the use of unmanned and autonomous surface vessels …aaus.org.au/resources/documents/civsec...

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Dr Derek Rogers | CEAV | Issue 1.0 1

THE USE OF UNMANNED AND AUTONOMOUS SURFACE VESSELS TO IMPROVE MARITIME SECURITY

Professor Derek Rogers, Head, Saab Global Centre of Excellence in Autonomous Vessels



INTRODUCTION

• The management of the security of Australia’s maritime environment is an important issue in terms of defence, border protection, and the economy but a challenge given the sheer distances involved.

• This presentation:

‒ Australian Context:

‒ The scale of the maritime security task

‒ Threats to maritime security

‒ Historical approaches

‒ Current framework

‒ Emerging Technology

‒ Unmanned and Autonomous Systems

‒ Saab’s work in Unmanned Surface Vessels (USV)

‒ Economics

‒ Qualitative analysis of the economics of USV

‒ Concluding Remarks



MARITIME SECURITY – THE SCALE OF THE TASK

• Australia’s area of direct security covers more than 10% of the Earth’s surface:

• One of the largest in the world; and

• Covers over 14 million square kilometers, which is almost twice the size of the mainland.

• Australia’s imports and exports by sea constitute:‒ 75% by value; and

‒ 99.9% by weight.

• Fibre-optic submarine cables handle:‒ More than 99% of Australia’s data traffic.

• Coastal shipping plays a substantial role in our domestic transport network

‒ Especially to the remote north and west of Australia.Australia’s Maritime Jurisdiction

© Commonwealth of Australia (Geoscience Australia) 2015.



MARITIME SECURITY – THE SCALE OF THE TASK

• Off shore oil and gas

‒ The North-West shelf supplies a significant amount of Australia’s oil and gas needs

‒ Australia currently has around 53 offshore platforms and 76 pipelines

‒ The total marine petroleum basin area could be approximately 1 million square kilometers

Australia’s Liquid Hydrocarbon Resources - © Commonwealth of Australia (Geoscience Australia) 2015.



THREATS TO MARITIME SECURITY

• Lee Cordner - “Managing Maritime Security Risks in the Indian Ocean” [2014], identified 19 maritime security risks including:

‒ Disruption of energy cargoes at sea;

‒ Offshore oil and gas safety and security incidents;

‒ Illegal exploitation of marine living resources, in areas of national jurisdiction;

‒ Non-state actors impinging upon freedom of navigation (piracy, maritime terrorism);

‒ Transgressions of sovereignty in the territorial sea or Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ); and

‒ Law and order at sea transgressions: crime, piracy, robbery, smuggling, trafficking, illegal immigration, and Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) fishing.

• Missing was protection of critical infrastructure – ports and harbours



PORTS AND HARBOURS

• Australia has approximately 70 ports

‒ Sixty of these facilities regularly handle international passengers or freight

“The security of ports and ships must consider all environments: land, sea, surface and sub-surface

… While tight physical security might be possible on the entry points to a port from the landside, it is

extremely difficult to secure a port and the ships in it from attacks launched from the seaward,

particularly if there is a high level of small craft activity in the port ”

Bateman S., “Assessing the Threat of Maritime Terrorism: Issues for the Asia-Pacific Region”, Security Challenges Journal, Volume 2, Number 3, October 2006

“Over 300 separate port facilities are located within these ports.

Some of these facilities handle chemicals and other materials that

are extremely flammable, toxic or both.”

November 2008, the gunmen involved in the Mumbai massacre in India landed undetected from the sea in

the middle of the city's busy downtown port area

Bergin A., Bateman S., “Future Unknown: The Terrorist Threat to Australian Maritime Security”, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, April 2005.



DISRUPTION OF CARGOES / ENERGY SUPPLY

• Two major vulnerabilities:

‒ Key choke points

‒ Including the Indonesian Archipelago and Torres Strait

‒ Alternative routes

‒ Longer, deep water and much more expensive

‒ Obvious targets for disruption

‒ Can identify shipping only intended for AU or NZ a considerable distance away in the Indian and Pacific oceans

‒ “Sandison Line” (Australian Maritime Doctrine)

Two way route in Torres Strait © Commonwealth of Australia.

“Last year (2014), Al Qaeda warned it was targeting

oil supplies as part of its continuing campaign of

global terrorism.”

