ThisanalysiswasproducedwithintheThinkVisegradNon-V4Fellowshipprogramme.Think Visegrad – V4 Think Tank Platform is anetwork forstructured dialog on issues of strategic regionalimportance.Thenetworkanalyseskey issues for theVisegradGroup,andprovides recommendations to thegovernmentsofV4countries,theannualpresidenciesofthegroup,andtheInternationalVisegradFund.FormoreinformationaboutThinkVisegradanditsmembersvisitwww.thinkvisegrad.org.

TheV4andEUStrategicAutonomy:

ConsensualVoice,DiscordantTones?

AnanalysisoftheV4approachtoEUCommonSecurityandDefencePolicy

GrégoireROOS

Abstract

SincePresidentObama'sAsianpivoting,theU.S.hasengagedinadiplomaticretrenchment

fromEuropeanaffairs,andDonaldTrumphasallbutconfirmed thisunderlying trendwith

recurringhostilestatementstowardstheEuropeanUnion(EU)andtheNorthAtlanticTreaty

Organisation (NATO). This has revived the EU's60-year old debate on the bloc’s common

defence and security framework, and pushed France's EmmanuelMacron and Germany's

AngelaMerkeltopromoteagreaterautonomyofdecision,capacityandcapabilityoftheEU

indefenceandsecurity.

It isagainstthisgeopoliticalbackdropand inthiscontextofdeterioratingU.S.-EUrelations

thattheconceptof"strategicautonomy"hasemergedintheEUpolicydiscussion1.Broadly

speaking, theconceptaimsatansweringthefollowingquestion:"Whatdowe,Europeans,

wanttobeabletoachieveonourown?"FortheFrenchand,toalargeextent,theGermans,

strategicautonomy isasynonymof strategiccapacityand strategicsovereignty.Butdoall

EUMemberStatesagreeonthedefinition,evenontherelevanceofsuchaconceptwhenit

comesoutasapotentialdirectconflictingalternativetoNATO?Inthisregard,theVisegrad

Group (V4) offers an enlightening example of the rationale and arguments of the EU

1Forthesakeofclarity,EUandEuropewillbeusedinterchangeablyhereinafter.

2

countries still reluctant to fully commit to the concept of strategic autonomy and its

underlyingpoliticalambition.Thispaperaimsataddressingthefollowingquestions:

▪ What do the V4’s consensus and divergence, as regards European defence and

security,tellusaboutthestrengthsandweaknessesoftheconceptof“EUstrategic

autonomy”?

▪ What concrete lessons canwe draw from the V4 case study to enable greater EU

resilienceindefenceandsecurity?

Analysis

WiththefalloftheBerlinWallthatsawtheolddreamofGermanreunificationcometrue,

and the collapse of the Soviet Union that led to the end of the Cold War, we took our

collectiveEuropeansecurityforgranted.Theso-called“easternthreat”2hadsuddenlyfaded

away, and NATO had demonstrated its relevance, resilience and strength, eventually

prevailing over the Warsaw Pact. In many regards, 1989 and its immediate geopolitical

aftermathscameoutasthecombinedsuccessofNATOandtheU.S.’Europeanstrategy3.

Aquarterofacentury later, theworldseemstohavefullyenteredthe21stcentury. New

global security threats have surfaced (i.e. Islamist terrorism, cyberwarfare, etc.), China is

flamboyantly(re)emerging,withproudly-statedambitionofglobalaffluence,andweseethe

end of theUS’monopoly on the setting of the global agenda. Europe is no longer at the

centreofthestage.Andnotonlyhasthespotlightbeengoneforsometime,butEuropean

collectivesecurity,onwhichtheU.S.hadsettheirsealin1989,isnowsubjecttodiscussion,

includingintheWhiteHouse4.

2Korbonski,Andrzej."EasternEuropeandtheSovietThreat."ProceedingsoftheAcademyofPoliticalScience33,no.1(1978):66-76.3Hutchings,RobertL.AmericanDiplomacyandtheEndoftheColdWar:AnInsider'sAccountofUSDiplomacyinEurope,1989-1992.WoodrowWilsonCenterPress(1997).4Bond,Ian.‘‘TrumpSoundstheRetreat:CanEuropeanDefenceAdvance?’’.CERInsight.June26,2020.

