THE

USSR-DRY-PRe

TRIANGLE IN

SOUTHEAST

ASIAby

DR. DONALD E. WEATHERBEE

Vol. VI, No.1

As Southeast Asia adjusts to the newrealities of the regional distribution ofpower and its changing connection tothe global balance, it becomes

increasingly clear that an important elementin determining the quality of the relationsbetween the non-Communist states of theAssociation of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN: Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia,Philippines, and Singapore) and the plincipalCommunist states will be the nature of therelations among the Communist statesthemselves. The local Communist victories inIndochina have thrown into stark relief theSoutheast Asian salient of the USSR-People'sRepublic of China (PRC) competition, thebasic strategic terms of which call for eachother's exclusion from the region. Thetermination of the military conflict hasremoved the restraints imposed by thesituational need for solidarity with theDemocratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV)during the war. The DRV in turn is exposedto more open pressures from both Communistgiants, which has the effect of constrainingthe DRV in articulating its own autonomousregional interests.

Both China and the Soviet Union haveinterests in Southeast Asia that can be definedin traditional political, economic, social, andcultural categories. Increasingly, however,their efforts to exert influence in the areahave focused on the specific terms of theirglobal confrontation. For the Soviet Union,the test of its policies in Southeast Asia hasbecome their contribution to its search forregional allies in the containment of China.For the PRC, the test of its policies has beentheir contribution to the isolation of theSoviet Union from Southeast Asia. In thisconflictive structure, the DRV seeks tomaintain political flexibility while leaping tothe revolutionary vanguard and promotingpolicies that enhance its own power positionindependently of either the USSR or thePRe. While Soviet and Chinese politicalactivity in the Southeast Asian regionincluding Indochina derives from theirappreciation of each other's competitiveinterests and ambitions, for the DRV,Southeast Asia-and particularly Indochina-is

71

Report Documentation Page Form ApprovedOMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering andmaintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information,including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, ArlingtonVA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if itdoes not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE 1976 2. REPORT TYPE

3. DATES COVERED 00-00-1976 to 00-00-1976

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The USSR-DRV-PRC Triangle in Southeast Asia

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

5b. GRANT NUMBER

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER

5e. TASK NUMBER

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) US Army War College ,ATTN: Parameters ,122 Forbes Avenue,Carlisle,PA,17013-5238

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATIONREPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT

15. SUBJECT TERMS

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Same as

Report (SAR)

18. NUMBEROF PAGES

16

19a. NAME OFRESPONSIBLE PERSON

a. REPORT unclassified

b. ABSTRACT unclassified

c. THIS PAGE unclassified

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18

the primary geostrategic sphere of interest.DRY policies can be either complementary orantagonistic to the political lines of the USSRand PRC in the global framework ofSino-Soviet bipolarity; but with theintroduction of the DRYas an independentactor in Indochina and ASEAN SoutheastAsia, the regional structure of Communistpower is no longer bipolar, but involves atriangular contest for influence. The purposeof the following pages will be to seek toidentify some of the terms of that contest inorder to suggest a probabilistic pattern offuture interactions among the DRY, USSR,and PRC, as well as between them andnon-Communist Southeast Asia.

THE SOVIET UNION'S POLITICAL LINESON CHINA

The Soviet Union's universal politicalattack on the PRC has many different themesfor different audiences. In Southeast Asia thatwhich is most often played is"expansionism," seeking to arouse on twolevels of response latent fears of Chinesedomination. On the one hand, the Sovietsallude to the "age-old tradition" in China of"great-Han chauvinism," which is expressed asthe Maoist recreation of the Chineseemperors' traditional great power positionamong the states to the south and southwestof China. On the second more contemporarylevel, the Soviets warn against the subjectivenationalism of Maoist China which aspires togreat power status requiring a foundation ofhegemonism.

Moscow cautions that Southeast Asiannations should not be deceived by the"double-faced" tactic of Peking's "diplomaticsmiles," while its real intentions are clearlydemonstrated by continued support to thearmed activity of anti-government forces.Soviet denunciation of "Maoist expansionistsand saboteurs"-that is, the insurgent forcesin Southeast Asia-puts them squarely on theside of the legitimate governments in theirc ounterinsurgent struggles. Any possiblepolitical ambivalency in this posture iseliminated by the explanation that the realCommunist parties in Southeast Asia have

72

been cynically betrayed by Peking. The modelcase which the Soviets use to demonstrateChinese perfidy is Burma, where-the Sovietspoint out-not only do the Chinese providesupport for the Maoists, but also collaboratewith right-wing reactionary forces (I.e., ethnicminority insurgents) in an attempt to destroythe state. This Soviet line is meant tounderpin its own political tactic of correctstate-to-state relations in Southeast Asia, asopposed to the dichotomous Chinese policywhich has not abandoned symbolic supportfor insurgent forces within the states, despitethe accomplishment of diplomatic relationswith the government of the states.

MOSCoW is quick to call attention toPeking's alleged territorial ambitions inSoutheast Asia as another proof of the

hegemonic ambitions of the Maoistleadership. Soviet sources regularly raise thespectre of Mao Tse-tung's claimedexpansionist line, supposedly secretlypronounced in August, 1965:

We [PRe] should by all means take overSoutheast Asia, including South Vietnam,Thailand, Burma, Malaysia, andSingapore.... This part of Southeast Asiais very rich. It has a great many resources,and is well worth the expense required toget hold of it.... After we take overSoutheast Asia, we can increase our forcesin this region.!

The Soviets refer to Chinese "cartographicaggression"-that is, the production of mapsshowing areas in other countries as part ofChinese territory-and score Peking for armedintervention in Burma and Laos in pursuit ofterritorial gain. The most prominent currentSoviet sYmbol of the PRC's expansionisticdesigns is the dispute over the islands in theSouth China Sea. Here, according to theChinese, the Soviets are seeking to "stir up"Vietnam against it. In this respect, the SovietUnion can not only capitalize on animmediate territorial dispute betweenVietnam and China, but also generalize to itstheme of the long-range Chinese threat toSoutheast Asia. In January 1974, China used

Parameters, Journal of the US Army War College

military force to implement its long-standingclaim to sovereignty over the Paracel (Hsisha)Islands, overrunning the South Vietnamesegarrison stationed there. Although Hanoimaintained a discrete public silence over thisopportunistic grab, diplomatic circlesreported that it was disturbed by the use offorce rather than negotiation. Hanoi's Sovietallies have not been so reticent and quicklycharged the PRC with betrayal of theVietnamese revolutionary forces and violationof Vietnamese sovereignty.

The issues of sovereignty over the scatteredisland groups of the South China Sea had longbeen contested between China, Taiwan,Vietnam, and the Philippines. They weregiven new urgency with the coming prospectof offshore oil and new law of the searegimes. The Vietnamese reponse to theChinese challenge has been to project its ownphysical presence into the maritime area bydispatching forces to take control of theSpratly group (Nansha Archipelago) alsoclaimed by China. The full extent of China'sclaims has recently been reasserted in a longarticle in the Kwangming Daily, picked upand repeated by the New China News Agency.It brings the southern limit to 4 degrees northlatitude, which, as Moscow has noted, dropsChina's "boundary" to within 20 miles ofSarawak. The Chinese warning to the DRV isunmistakable. "All islands belonging to Chinamust also return to the fold of themotherland," adding that China "will neverallow others to invade or occupy our territory[Le., the Spratlys] whatever the pretext."2The PRC's intransigence may in part beexplained as a function of its general concernabout the restoration of its integrity andrecovery of lost territories, one of the majorissues of the Sino-Soviet dispute.