Iggulden T., “Australian oil reserves below international standards and will

cost billions to fix, energy white paper says”, ABC News, 8th April 2015



OFF SHORE OIL AND GAS

“In 1981, British and Norwegian antiterrorist units were put on alert following a

warning that Palestinian terrorists planned to blow up a North Sea oil installation.”

“Guerrillas in Angola in 1977 threatened to blow up the Cabinda offshore drilling

complex operated by Gulf Oil Company. … The guerrillas wanted to shut down

the operation because it was providing $2 million daily to the government they

opposed. The guerrillas attacked harbor facilities and fuel reservoirs”

“Guerrillas operating at sea carried out attacks against port facilities (oil

terminals and storage depots) in Cuba in the 1960s and in Nicaragua in the

1980s”Jenkins B., “The Potential Threats to Offshore Platforms”, RAND Corporation, 1988

“US investors fear $300 billion worth of oil and gas rigs in Australia are

vulnerable to a terrorist attack”

Nicholson B., “US investors fear terror attack on $300B Aussie oil rigs”, The Australian, 29 May 2012

By Kommunikasjonsavdelingen NTFK - Offshore-Heidrun Uploaded by Arsenikk, CC

BY 2.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=29352262



MARITIME ATTACKS

October 12, 2000 attack on the USS Cole at Aden where 17

American sailors died when suicide bombers used a small craft

to hit the destroyer. There had been a precursor attempt using a

small craft on the USS The Sullivans, in January 2000, which

was unsuccessful.

2002 - Aden-Abyan Islamic Army attack using small craft on the

French oil supertanker MV Limburg as it was approaching the

Yemeni port of Mina al-Dabah Yemen, which killed one crew

member and spilled 90,000 barrels of oil.

“Numerous terrorist attacks by the ‘Sea Tigers’ of the Liberation

Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) on both merchant ships and Sri

Lankan warships”

USS Cole - DoD photo by Sgt. Don L. Maes, U.S. Marine Corps. (Released)

MV Limburg - Photo: GETTY

Bateman S., “Assessing the Threat of Maritime Terrorism: Issues for the Asia-Pacific Region”,

Security Challenges Journal, Volume 2, Number 3, October 2006

‘Al Qaeda considered tanker attacks’, 21st May 2011, available at

http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/809/Al_Qaeda_Considered_Tanker_Attacks



ILLEGAL FISHING

“… the management and conservation of living resources are important not only

for Australia’s domestic fisheries but also for the long-term preservation of a

healthy ecology”

Marine Reserves of Australia - © Commonwealth of Australia

“ … illegal finning had become more lucrative as the shark

population became more scarce and was now attractive to

developing fishing nations …”

Source: http://news.navy.gov.au/en/Dec2014/Fleet/1685#.VJQFPP-bAKA

A shark is freed from an illegal

longline by Navy and Australian

Fisheries Management Authority

personnel.

Witham K., “Reef latest target for illegal fishers”,

Brisbane Times, 30th November 2008

“Australian Maritime Doctrine RAN Doctrine

1”, Sea Power Centre – Australia, Royal

Australian Navy, 2010.

http://www.google.com.au/url?sa=i&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=images&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwjn84bw2b_MAhVE26YKHWOxBdQQjRwIBw&url=http://navyvic.net/news/2014/news_december2014.html&psig=AFQjCNH-QIIxRyQrlMbHV1N4mkoiOtexCA&ust=1462426354055555

http://www.google.com.au/url?sa=i&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=images&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwjn84bw2b_MAhVE26YKHWOxBdQQjRwIBw&url=http://navyvic.net/news/2014/news_december2014.html&psig=AFQjCNH-QIIxRyQrlMbHV1N4mkoiOtexCA&ust=1462426354055555



ILLEGAL FISHING – ASHMORE REEF

• “The Royal Australian Navy and the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service undertake patrols of the reserves and associated islands and reef ecosystems to ensure their protection against illegal foreign fishing. When illegal activity is suspected crews are arrested, prosecuted and their vessels impounded”

Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development website “Ashmore and Cartier

Islands”, available at http://regional.gov.au/territories/ashmore_cartier/index.aspx

http://regional.gov.au/territories/ashmore_cartier/index.aspx



OTHER PROTECTED ZONES

• Additional to oil and gas safety zones, marine reserves, and historic shipwreck zones, there are also protected zones for submarine cables.

• The Great Barrier Reef is covered by its own legislative act and management authority.