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Interestinglyenough,someevenventureintopointingoutthattheColdWarmightnothave

endedentirely,andsuggestitwouldappearmorepropertotalkofametamorphosisofthe

ideological split that characterised the opposition of the U.S.-Soviet blocs5. And indeed,

Europe’ssecurityisnowmorechallengedthaneversincethefalloftheBerlinWall.Assuch,

2014marksadecisiveturningpointintheperceptionoftheweaknessofEurope’scollective

security frameworkasmuchas itsexemplification.Russia’sannexationofCrimea inMarch

2014andtheintensificationoftheviolencethatfollowedinUkrainewerebutthefirstofa

long series of major destabilising geopolitical events on Europe’s eastern and southern

flanks: Libya’s second civil war in 2014, the migration crisis in 2015, the conflict in the

easternMediterraneanin2020,etc.Thesearesomeofthegreatsecuritychallengesfacing

Europe today, andwhich call for a collective, scalable, comprehensive and actionable EU

defenceandsecuritypolicy.

Itisagainstthisbackdropofnewgeopoliticalchallengesthatthethennewly-electedFrench

PresidentcalledforarenewingoftheEU’sdefenceandsecurity framework.Inhisflagship

Sorbonnespeech(2017)6,EmmanuelMacroncalledforEuropetofacetherealityofitsown

weaknessesindefenceandsecurity,whichwasfortoolongconsideredasbeingAmerica’s

business. A fewmonths before, at theG7 in Sicily, Chancellor AngelaMerkel had already

advocatedformoreEuropeaninvolvementinEuropeandefenceandsecurity,arguingitwas

now time “to take our fate into our own hands,’’ without, however, cutting the ties of

friendshipandcooperationwiththeU.S.andotherEuropeantraditionalalliesandpartners7.

And to emphasise what he sees as a survival challenge for Europe, President Macron 5Westad,OddWarne. ‘‘The ColdWar andAmerica’s Delusion of Victory’’.TheNew York Times. August 28,2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/28/opinion/cold-war-american-soviet-victory.html (accessedOctober14,2020).6Macron, Emmanuel. ‘‘Initiative pour une Europe souveraine, unie et démocratique”. Speech at SorbonneUniversity.Paris,September26,2017.https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2017/09/26/initiative-pour-l-europe-discours-d-emmanuel-macron-pour-une-europe-souveraine-unie-democratique (accessed October 24,2020).7Paravicini, Giulia. ‘‘Angela Merkel: Europe must take ‘our fate’ into own hands’’. Politico. May 28, 2017.https://www.politico.eu/article/angela-merkel-europe-cdu-must-take-its-fate-into-its-own-hands-elections-2017/(accessedOctober24,2020).

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denouncedNATO’s lethargicstanceonmostoftheburningsecurity issuesoftheday,and

called for a refreshed approach to how Europe addresses its main defence and security

challenges.Headvocatedforpushingformoreoperationalandstrategicautonomyinfront

ofa“brain-dead”NATO8.

Nevertheless,thegrowingsenseofU.S.disinterestandrelativedisengagementfromEurope

isnotnew.PresidentDonaldTrump'spolicywasbutaconfirmation–thoughlessdiplomatic

andtactful–ofanunderlyingtrendalreadyperceptibleunderPresidentObama9.Callingfor

a European strategic autonomy in reaction to President Trump’s tweets or public

declarationswouldthereforebestrategicallymisguidedandpoliticallyirrelevant.

In thisrespect, theVisegradGroup issomehowshowingamorenuanced stance. Itwould

seem insightful to analyse the rationale behind the V4 approach to European strategic

autonomy, to what extent they support it, and why they want to set limitations to the

concept.TheV4offersagoodexampleofCentralandEasternEurope’sconcernsregarding

the Franco-German proposal for a European strategic autonomy. But if all V4 countries

voicedtheirpoliticalconcerns,some,likeSlovakia10andtheCzechRepublic11acknowledged

theneedtodomorebetweenEuropeans,withoutexpectingeverythingfromthe“American

umbrella”.

EuropeanSecurityin2020:ATurningPoint?

Perhapsmorethan2008,2020maywellbe remembered incollectiveEuropeanhistoryas

theyearwhentheEUstoodfirminthestorm.Withanunprecedentedconjunctionofcrises,

8‘‘EmmanuelMacronwarnsEurope:NATOisbecomingbrain-dead’’.TheEconomist.November7,2019.9 Karl, David J. ‘‘Rejected: Why Obama Snubs Europe’’. The National Interest. April 1, 2015.https://nationalinterest.org/feature/rejected-why-obama-snubs-europe-12516(accessedOctober20,2020). 10MinistryofForeignandEuropeanAffairsoftheSlovakRepublic.”ForeignandEuropeanPolicyoftheSlovakRepublic in 2020.” https://www.mzv.sk/documents/10182/4238286/200710-zahranicna-a-europska-politika-SR-v-roku-2020(accessedNovember21,2020).11AMO.“EuropeandefensebetweenNATOandPESCO:ChartingacourseforCzechdefensePolicy”. Policy Paper. December 2017. https://www.amo.cz/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/AMO_European-defense-between-NATO-and-PESCO-Charting-a-course-for-Czech-defense-policy.pdf (accessed October 29,2020).

