the “wages of burman-ness
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The Wages of Burman-ness: Ethnicityand Burman Privilege in ContemporaryMyanmar
MATTHEW J. WALTONDepartment of Political Science, George Washington University, Washington DC, USA
ABSTRACT Ethnicity is one of the primary lenses through which scholars view conflict in Bur-ma/Myanmar. In this paper I examine the dominance of the majority ethnic group in Myanmar,the Burmans, and the ways in which Burman-ness functions as a privileged identity. I draw fromthe theoretical framework of Whiteness and White privilege in critical race theory to argue that,although there are important analytical differences between race and ethnicity, we can conceptua-lise Burman-ness as a form of institutionalised dominance similar to Whiteness. I support this ar-gument by documenting the ways in which Burmans are privileged in relation to non-Burmans,while still, in many cases, seeing themselves as equally subject to government repression. Thisanalysis of Burman privilege (and blindness to that privilege) is particularly relevant given thefact that the political reforms implemented by Myanmars new, partly civilian government since2011 have opened new opportunities for (mostly Burman) activists while coinciding with in-creased military violence in some non-Burman border regions of the country.
KEY WORDS: Burma, Myanmar, ethnic conflict, Burman, privilege, Whiteness
Ethnic conflict has persistently plagued Burma since before its independence in
1948.1 The military governments that ruled the country from 1962 until 2011
regularly battled ethnic insurgencies in the border areas and, despite a series of
ceasefires over the last 15 years, ethnic conflict continues today. As a result, ethnicity
remains one of the primary lenses through which scholars view conflict in present-
day Myanmar.2 This paper examines the dominance of the majority ethnic group inMyanmar, the Burmans, through a conceptual lens drawn from critical race theory.3
The theoretical framework of Whiteness and White privilege is used to determine if a
similar privileged identity of Burman-ness operates in Myanmar. I argue that we can
conceptualise Burman-ness as a form of institutionalised dominance similar to
Whiteness, despite the analytical differences between race and ethnicity. At the same
time some of the ways in which the boundaries of a dominant ethnic group appear to
be more porous than racial boundaries, particularly when they overlap with national
identity, as is the case in Myanmar. This argument is supported by documenting the
Correspondence Address: Matthew J. Walton, Department of Political Science, George Washington
University, 2115 G St. NW, Monroe Hall 440, Washington, DC 20052, USA.
Email: [email protected]
Journal of Contemporary Asia
iFirst article pp. 127, 2012
ISSN 0047-2336 Print/1752-7554 Online/12/000001-27 2012 Journal of Contemporary Asia
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2012.730892
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ways in which Burmans are privileged in relation to non-Burmans, while still, in
many cases, being subject to government repression themselves or, at least,
perceiving themselves as equally subject to repression.4 In the same way that critical
race theorists note that racism cannot be overcome without white recognition oftheir privilege, the inability of Burmans to recognise this privilege and to actively
work against it inhibits efforts to forge ethnic unity in Myanmar.
As a result of elections in 2010 and some political reforms since 2011, many
formerly hostile governments and international organisations have adopted a more
open stance toward Myanmar. Within this evolving political context, it is
particularly important for both international and domestic actors to continue to
focus on ethnic issues in Myanmar. As Western governments slowly begin to ease
sanctions, many influential individuals are urging continued Western engagement
with the Myanmar government in the hope that it will lead to more extensive
political reform. Members of the democratic opposition, including Daw Aung SanSuu Kyi, have also offered to play a role in the reconciliation process between the
government and the non-Burman ethnic groups. While the recent changes (including
release of many political prisoners, expanded freedoms of speech and press, and
more opportunities for democratic opposition groups to participate in the political
process) are encouraging, there are reasons to continue to push for further reform.
Of great concern, given the topic of this paper, is the increased fighting in some
ethnic areas. Government negotiations with ethnic armed groups have resulted in
ceasefires in some areas that had experienced long-running conflict, such as the
January 2012 ceasefire with the Karen National Union (KNU) in Karen State.