The Soviet Union continues to decry PRC"aggression" against the Vietnamese andsuggests wider implications. China is

aiming at "getting a strategically importantspring board for future attacks on SoutheastAsian countries and also demonstratingChina's determination to solve territorialproblems by armed force."3

Moscow also seeks to exploit the

Vol. VI, No.1

preexistent indigenous Southeast Asianconcerns and prejudices against their residentethnic Chinese communities. In aheavy-handed way, the Soviets caution thatthe overseas Chinese are "a kind of fifthcolumn," piously stating that the "incessantattempts to use Chinese emigres living in thesecountries to further Peking's selfish interestsare a cause for legitimate anxiety on the partof the governments and peoples of SoutheastAsia."4 They have gone so far as to suggestthat the Maoist regime deliberately organizesthe emigration of Chinese so as to createoverseas Chinese colonies that will beresponsive to Peking's policy requirements inthe target countries.

The Soviet Union argues that the PRC'sstrategic view is that there is a power vacuumin Southeast Asia. Ultimately, the PRC seeksto fill that power vacuum itself, but until ithas the capacity to do so, it pursues threetactics. First, through anti-Soviet acts, it seeksto deny the legitimate interests of the USSRin Asia. The principal tool is the "thesis of thestruggle against hegemonism," which isimplemented as a requirement ofnormalization of relations between Asianstates and the PRC. Secondly, throughpolicies of "divide and rule," it seeks toprevent the emergence of strong, independentindigenous actors in the region. It is this,according to the USSR, which explained

Dr. Donald E. Weatherbee has been Henry L.Stimson Professor of Political Science in theDepartment of National and International SecurityStudies, US Army War College, since 1974. He is onspecial leave from the University of South Carolina,where his pennanent position is Donald S. RussellProfessor of Contemporary Foreign Policy, In additionto an A.B. degree in Government from Bates College,Lewiston, Maine, Dr. Weatherbee holds the M.A. andPh.D. degrees in International Relations from theJohns Hopkins School ofAdvanced InternationalStudies. From 1962·64~ hewas a Ford FoundationForeign Area Fellow at TheHague, Netherlands. Dr.Weatherbee's special interestsare SEA politics andinternational relations, and heis the author of numerousbooks and articles dealing withthese areas.

73

Chinese coolness towards the reunification ofVietnam. Peking obviously wanted a dividedand weak Vietnam: "Peking would like tohave obedient neighbors near its border,therefore a united, independent and socialistVietnam obviously does not fall into theframework."5 Moreover, Peking has sought togive the "Indochina incident" (I.e., the Sovietlocution for its sustained recognition of theLon Nol government) an anti-Soviet color soas to drive a wedge between the liberationmovement and its natural ally-the SovietUnion. Finally, in the prosecution of thePRC's general line of "from-a-position­of-strength," Moscow charges that theChinese do not really want to see theexpulsion of the US presence in the region.Attacking the concept of Sino-American"collusion" against the Soviet Union, Moscowreviles "the Peking leaders open ap.peals forthe preservation of the US military presencein East, South and Southeast Asia," chargingthe PRC with "direct complicity withimperialism and neocolonialism."6

The major initiative undertaken by theSoviet Union towards the region wasproposition of a collective security

agreement for all Asia. This scheme, firstfloated in 1969, has never been given realstructural substance, nor have the ASEANstates shown any inclination to replace theentangling alliance of SEATO-nowdisbanded-or the Five Power DefenseAgreement-now lapsed into desuetude-withthe unpromising future of a Soviet-sponsoredcollective security agreement. It has beenpurposely ambiguous so that real objectionscannot be raised. Its value base is appealinglybut vaguely formulated to encompass theprinciples of peaceful coexistence. How thesecan be consolidated into a juridicalframework for international order in Asia hasonly been ambiguously suggested: "Such asecurity system can probably be created stepby step, through both collective and bilateralefforts by states."7 Bilaterally, the model isobviously the web of relationships thatconnect the USSR to India. With. theconclusion of the Conference on Security andCooperation in Europe, the principles of the

74

Final Act at Helsinki are now advanced as thebasis for a security formula applicable in Asiaas well as Europe. If the proposal ever reachedsuch a programmatic stage, then theconnection between the general strategy ofthe all-Asia collective security scheme andSoviet national security interests would bemore evident: the legitimation of a growingSoviet political-military presence in theregion; containment of the PRC; maintenanceof access to the region; provision of a securityalternative in Southeast Asia preempting thePRC and possibly forestalling a nuclear Japan.

PRC PERCEPTIONS

It is in its Chinese containment aspect thatthe collective security proposal continues tofuel the fires of the Sino-Soviet conflict inSoutheast Asia. Despite Soviet protestationsthat it is an all-Asia proposal meant to includethe PRC, the Chinese perceive it as a strategyof encirclement by the Soviet Union. Moscowretorts by claiming that PRC rejection of thecollective security scheme is proof of itsthreatening posture:

Only the sick imaginations of the Pekingleaders could conceive the idea of using asecurity system for the 'encirclement andisolation' of the C.P.R..... The assertionthat such a system can be used to establishhegemony in Asia is just as ridiculous....Peking refuses to accept such a systemprecisely because it dreams of hegemony inAsia, under which all the other countrieswould be its private domain. 8

This illustrates the distorted mirrorimage-like lines characterizing the Sino-Sovietversions of the universalistic ambitions oftheir rival. Moscow's vision of a Chinesepolicy of hegemonism founded on Hanchauvinism and nationalistic great poweraspirations operating in collusion with theUnited States is balanced by the Chinesethesis of superpower contention for worldhegemony. According to the Chinese, themain danger in the world today is the struggleof the USA and USSR for worldhegemony-the one impelled by its

Parameters, Journal of the US Army War College

capitalist-imperialist structure, the other byits social-imperialist structure. Of the two, itis Soviet social-imperialism that is the mostdangerous, because as the balance of forces inthe world has shifted, the Soviet Union hasbecome increasingly militaristic and aggressiveas it seeks to act as global overlord in place ofthe United States. The PRC's behavioraladvice to Southeast Asia is aphoristicallyexpressed in the saying: "Guard against thetiger at the back door while repulsing the wolfat the gate."

As the Soviet Union has attempted to raiseits profile in Southeast Asia through bilateraleconomic and cultural connections, Pekingrails against penetration, espionage, sabotage,and other nefarious activities of Soviet agentsworking under such cover activities asshipping, fishing, and journalism. Its greatestscorn has been directed at the revitalization ofthe collective security scheme. Peking warnsthat the collective security system "is only atool with which to contend for hegemony inAsia and to disintegrate and control the Asiancountries," noting approvingly that in 1975,"with the exposure of the sinister Sovietdesigns almost all Asian countries eitherdisapproved, boycotted, or rejected thesystem."9 The Soviet suggestion that theprinciples emerging from the CSCE Final Actare applicable to the security of Asia bringsthe Chinese retort that this is Sovietrevisionist humbug! "It is crystal clear," saythe Chinese examining real acts of the USSR,"that 'international agreements' such as theso-called principles gUiding relations betweenstates have no binding force on Sovietsocial-imperialism as a mere scrap ofpaper."! 0 The PRC singles out the principleof the "inviolability of frontiers" as beingparticularly noxious, since if applied' to EastAsia it would legitimate Soviet "occupation"of territory taken from China by Czaristimperialism.