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(such as the COVID-19 pandemic, tensions at the EU’s eastern border, in the eastern

MediterraneanandinBelarus...),2020maynotonlyhavebroughtEUMemberStatescloser

tooneanother,butalsorevealedtheresilienceofthebloc.

Mostprominently,theCOVID-19pandemichascomeoutasawake-upcallthatEuropewill

becomestronger,secureitsinterestsandassertitsplaceintheworldif itspeakswithone

voiceandtacklescriseswithauniqueandcomprehensivestrategy.AsAlešChmelař,Deputy

MinisterforEuropeoftheCzechRepublic,putit,theEUwillonlygrowstrongerifitisableto

demonstratea“unitedsolutiontothecrisesinfuture.”12

The political crisis and the violent street protests that followed the highly disputed re-

electionofPresidentLukashenkoofBelarusalsoputtotesttheEU’sabilitytodealwithits

easternneighboursandtoconcretelyaddressgeopoliticalchallenges13.

Lastly,thedefeatofDonaldTrumpandthevictoryofJoeBideninthe2020U.S.presidential

election is suggesting a likely change in the U.S.-EU relations, if not of policy at least of

atmosphere, with some hoping for a rebalancing of the relationship under a more pro-

EuropeanBidenAdministrationandcallingforanupholdingoftheTransatlanticbond.15But

acrossEUcapitals,fewbelievethataBidenAdministrationwillmeanareturntotheheyday

of the Transatlantic relationship, in part because thenextU.S.Presidentwill first need to

focusonmoreurgentmattersathome,suchasthemanagementoftheCOVID-19pandemic

andthesocio-economiccrisisthatisunfolding16.

12GLOBSEC. “The V4 European and Transatlantic Priorities in the Post COVID-19 Environment”. Summary.https://www.globsec.org/2020/06/29/the-v4-priorities-post-covid-19/(accessedOctober10,2020).13Von der Burchard,Hans. ‘‘EU agrees newBelarus sanctions targeting Lukashenko’’.Politico. November 4,2020. https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-belarus-sanctions-alexander-lukashenko/ (accessed November 4,2020).15 Kramp-Karrenbauer, Annegret. “Europe still needs America”. Politico. November, 2 2020.https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-still-needs-america/(accessedNovember2,2020).16Birnbaum,Michael.Morris,Loveday.“WhetherTrumporBidenwins,Europedoesn’tthinkitcandependonU.S.”. The Washington Post. October 30, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/europe-trump-biden-election/2020/10/30/7f7e6a62-188a-11eb-8bda-814ca56e138b_story.html (accessed November12,2020).

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In thisglobalgeopoliticalcontext,EU leaders, likeEmmanuelMacron,emboldenedby the

EU Covid recovery package and historic agreement for amutual debt decided by the EU

CouncilinJuly2020,believethetimehascomeforgreaterdefencepolicyconvergenceand

more integration towards EU strategic autonomy.17But as the calls for more strategic or

operational autonomy are growing, some wonder what the concept really covers18, and

whether it should mean cutting ties with the U.S. and/or lead to even greater political

integration.Inbothcases,theriskisforstrategicautonomytobedefinedbyNorthernand

CentralEuropeanstatesasanotherTrojanhorseofpoliticalintegration.Yet,originallyfalling

under the scope of defence and security policy, more properly called the EU Common

Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), strategic autonomy was met with some significant

supportintheV419.AndtheVisegradGroup’sargumentstobothembraceandrejectitmay

unveil a lot onwhy and how the concept of strategic autonomy, enlarged to encompass

fieldsotherthanCSDP(suchashealth,data,energy,industry),mightfailinthefuture.

In this regard, two key issues should be thoroughly taken into account: the V4’s

unconditional commitment toNATO, and the conditions underwhich the V4 is willing to

further contribute to CSDP’s initiatives such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation

(PESCO), the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and the European Defence

Fund(EDF).

V4andNATO:Anon-negotiablecommitment

Sincethefallofcommunismandtheirtransitiontodemocracy(barely30yearsago),theV4

countrieshaveinvestedalotofpoliticalenergytojointheAtlanticAlliance,uponwhichthey

havereliedeversincefortheirsecurity.Animportanthistoricalpoint,toooftenoverlooked,

17TheEconomist.“EmmanuelMacronrevivesapost-warinstitutionforapost-covidera”.September5,2020.18Tamma, Paola. “Europe wants ‘strategic autonomy’ — it just has to decide what that means”. Politico.October 15, 2020. https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-trade-wants-strategic-autonomy-decide-what-means/(accessedOctober16,2020).19Dostál,Vít.Végh,Zsuzsanna.“ForVisegrad,CSDPisIneffectivebutEUshouldGainStrategicIndependence”.EuropeanSecurity Journal.November27,2017.https://www.esjnews.com/visegrad-security-trends (accessedNovember12,2020).

