to assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State party. In addition, every State party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all stockpiled APMs it owns or possesses, or that are under its jurisdiction or control not later than four years after entry into force of the Convention (article 4), and to destroy mines in mined areas not later than ten years after that date (article S). In a case where a State party is unable to destroy all its APMs, it may submit a request for an extension of the deadline. Article 2 sets out the definition for “anti-personnel mine”, which explicitly excludes from the prohibition mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle, as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices.

The Convention makes an exception (article 3) to the general obligations of article 1, whereby States are permitted to retain or transfer a number of APMs for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques and to transfer APMs for destruction.

In an effort to facilitate implementation. States parties undertake to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and technological information; and, if in a position to do so, they shall provide assistance for the care, rehabilitation and social and economic reintegration of mine victims and for mine clearance and related activities (article 6).

States parties undertake a number of transparency measures (article 7). They are required to submit a report to the Secretary-General not later than 180 days after entry into force of the Conventicm, and updated annually thereafter, on their national implementation measures (article 9); and to submit data pertaining to such matters

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as their stockpiles, the location of all mined areas, and the types and quantity of all APMs retained or transferred, in accordance with article 3. They also report on the status of prograounes for conversion of production facilities and for destruction of mines.

Instead of a verification regime involving on-site challenge inspections, as mentioned above. States parties adcq>ted a facilitation and clarification of compliance procedure (article 8). States parties agree to consult and cooperate with each other regarding implementa- tic»i of the Convention. If a State party wishes to clarify a question relating to compliance, it may submit, through the Secretary-General, a request for clarification, and if it does not receive a response within 28 days or deems the response unsatisfactory, it may submit the matter to the next Meeting of the States parties. If further clarification is needed, the Meeting shall authorize a fact-finding mission, the members of which shall be appointed by the Secretary-General. The mission shall report back its findings to the Meeting, which may request the requested State party to take measures to address the compliance issue within a specified period of time. In connection with matters of compliance, it should be noted that each State party undertakes to take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measiures to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited under the Convention by persons or on territCM under its jurisdictiCH) or control (article 9).

The Convention also provides, inter alia, for regular and special Meetings of the States parties (article 11); a review conference five years after entry into force and subsequent conferences (article 12); entry into force six months after the 40th instrument of ratification has been deposited; no reservations; and unlimited duration. The Secretary-General is designated depositary.

Under the terms of the Convention, the Seaetary-General and the United Nations are required to play a role that exceeds the traditional role of depositary.22 With respect to international cooperation and assistance, the United Nations maintains a database on mine clearance experts and technologies, may elaborate national demining pro-

^ The UN Mine Action Service, centred within the Department of Peace-keeping Operations, was designated by the Secretary-General as the focal point for all mine-related activites within the United Nations system. In connection with the activities of collection, analysis and dissemination of mine-related information to be undertaken by the UN, the Swiss Government announced that it would establish an information management system.

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grammes upon request, may provide assistance for the care of mine victims and for mine awareness programmes, and maintains the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Mine Clearance. With respect to transparency measures, the Secretary-General receives and circulates to States parties annual reports on the various categories of information mentioned above, and fra: facilitation and clarification of compliance, he maintains lists of experts qualified to carry out fact-fmding missions, appoints the members of such missions, and circulates their reports. In additicm, he convenes the various meetings of States parties provided for in the Convention.


The General Asembly adopted three resolutions pertaining in whole or in part to the subject-matter of this chapter the Ottawa Convention (52/38 A), contributions towards banning anti-personnel landmines (52/38 H), and the CCW (52/42). At the time that the First Committee was considering these texts, it had before it a number of relevant reports of the Secretary-General.^^

On 6 November, the representative of Canada, on behalf of 119 sponsors, '* introduced a draft resolution entitled Convention on

Reports on: status of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (A/S2/227 and C(»rrs. 1 and 2), an international agreement to ban anti-personnel landmines (A/S2/268 and Add.l) and assistance in mine clearance (A/52/679).

Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso. Burundi, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colond>ia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cdte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark. Djibouti, Dominica, Etomini- can Republic, Ecuador. El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, France, Gabon, Germany. Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco. Mozambique. Namibia, Netherlands. New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Panama. Papua New Guinea. Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portu-

. / .

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the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction.

On 7 November, the representative of Australia, on behalf of the sponsors,^ introduced a draft resolution entitled “Anti-personnel landmines”. Subsequently, a revised text, entitled Contributions towards banning anti-personnel landmines, was circulated in which a preambular paragraph had been added referring to national, regional and multilateral efforts in demining and rehabilitation, the words “regional organization” had been added to operative paragraph 1, and the phrase “as interim measures” had been added to operative paragraph 2.

On 12 November, the First Committee took action on the two draft resolutions. It adopted the first draft resolution, introduced by Canada, by a recorded vote of 127 to none, with 19 abstentions. Sixteen countries explained their position.

Ten of the States that abstained on the Canadian initiative explained their votes. Azerbaijan, Egypt, India, Myanmar, and the United States all agreed with the ultimate goal of eliminating landmines, but felt that, given their particular security concerns, the comprehensive nature of the Ottawa Convention and the present lack of viable alternatives to landmines, they could not support a total ban at this time. Cuba, Pakistan and Turkey stressed the legitimacy of the use of mines for defensive purposes, with Turkey mentioning the need to counter their indiscriminate use by terrorists. In the view of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Ottawa Convention did not adequately

gal, Qatar, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Subsequent sponsors: Benin, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Georgia, Guinea-Bissau, Kuwait, Maldives, Republic of Moldova, Seychelles, Slovakia and Thailand.

^ Andorra, Australia, Belgium, Bhutan, Bulgaria, Cameroon. El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar. Monaco, Mongolia, Poland, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Spain, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States. Subsequent sponsors; Georgia, Marshall Islands and Niger.

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address both security and humanitarian aspects and did not provide for financial support and the transfer of relevant technology to countries affected by mines. Egypt and the United States laid particular emphasis on the urgency of intensifying demining efforts. Egypt pointed out that the Convention did not establish a legal framework for identifying the responsibility of States that, over a long period, had laid mines in the territories of other States and that there was a need for international assistance to clear such mines. Egypt, Iran, Myanmar and TUrkey expressed a preference for negotiations on a total ban in the CD, and India and Myanmar advocated a phased approach to counter the indiscriminate use of mines. Israel referred to its explanation of vote on the Australian draft resolution.

Some of the same themes were voiced by the five States that explained their affirmative votes on the Canadian draft text Although they could not adhere to the Convention because of security concerns, Lebanon and Singapore strongly opposed the indiscriminate use of landmines, and the latter called for making technology available to less developed States so that they could break their dependence on those weapons. Bulgaria and Finland stressed their commitment to achieving a total and effective ban worldwide and to parallel work in the CD. Moreover, Bulgaria pointed out that it would need financial and material support to caay out obligations under the Ottawa Convention if it were to adhere to it. Algeria, which had supported fully the Oslo Conference, believed that every effort should be made to ensure that countries that were not part of the Ottawa process would work towards the achievement of a universal and non-discriminatory ban through other forums, particularly the CD.

Viet Nam, itself a victim of mines, as it pointed out, was greatly concerned about their indiscriminate use; it did not, however, believe that the draft resolution or the Convention recognized the legitimate defensive role of these weapons, and therefore did not participate in the vote.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 142 to none, with 18 abstentions. For the text of resolution 52/38 A, Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stoclq>iling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, and the voting pattern, see pages 272 and 345, respectively.

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The First Committee adopted the Australian draft resolution by a recorded vote of 121 to 2, with 19 abstentions. Fifteen countries explained their position.

South Africa voted against because the draft resolution did not take into account the changed international situation since the successful Oslo Conference, did not recognize the central call of resolution 51/45 S to pursue an international ban and did not recognize that the CCW played an integral part in the international effort to address mines.

Cuba, Mexico and Togo—all of which abstained on the Australian initiative—explained their vote. Cuba, which had also abstained on the Canadian draft, abstained on the Australian text because it did not focus on eliminatirig the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel mines, did not refer explicitly to the need to take into account the characteristics of each region and to allow all States of a region to participate, and might serve as a pretext for giving priority to consideration of conventional weapons in the CD. Mexico did not see the need for a partial or a total renegotiation of what had been agreed at the 1996 Review Conference of the CCW and the 1997 Oslo Conference. Togo regretted that the efforts of the African countries to have their views accommodated in the draft resolution had been unsuccessful.

Eleven States explained their affirmative vote. Three—^Austria, New Zealand and Norway— supported the draft resolution because the wording made it clear that only interim, partial measures were being envisaged, and because it could be seen to complement the draft resolution on the Ottawa Convention. The Netherlands hoped that the CD would reflect on the issue in connection with the elements of its future work programme, focusing on the question of whether and how it could contribute to the success of the Ottawa Convention. Brazil supported it as a gesture of goodwill towards those States that were not in a position to sign the Ottawa Convention, but found it contradictory to ask the CD to intensify its efforts in an area in which it had not been capable of playing a role and where results had been achieved through another process. Bangladesh and Slovenia believed the draft resolution was in accord with the goal of eliminating mines, but the former cautioned that a ban on transfers might stimulate domestic manufacture. The Islamic Republic of Iran voted in favour despite reservations concerning some of the wording. Israel stated

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that it was obliged to maintain its ability to use anti-personnei landmines for self-defence and did so in acccardance with the requirements of the CCW. Both Chile and Portugal supported the encouragement of complementary efforts in various forums to achieve a total ban; the latter noted its pleasure in supporting the three draft resolutions before the Committee.

On 9 E>ecember, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 147 to none, with IS abstentions. For the text of resolution S2/38 H, Contributions towards banning antipersonnel landmines, and the voting pattern, see pages 281 and 348, respectively.

On 5 November, the representative of Sweden introduced the draft resolution entitled Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects on behalf of the sponsors.^ On 11 November, the First Committee adopted the draft resolution without a vote. Cuba stated that it believed that the amended Protocol II could be the most effective instrument available for solving the humanitarian problem caused by the indiscriminate and inespc»isiUe use of anti-personnel mines. Israel was in the process of reviewing amended Protocol 11; it supported the extension of accession to the CCW to as many States as possible, convinced that such action in the Middle East would serve as a confidence-building measure.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution without a vote. For the text of resolution 52/42, Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, see page 315.

In addition to these three draft resolutions relating to anti-personnel mines, the General Assembly adq)ted, without a vote, resolution

Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmaric, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland. Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, United Kingdom, United States and Uruguay.

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52/173, entitled “Assistance in mine clearance” by which it noted the December meeting in Ottawa, in particular the development there of an agenda for mine action.

Conclusion

The Ottawa Convention is the first treaty to ban outright and mandate the destruction of a conventional weapon that has long been a staple component of the arsenals of most States and has been very widely used in all parts of the world. This treaty will require strenuous efforts on the part of almost all parties to clear and destroy the banned weapon.

The Convention expands the norms of existing international humanitarian law concerning APMs through prohibiting not only their use, but also their development, production, stockpiling and transfer, and provides for their destruction. It provides a facilitation and clarification of compliance procedure to deal with questions concerning compliance. In addition, it institutes a system of transparency by which States parties are required to submit reports on a regular basis concerning their national implementation measures and data pertaining to such matters as stockpiles, location of mined areas, conversion of production facilities and destmction. The States parties will also meet regularly and in special cases, as well as at review conferences, to ensure smooth implementation of the Ccmvention.

The adoption of the Agenda for Mine Action is a very important part of the Ottawa process because it reveals the determination of a large number of States (including some not in a position at the moment to sign the treaty), international organizations and NGOs to address all aspects of mine clearance and mine victim assistance as well as to facilitate the early entry into force of the Convention.

Although an inq>ressive number of States signed the Convention in Ottawa and three, in fact, deposited their instruments of ratification, some States with in^rtan t production facilities and stockpiles did not do so. Further efforts are required in order to achieve universal adherence to a total ban. To this end, some States favour negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, while others favour negotiations within the framewodc of the CCW.

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C H A P T E R VI

Regional and other approaches

Introduction

States promote their security interests through global, regional and bilateral ap(M'oaches comprising a variety of disarmament, arms reduction and confidence-building measures.

In 1980, the United Nations study on all aspects of regional disarmament found that most States perceived threats to their security and the need for military preparedness as primarily related to conditions in their own regicms. The need for a regicmal approach to disarmament was stressed in two 1992 reports of the Secretary-General, and at its 1993 session, the Disarmament Conmtission adopted by consensus “Guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security”.

The regional approach was already ai^lied to the nuclear field in the late 1950s with the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Antarctica and was subsequently continued with the creation of nuclear-weapon- free zones in other parts of the world (see chapter I). More recently, it has become evident that major attention should also be paid to the question of the proliferation of conventional arms, especially at the regional level. As a result, a number of initiatives and measures have been taken, such as the reduction of conventional forces

1 Study on All Aspects of Regional Disarmament (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.81.IX.2).

New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the Post- Cold War Era (A/C. 1/47/7) and An Agenda for Peace (A/47/277-S/24111).

Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/48/42), annex II. The text of the document is reproduced in The Yearbook, vol. 18: 1993, chap. IV.

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(Europe), confidence-building measures (Africa, Europe and Latin America) and curbing illicit trafficking in small arms (Africa and Latin America).

It is generally accepted that the goal of regional confidence- building and arms limitation should be to increase stability and security within a region. It is up to the States of the region to consider, in the light of local conditions, the aj^ropriate arms limitation measures and the approaches to be utilized. When the various regional achievements complement wider, global efforts, they contribute to the consolidation of international peace and security.

This chapter gives a brief overview of some of the vicissitudes encountered by specific regions in their attempts to build confidence and encourage dialogue, to curb the flow of arms, and to actually reduce forces.


Throughout 1997, Member States continued to make determined efforts, within their respective regional contexts, to devise and strengthen appropriate approaches to curb the flow of small arms and light we2 )ons, to introduce and promote confidence-building and transparency measures, to adjust security structures to respond effectively to threats to the peace, to resolve conflict, increasingly of an intra-State nature, and to take measures to consolidate peace. The United Naticms has been involved in these endeavours.

There were important developments in two specific areas of conventional weapons that demonstrated the usefulness of combining global and region^ efforts to achieve results: anti-personnel landmines and small arms. Numerous regional meetings and workshops contributed to generating momentum towards a global agreement to ban anti-personnel mines (APMs), (see chapter V) and workshops were held at which such questions as illicit trafficking in small arms, the excessive accumulation of arms and the transfer of weapons were

* In connection with post-conflict peace-building, see the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) study series on the management of arms in peace processes, which discusses the experience of United Nations peace-keeping and other missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Croatia, El Salvador. Haiti, Liberia. Mozambique. Nicaragua. Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and Somalia.

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addressed, thus contributing to the efforts of the United Nati(Mis Panel of Governmental Experts, which studied the problems related to small arms and light weapons on a global scale. The following sections give an overview of some of the most significant developments in the various regions during 1997.

The financial difficulties of the Regional Centres, to which the Secretary-General has drawn the attention of the General Assembly each year since 1995, persisted. The Regional Centre for Asia and the Pacific enjoyed a sufficient level of voluntary funding for it to maintain its usual activities, as described below. The financial situation of the Centre for Africa was, however, precarious and the suspension of the operation of the Centre for Latin America and the Caribbean continued.

Africa

In considering the item entitled “The situation in Africa”, the Security Council met on 25 September, at the level of foreign ministers, to consider the need for concerted international effort to promote peace and security in Africa. While noting that African States have made significant strides towards democratization, economic reform and protection of human rights, the Council remained gravely concerned by the number and intensity of armed conflicts in Africa, which tlueaten regional peace, cause massive human dislocation and suffering, perpetuate instability and divert resources from long-term development. The Council requested the Secretary-General to develop a “comprehensive response” to these challenges and to submit a report by February 1998 containing concrete recommendations on ways to prevent and address these conflicts and how to lay the foundation for durable peace and economic growth.

The United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (OAUF continued to maintain a strong partnership and examined ways of strengthening collaboration on conflict prevention and resol

See the report of the Secretary-General on the three Regional Centres (A/S2/309 and Corr. 1). An addendum on the financial situation of the Centres was also issued (A/S2/309/Add.l).

« S/PRST/1997/46.

See the report of the the Secretary-General on cooperation between the United Nations and the OAU (A/52/374).

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TTie UN Disarmament Yearbook: 1997

ution as well as on enhancing the capacity of African States to contribute to peace-keeping operations, including in Africa.

With Africa widely regarded as having one of the largest ccm- centrations of anti-personnel mines in the world, and perhaps the greatest number of victims, individual African States and the OAU took a very active part in world-wide effOTts to ban these weapons. The Chairman of the OAU welcomed the adoption of the con^rehensive ban on anti-personnel mines at the Diplomatic Conference in Oslo on 18 September and its opening for signature in Ottawa on 3 December. Earlier in the year, from 19 to 21 May, 40 member States of the OAU, United Nations specialized agencies and a wide spectrum of representatives of the donor community and non-govemmental organizations (NGOs) attended the first Continental Conference of African Experts on Landmines, held in Kempton Park, South Africa.* The meeting adopted a plan of action that covered the issues of African policies on anti-personnel landmines, including mine clearance, realization of an African landmine-free-zone, landmine survivors assistance and international cooperation and finance.

In addition, African States, the OAU, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), other NGOs and regional organizations organized conferences in support of a ban on anti-personnel mines. The ICBL held its fourth international conference in Maputo, Mozambique, from 25 to 28 February, and the ICRC and the OAU sponsored a meeting of the South African Development Community in Harare, Zimbabwe, from 20 to 23 April. In December, 39 African States signed the Ottawa Convention. At the national level, Angola, Kenya, Somalia, Zambia and Zimbabwe launched landmine ban can^aigns while Mozambique and South Africa officially baiuied landmines from their countries.

Several specific situations of intra-State armed conflict continued to preoccupy the United Nations in the former Zaire, subsequently renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Rwanda and the Republic of the Congo.

* See the rqwrt of the Secretary-General of the OAU (CM/2009(LXV)), circulated as a document of the Conference on Disarmament (CD/1468).

South Africa completed the destruction of its stockpiles on 30 October.

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Regional and other appmaches

In the context of the peace process in Angola, implementati(Hi of key provisions of the Lusaka Protocol, in particular the demilitarization of the troops of the National Union for the Total Independmce of Angola (UNITA) and the extension of State administraticxi throughout the country, continued to be slow.

Under the Bangui Agreements, signed in early January, an inter- African force was established to monitor their implementation and to disarm the former rebels, the militia and all other unlawfully armed individuals in the Central African Republic. Between the ceasefire of 2 July and the end of the year, the disarmament provisions of the Agreements had been implemented almost fully with regard to heavy weapons and, with regard to light weapons, close to two thirds had been handed over to the regional peace force.

In West Africa, the successful completion of the disarmament and demobilization exercise in Liberia, which began in November 1996 and ended in February 1997, marked a significant turn of events. The stay of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group" was extended to help consoli^te and strengthen security in the country and to assist with the restructuring and training of the armed f(Mrces as well as the police and security services. Following the withdrawal of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), a representative of the Seoretary-General was appointed to head a UN Peace-building Support Office there.

In an eff<^ to curb small arms and light weapons, a ministerial consultation on the proposal for a moratorium on the importing, exporting and manufacture of light weapons in the Saharo-Sahelian subregion was held at Bamako, Mali, in March.The consultation

See the report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council (S/1998/61).

" The Economic Conununity of West African States (ECOWAS) set up the Monitoring Group, known as ECOMOG.

The consultations were held among Algeria, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania and Senegal, and were observed by representatives of the United Nations, the OAU, the Central African Non-Aggression Pact, the Chairman of the Wassenaar Group, the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and the Canadian International Development Agency. See the report of the Secretary-General on assistance to States for curbing the illicit trafflc in small arms and collecting them (A/S2/264), para. 4.

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reaffirmed the recommendation of the Secretary-General’s advisory mission on small arms to set up in the countries of the Saharo-Sahelian subregion national commissions against the proliferation of small arms and recommended, inter alia, the establishment of a mechanism to back the moratorium regime.

The need to take effective steps for conflict prevention was discussed at the Ninth Ministerial Meeting of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, held at Libreville, Gabon, from 7 to 11 July.‘ In its report, a plan of action was set out by which the Committee would, inter alia, set up and render operational at the earliest opportunity an early-wam- ing mechanism for Central Africa, hold a subregion^ conference on “Democratic Institutions and Peace in Central Africa”, organize training seminars to strengthen the capacity of Central African States to participate more actively in peace-keeping operations under the auspices of the United Nations and the OAU and organize j ( ^ military exKcises to stimulate the conduct of standard peace-keeping operations. At its fifty-second session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 52/39 B, by which it endorsed the programme of work adopted at the meeting.

Americas

Significant achievements were recorded in the promotion of peace and security in the Americas in 1997. As part of ongoing regional efforts to combat the illicit trafficking of small arms, the Organization of American States (OAS), at its twenty-seventh General Assembly held in Lima, Peru, from 2 to 6 June, approved the draft of an IntK-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and other Related Materials, submitted by the Rio Group. Tlie final text of the Convention‘s was submitted to OAS member States in the autumn and opened for signature in Washington, D.C. in November. Mexico played an

See the report of the ninth ministerial meeting (A/S2/283-S/1997/644, annex) and the report of the Secr^ary-General covering the activities of the Standing Advisory Committee (A/S2/293).

w AG/RES. 1445 (XXVD-0/97).

The text was circulated in 1998 as UN document A/S3/78, annex, and is r^roduced in ^pendix m this volume (see page 242).

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instrumental role in pushing for the agreement, which was signed by a total of 29 States*® on 14 November.

Hie Inter-American Convention seeks to prevent, combat and eradicate illegal arms trafficking by strengthening export controls, sharing law enforcement infcH mation, requiring appropriate markings on firearms, improving security measures for confiscated weapons and establishing a licensing system for exports and imports, among other measures. It also establishes a legal framework to confront the problem of arms trafficking and creates a consultative committee to address it. The treaty will enter into force 30 days after it has been ratified by two countries.

Central and South America have suffered from the circulation of a very large number of small arms. A seminar on the subject of illicit traffic in such weapons and sensitive technolc^ies, organized by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and the Government of Argentina, was held in Buenos Aires from 23 to 25 April to discuss the situation. The Chairman of the United Nations Panel studying small arms discussed its work, and participants in the seminar identified characteristics of the illicit arms trade in South America, such as volume and type of weapons, routes and networics, vulnerability to transboundary smuggling, incidence of terrorism, and level of expertise of law-enforcement and intelligence ofQcials, and formulated practical proposals for future action.

Latin American States also played an important role in the realization of the comprehensive ban on APMs, which was opened for signature in Ottawa in December. At the Confeience, two statements were made on behalf of countries in the region. Guatemala, representing the Central American Group, reaffirmed the Group’s commitment to make the region mine-free by the year 2000, and called upon all nations to sign and ratify the Convention. The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, noting that that region was totally “landmine free”, signed in the hope that the process would lead to the eradication of anti-personnel mines from the planet.

Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic. Ecuador, El Salvador. Grenada. Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti. Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, United States, Uruguay and Venezuela.

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Regarding bilateral relations, Ecuador and Peru undertook to establish a binational conunission on mutual confldence- and security- building measures, to embark on the drafting of a comprehensive agreement on border integration and to complete preparations for the physical demarcation of a common land boundary in disputed areas.

In the latter part of the year, concerns were voiced about the possibility of an inaease in arms imports into Latin America—despite a significant number of confidence-building mechanisms put in place between many Latin American States—after the United States Government decided on 1 August to lift a 20-year ban on the sale of advanced weaponry to the region. The ban, which had been imposed in cormection with human rights policies, would be lifted on 1 March 1998. United States officials stressed that as the Latin American democracies were becoming strc»iger and their economies growing, some of their governments wished to modernize their militaries and that any orders from the region for advanced weapons would be judged on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the arms balance in the region. In the First Conunittee, Argentina and Uruguay expessed concerns about the United States decision and, at the same time, the hope that the positive trends towards peace and stability in the region would continue.

While at a meeting of the Economic Conunission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) in Santiago, Chile, in No- vember, the Secretary-General stressed that an arms buildup in the region would be a mistake, and expressed the hope that the governments that were making such progress in economic and social development would also make efforts to check the arms race.

Asia and the Pacific

It is recognized that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is playing an increasingly important role in maintaining regional peace and stability. In connection with the observance of its thirtieth anniversary, the 30th ASEAN Ministerial meeting was

See the Brasilia Declaration and related documents circulated as document A/53/73-S/1998/163.

** See Micronoticias (a weekly public information bulletin of ECLAC), November 1997, p. 14.

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held in Subang Jaya, Malaysia, from 24 to 25 July. Two new members, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Myanmar, were admitted into ASEAN.Member States of the Association stressed their commitment to enhance cooperation among themselves while continuing to work closely with the ASEAN Dialogue Partners and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) participants. In particular, the ASEAN foreign ministers expressed satisfaction with the progress made by ARF as a forum for promoting security dialogue and cooperation in the region.

The fourth Regional Forum (ARF) was also held in Subang Jaya, on 27 July, with all ARF members ® participating. There was general agreement that ARF played a positive role in strengthening mutual understanding and promoting greater transparency in the region. The participants reiterated the importance of maintaining the evolutionary approach adopted by the ARF process and of taking decisions by consensus, and of the need to continue pursuing bilateral and subregional measures, applicable to their specific needs, to further mutual confidence in a gradual manner. In addition to considering regional matters, ARF members emphasized their support for international efforts in various fields of disarmament, including anti-personnel mines and, in particular, demining programmes and the rehabilitation of mine victims.

The member States of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-building Measures in Asia (CICA), meeting at Almaty, Kazakhstan, on 3 December, agreed that they would, without infringing the rights of all States to conclude disarmament and arms control agreements as appropriate, discuss questions relating to disarmament and non-proliferation with a view to helping to achieve the ultimate goal of the conq>lete elimination of weapons of mass destruction,

ASEAN members: Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic. Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nant The admission of Cambodia, however, was postponed owing to the outbreak of internal strife in that country. Nonetheless, ASEAN reaffirmed that no change would be made in Cambodia’s observer status at the ASEAN Ministerial meetings.

Apart from the ASEAN States, ARF includes: Australia, Canada, China, In^a, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, United States and the European Union.

See the concluding statement of the Conference, document A/52/748-^/1997/1003.

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arms control, security, confidence-building and the peaceful and equitable settlement of ^sputes.

As a follow-up measure to their 1996 Agreement on Confidence- Building in the Military Field in the Border Area, the five parties— China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikstan and the Russian Federation—signed in April an Agreement on Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in the Border Area.^ The Agreement provides for a significant reduction in forces and equipment and the exchange of information on military forces alcMig the bwders. It is expected that the Agreement will not only contribute to strengthening mutual trust and security among the five signatcmes, but also— as the first subregional document on disarmament in the Asia-Pacific region—establish a good precedent f(v confidence-building measures in the subregion.

In the context of bilateral relations, China and India exchanged instruments of ratification of their 1996 Agreement on Confidence- Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual CcMitrol in the China-India Border Areas, and the Agreement entered into force in August. Both countries then began discussions on specific methods to implement it.^ The United States and Japan announced on 23 Septendier the revision of their 1978 defence cooperaticm guidelines. Under the new arrangement, they agreed to enhance the existing level of cooperation in the event of an emergency. M«:e significantly, for the first time, Japan would be able to engage in military activities in cooperation with the United States in the areas surrounding Japan. Despite assurances that the revised security agreement was not directed at any specific State, concerns were raised by neighbouring countries and by domestic critics, who argued that the revised guidelines conflicted with Japan’s pacifist constitution.

Mean^ile, throughout most of 1997, the East Asia region remained the seccHid largest arms market after the Middle East^ Despite concerns expressed over the potential for an arms race, most States in the region continued with their respective weapons acquisiticm pro-

^ Reference to these Agreements is made in the Russian-Chinese Joint Declaration of 23 April (A/52/153-S/1997/384, annex).

Statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China at the United Nations Regional Disarmament Meeting in Jakarta on 16 February 1998.

Military Balance 1997/98, International Institute for Strategic Studiesaiss).

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Regional and other approadies

grammes. However, the financial crisis that hit the region in the last quarter of the year led most of the governments affected to seriously reconsider their major arms purchases. lighter military budgets resulting from the economic downturn are expected to signiHcantly reduce the flow of arms into the region over the next few years.

Hirough its activities, the United Nations Regional Centre fot Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific^ continued to encourage dialogue with the aim of enhancing openness, transparency and confidence-building and of promoting disarmament and security. In the course of the year, the Centre organized two major tegi(mal meetings^ dealing with a wide range of subjects, at Kathmandu, Nepal, and at Sapporo, Japan, respectively, and a symposium focusing on the subregion of northeast Asia, in Kanazawa, Japan. In addition, an informal exchange of views was held on the creation of a nuclear- weapon-free zone in Central Asia and the concept of a nuclear- weapon-free State, and cooperation with the Council for Security and Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region (CSCAP) was maintained.

Developments pertaining to nuclear-we^xm-firee zones are discussed in chaptn I.

Europe

There were several developments during the year that had an impact on European security: plans to enlarge NATO; negotiations on the NATO-Russian Founding Act, >^enna negotiations on the adaptation of the CFE Iteaty to the newly created security environment in the region, and the activities within the Organization for Security and CooperatiCMi in Europe (OSCE).^

At the Russian-United States summit held in Helsinki in March, President Yeltsin and President Clinton noted, in their joint statement

^ For details, see the report of the Secretary-General on the Regional Centre (A/S2^09 and Corr.I).

^ See Disarmament: A periodic review by the United Nations, vol. XX, No. 2/3 (1997) for a number of articles based on presentations made at the two regional conferences.

^ For information concerning cooperation between the United Nations and the OSCE, see the relevant r ^ r t of the Secretary-General (A/S2/4S0).

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on European security,^ that lasting peace in Europe should be based on the integration of all of the continent into a series of mutually supporting instituti<»is and relationships that would ensure that there would be no return to division or confrontation. After stressing the need to strengthen the OSCE, they expressed satisfaction with the outcome of the December 1996 Lisbon summit of the OSCE and agreed on the importance of implementing its decisions. While they continued to disagree on the question of the enlargement of NATO, they agreed that they should work together and with others on a document that would establish cooperation between NATO and Russia as an element of a new comprehensive European security system. They further agreed on the need to adapt the C ^ Treaty to the newly created security environment in Europe. To address some Russian concerns regarding nuclear weapons. President Clinton stated that NATO members had “no intention, no plan and no reason” to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of States that were not then members of the Alliance.

As agreed at a meeting of the States parties to the CFE Treaty in May 1996, the Review Conference launched a process of Treaty adaptation with the aim of improving the operation of the Treaty in a changing environment, enhancing its viability and effectiveness, and improving the security of each State party irrespective of whether it belonged to a pcditico-military alliance, at a lower level of armaments. According to section VI of the Document agreed to at the Conference, the Document would enter into force upon approval by all States parties, and if it did not enter into force by IS December 1996, they would review it As this condition was not fulfilled, the States parties agreed to extend the deadline until IS May 1997. They then successfully initiated negotiations within the Treaty’s Joint Con-

2* CD/1460.^ See Final Document of the First Conference to Review the Operation

of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength, Vienna, 15-31 May 1996, Annex A; Document agreed among the State Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, reproduced in Status, Sth edition: 1996, pp. 237-241. Annex A incorporates the so^alled “flank arrangement”, which provides tor extra flexibility for Russia within the Treaty in the flank region of the Treaty, while providing for extra transparency and speciflc constraints in the same region.

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sultative Group, based in Vienna, and the Document did enter into force on IS May.

Issues concerning the adaptaticHi process of the CFE Treaty were the subject of intensive negotiations. On 23 July, the States parties adopted a “Decision concerning certain basic elements for Treaty adaptation”. The basic agreement provides for the replacement of the bloc-to-bloc structure of the 'Treaty with the system of national and territorial ceilings. No State party’s national ceiling would exceed the level permitted by the current Treaty and aggregated levels would be significantly lower. These national ceilings would be codified as new, binding limits and reviewed every five years at scheduled review conferences. Territcviai ceilings would replace the existing structure of zones, with the exception that the substance of the flank regime would be maintained, but reconciled with the Treaty’s new adapted structure. Provisions were made for temporary deployments in excess of territorial ceilings. The Treaty was made open fra: accession by new States parties. A statement by the 16 NATO member States and a draft decision on modalities for conducting on-site visits to assess and account for treaty-limited equipment (TLE) unaccounted for and uncontrolled within the Treaty (UT1.E) were attached to the decision.

Plans for the enlargement of NATO had a profound effect on disarmament and arms limitation efforts at both the bilateral level and in the broader European context. After a number of high-level meetings to address Russia’s concerns, on 27 May in Paris, NATO members and the Russian Federation signed the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security.^ The Founding Act stipulates the basic principles on which their relationship will be based and focuses on specific areas. For instance, the parties agreed to strive to cooperate in the area of inaeasing transparency, predictability and mutual confidence regarding the size and roles of their conventional forces; in the negotiations on the adaptation of the CFE Treaty, they would seek to strengthen stability by further developing measures to prevent any potoitially threatening buildup of conventional forces in agreed regions of Europe, including Central and Eastern Europe; and in carrying out its collective defence and other missions, NATO, for its part, would rely on reinforcement rather than on additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces and Russia, for

^ A/52/I61-S/1997/413, annex, appendix.

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its part, would exercise similar restraint in its conventional force deployments in Europe. To carry out the activities and aims provided in toe Act, they also agreed to create the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, which would provide a mechanism for consultation, coordination and, where appropriate, joint decisions and action.

On 30 May in Sintra, Portugal, the members of NATO and participating countries in the Partnership for Peace decided to establish a Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council to provide the overarching framework for consultations among its members. At the summit meeting in Madrid, on 8 July, they issued the Madrid Declaration on Euro-At- lantic Security and Cooperation. The Declaration stressed the new NATO and the need to shape it for the 21st century, and invited the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to begin accession talks with NATO, so that their membership might become effective by the SOth aiuiiversary of the Alliance, in April 1999. Subsequently, on 16 December, those three States signed tl» Protocols of Accession of the New Members to NATO in Brussels during a meeting of foreign ministers. Meanwhile, in Madrid, on 9 July, a Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine was signed providing principles for the developnaent of NATO-Ukraine relations, c(msultati(Mi and cooperation for a more secure Europe. *

In accordance with the Dayton Agreement and under the auspices of the OSCE, the States parties to the Agreement on Subregional Arms Control,’ signed in Florence on 14 June 1996, continued to destroy surplus weapons and several data exchanges took place during the year. In addition, OSCE inspectors carried out inspections in connection with the destruction of weapons in the region.

Increasingly concerned about the effects of the transfer and excessive and destabilizing accumulation of small arms and light weapons, the European Union (EU), in June, adopted a programme for preventing and combating illicit trafficking in conventional arms.

The three documents referred to in this paragraph are reproduced in NATO Review, No. 4 (July-August 1997).

The Agreement on Subregional Arms Control provi<ted for limitations on five categories of weapons: battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery pieces of 7S mm calibre and above, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters. See “The Agreement on Subregional Arms Control of the ‘Dayton Agreement’ ” in Disarmament: A periodic review by the United Nations, vol. XIX, No. 2, 1996.

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The programme involves a series of measures to promote cooperation and ^ ta exchange between the relevant authorities of member States and calls upcm member States to strengthen domestic legislation and administrative procedures and to provide assistance to third countries in post-conflict situati<ms. The i»'ogramme is aimed at trafficking in all types of conventional weapons, with the emphasis on portable weapCHis.