‒ Bigger than Victoria and Tasmania combined.

‒ Bigger than the United Kingdom, Switzerland and Holland combined.

‒ Roughly the same area as Japan, Germany, Malaysia or Italy.

‒ Approximately half the size of Texas.

Current and planned submarine cables.

Source: TeleGeography www.submarinecablemap.com CC 3.0

http://www.submarinecablemap.com/



AUSTRALIAN MARITIME SECURITY

• The overall framework for the Australian maritime security is the Guide to Australian Maritime Security Arrangements (GAMSA). GAMSA covers:

‒ The various pieces and Australian and international maritime legislation;

‒ The roles of all government and non-government stakeholders; and

‒ Many of the risks identified by Cordner (given previously) as dedicated chapters.

• Several agencies listed in GAMSA have now changed.

‒ Maritime Border Command is Australia's lead civil maritime security authority.

‒ Other key participants include:

‒ Office of Transport Security;

‒ Australian Federal Police (AFP);

‒ Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA);

‒ Australian Maritime and Fisheries Authority (AMFA);

‒ Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority (GBRMPA);

‒ State and Territory Bodies, Port Authorities, and Industry;

‒ Departments of: Environment, Industry, Agriculture and Water Resources;

‒ National Offshore Petroleum Safety and Environmental Management Authority (NOPSEMA).



RESPONSIBILITIES AND HISTORY

• The paper associated with this talk maps various threats and their location to the currently responsible agency or agencies.

• History of civil surveillance of Australia’s borders is provided on the Maritime Border Command website:

‒ Began in the 1960’s using Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) and Royal Australian Navy (RAN) planes to patrol the newly declared 12 nautical mile fishing zone.

‒ Surveillance increased to 27,000 hours per annum by the 1970’s using charted civilian aircraft in addition to RAN and RAAF aircraft.

‒ After two undetected arrivals in 1999 a series of reviews led to the creation of the Joint Offshore Protection Command in 2004

‒ Renamed Border Protection Command in 2006;

‒ Renamed Maritime Border Command in 2015.

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Maritime Border Command X X X



MARITIME BORDER COMMAND ASSETS

• Eight Cape Class vessels that will replace the current Bay Class vessels and can perform 28 day patrols with 18 crew;

• Two cutters ‘Ocean Shield’ and ‘Thaiyak’ each with two Rigid Hulled Inflatable Boats (RHIBs), the former accommodating over 78 crew and the latter 13 crew and 4 special operations personnel; operating up to 300 days continuously;

• Contracted Dash-8 surveillance aircraft.

• Other materiel assets utilised by Maritime Border Command include:

‒ RAAF AP-3 Orion Maritime Patrol Aircraft and

‒ other RAN assets including Patrol vessels and Frigates,

‒ as well as intelligence gathered from satellite surveillance and quite likely Over the Horizon Radar (OTHR).



EMERGING TECHNOLOGY

• There is newly emerging technology that can further complement these assets.

‒ Unmanned Systems (UxV) comprising

‒ Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV),

‒ Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGV),

‒ Unmanned Surface Vessels (USV), and

‒ Unmanned Underwater Vessels (UUV).

‒ Other names are also used RPAS, ROV, AUV …

• Unmanned Maritime Systems (UMS) may refer to both USV and UUV.

• Manned and Unmanned Systems (MUNS) refer to systems that can be operated without or without a person on board.

‒ USV offer the best opportunity for this.

• Unmanned Systems are often described as applying to the dull, dirty and dangerous with application in Defence, Civil Security, and Other applications.

‒ But they also provide the opportunity to identify new operational uses.



THE VISION

• Chief of the Royal Australian Navy’s Vision Statement for Unmanned Systems

“To fight and win at sea, Navy will achieve its maximum operational capability through a system ofmanned platforms and complementary unmanned vehicle systems in an integrated and networkedforce.

Unmanned vehicle range, persistence and payload – whether above, on or under the sea – willextend the sensors, integration and networking capacity, communications, situational awareness,targeting fidelity and potentially, weapon delivery.

Wherever possible the vehicles will be off-the-shelf, technically proven and minimise operationalrisk and cost.”

• Unmanned systems can also cover a spectrum of operational capability from remotely controlled, to semi-autonomous to fully autonomous.

‒ Semi-autonomous operation can be viewed as the ability to navigate by waypoints, for example.