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lies in the chronology of NATO and EUmemberships of V4 countries, andwhichmay, in

itself,sayalotaboutthevisceralattachmentofthegrouptoNATO.Indeed,whenallfour

countries joined the EUon 1May 2004, three of them, the CzechRepublic, Hungary and

Poland,hadalreadybeenNATOmembersforfouryears(1999).OnlySlovakiajoinedNATO

onthesameyearofitsaccessiontotheEU.Thissimplehistoricalremindermayallowusto

understand,toacertainextent,theorderofpoliticalprioritiesofacountrylikePoland,that

may have preferred to strengthen its relations with both the Alliance and Washington,

ratherthanincreasingdefencecooperationwiththeEUanditsregionalpartners20.Logically

enough, being the youngest NATOmember amongst the four, Slovakia is also the one to

demonstrate the frankest openness towards greater EUdefence cooperation, and the V4

countrywiththeleastpro-Atlanticpublicopinion21.Butitwouldbeimpropertoexplainthe

V4’sattachmenttoNATOinthesolelightofhistory.Nationalthreatperceptionsalsomatter

agreatdeal.AndwiththecurrentsituationinUkraineandthemilitaryinvolvementofRussia

in the country, the objective likelihoodof conventional conflict on Poland’s northern and

eastern border and aggression from Russia remains fair, however limited. In this regard,

Poland’sdefenceprioritieswillalways,atleastforthetimebeingandthenearfuture,align

with those of the Baltic States. As such, Poland is a key actor of NATO’s eastern flank

defence,andthereforeseesanyattempttoundermineNATOasathreattoitsownnational

security. Inthissense,Warsawcanonly considerregionaldefence integrationthroughthe

lens of NATO. It’s worth mentioning, however, that Poland is not alone in its steadfast

commitmenttoupholdNATOdeterrencecapacity,asitisapriorityequallysharedamongst

theV4.

ButnationalthreatperceptionisnottheonlyreasonbehindtheV4’sprioritisationofNATO

overEU’sdefenceintegrationinitiatives.Asacornerstoneofbothnationaldefenceplanning

andV4regionaldefencecoordination,NATOisnotanincidentalfactoronemayeasilytake

20Muti,Karolina.“Poland:TheMissingLinkinEuropeanDefence”.IAICommentaries.September21,2018.21 GLOBSEC. “GLOBSEC Trends 2019”. https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/GLOBSEC-Trends2019.pdf(accessedOctober25,2020).

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out of the equation overnight. It is deeply embedded in the national defence culture

asmuch as it is in the national as well as Central European security framework. National

cycles of procurement and capability development planning aremostly calibrated to fulfil

national’s commitment to NATO. This is exemplified in the V4 battlegroup’s coordination

withtheNATOResponseForce22andtheV4training&exercisestrategy23aimedatreaching

NATOHighReadinessgoals,allstemmingfromtheV4’s“Long-TermVisionoftheVisegrad

Countries on Deepening their Defence Cooperation”. Signed inMarch 2014, this flagship

blueprint for defence partnership sets three key priorities for regional cooperation, all of

which are also aimed at driving national defence planning priorities: 1) capability

development, procurement & defence industry cooperation; 2) development of

transnationalunitsand increaseof cross-borderactivitiesandmilitarymobility facilitation;

3) strengthening of defence culture and education, increase of common training &

exercising. Increasing cooperation culture by organisingmore regular common troop and

cross-borderexercises isalsoaimedatstrengtheningforcesreadinessand interoperability,

twofundamentalgoalsofNATO.Forcesreadinesscoordination isnotonlyapriorityofthe

V4 Long-Term Vision, but also of the V4’s joint exercise within NATO as shows their

involvementintheAlliance’sVeryHighReadinessJointTaskForce(VJTF).Thisisperhapsone

themostimportantpointstostresshere,asitisinthelightofitsinitiativescontributionand

support to NATO interoperability and forces readiness that all Visegrad countries are

assessing the relevance of PESCO. From aV4 standpoint, PESCO initiatives therefore only

make sense if these enable synergies and cost-effectiveness through capability-driven

defence cooperation. Does it mean that all V4 countries reject amore industry-driven

cooperation?Not necessarily, as Poland -with the strongest defence industry amongst V4

countriesandclearambitionstomakeitevenmoreresilientandcompetitive-,asmuchasits 22Urbanovska, Jana, Paulech, Michal. ‘‘Visegrad Four EU Battlegroup: Meaning and Progress’’. Obrana astrategie14,no.2(2014):49-60.23Visegrad Group. “Bratislava Declaration of Visegrad Group Heads of Government Deepening V4 DefenceCooperation”. 2015.https://www.mzv.sk/documents/10182/51419/Bratislava+Declaration+FINAL.pdf/8befd1e0-ae11-48a4-9e77-bf216a46c091(accessedOctober26,2020).