However, while the new civilian government appears to be opening up political space
in central, Burman areas, some non-Burman areas have seen renewed violence,
including Kachin State since June 2011. Additionally, the ceasefires that do exist are
fragile and the Burmese government has yet to consider a lasting political resolution
to the conflicts.5 This demonstrates that many non-Burmans are not in a position to
enjoy the benefits of recent political reforms; indeed, at times it seems as if the
government is implementing two separate, but related policies: one of increased
openness, of which Burmans are the primary beneficiaries, and one of violent
repression, of which non-Burmans remain the primary victims. As I argue below,
part of Burman privilege is not only avoiding the worst elements of violent
repression, but also being able to ignore it when it occurs elsewhere, since it is not
part of their everyday political reality.For the past 50 years, the Burmese military has been accused of committing much
of the violence against non-Burman populations. However, this analysis does not fit
into a simple narrative that posits the military on one side as the oppressor and the
opposition on the other side fighting for good. The history of ethnic conflict in
Myanmar has been far more complex than this. First, hostilities between Burmans
and non-Burmans go back well before the military took power in 1962. Some of the
most prominent figures in the Burmese independence movement used chauvinistic
rhetoric and even committed atrocities against non-Burman populations. However,
decades of military campaigns combating (mostly ethnic) insurgencies have resulted
in policies that institutionalise differential treatment of Burmans and non-Burmans.Thus, while they may not be explicitly based on ethnic discrimination, these practices
have generated a set of privileges that Burmans enjoy because of their ethnic identity.
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Furthermore, it is important to note that, because the rights of citizens of every
ethnicity have been restricted to some degree, it has been more difficult for Burmans
to acknowledge the differential experiences of suffering, which will continue to
inhibit efforts at ethnic reconciliation.It should be stressed that this analysis of Burman-ness as a privileged identity is
meant to draw out the historical processes that have resulted in Burman dominance
and the institutionalisation of Burman privilege. It would be counterproductive to
blame the Burman population today for this process and its results. However,
seeing Burman-ness as similar to Whiteness can encourage Burmans to recognise the
ways in which they are privileged in relation to non-Burmans and acknowledge the
differential suffering and oppression of non-Burman communities. In addition,
positing Burman-ness as a set of power relations highlights the necessary role of
Burmans in dismantling structures of Burman privilege and in creating a space for
ethnic unity and equality in Myanmar.I begin with a discussion of the similarities and differences between the concepts of
race and ethnicity. I draw from critical race theory to analyse ethnicity in Myanmar
because ethnicity plays a similar role there as race does in the USA, as a primary
marker of difference. Ethnicity is significant in Myanmar because of the ways in
which political, economic and social opportunities and power largely follow ethnic
divisions. Next, I introduce the way in which I analyse Burman-ness through the
lenses of Whiteness and White privilege. In order to demonstrate the existence of
Burman-ness as a dominant ethnic identity, I look at particular periods and episodes
in Burmese history and the reinforcement of contemporary Myanmar identity as
Burman. Next, I explore several areas that demonstrate the existence of privileges
enjoyed by Burmans as a result of their ethnic identity. These correspond with ways
in which non-Burmans are structurally disadvantaged or actively targeted by the
government, reinforcing their subordinate position. I also discuss how Burmans,
including members of the democratic opposition, are unaware of the ways in which
they reinforce their privileged position and the few notable instances in which they
recognise that privilege.