‒ The latter two cases may or may not include some form of ‘tele-presence’,

‒ The ability for an operator to obtain real-time situational awareness and health and monitoring information over a communications link.



UNDERSTANDING AUTONOMY

Level Name Description

0 Remote Control All functions directly controlled by a control link

i.e. remote control

1 Emergency Stop Includes a simple emergency abort system that

shuts down the vehicle in the event of the failure

of a primary vehicle system

2 Waypoint Navigation Can follow pre-programmed waypoints and

automatically correct simple failures

3 Collision Detection and

Avoidance

Includes obstacle avoidance algorithms

4 Mission Adaptation Can adjust the current mission based on

information retrieved by on-board sensors

5 Cooperative operation Any behaviours that are beyond the other

categories, such as cooperative behaviour

between vessels

Level Control Description

1 Human

operated

Remote control – all control by human operator e.g.

operator instructs USV to make a turn.

2 Human

directed

Permissive – USV asks for permission e.g. USV

requests to make a turn and operator confirms,

declines or does not respond.

3 Human

delegated

Declarational – USV declares intention e.g. USV

indicates it will make a turn and operator can

overrule or remain silent.

4 Human

monitored

Reportive – USV reports action e.g. USV informs

operator that it has made a turn.

5 Autonomous Autonomous – USV does not report action e.g.

USV makes the turn.

A functional view of autonomyA macro level view of autonomy

Automatic – System does as programmed

Autonomous – can be viewed as ‘delegation within bounds’

System can find its own way to do something – agent-based / deep learning systems

Predictable environments

Uncertain environments



WEAPONS

• The incorporation of weapons onto platforms is another key issue to consider with the use of autonomous and unmanned systems for maritime security.

• In a military context Australia is a party to International Humanitarian Law (adhering to the Geneva Conventions) during times of armed conflict.

• Australia also undertakes Article 36 reviews of any new weapon to determine its legality.

• The use of such systems in civil security is less clear. However a number of criminal justice instruments govern the use of lethal force in law enforcement:

‒ 1979 Code of Conduct – adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution 34/169

‒ 1990 Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials

‒ These rules generally prescribe capture rather than lethal force

‒ But still need to meet the criteria of necessity, proportionality and precaution – all difficult to do in a dynamic, unpredictable environment.

• “It is not always necessary to weaponise a platform” – Submission to Senate Inquiry April 2015



SAAB’S WORK IN USV

• October 2013 the CEO of Saab Sweden, Håkan Buskhe, announced a plan to establish a Global Centre of Excellence in Autonomous (Unmanned) Surface Vessels (CEAV) in Adelaide, Australia.

• Work initially focused on a trimaran design – mockup hull at Indodefence November 2014

• January 2015 Saab took complete control of the project

‒ Focused on a flexible, low-cost, reliable, USV mission system that could be applied across a number of different platforms as suited for the operational mission

‒ Depending on the operational mission a platform may be optimised for:

‒ Speed;

‒ Maneuverability;

‒ Endurance;

‒ Payload; or

‒ some combination thereof.



PACIFIC 2015

• In October 2015 Saab demonstrated an operational USV Mission System, Bonefish™, at the major Australian naval exhibition, Pacific 2015, to significant Australian and international interest.



PORTABLE CONTROL STATION



SITUATIONAL AWARENESS – MASTER /SENSOR VIEW

Raymarine Multi-Function Display Saab OneView™

- easily reconfigured for different layouts



HEALTH MONITORING – ENGINEER VIEW



MISSION PLANNING AND ANALYSIS

• Mission Planning

‒ Safe Navigation

‒ Waypoints and routes

‒ Index lines

‒ Marks

‒ Mission Plan File (MPF)

‒ (Tasks en-route)*

• Mission Analysis

‒ Mission Replay

‒ Position

‒ Video

‒ (…)

‒ (Analytics)

* Can validate the MPF prior to a mission in a

laboratory using simulators/stimulators



CMS INTEGRATION

• A Combat Management System (CMS) is the command and control center for advanced ships

‒ Provides Situational Awareness (SA)

‒ Integrates weapons and sensors

‒ Real USV position and USV AIS detections displayed on the CMS

‒ All USV video feeds also displayable on the CMS

‒ Next steps to display and sensor fuse USV radar tracks

USV and CMS integration• CMS agnostic



COMMUNICATIONS INTEGRATION

A CMS operator and USV Master, USV Engineer

may be located in different parts of a ship



PLATFORM - BONEFISH™ RHIB

• Leading up to Pacific Saab re-focused on Bonefish™ for a Rigid Hulled Inflatable Boat (RHIB)