On 6 November, the refvesentative of Pakistan introduced, on behalf of the sponsors,^ a draft resolution entitled Regional disarmament. On 11 November, the First Committee had before it a revised draft resolution, which contained the following changes: in the seventh preambular paragraph, the words “and nuclear non-proliferation” were deleted after the word “disarmament”, and in the ninth preambular paragraph, the words “smaller States” were replaced by the words “all States”. On 12 November, the First Committee adopted the draft resolution without a vote.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution without a vote. For the text of resolution 52/38 P, Regional disarmament, see page 296.

On 7 November, the representative of Pakistan introduced a draft resolution entitled Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels on behalf of the sponsors.^ On 11 November, the First Committee adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 153 to 1, with 2 abstentions.

India indicated that it would vote against the draft resolution for the following reasons: a regional approach must be arrived at freely when there was sufficient confidence among all the participants

Albania. Aimenia, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Ghana. Indonesia, Liberia. Mali, Nepal. New Zealand. Niger. Pakistan. Papua New Guinea. Sierra Leone. Sri Lanka. Sudan. Togo. Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine and Zimbabwe.

Bangladesh, Benin. Czech Republic. Democratic Republic of the Congo. El Salvador. Italy. Mexico. Norway, Pakistan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and United Kingdom. Subsequent sponsors; Ecuador. Germany. Nepal. Portugal and Spain.

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that the agreements would serve their specific security interests; with regard to the Assembly’s request to the CD, in operative paragraph 2, to formulate principles for regional agreement on conventional arms control, it ^d not believe that this was an appropriate task for the CD; in fact there was no need to formulate any such principles since the guidelines and principles for regional approaches to disarmament had been formulated by the Disarmament Commission and endorsed by the General Assembly in 1993; it expressed reservations about the reference in the draft’s sixth preambular paragraph to the proposals for conventional arms control made in the context of South Asia— India did not regard South Asia as a region for purposes of security and disarmament; such a narrow definition did not fully reflect the security concerns of all the States in South Asia.

Cuba abstained in the vote because it did not agree with approaches reflected in the draft; there was no reference in the preambular part of the text to the initiative and possibility for the effective participation of any State interested in the process, or to the need to take into account the particular characteristics of each regi<xi and legitimate national security concerns of States. Also, the text omitted any reference to the vali^ty of the global process of arms control and its relationship to the regional and subregional processes. As regards the operative part, it believed that any reference to the responsibilities of the CD in considering specific questions should take account of the fact that the CD must work on disarmament priorities.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 164 to 1, with 2 abstentions. For the text of resolution 52/38 Q, Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional level, and the voting pattern, see pages 298 and 356, respectively.

On 6 November, the representative of Gabon, on behalf of the States members of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, introduced a draft resolution entitled Regional confidence-building measures. On 13 November, the First Committee adopted the draft resolution without a vote.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution without a vote. For the text of resolution 52/39 B, Regional confidence-building measures, see page 304.

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On 6 November, the representative of Mali, on behalf of the sponsors,introduced a draft resolution entitled Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them. On 11 November, the First Committee had befwe it a revised text, which added the words “as far as possible” after the words “to support” in operative paragraph 6. On 12 November, the First Committee adopted the revised text without a vote.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution without a vote. For the text of resolution 52/38 C, Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them, see page 274.

On 7 November, die representative of Nepal introduced a draft resolution entitled United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific on behalf of the sponsors.^ On 14 November, the First Conmiittee adc^ted the draft resolution without a vote.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution without a vote. For the text of resolution 52/39 A, United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, see page 303.

On the recommendation of the First Conmuttee, the General Assembly adopted without a vote two resolutions on international security: resolution 52/43, Strengthening of security and cooperation

Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Guinea. Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Japan, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Togo. Subsequent ^nsors: Costa Rica, Cdte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Jamaica and Senegal.

^ Australia, Bangladesh, Fiji, Indonesia, Japan. Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Mongolia, Myanmar. Nepal, New Zealand, Republic of Korea. Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Viet Nam. Subsequent sponsors; Brunei Darussalam. COsta Rica, Paldstan and Philippines.

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in the Mediterranean region,^ and resolution 52/48, Development of good-neighbourly relations among Balkan States.

Conclusion

Efforts to promote peace and security through regional approaches to the limitation and reduction of arms and to conHdence-building continued in ail regions throughout the year, thereby contributing to global efforts in these areas. Armed conflicts—often of an intra-State nature— in different regions preoccupied the United Nations, regional organizations and the States directly involved, especially in Africa. Nevertheless, the disarmament and demobilization components of peace-building were successfully undertaken in the Central African Republic and Liberia, and planning for a moratorium on the import, export and manufacture of light weapons in the Saharo-Sahelian subregion continued. A significant step was taken by the Americas with the opening for signature of the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Related Materials. In Asia, ASEAN’s role in furthering regional and subregional peace and stability was increasingly recognized. Moreoever, the first subregional agreement entailing the actual reduction of military forces in border areas was signed by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. However, the East Asia region remained the second largest arms market after the Middle East, although it could be expected that the financial CTisis it experienced towards the end of the year will slow this trend somewhat. In Europe, the process of adaptation of the CFE Treaty to the changing security environment continued and further progress was made in implementing the Dayton Agreement. The range of application of the regional approach to disarmament and other security issues can be expected to grow, and closer cooperation between the United Nations and existing regional organizations to develop, thereby contributing to the maintenance of intemational peace and security.

While considering these two items, the General Assembly had before it two reports of the Secretary-General. The report on the Mediterranean region (A/S2/427) contained the views of Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta and the Russian Federation; and the report on good-neighbourly relations among Balkan States (A/52/373) those of France, Italy and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

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C H A P T E R VII

Other issues

Introduction

In 1997, THERE WERE A NUMBER OF ISSUES that had, in most instances, been before the international conununity for some time, but that, for a variety of reasons, were not directly addressed to any great extent in the different disarmament forums. They were, however, the subject of resolutions in the General Assembly. They are dealt with in this chapter under the title “Other issues”, because they do not lend themselves to placement in any of the topical chapters of this volume, nor do they share a common theme among themselves. Hiis chapter thus covers: outer space issues; the relationship between disarmament and development; the role of science and technology; and arms regulation and disarmament agreements; conq>Iiance, verification, and observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of treaties.

Outer space issues


The Conference did not establish an ad hoc committee on the preven- tiwi of an arms race in outer space during its 1997 session. However, the subject was actively discussed during plenary and informal meetings.

A number of delegations, mainly from the Group of 21, for example, Chile, Egypt, India, Mexico, Pakistan and Sri Lanica, reaffirmed the importance of maintaining outer space as a weapons-free environment. While acknowledging that the arms race of the cold

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war had recently given way to cooperation in the peaceful exploration of outer space, they saw the need to ensure that that environment would never be used for deployment of space-based weapons systems. Therefore, they were of the view that the Conference should begin consideration of an international agreement that would prevent the weaponization of outer space and called for the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee cm Outer Space with an appropriate mandate in order to commence negotiations. Egypt, in particular, insisted that any military activities in outer space should be banned. On S June, the Group of 21 formally tabled a programme of work for the session that contained a proposal to establish that Ad Hoc Committee. >

China actively supported this proposal. It expressed the hope that there was no militarization of outer space indeed and stressed that it would be too late to deal with this problem when the race entered an intensive phase.

With respect to the programme of wcvk, Canada proposed the wording “Legally binding instrument to prevent the weaponization of outer space”.

The United States held that there was not, nor had there been, an arms race in outer space, that the existing legal regime had served well, and there was no need for new procedures. Consequently, the wording “Prevention of an arms race in outer space” was not accurate. It had no objection in principle to the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee, provided that its mandate would be reformulated. It emphasized that should the Conference consider the issue, it would first have to identify a specific substantive aspect. Several other members of the CD mentioned the need to update the former Committee’s mandate to address current needs.

The Special Coordinator on the review of the agenda reported that there was a clear trend in favour of keeping this item; however, there were different views with regard to the urgency of the problem. At least two delegations proposed reformulating the item to: “Legally binding document to prevent the weaponization of outer space”, while others considered that the issue would best be addressed in the context of confidence-building measures.

1 CD/1462.2 CD/1456.

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Other issues


On 6 November, the representative of Sri Lanka introduced a draft resolution entitled Prevention of an arms race in outer space in the First Committee on behalf of the sponsors.^ On 11 November, the First Committee adopted it by a recorded vote of 101 to none, with 40 abstentions. For the first time in more than ten years, no separate votes were taken on any of the paragraphs.

The United States explained its abstention by stating that the draft text suffered from a conceptual weakness: it neglected the fact that there was no arms race in outer space. Luxembourg, on behalf of the European Union (EU), which had also abstained, noted what they considered positive changes in the wording over the versions of previous years. They felt that the matter of discussion in the Conference on Disarmament had been presented in a constructive manner in the eleventh preambular paragraph, but, while appreciating the invitation made to the CD in operative paragraph 6, felt that it would be inappropriate to inrejudge the results of the debate in the Ccnference. The EU would reconsider its position in 1998 in the light of developments.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 128 to none, with 39 abstentions. F(»: the text of resolution 52/37, Prevention of an arms race in outer space, and for the voting pattern, see pages 269 and 344, respectively.

Relationship between disarmament and development


At the time that the First Committee was considering the draft resolution on disarmament and development, it had before it a note by

Chile, China. Costa Rica, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nigeria. Sri Lanka and Sudan. Subsequent ^nsors: Algeria, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Cuba, Iran (Islamic Republic of) and Mongolia.

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the Secretary-General,in response to a request by the General Assembly the previous year. In his note, the Seaetary-General stated that the situation remained unchanged from 1996.

On 6 November, the representative of Indonesia introduced a draft resolution entitled Relationship between disarmament and development, submitted by Colombia on behalf of the States Members that are members of the Non-Aligned Movement. On 12 November, the First Committee adopted the draft resolution without a vote.

Several States made explanations of position, llie ElP believed that there was no automatic linkage between commitments entered into by the EU regarding economic and social development and development assistance, on the one hand, and savings realized elsewhere, on the other. Israel dissociated itself from the provisicxis of the 1995 Cartagena summit, referred to in the fourth preambular paragraph. The United States did not participate in the consensus since it believed that disarmament and development are two distinct issues that do not lend themselves to being linked nor did it consider itself bound by the Final Document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution without a vote. For the text of resolution 52/38 D, Relationship between disarmament and development, see page 276.

* A/521228, pursuant to resolution 51/45 D. The report did not contain any views and proposals of Member States, since none had been communicated to the Secretary-General.

See the report of 1996 (A/51/207), in which he had noted that, pending further guidance by Member States, he had no new developments to report.

Subsequent sponsors; Costa Rica and El Salvador. In addition, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe associated

with the EU, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and the associated country of Cyprus, as well as Iceland, a member of the European economic area, aligned themselves with this explanation.

* United Nations publication. Sales No. E.87.IX.8.

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Other issues

Role of science and technology


On 7 November, the representative of India, on behalf of the sponsors, introduced a draft resoluti(»i entitled The role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament in the First Committee. On 12 November, the Committee adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 88 to 42, with 17 abstentions.

While explaining its support for the draft resolution, China expressed a reservation regarding the second preambular paragraph. Although it endorsed the in^lementation of stringent non-proliferation measures for weapons of mass destruction, it also believed—as in the case of the development of outer space weapons—that the applica- tiCHi of technology had the same significance fcx: conventi(mal weapons. Moreover, it was convinced that no non-proliferation measure should hinder international coc^ration in the peaceful uses of science and technology, and that concerns about proliferation should be addressed through dialogue and cooperation.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the resolution by a recorded vote of 103 to 43, with 19 abstentions. For the text of resolution 52/33, The role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament, and the voting pattern, see pages 261 and 340, respectively.

Arms limitation and disarmament agreements


On 6 November, the representative of the United States, on behalf of the sponsors,'* introduced in the First Committee a draft resolution

Bangladesh, Bhutan, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ghana, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kenya, Lesotho, Malaysia, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sii^apore and Sri Lanka.

*** Argentina, Australia. Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium. Bolivia. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria. Canada. Chile. Costa Rica. Croatia. Czech Republic. Denmark, Ecuador. Estonia. Bji, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,

149


entitled Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament and nonproliferation agreements. On 11 November, the sponsors revised the wor^ng of the ninth preambular paragraph from “arms control, non- prohferation, and disarmament agreements” to “arms limitation and disarmament and non-proliferation agreements”. At the same meeting, the First Committee adopted the draft resolution without a vote. On that occasion, China stated that, given the relevant international legal instruments that had entered into force or were close to entering into force, it believed that the existing discriminatory and exclusive mechanisms and arrangements for non-proliferation, which inhibited the development of develc^ing countries, should be rescinded, overhauled or renounced and that there was, therefore, no need for States that were not party to them to conq)iy with them.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution without a vote. For the text of resolution 52/30, Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament and non-proliferation agreements. see page 256.

On 6 November, the representative of Canada introduced in the First Committee, on behalf of the sponsors,' a draft resolution entitled Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification. On 11 November, the Conunittee adopted the draft resolution without a vote.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution, also without a vote. Fot the text of resolution 52/31, Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification, see page 258.

On 6 November, the representative of Indonesia introduced in the First Committee, on behalf of the States Members of the UnitedHungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liberia, Lithuania. Luxemlmurg, Malawi, Malta, Marshall Islands. Monaco, Mongolia. Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway. Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova. Romania, San Marino, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia. Spain. Sweden, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Turkey. Tuikmenistan. United Kingdom, United States and Uruguay. Subsequent sponsors: Cyprus and Ukraine.

Austria, Bangladesh, Brazil. Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary. Latvia, Lithuania, New Zealand, Poland, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Singapore. Slovakia, Sri Lanka, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedoma, T\irkey, Ukraine and Uruguay. Subsequent sponsors; Croatia and Kazakhstan.

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Other issues

Naticms that are members of the Non-Aligned Movement, a draft resolution entitled Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control. A revision was subsequently submitted^ in which an operative paragraph reaffirming the resolution of the previous year was deleted. On 12 November, the First Committee adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 138 to none, with 8 abstentions. On that occasion, the Republic of Korea explained its affirmative vote, stating that, by contrast to the 1996 text, on which it had abstained, the 1997 draft text duly reflected the ongoing international efforts to incorporate envi- roimiental norms into disarmament and arms control agreements.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 160 to none, with 6 abstentions. For the text of resolution 52/38 E, Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control, and the voting pattern, see pages 277 and 347, respectively.

Also ^nsored by Costa Rica.

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C H A P T E R Vni

Institutional aspects

Introduction

Under th e C harter, th e G eneral Assembly and th e Security Council are the main organs dealing with matters of disarmament and the regulation of armaments. The existing disarmament machinery, as set out in the Final Document of the General Assembly at its first special session devoted to disarmament, in 1978, has remained essentially the same. It consists of the General Assembly and its two subsidiary bodies, namely, the First Committee and the Disarmament Commission, and the Conference on Disarmament—the “single multilateral negotiating forum” on disarmament of the international community. In addition, questions of disarmament are dealt with in other international frameworks established on the basis of multilateral, regional and bilateral agreements.

In 1992, at the request of the members of the Security Council, the Secretary-General prepared a report entitled An Agenda for Peace, incorporating recommendations on ways of strengthening the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peace-keeping within the framework and provisions of the Charter. He later elaborated on the role of disarmament in his report entitled New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the Post- Cold War Era? in which he suggested that the disarmament machinery should be reassessed. At the following sessions, the First Committee

General Assembly resolution S-10/2, part IV.2 A/47/277-S/24111.3 A/C. 1/47/7.

153

The UN Disamament Yearbook: 1997

discussed the question of rationalization of its work and ad(^ted a number of decisions and resolutions.^


Reform programme

In an effort to identify (he ways in which the United Nations could more effectively and efficiently meet the challenges that lay ahead, the Secretary-General submitted to the General Assembly a report entitled “Renewing the United Nations: a programme for reform,” which included three types of measures: the Hrst, concerning the organization and management of the Secretariat, programmes, and funds; the second, complementary measures that resided within the jurisdiction of Member States, and the third, several fundamental proposals for possible action by the General Assembly in the longer term. As far as disarmament and the regulation of arman^nts were concerned, he noted that the emergence of new dangers and actors had added new urgency to the tasks that the United Nations was called upon to undertake in this area, and a managerial reorganization of the Secretariat’s capacities would now be effected so that a structure would be in place to respond effectively to the priorities of Member States. Thus a new department for disarmament affairs would be established, replacing the Centre for Disarmament Affairs, headed by an undersecretary-general. The Secretary-General’s report was discussed in the general debate in the General Assembly and in the First Committee. While a majority of Member States welcomed his proposals fra: refwm and supported the creation of the new department, some questions were raised concerning its priorities, as outlined in his programme. Subsequently, the Secretary-General addressed these questions in an addendum to his report.^ On 12 November, the General Assembly adopted, without a vote, resolution S2/12, entitled “Renewing the United Natiois: a programme for reform”.

Decision 47/422 of 9 December 1992, resolution 47/54 G of 8 April 1993, resolution 48/87 of 16 December 1993, decision 48/499 of 14 September 1994, resolution 49/85 of 15 December 1994, and decision 50/421 of 12 December 1995.

5 A/51/950.« A/51/950/Add.3.

154


In his report, the Searetary-General also recommended that the General Assembly imdertake a review of the work of the Disarmament Commission and the First Committee with a view to updating, rationalizing and streamlining their work.

During the First Committee’s consideration of the item on the rationalization of its work and the reform of its agenda, different views were expressed. Luxembourg, speaking on behalf of the European Union (EU) and a number of States that associated themselves with it, stated that, given the fact that the reform programme was going to be considered directly in the plenary meetings of the Assembly, the First Committee should focus on the rationalization of its methods of work. While the general debate in the Committee remained an important opportunity for delegations to set out their national positions and should last up to 10 meetings, the thematic debate initially proposed by the EU to promote more focused and interactive discussion had ikH proved useful and should be ended. Hius Luxembourg proposed that the First Committee’s work should begin with the traditional general debate followed by the presentation and consideration of draft resolutions, grouped by topics. Thematic debate should be merged with the presentation and examination of draft texts. As far as the agenda was concerned, some items and sub-items should be reallocated in a more coherent manner and the majority of items should be considered every two ot three years. Finally, Luxembourg suggested that the Committee endorse in principle these proposals and that they should be the subject of further consultation.

Colombia, speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, stated that while the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament remained relevant and valid in defining the First Committee’s work, in the interest of rationalization, it would be useful to consider issues as groups of items or clusters. Another useful device would be the clustering of draft resolutions; in addition, efforts should be made to present them well before they were discussed to allow time for informal consultations.

After consulting with Member States, the Chairman submitted a draft decision entitled “Rationalization of the work and reform of the agenda of the First Committtee”, in which he proposed that the General Assembly decide that, as from the fifty-third session, the Commmittee (a) would c(xiduct and conclude its substantive work in not less than 30 meetings (in the revision, the wording was changed

155


to “time not exceeding 5 weeks”), and (Jb) would conduct its work by combining the existing phases in the programme of work, provided that sufficient time would be allowed for informal consultations and discussions on draf t resolutions. When it became evident that there was no consensus on the Chairman’s draft decision, he decided to withdraw it for further consultation by him or his successor.^

As a result, following the conclusion of the work of the First Committee, informal ccmsultations, initiated by the EU, were carried out to see how the Secretary-General’s recommendation for a review of the work of the First Committee and the Disarmament Commission could be implemented. Through consultation, agreement was reached to reconvene the First Committee for this purpose for one week in the first part of 1998. Accordingly, at the plenary meeting, the two items referring to the Disarmament Commission (item 73) and the First Committee (item 83), respectively, were left open for further consideration.

Fourth speciat session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament

During 1997, the questi(Mi of holding a fourth special sessicHi devoted to disarmament was considered by the Disarmament Conunission (see page 157) and in the First Committee.

Most references in the Conunittee were of a general nature, with many non-aligned members expressing the hope that it would be convened as soon as possible. Egypt held that the General Asssembly should agree on a date— specifically in 1999 to serve as a catalyst for the 2000 NPT Review Conference— and that the work should then proceed to formulating an agenda. With respect to the agenda, Mexico stressed that the Final Document of the first special session should serve as a guide for negotiaticxis, while members of the EU emphasized that the agenda must be comprehensive and balanced, including both conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, and the United States stressed that it not be unduly weighted towards nuclear disarmament.

See the report of the I%st Committee on the item on rationalization of the work and reform of the agenda of the First Committee (A/52/612) and subsequent decision 52/416, by which the Assembly took note of the report.

156


Although in 1996 the General Assembly had decided, by resolution 51/45 C, to convene the fourth special session in 1999 subject to the emergence of consensus on its agenda and objectives,* in 1997 it agreed to make the decision on an exact date for and on organizational matters relating to the convening of the special session subject to the outcome of the deliberations of the Disarmament Commission at its 1998 substantive session. In connection with this decision, see the account of the discussion on resolution 52/38 F, page 164.


In the course of its organizational session for 1997, the Disarmament Commission met on 9 and 11 December 1996 and on 21 April 1997. As a result of the discussion of the draft resolution concerning the Disarmament Commission (later adopted as resolution 51/47 B) in 1996, the General Assembly recommended that the Disarmament Commission adopt two items: (a) “Estabhshment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely anived at among the States of the region concemed” and (b) “Fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament”, while the third agenda item was left to be added later. At its organizational session, the Commission decided that the third substantive agenda item would be “Guidelines on conventional arms control/limitation and disarmament, with particular emphasis on consolidation of peace in the context of General Assembly resolution 51/45 N”. At the begiiming of its substantive session, held from 21 April to 13 May under the chairmanship of Mr. Andelfo J. Garcia of Colombia, the Commission held a general exchange of views on all agenda items. It then entrusted Working Group I with the mandate of dealing with the item on the establishment of nuclear- weapon-free zones, Working Group II with the item on the special session, and Working Group III with the item on guidehnes on conventional arms control/limitation and disarmament. The work of Working Groups I and III are discussed in chapters I (see page 22) and IV (see page 88), respectively, while the work of Working Group II is

* Resolution 41/45 C, in paragraph 2, noted that, in the view of the Secretary-General, preparations for the special session could begin in 1997. Since, however, the consensus did not emerge in the Disarmament Commission with regard to the convening of the session, no preparations took place. See the relevant note by the Secretary-General (A/52/288).

157


discussed below. The Commission concluded its work on 13 May by adopting its report’ to the General Assembly.

Working Group on the fourth special session

The Working Group ccmtinued with a general exchange of views on the subject and a number of working papers were submitted which are listed in its report It then engaged in substantive deliberation of a series of revisions of a non-paper prepared by the Chairman in consultation with delegations. Although ^ter intensive consultations it was generally agreed that a fourth special session devoted to disarmament would be convened, subject to the emergence of a consensus on its objectives and agenda, differences of view among States regarding these matters persisted. In the end, the Working Group took note of the paper presented by the Chairman, on which there was no consensus. It was further stat^ that if the Commission decided to include the item in its agenda for the 1998 session, the pi )er presented by the Chairman, as annexed to the report,would be without prejudice to the position of any delegation.

Resolution concerning the Disarmament Commission

On S November, the representative of Colombia introduced a draft resolution entitled Report of the Disarmament Commission on behalf of the sponsors.1' On 12 Novemb^, the First Committee adopted the draft resolution without a vote and no delegation explained its position.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution without a vote. For the text of resolution 52/40 B, Report of the Disarmament Commission, see page 311.


The Conference on Disarmament (CD) was in session from 20 January to 27 March, from 12 May to 27 June and from 28 July to 10 Sep

® Official Records of the General Assembly, F^-second Session. Supplement No. 42 (A/52/42).

•0 A/52/42, annex D.Algeria, Australia, Belarus, Colombia, Cuba, Gabon, Ghana, Indo

nesia, Ireland, Luxembourg, Mongolia, Romania and Viet Nam. Subsequent sponsors: Cbsta Rica and Ecuador.

158


tember, and concluded by adopting its report to the General Assembly. In addition to the 60 members participating in the session,46 other States,at their request, were invited to take part. The Conference adopted the same agenda as in previous years, with the exception of the item “Nuclear test ban” (on which a Treaty had been adopted by the General Assembly in 1996). ^

The proceedings of the CD were influenced to a great degree by the continued divergence of views on the priorities in disarmament. iWoughout the session, successive presidents conducted intensive consultations with a view to reaching consensus on the programme of work. However, it was not possible to establish any negotiating mechanism on any of the substantive items on the agenda, nor to establish any other mechanisms, apart from the appointment of the four special

Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-second Session, Supplement No, 27 (A/52/27). The presidency of the Conference was successively assumed by: Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Slovakia and Sri Lanka.

Algeria, Argentina, Australia. Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, I>emo- cratic People’s Republic of Korea, Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Rnland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic oQ, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Pem, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe.

Armenia, Bolivia, Brunei Darussalam, Costa Rica, C6te d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Gabon, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Holy See, Iceland, Ireland, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Nepal, Oman, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Singapore, Slovenia, Sudan, Swaziland, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay and Zambia.

The 1997 substantive agenda items were: (a) cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; (b) prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters; (c) prevention of an arms race in outer space; (d) effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (e) new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons; {f) comprehensive programme of disarmament; and (^) transparency in armaments.

159


coordinators mentioned below. As no agreement was reached with regard to the programme of work, substantive discussions on various agenda items took place only in plenary meetings.

In general, non-aligned countries sought the establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time, while delegations from Western and Eastern European countries advocated the establishment of an ad hoc committee on anti-personnel landmines and the establishment of committees on a fissile material cut-off and transparency in armaments.

On 26 June, the Conference appointed four special coordinators to deal with the following questions: the representative of Australia on anti-personnel landmines,*® the representative of Austria on the expansion of the membership of the CD, the representative of Egypt on the in^roved and effective functioning of the CD, and the representative of Hungary on the review of the agenda. The special cowdinat(M's reported to the CD on the results of their consultations on 28 August. Since they had only two months in which to hold consultations on the items assigned to them, each reported a lack of time to complete his task and suggested further consultations the following year. For the report on landmines, see page 111. The reports on the oAer three subjects are discussed below.

Regarding the question of expansion of membership of the Conference, the Special Coordinator found that while no delegation was (^posed to expansion in principle, there were divergent views as to its appropriate timing and scope as well as the possible selection criteria for new members.* Referring to General Assembly resolution Sl/47

The appointment was made under the agenda item 'YTompFebensive programme of disarmament”.

‘7 CD/PV.774 and 776.

See the following documents submitted on the issue of membership; CD/1438 and Corr. 1 (Turkey), CD/1439 (Cyprus) and CD/1448 (Slovenia).

After the expansion by 23 States in 1996, there were 14 outstanding applications for membership: Ireland, Tunisia, Ecuador, Greece, Croatia, Kuwait, Portugal, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Malaysia, Costa Rica, Denmarie, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Cyprus (in chronological order).

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A, which calls upon the CD to “consider all remaining applicaticms for membership with a view to teaching a decisim on its further enlargement before the end of its 1997 session”, the Special Coordinator noted that the onicepts of regional or political balance, national security interests, admission based on the date of application for membership versus a phased approach, and the connection between the ci^acity of the forum to conduct effective negotiations and the number of its participants were often mentioned by delegates in his consultations. He concluded that at that stage a decision on the question of expansion appeared premature.

The Special Coordinator on improved and effective functioning^ reported that he had found in his consultations a reaffirmation of several rules of procedure of the CD. Areas needing further consultations included the possibility of applying the rule of consensus to matters of substance only and of adopting the agenda and the programme of work on a biennial or pluri-annual basis. The Special Cocffdinator also reported proposals from delegatimis regarding the possibility of including in the aimual reports of the CD a brief description of the main themes and proposals made in statements at plenary meetings, without value judgement, of strengthening the authority and function of the presidency, and of greater involvement of non-govemmental organizations in its woric.

The Special Coordinator on the review of the agenda reported that there were two schools of thought. Some delegatiCMis believed that the Conference should maintain its present agenda, whidi could only be changed by a new special session on disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly, and which should have nuclear disarmament as the priority. Others preferred to replace the current agenda with a new, updated one that would establish three broad items: “Nuclear disarmament”, “Conventional disarmament” and “Other items” (mainly to deal with outer space issues). These delegations held that the priority would be negotiations on the cessation of the production of nuclear materials for weapons purposes and anti-personnel landmines. Regarding the agenda tor 1997, the Special Coordinator said that a number of delegations favoured retaining each item, while others

Chile submitted a document on the issue of inq>roved and effective functioning (CD/1473).

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preferred deleting those items deemed by them to be obsolete. He concluded that consensus on the future agenda was not within reach.

Resolution concerning the Conference on Disarmament

On 6 November, the representative of Sri Lanka, on behalf of the sponsors, ! introduced a draft resolution entitled Report of the Conference on Disarmament. On 12 November, the First Committee adopted the draft resolution without a vote, and no delegation e:q>lained its position.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adc^ed the draft resolution without a vote. For the text of resolution 52/40 A, Report of the Conference on Disarmament, see page 310.


At its plenary meetings between 22 September and 7 October,^ the General Assembly held a general debate, in the course of which a large number of Member States addressed different aspects of disarmament and security questions. The First Committee, meeting under the chairmanship of Mr. Mothusi Nkgowe of Botswana, held both substantive meetings and infcffmal meetings for structured discussim on the items listed in annex I to this chapter, between 9 October and 17 November.23

Resolution on the role of the United Nations in disarmament

On 12 November, the representative of Pakistan introduced a draft resolution entitled Role of the United Nations in disarmament on behalf of the sponsors.^ Subsequently, the text was revised by deleting the opening paragraph that had referred to the Secretary-General’s report

Costa Rica, Kenya and Sri Lanka. Subsequent sponsor. Ecuador.22 Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-second Session, Ple

nary Meetings, Sth to 28th meetings.

23 Ibid., First Committee, 2nd to 24th meetings.2 India, Iran (Islamic Rq>ublic of), Mexico, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nq>al

and Pakistan. Subsequent sponsor: Cuba.

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“Renewing the United Nations: a programme for reform” ^ On 14 November, the First Committee ad^>ted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 93 to 42, with 9 abstentions.

Among those voting against the draft resolution, Australia gave the following explanation: it adhered strictly to the view that reform issues concerned the vision of Member States for the Organization as a whole and should be dealt with as a package under the authority of the General Assembly and not its committees; the overall intention of the draft was clearly to discourage the Secretary-General from his proposals to strengthen the Secretariat’s advisory capacity in the area of disarmament; in adhering to the Final Document of the tenth special session, the draft ignored more nKxlem mandates based on Assembly resolutions; the draft text also ignored the fact that the Non-Aligned Movement itself had called for updating the disarmament agenda and machinery of the United Nations through a further special session on disarmament; the text imposed an artificial schedule of priority on disarmament issues; and operative paragraph 8 perpetuated the myth that the Secretary-General planned a super-verification role for the Secretariat Although noting certain positive elements in the draft resolution, the European Union voted against the draft as a whole because the text still caused some important problems of principle. Israel disassociated itself from the main thrust of the draft resolution, from some of its provisions and from much of its language. New Zealand c«isidered the draft resoluti(Mi backward-looking and superfluous. South Afirica held that the text endeavoured to retain the status quo in the United Nations disarmament machinery without taking into account the Secretary-General’s proposals in that regard. The United States indicated that it would vote against the draft resolution despite the deletion of the first preambular paragraph because, in its view, the draft inq)inged on the larger efforts at United Nations reform, whidi were more prc^rly the work of the General Assembly.

Among those abstaining, Argentina, while sharing various points expressed in the draft resolution, felt that the text did not take sufficient account of the reform programme of the Secretary-General. Canada held the view that the substantive matters dealt with in the draft needed conqvdiensive and careful considerati(Mi.

25 A/51/950 and Add.3.

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China voted in favour of the draft resolution for the following reasons: it believed diat the draft was not in conflict with the ongoing reform of the United Nations; the disarmament machinery menticMied in the revised text should not only continue to exist, but be further strengthened; die Seaetariat should as authorized by the General Assembly, provide support to existing disarmament machinery, and should not replace the sovereign States in the exercise of their functions. In addition, China endorsed the reference to con^liance with treaties. Kenya supported the draft resolution because it believed that the United Nations had a role to play in disarmament through its existing machinery. The Russian Federation stated that it would vote in favour of the draft resolution as it had always supported the existing international disarmament machinery; it reaffirmed the recognized role of the Conference Disarmament as the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament Ibrkey, which believed that the main thrust of the draft text was in keeping with earlier Assembly resolutions, was of the view that the draft was not in conflict with the reform progranune of the Secretary-General. In casting its vote in favour of the draft text, Ghana stated that, like others, it had joined the consensus in the decision regarding the reform process in the General Assembly.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 111 to 41, with 12 abstentions. For the text of resolution 52/40 C. Role of the United Nations in disarmament, and the voting pattern, see pages 312 and 360, respectively.

Resolution concerning the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament

On 6 November, the representative of Indonesia introduced a draft resolution entitled Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, submitted by Colombia on behalf of the States Members of the United Nati(Mis that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.^ On the same date, the draft was revised by deleting operative paragraph 2, which had read: “Notes the view of the Secretary-General that preparations for the special session could begin in 1998”, and renumbering the remaining paragraphs accordingly.

^ Subsequent sponsor Costa Rica.

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On 14 November, the representative of Colombia orally revised the draft resolution by replacing the words “general agreement” with the word “consensus” in operative paragraph 1; and in operative paragraph 3, the words “in the light of the outcome” were replaced by the words “subject to the outcome”. At the same meeting, the First Committee adopted the orally revised draft resolution without a vote.

A number of delegations explained their votes. The European Union stressed that its support for the draft resolutic»i did not imply agreement with the fifth preambular paragraph (referring to the 1995 Final Document of the non-aligned conference at Cartagena);^ it intended to participate in future constructive exchanges on a fourth special session on disarmament at the 1998 Disarmament Commission session. Israel also dissociated itself from the content of the fifth preambular paragraph and shared the concerns expressed by other delegations that explained their vote on the draft resolution. The Russian Federation reiterated its view that the decision to convene a special sessicm could be adopted only after a consensus had been reached as to the objectives, agenda and the dates for the session. The United States explained that its support for the draft should not be misconstrued as support for a special session. Rather, it supported the draft because the text made clear that such a session should be convened on the basis of consensus, and that it would be useful only if there was consensus on its objectives and agenda. In its view, such an agenda should be balanced and not unduly weighted towards nuclear issues; the agenda should include, for example, items such as conventional weapons, transparency and confidence-building measures.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution without a vote. For the text of resolution 52/38 F. Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, see page 278.

27 A/50/752-S/1995/1035, annex 01.

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ANNEX

Agenda items of tiie First Committee*

1. Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament obligations (62).

2. Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification (63).

3. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (64).4. Reduction of military budgets (65):(a) Reduction of military budgets;(h) Objective information on military matters, including transparency

of military expenditures.5. The role of science and technology in the context of international

security and disarmament (66).6. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the

Middle East (67).7. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia (68).8. Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-

nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (69).

9. Prevention of an arms race in outer space (70).10. General and con^lete disarmament (71):(a) Notification of nuclear tests;{h) Small arms;(c) Transparency in armaments;( 0 Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas;(e) Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly

devoted to disarmament: report of the Preparatory Committee for the Fourth Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament;

(/) Relationship between disarmament and development;(^) Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and imple

mentation of agreements on disarmament and arms control;(h) Measures to curb the illicit transfer and use of conventional arms;(0 Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes;(/) Regional disarmament;

* A/BUR/52/1.

166


(k) Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons',

(/) Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures;(m) Nuclear disarmament;(n) Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels;(o) Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Devel

opment, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction;

[p) Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of vehicles for their delivery in all its aspects.

11. Review and in^lementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly (72):

{a) United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacitic;

(Jb) Regional confidence-building measures;(c) Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons.12. Review of the implementation of the recommendations and deci

sions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session (73):

(a) Report of the Disarmament Commission;(b) Report of the Conference on Disarmament;(c) Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters;(d) United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.13. The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East (74).14. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain

Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (75).

15. Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region (76).

16. Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace (77).

17. Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) (78).

18. African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (79).19. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and

Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (80).

167

The UN Disarmamnt Yearbook: 1997

20. Maintenance of international security (81).21. Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the

Strengthening of International Security (82).22. Rationalization of the work and reform of the agenda of the First

Committee (83).

168

C H A P T E R IX

Studies, information and training

The AcnvrriES undertaken by the United Nations for information and training in the field of disarmament include expert studies on various topics, an information programme, fellowships, training and advisory services, publications and research. The Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters advises the Seaetary-General, inter alia, on the studies programme and implementaticxi of the information programme, and serves as the Board of Trustees of UNIDIR. For a list of publications prepared by the Centre for Disarmament Affairs and by the United Natiois Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), see the annex to this chapter, page 173.

Disarmament studies programme

Study completed in 1997

Pursuant to resolution 50/70 B of 12 December 1995, the Panel of Govenmiental Experts on Small Arms, appointed by the Secretary- General to prepare a report on the types of small arms and light weapCHis actually used in conflicts, the causes of their excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer, and the ways and means to prevent and reduce their transfer, completed and submitted its report to the General Assembly in August. The report and the resulting resolution, 52/38 J, entitled “Small arms”, are discussed in chapter IV; see pages 78 and 283, respectively.

Studies initiated in I 7

By resolution 52/38^ “Small arms”, the General Assembly not only endorsed the recommendations contained in the Secretary-General’s

* The 1997 report of the Advisory Board on Disarmainent Matters was issued as document A/S2/282.

2 A/52/298.

169


report on small arms, mentioned above, but initiated two further studies to be undertaken by him.

It called for a study on the problems of ammunition and explosives in all their aspects, to be carried out as early as possible, within available financial resources, and in cooperation with apprc^riate intemational and regional organizations, where necessary.^

It also requested that a report be prepared, with the assistance of a group of governmental experts to be nominated by the Secretary- General, on the progress made in the implementation of the recommendations of the report on small arms and on further actions recommended to be taken. This report is to be submitted to the General Assembly at its fifty-fourth session.

United Nations Disarmament Infoimation Programme

During the year, as part of efforts Organization-wide to serve the intemational community by keeping in step with the latest communications trends and technologies, the Centre for Disarmament Affairs expanded its use of electronic means to disseminate information. It began to design its own home page on the Internet as a conq>onent of the United Nations website,'* and continued to make the composite table of the Register of Conventional Arms available electronically, which it had done for the first time in 1996. Because of staffing constraints, the Centre’s traditional publications programme was somewhat reduced in type of publication and frequency of issuance (see the annex to this chapter).

In addition to publishing information, the Centre remained in active contact with the major constituents that its information programme serves. Staff participated in panels organized by the diplomatic and academic communities on illicit trade, light weapons, and building societal resistance to violence. The Centre participated in meetings of the Intemational Association of University Presidents (lAUPyUN Commission on Disarmament Education, Conflict Resolution and Peace. It was also represented at the annual intemational

Although the resolution did not set a date for completion, it is expected that the study will be submitted to the General Assembly at its fifty-third session.

Internet: http://www.un.org (link to ‘Teace and Secuiity-Disarmament”).

170

http://www.un.org


seminar on arms control and disarmament for sdiolars and educators, held at Juniata College in Pennsylvania, United States, in September. Following that seminar, some of the participants from Africa met at Headquarters to explore the theme of the prevention of conflicts and the control of small arms and light weapons in West Africa.

As an important part of its outreach programme, the Centre maintained active liaison with the public and the non-governmental community (NGOs), and the latter group, in collaboration with the Centre and the Department of Public Information, organized, as is customary, a number of events during Disarmament Week. A photo exhibit entitled “The United Nations and Nuclear Disarmament” was mounted in the public lobby at Headquarters, and a brochure on the subject, which also served as a guide to the exhibit, was issued. The NGO Committee on Disarmament invited two Nobel laureates to take part in public discussions on banning landmines and on nuclear disarmament: Ms. Jody Williams, Coordinator of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, and Dr. Joseph Rotblat, of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs. As part of the celebrations for UN Day at the UN Office in Geneva, the Geneva Branch of the Centre cHrganized a stand presenting the history and achievements of the Conference on Disarmament and its predecessors and displaying the Centre’s publications. In addition, st^f provided information to visitors on various aspects of disarmament.

At the request of the public inquiries unit of the Department of Public Information, the staff of the Centre undertook numerous briefmg engagements for the benefit of visiting high school and university students and of United Nations Association members from various countries.

Working with States parties, the Centre facilitated the participation of NGOs in the opening session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, implementing a decision of the Committee to make time available at each session for representatives of NGOs to address delegations. This marked a significant change from the modalities governing the attendance of NGOs during the preparatory process leading up to the 1995 Review Conference, during which they had been allowed only to attend open meetings of the Committee.

In the course of the year, the Centre provided training for six interns in various aspects of its work: following the debate in the

171


General Assembly and the First Committee and reporting thereon, assisting in research tasks, drafting pcfftions of publications, contributing to the database and servicing regional conferences.

The flow of contributions to the Voluntary Tmst Fund for the Disarmament Information Programme remained low. Tlie Centre drew upon the Fimd to cover expenses in preparing and disseminating publications, to help finance the production of the guide book “The United Nations and Nuclear Disarmament” and to pay for services related to public events during Disarmament Week.

Disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services

The Centre for Disarmament Affairs continued to provide training for young diplomats, especially those from developing countries, through its fellowship, training and advisory services programme. The programme, which began on 15 September in Geneva and ended on 1 November in New York, benefited a total of 24 diplomats from the following countries: Algeria, Bangladesh, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Germany, Hungary, Indonesia, Italy, Kazakstan, Mexico, Morocco, Russian Federation, Senegal, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Togo, Ukraine, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe. As is customary, the programme comprised lectures, speaking, drafting and simulation exercises, research projects, and study visits to Austria, Germany, Japan and the Netherlands.

With a view to streamlining the work of the First Committee and enhancing efficiency, the General Assembly had decided, by resolution 51/46 F of December 1996, to include the item “United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services” on its agenda at its fifty-third session. Thus, no resolution on the subject was adopted at the fifty-second session.

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

By a note to the General Assembly, the Seaetary-General transmitted the report of the Deputy Director of UNIDIR and the report of the Board of Trustees of UNIDIR on the activities of the Institute for

5 A/52/272.

172


the period from July 1996 to June 1997. The research programme of the Institute continued to focus on the areas of collective security, regional security and non-proliferation studies. Activities relating to a fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament—a subject-area foreseen in the research programme adopted in June 199^were put on hold pending clarification of its timing and modalities. The publications produced by UNIDIR under its research programme are listed in the annex to this chapter.


On 7 November, the rejffesentative of Mexico introduced a draft resolution entitled United Nations Disarmament Information Programme on behalf of the sponsors.® On 12 November, the representative of Mexico orally revised the fourth preambular paragraph by deleting the words “with concern” after the word "Noting”. At the same meeting, the First Committee adopted the orally revised draft resolution without a vote.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution without a vote. For the text of resolution 52/39 D, United Nations Disarmament Information Programme, see page 309.

ANNEX

Publicatioiis

Centre for Disarmament Affairs

The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, vol. 21: 1996 (Sales No. E.97.IX.1)Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations, vol. XX, Nos. 1 and 2/3Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements, 5th edition: 1996 (Sales No. E.97.IX.3)United Nations Concern for Peace and Security in Central Africa/Les Nations Unies soucieuses de promouvoir la paix et la sicuriti en AfHque centrale (Sales No. E.98.IX.2)

® Colombia, Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan and Peru. Subsequent sponsors: Argentina, Costa Rica, Ecuador and Myanmar.

173


In cooperation with the NGO Committee on Disarmament

1996: Disarmament at a Critical Juncture (Sales No. E.97.IX.2)The United Nations and Nuclear Disarmament by William Epstein (SalesNo. E.97.IX.4)

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

Research reports

The Transfer of Sensitive Technologies and the Future of Control Regimes by Pericles Gasparini Alves and Kerstin Hoffman (eds.), 1997 (Sales No. GV.E.97.0.10).

Increasing Access to Information Technology for International Security: Forging Cooperation among Research Institutes by Pericles Gasparini Alves (ed.), 1997 (Sales No. GV.E.97.0.23).

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in the 21st Century, by Pericles Gasparini Alves and Daiana Cipollone (eds.), 1996, 169 p. (Sales No. GV.E.97.0.29). Also available in Spanish: Las Zonas Litres de Armas Nucleares en el Siglo XXI, editado por Pericles Gasparini Alves y Daiana Cippolone, 1997 (Sales No. GYS.97.0.29).

Operacidn CEIBO: Ejercicio Combinado de Operaciones de Mantenimiento de la Paz entre Uruguay y Argentina, editado por Cnel. Carlos Pagola y Cnel. Jorge Tereso, 1997 (Sales No. GV.S.97.0.30).

UNIDIR NewsLetter

No. 34/96: The Transfer of Sensitive Technologies and the Future of Control Regimes. Le transfer de technolgies sensibles et Vavenir des regimes de contrdle.

No. 35/96: The Korean Peninsula: Today and Tomorrow. La p^ninsule co- reenne: aujourd*hui et demain.

Special Issue/Numero sp&ial 3/97: The Elimination of Landmines. Velimina- tion des mines terrestres.

174

A P P E N D I C E S

A P P E N D I X I

Status of multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements

The data contained in this appendix have been furnished by the depositaries of tile treaties or agreements concerned.

The Secretary-General is the depositary of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques; the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies; the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively hijurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects; the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction; the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction.

Canada and Hungary are depositaries of the Treaty on Open Skies.France is the depositary of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use

in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warlfare.

Mexico is the depositary of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco).

The Netherlands is the depositary of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty).

The Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity is the depositary of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty).

The Organization of American States is the depositary of the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Tracking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials

The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America are depositaries of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water; the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration

177


and Use of Outer Space* including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies; the Treaty on the Non-F^liferation of Nuclear Weapons; the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof; and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.

Thailand is the depositary of the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon>Free Zone Treaty (Bangkok Treaty).

The United States of America is the depositary of the Antarctic Treaty. The Secretary General of the Forum Secretariat (formerly the South Pa

cific Bureau for Economic Cooperation) is the depositary for the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga).

Inclusion of information concerning the treaties and agreements of which the Secretary-General is not the depositary is as reported by the respective depositaries and implies no position on the part of the United Nations with respect to the data reported.

The total number of parties has been calculated on the basis of information received from the depositaries.

Actions reported in the period 1 January to 31 December 1997

The following list shows actions reported, if any, during the period 1 January to 31 December 1997 with regard to multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements.

Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare

S ign ed a f G eneva: 17 June 1925E n te re d in to fo rc e : for each signatory as from the date of deposit of its ratifi

cation; accessions take effect on the date of the notification by the depositary Government

Accession is indicated by (<i), acceptance by (A) and succession by (5 ). In the case of multi-depositary clauses, depositary action may be completed with one or more of the several depositaries. The letters “O**, **B”, “M”, “L**, and “W” indicate where the reported action was completed: **0"* for Ottawa, **B” for Budapest, “M*’ for Moscow, “U’ for London, and “W” for Washington.

The texts of treaties concluded up to 1992 are contained in Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements 4th edition: 1992, vols. 1 and 2 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.93.DC.11), and thereafter in Status 5th edition: 1996 (United Nations publication. Sales No. E.97.DC.3).

178

Status cf agreements

D e fo s tta ry G o v ern m en t; France

N ew P a rtie s : none

T o ta l n u m b er o f P a rh e s : 131

The Antarctic Ikcaty

S igned a t WAsmNcroN; 1 December 19S9 E n te re d in to fo rc e : 23 June 1961 D e fo s tta ry G o v ern m en t: United States of America

N ew P a rtie s : noneTotal number ch Pa r iies: 43*

IVeaty Banning Nudear Weapon Tests in Ae Atmospiiere in Outer ^aoe and under Water

S igned by th e o r ig in a l P a rtie s^ in M oscow : S August 1963 O pened f o r s ig n a tu re in L(»ax)N, Moscow a n d W ashingtcm :

8 August 1963 E n te re d in to fo rc e ; 10 October 1963D e fo s tta ry G o vernm en ts: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom of Great

Britain and Northern Ireland (L). and United States of America (W)

N ew Parties: none

T otal number of Parties: 124

Treaty on Prindplcs Govoning flw Activities of States in tiie Expknation and Use of Outer Space, includil ; the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies

O pened f o r s ig n a tu re in [xmDON, Moscow a n d W ash in g to n ;

27 January 1967 E n te re d in to fo rc e : 10 October 1967D e fo s tta ry GovERNMEhnrs: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom of Great

Britain and Northern beland (L), and United States of America (W)

‘ Consultative parties are: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, China, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, R ^blic of iCorea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, South AMca, Spain, Sweden, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, Uruguay and United States.

The Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic IVeaty (Madrid Pro- tocol) (not related to disarmament) entered into force on 14 January 1998.

** The original parties are the Russian Fed»ation, the United Kingdom and the United States.

179


N ew Parties: none

T o ta l num ber o f P aio ies: 94

IVeaty for ttie Phihibilion of Nudear Weapons in Latin America and liie Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatdolco)

O pened f o r s ig n a tu re a t M exico C tty : 14 February 1967 E n te re d in to fo rc e : for each Government individually D h p o sttary G o v ern m en t: Mexico

N ew Parties: noneAmendment to article 7®

S ignatories: Barbados — 14 FebruaryR atifications: Barbados — 14 February

Venezuela — 14 FebruaryAmendment to article 25

Signatories: Barbados — 14 FebruaryGuatemala — 23 October

RATIFICAnONS: Barbados — 14 FebruaryVenezuela — 14 February

Amendment to articles 14, 15, 16, 19 and 20SlGNATORO=S: Barbados — 14 FebruaryR atifications: Barbados — 14 February

Venezuela — 14 FebruaryT otal num ber of Parties: 38*»

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

O pened for signature in London, M oscow and WAsraNGTON:1 July 1968

® Amendment adopted by the General Conference of OPANAL, pursuant to resolution 267 (E-V) of 3 July 1990.

Amendment adopted by the General Conference of OPANAL, pursuant to resolution 268 (XU) of 10 May 1991.

8 Amendment adopted by the General Conference of OPANAL pursuant to resolution 290 (VO) of 26 August 1992.

Total includes the five nuclear-weapon States and the Netherlands, which have ratified one or both of the Additional Protocols. The TVeaty is fully in force for all the regional States that ratify it and waive the requirements under article 28.

180

Status of agreements

E n te re d ihnx> fo rc e : S March 1970D e to s ita ry GovERNMEim: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom of G reat

Britain and Northern Ireland (L). and United States of America (W)

N ew P a rtie s ; Oman —23 January (W) (a)T o ta l num ber o f P a rtie s : 186

Treaty on the Prahibitioii of (he Enqilacement of Nudear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Dcsinictfon on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof

O pened for signature in London, M oscow ani> Wa s»ington :11 February 1971

E n te re d in fo fo rc e ; 18 May 1972D ep o sita ry G o v ern m en ts: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom of Great

Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

N ew Pasties: none

T o ta l n um ber o f P a rtie s : 91

Convention on the Prahfliilian of die Devck men induction and Stock*

elii^ of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Thdr estruction

O pened f o r s ig n a tu re in L ondon . M oscow a n d WAsmNoroN: 10 April 1972 E n te re d in to fo rc e : 26 M arch 197SD ep o stta ry GovERNMEi<rrs: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom of Great

Britain and Northern Ireland (L). and United States of Ammca (W)

N ew P a rtie s : Latvia — 6 February (L) (a)

T o ta l nu m b er o f P aio ies: 140

Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Tediniqucs

O pened f o r s ig n a tu re a t G eneva: 18 May 1977E n te re d in to fo rc e : S October 1978D ep o sttary : The Secretary-General of the United Nations

N ew Parties: none

T o ta l n um ber P a rtie s : 64

Agreement Governii the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Cdestial Bodies

O pened f o r s ig n a tu re a t N ew Y o rk : 18 December 1979

181


E n te re d in to fo rc e : 11 July 1984

D ep o sitary : The Secretary-General of the United Nations

N ew Parties: none

T otal N umber of Parties: 9

Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on tiie Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Wiiicii May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects

O pened f o r s ig n a tu re a t Mew Y o rk : 10 April 1981

E n te re d in to fo rc e : 2 December 1983

D ep o sttary : The Secretary-General of the United Nations

N ew P a rtie s : ‘ CambodiaPanama Portugal PeruHoly See Monaco Cape Verde Uzbekistan

T o ta l num b er o f P a rtie s : 71

* Article 5, subparagraph 2, of the Convention states:“For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance,

approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force six months after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratiHcation, acceptance, approval or accession.**

j With the following declaration:‘'The Holy See, as a signatory of the [said Convention and annexed Pro

tocols], in keeping with its proper nature and with the particular condition of Vatican City State, intends to renew its encouragement to the International Community to continue on the path it has taken for the reduction of human suffering caused by armed conflict.

**Every step in this direction contributes to increasing awareness that war and the cruelty of war must be done away with in order to resolve tensions by dialogue and negotiation, and also by ensuring that international law is respected.

7.

•2S March (a)■26 March (a)- 4 April- 3 July (a)-22 July (a)i -12 August (a)•16 September (a) '29 September (a)

182


Amended Protocol IICambodiaIrelandDenmarkGermanyJapan

— 25 March —21 March*— 30 April*— 2 May® —10 June —12 June— 3 July

PhilippinesPeru

*'The Holy See, while maintaining that the above-mentioned Convention and Protocols constitute an important instrument for humanitarian international law, reiterates the objective hoped for by many parties: an agreement that would totally ban anti-personnel mines, the effects of which are tragically well-known.

**In this regard, the Holy See considers that the modifications made so far in the second Protocol are insufficient and inadequate. It wishes, by means of its own accession to the Convention, to offer support to every effort aimed at effectively banning anti-personnel mines, in the conviction that all possible means must be used in order to buikl a safer and more fratemal world.*’ With the following declarations:

Article 1:*lt is the understanding of Ireland that the provisions of the amended

Protocol which by their contents or nature may be applied also in peacetime, shall be observed at all times.’*

Article 2(3):**It is the understanding of Ireland that the word 'primarily* is included

in article 2, paragraph 3 of the amended Protocol to clarify that mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped.**

* Same declarations, mutatis mutandis, as those made by Ireland.™ With the following declarations:

Articles 1 and 2:[Same declarations, mutatis mutandis, as those made by Ireland.]Article 5, paragraph 2(b):*lt is understood that article 5, paragraph 2{b) does not preclude agree

ment among the States concerned, in connection with peace treaties or similar arrangements, to allocate responsibilities under paragraph 2(b) in anotlier manner which nevertheless respects the essential spuit and purpose of the article.

183


Sweden Monaco Australia Cape Verde Liechtenstein

—16 July® —12 August —22 August—16 September —19 Novembei^

T o ta l n u m ber o f p arties:1 2

Protocol IV A ccep tan ce : Sweden —15 JanuaryP

CambodiaPanamaIrelandDenmarkJapan

— 25 March — 26 March —21 March*! — 30 April —10 June

° With the following declarations:Articles 1 and 2:**Sweden intends to apply the Protocol also in time of peace.** Article 2(3):[Same declaration, mutatis mutandis, as the one made by Ireland.] Article 5, paragraph 2:**Sweden is of the opinion that the obligations ensuing from article 5,

paragraph 2 shall not be interpreted to the e^ect that the High Contracting Parties or parties in a conflict are prevented from entering into an agreement allowing another party to conduct mine clearance.**

In respect of article /, same declaration, mutatis mutandis, as the one made

P With the following declarations:**Sweden intends to apply the Protocol to all types of armed conflict;**Sweden intends to pursue an international agreement by which the

provisions of the Protocol shall be applicable to all types of armed conflict;**Sweden has since long strived for explicit prohibition of the use of

blinding laser which would risk causing permanent blindness to soldiers. Such an effect, in Sweden's view, is contrary to the principle of international law prohibiting means and methods of warfare which cause unnecessary suffering.**

4 With the following declaration:Article I:“It is the understanding of Ireland that the provisions of the Additional

Protocol which by their contents or nature may also be applied in peacetime, shall be observed at all times.**

by Ireland.

184


PhilippinesGermanyPeruHoly SeeGreeceAustraliaCape VerdeUzbekistanLiechtenstein

—12 June —21 Jun^— 3 July —22 July— 5 August'— 22 August—16 September —19 September —19 Novembei

T o ta l num ber o f p a rtie s : 16

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone TVeaty (TVeaty of Rarotonga)

O pened f o r s ig n a tu re a t R a ro to n g a : 6 August 1985E n te re d in to fo rc e : 11 December 1986D eposftary : The Secretary General o f the Forum Secretariat

T otal number of Parties: 16*

Treaty on Conventtonal Armed Forces in Europe (CFE TVeaty)

S igned a f P aris: 19 November 1990 E n te re d in to fo rc e : 9 November 1992

' Same declaration, mutatis mutandis, as the one made by Ireland. With the following declaration:

*lt is the understanding of the Government of Australia that the provisions of Protocol IV shall apply in all circumstances.’*

* Total includes nuclear-weapon States—China and the Russian Federation, which have ratified Protocols 2 and 3, and France, which ratified Protocols 1-3 in 1996 but was not reported until 1997.

Protocol I RATiFiCAnoN: United Kingdom

Protocol 2 RATincAnoN: United Kingdom

Protocol 3 RAnncAnoN:: United Kingdom

—19 September

—19 September

—19 Septendber

185

The UN tHsamamerU Yearbook 1997

D eposttary G overnmei^ . T he N etherlands

N ew Parties: none

Total num ber of Parties; 30

C o n firm a tio n o f a p p ro v a l in a c c o rd a n c e w tth A n n ex A t o th e B n a l D ocum ent o f th e B r s t C o n fe re n c e t o R eview th e O p e ra tio n gf th e T re a ty ON C o n v e n tio n a l A rm ed F o rc e s in E u ro p e a n d th e C o n c lu d in g A c t o f

THE NBGOnAnON ON PERSONNEL STRENGTH VIENNA, 31 May 1996. THE DOCUMENT e n te re d in to FORCE ON 15 May 1997 in c o n fo rm tty w tth i t s S e c tio n V I. p a ra g ra p h 1. JUNCTO THE DECISH G ro u p o n 1 December 1996:

United Kingdom Norway Spain Belgium Turkey Hungary OecM’gia

With the following declaration:**The Parliament of Georgia,Xonfimiing its attitude towards the CFE Treaty as the fundamental

document for the European Security;'‘Confirming by the ratification of the Document agreed among the

States Parties to the iWaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19,1990 in the First Conference to Review the Operation of the Treaty (thereafter Flank Document) its readiness for ensuring the prompt entering into force of the Flank Document;

**Ready to avoid any misunderstandings that may arise from misinterpretation of the Flank Document;

**Noting the goodwill expressed while adopting the Flank Document in Vienna on May 31, 1996 which, despite the different positions on some questions, secured a consensus;

“States:“1. After the entering into force of the Flank Document on May 15,

1997, the Flank issue should not be considered as being finally decided. The CFE Treaty adaptation process, taking new realities into consideration, should reach such agreement that will take into consideration and satisfy the interests of all parties.

186

TAKEN BY THE JoiNT CONSULTATIVE

— 8 January —13 January— 8 April —29 April— 6 May— 7 May —13 May“


RomaniaArmeniaKazakhstan

—13 May —14 May' —14 May

**2 The Flank Document does not give countries the right to legitimize the deployment of their armed forces on the territory of other countries. This issue should be regularized between the parties involved on the basis of a bilateral agremeent

**3. The Flank Document does not revoke, and is not against the principles and procedures of the CFE Treaty and related agreements. In particular, the procedures established by Tashkent May 15, 1992 Agreement are still in force.

The temporary deployment of TLE is not to be regarded as being a means of achieving balance, but as a temporary recourse in particular cases. Therefore, the term 'temporary deployment', should be clearly defined by identifying its purpose, frequency, duration and geographical location. Prior to this, Georgia will abstain from conducting the negotiations on not to ask for the temporary deployment of TLE on its teiritory except for peace-keeping operations and bilateral and multilateral military exercises.

**5. Special attention should be paid to the issue of uncontrolled treaty limited equipment (UTLE), so-called 'white spots'. Before solving this problem, Geoigia will abstain from conducting the negotiation on the reallocation of the maximum levels for holdings of TLE established by the Tashkent Agreement of May 15. 1992.

**6. The flexibility of the Flank Document shall not be used against the interests of the sovereign rights of any country; in particular, no vast amount of TLE should be concentrated on the territories of other countries. To avoid this, the * National Ceilings’ should become the basis for the elaboration of the maximum levels of TLE, on the basis of which * territorial ceilings’ shall be established." With the following statement:

“With regard to Joint Statement of the United States of America and the Azerbaijan Republic, the Republic of Armenia would like to state the following:

—Armenia confirms its adherence to the full implementation of the CFE Treaty and its readiness to cooperatively contribute to the solution of the issue of the unaccounted-for and uncontrolled TLE.

—^Armenia is of the view that the issue of the unaccounted-for and uncontrolled TLE could not be either legally or procedurally linked to the *CFE Flank Agreement*.

—^Armenia reiterates its understanding that the issue of unaccounted-for and uncontrolled TLE should be addressed not only as a Treaty implementation issue but as a Treaty operational one as well."

187


PolandRussian Federation

—14 May —14 May*

With the following statement:*"In the light of the views of the Russian Federation on the context and

future of the Flank Agreement, as expressed in the Note dated 14 May this year and addressed to the depositary of the CFE lYeaty, the delegation of Poland would like to state the following:

** 1. The Russian position, as it seems to link future Russian observance of the levels of forces in the flank area with the establishment of collective ceilings for alliances and limitations on additional permanent stationing of forces in the entire CFE area of application, may jeopardize the CFE adaptation process through the introduction of artificid and unfounded linkages into the negotiation.

**2. The above-mentioned position of the Russian Federation is seen as having implications neither for CFE States commitments under the Treaty and documents constituting a mandate for the CFE adaptation negotiation, nor for the need for all CFE States to obso^e meticulously all provisions of the CFE regime.”

* With the following declaration:*‘2. While approving the Document the Russian Party:**(A) Notes the signiHcance of the Document as it was agreed on May

31,1996 for implementation of the Treaty in its present form. The equitable and responsible cooperation of all States Parties, based on good will to ensure the full use of the possibilities provided in Article IV, paragraphs 1,2 and 3 of the IDocument, constitutes the foundation for the viabiUty of the Document.

**(B) Confums that the Document in its present form is without prejudice to bilateral negotiations and agreements on stationing of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation beyond its territory in the flank zone.

“(C) States that any reservations as well as any interpreting statements of other States Parties which directiy or indirectly modify the substance and meaning of the Document do not entail any consequences as to the rights and obligations of the Russian Federation arising from the Document. In the event such reservations or interpreting statements are made the Russian Party reserves the right to respond to them accordingly.

**(D) Underlines that the process of adaptation of the Treaty for an undivided Europe should include an appropriate solution of the flank limitations problem within the context of abolishment of the present zonal structure of the Treaty and its replacement by national ceilings. In this connection the Russian Party expresses its readiness to consider a possibility to ensure restraint in relation to the present levels of its conventional armed forces

188


United States —14 May^

in the flank area as it is referred to in Article n, paragraphs 1 and 3 of the Document. The scope, status and duration of such provision on restraint will conrespond to the scope, status and duration of provisions on limitation on overall ceilings for military alliances and on limitation on additional permanent stationing of conventional armed forces of the States Parties beyond their teiritories.

**A11 provisions listed in paragraph 2 of the present Note have been indispensable conditions for approval of the Document by the Russian Federation.’* [Unofficial translation]y With the following joint statement by the United States of America and the

Azerbaijan Republic:*The United States and Azerbaijan look forward to the prospective entry

into force on May 15,1997, of the Document Agreed Among the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, dated May 31,1996 (*The CFE Flank Agreement*). The United States and Azerbaijan affirm their joint understanding that with respect to the region covered by the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, a State’s m ilit^ forces should be deployed on the territory of another State only with the freely expressed consent of the host country.

**They further affirm that with respect to the CFE Flank Agreement, it is their common understanding that this agreement:

—does not give any State Paity the right to station (under Article IV, paragraph 5 of the Treaty) or temporarily deploy (under Article V, paragraphs l(^) and (c) of the Treaty) conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty on the territory of other States Parties to the Treaty without the freely expressed consent of the receiving State Party;

—does not alter or abridge the right of any State Party under the CFE Treaty to utilize fully the maximum levels for its holdings of conventional armaments and equipment limited by die TVeaty notified pursuant to Ardcle Vn of the Treaty;

—does not alter in any way the requirement for the freely expressed consent of all States Parties concerned in the exercise of any reallocations envisioned under Article IV, paragraph 3 of the CFE Flank Agreement

**The United States acknowledges the absence of foreign military bases on the territory of the Azerbaijan Republic and supports the position taken by Azerbaijan that the temporary presence of foreign troops on its territory may be based only on a duly concluded agreement with Azerbaijan according to its constitution and in conformity with international law.

**The United States and Azerbaijan reiterate their concern with regard to conventional armaments and equipment of types limited by the lYeaty, which

189


AzerbaijanBelarusRepublic of MoldovaPortugalUkraine

—15 Mayy —15 May —15 May* —15 May —15 May"

are unaccounted for and uncontrolled within the IVeaty. They recognize the obligation of aU States Parties to work in a coopmldve manner within the Joint Consultative Group to develop practical steps toward fulfilling the commitment of the States Parties, as expressed in the Review Conference Bnal Document, to resolve the issue of unaccounted-for-TLE as soon as possible and achieve full implementation of all Treaty provisions.

**The United States supports the sovereign right of Azerbaijan, as a freo and independent State, to take the position under the CFE Treaty contained in the statement of the Chairman of the First CFE Review Conference on May 31, 1996, that temporary depbyment and reallocation of quotas refenred to in Section IV, paragraphs 2 and 3 of the CFE Flank Agreement will not be used in the context of the Azerbaijan Republic.*’* With the following declaration:

“The ratification of the Document Agreed Among the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, does not mean that the Republic of Moldova accepts the presence and temporary deployment on its territory of the conventional armed forces of other States.”

** With the folk>wing reservations:** 1. The obligations of the Russian Federation envisaged by Section

II of the Document are valid to the extent that the presence of armaments and equipment limited by the CFE Treaty (TLE) of the Russian Federation is admitted by Ukraine in that part of its territory which is included in the area described in Article V, subparagraph 1(A), of the IVeaty, as understood by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the time the iVeaty was signed.

In any case, the consent of Ukraine for such a presence, whatever the way this consent is expressed, cannot be regarded as the one that cannot be annulled.

'Nothing in the Document can be construed as the expression of the consent of Ukraine for the presence or stationing of TLE of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine which is included in the area described in Article V, subparagraph 1(A), of the Treaty, as understood by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the time the Treaty was signed.

**3. The provisions of Section IV, paragraph 3, of the Document shall in no way affect the rights and obligations of Ularaine under the Agreement

J.

190


Total N um ber o f A pprovals:

TVeaty on Open Skies^

S igned a t H elsin k i: 24 March 1992 N o t y e t in fo r c e

D epositary G overnm ents: C anada and H ungary

N ew RAiiHCAnoNS: none

Total num ber of R atificahons: 22

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction

S igned a f Paris: 13 January 1993E n te re d in to fo rc e : 29 April 1997DEPOsrTARY: The Secretary-General of the United Nations

S ig n a to rie s : Bosnia and Herzegovina —16 January

T o ta l n u m b er o f S ig n a to rie s : 165

on the Principles and Procedures for the Implementation of the IVeaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of 15 May 1992.

“4. The validity of the Document shall be limited by the date of entry into force of the adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

**The reservations mentioned in the above pvagraphs 1 through 4 shall be valid through the entire time of the operation of the Document* including the period of its provisional application.’*Total includes France, Italy, Greece, the Kingdom of the Netherlands (King

dom in Europe), Canada, Slovakia, Denmark, Bulgaria, Luxembourg, Czech Republic, Germany, Iceland, which coniinned their approval in 1996.

The provisional application of the Treaty, which expired 31 December 1997, has been prolonged to 30 June 1998 by a decision of the Open Skies Consultative Commission in Vienna.

GrenadaJamaicaBhutanSuriname

— 9 April —18 April — 24 April — 28 April

191


P arties:"* Belgium —27 January^Bosnia and Herzegovina —25 FebruaryLao People’sDemocratic Republic —25 February

Niger — 9 AprilSaint Lucia — 9 AprilLuxembourg —15 April*®Tunisia —15 AprilTogo —23 AprilBangladesh — 25 ^ r i lChina — 25 AprilEquatorial Guinea —25 AprilKenya — 25 AprilUnited States — 25 April*Zimbabwe — 25 AprilBahrain — 28 AprilIceland —2S AprilMali — 28 AprilMalta — 28 AprilRepublic of Korea — 28 AprilSuriname — 28 April

Article XXI, subparagraph 2, of the Convention states:* For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited

subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the 30th day following the date of d ^ s it of their instrument of ratification or accession.**

Upon deposit of the insUimient of ratification, the Government of [name of State] confirmed the declaration it made upon signature.

>Tith the following reservation:**Subject to the condition which relates to the Annex on Implementation

and Verification, that no sample collected in the United States pursuant to the Convention will be transferred for analysis to any laboratoi7 outside the territory of the United States.**

192


CubaTurkey

—29 April*8 —12 May —21 May —29 May — 9 June —11 June

SingaporeKuwaitGuineaSlovenia

With the following declarations:**The Government of the Republic of Cuba declares, in conformity with

article m (a)(iii) of the Convention, that there is a colonial enclave in its territory - the Guantanamo Naval Base - a part of Cuban national territory over which the Cuban State does not exercise its rightful jurisdiction, owing to its illegal occupation by the United States of America by reason of a deceitful and fraudulent Treaty.

“Consequently, for the purposes of the Convention, the Government of the Republic of Cuba does not assume any responsibility with respect to the aforesaid territory, since it does not know whether or not the United States has installed, possesses, maintains or intends to possess chemical weapons in the part of Cuban territory that it illegally occupies.

**The Government of the Republic of Cuba also considers that it has the right to require that the entry of any inspection group mandated by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, to carry out in the territory of Guantanamo Naval Base the verification activities provided for in the Convention, should be effected through a point of entry in Cuban national tmitory to be determined by the Cuban Govomment.

'*The Government of the Republic of Cuba considers that, under the provisions of article XI of the Convention, the unilateral application by a State party to the Convention against another State party of any restriction which would restrict or impede trade and the development and promotion of scientific and technological knowledge in the Held of chemistry for industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other purposes not prohibited under the Convention, would be incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention.

“The Government of Cuba designates the Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment, in its capacity as the national authority of the Republic of Cuba for the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, as the body of the central administration of the State responsible for organizing, directing, monitoring and supervising the activities aimed at preparing the Republic of Cuba to fulfil the obligations it is assuming as a State party to the aforementioned Convention.**

193


the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

Trinidad and TobagoBurkina FasoGhanaBrunei DarussalamQatarGuyanaPakistanJordanIran (Islamic Republic oQ

— June (a)—7A June (a)— 8 July— 9 July

—28 July— 3 Sq>tember —12 September — 28 October***

—19 October (a)— 3 November®*

*•* Wth the following declaration:** 1. Pakistan has consistently stood for the complete prohibition and

thorough destruction of all chemical weapons and their production facilities. The Convention constitutes an international legal framewoik for the realization of this goal. Pakistan, therefore, supports the objectives and purposes of the Convention.