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V4 partners, cannot ignore the positive prospect of astronger EUmilitary industry for its

defenceindustryandthousandsofjobsatstake24.SlovakiaandtheCzechRepublicarewell

awareoftheopportunityofdefenceinvestmentandarmymodernisationofferedbyPESCO

and theEuropeanDefence Fund (EDF)25,26.WhilePESCOenables cooperationwith several

EUMemberStatesonprojectsofhighpriorityfortheSlovakArmedForces,suchastheSelf-

Propelled Artillery Unit, retained as a PESCO project in as early as December 2017, EDF

contributestoalleviatethepressureonnationalbudgets27.Andwetouchuponanimportant

pointhere:iftheEDFisindeedastrongargumenttowinoverthemostreluctantcountries,

it needs, however, to be financially consistent to remain politically credible. As such, the

recent cuts decided by the EU Commission and approved by the Parliament, that would

downsizetheallocationpackagetotheEDFbynearly40%,arenotanencouragingsign28.

Lastly,migrationisacommonandburningconcernamongsttheV4,whichhassignificantly

contributedtocementthegroup’spoliticalcoherencesincethe2015migrationcrisis.Asthe

keystone of the EU’s fragile south-eastern neighbourhood, Turkey is a strategic country.

With more than 3.5 million Syrian refugees on its territory, Turkey is a buffer state of

fundamental importancetotheEUand,evenmoreso,totheV429.That iswhytherecent

calls for increased sanctionsonTurkeyand further steps to isolateAnkarahavebeenmet

with tepidity in V4 capitals, who consider Turkey too important a partner (and NATO’s

24Office of the Government. “Prime Minister: We need strong defence industry, there is no strong armywithout it”.November27,2019.https://www.premier.gov.pl/en/news/news/prime-minister-we-need-strong-defence-industry-there-is-no-strong-army-without-it.html(accessedNovember16,2020).25Visegrad Group. “PESCO opportunity for Czech defence industry, says minister”. Dececmber 11, 2017.http://www.visegradgroup.eu/news/pesco-opportunity-for(accessedNovember16,2020).26 Spectator SME. “Slovakia joins PESCO initiative”. November 13, 2017.https://spectator.sme.sk/c/20695566/slovakia-joins-pesco-initiative.html(accessedNovember17,2020).27See: Ianakiev,Gueorgui. ‘‘TheEuropeanDefence Fund,AGameChanger for EuropeanDefence IndustrialCollaboration’’.PolicyPaper.ArmamentIndustryEuropeanResearchGroup.November2019.28 CGTN. “EU states warned not to cut defense spending amid pandemic”. November 18, 2020.https://newseu.cgtn.com/news/2020-11-18/EU-states-warned-not-to-cut-defense-spending-amid-pandemic-Vv5KKiqfyU/index.html(accessedNovember18,2020).29 UNHCR. “Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Turkey”. https://www.unhcr.org/tr/en/refugees-and-asylum-seekers-in-turkey(accessedNovember16,2020).

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secondbiggestarmy)toantagonise.FromtheV4standpoint,NATOshouldthereforeserve

as theprivileged platformof dialoguewithTurkey,andwork toavoid confrontations that

wouldisolateapartnercountrycruciallylocatedonthesouth-easternmigrationroute.

V4andCSDP:TowardsaGreaterParticipationbutwithUnevenLevelsofEngagement

The economic crisis triggered by the COVID pandemic will have significant impacts on

national defence expenditures, while the need for military equipmentmodernisation will

grow. As we underlined earlier, this all occurs in a global context of great geopolitical

instability, especially on the eastern and southern flanks of both the EU and NATO. This

provides CSDP initiatives with afavourable ground to appeal to the V4. And as Andrzej

Sadoś,thePolishpermanentrepresentativetotheEU,highlighted,“astheworldstruggles

withaglobalpandemic,theUSnavigatesitspost-electionrealityandChina'sroleonaworld

stage is changing, European defence cooperation is ever more important.“30And indeed,

even Poland, in spite of its “reflexive Altanticism“31, and though hesitant until the last

minute, joined PESCO, convinced by the participation of its Baltic partners. It has now

committedtotheLithuanian-ledprojectoncyberdefence,theCyberRapidResponseTeams

&MutualAssistance inCybersecurityProgramme (November2018).Warsawsees it as an

opportunity to increase synergies in defending NATO’s eastern flank. This is avery good

example of where aV4 country, as reluctant to defence cooperation outside NATO as