The PRC's strategic response to the SovietUnion's challenge has been the implicitpromotion, indirectly and ambivalently,

of a regional balance of power. This hasinvolved three tactics in Southeast Asia:attempting to deny the USSR political access

Vol. VI, No.1

to ASEAN through the collective securityscheme; normalization of bilateral relationswith Southeast Asian states and neutralizingthem as possible allies of the Soviet Union;and Sino-American detente. The Chinese lineon a continued American presence puts thePRe at odds not only with the USSR, whichdemands immediate and total Americanwithdrawal, but more importantly for theASEAN states, with the DRV. Their divergentviews are apparent in their diametricallyopposed perceptions of the meaning of thetrip through Southeast Asia made byAssistant Secretary of State Philip Habib inlate May-early June 1975. An importantChinese commentary placed Habib'sreassurances about America's role inSoutheast Asia in the context of Sovietsocial-imperialism's efforts to take advantageof "the increasingly weak and strategicallypassive position" of the United States inSoutheast Asia. The article noted withoutcomment that:

Although the United States has beencompelled to readjust its strategicdeployment in Southeast Asia, it isreluctant to abandon its interests in thisregion. Washington recently sent itsassistant secretary of state, Habib, to tourSoutheast Asian countries. It repeatedlystressed that the United States is still anAsian and Pacific country and will play itsdeserved and responsible role for the sakeof the interests of the United States andthis region.!l

The North Vietnamese, on the other hand,placed the Habib pilgrimage in the context ofthe persistence of the US imperialists' evilintentions in Southeast Asia following thebankruptcy of their policy in Indochina.

Habib's trip was designed to appease theUS allies in Southeast Asia and strive tokeep the remainder of this area within theUS sphere of infiuence, and, also atendeavoring to set up a new defenseperimeter to counter the revolutionarymovements which are rapidly developingfollowing the US defeat in Vietnam,Cambodia and Laos.! 2

75

THE DRV'S VI EW

According to Hanoi, the new balance offorces in the region has led to the collapse ofthe decades-old US defense line designed todam up the rising national liberationmovements and forces of socialism. In thishistoric confrontation, the defeat of the USrepresents the bankruptcy of its policy andstrategy that had the support of reactionaryelites elsewhere in Southeast Asia. TheVietnamese victory is seen as mobilizing all ofthe people in Southeast Asia to rise up andseize their revolutionary destiny. Indicatorsthat the people are determined to freethemselves are the facts that, even wherethere had been "collaboration" with theAmerican aggressor, already there is talk ofneutralism, extension of relations into thesocialist world, and review of militaryconnections to the United States. Hanoiwarns, though, that the United States is stillnot reconciled to total defeat, adding that inthe region itself, "some individuals are stillshowing an attitude incompatible with thenew situation in Southeast Asia,"13 andcautioning the "ruling circles" in ASEAN that"to blindly follow the anti-Communist roadand to continue to tail after the USimperialism is unwise and will only bringthem misfortune. The tragic collapse of theUS henchmen in Saigon, Phnom Penh andVientiane is a very obvious lesson for thepro-American forces. "14

Hanoi's view of Southeast Asia and itsputative role as leader of therevolutionary forces in the region sharply

distinguishes its policy line from that of eitherthe USSR or the PRe. The USSR iscommitted to nonrevolutionary state-to-staterelations in the region. The PRC has sharplyseparated state behavior from theinternational connections of fraternalrevolutionary parties and movements. Hanoi'srevolutionary line is undifferentiated.

Vietnam's victory ... has given rise to anew strength in Southeast Asia-theunyielding strength of the revolutionarypeople in that region who are becoming

76

masters of their own destiny-and hascontributed significantly to the commonstruggle for peace, national independence,democracy and socialism in the world.Vietnam's victory is eloquent proof of theoffensive posture of the worldrevolutionary movement. The offensivestrategy has defeated the compromise andnegative strategies [italics added] .15

The censure of the "compromise andnegative strategies" is a slap at both the PRCand the USSR, who were less than eager tosacrifice their policies of rapprochement anddetente with Washington on the altar ofVietnamese unification. In the period leadingup to the Paris Accords and in theimplementing of them, Hanoi had reason tofeel that its "reVOlutionary" interests werebeing subordinated to the interests of itsprincipal supporters and suppliers in thetensions of the Sino-American-Soviet globalrelationship.

THE HANOI·MOSCOW LINK

Hanoi's current inclination to the USSR asopposed to the PRC results from a mix ofmotives; the primary one being probably apragmatic appreciation of the economicreq uirements of the task of socialistconstruction in a unified Vietnam. Thereconstruction and development program ofthe DRV, particularly as embodied in thetargets and sectoral emphases of the 1976-80Five Year Plan, are attuned to the Sovietmodel of development as opposed to theMaoist model. "For us," say the Vietnamese,"socialism is the magnificent image of theSoviet Union."16 In order to even begin toapproach the targets of the plan, Hanoi willneed important infusions of capital andtechnical assistance from the East Europeansocialist economies, particularly the SovietUnion. In October and November 1975, LeDuan and Le Thanh Nghi, Deputy Premierand Minister of State Planning, visitedHungary, the USSR, Bulgaria, the GermanDemocratic Republic, Czechoslovakia,Poland, and Rumania, formally signing awell-planned and coordinated procession of

Parameters, Journal of the US Army War College

technical and economic assistance and loanagreements. In Moscow, in addition to theusual joint communique, Le Duan andBrezhnev issued a declaration that gave themain directions for the strengthening ofrelations "between the parties and the peoplesof the two fraternal countries" in all fields. Inthis declaration, it was agreed that economicand technical cooperation, "including thecoordination of economic developmentplans," would take place on a bilateral basis aswell as within the framework of multilateralcooperation among the socialist countries.The effect, of course, is to partially integratethe North Vietnamese economy into theComecon economy.