**2, The objectives and purposes of the Convention must be strictly adhered to by all States. The relevant provisions on Challenge Inspections must not be abused to the detriment of the economic and security interests of the States Parties unrelated to chemical weapons. Otherwise, the universality and effectiveness of the Convention is bound to be jeopardized.

“3. Abuse of the verification provisions of the Convention, for purposes unrelated to the Convention, will not be acceptable. Pakistan will never allow its sovereignty and national security to be compromised.

**4. The Convention should effectively facilitate trade, scientiHc and technological exchanges and cooperation in the field of chemistry for peaceful purposes. All export control regimes inconsistent with the Convention must be abolished.’*

With the following declaration:**The Islamic Republic of Iran, on the basis of the Islamic principles

and beliefs, considers chemical weapons inhuman, and has consistently been on the vanguard of the international efforts to abolish these weapons and prevent their use.

**1. The Islamic Consultative Assembly (the Parliament) of the Islamic Republic of Iran approved the bill presented by the Government to join the [said Convention] on 27 July 1997, and the Guardian Council found the legislation compatible with the Constitution and the Islamic Tenets on

7.

194

Russian Federation


— 5 November

30 July 1997, in accordance with its required Constitutional process. The Islamic Consultative Assembly decided that:

**The Government is hereby authorized, at an appropriate time, to accede to the [said Convention] - as annexed to this legislation and to deposit its relevant instrument.

“The Ministry of Foreign Affairs must pursue in all negotiations and within the framework of the Organization of the Convention, the full and indiscriminate implementation of the Convention, particularly in the areas of inspection and transfer of technology and chemicals for peaceful purposes. In case the afore-mentioned requirements are not materialized, upon the recommendation of the Cabinet and aj^roval of the Supreme National Security Council, steps aimed at withdrawing fiom the Convention will be put in motion.

**2. The Islamic Republic of Iran attaches vital signiHcance to the full, unconditional and indiscriminate implementation of all provisions of the Convention. It reserves the right to withdraw from the Convention under the following circumstances;

—non-compliance with the principle of equal treatment of all States Parties in implementation of all relevant provisions of the Convention;

—disclosure of its confidential information contrary to the provisions of the Convention;

—imposition of restrictions incompatible with the obligations under the Convention.**3. As stipulated in article XI, exclusive and non-transparent re

gimes impeding free international trade in chemicals and chemical technology for peaceful purposes should be disbanded. The Islamic Republic of

rejects any chemical export control mechanism not envisaged in the Convention.

“4. The Organization for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is the sole international authority to determine the compliance of States P ^es regarding chemical weapons. Accusations by States Parties against other States Parties in the absence of a determination of non-compliance by OPCW will seriously undermine the Convention and its repetition may make the Convention meaningless.

**5. One of the objectives of the Convention as stipulated in its preamble is to "promote free trade in chemicals as well as international cooperation and exchange of scientifrc and technical infomiation in the field of chemical activities for purposes not prohibited under the Convention in order to enhance the economic and technological development of all States Parties.* This fundamental objective of the Convention should be

J.

195


Nepal —18 November— 3 DecemberVenezuela

T o ta l n u m b er o f p a rtie s: 106

TVeaty on the Southeast Asia Nudcar Weapon-Free Zone (Ban^ok TVeaty)

SIC2NED AT B an g k o k : IS December 1995 E n te re d in to fo rc e : 27 March 1997 D ep o stta ry G o v e rn m e n t Thailand

T o ta l n u m b er o f S ig n a to rie s: 10PARHESr i Thailand —20 March

T o ta l n u m ber o f P a rtie s : 9

African Nudear-Weapon-Free-Zone IVeaty (Pelindaba IVeaty)

S igned a f C a iro : 11 April 1996

N o t y e t in fo r c e

respected and embraced by all States Parties to the Convention. Any form of undermining, either in words or in action, of this overriding objective is considered by the Islamic Republic of Iran a grave breach of the provi< sions of the Convention.

''6. In line with the provisions of the Convention regarding non-discriminatory treatment of States Parties:

—inspection equipment should be commercially available to all States Parties without condition or limitation;

—the OPCW should maintain its international character by ensuring fair and balanced geographical distribution of the personnel of its Techni cal Secretariat, provision of assistance to and cooperation with States Parties, and equitable membership of States Parties in subsidiary organs of the Organization.“7. The implementation of the Convention should contribute to in

ternational peace and security and should not in any way diminish or harm national security or territorial integrity of the States Parties'*.Article 16, subparagraph 2, of tiie Treaty states:

“For States which ratify or accede to this TVeaty after the date of this seventh instrument of ratification or accession, this IVeaty shall enter into force on the date of deposit of its instrument of ratification or accession.**

CambodiaSingaporeIndonesia

—n March —n March —10 April

196


D efosttarY : The Secietary-General of the Organization of Afncan Unity

—n January

—10 October

—10 October

S ig n a to rie s: CongoT o ta l num ber o f Si<»ixroRiEs: 49

Protocol /RATlFICAnoNs: China

Protocol / /RxnFiCAn(»is: ChinaTotal nia<ber w RAnncAnoNs: 4*'

Comprdiciisivc Nvdcar-Tcst-Ban ‘nrcaty

O pened f o r sh sn a tu re a t N ew Y o rk : 24 September 1996N ot yet in force

D e p o sita ry : The Seaetary-Generai of the United Nations

Signatories:

RAnPlCAiiotiB:

Suriname —14 JanuaryBrunei Darussalam —22 JanuaryCongo —11 FebruaryMali —18 FebruaryGuinea-Bissau —11 AprilAntigua and Barbuda —16 AprilAzeibaijan —28 JulyLao People’sDemocratic Republic — 30 JulyRepublic of Moldova —24 SeptemberMaldives — 1 OctoberCoc Islands — 5 DecemberATOIUES: 149Qatar — 3 MarchUzbekistan —29 MayJapan — 8 JulyMicronesia (FederatedStates of) —25 July

Mongolia — 8 AugustCzech Republic —11 Sq>tember

Total includes Hrance, which has ratified Protocols I, n and m, and China, which has ratified Protocols I and n.

197


Peru —12 NovemberTotal no . of RAnncAnoNS: 8

Inter-American Convention against the Illldt Manufacturing of and Trafficking In Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials

O pened f o r s ig n a tu re a t W ash in g to n . D. C.: 14 November 1997


DEPOSriARY: ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

S ig n a to rie s:

Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, —14 November Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay,Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, United States, Uruguay,Venezuela

T otal number of Signatories: 29

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and TVansfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Tlieir Destruction (Ottawa Convention)

O pened f o r s ig n a tu re a t O tta w a : 3 December 1997


D ep o sttary : The Secretary-General of the United Nations S ig n a to rie s:

Algeria, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, — 3 December Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Benin,Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana,Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambo> dia, Canada, * Chile, Colombia, Cook Islands,

^ With an understanding:**It is the understanding of the Government of Canada that, in the context

of operations, exercises or other military activity sanctioned by theJ,

198


Costa Rica. C6te d’Ivoire, Czech Republic, — 3 December Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic,Ethiopia, Fiji, France, Gabon, Germany, Greece,**"Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti,Honduras, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan,Liechtenstein, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania,Mauritius, Mexico, Mozambique, Namibia,Netherlands, New Zealand, Niue, Norway, Paraguay,Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Republic of Moldova,Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa,San Marino, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zimbabwe

Angola, Aigentina, Brunei Darussalam, Cape Veide, — 4 December Croatia, Cyprus, Denmaric, Ecuador, El Salvador,Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, Holy See, Iceland,Indonesia, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Madagascar,Malawi, Malta, Marshall Islands, Monaco, Nicaragua, Niger, Panama, Poland, Qatar, Seychelles,Solomon Islands, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland,Sweden, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia,Vanuatu, Yemen

T o ta l no. o f s ig n a to rie s : 123

United Nations or otherwise conducted in accordance with international law, the mere participation by the Canadian Forces, or individual Canadians, in operations, exercises or other military activity conducted in combination with the amied forces of States not party to the Convention which engage in activity prohibited under the Convention would not, by itself, be considered to be assistance, encouragement or inducement in accordance with the meaning of those terms in article 1, paragraph l(cy\

With the following declaration:**Greece fully subscribes to the principles enshrined within the (said Con

vention] and declares that ratification of this Convention will take place as soon as condidons relating to the implementation of its relevant provisions are

Kenya

Zambia

— 5 December

—12 December

fulfilled.’

199


Ratifications: Canada — 3 DecemberIreland — 3 DecemberMauritius — 3 December

T o ta l no . o f RATiFicAnoNS: 3

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(s) signed; (r) ratiHed (including accessions and successions)

Signatory or party rep^ed

Treaty ctf Tlateloico

Treaty of Rarotoaga CFE

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BangkokTreaty

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Angola s

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Bulgaria s r s r

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Burundi 8

Cambodia s r

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222


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Treaty of Tlatdolco

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Gabon s

Gambia s r

Georgia r s

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Greece s r s r

Grenada s r S

Guatemala s r S

223


Composite table of signatories and parties to regional treaties as of 31 Decemi>er 1997, as reported by depositaries {continued)

Signatory or party reported

Treaty of Tlatelolco


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BangkokTreaty

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Guinea s

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224


Signatory or party reported

Treaty of Tlatelolco


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Sao Tome and Principe

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Senegal s

Seychelles s

Sierra Leone s

Singapore s r

Slovakia s r s r

225


Composite table of signatories and parties to r^onal treaties as of 31 December 1997, as reported by depositaries {continued)

Signtiory or party reported

Treaty of Tlateiolco


openSkies

BangkokTreaty

PeiindabaTreaty

Fire-arms

Solomon Islands s r

South Africa S

Spain s r s r

Sudan S

Suriname s r s

Swaziland S

Thailand S r

Togo S

Tonga s

Trinidad and Tobago s r

Tunisia S

Turicey s r s r

Tuvalu s r

Uganda S

Ukraine r s

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Noithera faeland

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s r s r S

(P.I&IV

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s

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s

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Vanuatu s r

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Viet Nam s r

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2 ^bab w e s

* A.R means Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Tlateiolco.

^ P. means Protocol to the TVeaty of Rarotonga.

^ P. means Protocol to the Peiindaba Treaty

226

A P P E N D IX II

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,Stockpiling, Production and lyansfer of Anti'Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction*

Preamble

The States Parties,Determined to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti

personnel mines, that kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mosdy innocent and defenceless civilians and especially children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe consequences for years after emplacement.

Believing it necessary to do their utmost to contribute in an efficient and coordinated manner to face the challenge of removing anti-personnel mines placed throughout the worid, and to assure their destruction.

Wishing to do their utmost in providing assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including the social and economic reintegration of mine victims.

Recognizing that a total ban of anti-personnel mines would also be an inq>ortant conHdence-building measure.

Welcoming the adoption of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and calling for the early ratification of this Protocol by all States which have not yet done so.

Welcoming also United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45 S of 10 December 1996 urging all States to pursue vigorously an effective, legally- binding international agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines,

* UN Legal OfHce, certified true copy.

227

The UNDisamamnt Yearbook: 1997

Welcoming furthermore the measures taken over the past years, both unilaterally and muitilaterally, aiming at prohibiting, restricting or suspending the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines.

Stressing the role of public conscience in furthering the principles of humanity as evidenced by the call for a total ban of anti-personnel mines and recognizing the efforts to that end undertaken by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and numerous other non-governmental organizations around the world.

Recalling the Ottawa Declaration of 5 October 1996 and the Brussels Declaration of 27 June 1997 urging the international community to negotiate an international and legally binding agreement prohibiting the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines.

Emphasizing the desirability of attracting the adherence of all States to this Convention, and determined to work strenuously towards the promotion of its universalization in all relevant fora including, inter alia, the United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament, regional organizations, and groupings, and review conferences of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,

Basing themselves on the principle of international humanitarian law that the right of the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, on the principle that prohibits the employment in armed conflicts of weapons, projectiles and materials and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering and on the principle that a distinction must be made between civilians and combatants.

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

General obligations

1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances:a) To use anti-personnel mines;b) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer

to anyone, directly or indirectly, anti-personnel mines;c) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any

activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of

all anti-pmonnel mines in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.

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Article 2

Deflnitioiis

1. “Anti-personnel mine” means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. Mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped.

2. “Mine” means a munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or a vehicle.

3. “Anti-handling device” means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.

4. “Transfer " involves, in addition to the physical movement of antipersonnel mines into or from national territory, the transfer of title to and control over the mines, but does not involve the transfer of territory containing emplaced anti-personnel mines.

5. “Mined area” means an area which is dangerous due to the presence or suspected presence of mines.

Article 3

Exceptions

1. Notwithstanding the general obligations under Article 1, the retention or transfer of a nund>er of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques is permitted. The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.

2. The transfer of anti-personnel mines for the purpose of destruction is permitted.

Article 4

DestnicfioB of stockpiled anti-personnel mines

Except as provided for in Article 3, each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines it owns or possesses, or that are under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than four years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.

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Article 5

Destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas

1. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti’personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.

2. Each State Party shall make every effort to identify all areas under its jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced and shall ensure as soon as possible that all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, until dll anti-personnel mines contained therein have been destroyed. The marking shall at least be to the standards set out in the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines referred to in paragraph 1 within that time period, it may submit a request to a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of such anti-personnel mines, for a period of up to ten years.

4. Each request shall contain:a) The duration of the proposed extension;b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension,

including:(i) The preparation and status of work conducted under national

demining programs;(ii) The fmancial and technical means available to the State Party

for the destruction of all the anti-personnel mines; and(iii) Circumstances which impede the ability of the State Party to

destroy all the anti-personnel mines in mined areas;c) The humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications

of the extension; andd) Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed exten

sion.5. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Review Conference shall,

taking into consideration the factors contained in paragraph 4, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for an extension period.

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6. Such an extension may be renewed upon the submission of a new request in accordance with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this Article. In requesting a further extension period a State Party shall submit relevant additional information on what has ^en undertaken in the previous extension period pursuant to this Article.

Article 6

International cooperation and assistance

1. In fulfilling its obligations under this Convention each State Party has the right to seek and receive assistance, where feasible, from other States Parties to the extent possible.

2. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate and shall have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information concerning the implementation of this Convention. The States Parties shall not impose undue restrictions on the provision of mine clearance equipment and related technological information for humanitarian purposes.

3. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims and for mine awareness programs. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national organizations or institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and their International Federation, nongovernmental organizations, or on a bilateral basis.

4. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for mine clearance and related activities. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international or regional organizations or institutions, non-govemmental organizations or institutions, or on a bilateral basis, or by contributing to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, or other regional funds that deal with demining.

5. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines.

6. Each State Party undertakes to provide information to the database on mine clearance established within the United Nations system, especially information concerning various means and technologies of mine clearance, and lists of experts, expert agencies or national points of contact on mine clearance.

7. States Parties may request the United Nations, regional organizations, other States Parties or other competent intergovernmental or non-govemmental fora to assist its authorities in the elaboration of a national demining program to determine, inter alia:

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a) The extent and scope of the anti-personnel mine problem;b) The financial, technological and human resources that are required

for the implementation of the program;c) The estimated number of years necessary to destroy all anti-person-

nel mines in mined areas under the jurisdiction or control of the concernedState Party;

d) Mine awareness activities to reduce the incidence of mine-related injuries or deaths;

e) Assistance to mine victims;f i The relationship between the Government of the concerned State

Party and the relevant governmental, inter-govemmental or non<govemmental entities that will work in the implementation of the program.

8. Each State Party giving and receiving assistance under the provisionsof this Article shall cooperate with a view to ensuring the full and prompt in^lementation of agreed assistance programs.

Article 7

TVansparency measure

1. Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party on:

a) The national implementation measures referred to in Article 9;b) The total of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines owned or possessed

by it, or under its jurisdiction or control, to include a breakdown of the type, quantity and, if possible, lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine stockpiled;

c) To the extent possible, the location of all mined areas that contain, or are suspected to contain, anti-personnel mines under its jurisdiction or control, to include as much detail as possible regarding the type and quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine in each mined area and when they were emplaced;

d) The types, quantities and, if possible, lot numbers of all anti-personnel mines retained or transferred for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance or mine destruction techniques, or transferred for the purpose of destruction, as well as the institutions authorized by a State Party to retain or transfer anti-personnel mines, in accordance with Article 3;

e) The status of programs for the conversion or de-conmiissioning of anti-personnel mine production facilities;

f) The status of programs for the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, including details of the methods which

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will be used in destruction* the location of all destruction sites and the applicable safety and environmental standards to be observed;

The types and quantities of all anti-personnel mines destroyed after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, to include a breakdown of the quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine destroyed, in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, respectively, along with, if possible, the lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine in the case of destruction in accordance with Article 4;

h) The technical characteristics of each type of anti-personnel mine produced, to the extent known, and those currently owned or possessed by a State Party, giving, where reasonably possible, such categories of information as may facilitate identification and clearance of anti-personnel mines; at a minimum, this information shall include the dimensions, fusing, explosive content, metallic content, colour photographs and other information which may facilitate mine clearance; and

0 The measures taken to provide an immediate and effective warning to the population in relation to all areas identified undor paragraph 2 of Article 5.

2, The information provided in accordance with this Article shall be updated by the States Parties annually, covering the last calendar year, and reported to the Secretary-General of the United Nations not later than 30 April of each year.

3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit all such reports received to the States Parties.

Article 8

Facilitation and clarification of compliance

1. The States Parties agree to consult and cooperate with each other regarding the inplementation of the provisions of this Convention, and to work together in a spirit of cooperation to facilitate compliance by States Parties with their obligations under this Convention.

2. If one or more States Parties wish to clarify and seek to resolve questions relating to compliance vnih the provisions of this Convention by another State Party, it may submit, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, a Request for ClariHcation of that matter to that State Party. Such a request shall be accompanied by all appropriate information. Each State Party shall refrain from unfounded Requests for Clarification, care being taken to avoid abuse. A State Party that receives a Request for Clarification shall provide, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within 28 days to the requesting State Party all information which would assist in clarifying this matter.

3. If the requesting State Party does not receive a response through the Secretary-General of the United Nations within that time period, or deems

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the response to the Request for Clarification to be unsatisfactory, it may submit the matter through the Secietary-General of the United Nations to the next Meeting of the States Parties. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the submission, accompanied by all appropriate information pertaining to the Request for Clarification, to all States Parties. All such information shall be presented to the requested State Party which shall have the right to respond

4. Pending the convening of any meeting of the States Parties, any of the States Parties concerned may request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to exercise his or her good ofHces to facilitate the clarification requested.

5. The requesting State Party may propose through the Secretary- General of the United Nations the convening of a Special Meeting of the States Parties to consider the matter. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall thereupon communicate this proposal and all information submitted by the States Parties concerned, to all States Parties with a request that they indicate whether they favour a Special Meeting of the States Parties, for the purpose of considering the matter. In the event that within 14 days from the date of such communication, at least one-third of the States Parties favours such a Special Meeting, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene this Special Meeting of the States Parties within a further 14 days. A quorum for this Meeting shall consist of a majority of States Parties.

6. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties, as the case may be, shall first determine whether to consider the matter further, taking into account all information submitted by the States Parties concerned. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach a decision by consensus. If despite all efforts to that end no agreement has been reached, it shall take this decision by a majority of States Parties present and voting.

7. All States Parties shall cooperate fully with the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties in the fulfilment of its review of the matter, including any fact-Hnding missions that are authorized in accordance with paragraph 8.

8. If further clarification is required, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall authorize a fact-finding mission and decide on its msmdate by a majority of States Parties present and voting. At any time the requested State Party may invite a fact-ftnding mission to its territory. Such a mission shall take place without a decision by a Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties to authorize such a mission. The mission, consisting of up to 9 experts, designated and approved in accordance with paragraphs 9 and 10, may collect additional information

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on the spot or in other places directly related to the alleged compliance issue under the jurisdiction or control of the requested State Party.

9. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall prepare and update a list of the names, nationalities and other relevant data of qualified experts provided by States Parties and communicate it to all States Parties. Any expert included on this list shall be regarded as designated for all fact-Hnding missions unless a State Party declares its non-acceptance in writing. In the event of non- acceptance, the expert shall not participate in fact-fmding missions on the territory or any other place under the jurisdiction or control of the objecting State Party, if the non-acceptance was declared prior to the appointment of the expert to such missions.

10. Upon receiving a request from the Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall, after consultations with the requested State Party, appoint the members of tlie mission, including its leader. Nationals of States Parties requesting the fact-Onding mission or directly affected by it shall not be appointed to the mission. The members of the fact-finding mission shall enjoy privileges and immunities under Article VI of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, adopted on 13 February 1946.

11. Upon at least 72 hours notice, the members of the fact-finding mission shall arrive in the territory of the requested State Party at the earliest opportunity. The requested State Party shall take the necessary administrative measures to receive, transport and accommodate the nndssion, and shall be responsible for ensuring the security of the mission to the maximum extent possible while they are on territory under its conUrol.

12. Without prejudice to the sovereignty of the requested State Party, the fact-finding mission may bring into the territory of the requested State Party the necessary equipment which shall be used exclusively for gathering information on the alleged compliance issue. Prior to its arrival, the mission will advise the requested State Party of the equipment that it intends to utilize in the course of its fact-finding mission.

13. The requested State Party shall make all efforts to ensure that the fact-fmding mission is given the opportunity to speak with all relevant persons who may be able to provide information related to the alleged con^liance issue.

14. The requested State Party shall grant access for the fact-fmding mission to all areas and installations under its control where facts relevant to the compliance issue could be expected to be collected. This shall be subject to any arrangements that the requested State Party considers necessary for.

a) The protection of sensitive equipment, information and areas;

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b) The protection of any constitutional obligations the requested State Party may have with regard to proprietary rights, searches and seizures, or other constitutional rights; or

c) The physical protection and safety of the members of the fact-finding mission.In the event that the requested State Party makes such arrangements, it shall make every reasonable effort to demonstrate through alternative means its compliance with this Convention.

15. The fact-fmding mission may remain in the territory of the State Party concerned for no more than 14 days, and at any particular site no more than 7 days, unless otherwise agreed.

16. All information provided in confidence and not related to the subject matter of the fact-Hnding mission shall be treated on a confidential basis.

17. The fact-finding mission shall report, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties the results of its findings.

18. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall consider all relevant information, including the report submitted by the fact-finding mission, and may request the requested State Party to take measures to address the compliance issue within a speciOed period of time. The requested State Party shall report on all measures taken in response to this request.

19. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may suggest to the States Parties concerned ways and means to further clarify or resolve the matter under consideration, including the initiation of appropriate procedures in conformity with international law. In circumstances where the issue at hand is determined to be due to circumstances beyond the control of the requested State Party, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may recommend appropriate measures, including the use of cooperative measures referred to in Article 6.

20. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach its decisions referred to in paragraphs 18 and 19 by consensus, otherwise by a two-thirds majority of States Parties present and voting.

Article 9

National implementation measures

Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.

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Article 10

Settlement of disputes

1. The States Parties shall consult and cooperate with each other to settle any dispute that may arise with regard to the application or the interpretation of this Convention. Each State Party may bring any such dispute before the Meeting of the States Parties.

2. The Meeting of the States Parties may contribute to the settlement of the dispute by whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling upon the States parties to a dispute to start the settlement procedure of their choice and reconunending a time-limit for any agreed procedure.

3. This Article is without prejudice to the provisions of this Convention on facilitation and clarification of compliance.

Article 11

Meetings of the States Parties

1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider any matter with regard to the application or implementation of this Convention, including:

a) Tlie operation and status of this Convention;b) Matters arising fipom the reports submitted under the provisions of

this Convention;c) International cooperation and assistance in accordance with Article 6;d) The development of technologies to clear anti-personnel mines;e) Submissions of States Parties under Article 8; andf) Decisions relating to submissions of States Parties as provided for

in Article 5.2. The First Meeting of the States Parties shall be convened by the

Secretary-General of the United Nations within one year after the entry into force of this Convention. The subsequent meetings shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations annually until the first Review Conference.

3. Under the conditions set out in Article 8, the Secretary-General ofthe United Nations shall convene a Special Meeting of the States Parties.

4. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Conmiittee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend these meetings as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

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Article 12

Review Conferences

1. A Review Conference shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations five years after the entry into force of this Convention. Further Review Conferences shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations if so requested by one or more States Parties, provided that the interval between Review Conferences shall in no case be less than five years. All States Parties to this Convention shall be invited to each Review Conference.

2. The purpose of the Review Conference shall be:a) To review the operation and status of this Convention;h) To consider the need for and the interval between further Meetings

of the States Parties referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 11;c) To take decisions on submissions of States Parties as provided for

in Article 5; andd) To adopt, if necessary, in its Hnal report conclusions related to the

implementation of this Convention.3. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations,

other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend each Review Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

Article 13

Amendments

1. At any time after the entry into force of this Convention any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated to the Depositary, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and shall seek their views on whether an Amendment Conference should be convened to consider the proposal. If a majority of the States Parties notify the Depositary no later than 30 days after its circulation that they support further consideration of the proposal, the Depositary shall convene an Amendment Conference to which all States Parties shall be invited.

2. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Conunittee of the Red Cross and relevant non-govemmental organizations may be invited to attend each Amendment Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

3. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference unless a majority of the States Parties request that it be held earlier.

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Ottawa Convention

4. Any amendment to this Convention shall be adopted by a majority of two-thirds of the States Parties present and voting at the Amendment Conference. The I>epositary shall communicate any amendment so adopted to the States Parties.

5. An amendment to this Convention shall enter into force for all States Parties to this Convention which have accepted it, upon the deposit with the Depositary of instruments of acceptance by a majority of States Parties. Thereafter it shall enter into force for any remaining State Party on the date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance.

Article 14

Costs

1. The costs of the Meetings of the States Parties, the Special Meetings of the States Parties, the Review Conferences and the Amendment Conferences shall be borne by the States Parties and States not parties to this Convention participating therein, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjust^ appropriately.

2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the United Nations under Articles 7 and 8 and the costs of any fact-finding mission shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.

Article 15

Signature

This Convention, done at Oslo, Norway, on 18 September 1997, shall be open for signature at Ottawa, Canada, by all States from 3 December 1997 until 4 December 1997, and at the United Nations Headquarters in New York from 5 December 1997 until its entry into force.

Article 16

Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession

1. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the Signatories.

2. It shall be open for accession by any State which has not signed the Convention.

3. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary.

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Article 17

Entry into force

1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the month in which the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited.

2. For any State ^ ic h deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

Article 18

Provisional application

Any State may at the time of its ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, declare that it will apply provisionally paragraph 1 of Article 1 of this Convention pending its entry into force.

Article 19

Reservations

The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations.

Article 20

Duration and withdrawal

1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have

the right to withdraw from this Convention. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties, to the Depositary and to the United Nations Security Council. Such instrument of withdrawal shall include a full explanation of the reasons motivating this withdrawal.

3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect six months after the receipt of the instrument of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that six-month period, the withdrawing State Party is engaged in an armed confiict, the withdrawal shall not take effect before the end of the armed conflict.

4. The withdrawal of a State Party from this Convention shall not in any way affect the duty of States to continue fulfilling the obligations assumed under any relevant rules of international law.

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Article 21

Depositary

The Secretary>General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depositary of this Convention.

Article 22

Authentic texts

The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be dq>osited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

241

A P P E N D I X III

Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and TVaffii^ng in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials*

The States PartiesAware of the ui;gent need to prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit

manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials, due to the harmful effects of these activities on the security of each State and the region as a whole, endangering the well-being of peoples, their social and economic development, and their right to live in peace;

Concerned by the increase, at the international level, in the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials and by the serious problems resulting therefrom;

Rec0rming that States Parties give priority to preventing, combating, and eradicating the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials because of the links of such activities with drug trafficking, terrorism, transnational organized crime, and mercenary and other criminal activities;

Concerned about the illicit manufacture of explosives from substances and articles that in and of themselves are not explosives—and that are not addressed by this Convention due to their other lawful uses—for activities related to drug trafficking, terrorism, transnational organized crime and mercenary and other criminal activities;

Considering the ui^ent need for all States, and especially those States that produce, export, and import arms, to take the necessary measures to prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials;

Convinced that combating the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials calls for intema-

* A/53/78, annex.

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Inter-American Convention

tional cooperation, exchange of information, and other appropriate measures at the national, regional, and international levels, and desiring to set a precedent for the international conununity in this regard;

Stressing the need* in peace processes and post-conflict situations, to achieve effective control of Hrearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials in order to prevent their entry into the illicit market;

Mindful of the pertinent resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly on measures to eradicate the illicit transfer of conventional weapons and on the need for all States to guarantee their security, and of the efforts carried out in the framework of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD);

Recognizing the importance of strengthening existing international law enforcement support mechanisms such as the International Weapons and Explosives Tracking System (IWETS) of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), to prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafHcking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials;

Recognizing that international trade in firearms is particularly vulnerable to abuses by criminal elements and that a *"know-your-customer ’ policy for dealers in, and producers, exporters, and importers of, firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials is crucial for combating this scourge;

Recognizing that States have developed different cultural and historical uses for firearms, and that the purpose of enhancing international cooperation to eradicate illicit transnational trafficking in firearms is not intended to discourage or diminish lawful leisure or recreational activities such as travel or tourism for sport shooting, hunting, and other forms of lawful ownership and use recognized by the States Parties;

Recalling that States Parties have their respective domestic laws and regulations in the areas of Hrearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials, and recognizing that this Convention does not commit States Parties to enact legislation or regulations pertaining to firearms ownership, possession, or trade of a wholly domestic character, and recognizing that States Parties will apply their respective laws and regulations in a manner consistent with this Convention;

Reaffirming the principles of sovereignty, nonintervention, and the juridical equality of States,

HAVE DECIDED TO ADOPT THIS INTER-AMERICAN CONVEN- TION AGAINST THE ILLICIT MANUFACTURING OF AND TRAFRCK- ING IN FIREARMS, AMMUNITION, EXPLOSIVES, AND OTHER RELATED MATERIALS:

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Article /

Definitioiis

For the purposes of this Convention, the following definitions shall apply:1. “Illicit manufacturing”: the manufacture or assembly of firearms,

ammunition, explosives, and other related materials:a. from components or parts illicitly trafficked; orb. without a license from a competent governmental authority of the

State Party where the manufacture or assembly takes place; orc. without marking the firearms that require marking at the time of

manufacturing.2. “Illicit trafficking"’: the in^ort, export, acquisition, sale, delivery,

movement, or transfer of firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials from or across the territory of one State Party to that of another State Party, if any one of the States Parties concerned does not authorize it.

3. “Firearms”:a, any barreled weapon which will or is designed to or may be readily

converted to expel a bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive, exceptantique fu-earms manufactured before the 20th Century or their replicas; or

b. any other weapon or destructive device such as any explosive, incendiary or gas bomb, grenade, rocket, rocket launcher, missile, missile system, or mine.

4. “Anmiunition”: the complete round or its components, including cartridge cases, primers, propellant powder, bullets, or projectiles that are used in any firearm

5. “Explosives”: any substance or article that is made, manufactured, or used to produce an explosion, detonation, or propulsive or pyrotechnic effect, except:

a. substances and articles that are not in and of themselves explosive;or

b. substances and articles listed in the Annex to this Convention.6. “Other related materials”: any component, part, or replacement part

of a firearm, or an accessory which can be attached to a firearm.7. “Controlled delivery”: the technique of allowing illicit or suspect

consignments of firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials to pass out of, through, or into the territory of one or more states, with the knowledge and under the supervision of their competent authorities, with a view to identifying persons involved in the commission of offenses referred to in Article IV of this Convention.

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Article IIPurpose

The purpose of this Convention is:to prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and

trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials;

to promote and facilitate cooperation and exchange of information and experience among States Parties to prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials.

Article HI Sovereignty

1. States Parties shall carry out the obligations under this Convention in a manner consistent with the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity of states and that of nonintervention in the domestic affairs of other states.

2. A State Party shall not undertake in the territory of another State Party the exercise of jurisdiction and performance of functions which are exclusively reserved to the authorities of that other State Party by its domestic law.

Article IV Le^lative Measures

1. States Parties that have not yet done so shall adopt the necessary legislative or other measures to establish as criminal offenses under their domestic law the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials.

2. Subject to the respective constitutional principles and basic concepts of the legal systems of the States Parties, the criminal offenses established pursuant to the foregoing paragraph shall include participation in, association or conspiracy to commit, attempts to commit, and aiding, abetting, facilitating, and counseling the commission of said offenses.

Article V Jurisdiction

1. Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offenses it has established in accordance with this Convention when the offense in question is committed in its territory.

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2. Each State Party may adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offenses it has established in accordance with this Convention when the offense is committed by one of its nationals or by a person who habitually resides in its territory.

3. Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offenses it has established in accordance with this Convention when the alleged criminal is present in its territory and it does not extradite such person to another country on the ground of the nationality of the alleged criminal.

4. This Convention aoes not preclude the application of any other rule of criminal jurisdiction established by a State Party under its domestic law.

Article VI

Marking of Firearms

1. For the purposes of identification and tracing of the Hrearms referred to in Article I.3.a, States Parties shall:

a. require* at the time of manufacture, appropriate markings of the name of manufacturer, place of manufacture, and serial number;

b. require appropriate markings on imported firearms permitting the identification of the importer’s name and address; and

c. require appropriate markings on any firearms confiscated or forfeited pursuant to Article VII. I that are retained for official use.

2. The Hrearms referred to in Article 1.3.b should be marked appropriately at the time of manufacture, if possible.

Article VII

Confiscatioii or Forfeiture

1. States Parties undertake to confiscate or forfeit firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials that have been illicitly manufactured or trafHcked.

2. States Parties shall adopt the necessary measures to ensure that all firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials seized, confiscated, or forfeited as the result of illicit manufacturing or trafficking do not fall into the hands of private individuals or businesses through auction, sale, or other disposal.

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Article VIII

Security Measures

States Parties, in an effort to eliminate loss or diversion, undertake to adopt the necessary measures to ensure the security of firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials imported into, exported from, or in transit through their respective territories.

Article IX

Export, Import, and Transit Licenses or Authorizations

1. States Parties shall establish or maintain an effective system of export, in ^ rt, and international transit licenses or authorizations for transfers of firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials.

2. States Parties shall not permit the transit of firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials until the receiving State Party issues the corresponding license or authorization.

3. States Parties, before releasing shipments of firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials for export, shall ensure that the importing and in-transit countries have issued the necessary licenses or authorizations.

4. The in^orting State Party shall inform the exporting State Party, upon request, of the receipt of dispatched shipments of firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials.

Article X

Strengthening of Controls at Export Points

Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to detect and prevent illicit trafficking in firearms, animunition, explosives, and other related materials between its territory and that of other States Parties, by strengthening controls at export points.

Article XI

Recordiceeping

States Parties shall assure the maintenance for a reasonable time of the information necessary to trace and identify illicitly manufactured and illicitly trafficked firearms to enable them to comply with their obligations under Articles Xin and X m

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Article XII

Confidentiality

Subject to the obligations Loosed by their Constitutions or any international agreements, the States Parties shall guarantee the confidentiality of any information they receive, if requested to do so by the State Party providing the information. If for legal reasons such confidentiality cannot be maintained, the State Party that provided the information shall be notified prior to its disclosure.

Article XIII

Exchange of Information

1. States Parties shall exchange among themselves, in conformity with their respective domestic laws and applicable treaties, relevant information on matters such as:

a. authorized producers, dealers, importers, exporters, and, whenever possible, carriers of firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials;

b. the means of concealment used in the illicit manufacturing of or trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials, and ways of detecting them;

c. routes customarily used by criminal organizations engaged in illicit trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials;

d. legislative experiences, practices, and measures to prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials; and

e. techniques, practices, and legislation to combat money laundering related to illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials.

