NWC 1029

THE UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

PROBLEM SOLVING AND THE MILITARY PROFESSIONAL

William J. Hartig (Colonel, USMC [Ret])

June 2005 (Revised June 2012)

2

The intuitive mind is a sacred gift and the rational mind is a

faithful servant. We have created a society that honors the servant and

has forgotten the gift.

—Albert Einstein

In the profession of arms, we are often tasked with identifying, assessing, and defining problems, and then developing coherent solutions to them in a time and resource constrained, volatile, uncertain, complex, ambiguous, and often violent environment. The simple reality is that as senior officers we are problem solvers, yet we spend precious little intellectual capital on understanding what that specifically means. Our intent is to present the military officer or civilian counterpart with a cognitive line of departure for thinking about problems for as we shall discover, the accurate identification of the true problem is quite often far more difficult than the development of any potential solution.

Following is a general organization of this paper and a short summation of what is

to come. We start this journey with a simple question: what is a problem? A discussion of what a problem is and whether or not problems always have solutions follows. We then identify some discrete problem types and broad problem genres. Why do we need to understand the different sorts as they refer to problem solving? It is done because different problem types require different cognitive approaches and they require different instruments to reach closure. As a senior officer, however, the most critical instrument in problem solving is neither process nor hardware; rather, the only unanimously applicable aspect throughout the realm of problem solving is ‘wetware’—as evidenced by a sharp intellect. As we will come to understand, the intellect is the only complete weapon we as problem solvers have. To continue, once we believe we understand what a problem is and into what category it may fall, we will seek (and fail to find) a universal process to solve problems.

As you will come to value, not all problems we face have solutions; in fact, many

of the problems encountered by military professionals at the operational level of war are not truly solvable in the literal sense. How then do we proceed? We will continue this discussion by examining the military planning processes to determine how applicable they are across the wide spectrum of conflict. Additionally, we will consider the prerequisites necessary for the type of mental activity associated with the critical thinking skills we develop. We will briefly discuss the concept of design as a methodology for addressing certain types of problems. Design is on the cusp of being seen in U. S. military doctrine and the planner can expect a change in the language of problem solving in the not too distant future. This discussion will end with an exhortation to use the academic year at the War College to sharpen your intellect, your intellectual sword, in order to better serve our men and women in uniform, our military and political leaders, and the American people. A precautionary note is in order, however; in a careful reading of this document, you will realize that we often shift between the world of theory and that of practice, but unlike Clausewitz, we will try to keep the reader informed regarding which world we are cognitively occupying.

3

What Is a Problem?

It's not that I'm so smart; it's just that I stay with problems longer.

—Albert Einstein

Oftentimes, a problem may be identified through an observable and measurable activity. In others, there is a cognitive dissociation where the facts seen are not congruent with what is believed. Still, a problem is evident when we have a goal or objective and

do not know how to achieve it, or there are obstacles, known and unknown, that impede us along the way. In an observable activity, consider a simple example. In the interwar period between World Wars, a series of War Plans were tested at the Naval War College. One, War Plan Orange, envisioned a war against Japan in the Pacific. In order to prosecute this type of operation, troops and equipment would need to move from ship-to-shore in the face of opposition. A problem

statement became clear; there existed no means to move forces under armor from ship-to-shore. The development of the amphibious tractor was the logical solution to this problem. Another, perhaps more complex example may be found in a simple headache. The prudent problem solver asks, is the headache the problem, or is it a symptom of the true problem? In a situation where what we believe and what we see are not congruent, a problem exists. The quandary is in identifying the correct problem and not shifting our mental paradigm to accommodate the increasingly complex new challenge; not solving the problems we are accustomed to solving instead of the problems we face. That is the first and most difficult, yet critical step in problem solving—accurately identifying the true problem and determining a methodology to address it. There are many obstacles to this endeavor in the military profession: culture, time constraints, personal background, political imperatives, media pressures, and service bias. All, unfortunately, add to the problem solvers’ challenge. We will discover that when the typology of problems is discussed below that some problems have no neatly bounded problem statements; they are problems absent clear or identifiable boundary conditions.1 We will discover that there exists a problem set that has no clear solution, no algorithmic process to follow to logical conclusion, no discernible starting point, and no known stopping point. These are the types of problems we face in the real world, and it is these problems that we will emphasize throughout the course of studies here at the Naval War College.

1 A boundary condition is a description of specific facts that are required, along with a known, a law, or a process, to explain a particular event, state, or fact.