There are naturally certain political quidpro quos involved. According to the October31, 1975, declaration, "The two sides heldcompletely identical views on the mattersbrought to discussion." Although the PRCmight view the North Vietnamese panderingto the Soviet line as a product ofsocial-imperialist neocolonialism, beforefar-reaching conclusions about the degree ordepth of DRV political subserviency to theUSSR are formed, it is important to note thatthose issues on which the DRV hasaccommodated the USSR can be viewed asrather remote from the Hanoi's centralpolitical and geostrategic concerns.Endorsement of the MPLA in Angola or theFinal Declaration of the Helsinki meetingmight be considered a rather cheap price topay for the economic leadership. The DRVhas not, however, paid any political price withrespect to its own interests in Southeast Asia.It has not endorsed Soviet policy lines on theordering of the region, holding firmly to itscentral theme that the future of SoutheastAsia is for the Southeast Asians to determine,implicitly excluding, along with the UnitedStates, the USSR and PRC as Southeast Asianactors. The DRV has not accepted the Sovietcollective security scheme. Although Sovietcommentators have claimed that theVietnamese victory in Indochina is part of theheadway being gained by the idea ofcollective security in Asia, there is noevidence to suggest that the DRV recognizessuch linkage. The contrary seems evident in

Vol. VI, No.1

the differing DRV-USSR perceptions ofASEAN's role in the region. The Soviet Unionhas viewed ASEAN's gropings towards aneutralization formula as the first steptowards the realization of an Asian collectivesecurity system. Hanoi, on the other hand,has viciously attacked the "pro-Americanneutrality" of ASEAN as another proof of itsessen tial imperialist and neo-colonialistorientations. A sentence in the November1975 joint communique between Rumaniaand the DRV may accurately define the kindof relationship that the Vietnamese seek withthe Soviet Union: "The two sides declare thatall the Communists and workers parties areindependent and equal. They base themselveson the political conditions in their owncountry and on the principles ofMarxism-Leninism to work out their ownpolicies and to support each other."

The DRV has refrained from takingstances openly critical of the PRC or itsleadership by name. It has not allowed

the Soviet Union to use the DRV relationshipas a weapon against China. On the other hand,the PRC presents the greatest threat toHanoi's realization of its own ambitions andeven, perhaps, independence. The sources ofantagonisms between the DRV and the PRCare many, having deep historical andpsychological roots. From the point of viewof the DRV, the PRC is encroaching on itsterritory, I.e., the Paracel Islands dispute andits wider implications. We should notunderestimate the possible threat perceptionfrom the north that the DRV elite may feel.Although they continue to mouth thes tere otyped phrases of friendship andcooperation, it does not require a great dealof reading between the lines to find coolnessand mutual suspicion. The principalpre-revolutionary symbols of Vietnamesenationalism are anti-Chinese, and these arewielded by the revolutionary leadership withgusto. Le Duan, celebrating the April victory,attributed the glory to the heroic Vietnamesepeople in whose veins flows the blood of theTrung sisters, Lady Trieu, Ly Thung Kiet, andTran Hung Dao-all of whom had led thepeople against the "northern invaders."! 7

77

Chinese sponsorship of what from Hanoiwould appear to be a truly autonomousProvisional Revolutionary Government ofSouth Vietnam (PRGSV) regime-as opposedto rapid unification~combined with thePRC-Phnom Penh axis, gave substance to thecharge that China wanted a dependent,fragmented Indochina.

The Chinese have been preoccupied withthe fear that the DRV would become a kindof Soviet satellite, a block in the wall ofcontainment that Peking argues is Sovietstrategy in Asia. When the Cambodian leader,Khieu Samphan, visited Peking in August1975, Teng Hsiao-ping told him that after theUnited States had been defeated in Vietnam,"the other superpower seized the opportunityby hook or by crook to extend its eviltentacles in Southeast Asia." 18 In anunparalleled way, the terms of the Sino-Sovietdispute were brought home to the NorthVietnamese on North Vietnamese soil by theChinese Vice-Premier Chen Hsi-Iien. In aspeech to the workers of the Thai Nguyeniron and steel works, September 3, 1975,Chen detailed the terms of the "superpowercontention for world hegemony" which isgetting, "more fierce and the factors for warare increasing."19 In a thrust at the DRV,Chen said the superpowers "are doing theirutmost to place other countries under theirsphere of influence, interfering in theirinternal affairs, violating their independenceand sovereignty," indirectly hinting that theVietnamese should not sell themselves out fora mess of USSR economic pottage. Chen'smilitary career makes his remarks even moreacute. There was no public Vietnamesereaction to this undiplomatic butunmistakably pointed speech. The Sovietreaction was angry. Soviet spokesmen tookthis "act of political provocation" to attributeto the Vietnamese a position in theSino-Soviet dispute that the DRV has soughtto avoid: "The Vietnamese people clearlyknow the difference between friend andfoe. "20 The fact that this was an escalation ofthe struggle for influence in Indochina wasduly noted:

The Maoist leaders attempt to move the

78

'cold war' which they are waging againstthe USSR and the entire socialistcommunity onto Vietnamese soil, too)cannot be regarded as anything but anattempt to counterpoise their anti~Marxist

viewpoint to the well-known position ofthe Vietnam Workers Party and anythingbut gross political tastelessness) 1

When Le Duan travelled to Peking in lateSeptember 1975, Teng Hsiao-ping, speaking atthe banquet given for the Vietnamese partyby the Central Committee of the CPC,elaborated on the superpower thesis, "thebiggest international exploiters and oppressorsof today," and, in words that had particularrelevance for his guest, went on to say: "Moreand more people have come to see now thatto combat superpower hegemonism is a vitaltask facing the people of all countries."2 2 LeDuan's trip to China was part of the DRV'sefforts to gain commitments of materialsupport for the Five Year Plan. Apparentlythere were difficulties encountered. Le Duandid not give a return banquet; there was nojoint communique; the Vietnamese Party leftChina with little fanfare; there was nolong-term agreement on Chinese assistance tothe DRV. It may be that the political pricethe PRC was asking was too high.

CAMBODIA

Although Peking's strategy of counteringSoviet encroachment in Southeast Asia hasmet with little success in Vietnam, it is beingapplied elsewhere in Indochina, where it mayhave the effect-probably intended-oflimiting the DRV's influence as well.

The primary foreign policy problem facedby the Cambodian leadership relates to thecapacity and ambition of the DRV. Thequestion is the degree to which the NorthVietnamese require a Cambodian client ordependent as part of a grander scheme ofIndochinese hegemony, now that the militaryrequirement for Cambodian facilities for theNorth Vietnamese Army no longer obtains.This potentiality has to be viewed against acultural, political, and ethnic history oftraditional antagonisms between the Khmer

Parameters, Journal of the US Army War College

and Vietnamese peoples independent of theparticular regime structures. Even during theprosecution of the Indochinese wars, theconflicting Vietnamese and Khmer Rougeinterests led at times to armed clashesbetween the parties despite their ideologicalmilitant solidarity. After the war ended inCambodia and South Vietnam, tensionbetween the Khmer Rouge and NVA ineastern Cambodia persisted.

Not only was there a problem of thepresence of North Vietnamese soldiers inCambodia, but the Vietnamese quicklydemonstrated a willingness to use forceagainst the new Cambodian government as ameans to delimit the maritime sovereignty ofthe PRGSV in areas that had been territoriallydisputed. In May 1975, the Vietnameseimposed control on the island of Phu Quoc,militarily confronting the Cambodians in thenorth of the island. This was followed in Juneby an air and sea assault against the KhmerRouge garrison on Puolo Wai, which theVietnamese seized after three days of fighting.This extended the continental shelf of SouthVietnam in an area of proved offshore oilresources, solving by force a problem that theantecedent governments had by agreementput off to the postwar future. The aggressiveVietnamese behavior revivified persistentCambodian apprehensions about itsneighbors' designs on its territorial integrity.This concern has been a central thread ofCambodia's modern external relations. In thisrespect, the new ruling elite is perceptuallylinked to its nonrevolutionary predecessors. Itis reported that after the June incident, ahigh-ranking Cambodian delegation journeyedsecretly to Hanoi to protest the Vietnameseincursions. This was followed by a singularlyunpublicized trip by Le Duan to Cambodia inlate July or early August. A very brief andnonelaborative communique was issued whichnoted that: "The Cambodian and Vietnamesedelegations held cordial conversations in anatmosphere of brotherhood on questions ofmutual interest. The two delegations reachedunanimity of views on all questions raised."2 3

Apparently this "unanimity of views" didresult in some retreat by the Vietnamese fromthe position they had previously staked outby arms.