Poland,isconvincedtotakeanactivepartinaPESCOproject:whenEUandNATOpurposes

converge. This is also areason why Poland is still relatively reluctant to industry-driven

projects, and advocates for amore capability-driven strategic autonomy. In this regard,

Poland’sletterofintenttojoinPESCOaddressedtotheEUHighRepresentativeforForeign

Affairsand SecurityPolicy JosepBorrell,pinningdown3conditions for its participation, is

insightful:1)primacyofNATO’sdefenceplanning;2)competitiveaswellasgeographically 30Sadoś,Andrzej. ‘‘HowtofurtherdevelopEuropeansecurityanddefencecooperation’’.Euractiv.November6, 2020. https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-and-security/opinion/how-to-further-develop-european-security-and-defence-cooperation/(accessedNovember8,2020).31See:Harnisch,Sebastian.Frank,Cornelia.Maull,HannsW.RoleTheoryinInternationalRelations.Taylor&Francis,2011:145.

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balanceddevelopmentoftheEUdefenceindustryinordertosuitallparticipatingMember

States;3)a360-degreeapproachtosecuritychallenges,withparticularattentiontotheEU’s

easternborder32.

Therefore, Poland doesn’t deny the relevance or legitimacy of PESCO, but highlights the

importanceofpreventingcompetitionbetweenNATOandEU initiatives,andthenecessity

of working on convergence of NATO and EU purposes and ensure that the fundamental

principle of interoperability between NATO and EUMember States is upheld, a principle

equallysharedamongsttheV4,asstressedearlier.

ButotherV4countries seemmoreeager to supportgreaterefforts to furtherEUdefence

integration,suchasHungary,whosePrimeMinisterViktorOrbánhasbeenadvocatingforan

autonomous EU military force for some time33. Although still a premature project at this

stage, the idea has also been supported by the Czech Republicwith then PrimeMinister

Bohuslav Sobotka stating that the proposal of a joint EU army should be seriously

considered,inspiteofthetechnicalandpoliticalchallengesinduced34.Thishighlysensitive

question of an EU army is a good example of the diverging approaches to EU defence

integrationwithintheVisegrad.

Somepoliticalconcerns,however,remainevenlysharedbetweentheV4countries.Aswith

anynewEUcooperationframework,thespectreofFranco-Germaninfluenceisnotfaraway.

WhencePoland’scallforabalanceddevelopmentoftheEUdefenceindustry.ForWarsaw,it

is essential to send a clear signal that the industrial appetite of Paris andBerlin (the two

leading defence industries in Europe) may be asignificant impediment to further V4

participation in the future, and that it could, incidentally, only be reined in with the

32EuropeanParliament.“Permanentstructuredcooperation(PESCO):Beyondestablishment”.Briefing,March2018. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/614739/EPRS_BRI(2018)614739_EN.pdf(accessedNovember22,2020).33 Kroet, Cynthia. “Viktor Orbán wants an EU military force.” Politico. August 26, 2016.https://www.politico.eu/article/viktor-orban-wants-an-eu-military-force/(accessedNovember22,2020)34 BBC. “Czechs and Hungarians call for EU army amid security worries”. August 26, 2016.https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37196802(accessedNovember22,2020).

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contribution of third countries, first amongstwhich theUK. As aconsequence, and this is

equallysharedamongstV4countries,PESCOprojectsshouldbeopentocloseallies,NATO

andnon-NATOmembersalike,suchastheUK.ThedoorshouldremainopenfortheUKto

stay involved in CSDP, whether for capability or industrial cooperation, whatever the

outcomeoftheon-goingBrexitnegotiations.35Inthisregard,therecentdecisionoftheEU

Council to set out conditions for third-state participation in PESCO projectswasmet very

positively across the V436. And the best guarantee of abalanced EU military industry

developmentwould either be to deploy production plants on the territory of the country

leading thePESCOprojectand/or toensure that the country oforiginof theparticipating

defence corporations may not be the same where these companies will build their

productionfacilities.ShouldtheV4concretelyseethebenefitsofPESCOprojectsintermsof

investmentontheirterritory(alongwiththecorrelatedimpactonlocalemployment),then

CSDP would be more clearly seen as an opportunity not just for enhanced defence

interoperabilitywithgreatersynergiesatalowercost,butalsoasanopportunityfortheV4

national defence industries to becomemore competitive, scale-up more quickly, thereby

openingthedoortoincreasedexportsandhireagreaternumberofdomesticworkers.