2. States Parties shall provide to and share with each other, as appropriate, relevant scientific and technological information useful to law enforcement, so as to enhance one another’s ability to prevent, detect, and investigate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials and prosecute those involved therein.

3. States Parties shall cooperate in the tracing of firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials which may have been illicitly manufactured or trafficked. Such cooperation shall include accurate and prompt responses to trace requests.

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Article XIV

Cooperatioii

1. States Parties shall cooperate at the bilateral, regional, and international levels to prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials.

2. States Parties shall identify a national body or a single point of contact to act as liaison among States Parties, as well as between them and the Consultative Conunittee established in Article XX, for purposes of cooperation and information exchange.

Article XV

Exchange of Experience and Training

1. States Parties shall cooperate in formulating programs for the exchange of experience and training among con^etent officials, and shall provide each other assistance that would facilitate their respective access to equipment or technology proven to be effective for the implementation of this Convention.

2. States Parties shall cooperate with each other and with competent international organizations, as appropriate, to ensure that there is adequate training of personnel in their territories to prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in Hrearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials. The subject matters of such training shall include, inter alia:

a. identification and tracing of Hrearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials;

b. intelligence gathering, especially that which relates to identification of illicit manufacturers and traffickers, methods of shipment, and means of concealment of firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials; and

c. improvement of the efficiency of personnel responsible for searching for and detecting, at conventional and nonconventional points of entry and exit, illicitly trafficked firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials.

Article XVI

Technical Assistance

States Parties shall cooperate with each other and with relevant international organizations, as s^propriate, so that States Parties that so request receive the technical assistance necessary to enhance their ability to prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related mat^ials, including technical assistance in those matters identified in Article XV.2.

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Article XVII

Mutual Legal Assistance

1. States Parties shall afford one another the widest measure of mutual legal assistance, in conformity with their domestic law and applicable treaties, by promptly and accurately processing and responding to requests from authorities which, in accordance with their domestic law, have the power to investigate or prosecute the illicit activities described in this Convention, in order to obtain evidence and take other necessary action to facilitate procedures and steps involved in such investigations or prosecutions.

2. For purposes of mutual legal assistance under this article, each Party may designate a central authority or may rely upon such central authorities as are provided for in any relevant treaties or other agreements. The central authorities shall be responsible for making and receiving requests for mutual legal assistance under this article, and shall communicate directly with each other for the purposes of this article.

Article XVIII

Controlled Delivery

1. Should their domestic legal systems so permit. States Parties shall take the necessary measures, within their possibilities, to allow for the appropriate use of controlled delivery at the international level, on the basis of agreements or arrangements mutually consented to, with a view to identifying persons involved in the offenses referred to in Article IV and to taking legal action against them.

2. Decisions by States Parties to use controlled delivery shall be made on a case-by-case basis and may, when necessary, take into consideration fmancial arrangements and understandings with respect to the exercise of jurisdiction by the States Parties concerned.

3. With the consent of the States Parties concerned, illicit consignments under controlled delivery may be intercepted and allowed to continue with the firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials intact or removed or replaced in whole or in part.

Article XIX

Extradition

1. This article shall apply to the offenses referred to in Article IV of this Convention.

2. Each of the offenses to which this article applies shall be deemed to be included as an extraditable offense in any extradition treaty in force be

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tween or among the States Parties. The States Parties undertake to include such offenses as extraditable offenses in every extradition treaty to be concluded between or among them.

3. If a State Party that makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from another State Party with which it does not have an extradition treaty, it may consider this Convention as the legal basis for extradition with respect to any offense to which this article applies.

4. States Parties that do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty shall recognize offenses to which this article applies as extraditable offenses between themselves.

5. Extradition shall be subject to the conditions provided for by the law of the Requested State or by applicable extradition treaties, including the grounds on which the Requested State may refuse extradition.

6. If extradition for an offense to which this article applies is refused solely on the basis of the nationality of the person sought, the Requested State Party shall submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution under the criteria, laws, and procedures applied by the Requested State to those offenses when they are conmiitted in its own territory. The Requested and Requesting States Parties may, in accordance with their domestic laws, agree otherwise in relation to any prosecution referred to in this paragraph.

Article XX

Establishment and Functions of the Consultative Committee

1. In order to attain the objectives of this Convention, the States Parties shall establish a Consultative Committee responsible for:

a. promoting the exchange of information contenq>lated under this Convention;

b. facilitating the exchange of information on domestic legislation and administrative procedures of the States Parties;

c. encouraging cooperation between national liaison authorities to detect suspected illicit exports and imports of Hrearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials;

d. promoting training and exchange of knowledge and experience among States Parties and technical assistance between States Parties and relevant international organizations, as well as academic studies;

e. requesting from nonparty States, when appropriate, information on the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials; and

/. promoting measures to facilitate the application of this Convention.

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2. Decisions of the Consultative Committee shall be recommendatory in nature.

3. The Consultative Conmiittee shall maintain the confidentiality of any information it receives in the exercise of its functions, if requested to do so.

Article XXI

Structure and Meetings of the Consultative Committee

1. The Consultative Committee shall consist of one representative of each State Party.

2. The Consultative Committee shall hold one regular meeting each year and shall hold special meetings as necessary.

3. The first regular meeting of the Consultative Committee shall be held within 90 days following deposit of the 10th instrument of ratification of this Convention. This meeting shall be held at the headquarters of the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States* unless a State Party has offered to host it.

4. The meetings of the Consultative Committee shall be held at a place decided upon by the States Parties at the previous regular meeting. If no offer of a site has been made, the Consultative Committee shall meet at the headquarters of the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States.

5. The host State Party for each regular meeting shall serve as Secretariat pro tempore of the Consultative Committee until the next regular meeting. When a regular meeting is held at the headquarters of the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States, a State Party that will serve as Secretariat pro tetnpore shall be elected at that meeting.

6. In consultation with the States Parties, the Secretariat pro tempore shall be responsible for:

a. convening regular and special meetings of the Consultative Committee;

b. preparing a draft agenda for the meetings; andc. preparing the draft reports and minutes of the meetings.7. The Consultative Committee shall prepare its own internal rules of

procedure and shall adopt them by absolute majority.

Article XXII

Signature

This Convention is open for signature by member States of the Organization of American States.

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Article XXIII

Ratification

This Convention is subject to ratification. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States.

Article XXIV

Reservations

States Parties may, at the time of adoption, signature, or ratification, make reservations to this Convention, provided that said reservations are not incompatible with the object and puiposes of the Convention and that they concern one or more specific provisions thereof.

Article XXV Entry into Force

This Convention shall enter into force on the 30th day following the date of deposit of the second instrument of ratification. For each State ratifying the Convention after the cteposit of the second instrument of ratification, the Convention shall enter into force on the 30th day following deposit by such State of its instrument of ratification.

Article XXVI

Denunciation

1. This Convention shall remain in force indefinitely, but any State Party may denounce it. The instrument of denunciation shall be deposited with the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States. After six months from the date of deposit of the instrument of denunciation, the Convention shall no longer be in force for the denouncing State, but shall remain in force for the other States Parties.

2. The denunciation shall not affect any requests for information or assistance made during the time the Convention is in force for the denouncing State.

Article XXVII

Other Agreements and Practices

1. No provision in this Convention shall be construed as preventing the States Parties from engaging in mutual cooperation within the framework of other existing or future international, bilateral, or multilateral agreements, or of any other applicable arrangements or practices.

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2. States Parties may adopt stricter measures than those provided for by this Convention if* in their opinion, such measures are desirable to prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in Hrearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials.

Article XXVIII

Conference of States Parties

Five years after the entry into force of this Convention, the depository shall convene a conference of the States Parties to examine the functioning and application of this Convention. Each conference shall determine the date on which the next conference should be held.

Article XXIX

Dispute Settlement

Any dispute that may arise as to the application or interpretation of this Convention shall be resolved through diplomatic channels or, failing which, by any other means of peaceful settlement decided upon by the States Parties involved.

Article XXX

Deposit

The original instrument of this Convention, the English, French, Portuguese, and Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States, which shall forward an authenticated copy of its text to the Secretariat of the United Nations for registration and publication, in accordance with Article 102 of the United Nations Charter. The General Secretariat of the Organization of Ameri* can States shall notify the member States of the Ofganization of the signatures, of the deposits of instruments of ratification and denunciation, and of any reservations.

ANNEX

The term “explosives” does not include: compressed gases; flammable liquids; explosive actuated devices, such as air bags and fire extinguishers; propellant actuated devices, such as nail gun cartridges; consumer fireworks suitable for use by the public and designed primarily to produce visible or audible effects by combustion, that contain pyrotechnic compositions and that do not project or disperse dangerous fragments such as metal, glass, or brittle plastic; toy plastic or paper caps for toy pistols; toy propellant devices consisting of small

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paper or composition tubes or containers containing a small charge or slow burning propellant powder designed so that they will neither burst nor produce external flame except through the nozzle on functioning; and smoke candles, smokepots, smoke grenades, smoke signals, signal flares, hand signal devices, and Very signal cartridges designed to produce visible effects for signal purposes containing smoke compositions and no bursting chaiges.

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A P P E N D I X IV

Text of disarmament resolutions and decision

Resolution 52/30

Compliance widi arms limitation and disarmament and non-proliferation agreements

The General Assembly,Recalling its resolution 50/60 of 12 December 1995 and other relevant

resolutions on the question.Recognizing the abiding concern of all Member States for maintaining

respect for rights and obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law.

Convinced that observance of the Charter of the United Nations, relevant treaties and other sources of international law is essential for the strengthening of international security.

Mindful, in particular, of the fundamental importance of full implementation and strict obsCTvance of agreements and other agreed obligations on arms limitation and disarmament and non-proliferation by States parties if individual nations and the international community are to derive enhanced security from them.

Stressing that any violation of such agreements and other agreed obligations by States parties not only adversely affects the security of States parties but can also create security risks for other States relying on the constraints and commitments stipulated in those agreements and other agreed obligations,

Stressing also that any weakening of confidence in such agreements and other agreed obligations diminishes their contribution to global or regional stability and to further arms limitation and disarmament and non-proliferation efiforts, and undermines the credibility and effectiveness of the international legal system.

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Text of resolutions and decision

Recognizings in this context, that full compliance by States parties with all provisions of existing agreements and the resolving of compliance concerns effectively by means consistent with such agreements and international law can, inter alia, facilitate the conclusion of additional arms limitation and disarmament and non-proliferation agreements, and thereby contribute to better relations among States and the strengthening of world peace and security,

Believing that con^>liance with all provisions of arms limitation and disarmament and non-proliferation agreements by States parties is a matter of interest and concern to all members of the international community, and noting the role that the United Nations has played and should continue to play in that regard.

Welcoming the contribution to international peace and regional security that full compliance by States parties with verification provisions of arms limitation and disarmament and non-proliferation agreements provides.

Also welcoming the universal recognition of the critical importance of the question of compliance with and verification of arms limitation and disarmament and non-proliferation agreements, and other agreed obligations,

1. Urges all States parties to arms limitation and disarmament and non-proliferation agreements to implement and conq>ly with the entirety of all provisions of such agreements;

2. Calls upon all Member States to give serious consideration to the implications that non-compliance by States parties with any provisions of arms limitation and disarmament and non-proliferation agreements has for international security and stability, as well as for the prospects for progress in the field of disarmament;

3. Also calls upon all Member States to support efforts aimed at the resolution of compliance questions by means consistent with such agreements and international law, with a view to encouraging strict observance by all States parties of the provisions of arms limitation and disarmament and non-proliferation agreements and maintaining or restoring the integrity of such agreements;

4. Welcomes the role that the United Nations has played and continues to play in restoring the integrity of, and fostering negotiations on, certain arms limitation and disarmament and non-proliferation agreements and in the removal of threats to peace;

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The UN Disannament Yearbook: 1997

5. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to provide assistance that may be necessary in restoring and protecting the integrity of arms limita> tion and disarmament and non-proliferation agreements;

6. Encourages efforts by all States parties to develop additional cooperative measures, as appropriate* that can increase confidence in com> pliance with existing arms limitation and disannament and non-proliferation agreements and reduce the possibility of misinterpretation and misunderstanding;

7. Notes the contribution that verification experiments and research can make and already have made in confirming and improving verification procedures for arms limitation and disarmament and non-proliferation agreements under study or negotiation, thereby providing an opportunity, from the time that such agreements enter into force, for enhancing confidence in the effectiveness of verification procedures as a basis for determining con^liance;

8. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-fourth session an item entitled *tDon liance with arms limitation and disarmament and non-proliferation agreements”.

Resolution 52/31

Verification in ail its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification

The General Assembly,Noting the critical importance of, and the vital contribution that has

been made by, effective verification measures in arms limitation and disarmament agreements and other similar obligations.

Reaffirming its support for the sixteen principles of verification drawn up by the Disarmament Commission,

Recalling its resolutions 40/152 O of 16 December 1985, 41/86 Q of 4 December 1986,42/42 F of 30 November 1987,43/81 B of 7 December 1988, 45/65 of 4 December 1990, 47/45 of 9 December 1992, 48/68 of 16 December 1993 and 50/61 of 12 December 1995,

Recalling also the reports of the Secretary-General of 11 July 1986, 28 August 1990, 16 September 1992, 26 July 1993, 22 September 1995 and 6 August 1997, and the addenda thereto,

1. Rec0rms the critical importance of, and the vital contribution that has been made by, effective verification measures in arms limitation and disarmament agreements and other similar obligations;

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2. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its nfty-fourth session on further views received from Member States pursuant to resolution 50/61;

3. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-fourth session the item entitled ^ VeriHcation in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification”.

Resolution 52/32

Objective information on military matters including transparency of military expenditures

The General Assembly,Recalling its resolution 51/38 of 10 December 1996 on objective in-

formation on military matters, including transparency of military expenditures.

Also recalling its resolution 35/142 B of 12 December 1980, which introduced the United Nations system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures, and its resolutions 48/62 of 16 December 1993 and 49/66 of 15 December 1994, calling upon all Member States to participate in it, and its resolution 47/54 B of 9 December 1992, endorsing the guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters and inviting Member States to provide relevant information to the Secretary-General regarding their implementation.

Noting that since then national reports on military expenditures and on the guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters have been submitted by a number of Member States belonging to different geographic regions.

Welcoming the report of the Secretary-General on ways and means to implement the guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters, including, in particular, how to strengthen and broaden participation in the United Nations system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures.

Expressing its appreciation to the Secretary-General for providing Member States with the reports on military expenditures in standardized form reported by States and on guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters.

Welcoming the decision of many Member States to exchange and to publish information annually on their military budgets and to in:^lement

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the guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters, as appropriate,

Recffirming its firm conviction that a better flow of objective information on military matters can help to relieve international tension and contribute to the building of confidence among States and to the conclusion of concrete disarmament agreements.

Convinced that the improvement of international relations forms a sound basis for promoting further openness and transparency in all military matters.

Recalling that the guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters recommended certain areas for further consideration, such as the improvement of the United Nations system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures,

1. Recommends the guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters to all Member States for implementation, fully taking into account specific political, military and other conditions prevailing in a region, on the basis of initiatives and with the agreement of the States of the region concerned;

2. Calls upon all Member States to report annually, by 30 April, to the Secretary-General their military expenditures for the latest fiscal year for which data are available, using, for the time being, the reporting instrument as recommended in its resolution 35/142 B;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to circulate annually the reports on military expenditures as received from Member States;

4. Endorses the intention of the Secretary-General, as stated in his report, to resume consultations with relevant international bodies, within existing resources, with a view to ascertaining the requirements for adjusting the present instrument to encourage wider participation;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to make recommendations, based on the outcome of the intended consultations and taking into account the views of Member States, on necessary changes to the content and structure of the United Nations system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures in order to strengthen and broaden participation, and to submit a report on the subject to the General Assembly at its fifty-third session;

6. Calls upon all Member States, in time for the deliberation by the General Assembly at its fifty-third session, to provide the Secretary-Gen- eral with their views on ways and means to strengthen and broaden participa

260


tion in the United Nations system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures, including necessary changes to its content and structure;

7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-third session the item entitled 'Objective information on military matters, including transparency of military expenditures'*.

Resolution 52/33

The role of science and lechn<dogy in the context of international security and disarmament

The General Assembly,Recognizing that scientific and technological developments can have

both civilian and military applications and that progress in science and technology for civilian applications needs to be maintained and encouraged.

Concerned that military applications of scientific and technological developments can contribute significantly to the improvement and upgrading of weapons of mass destruction.

Aware of the need to follow closely the scientific and technological developments that may have a negative impact on international security and disarmament, and to channel scientiHc and technological developments for beneficial purposes.

Cognizant that the international transfers of dual-use as well as high- technology products, services and know-how for peaceful purposes are important for the economic and social development of States,

Cognizant also of the need to regulate such transfers of dual-use goods and technologies and high technology with military applications through multilaterally negotiated, universally acceptable, non-discriminatory guidelines.

Expressing concern over the growing proliferation of ad hoc and exclusive export control regimes and arrangements for dual-use goods and technologies.

Recalling that the Final Document of the Eleventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, from 18 to 20 October 1995, noted that restrictions being placed on access to technology through the in^sition of non-transparent ad hoc export control regimes with exclusive membership tended to impede the economic and social development of developing countries.

Emphasizing that internationally negotiated guidelines for the transfer of high technology with military applications should take into account the

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legitimate defence requirements of all States and requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, while ensuring that access to high-technology products and services and know-how for peaceful purposes is not denied,

1. Affirms that scientific and technological progress should be used for the benefit of all mankind to promote the sustainable economic and social development of all States and to safeguard international security, and that international cooperation in the use of science and technology through the transfer and exchange of technological know-how for peaceful purposes should be promoted;

2. Invites Member States to undertake additional efforts to apply science and technology for disarmament-related purposes and to make disarmament-related technologies available to interested States;

3. Urges Member States to undertake multilateral negotiations with the participation of all interested States in order to establish universally acceptable, non-discriminatory guidelines for international transfers of dual-use goods and technologies and high technology with military applications;

4. Recalls its resolution 51/39 of 10 December 1996 and its request to the Secretary-General to submit an updated report no later than at its Hfty- third session;

5. Encourages United Nations bodies to contribute, within existing mandates, to promoting the application of science and technology for peaceful purposes;

6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-third session the item entitled ""The role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament”.

Resolution 52/34

Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Midde East

The General Assembly,Recalling its resolutions 3263 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3474

(XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/71 of 10 December 1976, 32/82 of 12 December 1977, 33/64 of 14 December 1978, 34/77 of 11 December 1979, 35/147 of 12 December 1980, 36/87 A and B of 9 December 1981, 37/75 of 9 December 1982, 38/64 of 15 December 1983, 39/54 of 12 December 1984, 40/82 of 12 December 1985, 41/48 of 3 December 1986,42/28 of 30 November 1987, 43/65 of 7 December 1988, 44/108 of 15 December 1989,

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45/52 of 4 December 1990,46/30 of 6 December 1991,47/48 of 9 December 1992, 48/71 of 16 December 1993, 49/71 of 15 December 1994, 50/66 of 12 December 1995 and 51/41 of 10 December 1996 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Recalling also the recommendations for the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East consistent with paragraphs 60 to 63, and in particular paragraph 63 (ii), of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

Emphasizing the basic provisions of the above-mentioned resolutions, which call upon all parties directly concerned to consider taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East and, pending and during the establishment of such a zone, to declare solemnly that they will refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party, to agree to place their nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and to declare their support for the establishment of the zone and to deposit such declarations with the Security Council for consideration, as appropriate.

Reaffirming the inalienable right of all States to acquire and develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Emphasizing the need for appropriate measures on the question of the prohibition of military attacks on nuclear facilities.

Bearing in mind the consensus reached by the General Assembly since its thirty-fifth session that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would greatly enhance international peace and security.

Desirous of building on that consensus so that substantial progress can be made towards establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East,

Welcoming all initiatives leading to general and complete disarmament, including in the region of the Middle East* and in particular on the establishment therein of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons.

Noting the peace negotiations in the Middle East, which should be of a comprehensive nature and represent an appropriate framework for the peaceful settlement of contentious issues in the region.

Recognizing the importance of credible regional security, including the establishment of a mutually verifiable nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Emphasizing the essential role of the United Nations in the establishment of a mutually veriHable nuclear-weapon-free zone.

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Having examined the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of General Assembly resolution 51/41,

1. Urges all parties directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, and, as a means of promoting this objective, invites the countries concerned to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

2. Calls upon all countries of the region that have not done so, pending the establishment of the zone, to agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;

3. Takes note of resolution GC(41)/RES/25, adopted on 3 October 1997 by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency at its forty-first regular session, concerning the application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East;

4. Notes the importance of the ongoing bilateral Middle East peace negotiations and the activities of the multilateral Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security in promoting mutual confidence and security in the Middle East, including the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone;

5. Invites all countries of the region, pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, to declare their support for establishing such a zone, consistent with paragraph 63 (d) of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, and to deposit those declarations with the Security Council;

6. Also invites those countries, pending the establishment of the zone, not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or permit the stationing on their territories, or territories under their control, of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices;

7. Invites the nuclear-weapon States and all other States to render their assistance in the establishment of the zone and at the same time to refrain from any action that runs counter to both the letter and the spirit of the present resolution;

8. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of General Assembly resolution 51/41;

9. Invites all parties to consider the appropriate means that may contribute towards the goal of general and complete disarmament and the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the region of the Middle East;

10. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to pursue consultations with the States of the region and other concerned States, in accordance with

264


paragraph 7 of resolution 46/30 and taking into account the evolving situation in the region, and to seek from those States their views on the measures outlined in chapters III and IV of the study annexed to his report or other relevant measures, in order to move towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon- free zone in the Middle East;

11. Also requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its fifty-third session a report on the implementation of the present resolution;

12. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-third session the item entiUed ""Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East”.

Resolution 52/35

Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia

The General Assembly^Recalling its resolutions 3265 B (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3476

B (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/73 of 10 December 1976, 32/83 of 12 December 1977, 33/65 of 14 December 1978, 34/78 of 11 December 1979, 35/148 of 12 December 1980, 36/88 of 9 December 1981, 37/76 of 9 December 1982,38/65 of 15 December 1983,39/55 of 12 December 1984,40/83 of 12 December 1985, 41/49 of 3 December 1986, 42/29 of 30 November 1987, 43/66 of 7 December 1988, 44/109 of 15 December 1989, 45/53 of 4 December 1990, 46/31 of 6 December 1991, 47/49 of 9 December 1992, 48/72 of 16 December 1993, 49/72 of 15 December 1994, 50/67 of 12 December 1995 and 51/42 of 10 December 1996 concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia,

Reiterating its conviction that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world is one of the measures that can contribute effectively to the objectives of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and general and con >lete disarmament.

Believing that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, as in other regions, will assist in the strengthening of the security of the States of the region against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Taking note with appreciation of the declarations issued at the highest level by the Govemments of South Asian States that are developing their peaceful nuclear programmes, reaffirming their undertaking not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons and to devote their nuclear programmes exclusively to the economic and social advancement of their peoples.

Welcoming the proposal for the conclusion of a bilateral or regional nuclear-test-ban agreement in South Asia,

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Noting the proposal to convene, under the auspices of the United Nations, a conference on nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia as soon as possible, with the participation of the regional and other concerned States,

Noting also the proposal to hold consultations among five nations with a view to ensuring nuclear non-proliferation in the region.

Considering that the eventual participation of other States, as appropriate, in this process could be useful.

Bearing in mind the provisions of paragraphs 60 to 63 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly regarding the establishment of nuclear<wes^n-free zones, including in the region of South Asia,

Taking note of the note by the Secretary-General,1. Rec0rms its endorsement, in principle, of the concept of a nuclear-

weapon-free zone in South Asia;2. Urges once again the States of South Asia to continue to make

all possible efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and to refrain, in the meantime, from any action contrary to that objective;

3. Welcomes the support of ail the Hve nuclear-weapon States for this proposal, and calls upon them to extend the necessary cooperation in the efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to communicate with the States of the region and other concerned States in order to ascertain their views on the issue and to promote consultations among them with a view to exploring the best possibilities of furthering the efforts for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;

5. Also requests the Secretary-General to report on the subject to the General Assembly at its Hfty-third session;

6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-third session the item entitled ""Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia*".

Resolution 52/36

Conclusioii of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against tiie use or threat

of use of nuclear weapons

The General Assembly^Bearing in mind the need to allay the legitimate concern of the States

of the world with regard to ensuring lasting security for their peoples,

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Convinced that nuclear weapons pose the greatest threat to mankind and to the survival of civilization.

Welcoming the progress achieved in recent years in both nuclear and conventional disarmament.

Noting that, despite recent progress in the field of nuclear disarmament, further efforts are necessary towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Convinced that nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons are essential to remove the danger of nuclear war.

Determined strictly to abide by the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations on the non-use of force or threat of force.

Recognizing that the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of non-nuclear-weapon States need to be safeguarded against the use or threat of use of force, including the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Considering that, until nuclear disarmament is achieved on a universal basis, it is in^)erative for the international community to develop effective measures and arrangements to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from any quarter.

Recognizing that effective measures and arrangements to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons can contribute positively to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons,

Bearing in mind paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament in which it urged the nuclear-weapon States to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear- weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and desirous of promoting the implementation of the relevant provisions of the Final Document,

Recalling the relevant parts of the special report of the Committee on Disarmament submitted to the General Assembly at its twelfth special session, the second special session devoted to disarmament, and of the special report of the Conference on Disarmament submitted to the Assembly at its fifteenth special session, the third special session devoted to disarmament, as well as the report of the Conference on its 1992 session.

Recalling also paragraph 12 of the E)eclaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, contained in the annex to its resolution 35/46 of 3 December 1980, which states, inter alia that all efforts should be exerted by the Committee on Disarmament urgently to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear- weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

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Noting the in-depth negotiations undertaken in the Conference on Disarmament and its Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, with a view to reaching agreement on this item.

Taking note of the proposals submitted under that item in the Conference on Disarmament, including the drafts of an international convention.

Taking note also of the relevant decision of the Eleventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, from 18 to 20 October 1995, and also of the decision adopted by the Tenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non- Aligned Countries, held at Jakarta from 1 to 6 September 1992, as well as the relevant recommendations of the Organization of the Islamic Conference reiterated in the Final Communique of the Twentieth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, held at Istanbul from 4 to 8 August 1991, calling upon the Conference on Disarmament to reach an urgent agreement on an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Taking note fiirther of the unilateral declarations made by all nuclear- weapon States on their policies of non-use or non-threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States,

Noting the support expressed in the Conference on Disarmament and in the General Assembly for the elaboration of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, as well as the difticulties pointed out in evolving a common approach acceptable to all.

Noting also the greater willingness to overcome the difficulties encountered in previous years.

Taking note of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) of 11 April 1995 and the views expressed on it.

Recalling its relevant resolutions adopted in previous years, in particular resolutions 45/54 of 4 December 1990, 46/32 of 6 December 1991,47/50 of 9 December 1992, 48/73 of 16 December 1993, 49/73 of 15 December 1994, 50/68 of 12 December 1995 and 51/43 of 10 December 1996,

1. Reaffirms the urgent need to reach an early agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

2. Notes with satisfaction that in the Conference on Disarmament there is no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, although the difticulties as regards evolving a common approach acceptable to all have also been pointed out;

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3. Appeals to all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to work actively towards an early agreement on a common approach and, in particular, on a common formula that could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character;

4. Recommends that further intensive efforts should be devoted to the search for such a common approach or common formula and that the various alternative approaches, including, in particular, those considered in the Conference on Disarmament, should be further explored in order to overcome the difHculties;

5. Recommends also that the Conference on Disarmament should actively continue intensive negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement and concluding effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear- weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, taking into account the widespread support for the conclusion of an international convention and giving consideration to any other proposals designed to secure the same objective;

6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-third session the item entitled "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons”.

Resolution 52/37

Prevention of an arm s race in outer space

The General Assembly,Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the exploration and

use of outer space for peaceful purposes,Reaffirming the will of all States that the exploration and use of outer

space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be for peaceful purposes and shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development.

Reaffirming also provisions of articles HI and IV of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,

Recalling the obligation of all States to observe the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations regarding the use or threat of use of force in their international relations, including in their space activities.

Reaffirming paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in which it is stated that in order to prevent an arms race in outer space further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty,

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Recalling its previous resolutions on this issue and taking note of the proposals submitted to the General Assembly at its tenth special session and at its regular sessions, and of the recommendations made to the competent organs of the United Nations and to the Conference on Disarmament*

Recognizing that prevention of an arms race in outer space would avert a grave danger for international peace and security.

Emphasizing the paramount importance of strict compliance with existing arms limitation and disarmament agreements relevant to outer space, including bilateral agreements, and with the existing legal regime concerning the use of outer space.

Considering that wide participation in the legal regime applicable to outer space could contribute to enhancing its effectiveness,

Noting that the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, taking into account its previous efforts since its establishment in 1985 and seeking to enhance its functioning in qualitative terms, continued the examination and identification of various issues, existing agreements and existing proposals, as well as future initiatives relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and that this contributed to a better understanding of a number of problems and to a clearer perception of the various positions.

Noting also that there were no objections in principle in the Conference on Disarmament during its 1997 session to the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee, subject to re-examination of the mandate contained in the decision of the Conference on Disarmament of 13 February 1992,

Emphasizing the mutually complementary nature of bilateral and multilateral efforts in the field of preventing an arms race in outer space, and hoping that concrete results will emerge from those efforts as soon as possible.

Convinced that further measures should be examined in the search for effective and verifiable bilateral and multilateral agreements in order to prevent an arms race in outer space, including the weaponization of outer space.

Stressing that the growing use of outer space increases the need for greater transparency and better information on the part of the intertiational community.

Recalling in this context its previous resolutions, in particular resolutions 45/55 B of 4 December 1990, 47/51 of 9 December 1992 and 48/74 A of 16 December 1993, in which, inter alia, it reaffirmed the importance of confidence-building measures as means conducive to ensuring the attainment of the objective of the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Conscious of the benefits of conHdence- and security-building measures in the military field.

Recognizing that negotiations for the conclusion of an international agreement or agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space remain a

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priority task of the Ad Hoc Committee and that the concrete proposals on confidence-building measures could form an integral part of such agreements,

1. Reaffinns the importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space, and the readiness of all States to contribute to that common objective, in conformity with the provisions of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies;

2. Reaffirms its recognition, as stated in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, that the legal regime applicable to outer space by itself does not guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer space, that this legal regime plays a significant role in the prevention of an arms race in that environment, that there is a need to consolidate and reinforce that regime and enhance its effectiveness, and that it is important strictly to comply with existing agreements, both bilateral and multilateral;

3. Emphasizes the necessity of further measures with appropriate and effective provisions for verification to prevent an arms race in outer space;

4. Calls upon all States, in particular those with major space capabilities, to contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space and of the prevention of an arms race in outer space and to refrain from actions contrary to that objective and to the relevant existing treaties in the interest of maintaining intemational peace and security and promoting international cooperation;

5. Reiterates that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, has the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects;

6. Invites the Conference on Disarmament to re-examine the mandate contained in its decision of 13 February 1992, with a view to updating it as appropriate, thus providing for the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee during the 1998 session of the Conference on Disannament;

7. Recognizes, in this respect, the growing convergence of views on the elaboration of measures designed to strengthen transparency, confidence and security in the peaceful uses of outer space;

8. Urges States conducting activities in outer space, as well as States interested in conducting such activities, to keep the Conference on Disarmament informed of the progress of bilateral or multilateral negotiations on the matter, if any, so as to facilitate its work;

9. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-third session the item entitled “Prevention of an arms race in outer space”.

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Resolution 52/38 A

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction

The General Assembly,Determined to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by

anti-personnel mines that kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless civilians and especially chilc^en, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe consequences for years after emplacement.

Believing it necessary to do the utmost to contribute in an efficient and coordinated manner to facing the challenge of removing anti-personnel mines placed throughout the world* and to assure their destruction.

Wishing to do the utmost in assuring assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including the social and economic reintegration, of mine victims.

Recalling its resolution 51/45 S of 10 December 1996 urging all States to pursue vigorously an effective, legally binding international agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines with a view to con^>leting the negotiation as soon as possible.

Stressing the role of public conscience in furthering the principles of humanity as evidenced by the call for a total ban on anti-personnel mines, and recognizing the efforts to that end undertaken by the ^ternational Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the International Can >aign to Ban Landmines and numerous other non-governmental organizations around the world.

Recalling the Ottawa Declaration of 5 October 1996 and the Brussels Declaration of 27 June 1997 urging the international conmiunity to negotiate an international and legally binding agreement prohibiting the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines.

Emphasizing the desirability of attracting the adherence of all States to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, and determined to work strenuously towards the promotion of its universalization in all relevant forums including, inter alia, the United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament, regional organizations and groupings, and review conferences of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Lijurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,

Basing itself on the principle of international humanitarian law that the right of the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, on the principle that prohibits the employment in

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armed conflicts of weapons, projectiles and materials and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering and on the principle that a distinction must be made between civilians and combatants.

Welcoming the conclusion of negotiations on 18 September 1997 at Oslo on the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stoclcpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction,

1. Invites all States to sign the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, which was open for signature at Ottawa on 3 and 4 December 1997 and at Headquarters in New York on 5 December 1997, and which shall remain open for signature thereafter at Headquarters until its entry into force;

2. Urges all States to ratify the Convention without delay subsequent to their signatures;

3. Calls upon all States to contribute towards the full realization and effective implementation of the Convention to advance the care and rehabilitation, and the social and economic reintegration of mine victims, and mine- awareness progranmies, and the removal of anti-personnel mines placed throughout the world and the assurance of their destruction;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to render the necessary assistance and to provide such services as may be necessary to fulfil the tasks entrusted to him by the Convention;

5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-third session an item entitled “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruc> tion”.

Resolution 52/38 B

Transparency in armaments

The General Assetnbly,Recalling its earlier resolutions on transparency in armaments.Continuing to hold the view that an enhanced level of transparency

in all types of armaments contributes greatly to confidence-building and security among States,

Taking duly into account the relationship between transparency and the security needs of all States at the regional and intemational levels.

Recognizing that, notwithstanding the fact that the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms in its current form deals with seven categories of conventional weapons, the principle of transparency should also apply to

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weapons of mass destruction and to transfers of equipment and technologies directly related to the development and manufacture of such weapons.

Convinced that an enhanced level of transparency in weapons of mass destruction and transfers of equipment and technologies directly related to the development and manufacture of such weapons could serve as a catalyst towards general and complete disarmament.

Stressing the need to achieve universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, as well as other instruments related to transfers of equipment and technologies directly related to the development and manufacture of such weapons, with a view to realizing the goal of the total elimination of all weapons of mass destruction,

1. Takes note of the reports of the Secretary-General on transparency in armaments;

2. Reaffirms its conviction of the interrelationship between transparency in the field of conventional weapons and transparency in the fields of weapons of mass destruction and transfers of equipment and technologies directly related to the development and manufacture of such weapons;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States on ways and means of enhancing transparency in the Helds of weapons of mass destruction and transfers of equipment and technologies directly related to the development and manufacture of such weapons with a view to enhancing transparency in the field of conventional weapons and to include in his report to the General Assembly at its fifty-third session a special section on the implementation of the present resolution;

4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-third session the item entitled ‘Transparency in armaments”.

Resolution 52/38 C

Assistance to States for curbing the iiiidt traffic in small arms and coUerai^ them

The General Assembly^Recalling its resolutions 46/36 H of 6 December 1991, 47/52 G and

J of 9 December 1992, 48/75 H and J of 16 December 1993, 49/75 G of 15 December 1994, 50/70 H of 12 December 1995 and 51/45 L of 10 December 1996,

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Considering that the illicit circulation of massive quantities of small arms throughout the world impedes development and is a source of increased insecurity.