Vol. VI, No.1

The Khmer Rouge's diplomatic responsewas paralleled by a vigorous internalcampaign to heighten the Cambodian

peoples' "absolute determination to defendtheir territorial integrity, territorial waters,sea, islands, and air space,"24 an invocationof nationalist sentiments that became aregular part of the government's mobilizingsymbols. Verbal defense was accompanied bysome readiness precautions on other offshoresites that might be the object of Vietnameseambitions. For example, the forces stationedon Kaoh Tunsay and Kaoh Puo, off the coastat Kep, were praised for transforming "thesetwo islands into fortified bases so as to insurethe defense of territorial waters."25

Further security was sought by neutralizingthe other Indochina front. Cambodia hasobtained satisfaction on the issue of territorialintegrity from the Lao People's DemocraticRepublic (LPDR). In mid-December 1975,the first official Lao delegation to visitCambodia agreed in a joint communique to"respect each other's independence,sovereignty, and territorial integrity on thebasis of present borders"26 [italics added J•This mutual endorsement of the territorialstatus quo formally ratified the pledge madein the Joint Declaration of the IndochineseSummit Conference, April 25,1970, to whichboth the North Vietnamese and the NationalLiberation Front were also signatories.

It is possible to interpret the developmentof Thai-Cambodian relations within theframework of limiting the influence of theDRV. At first the Thai-eambodianrelationship was marked by frontier frictioncaused by the movement of refugees, poorcommand and control over foraging KhmerRouge units, and a certain arrogance ofvictory on the Cambodian side. Theintermittent conflict on the border wasinconsistent with the general foreign policyline of the new Khmer regime and specificallywith its wish "to exist in peace with all peaceand justice loving nations in Southeast Asia,and particularly with the peoples ofneighboring countries with whom we arebound to live forever by history andgeography."27 Rapid progress was madetowards a normal relationship once theChinese-Thai accommodation was finalized in

79

July 1975. The Chinese role in bringing theThais and Khmer Rouge together seemsevident. It is reported that Chou En-Iai toldKukrit in Peking that the minor problemsbetween the two countries could be sortedout once diplomatic ties were established.Low-level official talks took place at theborder in July and August, followed at theend of October by a Cambodian mission toBangkok led by Vice Premier Ieng Sary. Ajoint communique was issued which pointedto eventual diplomatic relations. The twosides also agreed to accept the present frontierbetween the two countries and to fashiontheir relations on the basis of the principles ofpeaceful coexistence.

I t is in its ties to the People's Republic ofChina that the new Cambodian regimemost clearly demonstrates independence

from the DRV. While DRV-PRC relationshave cooled, Cambodia has forged new, closelinks with its Chinese supporters. Thedifferent treatment accorded Peking and theDRV is clearly evident in the May 10, 1975,message greeting the peoples who had wishedthe Khmer Rouge well. 28 Chinese-Cambodianrelations were depicted as characterized by"militant solidarity" founded on along-standing tradition of "friendly andfraternal" relations. The strong, developing,and flourishing bonds between the PRC andCambodia were called "a radiant model ofinternational relations based on sinceresupport and mutual respect." On the otherhand, the Vietnamese were merely listed withLaos and North Korea as "three other closecomrades-in-arms of the Cambodian people inAsia." It has only been with the Chinese thatthe Cambodians have admitted to a specialbilateral relationship. This was formaiizedwhen Khieu Samphan visited Peking inAugust 1975 and signed a joint communiquewith his Chinese hosts in which Cambodiapublicly subscribed to the Chinese"superpower thesis" and praised China as theleader of the socialist world.

LAOS

The situation is quite different with respect

80

to Laos. An appraisal of the ideologicalorientations of the Revolutionary Party'selite, the power relationship that existsbetween Laos and its neighbors, and thesubstantial material requirements for thebuilding of a socialist society in Laos indicatesthat the North Vietnamese position inrelation to the decisionmaking of the LPDR isas strong today as it was to thedecisionmaking of the Pathet Lao. The twoLao Communist leaders who have emerged totake direction of the new government,Kaysone Phomvihan and Nouhak Phomsavan,made their way to power through theirpolitical and personal ties to the NorthVietnamese Communist elite. On the otherhand, the former public leaders of the"patriotic side" who had been identified withnationalistic potential-for example,Souphanouvong and PhoumiVongvichit-have been relegated to secondaryroles in the structure of the LPDR. Kaysonepoints with pride to the ancestry of theLaotian party in Ho Chi Minh's IndochineseCommunist Party and the clear-sightedleadership given by the Vietnamese. There hasbeen no effort to downgrade the contributionmade by the North Vietnamese to the Laorevolution. Giving immediate substance to theomnipresent psycho-historical Vietnameseconnection is the physical presence of DRVcadres, technicians, and NVA elements still inLaos. The DRV's military posture there seemsto be equally a function of Hanoi's perceptionof its own "forward basing" needs as well asthe Lao Communist's desire for a guarantoragainst possible adventurism from across theMekong.

The most pressing problem for the LPDR isthe reorientation of its economy, a questionwhich assumed crisis proportions when, as aresult of the Thai closure of the border inNovember 1975, Vientiane was cut off fromits normal access to the goods of the worldeconomy. The severe shortages of essentialimports, such as gasoline, rice, sugar, milk,and kerosene, although mitigated byemergency relief activities by the DRV andthe USSR in particular, solidified the LPDR'sresolution to economically turn away fromthe dependent and uncertain relationship it

Parameters, Journal of the US Army War College

had with Thailand. Intense road buildingactivity has been undertaken to secureall-weather transport routes to theVietnamese coast at Haiphong and Vinh.Although self-reliance is the mass slogan, theLPDR leaders are aware of what in fact istheir reliance on others, resulting fromgeography as well as political sympathy. AsKaysone has said: "In economic building ourcountry now very much needs the assistanceand cooperation of all fraternal countries,first of all Vietnam."29

Along with the DRV, the USSR hasshown a high profile in revolutionaryLaos. Certainly, a prominent Russian

role is not contrary to the Lao Communists'perception of the Soviet socialist world role:"The status and role of the USSR in theinternational arena have risen, becoming theleading banner of the socialist bloc and thestrong pillar for all national liberationstruggles on the five continents."30 Laotianideological solidarity with the DRV isconsistent with ideological solidarity with theSoviet Union.

The question is whether the PRC willattempt to maintain a presence in Laos.During the existence of the ProvisionalGovernment of National Union (PGNU), theChinese vied with the USSR and DRV as aprovider of assistance. For the LPDR, thenetwork of roads linking China to northernLaos may be as strategically intimidatingtoday as it was for the non-Communistgovernments in the past. Although theRussian media may scornfully refer toChinese "occupation forces" in Laos, the Laocannot avoid the geographic fact of acommon border with a much more powerfulneighbor. One analyst has concluded that:"There will surely be limits to the extent towhich Laos can free herself of Chineseinfluence even if she wished to do so. In thelong run, the impact of the People's Republicof China is likely to be much greater than thatof the Soviet Union."3] This is a reminderthat the same kind of limit operates tomediate the DRV-PRC breach.