Comparing Race and Ethnicity
The initial challenge in seeking to explain ethnic dominance in Myanmar in terms of
Whiteness is in equating race and ethnicity. While the dominant criterion ofcomparison and categorisation in the West has been race (and in America, the black/
white racial distinction), in Southeast Asia individuals and groups more frequently
identify themselves in other ways. Ethnic categories are prominent markers of
identity in Southeast Asia, although ethnicity itself is a more recent construct and
reflects a contemporary solidification of historically malleable identity markers, as
explained below. Additionally, ethnicity remains a contested topic within the social
sciences, and scholars working in Western and non-Western contexts often
understand and use the term differently (Chang and Dodd 2001). There are
important analytical differences between race and ethnicity. Van den Berghe (1978,
910) distinguishes between race, which is a group that is socially defined but on thebasis of physical criteria, and ethnic groups, which are socially defined but on the
basis of cultural criteria. Card (1995, 143) agrees, arguing that, while both race and
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ethnicity are socio-political constructs, ethnicity does not have the biological (or
physical) element that race does.
Much of the injustice associated with racial discrimination and racism comes from
the fact that a group of people is judged based on ascriptive characteristics, that is,physical characteristics over which they have no control and cannot change. While
we generally discount biological arguments about race today, it is the discriminatory
ideology and action that is based on those biological or ascriptive characteristics of
others that underpins racism. Thus, Mills (1997, 126) claims that race is
sociopolitical rather than biological, but it is nonetheless real. Part of the challenge
in studying and addressing racism and racial discrimination is in making sense of the
socially constructed nature of race while also acknowledging its very tangible effects
in the world.
The above definitions suggest that ethnicity is not ascriptive in the same way that
race is. Its markers are not always immediately apparent, meaning that ethnicidentity may not always lead directly to difference and conflict, as race often does.
Scholars studying Southeast Asia have demonstrated the utility in understanding
ethnicity as a relational concept. Lieberman (1978, 457) describes ethnic identity as
roles vis-a`-vis other groups. Ethnicity is thus not built on specific, permanent
cultural traits but rather constructed and changed over time as a result of
interactions with different groups and individuals. According to Keyes (1997),
ethnicity becomes salient in the modern world when politics coincides with cultural
differences, particularly when articulated with reference to a national ideology.
Ethnic identity, therefore, refers to cultural differences that are identified through
repeated interactions and gradually perceived as politically important.
However, despite the fact that academic scholarship recognises ethnicity as
socially constructed, many people see ethnicity as an integral part of their cultural
identity and sense of personhood (Fredrickson 2002, 140). This is particularly
significant in looking at the development and reification of ethnic identity in
Myanmar in a historical context. Historians and anthropologists have described the
fluidity of ethnic identity in the pre-colonial period in Myanmar, suggesting that
individuals could strategically change their ethnicity as a conscious choice (Lieber-
man 1978, 457). In fact, the configurations of identity markers that we now call
ethnicity did not exist in their current, ossified form prior to British categorisation
efforts during the colonial period. However, as these colonially demarcated ethnic
categories acquired increasing political, social and economic significance, they alsogained stability as markers of personhood. Additionally, in Myanmar, many
opposition groups increasingly came to see conflict with the central government in
ethnic terms, adding salience to socially constructed identities. Many view ethnicity
not only as a source of cultural identity but also as a badge of resistance (see South
2008).
This paper argues that, in the case of Myanmar, race and ethnicity are functionally
similar with regard to access to power and privilege. The dominance that is
constructed along racial lines in the case of Whiteness can be replicated according to
ethnic boundaries. This is possible in a place such as Myanmar because people often
perceive ethnicity as something inborn, unchangeable and, in some cases,determinant of an individuals very nature.6 The functional similarity of race and
ethnicity in this case becomes clearer when we look at Whiteness in more detail.
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Whiteness and Burman-ness
I follow Charles Mills in considering Whiteness to be a racialised order of white
supremacy, historically privileging those who are considered to be White butreplicable locally within other contexts.7 This condition is one in which individuals of
a certain race or skin colour enjoy a number of advantages over others simply
because of that skin colour and the social standing that has been constructed around
it. We can view Whiteness as a set of public privileges that confer civic, economic,
social and psychological benefits on whites (Olson 2002, 387388). As McIntosh
(1988, 1) explains in her seminal essay on White privilege, . . . whites are taught to
think of their lives as morally neutral, normative, and average, and also ideal, so that
when we work to benefit others, this is seen as work which will allow them to be
more like us. There is thus a way in which Whiteness is seen as that which is
normal, and everything non-white is compared to it (and usually found lacking).Additionally, precisely because it assumes an unquestioned normative position,
Whiteness, and the privileges that accompany it, is invisible to itself.