4

The Typology of Problems

No problem can stand the assault of sustained thinking.

—Voltaire

In the literature, one discovers many discrete problem types. For example, there are logical problems intended to assess or test one’s mental acuity. Logical problems may be represented by intellectually stimulating games like contract bridge or chess. As military planners, we are thankful if we are faced with logical problems. Still, there are algorithmic problems.2 Traditionally thought of in mathematical terms, algorithmic problems are resolved using a predetermined, well-bounded, and rigid process. Scheduling and movement of forces, logistical sustainment, port throughput, firing solutions, and ammunition expenditure rates are all examples of this type of problem. An algorithmic approach is ideally suited in military acquisition, for example. American industry can build almost whatever we want. This part of the equation, the building of equipment, is the uncomplicated part. The difficult question, the complicated question, and one where the algorithmic approach falls far short, is ‘what is it that we want’?

The primary limitation of the algorithmic approach with its linear, analytical

processes has generally been seen as dependence on the use of routine knowledge coupled with a potential lack of a holistic understanding of the nature of the problem faced. Information that is learned only as a procedure, as a matter of rote, is exceptionally difficult to transfer between problem sets precisely because of this lack of a holistic understanding of the underlying causes.3 Procedures are easy to transfer but woefully flawed in universal application. This becomes evident when applying one of our rational analytical processes (JOPP, MDMP, etc.) to an ill-structured problem such as insurgency. Think of the car builder in Detroit. One person becomes an expert in mounting the bumper. Clearly, this person has seen a wide range of problems with bumper mounting. If we transfer this expert to windshield installment, are the skills developed in the bumper department transferable? What if we put this person in charge of the assembly of the entire automobile? Would the expert skills in bumpers and windshields transfer? And to murky the theoretical waters further, there are diagnosis-solution problems, rule-using problems, case-method problems, tiered problems, physical problems, intangible problems, puzzles, dilemmas, story problems, troubleshooting, design problems, issue-based problems, problems of rationality, and so forth. We return then to the basic question, what is a problem? We may list several definitions in the reading, but the true definition and the only one that matters is the one that the reader develops in his or her own mind. These problem forms are described above as distinct and separate because here we speak of theory. To present the information, we elect first to present the theory and then move to reality. The theoretical bounding of the problem types above presents a

2 , D. H. Jonassen and M. Tesser. “An Outcomes Based Taxonomy for Instructional Systems Design Evaluation, and Research.” Training Research Journal 2 (1996/1997). 3 Ibid.

5

mental image that is relatively straightforward and comprehensible. In theory, these problems are neatly bounded and can be easily identified. Solutions to them can be visualized, tested for validity and applicability, an optimal solution selected, and ultimately implemented—all with a clear causality chain between the solution implementation and the outcome. Now, we must shift back into our reality. In the real world, the problems we face will be combinations of these discrete types cited above, and it will in fact be exceedingly difficult to discern what specific type we face. Nor can the solutions to them be logically tested. Why does it matter? It matters in that the cognitive skills and the processes used vary with problem type. Fortunately, over the years, a number of social scientists have developed something of a bounding mechanism to add some clarity to our real world, and in keeping with the time tested intellectual practice of going from the very broad to the more defined, we will now discuss two universal problem types.

Problems and Their Structure

To begin, do not be concerned about the differentiation between or among general

problem sets. Differentiation is done merely to provide some clarity in the exceptionally complex subject area we discuss. In 1973, Nobel Prize winning economist Dr. Herbert A. Simon distinguished problems as falling into two broad categories. Simon posited that problems were classified as either well-structured or ill-structured and further recommended different design approaches for each, because each requires manifestly singular skills.4 We will investigate these two general problem types: well-structured problems and ill-structured problems. In a subsequent reading we will investigate the topic of complexity and how it impacts us as problem solvers.

The Well-Structured Problem

The more commonly encountered problems, especially in the private sector and in

educational institutions such as the War College, are well-structured problems. A well-structured problem may be found in the arithmetic lesson or in the study of history, and may even be found in our own syllabus with its “Questions” section. This represents an attempt to present exceptionally complex problems as well-structured problems. These textbooks and syllabi do so because they require students to apply a finite number of ideas, rules, and principles previously studied.5 Such problems have also been referred to as transformational problems.6 A transformational problem consists of a clearly-defined starting point and bounded initial state, a clearly articulated and achievable goal, and solution sets that are verifiable and measurable. In the private sector, often a simple cost/benefit analysis yields optimality in what, at face value, appears to be exceptionally

4 ,Herbert A. Simon, “The Structure of Ill-Structured Problems.” Artificial Intelligence. 4 (Winter 1973): 181-201. 5 Jonassen and Tessmer. 6 J. Greeno, “A View of Mathematical Problem Solving in School.” In M.U. Smith (ed.), Toward a Unified Theory of Problem Solving. (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1991).