For the immediate future, however, theLPDR seems to find what is almost a

Vol. VI, No.1

"younger brother" relationship to the DRVcongenial. This was apparent in the exchangesthat took place during the February J976visit of the leading members of the Lao partyand government to Hanoi. The finalcommunique established that the bilateralconnection between the two was differentfrom that which might link them to othersocialist states:

The special, pure, consistent, exemplaryand rarely-to-be seen relationship that hasbound Vietnam to Laos constitutes a factorof utmost importance that has decided thecomplete and splendid victory of therevolution in each country. 'This is also thefirmest basis for the solidarity andcooperation between the parties and thetwo countries, and for the victory of therevolution in each country in the newstage.32

The two sides evinced their determinationto consolidate and build upon this specialrelationship. The kind of economic andfinancial links presaged in the Februarydocument suggest that the USSR-DRV modelmight find its pendant in the DRV-LPDRconnection.

THE ASEAN SPHERE

Of mOre than passing interest tonon-Communist Southeast Asia is whether ornot the Lao-Vietnamese special relationshipmeans LPDR support for DRV external goals.The joint communique adverts to therevolutionary ends of policy: "The two sidesfully support the just and surely victoriousstruggle of the peoples in this region forpeace, national independence, democracy,social progress, and will actively contribute tohelping the Southeast Asian states becomereally independent, peaceful and neutralones." Although the DRV has indicated itswillingness to organize on a "step-by-step"basis relations with the countries of SoutheastAsia on the principles of peaceful coexistence,it is clear that the controlling definitions ofthe terms of coexistence will have to beHanoi's. The sine qua non of independence is

81

the complete elimination of the Americanpresence. Hanoi demands that the ASEANstates "must escape from the influence of USimperialists, dismantle all US bases, abandonthe policy of tailing after the United States,and adopt a truly cooperative and friendlyattitude."33 All subordinate links to theUnited States-political, military, economic,and cultural-must be broken as a conditionof friendly and cooperative relations withrevolutionary Vietnam.

The touchstone for the quality of therelations that the DRV intends todevelop with the rest of Southeast Asia

is Thailand. The Thai case presents undilutedthe many issues outstanding between theDRV and the ASEAN states: the residual UScommitment, domestic anti-Communism,support for insurgent forces, and ASEANintegration. For the DRV, Thailand has beenan enemy, allowing its territory to be used bythe United States to prosecute the war inIndochina, as well as being a party to theconflict itself. Even before the DRV victoryin Indochina, the two governments began toaddress the problem of postwar relations. TheThais demanded that the DRV should stopassisting Thai Communist insurgents directly,or indirectly through Vietnamese refugees inNortheast Thailand. The DRV, on the otherhand, required as an absolute conditionpreceding relations with Thailand that all USmilitary forces should be expelled fromThailand, and all US bases and facilities beclosed. The DRV position remainedunchanged. If anything, it hardened with thecomplication for Thailand of the SouthVietnamese aircraft and equipment whicharrived in Thailand in April 1975. ThePRGSV, backed by the DRV, immediatelydemanded that it be returned to the newowners.

The controversy over the return of theequipment and planes was the background ofthe initial contact between the Thais and thenew authorities in South Vietnam. A PRGSVdelegation arrived in May to negotiate theissue. It left claiming that Thailand's failure tomeet the demands of South Vietnam did notcreate favorable circumstances for the

82

establishment of relations between Thailandand the PRGSV. More progress was expectedwhen the first direct bilateral DRV-Thaidiscussions took place at the end of May1975. Unfortunately, the talks were precededby an outbreak, inspired or spontaneous, ofanti-Vietnamese demonstrations in theNortheast. The DRV mission had beenpreceded by a DRV protest and demand thatthe Thai government assume responsibility forthe incidents and take the measures necessaryto prevent a reoccurrence. The perennialquestion of the Vietnamese minority inThailand leaped again to the forefront andbecame a third major issue in thenormalization process. The Thai side in thenegotiation was under strong pressure from itsdomestic left and center not to raise thethorny issues of DRV support to Thaiinsurgents or DRV troops in Laos.

The negotiations ended with a jointcommunique:

The two delegations reached agreement onmany issues of common interests. However,several other problems remain to bediscussed. With this in mind, the Thaidelegation has accepted the DemocraticRepublic of Vietnam's invitation to visitHanoi. The date of the visit will be setlater.

There is no evidence that the DRV retreatedfrom its unconditional demands about the USpresence or the return of the aircraft. This,combined with continued sporadic attacks onthe Vietnamese in Thailand and deterioratingThai-Lao relations as the PGNU became theLPDR, has resulted in a stand-off. Theexchange visit has not taken place. Thai-DRVrelations remain frozen in a state of officialhostility .

Bangkok's willingness to allow its relationswi th the DRV to slide towardspermanent "cold war" relates to a

number of internal and external factors, oneset of which connects the Thai "DRV policy"to the Sinb-Soviet-DRV triangle. On July I,1975, the Thais and the PRe establisheddiplomatic relations. The official

Parameters, Journal of the US Army War College

communique followed the pattern establishedby the Malaysian-Chinese recognition formulaa year earlier. The "anti-hegemony" clausewas present. All official relations betweenThailand and Taiwan were terminated. It wasagreed that aggression and subversion or otherinternal interference into the affairs of theother country were impermissible. Pekingdeclared that it did not recognize dualnationality for the Chinese residents inThailand and called upon the overseas Chineseto abide by Thai law. The official opening ofdiplomatic relations climaxed a process ofnormalization of relations with the PRC thathad begun in an exploratory fashion evenbefore the democratic revolution of October1973.

While in Peking, the Thai Prime Minister,Kukrit, and his party received numerousinformal and unofficial signs and signals fromhis hosts about the distribution of power inSoutheast Asia. The usual warnings aboutletting the tiger in the back door was given,and the Thais were warned not to be undulyhasty in putting an end to the Americanmilitary bases. Of particular interest was thesuggestion that the tiger might have cubs.Kukrit quoted Teng Hsiao-ping as saying thatan Asian third world non-superpower wasattempting to establish hegemony over othercountries. In a speech made from ·Canton, theThai Prime Minister claimed that the Thai andChinese governments had almost identicalviews regarding the Indochina issues. In aremark on Thai television, Kukrit madeexplicit what some saw as one factor in theThai-Chinese link-the intention to outflankthe DRV-when he said that Thailand shouldnot fear certain "small countries" after havingmade friends with such a big country.34

The real test for Thailand has been inLaos. The radicalization of the PGNUwas paralleled by escalating charges and

countercharges across the Mekong River. Thebarrage of accusations of intervention, spying,and plotting was punctuated by numerousarmed incidents involVing Thai patrol craft onthe river. Finally, in November after theforced grounding of a patrol craft, the Thaisclosed the border, with serious economic

Vol. VI, No.1

consequences. The Lao Communist elitesuspect the "reactionary clique" in Bangkokof conspiring with Lao "rightist" elements toundo the revolution. Thai policy towardsLaos continues to be viewed as aggressive andinterventionist, backed by US imperialism.The Thais, on the other hand, suspect theLaotians of harboring ill-disguised irredentistambitions in Thailand's 16 northeasternprovinces. More real is the Thai concern aboutthe changed strategic position along theMekong in relation to what it perceives asimplacable DRV hostility now being ventedthrough a puppet. Thai stubborn claims thatthe deterioration in Lao-Thai relations hasbeen caused by the instigation of a thirdcountry obscures one of the real issuesbetween Laos and Thailand: the Thais nolonger are dealing with a weak and compliantVientiane regime. The PGNU and its LPDRsuccessor have forcibly asserted a Laorevolutionary nationalism and insistence onsovereignty that invalidates the old patternsof trans-Mekong contact.