‒ The workhorses of most navies

‒ Common to a large number of ships and used in a large number of roles

‒ In use by water police, emergency services, and search and rescue organisations

• RHIBs allow easy technology adoption and experimentation

‒ Fit with Launch and Recovery, and Sustainment systems

‒ No loss of capability and instead a gain in capability e.g. evidence collection/sensors, sea-keeping

‒ Whereas a custom USV will lead to a loss of overall capability in exchange for some specialist capability

• Modular construction of modern RHIBs allows flexibility – seats, mission bay, …

• Saab’s Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) approach exploits the economies of scale and continuous developments of commercial maritime equipment

‒ Able to be militarily (electronically) hardened as required



ECONOMICS

• Many people intuitively grasp the value proposition of USV

‒ Removing personnel from harm’s way or drudgery, increased persistence, …

‒ Savings on labour costs;

‒ Greater savings when control of multiple USV – “human-on-the-loop”

‒ However there has been very limited economic analysis of USV

By Planemad [CC BY-SA 3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0)], via Wikimedia Commons

• Examples:

‒ Centre for Innovative Technology (CINT) in 2011 concluded that “13 USV are needed to guard the 1,000 nm Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor off the Horn of Africa (highest world piracy activity)”.

(Reported in “Unmanned Surface Vehicles for Defence and Security Global Markets and Technologies Outlook 2013 – 2020” by Market Info Group LLC)

‒ US Naval Postgraduate School concluded that “Using 10 USV’s, 30 UAV’s, 10 at sea bases (unmanned) and only 1 war ship the overall system would provide a constant presence in the Gulf of Aden, and would spare 29 ships and 8030 naval personnel.”

(Bostwick S., et. al., “Augmenting Naval Capabilities in Remote Locations”, Naval Postgraduate School, December 2009)

‒ “New ACTUV estimated to cost $15,000-$20,000 per day compared to $700,000 per day for an equivalent warship”

(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sea_Hunter)



ECONOMICS

• Apart from capability often most important for a buyer are the price and on-going costs

• Price and on-going costs are dependent on the specific solution and usage profile

‒ Regulations related to use, likely to be reasonable and not a significant barrier to technology adoption

• In general terms price and on-going costs can be investigated in terms of influence factors

• USV provide an opportunity to use COTS equipment:

‒ Economies of scale

‒ A competitive market (multiple suppliers, importation without the need for a license)

‒ Easier integration through adherence to standards such as NMEA2000

By Femnett/Maretron, LLP - Maretron, LLP, CC BY 2.5, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=9815260

• All of which maintains supply and investment, and drives down price and on-going costs

• Industry can typically rapidly ramp up production without major investment or regulatory impediment, which would otherwise lead to price increases

‒ Industry capability can be sustained in peacetime without subsidy



ECONOMICS

• The skills required to manufacture and maintain USV apply across a number of industries

‒ So there will always be a reasonable market in terms of job applicants, which again minimises the labour force impact on price on on-going costs

• USV can also be manufactured and maintained faster and at a fraction of the cost

• World War II - Royal Navy Destroyers and German Patrouillenboot Ausland (PA) class patrolling the coast to protect ports, harbours and other critical infrastructure

‒ USV could do this far cheaper and with greater persistence i.e. no need to return to port to resupply with food

‒ USV could be stored in a warehouse (rather than alongside) incurring minimal cost, and then deployed as required

• In World War II, for example, the primary limitation was not so much the rate of production of aircraft but rather the time required to train pilots

‒ USV offer an opportunity to reduce this training time substantially

‒ Performance can be further enhanced when we apply autonomy techniques to improve sea-keeping

‒ Beneficial to crewed RHIBs as well



CONCLUDING REMARKS

• USV are not a replacement for existing assets used in maritime security:

‒ Naval and maritime border command vessels;

‒ Maritime patrol aircraft;

‒ Over the horizon radar; and

‒ Personnel in ports and harbours for example.

• USV are a complementary asset that can provide a distinct return-on-investment advantage and capability gain for maritime security.

• Australian Industry has the capabilities to provide the solutions needed, so use us.



[email protected]

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