Positing Burman-ness as Whiteness initially appears to be problematic, since
scholars have described Whiteness as a particular relationship to both power and to
others who are considered non-white. In Myanmar, the vast majority of the people,
both Burman and non-Burman, have, until recently, lived under a military
government widely perceived by most of the population to be repressive. While it
is true that almost all of the leaders of this government were Burman, and they
usually reserved the most destructive treatment for non-Burman ethnic groups (as
documented later in the paper), it is also undeniable that most of the Burman people
in Myanmar have been oppressed to some degree by the government as well. Is it
possible, given these conditions, to view Burmans as privileged, even dominant
within Burmese society?
Critical race theorists have made the case that members of a dominant group can
be exploited or oppressed by elites within that dominant group, even as they
continue to enjoy privileges denied to those outside the group. Roediger (1999) has
examined the ways in which white working class Americans gradually came to see
themselves as White by aligning themselves with the white capitalist power
structure and against potential non-white allies. Roediger catalogues the ways in
which factory owners and other elites convinced white workers to act against their
own interests while asserting their Whiteness. He uses a notion, created by theAfrican-American author and civil rights activist W.E.B. DuBois, that certain
individuals receive privileges (wages) simply because of their skin colour. Roediger
(1999, 1213) argues that this wage exists not just with regard to status, but also in
the way that status is bound up with real social gains . . . That is, status and
privileges conferred by race could be used to make up for alienating and exploitative
class relationships.
Roedigers analysis is helpful in examining Myanmar because it leads us to ask:
what, if any, are the wages of Burman-ness? Despite the limitations faced by almost
all of the people in Myanmar, regardless of ethnicity, is there evidence that Burmans
enjoy a privileged position in relation to the other ethnic groups? Do Burmans thinkof themselves as racially or ethnically separate or superior? In order to answer these
questions the next section examines the recent ethnic history of Myanmar, paying
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close attention to the ways in which Burmans have seen themselves, particularly in
opposition to the other ethnic groups of Myanmar. I hope to show that not only is
there a sense of Burman-ness, there are also wages of Burman-ness that benefit all
Burmans, even as most of them have also experienced some degree of governmentoppression.8 Furthermore, even though explicit ethnic discrimination is not reflected
in policy, military action against ethnic insurgencies over the past six decades has
resulted in the institutionalisation of differential treatment, even more difficult to
challenge because it is on the grounds of national unity.
This paper argues that in contemporary Myanmar society Burman-ness functions
as a localised version of Whiteness. Burmans are generally privileged politically,
economically and socially vis-a`-vis non-Burmans. The government, and society in
general, presents Burman culture and values as the norm, as examples of
Myanmar values and the Burmese language can also implicitly posit Burman
identity as the norm. For example, when people use the most common Burmese termfor ethnic group (tain yin tha), it is often unclear whether they are including
Burmans in the category or are referring only to the non-Burman ethnic groups
(Khaing M. Thein 2011). Burman-ness as a system of ethnic superiority is also
invisible to itself. The past five decades of military rule have only reinforced the
invisibility of Burman privilege to Burmans in Myanmar since most citizens,
regardless of ethnicity, have had some perceived experience of oppression under a
succession of military regimes. However, as outlined below, the degree of oppression
and suffering to which non-Burman ethnic groups are potentially subject is
significantly greater than the oppression that Burmans face.
Ethnicity in Burmese History
Burmans are the dominant ethnic group in Myanmar; they make up between 60%
and 70% of the population and live primarily in the central region of the country
(Smith 1999). The next largest groups are the Shan, who live primarily in the
Northeast region, and the Karen, who live in the Central and Eastern regions.