Agoodexample,althoughnotinaPESCOcontext,isthedecisionofGermanRheinmetallAG

defencegroup tobuild themajority of its LynxKF41 infantry fighting vehicle (IFVs) in the

buyer’scountry,thatis:Hungary.WithaEUR-2-billioncontractand218IFVspurchased,the

decision ofRheinmetall to assemble 172units atZalaegerszeg, inWesternHungary, is far

frominsignificant,as itwill implyanotherEUR-168-million investmenttobuildthemilitary

35TrevorTaylor.“Brexit’sImplicationsforUKDefenceIndustrialCooperationwithEurope.”RUSICommentary,5November2020.https://rusi.org/commentary/brexit-implications-uk-defence-industrial-cooperation-europe(accessedNovember22,2020).36For more details on EU Member States approach to third-country participation, see: Brudzińska, Kinga.

Kudzko,Alena.Zaborowski,Marcin.“Third-CountryParticipationinEUDefenceIntegration:HowitWorksand

How it is Viewed by EU Member States”. GLOBSEC Policy Institute. October 2020.https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/GLOBSEC_Third-country-participation-in-EU-defence-integration-initiatives.pdf(accessedNovember3,2020).

13

production base in addition to the already-existing plant, by building a20-hectare test

field37.Withanestimated500jobscreated,Rheinmetall’sprojectshows,ifneedbe,thatof

allpublic investments,defence is thatwiththehighest return-on-investment ratio.38If the

German defence group alsowins the Czech tender for the same IFVs, it will send avery

strong signal to the V4 that EU military industrial development is not just strategically

relevantforthebloc,itisalsoeconomicallyprofitable.

Furthermore,focusingonthecountries‘planningprioritiesandimmediatethreatchallenges

isessential.Andbyoverlookingtherightfulconcernsoftheregion,CSDPandotherdefence

cooperationinitiatives,suchastheflagshipFrenchEuropeanInterventionInitiative(E2I),out

ofwhichallV4countrieshavebeenkeptthusfar,runtheriskofalienatingtheV4andlosing

preciouspoliticalmomentum.ThecaseoftheE2I,launchedbyEmmanuelMacronin2018,

in the wake of his Sorbonne Speech, is a revealing example of the divergence of

methodologicalapproachtocooperationinitiativesbetweenParis-BerlinandtheV4.Indeed,

laying the foundation for cooperation outside the EU institutional framework and with a

limitednumberofMemberStates,E2IaddsuptoanalreadycomplexgalaxyofEUtoolsand

acronyms(PESCO,CARD,EDFandothers).ExcludingallV4countriesandBalticStates(with

theexceptionofEstonia)hassentapoliticallynegativemessagetotheregion,alreadywary

of Franco-German initiatives in defence cooperation. Building trust between Western

Europeand theV4would call fora reversalof themethodological approach: contentand

projects should prevail over heavy political structures. In other words, content first,

structuressecond.

37 ReMix. “Hungary to build country's largest military production facility with Germany's Rheinmetall”.September 2020. https://rmx.news/article/article/hungary-to-build-country-s-largest-military-production-facility-to-produce-german-rheinmetall-infantry-fighting-vehicles(accessedOctober10,2020).38BrandonK.Chicotsky.“InvestmentReturnsintheDefenseIndustry.”JohnHopkinsUniversityCareyBusinessSchool, August 2017. https://carey.jhu.edu/carey-the-torch/2017/08/investment-returns-in-the-defense-industry/(accessedNovember22,2020).

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Lastly,ifPoland isconcernedbyNATO’seasternflank,Hungary,ontheotherhand,willbe

lookingmoretothesouth,andpaycloserattentiontothemigrationroutesandtheBalkans.

Slovakia, like the Czech Republic, is more concerned by cyber networks security and

disinformation39. Therefore, by concretely addressing participating states’ direct security

concerns, PESCO projects could gain more attraction and appeal further to reluctant

countries.

Conclusion

Aswehaveseen,thedebatearoundEUstrategicautonomyisnotaunitaryone.AndtheV4,

howeveraligned in itscommitmenttoNATO,cannotbegraspedasahomogeneousgroup

whenitcomestoEUdefencecooperationandCSDPinitiatives.WhileallV4countrieshave

joined PESCO (each of them leading one project and participating in at least five others),

theyremaincautiousaboutthepoliticalnatureofcooperationinitiatives.Andperhapsmore

importantly,theV4remainswaryofaconceptofstrategicautonomythatwouldgobeyond

the mere scope of defence and security, and embrace other issues likely to affect their

relationshipwiththeU.S.andNATO.Theframingoftheconceptisthereforeasimportantas

itscontent.AndasfarasCSDPinconcerned,theV4reactionsshowthatitisvitaltoposition

PESCOandEDFinthelightofNATO:inotherwords,showinghowCSDPinitiativescanhelp

MemberStatestofulfiltheirNATOcommitmentsmorequicklyandatalowercost.Let’salso

stress that if PESCO contributes indeed to increase states’ capabilities, it does not brand

themwithanEUflag:bymakingEUcountries’defencestrongerandmoreresilient,PESCO

thereforemakesEU-NATOMemberStatesstrongerandmoreresilient.