6

complex problems. Some of the characteristics identified in the literature of well-structured problems include:

Most, if not all elements of the problem are known and quantifiable. Problem statements are clear, well bounded, and have a solution. The use of a rational, analytical problem solving process with a finite number of

rules and principles, applies. Such problems have a relatively well-defined and stable problem statement. We know when the solution or a solution is reached. They have a solution that can be objectively evaluated as being right or wrong. They belong to a class of similar problems that can be solved in a similar manner. Well structured problems have solutions that can be tried and abandoned.

Because a problem is well structured does not mean that it cannot be amazingly complicated, possibly even complex. Well structured problems, however, may be

generally likened to the closed systems discussed in General Systems Theory.7 A system may be considered closed if it has a feedback loop in its control, as opposed to an open system where there is no feedback loop. In a closed system, part of the output of this system is also used as the input to the system, which is its

feedback.8 An example of a closed system may be the human circulatory system. Our circulatory system is incredibly complex, arguably a miracle in engineering, but nonetheless it is a closed system. And, because it is a closed system, direct and indirect effects of specific actions taken against it may be accurately predicted and measured. Another example of a closed system is a power grid. By identifying critical links and nodes, targeteers may accurately determine the physical effects of actions taken against the grid. The tenets of the now thankfully defunct Effects Based Operations (EBO) neatly fit within the boundaries of closed systems as the identification of critical links and

7 This theory may be attributed to renowned biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy who in 1936 believed that the sciences needed a multidisciplinary theory for research. For a detailed explanation of closed and open systems, see Ludwig von Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory: Foundations, Development, Applications. (New York: George Braziller, 1976). 8 Ibid.

7

nodes is realizable. A System of Systems Approach (SoSA) likewise is an ideal approach for solving many of these well structured problems. Well structured problems are normally easily measured and, therefore, tangible Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) provide ideal metrics in determining the efficacy of solution models. As senior military planners, however, our expertise is not often sought in developing solutions to problems that are well structured.

The Ill-Structured Problem

The rational, analytical planning process commonly used in the joint world and by

individual services is arguably a relic of the Cold War. Rooted in industrial age war between rational actors with symmetric goals, its utility in this environment is undeniable. Simply put, it is suited best to quadrant one activities (See Figure 1, below). It fails to take into consideration, however, the post Soviet era fragmentation of the global battle space; a battle space fragmented along social, ethnic, economic, and religious lines. It is, pragmatically, what we have. The problems we quite often face today are those found in the lower segments of quadrants two, three, and more recently, in quadrant four. Moving away from that narrow band of the spectrum of conflict where the rational analytical process applies (conventional state-on-state conflict, for example), where systematic and rational processes are a sound logic, we begin to slip farther away from a world in which optimal solutions exist to the world in praxis; often, our world is one in which we face ill-structured problems, resource constraints, political and media pressure—a world where we must “satisfice” in order to survive.9

Satisficing, a merging of satisfying and sufficing, may be defined as the

acceptance of a choice or judgment as one that is good enough—one that satisfices. According to our friend Herbert Simon, who coined the term, the tendency to satisfice shows up in many cognitive tasks such as playing games, solving problems, and making long range financial decisions where people typically do not or cannot search for the

9 Herbert A. Simon, “Bounded Rationality and Organizational Learning.” Organizational Science. 2, No. 1 (1991): 125-134.

From Sex, Leadership, and Rock'n'Roll - Leadership Lessons from the Academy of Rock, Cook, Peter (2006) Crown House.

8

A typical morning on the Stock Exchange – A classic Open System

optimal solutions.10 The prudent professional is forewarned, however, that compromise is not a substitute for satisficing!