Following after these groups (and making up much smaller proportions of the
population) are the Kachin, Chin, Karenni, Mon, Rakhaing Wa, and Naga, as well
as many other smaller ethnic groups.9 The official government figures report 135
different ethnic groups in Myanmar, but many observers dispute this number , seeing
it as a divide-and-rule tactic inherited from the British and designed to minimisethe impact and presence of the larger minority ethnic groups by splitting them into
smaller components, and to prevent solidarity by lumping disparate groups together
(Gravers 1999). While Burmans are numerically dominant in urban settings, these
urban areas are also ethnically diverse, and include besides various non-Burman
indigenous ethnic groups Indians, Chinese and other foreign residents.
Pre-colonial Notions of Ethnicity
Although Smith (1999, 33) correctly notes that many important details of Burmas
ethnic past are still conjecture, we know that throughout the pre-colonial periodthere were frequent wars between nominally independent kingdoms in the area that
would eventually be consolidated by the British as Burma. In some cases the identity
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of these kingdoms mapped on to contemporary ethnic divisions. However,
Lieberman (1987) alerts us to the dangers of reading ethnic differences that have
only recently become politically salient into historical conflicts, particularly in pre-
colonial Southeast Asia. We should probably avoid classifying these earlier conflictsas having been based primarily on ethnicity. Individuals at that time based their
identity more on shifting political patronage networks, which would only later
coalesce into ethnic groups, helped in large part by the British colonial zeal for
classification and administration based on ethnic and religious categories.
Lieberman (2003) also shows how the pre-colonial Burman polity followed the
general Southeast Asian trend toward centralisation, increasing its geographical area
of control as well as its cultural and political influence over its subjects. As a result,
many non-Burman people could and did choose to alter their identity strategically,
identifying as Burman for social and political purposes. But, as Charney (2006) has
demonstrated in his recent study of the group of literati who developed theKongbaung dynastys legitimating discourse, Burman identity itself was also more
inclusive, particularly during the eighteenth century. An exclusive, chauvinistic
Burman identity would have been increasingly inconsistent with the demands of
maintaining a growing and multi-cultural empire, thus non-Burman ethnic
groups were incorporated into the polity in various ways and in some aspects
inclusion was based more on political commitment than cultural markers (Charney
2006, 138).
The markers that would eventually coalesce into ethnic identities were thus
initially sometimes merely indicators of political allegiance or geographical location.
Over time, ethnic categories could translate into hardened ethnic identities in
certain contexts. Daily contact between different groups naturally produced
perceptions of difference (Charney 2006, 134). That was often the case when the
relationship between groups was conditioned by conflict or conquest. For example,
Leider (2008, 453) has noted the ways in which Arakanese cultural identity solidified
in response to the Burmese invasion and occupation of Arakan under Bodawhpaya
in 1785.
In addition, religion, rather than ethno-cultural traits, was probably more
important in determining ones social standing. Lehman (2007, 109) recounts the
common phrase To be Burman is to be Buddhist, in explaining the centrality of
Buddhist culture (if not explicitly religious practice) to Burman identity. While
scholars can question the explicitly ethnic character of pre-colonial conflicts inBurma, these conflicts definitely existed; however, they were no doubt exacerbated
by British territorial divisions and by colonial military recruitment policies which
demarcated and created ethnic identity as a primary differentiating factor in colonial
and post-colonial social and political life.
Ethnicity and Nationalism in the Colonial Period
After conquering Burma in stages, beginning in 1824 and concluding in 1886, the
British divided the country into Ministerial Burma (the central area, controlled
from Rangoon) and the Frontier Areas (the peripheral, border regions that werecontrolled nominally by traditional leaders). Burmans were numerically dominant in
ministerial Burma; however, the area also included many Mon, Karen and
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Rakhaing. The Shan, Kachin, Chin, Karen, Karenni and many other smaller ethnic
groups inhabited the Frontier Areas. One way the British contributed to the
ossification of ethnic identity was through the colonial obsession with classification.