TheV4casestudyalsohighlightstheimportanceofincreasedEU-NATOinteroperabilityand

cooperation, but also of the complementarity –if not convergence- of priorities. In this

regard,theso-calledeasternflankisanillustrativeexample:byenhancingcooperationand

39KatarinaKlingova.“‘Infodemic’hitSlovakiaaswell.Fearanduncertaintyarefertilegroundforspreadingoffalsecontentandconspiracies.”GLOBSECApril2020.https://www.globsec.org/2020/04/04/infodemic-hit-slovakia-as-well/(accessedNovember16,2020).

15

prioritising forces readiness, cross-border mobility and deterrence, the EU and NATO

increasetheirjointdefenceanddeterrencecredibility.

Lastly,andthisisperhapsthemostsalientpointofthisresearch,keepingtheV4engagedin

theglobalEUdiscussionondefencecooperation isessential.Amulti-speedEUofdefence

wouldbethegreatestimpedimenttoitssuccessandresilienceinthelongrun.Assuch,the

exclusionoftheV4fromtheE2Icameoutasawrongpoliticalmessageatatimewhenthe

challengeistodomoretogether.

Allinall,rebalancingfromNATOtowardsCSDPatlargewilltaketime,andthatiswhyallV4

countriesareadvocatingforaprogressiveapproachandaslowerpace,soastoletthenew

PESCO/EDFframeworkbearfruits:inthisregard,all4countriesarealignedinsofarasthey

push for less horizontal growth and a more vertical approach (fewer projects but better

measurableachievements).Onecrucialissue,however,remains:thatoftheEU’sbudgetary

dedicationtoenhancedefencecooperation.WhiletheV4havemademilitarymobilityone

of the key objectives of their defence cooperation (includingwithin the Central European

Defence Cooperation Framework), the EU Commission considered cutting all funding to

militarymobility in itsMultiannual Financial Framework (MFF) revision proposals in early

2020. In this regard, the political stakes are high. And any increase of structural funds to

defenceinfrastructuredevelopmentandtotheEDFandEPF(EuropeanPeaceFund)couldbe

interpretedbytheV4asaclearsignal thattheEU isabletofinanciallydelivertomeet its

geopoliticalambitions.

BridgingtheEuro-V4GapinDefenceCooperation:SomeKeyRecommendations

▪ UpholdtheroleofNATOasacatalyst forEuropeanresiliencepotential indefence

andsecurity;

▪ Enhance, wherever possible, EU-NATO capability cooperation, with common

training&exerciseinparticular;

16

▪ Assuch,promoteNATOasaplatformfordialoguewithTurkey,whosepositionin

themigrationroutesiscrucial;avoidisolatingTurkeyiskeyfortheV4asmuchasfor

Europe;

▪ No contradiction between Franco-German strategic autonomy concept and Euro-

Atlantic cooperationas longasNATO interoperability and procurement principals

areupheldandfulfilled;

▪ National capabilities must be developed and deployed for both EU and NATO

purposes:convergenceisessential;

▪ MakedefenceindustrialdevelopmentatopEUpriorityandputitattheheartofthe

strategicautonomyconcept/framework:itisessentialtomakeitmoreappealingto

V4andproveitisn’ttheTrojanhorseoffurtherpoliticalintegration;

▪ Consequently,more structural funds need to be allocated tomilitary mobility &

infrastructureandcyber&networkssecurity(twotopprioritiesofboththeV4ada

majorityofEUmemberStates);

▪ Therefore, future updates of the MFF will need to reflect it with an increase of

defenceexpenditurelinesintheEUbudget(bothstructuralfundsandEDF);

▪ Favour a Euro-Russian dialogue table and avoid bilateral channels that would

deprivetheV4andotherEUcountriesoftheirseatatthetable;

▪ Revive and update theWeimar Triangleby turning intoaFrance+Germany+V4

format, with bi-annual meetings and a clear defence cooperation and regional

dialogueagenda(e.g.dialoguewithRussia…);

▪ AsregardsCSDPandrelatedtoolsandmechanisms(PESCO,E2I):reversethecurrent

methodological approach,underwhich thepolitical structureprevailsover content

and projects: start with pilot cooperation projects first before creating further

administrative heaviness. Thiswill contribute to build trust amongst partners and

convincethemosttepidstates;

17

▪ Increasestrategicforesightandtheex-antemeasurementofthestrategicimpactof

decisions (content should prevail over structures); E2I provides for strategic

foresight,butV4isexcluded;

▪ Border control shouldbeaddressedaspartof thediscussiononstrategicautonomy;even

moreimportantthatitisindeedapurelyEuropeanproblem(U.S.notdirectlyconcerned).

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