As stated earlier, the more common challenge the military professional faces is

the ill-structured problem. Ill-structured problems are most commonly encountered in the communal domain. They are almost exclusively social problems; insurgency, civil war, mass atrocity events, humanitarian assistance, and countering ideological support to terrorism are some examples. Because they are not bounded as neatly as problems with structure, the problem solver cannot readily envision a solution. Compounding this challenge is the fact that in the problems the military professional may face, the impact of culture (service, interagency, and societal) as well as the incorporation of selected workings of the informational, economic, diplomatic, and social sciences—are essential in identifying the issues at hand. There exist many potential solutions to these problems; the challenge being that in order to evaluate them, they must be implemented. Once implemented, the solutions change the problem set, so a sharp intellect and a flexible ongoing assessment process is essential. The concept of design, which is just now being included in U.S. military doctrine, used for three quarters of a century by social scientists and others, is now emerging as a methodology for addressing ill-structured problems.

An ill-structured problem, often associated with the open system concept from

von Bertalanffy’s General Systems Theory, has some distinct characteristics. In the social sciences, open systems may be defined by their process—a process that has permeable borders, complex interdependencies that are not clearly understood and many times not even recognized, no clear stopping rules, layers of complexity that are integrated horizontally and vertically, and no clear input – output causality chain. One may wonder why a definition from social sciences applies to

what we as military planners and senior officers do as a matter of routine. War is, as Clausewitz and a host of others have so eloquently argued, a social phenomenon, and any

10 Arthur S. Reber, The Penguin Dictionary of Psychology, 3rd ed. (New York Penguin Books: 2001).

9

attempt to understand it through rigid scientific laws or through an explication of its causes is simply creating a synthetic truth.11

Common in diplomatic, informational, military, and economic realms, ill-

structured problems are simply too complex to yield to the processes that were so dramatically successful in well-structured or even partially structured problems. Where one can liken a well structured problem to a mathematics problem, the ill structured problem is more like an ecology, or biology—a true complex, adaptive system that grows, changes, and adapts to external influence.12 We will investigate problems that manifest themselves as Complex Adaptive Systems in a future reading. Whereas the problem with structure was generally measurable and the determination of tangible Measures of Effectiveness could provide the commander with valid metrics for establishing the efficacy of a solution to the problem, an ill-structured problem is not always measurable in physical ways. Likewise, in trying to apply the tenets of EBO against the ultimate open system, a thinking human being, that requisite cause and effect chain is exceptionally difficult to understand. Clausewitz forewarned his audience regarding this causal linkage when he wrote, “Serious trouble arises only when known facts are forcibly stretched to explain effects; for this confers on these facts a spurious importance.”13 In the absence of a cognitive feedback loop to close this open system, it is extremely complicated, almost requiring a transcendent intellect to determine if the effects observed are related to the actions being taken—or vice versa.

Some of the characteristics identified in the literature about ill-structured

problems include: They contain incomplete, contradictory, and changing requirements. Solutions to them are often difficult to recognize as such because of complex

interdependencies between symptoms of the problem. While attempting to solve a problem lacking structure, the solution of one of its

aspects may reveal or create another, even more complex problem. The problem is not understood until after formulation of a solution. Stakeholders, especially in coalition operations, have radically different

worldviews and different frames of references (culture) for understanding the problem.

Constraints and resources to solve the problem change over time. Ill-structured problems do not have an exhaustive set of potential solutions; hence

the search for alternatives is limited. Perfect information is fantasy. Every ill-structured problem may be considered to be a symptom of another

problem. Discrepancies in representing an ill-structured problem can be explained in

numerous ways—the choice of explanation determines the nature of the resolution.

11 A synthetic truth is a statement that is true in part because of contingent facts about the world. 12 For a more complete discussion of complexity and problem solving see Herbert Simon’s 1976 lecture notes delivered at the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association entitled “How Complex Are Complex Systems.” Available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/192399 (accessed 2 June 2012). 13 von Clausewitz, On War, 157.

10

Every ill-structured problem is essentially unique—lessons-learned are hard to transfer across to other problems and the cognitive approach will vary.

Ill-structured problems are normally ‘solved’ (as well as they can be. . .) through group efforts, hence optimization is simply not an option. Satisficing is the endgame.

Ill-structured problems require inventive/creative solutions. Every implemented solution to an ill-structured problem has consequences and

may cause additional problems. Ill-structured problems have no stopping rule (s), meaning we rarely know when

they are solved. Solutions to ill-structured problems are not yes-or-no, but rather better, worse, or

good enough. There is no immediate and no ultimate test of a solution to an ill-structured

problem other than time.