British public servants and scholars moved all across Burma, collecting data onvarious ethnic groups in order to manage and control the population more
effectively. By incorporating these ethnic distinctions into their dual system of
colonial administration, the British helped to solidify ethnic identities that, prior to
colonisation, were more fluid, relational and context-dependent.
After the final annexation of upper Burma in 1886, the British gradually began to
exclude ethnic Burmans from the armed forces; in 1925 they adopted a policy of
recruiting only Chins, Kachins and Karens, and subsequently discharged all
Burmans from the army (Selth 2002, 9). In the eyes of the Burmans, ethnic minorities
came to be associated with colonial rule (Smith 1999, 45). Citing the colonial scholar
and administrator J.S. Furnivall, Selth (1986) has pointed out that, before WorldWar II, the British used the Burmese military primarily as a tool to maintain internal
security, leading the Burman majority to see the military as an instrument to
facilitate their oppression at the hands of ethnic minorities. Burmans also perceived
British colonial policies as a threat to their cultural and religious identity. Because of
the association of non-Burman ethnic groups with British dominance, the specific
content of Burman ethnic identity developed, in part, in opposition to other ethnic
groups. They saw these other groups as privileged servants of the British and, thus, a
threat to the existence of the Burman people and Burman way of life. During the
struggle for independence, this oppositional and increasingly exclusive ethnic
identity would merge with a nascent Burmese nationalism, often placing other
ethnic groups outside the boundaries of the nation.
In the opening decades of the twentieth century, Burmese nationalism was
developing in opposition to British colonial rule. Although occasionally expressed as
inclusive of all of the people within Burmas borders, it was really a Burman
nationalism that gradually began to equate elements of Burman culture and Burman
history with a presumably broader Burmese heritage (Brown 1994, 45). In 1930 a
group of mostly Burman nationalists formed the Dobama Asiayone (Our Burma
Association or We the Burmese Association), seeking to promote what they saw
as Burmese culture (in reality, Burman culture). In doing so, they also worked to
exclude and demonise the indigenous groups that they saw as collaborators with the
British colonialists. In contrast to the Our Burma or We Burmese stanceimplied in the word dobama, members of the group referred to the actions of the
indigenous ethnic allies of the British as thudo-bama, Their Burma or Those
Burmese (Nemoto 2000). The ethnically exclusive nature of this nationalist
sentiment became explicit in such Dobama slogans as: Master race we are, we
Burmans (quoted in Gravers 1999, 38). Even before they gained political power,
Burman leaders declared their superiority over the other ethnic groups and claimed
that they were the rightful rulers of the country.
A small group of Burmans including the young Aung San, who would soon
become Burmas independence hero joined with the Japanese in 1941 and
supported the Japanese invasion that successfully ousted the British from Burmeseterritory by early 1942. This move set the Japanese and their predominantly Burman
allies against the British and their forces made up almost entirely of Indians and non-
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Burman ethnic groups. However, it did not take long for Burman nationalists to
become disillusioned with their role as a de facto Japanese colony and they quickly
formed a new, anti-Japanese resistance. Despite the fresh sources of conflict that
arose from the Japanese occupation, British officers and non-Burman troopsreluctantly agreed to co-operate with Burman soldiers in driving the Japanese out of
Burma by 1945. With the expulsion of the Japanese as the most immediate goal, the
parties paid very little attention to discussing how a future Burma would be
organised, in particular how and by whom it would be governed. As a consequence,
the Japanese were defeated by networks of armed guerillas and soldiers fighting
against the same enemy but fighting for very different visions of the future
(Callahan 2003a, 85).