Considering also that the illicit international transfer of small arms and their accumulation in many countries constitute a threat to their populations and to national and regional security and are a factor contributing to the destabilization of States,

Basing itself on the statement of the Secretary-General relating to the request of Mali for United Nations assistance for the collection of small arms.

Gravely concerned at the extent of the insecurity and banditry linked to the illicit circulation of small arms in Mali and the other affected States of the Saharo-Sahelian subregion.

Taking note of the first conclusions of the United Nations advisory missions sent to the affected countries of the subregion by the Secretary- General to study the best way of curbing the illicit circulation of small arms and ensuring their collection,

Taking note also of the interest shown by the other States of the subregion in receiving a United Nations advisory mission.

Noting the actions taken and those recommended at the meetings of the States of the subregion held at Banjul, Algiers, Bamako, Yamoussoukro and Niamey to establish close regional cooperation with a view to strengthening security.

Basing itself on the report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization, in particular the section entitled ‘‘Preventive diplomacy, peaceful settlement of disputes and disarmament”,

1. Welcomes the initiative taken by Mali concerning the question of the illicit circulation of small arms and their collection in the affected States of the Saharo-Sahelian subregion;

2. Also welcomes the action taken by the Secretary-General in in^lementation of this initiative in the context of General Assembly resolution 40/151 H of 16 December 1985;

3. Thanks the Governments concerned in the subregion for the substantial support that they have given to the United Nations advisory missions, and welcomes the declared readiness of other States to receive the United Nations Advisory Mission;

4. Encourages the Secretary-General to continue his efforts, in the context of the implementation of resolution 49/75 G and of the recommendations of the United Nations advisory missions, to curb the illicit circulation of small arms and to collect such arms in the affected States that so request, with the support of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Dis

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armament in Africa and in close cooperation with the Organization of African Unity;

5. Notes that, as part of its efforts to halt the flow of small arms into Mali and the Saharo-Sahelian subregion, the Government of Mali oversaw the destruction, at the “Rarne of Peace” ceremony held at Timbuktu, Mali, on 27 March 1996, of thousands of small anns handed over by ex-combatants of the armed movements of northern Mali;

6. Encourages the setting up in the countries of the Saharo-Sahelian subregion of national commissions against the proliferation of small arms, and invites the international community to support as far as possible the smooth functioning of the national commissions where they have been set up;

7. Takes note of the conclusions of the ministerial consultation on the proposal for a moratorium on the importing, exporting and manufacture of light weapons in the region, held at Bamako on 26 March 1997, and encourages the States concerned to pursue their consultations on the matter;

8. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to examine the issue and to submit to the General Assembly at its tifty-third session a report on the implementation of the present resolution;

9. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-third session an item entitled ""Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them”

Resolution 52/38 D

Relationship between disarmament and development

The General Assembly,Recalling the provisions of the Final I>ocument of the Tenth Special

Session of the General Assembly concerning the relationship between disarmament and development.

Recalling also the adoption on 11 September 1987 of the Final Document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development,

Recalling further its resolutions 49/75 J of 15 December 1994, 50/70 G of 12 December 1995 and 51/45 D of 10 December 1996,

Bearing in mind the Final Document of the Eleventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries, held at Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, from 18 to 20 October 1995,

Stressing the growing importance of the symbiotic relationship between disarmament and development in current international relations.

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L Acknowledges the note by the Secretary-General and actions taken m accordance with the Final Document of the bternational Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development;

2. Urges the international community to devote part of the resources made available by the implementation of disarmament and arms limitation agreements to economic and social development, with a view to reducing the ever widening gap between developed and developing countries;

3. Invites all Member States to conununicate to the Secretary-General, by 15 April 1998, their views and proposals for the implementation of the action programme adopted at the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, as well as any other views and proposals with a view to achieving the goals of the action programme, within the framework of current international relations;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to take action, through appropriate organs and within available resources, for the implementation of the action programme adopted at the International Conference;

5. Also requests the Secretary-General to submit a report to the General Assembly at its fifty-third session;

6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-third session the item entitled "Relationship between disarmament and development”.

Resolutiono 52/38 E

Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control

The General Assembly^Recalling its resolutions 50/70 M of 12 December 1995 and 51/45 E

of 10 December 1996,Emphasizing the importance of the observance of environmental norms

in the preparation and implementation of disarmament and arms limitation agreements.

Recognizing that it is necessary to take duly into account the agreements adopted at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, as well as prior relevant agreements, in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms limitation.

Mindful of the detrimental environmental effects of the use of nuclear weapons,

1. Reaffirms that international disarmament forums take fully into account the relevant environmental norms in negotiating treaties and agreements

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on disarmament and arms limitation and that all States, through their actions, fully contribute to ensuring compliance with the aforementioned norms in the implementation of treaties and conventions to which they are parties;

2. Calls upon States to adopt unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures so as to contribute to ensuring the application of scientiHc and technological progress in the framework of international security, disarmament and other related spheres, without detriment to the environment or to its effective contribution to attaining sustainable development;

3. Invites all Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General information on the measurer they have adopted to promote the objectives envisaged in the present resolution, and requests the Secretary-General to submit a report containing this information to the General Assembly at its tifty-third session;

4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-third session the item entitled “Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control''.

Resolution 52/38 F

Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament: report of the Preparatory Committee

for the Fourth Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament

The General Assembly,Recalling its resolutions 49/75 I of 15 December 1994, 50/70 F of

12 December 1995 and 51/45 C of 10 December 1996,Recalling also that, there being a consensus to do so in each case, three

special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament were held in 1978, 1982 and 1988, respectively.

Bearing in mind the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the Hrst special session devoted to disarmament, and the objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Welcoming the recent positive changes in the international landscape, characterized by the end of the cold war, the relaxation of tensions at the global level and the emergence of a new spirit governing relations among nations,

Taking note of paragraph 108 of the Final Document of the Eleventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries, held at Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, from 18 to 20 October 1995, which supported the convening of the fourth special session of the General Assem

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bly devoted to disarmament in 1997, which would offer an opportunity to review, from a perspective more in tune with the current international situation, the most critical aspects of the process of disarmament and to mobilize the international community and public opinion in favour of the elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and of the control and reduction of conventional weapons.

Taking note also of the report of the 1997 substantive session of the Disarmament Commission on the item entitled “Fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament’’.

Desiring to build upon the substantive exchange of views on the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament during the 1997 substantive session of the Disarmament Commission,

Reiterating its conviction that a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament can set the future course of action in the field of disarmament, arms control and related international security matters.

Emphasizing the in^ortance of multilateralism in the process of dis< armament and arms control, peace and security.

Noting that, with the completion of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction and in 1996, the adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, as well as of amended Protocol II and new Protocol IV to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, the following years would be opportune for the international community to start the process of reviewing the state of affairs in the entire field of disarmament and arms control in the post-cold< war era,

1. Decides, subject to the emergence of a consensus on its objectives and agenda, to convene the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;

2. Endorses the recommendation of the Disarmament Commission at its 1997 substantive session that the item entitled “Fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament*’ should be included in the agenda of the Commission at its 1998 session;

3. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-third session the item entitled “Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament” and, subject to the outcome of the deliberations at the 1998 substantive session of the Disarmament Commission, to set an exact date for and to decide on organizational matters relating to the convening of the special session.

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Resolution 52/38 G

Consolidatioii of peace through practical disarmament measures

The General Assembly^Recalling its resolution 51/45 N of 10 December 1996,Convinced that a corq>rehensive and integrated approach towards cer

tain practical disarmanient measures, such as, inter alia, arms control, particularly with regard to small arms and light weapons, confidence-building measures, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, demining and conversion, often is a prerequisite to maintaining and consolidating peace and security and thus provides a basis for effective rehabilitation and social and economic development in areas that have suffered from conflict,

Noting with satisfaction that, since the adoption of resolution 51/45 N, the importance of such practical disarmament measures has received growing attention from the international community in general, and from interested and affected Member States in particular, as well as from the Secretary-Gen- eral,

Stressing that further efforts are needed in order to develop and effectively implement programmes of practical disarmament in affected areas.

Recalling the deliberations at the 1997 substantive session of the Disarmament Conmiission in Working Group III on agenda item 6, entitled ''Guidelines on conventional arms control/limitation and disarmament, with particular emphasis on consolidation of peace in the context of General Assembly resolution 51/45 N”, where the scope of resolution 51/45 N was a major focus.

Welcoming the adoption by the Disarmament Conmiission of the ‘‘Guidelines for international arms transfers in the context of General Assembly resolution 46/36 H of 6 December 1991”,

Noting, with reference to its resolution 50/70 B of 12 December 1995, the report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms and its relevance in the context of the present resolution and of the ongoing woiic in the Disarmament Commission,

1. Stresses the particular relevance of the deliberations at the 1997 substantive session of the Disarmament Commission in Working Group III on agenda item 6, entitied “Guidelines on conventional arms control/limitation and disarmament, with particular emphasis on consolidation of peace in the context of General Assembly resolution 51/45 N” for this topic, takes note of the Chairman’s paper of 9 May 1997 and other views expressed, as a useful basis for further deliberations, and encourages the Disarmament Conunission to continue its efforts aimed at the adoption of such guidelines;

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2. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General on the consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures, submitted pursuant to resolution 51/45 N, and encourages Member States as well as regional arrangements and agencies to lend their support to the implementation of relevant reconmiendations contained therein;

3. Recognizes, with reference to paragraph 12 of section III of the report, that the readiness of the international community to assist affected States in their efforts to consolidate peace would greatly ^nefit the effective implementation of practical disarmament measures;

4. Invites interested States to establish a group in order to facilitate this process and to build upon the momentum generated, and requests the Secretary-General to lend his support to the efforts of such a group;

5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-third session the item entitled “Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures”.

Resdution 52/38 H

Contributions towards banning anti-personnel landmines

The General Assembly,Recalling its previous resolutions 48/75 K of 16 December 1993,

49/75 D of 15 December 1994, 50/70 O of 12 December 1995 and 51/45 S of 10 December 1996,

Taking into account the efforts to address the landmine issue, and underlining that the efforts made within different forums should be mutually reinforcing.

Taking note of the decisions taken by States to adopt bans, moratoriums or other restrictions on transfers of anti-personnel landmines, and other measures taken unilaterally.

Welcoming the ongoing national, regional and multilateral efforts in demining and victim rehabilitation.

Having considered the report of the Conference on Disarmament,1. Urges all States and regional oiganizations to intensify their efforts

to contribute to the objective of the elimination of anti-personnel landmines;2. Welcotnes, as interim measures, the various bans, moratoriums and

other restrictions akeady declared by States on anti-personnel landmines, and calls upon States that have not yet done so to declare and implement such bans, moratoriums and other restrictions as soon as possible;

3. Invites the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its efforts on the issue of anti-personnel landmines;

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4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty>third session an item entitled ‘ Contributions towards banning anti-personnel landmines*’.

Resdutioii 52/38 I

Prohibition of the dumping of radloactiye wastes

The General Assembly^Bearing in mind resolutions CM/Res.ll53 (XLVni) of 1988 and CM/

Res. 1225 (L) of 1989, adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, concerning the dumping of nuclear and industrial wastes in Africa,

Welcoming resolution GC(XXX!V)/RES/530 establishing a Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste, adopted on 21 September 1990 by the General Conference of the Interaa- tional Atomic Energy Agency at its thirty-fourth regular session.

Welcoming also resolution GC(XXXVIII)/RES/6, adopted on 23 September 1994 by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency at its thirty-eighth regular session, inviting the Board of Govemors and the Director General of the Agency to commence preparations for a convention on the safety of radioactive waste management, and noting the progress that has been made in that regard.

Taking note of the conmiitment by the participants at the Sununit on Nuclear Safety and Security, held in Moscow on 19 and 20 April 1996, to ban the dumping at sea of radioactive wastes.

Considering its resolution 2602 C (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, in which it requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, inter alia, to consider effective methods of control against the use of radiological methods of warfare.

Recalling resolution CM/Res.l356 (LIV) of 1991, adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, on the Bamako Convention on the Ban on the Import of Hazardous Wastes into Africa and on the Control of Their Transboundary Movements within Africa,

Aware of the potential hazards underlying any use of radioactive wastes that would constitute radiological warfare and its implications for regional and international security, in particular for the security of developing countries.

Recalling all its resolutions on the matter since its forty-third session in 1988, including its resolution 51/45 J of 10 December 1996,

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Desirous of promoting the implementation of paragraph 76 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament,

1. Takes note of the part of the report of the Conference on Disarmament relating to a future convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons;

2. Expresses grave concern regarding any use of nuclear wastes that would constitute radiological warfare and have grave implications for the national security of all States;

3. Calls upon all States to take appropriate measures with a view to preventing any dumping of nuclear or ra^oactive wastes that would infringe upon the sovereignty of States;

4. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to take into account, in the negotiations for a convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons, radioactive wastes as part of the scope of such a convention;

5. Also requests the Conference on Disarmament to intensify efforts towards an early conclusion of such a convention and to include in its report to the General Assembly at its flfty-third session the progress recorded in the negotiations on this subject;

6. Takes note of resolution CM/Res.l356 (LIV) of 1991, adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, on the Bamako Convention on the Ban on the Import of Hazardous Wastes into Africa and on the Control of Their Transboundary Movements within Africa;

7. Expresses the hope that the effective implementation of the International Atomic Energy Agency Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste will enhance the protection of all States from the dumping of radioactive wastes on their territories;

8. Welcomes the adoption at Vienna on 5 September 1997 of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, as recommended by the participants in the Moscow Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security, and the signing of the Joint Convention by a number of States beginning on 29 September 1997, and appeals to all States to sign and subsequently ratify, accept or approve the Convention, so that it may enter into force as soon as possible;

9. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-third session the item entitled “Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes’*.

Resolution 52/38 J

Small arms

The General Assembly,

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Recalling its resolution 50/70 B of 12 December 1995,Recalling also its resolution 51/45 L of 10 December 1996, in which

it welcomed the initiative taken by Mali concerning the question of the illicit circulation of small arms and their collection in the aff ected States of the SaharO’Sahelian subregion.

Convinced of the need for a comprehensive approach to promote, at the global and regional levels, the control and reduction of small arms and light weapons in a balanced and non-discriminatory manner as a contribution to international peace and security.

Reaffirming the inherent right to individual or collective self-defence recognized in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, which implies that States also have the right to acquire arms with which to defend themselves.

Reaffirming also the right of self-determination of ail peoples, in particular peoples under colonial or other forms of alien domination or foreign occupation, and the importance of the effective realization of this right, as enunciated, inter alia, in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights on 25 June 1993,

Reqffirtning further the ui;gent need for practical disarmament in the context of the conflicts the United Nations is actually dealing with and of the weapons that are actually killing people in the hundreds of thousands.

Welcoming the submission of the report of the Secretary-General prepared with the assistance of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, which contains measures to reduce the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons in specific regions of the world and to prevent such accumulations and transfers from occurring in future,

Welcoming also the guidelines for international arms transfers in the context of General Assembly resolution 46/36 H of 6 December 1991, which were adopted by consensus by the Disarmament Commission in 1996, and taking note of the ongoing efforts of the Commission to consider guidelines for post-conflict situations, including demobilization of former combatants, disposal and destruction of weapons, as well as confidence- and security- building measures,

1. Endorses the recommendations contained in the report on small arms, which was approved unanimously by the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, bearing in mind the views of Member States on the reconmiendations;

2. Calls upon all Member States to implement the relevant recommendations to the extent possible and where necessary in cooperation with appropriate international and regional organizations and/or through international

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and regional cooperation among police, intelligence, customs and border control services;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to implement the relevant recommendations, in particular to initiate a study on the problems of ammunition and explosives in all their aspects, as early as possible, within available financial resources, and in cooperation with appropriate international and regional organizations where necessary;

4. Also requests the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States on the report and on the steps that they have taken to implement its recommendations, and, in particular, to seek their views on the recommendation concerning the convening of an international conference on the illicit arms trade in all its aspects in time for consideration by the General Assembly at its flfty-thu-d session;

5. Further requests the Secretary-General to prepare a report, with the assistance of a group of governmental experts to be nominated by him in 1998 on the basis of equitable geographical representation, (a) on the progress made in the implementation of the recommendations of the report on small arms and (b) on further actions recommended to be taken, to be submitted to the General Assembly at its fifty-fourth session;

6. Encourages Member States and the Secretary-General to carry out recommendations for post-conflict situations, including demobilization of former combatants and di^osal and destruction of weapons;

7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty>third session the item entitled **Small arms*’.

Resolution 52/38 K

Nudear disarmament with a view to tiie ultimate elimination of nudear weapons

The General Assembly^Recalling its resolutions 49/75 H of 15 December 1994, 50/70 C of

12 December 1995 and 51/45 G of 10 December 1996,Recognizing that the end of the cold war has increased the possibility

of freeing the world from the fear of nuclear war.Appreciating the entry into force of the Treaty on the Reduction and

Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, to which Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States of America are parties, and looking forward to the early entry into force of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, which was ratified by the United States of America,

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Welcoming the reductions in the nuclear arsenals of other nuclear- weapon States,

Welcoming the removal of all nuclear weapons of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from the territories of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine,

Welcoming the joint statement issued by the Presidents of the Russian Federation and the United States of America at Helsinki on 21 March 1997, which set forth the common understanding that, once the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms enters into force, these two States will immediately begin negotiations on a START III agreement.

Welcoming tlie decision of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to extend the Treaty indefinitely, taken without a vote, as well as the decisions on strengthening the review process for the Treaty and on the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

Noting the reference in the decision on the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament to the importance of the following measures for the full realization and effective implementation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, including the programme of action as reflected below:

(a) The completion by the Conference on Disarmament of the negotiations on a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty no later than 1996, and utmost restraint that should be exercised by the nuclear-weapon States pending the entry into force of that treaty;

Q>) The immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein;

(c) The determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Welcoming the adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty at the Hftieth session of the General Assembly and its opening for signature at the beginning of the fifty-first session, and noting the subsequent signing of that Treaty by over one hundred and forty Member States,

Welcoming also the smooth start of the strengthened review process of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons with the successful

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conclusion in April 1997 of the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the next Review Conference, which will be held in the year 2000,

Recalling that nuclear non-proliferation and the promotion of nuclear disarmament are key elements in the maintenance of international peace and security, which is one of the most important purposes of the United Nations,

1. Urges States not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to accede to it at the earliest possible date, recognizing the importance of universal adherence to the Treaty;

2. Calls for the determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and invites them to keep States Members of the United Nations duly informed of the progress or efforts made;

3. Welcomes the ongoing efforts in the dismantlement of nuclear weapons, and notes the importance of the safe and effective management of the resultant fissile materials;

4. Calls upon all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to make their best efforts for the success of the next Review Conference, which will be held in the year 2000;

5. Calls upon all States to implement fully their commitments in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Resolution 52/38 L

Nudear disarmament

The General Assembly,Recalling its resolution 49/75 E of 15 December 1994 on a step-by-step

reduction of the nuclear threat, and its resolutions 50/70 P of 12 December 1995 and 51/45 O of 10 December 1996 on nuclear disarmament.

Reaffirming the commitment of the international conmiunity to the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the creation of a nuclear- weapon-free world.

Bearing in mind that the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction have already established legal regimes on the complete prohibition of biological and chemical weapons, respectively, and determined to achieve a nuclear weapons convention on the prohibition of the

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testing, development, production, stockpiling, loan, transfer, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons and on their destruction, and to conclude such an international convention at an early date.

Recognizing that there now exist favourable conditions for creating a world free of nuclear weapons.

Bearing in mind paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, calling for the urgent negotiation of agreements for the cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems, and for a comprehensive and phased programme with agreed timeframes, wherever feasible, for the progressive and balanced reduction of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time.

Reiterating the highest priority accorded to nuclear disarmament in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and by the international community.

Recognizing that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and any proposed treaty on fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices must constitute disarmament measures, and not only non-proliferation measures, and that these measures, together with an international legal instrument on adequate security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States and an international convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, must be integral steps leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework.

Welcoming the entry into force of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, to which Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States of America are States parties.

Welcoming also the conclusion of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Anns by the Russian Federation and the United States of America and the ratification of that Treaty by the United States of America, and looking forward to the full implementation of the START I and START II Treaties by the States parties, and to further concrete steps for nuclear disarmament by all nuclear-weapon States,

Noting with appreciation the unilateral measures by the nuclear- weapon States for nuclear arms limitation, and encouraging them to undertake further such measures.

Recognizing the conplementarity of bilateral and multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament, and that bilateral negotiations can never replace multilateral negotiations in this respect.

Noting the support expressed in the Conference on Disarmament and in the General Assembly for the elaboration of an international convention

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to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and the multilateral efforts in the Conference on Disarmament to reach agreement on such an international convention at an early date.

Recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons issued on 8 July 1996, and welcoming the unanimous reaffuination by all Judges of the Court that there exists an obligation for all States to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

Mindful of paragraph 84 and other relevant reconmiendations in the Final Document of the Eleventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries, held at Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, from 18 to 20 October 1995, calling upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish, on a priority basis, an ad hoc committee to commence negotiations early in 1996 on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons within a time*bound framework; paragraph 58 of the fmal document of the Twelfth Ministerial Conference of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi on 7 and 8 April 1997; and paragraphs 40 to 42 of the communique of the Meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegations of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries to the Fifty-second Session of the General Assembly, held in New York on 25 September 1997, which called for, as a first step, the conclusion of a universal and legally binding multilateral agreement committing all States to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

Bearing in mind the proposal of twenty-eight delegations to the Conference on Disarmament that are members of the Group of 21 for a progranune of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons, and expressing its conviction that this proposal will be an important input and will contribute to negotiations on this question in the Conference,

Commending the initiative by twenty-six delegations to the Conference on Disarmament that are members of the Group of 21, proposing a comprehensive mandate for an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, which includes negotiations for, as a first step, a universal and legally binding multilateral agreement committing all States to the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, an agreement on further steps required in a phased programme with time-frames leading to the total elimination of these weapons and a convention on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices taking into account the report of the Special Coordinator on that item and the views relating to the scope of the treaty,

1. Recognizes that, in view of recent political developments, the time is now opportune for all nuclear-weapon States to undertake effective dis

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armament measures with a view to tlie total elimination of these weapons within a time-bound framework;

2. Recognizes also that there is a genuine need to de-emphasize the role of nuclear weapons, and to review and revise nuclear doctrines accordingly;

3. Urges the nuclear-weapon States to stop immediately the qualitative improvement, development, production and stockpiling of nuclear warheads and their delivery systems;

4. Reiterates its call upon the nuclear-wei^n States to undertake the step-by-step reduction of the nuclear threat and a phased programme of progressive and balanced deep reductions of nuclear weapons, and to carry out effective nuclear disarmament measures with a view to the total elimination of these weapons within a time-bound framework;

5. Expresses its concern at the continuing opposition by some States to the establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament, as called for in General Assembly resolution 51/45 O;

6. Reiterates its call upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish, on a priority basis, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament to commence negotiations early in 1998 on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound framewoiic through a nuclear weapons convention;

7. Urges the Conference on Disarmament to take into account in this regard the proposal of the twenty-eight delegations for a programme of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons, as well as the mandate for the ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, proposed by the twenty-six delegations;

8. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its fifty-third session a report on the implementation of the present resolution;

9. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-third session the item entitled “Nuclear disarmament**.

Resolution 52/38 M

Bilateral nudear arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament

The General Assembly,Recalling its previous relevant resolutions.Recognizing the fundamental changes that have taken place with re

spect to international security, which have permitted agreements on deep re

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ductions in the nuclear armaments of the States possessing the largest inventories of such weapons.

Mindful that it is the responsibility and obligation of all States to contribute to the process of the relaxation of international tension and to the strengthening of international peace and security and, in this connection, to adopt and implement measures towards the attainment of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Appreciating a number of positive developments in the field of nuclear disarmament, in particular the Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Elimination of Their Inter- mediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, and the treaties on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms,

Appreciating also the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and acknowledging the importance of the determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Welcoming the steps that have already been taken by the Russian Federation and the United States of America to begin the process of reducing the number of nuclear weapons and removing such weapons from a deployed status, and bilateral agreements on de-taigeting strategic nuclear missiles.

Noting the new climate of relations between the States of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which permits them to intensify their cooperative efforts to ensure the safety, security, and environmentally sound destruction of nuclear weapons.

Recalling the Moscow Summit Declaration on Nuclear Safety and Security of April 1996,

Urging early action to complete the ratification of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and further intensification of efforts to accelerate the in^lementation of agreements and unilateral decisions relating to nuclear arms reduction,

Appreciating the joint statement on future reductions in nuclear forces and the joint statement outlining the elements of an agreement for higher- velocity theatre missile defence systems, both issued on 21 March 1997 by the Russian Federation and the United States of America, as well as their joint statement of 10 May 1995 in connection with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems,

Welcoming the significant reductions made by other nuclear-weapon States, and encouraging all nuclear-weapon States to consider appropriate measures relating to nuclear disarmament.

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1. Welcomes the entry into force of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed in Moscow on 31 July 1991 by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, including the Protocol to that Treaty signed at Lisbon on 23 May 1992 by the parties thereto, and the exchange of documents of ratification between Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States of America on 5 December 1994 at Budapest;

2. Also welcofnes the signing of the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms in Moscow on 3 January 1993, and urges the parties to take the steps necessary to bring that Treaty into force at the earliest possible date;

3. Further welcomes the joint statement issued at Helsinki on 21 March 1997, in which Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton reached an understanding that after the entry into force of START n, their two countries would immediately commence negotiations on a START III agreement, which would include the establishment, by 31 December 2007, of lower aggregate levels of 2,000 to 2,500 strategic nuclear warheads, take measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and destruction of strategic nuclear warheads, and carry out other actions to promote the irreversibility of these deep reductions;

4. Notes with satisfaction the Protocol to START II, the Joint Agreed Statement, and the Letters on Early Deactivation, signed by the Russian Federation and the United States of America in New York on 26 September 1997, which are intended to promote the further process of still deeper reductions and limitations of strategic offensive arms;

5. Welcomes the signing on 26 September 1997 by Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States of America of a number of significant agreements that contribute to ensuring the viability of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems;

6. Expresses its satisfaction at the entry into force and ongoing inq>lementation of the 1991 Treaty as well as the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States of America to the 1993 Treaty, and expresses its hope that it will soon be possible for the Russian Federation to take corresponding steps for ratifying that Treaty;

7. Expresses further satisfaction at the continuing inq>lementation of the Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, in particular at the completion by the parties of the destruction of all their declared missiles subject to elimination under the Treaty;

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8. Welcomes the removal of all nuclear weapons from the territory of Kazakhstan as of 1 June 1995, from the territory of Ukraine as of 1 June 1996, and from the territory of Belarus as of 30 November 1996;

9. Encourages Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States of America to continue their cooperative efforts aimed at eliminating nuclear weapons and strategic offensive arms on the basis of existing agreements, and welcomes the contributions that other States are making to such cooperation as well;

10. Welcomes the participation in the Treaty on the Non-E^oliferation of Nuclear Weapons of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine as non-nuclear States, which thereby provided notable enhancement of the non-proliferation regime;

11. Urges the Russian Federation and the United States of America to conmience negotiations on a START III agreement immediately after START II enters into force, thereby realizing the understandings they reached in the joint statement issued at Helsinki;

12. Encourages and supports the Russian Federation and the United States of America in their efforts to reduce their nuclear weapons and to continue to give those efforts the highest priority in order to contribute to the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons;

13. Invites the Russian Federation and the United States of America to keep other States Members of the United Nations duly informed of progress in their discussions and in the implementation of their strategic offensive arms agreements and unilateral decisions.

Resolution 52/38 N

The nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas

The General Assembly,Recalling its resolution 51/45 B of 10 December 1996,Determined to continue to contribute to the prevention of the prolifer

ation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects and to the process of genera] and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, in particular in the field of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, with a view to strengthening international peace and security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling the provisions on nuclear-weapon-free zones of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, as well as of the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament of the

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1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Stressing the importance of the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, and Pelindaba, establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, as well as the Antarctic Treaty, to, inter alia, the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons, and underlining also the value of enhancing cooperation among the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty members by means of mechanisms such as joint meetings of States parties, signatories and observers to those treaties.

Recalling the applicable principles and rules of international law relating to rights of passage through maritime space, including under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,

1. Welcomes the contribution that the Antarctic Treaty and the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba are making towards freeing the entire southern hemisphere and adjacent areas covered by those treaties from nuclear weapons;

2. Calls for the ratification of the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba by all regional States, and calls upon all concerned States to continue to work together in order to facilitate adherence to the protocols to nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties by all relevant States that have not yet done so;

3. Welcotnes the steps taken to conclude further nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, and calls upon all States to consider all relevant proposals, including those reflected in its resolutions on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and South Asia;

4. Stresses the role of nuclear-weapon-free zones in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and in extending the areas of the world that are nuclear-weapon-free, and, with particular reference to the responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States, calls upon all States to support the process of nuclear disarmament, with the ultimate goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons;

5. Calls upon the States parties and signatories to the treaties of Tlate- lolco, Rarotonga. Bangkok and Pelindaba, in order to pursue the common goals envisaged in those treaties and to promote the nuclear-weapon-free status of the southern hemisphere and adjacent areas, to explore and implement further ways and means of cooperation among themselves and their treaty agencies;

6. Encourages the competent authorities of nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties to provide assistance to the States parties and signatories to such treaties so as to facilitate the accomplishment of these goals;

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7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-third session the item entitled ‘The nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas”.

Resolution 52/38 O

Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons

The General Assembly,Recalling its resolutions 49/75 K of 15 December 1994 and 51/45 M

of 10 December 1996,Convinced that the continuing existence of nuclear weapons poses a

threat to all humanity and that their use would have catastrophic consequences for all life on Earth, and recognizing that the only defence against a nuclear catastrophe is the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the certainty that they will never be produced again.

Mindful of the solemn obligations of States parties, undertaken in article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, particularly to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.

Recalling the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and in particular the objective of determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons.

Recalling also the adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in its resolution 50/245 of 10 September 1996,

Recognizing with satisfaction that the Antarctic Treaty and the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba are gradually freeing the entire southern hemisphere and adjacent areas covered by those treaties from nuclear weapons,

Noting the efforts by the States possessing the largest inventories of nuclear weapoas to reduce their stockpiles of such weapons through bilateral and unilateral agreements or arrangements, and calling for the intensification of such efforts to accelerate the significant reduction of nuclear-weapon arsenals.

Recognizing the need for a multilaterally negotiated and legally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the threat or use of nuclear weapons,

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The UN Disamatnent Yearbook: 1997

Reaffirming the central role of the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, and regretting the lack of progress in disarmament negotiations, particularly nuclear disarmament, in the Conference on Disarmament during its 1997 session.

Emphasizing the need for the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations on a phased progranmie for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time.

Desiring to achieve the objective of a legally binding prohibition of the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, threat or use of nuclear weapons and their destruction under effective international control.

Recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, issued on 8 July 1996,

1. Underlines once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control;

2. Calls once again upon all States immediately to fulfil that obligation by commencing multilateral negotiations in 1998 leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination;

3. Requests all States to inform the Secretary-General of the efforts and measures they have taken on the in^lementation of the present resolution and nuclear disarmament, and requests the Secretary-General to apprise the General Assembly of that information at its fifty-third session;

4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-third session the item entitled “Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons"'.

Resolution 52/38 P

Regional disarmament

The General Assembly,Recalling its resolutions 45/58 P of 4 December 1990, 46/36 I of

6 December 1991, 47/52 J of 9 December 1992, 48/75 I of 16 December 1993, 49/75 N of 15 December 1994, 50/70 K of 12 December 1995 and 51/45 K of 10 December 1996 on regional disarmament.

Believing that the efforts of the international community to move towards the ideal of general and complete disarmament are guided by the in

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herent human desire for genuine peace and security, the elimination of the danger of war and the release of economic, intellectual and other resources for peaceful pursuits.

Affirming the abiding commitment of all States to the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations in the conduct of their international relations.

Noting that essential guidelines for progress towards general and complete disarmament were adopted at the tenth special session of the General Assembly,

Taking note of the guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security adopted by the Disarmament Commission at its 1993 substantive session.

Welcoming the prospects of genuine progress in the field of disarmament engendered in recent years as a result of negotiations between the two super-Powers,

Taking note of the recent proposals for disarmament at the regional and subregional levels.

Recognizing the importance of confidence-building measures for regional and international peace and security.

Convinced that endeavours by countries to promote regional disarmament, taking into account the specific characteristics of each region and in accordance with the principle of undiminished security at the lowest level of armaments, would enhance the security of all States and would thus contribute to intemational peace and security by reducing the risk of regional conflicts,

1. Stresses that sustained efforts are needed, within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament and under the umbrella of the United Nations, to make progress on the entire range of disarmament issues;

2. Affirms that global and regional approaches to disarmament complement each other and should therefore be pursued simultaneously to promote regional and intemational peace and security;

3. Calls upon States to conclude agreements, wherever possible, for nuclear non-prolif eration, disarmament and confidence-building measures at the regional and subregional levels;

4. Welcomes the initiatives towards disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and security undertaken by some countries at the regional and subregional levels;

5. Supports and encourages efforts aimed at promoting conHdence- building measures at the regional and subregional levels in order to ease re

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gional tensions and to further disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation measures at the regional and subregional levels;

6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-third session the item entitled ' Regional disarmament"’.

Resdution 52/38 Q

Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels

The General Assembly,Recalling its resolutions 48/75 J of 16 December 1993, 49/75 O of

15 December 1994. 50/70 L of 12 December 1995 and 51/45 Q of 10 December 1996,

Recognizing the crucial role of conventional arms control in promoting regional and international peace and security.

Convinced that conventional arms control needs to be pursued primarily in the regional and subregional contexts since most threats to peace and security in the post-cold-war era arise mainly among States located in the same region or subregion.

Aware that the preservation of a balance in the defence capabilities of States at the lowest level of armaments would contribute to peace and stability and should be a prime objective of conventional arms control.

Desirous of promoting agreements to strengthen regional peace and security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces.

Noting with particular interest the initiatives taken in this regard in different regions of the world, in particular the commencement of consultations among a number of Latin American countries and the proposals for conventional arms control made in the context of South Asia, and recognizing, in the context of this subject, the relevance and value of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which is a cornerstone of European security.

Believing that militarily significant States and States with larger military capabilities have a special responsibility in promoting such agreements for regional security.

Believing also that an important objective of conventional arms control in regions of tension should be to prevent the possibility of military attack launched by surprise and to avoid aggression,

1. Decides to give urgent consideration to the issues involved in conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels;

2. Requests the Conference on Disarmament, as a first st^ , to consider the formulation of principles that can serve as a framework for regional

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agreements on conventional arms control, and looks forward to a report of the Conference on this subject;

3. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-third session the item entitled *tjonventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels”.

Resolution 52/38 R

TVansparency in armaments

The General Assembly^Recalling its resolutions 46/36 L of 9 December 1991, 47/52 L of

15 December 1992, 48/75 E of 16 December 1993, 49/75 C of 15 December 1994, 50/70 D of 12 December 1995 and 51/45 H of 10 December1996,

Continuing to take the view that an enhanced level of transparency in armaments contributes greatly to conHdence-building and security among States and that the establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms constitutes an important step forward in the promotion of transparency in military matters.