To the Many Processes

As military professionals, we have developed the Adaptive Planning and Execution System (APEX), which succeeded the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP), and each service has

developed its own peculiar service-oriented planning processes—all aimed at solving problems. They all share a common thread, the only significant difference being in language, not in process. The military planning process is the taxonomy used to solve many of the problems we face as military professionals. What many planners fail to recognize, however, is that planning is often, unfortunately, a teleological explanation, where the identification of the goal is used to explain the problem. But does it fit the parameters of the ill-structured problem? It is a classic rational, analytical approach that is ideally suited to problems with structure and to rational, industrial age, quadrant one problems (see figure 1), yet it

does have some limited utility in addressing ill-structured problems as well. It may be argued, however, that as we move away from conventional, state-on-state warfare, the utility of our current planning processes becomes less and less evident.

Figure 2: A generic planning process

11

How then does our rational, analytical planning process fit the type of problems we confront? This rational approach generally involves a broad, consensus-driven narrative description of the problem in which we attempt to rationally bound the problem we confront. This is known to us as the mission analysis phase. In reality, we are not analyzing a mission but rather we analyze tasks. During this phase, however, we engage in the most challenging task of all: the identification of the true problem. But we know that this is sometimes not possible. So, what is the planner to do? Often, we rationally bound the problem by artificially bounding it; by putting a cognitive ‘box’ around that portion of the problem that we can understand. Anything outside the box is dealt with through assumptions or is simply ignored. This entails risk and must be accounted for in any problem solving effort. Think of two potential operations. The first, conventional state-on-state regime removal fits nicely into the framework even though it is, in fact, an ill-structured problem. We can rationally bound the problem, identify potential solutions, and implement them, and most important of all, we know when the problem is solved. Now consider an insurgency, a classic social mess. How do the current planning processes fit this problem? What exactly is the problem? Oftentimes, the comfortable, well-used and understood planning process we as military professionals know is ill suited to these type problems.

It is during this problem definition phase that we must generate productive

conflict in the planning group in order to stimulate our critical thinking skills. The planning organization for this phase may be flat with as many participants involved as is physically possible. A flat organization serves multiple purposes; in the large group, universal acceptance of the problem statement is created through the concept of buy-in. The flat organization also fosters the expression of the most divergent viewpoints, and with various cultures clashing, there is created a ‘satisficed’ solution. A working awareness of the impacts of culture, or more precisely, of ethnocentrism, on the process would serve the planner well. The design approach to problem solving recognizes this and in fact leverages it in problem and solution framing.

After identifying the problem to the satisfaction of all, we then analyze causes,

develop potential alternative solution sets, compare each alternative against given criteria and contrast them against the problem’s intrinsic characteristics. We term this the Course of Action development and the subsequent analysis and war gaming phase. During this phase, we employ creative thinking skills, and often intentionally stovepipe the planning organization in order to allow creative thought through smaller, more-focused groups. A concomitant benefit of this organizational shift is the avoidance of product ownership that we often find later in the process. At this point, our Commander generally elects to choose or, more commonly, modify one of our alternatives. That alternative is then implemented, and a continual assessment begins to verify whether the solution derived and implemented actually resolves the problem confronted. This is the iterative nature of planning and problem solving.

While these linear and rational processes sound ideal in solving certain problems,

they often do not match the reality faced. As we have discussed, the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) is ideally suited to some problems, and considering complex

12

problems, has some utility in conventional, state-on-state conflict. It is important to note, however, that it is of no consequence how many processes we master; we will face problems that cannot be solved by any rational, analytical process. In looking at the types of problems with which we are confronted, the literature has generally separated problem types into two distinct spheres. One, the well-structured problem, fits ideally into a rational, analytical solution paradigm such as the JOPP. The other problem type, the one that occupies so much time and energy for military planners and commanders alike, the ill-structured problem, may not be, as demonstrated, well served by the rational, analytical approach.14 It is these type problems that beg a design approach as a methodology to address them.

So how, then, does our problem solving process apply in developing potential

solution sets to ill-structured problems? Our process provides an intellectual starting point, one that is albeit suited best in a narrow band of the spectrum of conflict and against a rational actor. It is in the rarest case, however, that we truly solve ill-structured problems. In the case of these problems, we should not begin by assuming that we can solve them, but that we can systematically attempt to resolve selected difficulties we have chosen to address. Here, then, is a place where the distinction between solving and resolving matters keenly. There are often no solutions to these types of problems, only events, actions, or ideas, whch we can at best arrange in time and space to ameliorate the problem’s fundamental cause or effects. Unfortunately, as we know, the symptoms are generally easier to identify than the underlying cause.