Ethnicity and Nationalism in Independent Burma
The British, now looking to withdraw from their colonial territories as quickly as
possible, began to see the Burman leaders, led by the war hero General Aung San, as
their best negotiating partners. They made a half-hearted attempt to ensure
representation of the non-Burman ethnic groups in a new Burmese state by requiring
as part of the 1947 Aung San-Atlee Agreement that the Burman leaders hold a
conference to determine the political desires of all the ethnic groups. This was
fulfilled by the Panglong Conference of 1947, a deeply flawed event that included
only three of the non-Burman ethnic groups, yet was apparently enough to satisfy
the British, leading to independence on January 4, 1948.10 Despite claims by Burman
leaders that they were fighting for the benefit of all the residents of the country,
members of the other ethnic groups remained unconvinced of their promises. Hugh
Tinker, a colonial administrator, commented in the period after independence that,
it is not pleasant to see Burman public men behaving towards their frontier
colleagues like a master race, insisting that the only true Burmese is a Burman
Buddhist (quoted in Brown 1994, 46). From the very beginning of the post-colonial
state, many Burmans understood Burmese (the national identity) to coincide with
Burman (the ethnic identity).
Burma achieved independence under the auspices of Burman nationalism, but, in
the late 1940s and early 1950s, it might have still been possible for the new country to
create a multi-ethnic nation. Unfortunately, the conditions under which Burma
gained its independence made it impossible for reconciliation and co-operation tooccur between the again dominant Burmans and the other ethnic groups. At the time
of independence, most Burmans still viewed the Karen as colonial collaborators, and
the two groups had spilled much blood between them.11 The Karen had relied on the
British to protect them (some even believed that they would be granted an
independent state of their own), but when the British withdrew the Karen were left
(in their view) at the mercy of the majority Burmans. One Karen leader asked:
How could anyone expect the Karen people to trust the Burmans after what
happened during the war the murder and slaughter of so many Karen people
and the robbing of so many Karen villages? After all this, how could anyoneseriously expect us to trust any Burman government in Rangoon? (Saw Tha
Din, quoted in Smith 1999, 62)
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Surprisingly, despite this mistrust, Karen troops in the army remained loyal
through independence and even played a vital role in repulsing a communist attack
on Rangoon at the end of 1948. But, as the army pursued the communists into
Karen areas, Burman army units and irregular militia units again committedatrocities against Karen civilians, which infuriated the Karen and pushed many of
them into open rebellion in January of 1949. The three non-Burman ethnic groups
who were present at the Panglong Conference (the Shan, Kachin and Chin) remained
loyal to the central government in the years following independence with only a few
exceptions. As signatories to the Treaty of Panglong, they may have felt more
confident that the government would grant them the status and rights that had been
promised at the conference. However, in 1949 the military was forced to respond to
an invasion of Kuomintang (KMT) troops from China into northeastern Shan State
and, just as in the Karen region, local inhabitants saw the mostly Burman troops
doing just as much damage to the Shan and other ethnic groups in the region as theKMT, deepening the divide between the majority and minority ethnic groups (Smith
2007, 84).
Throughout the 1950s, the military came to assume a position of prominence in
Burmese political life. At the same time, because of their constant battles against
insurgents political, ethnic and external they began to see many segments of their
own population as enemies to be pacified and contained, while it was the Burmese
nation (their own cultural heritage) that needed to be protected (Callahan 2003a). In
the late 1950s military leaders viewed the rise of non-Burman demands for
representation in a federal system as further evidence of their disloyalty to the
nation.12 When temporarily in 1958 and permanently in 1962 the military seized
power, they transformed their fear of their fellow citizens into a policy that excluded
many people from full membership in the nation, allegedly because of their disloyalty
to the national cultural heritage. Military rule from 19622011 (with only
occasional mostly cosmetic changes in leadership and policy) only served to
reinforce this outlook in which ethnic difference puts many groups outside of the
national community.