Welcoming the consolidated report of the Secretary-General on the Register, which includes the returns of Member States for 1996,

Welcoming also the response of Member States to the request contained in paragraphs 9 and 10 of resolution 46/36 L to provide data on their imports and exports of arms, as well as available background information regarding their military holdings, procurement through national production and relevant policies.

Welcoming further the report of the Secretary-General on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development.

Stressing that the continuing operation of the Register and its further development should be reviewed in order to secure a Register that is capable of attracting the widest possible participation,

1. Reaffirms its determination to ensure the effective operation of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms as provided for in paragraphs7 to 10 of resolution 46/36 L;

2. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development, and endorses the recommendations contained therein;

3. Calls upon Member States, with a view to achieving universal participation, to provide the Secretary-General by 31 May annu^ly with the requested data and information for the Register, including nil reports if appropri

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ate, on the basis of resolutions 46/36 L and 47/52 L and the recommendations contained in paragraph 64 of the 1997 report of the Secretary-General on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development;

4. Invites Member States in a position to do so. pending further development of the Register, to provide additional information on procurement from national production and military holdings and to make use of the “Remarks’’ column in the standardized reporting form to provide additional information such as types or models;

5. Decidesy with a view to further development of the Register, to keep the scope of and participation in the Register under review, and to that end:

{a) Requests Member States to provide the Secretary-General with their views on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development and on transparency measures related to weapons of mass destruction;

Requests the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of governmental experts to be convened in the year 2000 on the basis of equitable geographical representation, to prepare a report on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development, taking into account the work of the Conference on Disarmament, the views expressed by Member States and his reports on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development, with a view to a decision at its fifty-fifth session;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to implement the recommendations within his competence contained in his 1997 report on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development and to ensure that sufficient resources are made available for the Secretariat to operate and maintain the Register;

7. Invites the Conference on Disarmament to consider continuing its work undertaken in the field of transparency in armaments;

8. Reiterates its call upon all Member States to cooperate at the regional and subregional levels, taking fully into account the specific conditions prevailing in the region or subregion, with a view to enhancing and coordinating international efforts aimed at increased openness and transparency in armaments;

9. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its fifty-third session on progress made in implementing the present resolution;

10. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-third session the item entitled ‘Transparency in armaments”.

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Resolution 52/38 S

Establishment of a nudear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia

The General Assembly,Emphasizing the importance of internationally recognized agreements

on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world.

Recalling paragraphs 60, 61, 62 and 64 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 5 and 6 of the decision entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament” in the Final Document of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, concerning the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones,

Recalling also the Almaty Declaration of the heads of State of the Central Asian States of 28 February 1997 and the statement issued at Tashkent on 15 September 1997 by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia,

Reaffirming the generally recognized role of the United Nations in promoting the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Convinced that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world can contribute to ^e achievement of general and complete disarmament.

Believing that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions, including Central Asia, will help to strengthen peace and stability at both the regional and the global levels and is in the interest of the security of the States in the Central Asian region.

Welcoming the offer of Kyrgyzstan to hold a consultative meeting of experts on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia at Bishkek in 1998,

1. Calls upon all States to support the initiative aimed at the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia;

2. Requests the Secretary-General, within existing resources, to provide assistance to the Central Asian countries in the preparation of the form and elements of an agreement on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia;

3. Decides to consider the question of the establishment of a nuclear- weapon-free zone in Central Asia at its fifty-third session under the agenda item entitled ‘"General and complete disarmament”.

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Resolution 52/38 T

Status of die Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and

on Thdr Destruction

The General Assembly,Recalling its previous resolutions on the subject of chemical and bac

teriological (biological) weapons, in particular resolution 51/45 T of 10 December 1996, adopted without a vote.

Determined to achieve the effective prohibition of the development, production, acquisition, transfer, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and their destruction,

1. Welcomes the fact that the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction entered into force on 29 April 1997 with eighty-seven original States parties as well as the fact that seventeen States have subsequently become States parties to the Convention;

2. Notes with satitfaction that the First Conference of States Parties held at The Hague in the Kingdom of the Netherlands from 6 to 23 May 1997 successfully launched the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons with Ambassador Jose M. Bustani of Brazil as the first Director- General;

3. Emphasizes the necessity of universal adherence to the Convention, and calls upon all States that have not yet done so to become States parties to the Convention without delay;

4. Stresses the vital importance of full and effective implementation of, and compliance with, all provisions of the Convention;

5. Notes with satisfaction that the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons has quickly initiated verification activities, including the processing of declarations of States parties and the conducting of inspections of chemical weapons-related and other declared facilities as required by the Convention, and underlines the importance of the early initiation of activities under all relevant provisions of the Convention by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons;

6. Stresses the importance to the Convention that all possessors of chemical weapons, chemical weapons production facilities or chemical weapons development facilities, including previously declared possessor States, should be among the States parties to the Convention, and welcomes recent progress to that end;

7. Urges all States parties to the Convention to meet in full their obligations under the Convention and to support the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in its implementation activities;

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8. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-third session the item entitled “Inq>lementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction”.

Resolution 52/39 A

United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific

The General Assembly,Recalling its resolutions 42/39 D of 30 November 1987 and 44/117

F of 15 December 1989, by which it established the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and renamed it the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, with headquarters at Kathmandu and with the mandate of providing, on request, substantive support for the initiatives and other activities mutually agreed upon by the Member States of the Asia-Pacific region for the implementation of measures for peace and disarmament, through appropriate utilization of available resources.

Welcoming the report of the Secretary-General, in which he expresses his belief that the mandate of the Regional Centre remains valid and that the Centre could be a useful instrument for fostering a climate of cooperation in the post-cold-war era.

Commending the useful activities carried out by the Regional Centre in encouraging regional and subregional dialogue for the enhancement of openness, transparency and confidence-building, as well as the promotion of disarmament and security through the organization of regional meetings, which has come to be widely known within the Asia-Pacific region as the ' Kathmandu process*’.

Noting that trends in the post-cold-war era have emphasized the function of the Regional Centre in assisting Member States as they deal with new security concerns and disarmament issues emerging in the region.

Recognizing the need for the Regional Centre to pursue effectively its expanded function.

Expressing its appreciation to the Regional Centre for its organization of substantive regional meetings at Kathmandu and at Sapporo, Japan, in1997,

Appreciating highly the important role Nepal has played as the host nation of the headquarters of the Regional Centre,

1. Reaffirms its resolution 50/71 D of 12 December 1995, in particular its strong support for the continued operation and further strengthening

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of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific as an essential promoter of the regional peace and disarmament dialogue in the Asia-Pacific region known as the “Kathmandu process”;

2. Welcomes the fact that 1998 will mark the tenth anniversary of the Kathmandu process;

3. Expresses its appreciation for the continued political support and financial contribution received by the Regional Centre;

4. Appeals to Member States, in particular those within the Asia-Pacific region, as well as to international governmental and non-governmental organizations and foundations, to make voluntary contributions so as to strengthen the programme of activities of the Regional Centre and its implementation;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to provide all necessary support, within existing resources, to the Regional Centre in carrying out its programme of activities;

6. Also requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its fifty-thi^ session on the implementation of the present resolution;

7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-thirdsession the item entitled “United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific”.

Resolution 52/39 B

Regioiuil confidence-building measures

The General Assetnbly^Recalling the purposes and principles of the United Nations and its

primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

Bearing in mind the guidelines for general and complete disarmament adopted at its tenth special session, the first special session devoted to disarmament.

Recalling its resolutions 43/78 H and 43/85 of 7 December 1988, 44/21 of 15 November 1989, 45/58 M of 4 Etecember 1990, 46/37 B of6 December 1991,47/53 Fofl5 December 1992,48/76 A of 16 December1993, 49/76 C of 15 December 1994, 50/71 B of 12 December 1995 and 51/46 C of 10 December 1996,

Considering the importance and effectiveness of confidence-building measures taken at the initiative and with the participation of all States concerned, and taking into account the specific characteristics of each region, since such measures can contribute to regional disarmament and to intemational security, in accordance with the principles of the Charter,

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Convinced that the resources released by disarmament, including regional disarmament, can be devoted to economic and social development and to the protection of the environment for the benefit of all peoples, in particular those of the developing countries.

Convinced also that development can be achieved only in a climate of peace, security and mutual confidence both within and among States,

Bearing in mind the establishment by the Secretary-General on 28 May 1992 of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, the purpose of which is to encourage arms limitation, disarmament, non-{nroliferation and development in the subregion.

Recalling the Brazzaville Declaration on Cooperation for Peace and Security in Central Afnca,

1. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General on regional conH- dence-building measures, which deals with the activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa in the period since the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 51/46 C;

2. Reaffinns its support for efforts aimed at promoting confidence- building measures at regional and subregional levels in order to ease tensions and conflicts in the subregion and to further disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful settlement of disputes in Central Africa;

3. Also reaffirms its support for the programme of work of the Standing Advisory Committee adopted at the organizational meeting of the Committee held at Yaounde in July 1992;

4. Invites the States members of the Standing Advisory Committee that have not yet signed the Non-Aggression Pact to do so, and encourages all member States to expedite ratification, being convinced that the entry into force of the Pact will effectively contribute to the prevention of conflicts in the Central African subregion;

5. Welcomes with satirfaction the progranmies and activities of the Standing Advisory Committee for the period 1997-1998, adopted by the member States during the ninth ministerial meeting held at Libreville from7 to 11 July 1997, which are designed:

(a) To set up and render operational at the earliest opportunity and on the basis of voluntary contributions an early warning system for Central Africa;

(b) To launch programmes designed to retrain demobilized soldiers and prepare them for reintegration into civilian life;

(c) To combat the illegal circulation of weapons and drugs in the subregion;

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{d) To organize training seminars so as to strengthen the capacity of the Central African States to participate more actively in peacekeeping operations oiganized under the auspices of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity;

{e) To organize joint military exercises to simulate the conduct of stan> dard peacekeeping operations;

(/) To organize, for members of the armed forces and security forces of the Central African States, seminars and awareness programmes relating to the conduct of public affairs, the rule of law and respect for human rights;

{g) To hold a subregional conference on the topic “Democratic institutions and peace in Central Africa”;

(A) To revert to the holding of two annual meetings of the Standing Advisory Committee at the ministerial level in order to further consultations among the member States;

6. Expresses its conviction that the full implementation of those measures and activities will contribute to the promotion of confidence among the member States, the establishment of democracy and good governance and the consolidation of peace in the Central African subregion;

7. Welcomes the participation, at the invitation of the Government of Gabon, of representatives of the States permanent members of the Security Council in the ninth ministerial meeting of the Standing Advisory Committee, and invites the Secretary-General to facilitate the pursuit of this type of dialogue, which is likely to strengthen cooperation between the Council and the countries concerned with a view to contributing to the peaceful settlement of conflicts in Central Africa, whenever the States members of the Committee so request;

8. Thanks the Secretary-General for having established the Trust Fund for the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa;

9. Appeals to Member States and to governmental and non-govemmental organizations to make additional voluntary contributions to the Trust Fund for the implementation of the progranune of work of the Standing Advisory Committee, in particular the measures and objectives referred to in paragraph 5 above;

10. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to provide assistance to the States members of the Standing Advisory Conunittee to ensure that they are able to carry on with their efforts, being convinced that effective cooperation between the international community and the countries of the subregion can stimulate the search for peaceful solutions to the crises and conflicts that occur in the subregion;

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11. Also requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its fifty-third session a report on the implementation of the present resolution;

12. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-third session an item entitled "'Regional confidence-building measures: activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa”.

Resolution 52/39 C

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

The General Assembly^Convinced that the use of nuclear weapons poses the most serious threat

to the survival of mankind.Bearing in mind the advisory opinion of the International Court of Jus

tice of 8 July 1996 on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Convinced that a multilateral, universal and binding agreement pro

hibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would contribute to the elimination of the nuclear threat and to the climate for negotiations leading to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, thereby strengthening international peace and security.

Conscious that some steps taken by the Russian Federation and the United States of America towards a reduction of their nuclear weapons and the in^rovement in the international climate can contribute towards the goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

Recalling that, in paragraph 58 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, it is stated that all States should actively participate in efforts to bring about conditions in international relations among States in which a code of peaceful conduct of nations in international affairs could be agreed upon and that would preclude the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Reaffirming that any use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity, as declared in its resolutions 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961,33/71 B of 14 December 1978, 34/83 G of 11 December 1979, 35/152 D of 12 December 1980 and 36/92 I of 9 December 1981,

Determined to achieve a universal nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons, leading to their ultimate destruction.

Stressing that an international convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would be an important step in a phased programme to

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wards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a time>bound framework,

Noting with regret that the Conference on Disarmament* during its 1997 session, was unable to undertake negotiations on this subject as called for in General Assembly resolution 51/46 D of 10 December 1996,

L Reiterates its request to the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations, in order to reach agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, taking as a possible basis the draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons contained in the annex to the present resolution;

2. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly on the results of those negotiations.

A nnex

Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

The States Parties to the present Convention,Alarmed by the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the

existence of nuclear weapons.Convinced that any use of nuclear weapons constitutes a violation of

the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity.Desiring to achieve a multilateraU universal and binding agreement

prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.Bearing in mind the advisory opinion of the International Court of Jus

tice that there exists an obligation of all States to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective intemational control.

Determined, therefore, to achieve a universal nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons, leading to their ultimate destruction.

Convinced that the present Convention would be an important step in a phased programme towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework.

Determined to continue negotiations for the achievement of this goal. Have agreed as follows:

Article 1The States Parties to the present Convention solemnly undertake not

to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances.

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Article 2The present Convention shall be of unlimited duration.

Article 31. The present Convention shall be open to all States for signature.

Any State that does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragrsqph 3 of the present article may accede to it at any time.

2. The present Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification or accession shall be deposited with the Secretary’General of the United Nations.

3. The present Convention shall enter into force on the deposit of instruments of ratiHcation by twenty-five Governments, including the Governments of the five nuclear-weapon States, in accordance with paragraph 2 of the present article.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of the Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The depositary shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession and the date of entry into force of the present Convention, as well as of the receipt of other notices.

6. The present Convention shall be registered by the depositary in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the Unitai Nations.

Article 4The present Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French,

Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall send duly certified copies thereof to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have signed the present Convention,opened for signature a t______________ on the__________day of_________ one thousand nine hundred and_______________ .

Resolution 52/39 D

United Nations Disarmament Information Programme

The General Assetnbly,Recalling its decision taken in 1982 at its twelfth special session, the

second special session devoted to disarmament, by which the World Disarmament Can >aign was launched.

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Recalling also its resolution 51/46 A of 10 December 1996,Stressing the importance of informing, educating and generating public

understanding of the importance of and support for multilateral action, including action by the United Nations and the Conference on Disarmament, in the field of arms limitation and disarmament, in a factual, balanced and objec> tive manner.

Noting the delay in the publication of the 1996 edition of The United Nations Disannament Yearbook,

1. Expresses its concern at the continuing decrease in contributions to the United Nations Disar.nament Information Programme;

2. Invites the Secretary-General to continue to support the timely publication and distribution of The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook.

Resolution 52/40 A

Report of the Conference on Disarmament

The General Assembly,Having considered the report of the Conference on Disarmament,Convinced that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilat<

eral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community, has the primary role in substantive negotiations on priority questions of disarmament.

Considering, in this respect, that the present international climate should give additional impetus to multilateral negotiations with the aim of reaching concrete agreements.

Recognizing that the Conference on Disarmament has a number of urgent and in^ortant issues for negotiations,

1. Reaffirms the role of the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the intemational community;

2. Welcomes the determination of the Conference on Disarmament to fulfil that role in the light of the evolving international situation, with a view to making early substantive progress on priority items of its agenda;

3. Also welcomes the desire of the Conference on Disarmament to promote substantive progress during its 1998 session, and expresses the hope that appropriate consultations during the inter-sessional period could lead to the commencement of early work on various agenda items;

4. Encourages the Conference on Disarmament to continue the further review of its membership;

5. Also encourages the Conference on Disarmament to intensify further the ongoing review of its agenda and methods of work;

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6. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to ensure the provision to the Conference on Disarmament of adequate administrative* substantive and conference support services;

7. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to submit a report on its work to the General Assembly at its fifty-third session;

8. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-third session the item entitled “Report of the Conference on Disarmament”.

Resolution 52/40 B

Report of the Disarmament Commission

The General Assembly,Having considered the report of the Disarmament Commission,Recalling its resolutions 47/54 A of 9 December 1992, 47/54 G of

8 April 1993, 48/77 A of 16 December 1993, 49/77 A of 15 December1994, 50/72 D of 12 December 1995 and 51/47 B of 10 December 1996,

Considering the role that the Disarmament Commission has been called upon to play and the contribution that it should make in examining and submitting recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament and in the promotion of the implementation of the relevant decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session,

1. Takes note of the report of the Disarmament Commission;2. Reaffirms the in^ortance of further enhancing the dialogue and

cooperation among the First Committee, the Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament;

3. Also reaffirms the role of the Disarmament Commission as the specialized, deliberative body within the United Nations multilateral disarmament machinery that allows for in-depth deliberations on specific disarmament issues, leading to the submission of concrete recommendations on those issues;

4. Encourages the Disarmament Commission to continue to make every effort to enhance its working methods so as to enable it to give focused consideration to a limited number of priority issues in the field of disarmament, bearing in mind the decision it has taken to move its agenda towards a three-item phased approach;

5. Requests the Disarmament Commission to continue its work in accordance with its mandate, as set forth in paragraph 118 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, and with paragraph 3 of Assembly resolution 37/78 H of 9 December 1982, and to that end to make every effort to achieve specific recommendations on the items

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of its agenda, taking into account the adopted ""Ways and means to enhance the functioning of the Disarmament Commission’’;

6. Welcomes the fact that, pursuant to the adopted three-item phased approach, the Disarmament Commission, at its 1997 organizational session, adopted the following items for consideration at its 1998 substantive session:

(a) The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned;

(b) The fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;

(c) Guidelines on conventional arms control/limitation and disarmament, with particular emphasis on consolidation of peace in the context of General Assembly resolution 51/45 N of 10 December 1996;

7. Requests the Disarmament Commission to meet for a period not exceeding four weeks during 1998 and to submit a substantive report to the General Assembly at its fifty-third session;

8. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Disarmament Conmiission the annual report of the Conference on Disarmament, together with all the official records of the fifty-second session of the General Assembly relating to disarmament matters, and to render all assistance that the Commission may require for implementing the present resolution;

9. Also requests the Secretary-General to ensure full provision to the Disarmament Commission and its subsidiary bodies of interpretation and translation facilities in the official languages and to assign, as a matter of priority, all the necessary resources and services, including verbatim records, to that end;

10. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-third session the item entitled "'Report of the Disarmament Commission**.

Resolution 52/40 C

Role of the United Nations in disarmament

The General Assembly,Reaffirming that the United Nations has a central role and primary re>

sponsibility in the field of disarmament,Recalling in this regard the various resolutions and decisions adopted

by the General Assembly, in particular the principles and priorities established by consensus in the Declaration and the Programme of Action contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, which defme the role of the United Nations and form the basis for the existing disarmament machin

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ery, in the context of the implementation of the responsibilities of the Organization under the Charter of the United Nations,

Reaffirming the importance of the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, in conformity with paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

1. Affirms the vision of promoting international peace and security set out in the Charter of the United Nations and its provisions concerning the non-use of force and the threat of force;

2. Underlines the necessity of furthering the objectives of promoting disarmament and regulating armaments set out in the Charter, on the basis of negotiations reflecting the security interests of all States;

3. Reiterates that the adoption and implementation of disarmament measures should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to ensure the right of each State to security and to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantage over others;

4. Affirms its support for the objectives of nuclear and conventional disarmament, as set out in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament;

5. Reiterates that nuclear disarmament has the highest priority in efforts to advance disarmament on a universal basis;

6. Reaffirms its support for the United Nations machinery on disarmament, v hich is functioning pursuant to the decisions adopted at the tenth special session of the General Assembly;

7. Also reaffirms that the Conference on Disarmament is the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament;

8. Affirms that the implementation of international treaties dealing with disarmament should be carried out in accordance with the provisions of those treaties and that questions regarding compliance should be addressed in accordance with those provisions and the mechanisms established or envisaged in those provisions;

9. Also affirms that the Secretariat should support the realization of the objectives of disarmament, as set out in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, which was adopted by consensus.

Resolutfon 52/41

The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East


313


Bearing in mind its relevant resolutions*Taking note of the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Confer

ence of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the latest of which is resolution GC(41)/RES/25, adopted on 3 October 1997,

Cognizant that the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region of the Middle East would pose a serious threat to international peace and security.

Mindful of the immediate need to place all nuclear facilities in the region of the Middle East under full-scope safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency,

Recalling the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on 11 May 1995, in which the Conference noted with concern the continued existence in the Middle East of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, reaffirmed the importance of the early realization of universal adherence to the Treaty, and called upon all States in the Middle East that had not yet done so, without exception, to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and to place all their nuclear facilities under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

Recalling also the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on 11 May 1995, in which the Conference urged universal adherence to the Treaty as an urgent priority and called upon all States not yet party to the Treaty to accede to it at the earliest date, in particular those States which operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.

Noting that, since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 51/48 of 10 E)ecember 1996, Israel remains the only State in the Middle East that has not yet become party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Concerned over the threats posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons to the security and stability of the region of the Middle East,

Stressing the importance of undertaking confidence-building measures, in particular the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, in order to enhance peace and security in the region and to consolidate the global non-proliferation regime.

Noting the adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and its signature by one hundred and forty-nine States, including a number of States in the region,

1. Calls upon the only State in the region of the Middle East that is not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to

314


accede to it without further delay, and not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons and to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, and to place all its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities under fuil-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards as an important confidence- building measure among all States of the region and as a step towards enhancing peace and security;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its fifty-third session on the implementation of the present resolution;

3. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-third session the item entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East’’.

Resolution 52/42

Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on die Useof Certain Conventional Weapons Whidi May Be Deemed

to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects

The General Assembly,Recalling its resolution 51/49 of 10 December 1996 and previous resol

utions referring to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,

Recalling with satisfaction the adoption, on 10 October 1980, of the Convention, together with the Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I), the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II) and the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol HI), which entered into force on 2 December 1983,

Also recalling with satisfaction the adoption by the Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, on 13 October 1995 of the Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV), and on 3 May1996 of the amended Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines. Booby Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II),

Recalling the role played by the International Committee of the Red Cross in the elaboration of the Convention and the Procotols thereto.

Noting that, in conformity with article 8 of the Convention, conferences may be convened to examine amendments to the Convention or to any of the Protocols thereto, to examine additional protocols concerning other categories of conventional weapons not covered by existing Protocols or to review the scope and application of the Convention and the Protocols annexed

315


thereto and to examine any proposed amendments or additional protocols, and welcoming the decision adopted by the Review Conference in its Final Declaration on 3 May 1996 to convene a Review Conference no later than the year 2001,

1. Welcomes the additional ratiHcations and acceptances of or accessions to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, as well as the ratifications and acceptances of or accessions to the amended Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II);

2. Urgently calls upon all States that have not yet done so to take all measures to become parties, as soon as possible, to the Convention and the Protocols thereto, and in particular to amended Protocol n, with a view to achieving the widest possible adherence to this instrument at an early date, and calls upon successor States to take appropriate measures so that ultimately adherence to these instruments will be universal;

3. Calls, in particular, upon the States parties to the Convention to express their consent to be bound by the amended Protocol II with a view to its entry into force as soon as possible, and, pending its entry into force, to respect and ensure respect for its substantive provisions to the fullest extent possible;

4. Commends the Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV) to all States, with a view to achieving the widest possible adherence to this instrument at an early date and calls, in particular, upon the States parties to express their consent to be bound by the Protocol with a view to its entry into force as soon as possible;

5. Calls upon the Secretary-General, in his capacity as depositary of the Convention and the Protocols annexed thereto, to continue to inform it periodically of ratifications and acceptances of and accessions to the Convention and the Protocols, and decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-third session the item entitled “Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects”.

Resolution 52/44

Implementation of the Dedaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace

The General Assembly^Recalling the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, con

tained in its resolution 2832 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, and recalling also its resolution 51/51 of 10 December 1996 and other relevant resolutions.

316


Recalling also the report of the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean held in July 1979,

Recalling further paragraph 72 of the final document adopted by the Twelfth Ministerial Conference of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi on 7 and 8 April 1997, which underlined the importance of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean continuing his informal consultations on the future of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace and the Conmiittee’s work.

Emphasizing the need to foster consensual approaches, in particular given the prevailing international climate, which is conducive to the pursuit of such endeavours.

Noting the initiatives taken by countries of the region to promote cooperation, in particular economic cooperation, in the Indian Ocean area and the possible contribution of such initiatives to overall objectives of a zone of peace.

Convinced that the participation of all the permanent members of the Security Council and the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee is important and would assist the progress of mutually beneficial dialogue to develop conditions of peace, security and stability in the Indian Ocean region.

Considering that greater efforts and more time are required to develop a focused discussion on practical measures to ensure conditions of peace, security and stability in the Indian Ocean region.

Having considered the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean,

1. Takes note of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean;

2. Reiterates its conviction that the participation of all the permanent members of the Security Council and the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee is important and would greatly facilitate the development of a mutually beneficial dialogue to advance peace, security and stability in the Indian Ocean region;

3. Requests the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee to continue his dialogue on the work of the Ad Hoc Committee with all of its members, the permanent members of the Security Council and the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean and to report at an early date to the General Assembly, through the Ad Hoc Committee, on his consultations and on other relevant developments;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to render all necessary assistance to the Ad Hoc Committee, including the provision of summary records;

317


S. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty*fourth session the item entitled 'Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace”.

Resolution 52/45

Consdidation of the regime established by the TVeaty for tiie Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

and the Caribbean (TVeaty of TIatdolco)

The General Assembly,Recalling that in its resolution 1911 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963 it

expressed the hope that the States of Latin America would take appropriate measures to conclude a treaty that would prohibit nuclear weapons in Latin America

Recalling also that in the same resolution it voiced its confidence that, once such a treaty was concluded, all States, and in particular the nuclear- weapon States, would lend it their full cooperation for the effective realization of its peaceful aims.

Considering that in its resolution 2028 (XX) of 19 November 1965 it established the principle of an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations between nuclear-weapon States and those which do not possess such weapons.

Recalling that the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) was opened for signature at Mexico City on 14 February 1967,

Welcoming the holding of the eleventh special session of the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean on 14 February 1997 in commemoration of the thirtieth anniversary of the opening for signature of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, as well as the holding of the international seminar on the topic ''Nuclear- weapon-free zones in the next century” in Mexico City on 13 and 14 February 1997,

Recalling that in its preamble the Treaty of Tlatelolco states that military denuclearized zones are not an end in themselves but rather a means for achieving general and complete disarmament at a later stage.

Recalling also that in its resolution 2286 (XXII) of 5 December 1967 it welcomed with special satisfaction the Treaty of Tlatelolco as an event of historic significance in the efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote international peace and security.

Recalling further that in 1990, 1991 and 1992 the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and

318


the Caribbean approved and opened for signature a set of amendments to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, with the aim of enabling the full entry into force of that instrument.

Recalling resolution C/E/RES.27 of the Council of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, in which the Council called for the promotion of cooperation and consultations with other nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Noting with satitfaction that, with the full adherence on 14 February 1997 of Saint Kitts and Nevis, the Treaty of Tlatelolco is in force for thirty-two sovereign States of the region.

Also noting with satitfaction that on 22 October 1996 Paraguay and on 14 February 1997 Barbados and Venezuela deposited their instruments of ratification of the amendments to the Treaty of Tlatelolco approved by the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean in its resolutions 267 (E-V) of 3 July 1990, 268 (XII) of 10 May 1991 and 290 (E-VII) of 26 August 1992, and that on 23 October 1997 Guatemala signed the amendment to the Treaty contained in resolution 268 (XII),

Further noting with satisfaction that the amended Treaty of Tlatelolco is fully in force for Argentina, Barbados, Brazil, Chile, Guyana, Jamaica, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela,

L Welcomes the concrete steps taken by some countries of the region during the past year for the consolidation of the regime of military denuclearization established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco);

2. Notes with satisfaction the full adherence of Saint Kitts and Nevis to the Treaty of Tlatelolco;

3. Urges the countries of the region that have not yet done so to deposit their instruments of ratification of the amendments to the Treaty of Tlatelolco approved by the General Conference of the Agency for the Inhibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean in its resolutions 267 (E-V), 268 (XII) and 290 (E-VII);

4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-third session the item entitled ""Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)”.

Resolutioii 52/46

African Nudear-Weapon-Free Zone TVeaty


319


Recalling its resolution S1/S3 of 10 December 1996 and all its other relevant resolutions, as well as those of the Oi;ganization of African Unity,

Recalling also the successful conclusion of the signing ceremony of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba) that took place at Cairo on 11 April 1996,

Recalling further the Cairo Declaration adopted on that occasion, which emphasized that nuclear-weapon-firee zones, especially in regions of tension, such as the Middle East, enhance global and regional peace and security.

Noting the statement made by the President of the Security Council on behalf of the menibers of the Council on 12 April 1996, in which it was stated that the signature of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty constituted an important contribution by the African countries to the maintenance of international peace and security.

Considering that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, especially in the Middle East, would enhance the security of Africa and the viability of the African nuclear-weapon-free zone,

1. Calls upon Afirican States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty as soon as possible so that it may enter into force without delay;

2. Expresses its appreciation to the nuclear-weapon States that have signed the I^otocols that concern them, and calls upon those which have not yet ratified the Protocols concerning them to do so as soon as possible;

3. Calls upon the States contemplated in Protocol m to the Treaty that have not yet done so to take all necessary measures to ensure the speedy application of the Treaty to territories for which they are, de jure or de facto, internationally responsible and which lie within the limits of the geographical zone established in the Treaty;

4. Calls upon the African States parties to the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that have not yet concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency pursuant to the Treaty to do so, thereby satisfying the requirements of article 9 {b) of and annex II to the Treaty of Pelindaba when it enters into force;

5. Expresses its gratitude to the Secretary-General for the diligence with which he has rend^ed effective assistance to the signatories to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty in accordance with resolution 51/53;

6. Expresses its gratitude to the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity and the Director General of the International Atomic Eneigy Agency for the diligence with which they have rendered effective assistance to the signatories to the Treaty;

320


7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-fourth session the item entitled “African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty”.

Resolutioii 52/47

Convention on the Prohibition of the Develmmen^ Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on ']%eir Destruction

The General Assembly,Recalling its previous resolutions relating to the complete and effective

prohibition of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and to theu: destruction.

Noting with satisfaction that there are one hundred and forty States parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, including all the permanent members of the Security Council,

Bearing in mind its call upon all States parties to the Convention to participate in the implementation of the recommendations of the Review Conferences, including the exchange of information and data agreed to in the Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, and to provide such information and data in conformity with standardized procedure to the Secretary-General on an annual basis and no later than 15 April,

Recalling its resolution 46/35 A, adopted without a vote on 6 December 1991, in which it welcomed, inter alia, the establishment, proceeding from the recommendations of the Third Review Conference, of an ad hoc group of governmental experts open to all States parties to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint,

Recalling also its resolution 48/65, adopted without a vote on 16 December 1993, in which it conmiended the final report of the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Potential Verification Measures from a Scientific and Technical Standpoint, agreed to by consensus at the last meeting of the Ad Hoc Group at Geneva on 24 September 1993,

Recalling further its resolution 49/86, adopted without a vote on 15 December 1994, in which it welcomed the final report of the Special Conference of the States Parties to the Convention, adopted by consensus on 30 September 1994, in which the States parties agreed to establish an ad hoc group, open to all States parties, whose objective should be to consider

321


appropriate measures* including possible verification measures, and draft proposals to strengthen the Convention, to be included, as appropriate, in a legally binding instrument to be submitted for the consideration of the States parties.

Recalling the provisions of the Convention related to scientific and technological cooperation and the related provisions of the Hnal report of the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts, the final report of the Special Conference of the States Parties to the Convention, held from 19 to 30 September 1994, and the fmal documents of the Review Conferences,

1. Welcomes the information and data provided to date, and reiterates its call upon all States parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the £>evelopment. Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction to participate in the exchange of information and data agreed to in the Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention;

2. Also welcomes the progress made by the Ad Hoc Group towards fulfilling the mandate established by the Special Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on 30 September 1994, and urges the Ad Hoc Group to intensify its work with a view to completing it as soon as possible before the commencement of the Fifth Review Conference and to submit its report, which shall be adopted by consensus, to the States parties to be considered at a special conference;

3. Further welcomes in this context the steps taken by the Ad Hoc Group, as encouraged by the Fourth Review Conference, to review its methods of wodc and, in particular, the start of negotiations on a rolling text of a protocol to the Convention;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to render the necessary assistance to the depositary Gov^nments of the Convention and to provicte such services as may be required for the implementation of the decisions and recommendations of the Review Conferences, as well as the decisions contained in the final report of the Special Conference, including all necessary assistance to the Ad Hoc Group;

5. Calls upon all signatory States that have not yet ratified the Convention to do so without delay, and also calls upon those States that have not signed the Convention to become parties thereto at an early date, thus contributing to the achievement of universal adherence to the Convention;

6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its Hfty-third session the item entitled " Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction”.

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Decisioii 52/414

Comprehensive Nudeai^Test-Ban Treaty

The General Assembly, on the recommendation of the First Committee, recalling its resolution 50I2A5 of 10 September 1996, decided to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-third session the item entitled “Compre- hensve Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty”.

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A P P E N D IX VI

Voting patterns of resolutions and decision on disarmament adopted by the General Assembly in 1997

Reference in text

Resolutions on disarmament questions

52/30 Con^liance with arms limitation and disarmament and 149non-proliferation agreements

Adopted without a vote

52/31 Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the 150United Nations in the field of verification


52/32 Objective information on military matters, including 94transparency of military expenditures


52/33 The role of science and technology in the context of 149international security and disarmament

Adopted by a recorded vote of 103 to 43, with 19 abstentions, as follows:^

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Antigua-Barbuda,Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize,Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Dar-Salam,Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia,Congo, Costa Rica, C6te d’Ivoire, Cuba, DPR of Korea,Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Rep, Ecuador, Egypt,El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras,India, Indonesia, Iran (Isl R), Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya,

Subsequent to the voting the delegation of Haiti inforaied the Secretariat thatit had intended to vote in favour of the draft resolution.

340

Voting patterns of resolutions and decision

Referencein text

52/33 Kuwait, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon,{com) Liberia, Libyan AJ,Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia,

Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico,Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia,Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan,Panama, Papua N Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,Qatar, Rwanda, St Kitts-Nevis, Saint Lucia, St Vincent-Gren, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan,Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian AR, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad’Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, UA Emirates, UR Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam,Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria,Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic,Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Micronesia (FS), Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,Poland, Portugal, Rep of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, TFYR Macedonia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States

Abstaining: Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus,Brazil, Canada, Equatorial Guinea, Georgia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Marshall Islands, Rep of Korea, Russian Fed, Samoa, South Africa, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine

52/34 Establishnient of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the re- 33gion of the Middle East


52/35 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South 34Asia


Subsequent to the voting the delegation of Haiti informed the Secretariat thatit had intended to vote in favour of the draft resolution.