What Intellectual Skills Are Needed in Addressing Ill-Structured Problems?

Sometimes the questions are complicated and the answers are simple.

—Dr. Seuss

It seems intuitive that the intellectual skills

needed to address well-structured and ill-structured problems are different, yet theorists, educators, and practitioners have long presumed that the skills necessary to solve well-structured problems transfer positively to learning to resolve ill-structured problems. This can be seen in the various service academies where the educational focus for years was on engineering, because the engineering discipline is ideally suited to addressing the well-structured problem set. To our collective chagrin, however, this misplaced belief in cognitive transferability exists not only in our service academies but also in many of our institutions of higher

14 Rittel and Weber,1973.

13

education.15 While many theorists believed that “in general, the processes used to solve ill-structured problems are the same as those used to solve well-structured problems,” more recent research has indicated that we use different cognitive approaches, depending on the nature of the problem.16 Psychologists Dunkle, Schraw, and Bendixen argued in a 1995 study that there existed no relationship whatsoever between problem solving skills across the spectrum of well-structured or ill-structured problems. The recent discussion of the concept of cognitive transferability seems to lead to a logical follow-on question. If the skills developed in solving structured problems are not transferable to solving ill-structured problems, what skills are needed and how do we educate our officers in order to be successful in addressing these problems? Is there a universal process that may be used as a template in solving these type problems?

Because the human mind does not operate in a linear, positivistic, rules-bound

manner, the cognitive techniques used in solving ill-structured problems vary. The key question then, remains how do we shape the mind to make it agile enough to identify and assess, develop potential remedies, and implement solutions to ill-structured problems? We already believe that the existing planning process is not a perfect fit across the spectrum of conflict, so it remains that the human intellect, one sharpened through thought, study, and experience, is the way ahead in resolving ill-structured problems. Dr. William Duggan, of the U. S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute has presented in a 2005 monograph a concept aimed at aligning the rational analytical planning process with commander’s intuition.17 In it, he identifies three essential elements necessary for attaining higher order problem solving skills: strategic analysis, intelligent memory, and expert intuition. The combination of these three is termed strategic intuition. That these essential elements bear a remarkable resemblance to the Clausewitzian concept of coup d’oeil is no mistake.

Duggan clearly considered this concept and his monograph is an attempt to delve

deeply into the logical meeting of the rational analytical processes ideally suited to solve well-structured problems and the development of an intellect capable of solving ill-structured problems. The concept of expert intuition, wherein a person is said to solve problems through a combination of experience and pattern analysis, is a necessary precursor to strategic intuition. Proponents of expert intuition believe that in crisis situations, decisions are a result of a combination of past experience and a flash of insight.18 While personal experience is vital, vicarious experience is a satisfactory method to ‘load’ your brain with the experiences of others. Therefore, in order to deepen

15 M.E. Dunkle, G. Schraw, and L.D. Bendixen, “Cognitive Processes in Well-Defined and Ill-Defined Problem Solving.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, San Francisco, CA. 1995 16 H. Simon, “Decision Making and Problem Solving.” Research Briefings 1986: Report of the Research Briefing Panel on Decision Making and Problem Solving by the National Academy of Sciences. Published by National Academy Press, Washington, DC: 1978. 17 W. Duggan, “Coup D’Oeil: Strategic Intuition in Army Planning.” (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute of the U. S. Army War College, 2005). 18 Malcolm Gladwell, Blink: The Power of Thinking without Thinking. (New York: Little, Brown, 2005).

14

your experiential pool, you will refine your critical thinking skills, read critically of wars past, and consciously strive to develop a sharper intellect while here at the War College. Through the course of this academic year, your readings will not only to prepare you for class, but also load the experiences of others, both good and bad, in your intellect. This is done so that at some time in the future when you face an ill-structured problem, the depth of your experience, both personal and vicarious, will have sharpened the edge of your intellectual sword and you will demonstrate higher order problem solving skills.