There has been some suggestion from Thaiquarters that the DRV-and through theDRV, the Lao-attacks on Thai policy havebeen inspired by the Soviet Union, disturbedover the evolution of Sino-Thai relations.From the pattern of Thai diplomaticconsultation following the November incidenton the Mekong, it appears that the Thais feelthat the Soviet Union is a proper agency forcommunication with their Indochinaantagonists.

Only in Indonesia is there significantdeviation from the patterns of thetriangular competition. The Jakarta

authorities are not prepared to accept thedichotomous policy characteristic of Peking.Continued PRC verbal support to theCommunist Party of Indonesia (largely inexile) serves to confirm Indonesia'sdecisionmakers in the correctness of theirjudgment about Chinese intentions. Indonesiareacted to the Malaysian, Thai, and Philippinenormalization of relations with China byinsisting that these did not directly concernIndonesia. At the same time, however, theIndonesian leadership called for greater

83

vigilance and national resilience. Like itsASEAN partners, Indonesia anticipated theIndochina outcome. For the Indonesians,however, the emergence of a triumphant andrelatively powerful DRV had implications forIndonesia's own regional foreign policyambitions. Even before April 1975, theoutline of a bipolar Southeast Asia wasemerging with its northern axis in Hanoi, itssouthern in Jakarta.35 DRV revolutionaryhostility towards the Indonesian regime in thepost-Indochina war period has not beenmuted. Not only is the Suharto governmentcastigated for tailing after the United States,the memories of the IndonesianArmy-Communist confrontation in 1965 arerekindled with appeals to nbt forget the"blood bath" that led to the "massacre" ofthe Communists. Indonesian armedinvolvement in Timor hardened the linesbetween Jakarta and the Asian Communists.Both Peking and Hanoi took the side of theFreWin forces who, in early December 1975,proclaimed the Democratic Republic of EastTim or. Both capitols proclaimed theircomplete support for the independence ofEast Timor and called for the end ofI ndonesian aggression. Although neitherofficially recognized the Timorese "republic,"FreWin missions were welcomed in Pekingand Hanoi. The vitriolic attacks on Indonesiaemanating from the DRV and PRC were onlyequaled in propaganda savagery by theirreactions to the crushing of the IndonesianCommunist Party in 1965-66. The DRV haswarned Jakarta that its policy is "opposed bythe Indonesian people and the other peoplesof Southeast Asia as well."36 The Sovietpublic response to events in Timor has beenless violent, Moscow being unwilling to riskon a losing cause what gains it has made inrecrea ting an Indonesian-Russian link.Indonesia's desire to firm up in real terms itssecurity links within the region in the face ofrevolutionary hostility connected to realpower in North Vietnam has led to anacceleration of the process of politicalpolarization in Southeast Asia.

The adjustments of the ASEAN states tothe new situation in the region have beenlargely unilateral, although carried out after

84

regional consultation and communication.Although it was hoped that some kind ofASEAN framework might lead to the creationof a nonrevolutionary, cooperative structureof interaction between non-CommunistSoutheast Asia and the IndochineseCommunists, no one of the three regimes hasresponded favorably to ASEAN overtures.The very opposite has happened. The DRVattacks on the concept of ASEAN haveincreased. Economically, ASEAN is viewed asthe creature of imperialism andneocolonialism, while politically, ASEAN isused by the US through Indonesia "to rally allpro-American reactionary forces to opposethe revolutionary movement in SoutheastAsia.~'3 7

THE "CONTRADICTION" OFCOMMUNIST POWER

The DRV's analysis of the Southeast Asianpolitical setting concludes that the region isthe focus of the primary contradictionsbetween the socialist and imperialist camps.The characteristic of the balance of forces inthe region is the strength of the revolutionarymovements and the weakness of thereactionaries: "The factor deciding thedevelopmental trend of Asia in thepost-Vietnam period is the strength of therevolutionary currents of the time which arestrong and are on the offensive."38 Thisoffensive is to be intensified and will enjoythe full support of the Vietnamesepeoples-compatible, therefore, with the lawof historic evolu tion-and cannot be reversedby any reactionary force. Of immediatepolicy relevance is the form that"support"-or in the phrase of the Lao-DRVjoint communique, the "activecontribution"-to the revolutionary strugglein Southeast Asia might take, keeping in mindthe limits imposed by the political task ofreunification, the allocation of resources tosocialist domestic construction, and thepolitical activities of the other Communiststates in Southeast Asia.

It seems clear that the key to the DRV'spresence in ASEAN Southeast Asia will be itscontacts with revolutionary movements.

Parameters, Journal of the US Army War College

Adam Malik, the Indonesian Foreign Minister,scoffed at the idea that Thailand couldmanage to guarantee its security from NorthVietnam by friendship with China, In itsstrongest words yet, the DRV has called onthe Southeast Asian insurgent warriors to stepup the fight against the non-Communistregimes, In Hanoi's words, "time has neverbeen so good in Southeast Asia" for revolt,

I t is easy to iden tify the indigenous loser ofsuch a struggle if the DRV-backed forcesshould win, It is not so easy, however, to

say within the context of the Sino-Sovietdispute who would be the winner, or even ifthere would be a "winner," other than Hanoi.

In its search for allies in Southeast Asia, theSoviet Union has been singularly unsuccessfulin exploiting the very fluid and dynamicsecurity environment. In the first place, theChinese potential power presence is felt bySoutheast Asian leadership to be morecompelling than the Soviet actual presence.The policy thrust in Southeast Asia has beentowards the normalization of relations withthe Chinese, thus precluding acts that wouldbe viewed as anti-PRC. On the other hand, theSoviet Union still is viewed as being rather

'remote from the central interests of theSouthe,ast Asian states. The USSR has no realsanctions-political, economic, or military-toforestall an ti-Soviet acts such as acceptance ofthe anti-hegemony clause as the price fordiplomatic relations with the PRC. The USSRhas no significant indigenous political forcesto deploy in support of its policy ends. In itsefforts to mobilize support for its anti-PRCstance, it has articulated basicallyoppositional symbols, defining a COmmonenemy against which Southeast Asian stateshave to be alerted. One aspect of that enemyis the internal revolutionary forces in ASEAN,linked verbally and perhaps materially toPeking and Hanoi.