341


Reference in text

S2/3S In favour: Albania, Andorra, Antigua-Barbuda,(cont.) Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan,

Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus,Bel- gium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Dar-Salam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada,Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cdte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Rep, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia,Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany. Ghana,Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Iran (Isl R),Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia,Liberia, Libyan AJ, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania,Mexico, Micronesia (FS), Monaco, Mongolia,Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands,New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway,Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua N Guinea, Paraguay,Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar. Rep of Korea, Rep of Moldova, Romania, Russian Fed,Rwanda, St Kitts-Nevis, Saint Lucia, St Vincent-Gren,Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands,South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Tajikistan, Thailand, TFYR Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, UA Emirates, United Kingdom, UR Tanzania, United States. Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia,Zimbabwe

Against: Bhutan, India, Mauritius

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Algeria, Cuba, Cyprus, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic,Myanmar, Viet Nam

52/36 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to 29 assure non-nuclear*weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

342

\biing patterns of resolutions and decision

Reference in text

52/36 Adopted by a recorded vole of 116 to none, with 51 (cont,) abstentions, as follows:^

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Antigua>Barbuda, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados,Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana,Brazil, Brunei Dar-Salam, Burkina Faso, Cameroon,Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica. C6te d’Ivoire, Cuba, DPR of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica,Dominican Rep, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea,Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras,India, Indonesia, Iran (Isl R), Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan AJ, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua,Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua N Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, St Kitts-Nevis, Saint Lucia, St Vincent-Gren, Samoa,Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore,Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian AR, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda,Ukraine, UA Emirates, UR Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen,Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Armenia,Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia,Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Equatorial Guinea,Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (FS), Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand,Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rep of Korea, Rep of

Subsequent to the voting the delegation of Haiti informed the Secretariat thatit had intended to vote in favour of the draft resolution.

343


52/36 Moldova Romania, Russian Fed, San Marino, Slovakia,(cont.) Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, TFYR

Macedonia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States

52/37 Prevention of an arms race in outer space

Adopted by a recorded vote of 128 to none, with 39 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Antigua-Barbuda, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Dar-Salam, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, C6te d’Ivoire, Cuba, DPR of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Rep, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Isl R), Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan AJ, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (FS), Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua N Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rep of Korea, Russian Fed, Rwanda, St Kitts-Nevis, Saint Lucia, St Vincent-Gren, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian AR, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo. Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, UA Emirates, UR Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein,

Reference in text

147

344


Reference in text

52/37 Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway,{cant,) Poland, Portugal, Rep of Moldova, Romania, San

Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, TFYR Macedonia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States

52/38 General and complete disarmament

A Convention on the Prohibition of the Use. Stockpiling, 121Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction

Adopted hy a recorded vote of 142 to none, with 18 abstentions as follows:^

In favour: Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Antigua>Barbu- da, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahamas,Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium,Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil,Brunei Dar-Salam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon,Canada, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire,Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Rep, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji,Finland, France. Gabon. Georgia, Germany, Ghana,Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary. Iceland, Indonesia,Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Joi^an. Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan. Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia, Liechtenstein.Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malay- sia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mozambique.Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua,Niger, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua N Guinea,Paraguay. Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal. Qatar,Rep of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, St Kitts-Nevis,Saint Lucia. St Vincent-Gren, Samoa, San Marino.Saudi Arabia. Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore,Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa.Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname. Swaziland, Sweden,Thailand, TFYR Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad-Tobago,Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, UA Emirates,

Subsequent to the voting the delegation of Afghanistan informed the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour of the draft resolution.

345


Reference in text

52/38 A United Kingdom* UR Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan,(conL) Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: Azerbaijan, China, Cuba, Egypt, India,Iran (Isl R), Israel, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Morocco,Myanmar, Pakistan, Rep of Korea, Russian Fed, Syrian AR, Tajikistan, Turkey, United States

B Transparency in armaments 91


In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Antigua-Barbuda,Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize,Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Dar-Salam, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia,Congo, Costa Rica, C6te d’Ivoire, Cuba, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Rep, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon,Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti,Honduras, Indonesia, Iran (Isl R), Jamaica, Jordan,Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Liberia, Libyan AJ, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali,Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique,Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria,Oman, Panama, Papua N Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, St Kitts-Nevis, Saint Lucia, St Vincent-Gren, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, UA Emirates, UR Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam,Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Australia,Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Rnland, France, Germany,Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia,

® Subsequent to the voting, the delegation of Eritrea infomied the Secretariatthat it had intended to vote in favour.

346


Reference in text

52/38 B Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco,(cant.) Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal,

Rep of Moldova, Romania, Russian Fed, San Marino,Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, TFYR Macedonia,Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uzbekistan

Abstaining: Argentina, Belarus, China, Cyprus,Georgia, India, Japan, Kazakhstan, Malta, Marshall Islands, Pakistan, Rep of Korea, Tajikistan

C Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small 143arms and collecting them


D Relationship between disarmament and development 148


E Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and 150implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control

Adopted by a recorded vote o f 160 to none, with 6 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Mghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Antigua-Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia,Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh,Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan,Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Dar>Salam, Bulgaria,Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China,Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, C6te d’Ivoire, Croatia,Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, DPR of Korea,Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Rep,Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea,Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Georgia,Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary,Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Isl R), Ireland, Italy,Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Latvia,Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan AJ, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia,

347


Reference in text

52/38 E Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania,(cont,) Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique,

Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand,Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan,Panama, Papua N Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Rep of Korea, Rep of Moldova,Romania, Russian Fed, Rwanda, St Kitts-Nevis, Saint Lucia, St Vincent'Gren, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia,Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan. Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian AR, Tajikistan, Thailand, TFYR Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan,Uganda, Ukraine, UA Emirates, UR Tanzania, Uruguay,Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia,Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abslaining: France, Israel, Japan, Monaco, United Kingdom, United States

F Convening of the fourth special session of the General 164Assembly devoted to disarmament: report of the Preparatory Committee for the Fourth Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament


G Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament 94measures


H Contributions towards banning anti-personnel land- 122mines

Adopted by a recorded vote of 147 to none, with 15 abstentions, as follows:^

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra. Antigua-Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia,Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh,

Subsequent to the voting the delegation of the Syrian Arab Republic informed the Secretariat that it had intended to abstain.

348


Referettce in tfxt

52/38 H Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia,(cont,) Brazil, Brunei Dar-Salam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso,

Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo,Costa Rica. C6te d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Dem Rep of Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Rep, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji,Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana,Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, India, Iran (Isl R),Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar,Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Micronesia (FS), Monaco,Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands,New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway,Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua N Guinea, Paraguay,Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Rep of Korea, Rep of Moldova, Romania, Russian Fed, Rwanda, St Kitts-Nevis, Saint Lucia, St Vincent-Gren, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone,Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain,Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden,Tajikistan, Thailand, TFYR Macedonia, Trinidad-Toba- go, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine,UA Emirates, United Kingdom, UR Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela,Yemen

Against: None

Abstaining: Benin, Botswana, Cuba, Eritrea, Indonesia, Kenya, Malawi, Mexico, Mozambique,Namibia, Philippines, South Africa, Togo, Zambia,Zimbabwe

I Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes 38


349


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52/38 J Small arms 95


In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Antigua-Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia,Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados,Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia,Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Dar-Salam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia,Congo, Costa Rica, Cdte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba,Cyprus, Czech Republic, Dem Rep of Congo, Denmark,Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Rep, Ecuador, Egypt,El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia,Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia,Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary,Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Isl R), Ireland, Italy,Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Latvia,Liberia, Libyan AJ, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (FS), Monaco,Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia,Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger,Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua N Guinea,Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar,Rep of Korea, Rep of Moldova, Romania, St Kitts-Nevis, Saint Lucia, St Vincent-Gren, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia,Slovenia, Solomon Islands* South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Tajikistan, Thailand, TFYR Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan,Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, UR Tanzania,United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

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52/38 J Abstaining: Bahrain, Israel, Oman, Russian Fed,(cont.) Saudi Arabia, UA Emirates

K Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimi- 23 nation of nuclear weapons

Adopted by a recorded vote of 156 to none, with 10 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Antigua- Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados,Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia,Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Dar-Salam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia,Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic,Dem Rep of Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Rep,Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France,Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti,Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy,Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Latvia,Liberia, Libyan AJ, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania,Mexico, Micronesia (FS), Monaco, Mongolia,Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands,New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Oman,Panama, Papua N Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Rep of Korea, Rep of Moldova,Romania, Russian Fed, Rwanda, St Kitts-Nevis, Saint Lucia, St Vincent-Gren, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia,Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Tajikistan, Thailand, TFYR Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan,Uganda, Ukraine, UA Emirates, United Kingdom, UR Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan,Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia,Zimbabwe

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52/38 K Against: None (cont.)

Abstaining: Algeria, Cuba, DPR of Korea, India, Iran (Isl R), Israel, Mauritius, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan

L Nuclear disarmament 24

Adopted by a recorded vote of 109 to 39, with 18 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Antigua-Barbuda,Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize,Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Dar-Salam, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, China, Colombia,Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Cuba, DPR of Korea,Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Rep, Ecuador, Egypt,El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji,Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea<Bissau, Guyana. Haiti, Honduras, India,Indonesia, Iran (Isl R), Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic,Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan AJ, Madagascar, Malawi,Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius,Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar,Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman,Pakistan, Panama, Papua N Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, St Kitts-Nevis, Saint Lucia,St Vincent-Gren, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian AR, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, UA Emirates, UR Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela,Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria,Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic,Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rep of Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,TFYR Macedonia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States

352


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52/38 L Abstaining: Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus,{cont.) Chile, Cyprus, Georgia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Malta,

Marshall Islands, New Zealand, Rep of Korea, Russian Fed, San Marino, South Africa, Tajikistan, Ukraine

M Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations and nuclear disarma> 25 ment


In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Antigua-Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia,Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh,Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan,Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Dar-Salam, Bulgaria,Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China,Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia,Cyprus, Czech Republic, Dem Rep of Congo, Denmark,Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Rep, Ecuador, Egypt,El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia,Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland. France, Gabon, Georgia,Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary,Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan,Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Latvia, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar,Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands. Mauritania. Mauritius. Mexico, Micronesia (FS), Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique,Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal. Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger. Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan,Panama. Papua N Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,Poland, Portugal, Qatar. Rep of Korea, Rep of Moldova.Romania, Russian Fed. Rwanda. St Kitts-Nevis. Saint Lucia. St Vincent-Gren. Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia,Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa. Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan. Suriname. Swaziland, Sweden, Tajikistan, Thailand, TFYR Macedonia, Togo. Trinidad'Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan,

353


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52/38 M Uganda, Ukraine, UA Emirates, United Kingdom,(cont.) United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu,

Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: Cuba, DPR of Korea, India, Iran (Isi R), Lebanon, Libyan AJ, Syrian AR, UR Tanzania

N The nuclear<weapon-free southern hemisphere and adja> 36 cent areas


In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Antigua- Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan,Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus,Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil,Brunei Dar-Salam, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada,Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica. C5te d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, DPR of Korea, Dem Rep of Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Rep, Ecuador,Egypt, El Salvador. Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia,Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau. Guyana, Haiti. Honduras. Hungary, Indonesia, Iran (Isl R), Ireland. Jamaica. Jordan, Kazakhstan. Kenya. Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan AJ, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania.Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique. Myanmar,Namibia. Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger,Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua N Guinea,Paraguay, Peru. Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, St Kitts-Nevis, Saint Lucia, St Vincent-Gren, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia. Senegal, Sierra Leone,Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka,Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian AR, Tajikistan, Thailand, TFYR Macedonia. Togo, Trinidad-Tobago. Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda,Ukraine, UA Emirates, UR Tanzania. Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu. Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen,Zambia, Zimbabwe

354


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52/38 N Against: France, United Kingdom, United States (cant.)

Abstaining: Andorra, Armenia, Belgium, Bulgaria,Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,Georgia, Germany, Greece, Iceland, India, Israel, Italy,Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mauritius,Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rep of Korea, Rep of Moldova, Romania, Russian Fed,Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey

O Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice 27 on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons

Adopted by a recorded vote of 116 to 26, with 24 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Antigua-Barbuda,Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados,Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Dar-Salam, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chile, China.Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, C6te d’Ivoire, Cuba,DPR of Korea, Dem Rep of Congo, Djibouti, Dominican Rep. Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea. Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon,Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Isl R),Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan AJ, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta,Marshall Islands, Mauritania. Mauritius, Mexico,Mongolia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal,New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman,Pakistan, Panama, Papua N Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, St Kitts-Nevis, Saint Lucia,St Vincent-Gren, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia,Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands,South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland,Sweden, Syrian AR, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad-Tobago,

i Subsequent to the voting, the delegation of I\irkmenistan infomied the Secretariat it had intended to vote in favour of the draft resolution.

355


52/38 O {cont.)

P

Q

Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, UA Emirates, UR Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Albania, Andorra, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Germany. Greece, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Fed, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, TFYR Macedonia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States

Abstaining: Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Benin, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Iceland, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Norway. Rep of Korea, Rep of Moldova, Tajikistan. Turkmenistan

Regional disarmament


Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels

Adopted by a recorded vote of 164 to 1 with 2 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Antigua-Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan. Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize. Benin. Bhutan, Bolivia. Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Dar-Salam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon. Canada, Chile. China. Colombia. Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, CyjM-us, Czech Republic, DPR of Korea, Dem Rep of Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Ck>minica. Dominican Rep, Ecuador. Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon. Georgia, Germany. Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary. Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Isl R), Ireland, Israel, Italy. Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia, Liechtenstein,

Reference in text

141

141

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52/38 Q Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malay-(cant,) sia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands,

Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (FS),Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar,Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua,Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama,Papua N Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland,Portugal, Qatar, Rep of Korea, Rep of Moldova,Romania, Russian Fed, Rwanda, St Kitts>Nevis, Saint Lucia, St Vincent-Gren, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia,Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian AR, Tajikistan, Thailand, TFYR Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan,Uganda, Ukraine, UA Emirates, United Kingdom, UR Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan,Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: India

Abstaining: Cuba, Libyan AJ R Transparency in armaments 89

Adopted with a recorded vote of 155 to none, with 11abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Antigua-Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia,Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh,Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan,Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Dar-Salam, Bulgaria,Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China,Colombia, Congo. Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia,Cyprus, Czech Republic, Dem Rep of Congo, Denmark,Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Rep, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia,Fiji, Fmland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana,Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India,Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia,

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52/38 R Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg,(cont.) Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta,

Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Micronesia (FS), Monaco.Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria,Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua N Guinea,Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar,Rep of Korea, Rep of Moldova, Romania, Russian Fed,Rwanda, St Kitts-Nevis, Saint Lucia, St Vincent-Gren,Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore,Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa,Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Tajikistan, Thailand, TFYR Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan,Uganda, Ukraine, UA Emirates, United Kingdom, UR Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan,Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: Algeria, Cuba, DPR of Korea, Egypt, Iran (Isl R), Lebanon, Libyan AJ, Mexico, Myanmar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian AR

S Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central 35Asia


T Status of the Convention on the Prohibition of the De- 71velopment. Production. Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction


52/39 Review aiul implementation of the Concluding Documentof the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly

A United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarma- 143ment in Asia and the Pacific


B Regional confidence-building measures 142


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52/39 C Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear 26 Weapons

Adopted with a vote of 109 to 30, with 27 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Antigua-Barbuda,Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize,Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Dar^Salam, Burkina Faso, Cameroon. Chile, China,Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba,DPR of Korea, Dem Rep of Congo, Djibouti. Dominican Rep, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji. Gabon,Ghana, Grenada. Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Isl R),Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan AJ, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua,Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua N Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar. St Kitts-Nevis, Saint Lucia. St Vincent-Gren, Samoa,Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore,Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan,Suriname. Swaziland, Syrian AR, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, UA Emirates, UR Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela,Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Albania, Andorra, Belgium, Bulgaria,Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland.France, Germany, Greece, Hungary. Iceland, Italy,Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands,Norway. Poland, Portugal. Romania, Slovakia,Slovenia, Spain, TFYR Macedonia, Turkey, United Kingdom

i Subsequent to the voting, the delegation of the United States infomied theSecretariat that it had intended to vote against the draft resolution.

359


52/39 C Abstaining: Argentina, Armenia* Australia, Austria, (cont.) Azerbaijan, Belarus, Croatia, Cyprus, Georgia, Ireland,

Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Liechtenstein, Malta, Marshall Islands, New Zealand, Rep of Korea, Rep of Moldova, Russian Fed, San Marino, Sweden, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan

D United Nations Disarmament Information Programme


52/40 Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session

A Report of the Conference on Disarmament


B Report of the Disarmament Conunission


C Role of the United Nations in disarmament


In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Antigua-Barbuda, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Dar-Salam, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo. Costa Rica, Cdte d’Ivoire, Cuba, DPR of Korea, Dem Rep of Congo, Djibouti, Dominican Rep, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equat Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Isl R), Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan AJ, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua N Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Russian Fed, St Kitts>Nevis, Saint

Reference in text

173

162

158

162

360


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52/40 C Lucia, St Vincent-Gren, Samoa, Saudi Arabia Senegal,(cont.) Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname,

Swaziland, Syrian AR, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Tuiicey, Uganda, Ukraine,UA Emirates, UR Tanzania, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria,Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic,Denmark, Estonia, Fmland, France, Germany, &eece,Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Micronesia (FS), Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,Poland, Portugal, Rep of Moldova, Romania, Slovakia,Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, TFYR Macedonia, United Kingdom, United States

Abstaining: Argentina, Canada, Georgia, Japan, Kyrgyzstan, Malta, Marshall Islands, Rep Korea, San Marino, Solomon Islands, Uruguay, Uzbekistan

52/41 The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East 30

Adopted by a recorded vote of 147 to 2 with 14 absten-tions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra,Antigua-Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia,Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh,Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan,Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Dar-Salam, Bulgaria,Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia,Congo, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, DPR of Korea, Dem Rep of Congo, Denmark, Djibouti,Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea,Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia,Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary,Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Isl R), Ireland, Italy, Jamaica,Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon,Liberia, Libyan AJ, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali,Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco,

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52/41 Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal,{cont.) Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria,

Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Rep of Korea, Romania,Russian Fed, Rwanda, St Kitts-Nevis, Saint Lucia, St Vincent-Gren, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia,Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan,Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian AR, Tajikistan,Thailand, TFYR Macedonia, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, UA Emirates, United Kingdom, UR Tanzania, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Israel, United StatesAbstaining: Canada, C6te d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, India,

Kazakhstan, Kenya, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (FS), Myanmar, Norway, Papua N Guinea, Singapore, Trinidad-Tobago, Uruguay

52/42 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use 125of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects


52/44 Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean 37as a Zone of Peace


In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Antigua-Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Dar-Salam, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chile. China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo,Costa Rica. Cote d’Ivoire, Cuba, DPR of Korea, Dem Rep of Congo, Djibouti, Dominican Rep, Ecuador,Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia,Fiji, Gabon, Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala,Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Isl R), Jamaica, Japan, Jordan,

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52/44 Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s(cont.) Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan AJ,

Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta,Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico,Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia,Nepal. New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman,Pakistan, Panama, Papua N Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rep of Korea, Russian Fed, Rwanda,St Kitts-Nevis, Saint Lucia, St Vincent-Gren, Samoa,Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore,Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan,Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian AR, Tajikistan, Thailand,Togo, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan,Uganda, Ukraine, UA Emirates, UR Tanzania, Uruguay,Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia,Zimbabwe

Against: France. United Kingdom, United States

Abstaining: Albania, Andorra, Armenia. Austria,Belgium. Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark. Estonia, Finland, Germany,Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, haly, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Micronesia (FS), Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal.Rep of Moldova. Romania, San Marino, Slovakia,Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, TFYR Macedonia, Turkey, Uzbekistan

52/45 Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty 32for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)


52/46 African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty 33


52/47 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Pro> 72duction and Stockpiling of Bacteriologic^ (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction


363


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Decision

52/414 Con^rehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 31

Adopted by a recorded vote of 154 to none, with 4 abstentions, as follows:^

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Antigua-Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia,Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh,Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana,Brazil, Brunei Dar-Salam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo,Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Rep, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea,Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon,Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary,Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Isl R), Ireland, Israel, Italy,Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic,Lebanon, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxem> bourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta,Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mexico, Micronesia (FS),Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar,Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand. Nicaragua,Niger, Nigeria. Norway. Oman, Pakistan, Panama.Papua N Guinea. Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland,Portugal, Qatar, Rep of Korea, Rep of Moldova,Romania, Russian Fed, St Kitts-Nevis, Saint Lucia,Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands,South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian AR. Tajikistan, Thailand,TFYR Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia.Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, UA Emirates.United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan.Vanuatu. Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia,Zimbabwe

Subsequent to the voting the delegations of Ginea>Bissau, Haiti and Latviainformed the Secretariat that they had intended to vote in favour of the draft resolution.

364

52/414{cont.)


Reference in text

Against: None

Abstaining: Bhutan, India, Libyan AJ, UR Tanzania

365

A P P E N D I X VII

Abbreviations and acronyms

ABM Treaty Anti-Ballistic Missile TreatyAPMs Anti-personnel minesARF ASEAN Regional ForumASEAN Association of Southeast Asian NationsBWC Biological Weapons ConventionCCW Convention on Certain Conventional WeaponsCD Conference on DisarmamentCFE Treaty Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in EuropeCICA Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building

Measures in Asia CISCAP Council for Security and Cooperation in the

Asia Pacific Region CTBT Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban TreatyCTBTO Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty OrganizationCWC Chemical Weapons ConventionDOE Department of EnergyDPRK Democratic People’s Republic of KoreaECLAC Economic Conunission for Latin America and the CaribbeanECOMOG Economic Community of West African States

Monitoring Observer Group ECOWAS Economic Community of West African StatesEU European UnionG-7 Group of SevenIAEA International Atomic Energy AgencylAUP International Association of University PresidentsICBL International Campaign to Ban LandminesICBM Intercontinental ballistic missileICJ International Court of JusticeICRC Intemational Committee of the Red CrossIDC Intemational Data CentreINF Treaty Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and

Shorter-Range Missiles (United States-Russian)

366

Abbreviations and acronyms

IMPRES Institut Nacional de Prevenci6n SfsmicaIMS International Monitoring SystemMIRV Multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicleMTCR Missile Technology Control RegimeNATO North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNGOs Non-govemmental organizationsNMD National missile defenceNPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation TreatyNSG Nuclear Suppliers GroupOAS Organization of American StatesOAU Organization of African UnityOPCW Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical WeaponsOSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in EuropeOSI On-site inspectionPTBT Partial Test-Ban TreatyPTS Provisional Technical SecretariatSTART Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (I. II and III)TLE Treaty-limited equipmentTMD Theatre missile defenceUNDC United Nations Disarmament CommissionUNIDIR United Nadons Institute for Disarmament ResearchUNITA National Union for the Total Independence of AngolaUNOMIL United Nations Observer Mission in LiberiaUNSCOM United Nations Special CommissionUTLE Unaccounted for and uncontrolled treaty-limited equipmentVEREX Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and

Examine Potential Verification Measures from a Scientific and Technical Standpoint

367

S E L E C T I V E I NDE X

A reference to a chapter indicates the main place in The Yearbook where a subject is discussed. Under entries resolution on, the first page reference indicates where it is discussed in a chapter, the second indicates where it appears in the appendix of resolution texts (appendix IV). For information concerning the titles and sponsorship of resolutions, refer to appendix V.

AABM Treaty, 6-9

Advisory Board, 169

Africa, 78,110 Central Africa

Standing Advisory Committee, 132

report of Secretary- General, 132

nuclear-weapon-free zone, 20 resolution on, 33

text, 319 West Africa, 131, 171

Algeria, 88 explanation of vote

52/38 A, 123 52/38 K, 24 52/38 R, 89

Americas, 132-134 See Latin America and the Carib

bean

Angola. 118, 130, 131

Antarctic Treaty, 20

anti-personnel mines, 128, 135, 160 See also Ottawa Convention;

chap. V Africa, 130 Latin America, 133 resolutions on, 121,122

text, 272, 281,315

Argentina, 133, 134 explanation of vote

52/38 B, 93 52/38 0 , 29 52/40 C, 163

arms/technology transfers, 76, 134,136

See also Inter-American Convention; Register of Conventional Arms

illicit trafficking, 78-80,132-133, 140, 170

resolution on, 143 text, 274

ASEAN, 20,134--135

Asia, 134-137 Central Asia, 48,137

resolution on, 35 text. 301

368

Selective Index

Regional Centre, 129 resolution on, 143

text, 303 South Asia, 19,78

nuclear-weapon-free zone, 20 resolution on, 34

text, 265

Australia, 108,112, 116, 117 explanation of vote

52/38 B, 92 52/40 C, 163

Australia Group, 71

Austria, 113 explanation of vote

52/38 H, 124

Azerbaijanexplanation of vote

52/38 A, 122

BBangkok Treaty, 20

Bangladesh explanation of vote

52/38 H, 124 52/38 K, 24

Belarus, 7,48

Belgium, explanation of vote

52/38 0, 28

biological weapons.See BWC; chap. m

Bosnia and Herzegovina, 118

Brazil explanation of vote

52/38 H, 124

52/38 J, 96

Bulgaria explanation of vote

52/38 A, 123

Burundi, 130

BWC See chap. IllAd Hoc Group, 59, 61-63 resolution on, 72

text, 321

cCanada, 3.43-46.86, 111, 146

explanation of vote 52/38 B, 92 52/40 C, 163

Canbma Commission, 47

CCW, 111 amended Protocol II, 109, 113 resolution on, 125

text, 315

Central African Republic, 131

Centre/Department for Disarmament Affairs, 154, 170

publications, 173

CFE Treaty, 137-139

chemical weapons.See CWC; chap. HI

Chile, 134, 145 explanation of vote

52/38 H, 125 52/38 L, 25 52/38 0 .29

China, 5,43,44,47.65,88, 108-110,136,146

explanation of vote 52/30,150

369


52/33,149 52/38 B. 93 52/38 J. 96 52/38 K. 24 52/38 L. 25 52/38 N, 37 52/38 R. 90 52/39 C. 27 52/40 C. 164

Colombia, 51,77,86,155

Conference on Disarnianient, 3-5, 11-13,18,19.21,22,45-46, 87-88, 107,108-109, 111-112, 118, 145-146,158-162

agenda, 159-162 membership, 159,161 resolution on, 162

text, 310

confidence-building/measures, 46, 80,114,128,134.135-136, 139

resolution on. 142 text. 304

conventional weapons, 157 See also chaps. IV, V and VI practical disarmament/measures,

7 9 ^ , 131-132 resolution on, 94

text, 280 resolution on, 141

text, 298 small arms/light weapons, 77,

78-79,131,133, 140,170 moratorium. 76, 131 Panel of Experts, 78-79,84.

129,133,169 recommendations. 98-101

resolutions on. 95.143 text. 274,283

Croatia, 118

CTBT.3,8-11,12,45 decision on, 31

text, 323

Cuba, 59, 86,109, 118 explanation of vote

52/38 A, 122 52/38 B, 93 52/38 H, 124 52/38 J, 96 52/38 K, 23 52/38 M, 25 52/38 Q. 142 52/38 R. 89 52/42.125

CWC See chap. Ill OPCW, 65-68 resolution on, 71

text, 302

Czech Republic, 140

DDemocratic Republic of the Congo,

130

Disarmament Commission, 3, 19, 22,76,79,88-89,155-157

agenda, 157 resolution on, 158

text, 311

Disarmament Information Programme, 170-172

See chap. VIII resolution on, 173

text, 309

Disarmament Week, 171

DPRK, 15 explanation of vote

52/38 R, 90

370

Selective Index

E

economic aspects, 107 conversion, 18, 50 disarmament and development,

147-148 resolution on, 148

text, 276

Ecuador, 116, 134

Egypt, 12,44,88,108,111,145, 160

explanation of vote 52/38 A, 122 52/38 J, 96 52/38 R, 89 52/47,71

environmental aspects, 50 resolution on, 151

text, 277

Ethiopia, 118

Europe, 17,20,48,137-140

European Union, 45,86 explanation of vote

52/37,147 52/38 B, 92 52/38 D, 148*52/38 F, 165*52/40 C, 163

export controls, 18-19,50,71, 86,133,134

FFellowship, training and advisory

services, 172

Finland, 108, 118 explanation of vote

52/38 A, 123

fissile material, 13-14, 18 cut-off convention, 2,4, 11-14,

45-47,52, 160

Founding Act, 139

France, 5,47, 113

GGabon, 132

explanation of vote 52/38 O, 29

General Assembly, 154-157,162, 171

First Committee, 3,5,13,19,21, 22, 154^157, 171

agenda, 166 fourth special session, 77,

156-158 resolution on, 164

text, 278

Germany, 113 explanation of vote

52/38 0 ,28

* In addition, the States of Central and Eastern Europe associated with the EU—Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia. Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia—the associated State of Cyprus, and member countries of the European Economic Area, Iceland (52/38 D) and Norway (52/38 F).

371


Ghana explanation of vote

52/40 C 164

Greece explanation of vote

52/38 0 ,28

Guatemala, 118, 133

Hhumanitarian law, 113,116

Hungary, 108,140

IIAEA, 14.18

peaceful uses, 44,49 atoll radiological study, 17 DPRK, 15 Iraq, 15-16safeguards, 14-16,44,46

Model Protocol Additional,14-15,48

ICBL, 110,112, 116,117,130,171

ICJ, 3,22 advisory opinion


ICRC, 110,112,116,130

India, 12,108,136,145 explanation of vote

52/35,34 52/36,30 52/38 A, 122 52/38 B. 93 52/38 K, 23 52/38 M, 25

52/38 N. 37 52/38 Q, 141 52/41,31 52/414, 32 52/47,72

Indonesia explanation of vote

52/35,35

INF Treaty, 13

Inter-American Convention, 78, 132-133

See also appendix III

Iran (Islamic Republic of), 3,86, 108

explanation of vote 52/34, 33 52/38 A. 122 52/38 B, 93 52/38 H, 124 52/38 K, 24 52/38 M, 25 52/38 R, 90 52/41,31

Iraq, 68-70

Israel, 108,118 explanation of vote

52/32,94 52/34,34 52/35,35 52/38 D, 148 52/38 H, 124 52/38 N, 37 52/38 S, 35 52/40 C, 163 52/41,31 52/42,125 52/45,32 52/46,33 52/47,72

372

Selective Index

JJapan. 3.43.6S. 108.116.117.136.

137explanation of vote

52/38 L. 25 52/38 0.28 52/39 C. 26

KKazakhstan, 7,48,135

Kenya, 130 explanation of vote

52/40 C 164

Kyi;gyzstan, 20,48, 136

LLao People's Democratic Republic,

135

Latin America and the Caribbean,78,134

Eastern Caribbean States, 133 nuclear>weapon-free zone, 19

League of Arab States, 112

Lebanon explanation of vote

52/38 A, 123

Liberia, 131

MMalaysia, 135

Mali, 131

Marshall Islands, 50

Mexico, 12,42,52,86, 109, 132, 145,156

explanation of vote 52/38 B, 93 52/38 H, 124 52/38 J, 96 52/38 K, 24

Middle East, 19,50,52, 136 resolutions on, 30, 33

text, 262, 313military budgets/expenditures, 137

standardized reporting, 77,80,82 report of Secretary-

General, 77Mongolia, 48Mozambique, 130

MTCR, 19Myanmar, 48,135

explanation of vote 52/38 A, 122 52/38 R, 90

NNamibia. 118NATO. 137,138-140Nepal, 137Netherlands, 42

explanation of vole 52/38 H. 124

New Zealand explanation of vote

52/38 H, 124 52/40 C, 163

NGOs.53,110,117,171Nigeria. 48

explanation of vote 52/38 K, 24 52/38 R,91

373


Norway, 13,46,50 explanation of vote

52/38 H, 124

NPT,3,5,15, 16,20,21,22,156 See chap. IIPreparatory Committee, 13-14,

171

nuclear arms/materials See also chap. I illicit trafficking, 18 resolutions on

bilateral negotiations, 25 text, 290

elimination, 23 text, 285

use, 26, 27, 29 text, 266, 295, 307

nuclear disarmament, 44,45-47, 52,109, 160

See also entries under specific topics; chap. I

resolutions on, 23, 24,25 text, 285,287, 290

nuclear non-proliferation See chap. II

nuclear safety, 16,49 Joint Convention (IAEA), 16,50 Moscow Summit, 17

Nuclear Suppliers Group, 18

nuclear-weapon-free zones, 19-21, 22,44,48,50,137,157

See also southern hemisphere; specific regions/treaties; chap. I

resolutions on, 32,33,34,35,36 text, 262,265,301,318,319,

oOAS, 78,132

OAU, 129-130,132

Oman, explanation of vote, 52/38 B,91

OSCE, 137-138, 140

Ottawa Convention, 112-122 See also appendix II

outer space, 145-147, 161 resolution on, 147

text, 269

pPakistan, 12,145

explanation of vote 52/32.94 52/38 A. 122 52/38 J, 96 52/38 K, 23 52/38 M, 26 52/41,31 52/47,72

Pelindaba Treaty, 20 resolution on, 33

text, 319

Peru, 132,134

Poland, 116,140 explanation of vote

52/38 H, 125

Portugal explanation of vote

52«8H. 125

Rradioactive material/waste, 5,

16-18,49,50

374

Selective Index

Joint Convention, 16 resolution on, 38

text. 282

reform programme, 154-156

regional approaches/measures See also chap. VI resolutions on, 141, 142

text, 296, 298, 304

Regional Centres See also chap. VI report of Secretary-General, 137 resolution on, 143

text, 303

Register of Conventional Arms, 77, 80-86,87, 170

composite table, 101 Group of Experts, 81-86 reports of Secretary-General,

80-83

Republic of Korea, 108 explanation of vote

52/36, 30 52/38 E, 151

Republic of the Congo, 130

Russian Federation, 5-8,21,47,63, 64, 136,137, 139

explanation of vote 52/38 B, 92 52/38 F, 165 52/38 J, 95,96 52/40 C, 164

Rwanda, 130

SSaudi Arabia

explanation of vote 52/38 R, 90 52/41, 31

science and technology, 149 resolution on, 149

text, 261

security assurances, 21-22,44,48, 51


Security Council meeting on Africa, 129

Singapore explanation of vote

52/38 A, 123 52/38 J, 96

Slovenia explanation of vote

52/38 H, 124Somalia, 130

South Africa, 43,48,130 explanation of vote

52/38 B, 93 52/38 H, 124 52/38 0,29 52/40 C, 163

South Pacific nuciear-weapon-free zone, 20

southern hemisphere, 20 resolution on, 36

text, 293Spain, 116

explanation of vote 52/46,33

Sri Lanka, 118,145 explanation of vote

52/38 R,91

START Treaty/Treaties, 3,5,6-8, 13,47

375


studies* 169-171 ammunition and explosives, 170 small arms, 169

Sudan, 48 explanation of vote

52/38 R,91

Sweden explanation of vote

52/38 0,29

Syrian Arab Republic explanation of vote

52/34,34 52/38 R, 90 52/47,71

T

Tajikistan, 48, 136

theatre missile defence, 6-8

Togo, explanation of vote, 52/38 H, 124

transparency/objective information, 13, 18,46,60, 80,81,84, 86, 114, 128, 135,139, 160

See aba military budgets/expenditures; Register of Conventional Arms;

chap. IV resolutions on. 89,91,94

text. 259.273.299

Treaty of Rarotonga, 20

Treaty of Tlatelolco. 19-20 resolution on. 32

text. 318

Tuiicey. 108

explanation of vote 52/38 A, 122 52/40 C. 164

Turkmenistan. 48

uUkraine, 7,48,118

UNIDIR, 79,133,172 publications, 174

United Kingdom, S, 20,47,113 explanation of vote

52/381,97 52«80.28

United Nations role


United States, 4-7,10,43,47,63, 86.108,110-112,113, 115-117,118,134,136,137, 156

explanation of vote 52/37,147 5m $ A, 122 52/38 B, 92 52/38 D, 148 52/38 F, 165 52/38 J, 97 52/38 N, 36 52/38 0 , 28 52/38 S, 35 52/40 C, 163 52/41,31

UNSCOM, 15.68-70

Uruguay, 134

Uzbekistan, 48

376

Selective Index

V

Venezuela* 116

verification/compliance, 9. 11,14, 22,45,77, 113-115

resolutions on, 150 text, 256,258

\Tiet Nam explanation of vote

52/38 A, 123

wWassenaar Arrangement, 86

weapons of mass destruction, 19, 81,85,86,88,135

See also chaps. I, II and III

zZambia, 130

Zimbabwe, 130

377

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