Sharpening the Intellectual Sword

In order to develop the strategic intuition that Dr. Duggan suggests, or the coup

d’oeil that Clausewitz attributes to all great Captains of War, the modern military professional must deepen the intellectual pool of personal experience, enhance critical thinking skills, and be cognizant of the types of problems faced and the processes used to address them. This reading aims to the latter by beginning a discussion of the broad types of problems faced while recognizing the fact that different cognitive approaches are needed based on the nature of the problem and the environment. And as we will discuss later, the emergence of problems in the military domain classified as complex adaptive systems further challenges the problem solver. During this academic year, it is critical that the metaphorical intellectual pool of personal and vicarious experience be deepened through focused readings, case studies, research, faculty-to-student interaction, and most importantly, student-to-student interaction.

You will discover during the

Joint Military Operations trimester that our educational focus is on the near-term and approaches problem solving in that volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous real world we inhabit. You will discover that there are no fixed answers, no school solutions, only thoughts to consider. In the National Security Affairs Department, you will arrive armed with a deeper understanding of the nature of problems and problem solving, a richer understanding of the phenomenon we know as war, and a solid perception of the nuances of group planning. During the NSA trimester you will come to appreciate how our military forces are armed, trained, and equipped, recognizing the familiar concept of satisficing as you are exposed to the budget and procurement process. You will receive education in the strategic planning and selection of future military forces, their potential use as a tool of national power, the nature of economic, political, organizational, and behavioral factors that affect the selection and command of military forces; and in using

15

expanded critical thinking skills to formulate and execute strategy to achieve desired outcomes within complex national security organizations.

With that mental framework firmly established, you will continue your

intellectual journey through the Strategy and Policy Department trimester where you will study the great wars of the past and the relationship between policy and the most violent, some would argue, greatest of all social experiences—war. An appreciation for case studies and meaningful analysis will sharpen your thinking skills and deepen, vicariously, your experiential base. You will begin to discern the common threads that pervade conflict and under the rubric of problem solving, begin to deepen that intellectual pool needed in the modern problem solving environment. When you depart the College as a newly minted War College graduate, the intellectual sword spoken of earlier, the most effective weapon we may yield in this exceptionally complex, volatile, uncertain, and ambiguous environment, must be sharper. This sharpened sword is what will uniquely equip you to pierce the durable hide of the ill-structured problems found on the modern battle field, in the political environment, or in the policy think tank.

For students interested in learning more about problems and problem solving in

general, you may begin with the selected bibliography attached to this reading.

16

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.

Cook, Peter. Sex, Leadership and Rock n’ Roll – Leadership Lessons from the Academy

of Life. Crown House Publishing: London. 2006. Duggan, W. “Coup D’Oeil: Strategic Intuition in Army Planning.” Carlisle, PA:

Strategic Studies Institute of the U. S. Army War College, 2005. Gladwell, Malcolm. Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking. Boston: Little Brown & Company, 2005. Dunkle, M. E., G. Schraw, and L. D. Bendixen. “Cognitive Processes in Well-Defined

and Ill-Defined Problem Solving.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, San Francisco, CA. 1995. Available in Applied Cognitive Psychology 9, No. 6 (December 1995): 523-38.

Greeno, J. “A View of Mathematical Problem Solving in School.” In M.U. Smith (ed.),

Toward a Unified Theory of Problem Solving. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1991.

Jonassen, D.H., and M. Tessmer. “An Outcomes-Based Taxonomy for Instructional

Systems Design, Evaluation, and Research.” Training Research Journal 2 (1996/1997).

Reber, A. S. The Penguin Dictionary of Psychology. Penguin Press: New York, 1995. Rittel, H, and M. Webber. “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning.” Policy Sciences

4 (1973). Simon, H. “Decision Making and Problem Solving.” Research Briefings 1986: Report of

the Research Briefing Panel on Decision Making and Problem Solving by the National Academy of Sciences. Published by National Academy Press, Washington, DC: 1978.

__________. Bounded Rationality and Organizational Learning. Organizational Science. 2, No. 1 (1991): 125-134. ________. 1976 lecture notes delivered at the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association entitled “How Complex Are Complex Systems.” ________. “Theories of Bounded Rationality,” 1972, in C.B. McGuire and R. Radner,

eds., Decision and Organisation. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing, 1972.

17

________. Decision Making and Problem Solving.” Research Briefings 1986: Report of

the Research Briefing Panel on Decision Making and Problem Solving by the National Academy of Sciences. Published by National Academy Press, Washington, DC: 1978.

von Bertalanffy, Ludwig. 1928, Kritische Theorie der Formbildung, Borntraeger. In English: Modern Theories of Development: An Introduction to Theoretical Biology. New York: Oxford University Press, 1933.