The DRV's vanguard position in therevolutionary movement creates problems forthe Chinese as well. It may be that as theChinese find it necessary to makerevolutionary compromises with theanti-Communist regimes of Southeast Asia ina kind of tacit balance of power alliance with

Vol. VI, No.1

the United States, the DRV will seek topreempt the "Maoist" leadership of SoutheastAsian insurgency, conserving revolutionarypurity, but at the same time in a realpolitikmanner, limiting PRC influence in theASEAN region. In the long run, however, thePRC's proximity and relative power meansthat it cannot be excluded.

The DRV views Southeast Asia as beingthe center of "contradictions." Perhapsthe most important one today is that

which goes unmentioned by Hanoi: thecontradiction of "socialist" competition forpower. Predictions about the DRV's politicalbehavior in Southeast Asia cannot be basedon assumptions about "alliance" or"subordinate" links to the USSR. In terms ofthe interests of the ASEAN states-and byextension, the interests of the UnitedS ta t e s-because of the USSR-PRCcompetition in Southeast Asia, the DRVcannot become a hegemonic regional power.On the other hand, interacting with the USSRand PRC, the DRV's relative politicalindependence makes it less likely that eitherof the Communist superpowers will gainhegemonic ascendency,

NOTES

1. O. Vladimirov, "Peking's Great-Power Course,"lsvestia, 11 September 1975, in Current Digest afthe SovietPress, hereafter CDSP, 8 October 1975, pp. 1-4.

2. Shih THsu, "The South Sea Islands Have Been China'sTerritory Since Ancient Times," Kwangming Daily, NewChina News Agency, hereafter NCNA, 26 November 1975, inForeign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report-PeoplesRepublic ajChina, hereafter PBIS-PRe, 28 November 1975,pp, E7-8.

3. Moscow radio Peace and Progress, 29 November 1975,in Foreign Broadcast Infonnation Service DailyReport-Soviet Union, hereafter FBIS-USSR, 1 December1975, p. C1.

4. M. Tisoyan, "Peking's Policy in South and South-EastAsia," Pravda, I March 1974, in CDSP, 27 March 1974, p, 7.

5. Moscow radio Peace and Progress, 10 December 1975,inFBIS-USSR, 15 Decemher 1975, p, C2,

6. Editorial, "Contrary to the Vital Interests of thePeoples," Pravda, 27 February 1975, in CDSP, 19 March1975, p. 3.

7. Yeo Zhukov, "Security and Peace for the Peoples ofAsia," Pravda, 14 December 1974, in CDSP, 8 January 1975,pp, 10-11.

8. V. Kudryavtsev, "Asia: Problems of Security,"Isvestia, 28 August 1975, in CDSP, 24 September 1975, pp.1-2.

9. "Asian Countries and People-Guard Against Tiger at

85

the Back Door While Repulsing Wolf at the Gate." PekingReview, 9 January 1976. p. 20.

10. Commentary by Hsinhua, correspondent. "'EuropeanSecurity Conference': An Analysis of Its 'Fhial Act,'" PekingReview, 8 August 1975, p. 5.

11. Talk, "Changes in Situation in Southeast AsiaAdvantageous to the Peoples of Various Nations," Pekingradio, 16 June 1975, in FBIS-PRC, 19 June 1975, p. A4.

12. Quang Thai. "Southeast Asia Belongs to theSouth-East Asian Peoples," Nhan Dan, 12 June 1975, inForeign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report-Asiaand the Pacific, hereafter FBIS-AP, 13 June 1975, p. K7.

13. "This Law and That Law," Hanoi radio, 12 July 1975,in FBIS-AP, 14 July 1975, p. K1.

14. Commentary in Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 8 June 1975. inFBIS-AP, 10 June 1975, p. K5.

15. "A Great Change in Southeast Asia," Quan Doi NhanDan, 28 May 1975, inFIBS-AP, 30 May 1975, p. K5.

16. Commentary, "Socialism, the Necessary Path of OurNation," Vietnamese radio, 25 November 1975, in FBIS-AP,4 December 1975, p. K3.

17. As quoted by Vietnam News Agency, hereafterVNA,15 May 1975, in FBIS-AP, 15 May 1975, p. K3. The Trungsisters led the first Vietnamese uprising against Chineseoccupiers in 39 A.D. Trieu An rallied partisans against theChinese in 248 A.D. Ly Thung Kiet secured Chineserecognition of Vietnamese independence in 1077 A.D. TranHung Dao repelled the Mongol invaders from China in thethirteenth century.

18. "Vietnam: Fighting a New Kind of War," Far EasternEconomic Review, 26 September 1975, p. 10.

19. NCNA, 3 September 1975, in FBIS-PRC, 12September 1975, pp. All-14.

20. Moscow radio, 7 September 1975, in FBIS-USSR, 8September 1975, p. C2.

21. A. Krushinsky, "A Cynical Attack." Pravda, 5September 1975, in FBIS-USSR, 10 September 1975, p.C1.

22. NCNA, 22 September 1975, in FBIS-PRC, 23September 1975, p. A16. Although VNA reported the Tengspeech, it did not repeat the anti-Soviet material

23. VNA, 4 August 1975, in FBIS-AP, 4 August 1975, p.HI.

24. "Cambodia's Sons and DaUghters Are Determined toDefend the Territorial Integrity of Cambodia-TheirFatherland," Phnom Penh radio, 22 June 1975, inFBIS-AP23 June 1975, p. H4.

25. Phnom Penh radio, 3 August 1975, in FBIS-AP, 5August 1975, p. H3.

26. Phnom Penh radio, 19 December 1975, in FBIS-AP19 December 1975, p. H3.

27. "Our People's Pennanent Stand is to Live in Peace andFriendship With All Friendly Peoples, Near and Far," PhnomPenh radio, 22 May 1975, in FBIS-AP, 23 May 1975, p. H2.

28. "The Cambodian People Deeply Thank All FriendlyPeoples, Far and Near, For Their War Greetings on theCambodian Peoples Great Victory," Phnom Penh radio, 10May 1975, in FBIS-AP, 12 May 1975, pp. H4-5.

29. Radio Pathet Lao, 20 October 1975, in FBIS-AP, 21October 1975, p. 13.

30. Commentary, Radio Pathet Lao, 7 November 1975, inFBIS-AP, 10 November 1975, p.14.

31. Richard Butwell, "From Feudalism to Communism inLaos," Current History, December 1975, p. 246.

32. The text as given by VNA in FBIS-AP, 12 February1975, pp. KI-9.

33. Hanoi radio, 26 February 1976, in FBIS-AP, 27February 1976, p. K2.

34. Bangkok radio, 8 July 1975, in FBIS-AP, 9 July1975, p. J1.

35. See Donald E. Weatherbee, "Collective Defense,Neutralization, and the Balance of Power: ContendingSecurity Policies in Southeast Asia," in National Security andDetente (Crowell, 1976), pp. 153-83.

36. VNA, 31 December 1975, in FBIS-AP, 5 January1976, p. K2.

37. Comment on ASEAN Summit in Quan Doi Nhan Dan,22 FebruaIY 1976, in FBIS-AP, 26 FebruaIy 1976, p. K2.

38. Hoi Van, "The New Pacific Doctrine-The USCounterrevolutionary Strategy in Asia after Vietnam," TapChi Quan Nhan Dan, 8 FebruaIY 1976, in FBIS-AP, 10FebruaIy 1976, p. K5.

86 Parameters, Journal of the US Army War College