The Wages of Burman-ness in Myanmar
Events in Myanmars history since the colonial period have strengthened ethnic
differentiation, and Burman control of the government and military campaigns haveinstitutionalised differential privilege based on ethnicity. This section analyses a
number of areas in which non-Burmans are disadvantaged or actively harassed and
Burmans overlook or reinforce their privileged position, demonstrating that there
are indeed wages of Burman-ness. First, I look at processes of cultural
assimilation, or Burmanisation, that reinforce Burman cultural identity as the
norm of Myanmar national identity. Next, in the area of citizenship, non-Burmans
seem to enjoy only conditional membership in the national community and are
always subject to suspicion of disloyalty. Burman identity and dominance is also
reproduced through an educational system conducted almost exclusively in Burmese
that teaches a history in which non-Burmans are marginalised and sometimesdemonised. Additionally, while the democratic opposition does not display the
blatant chauvinism that characterised some of the rhetoric of previous leaders, they
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continue to act in ways that reinforce Burman privilege and fail to recognise the
particular struggles of non-Burmans. This is clear in the differential experiences of
repression that Burmans and non-Burmans have faced at the hands of the military
and the former military-led government. I conclude that the perception amongBurman democracy activists that they share a similar experience of suffering with
non-Burmans at the hands of the military government impedes their ability to
recognise the privilege that is attached to Burman-ness.
Burmanisation, Myanmafication and Cultural Assimilation
Brown (1994, 3637) has described Myanmar as an ethnocratic state, that acts as
the agency of the dominant ethnic community and requires of other ethnic groups
their assimilation into the dominant ethnic culture. The Burmese military
government promoted the dominant Burman culture through a process that hasbeen called Burmanisation, a term first used in this way by Lewis (1924). Houtman
(1999) has also labelled this process Myanmafication. The synonymous nature of
these terms indicates that government attempts to create a more inclusive
Myanmar national culture since 1989 have, in practice, merely nationalised
Burman cultural elements. The thrust of the assimilation argument is that members
of non-Burman ethnic groups are forced (either through direct coercion or through
incentives) to adopt various aspects of Burman culture, speeding their assimilation
into the Myanmar cultural nation, while at the same time ridding them of those
cultural elements that are deemed dangerous to national stability or contrary to the
spirit of national unity (see accounts in Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies 2010).
We should be very careful in our appraisal of forced cultural assimilation.
Recall that what we now view as coherent ethnic identities were more fluid, with
porous boundaries as recently as two hundred years ago. Additionally, it is difficult,
if not impossible in certain situations, to determine the degree to which non-
Burmans adopt Burman cultural traits as a matter of choice or as a result of
coercion. However, for the purposes of this analysis of Burman-ness as privilege, it is
sufficient to note that the position of Burman culture as the norm of national identity
means that Burmans are never compelled to make this choice themselves; that is, the
lack of pressure to assimilate culturally is a privilege enjoyed by members of the
dominant ethnic group. Non-Burmans might not (always) be forced at gunpoint to
assimilate Burman culture, but the fact that they cannot enjoy the same set ofprivileges while identifying and practising according to their ethnic identity speaks to
their systematic disadvantage and to the corresponding privilege that Burmans
enjoy.
The government is usually not explicit about its Burmanisation policies, describing
them instead as development efforts for border region national races (quoted in
Houtman 1999, 69). They promote this development work in publications like
Measures Taken for Development of Border Areas and National Races (Burma 1992),
barely disguising their view of the non-Burman ethnic groups as primitive, backward
and in need of guidance (see also Lambrecht 2004). Steinberg (2001, 55) notes that
educational institutions designated for the Development of National Groups are,in effect, designed to educate minority youth in Burman ways and Lambrecht
(2004, 173) argues that with little to no participation from local communities,
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development initiatives are no more than clumsy attempts to impose lowland
Burman culture. There are similarities in the ways in which whites in America and
Europe perceived Native Americans and Blacks (Pearce 1988; Mills 1999). The
government also carries out cultural assimilation through religious missions thatseek to spread Buddhism to other ethnic groups (Brown 1994, 49). In this way, they
not only reinforce the dominant Burman identity, but the specifically Buddhist
cultural traditions of the Burmans. Policies like this contrast the foreignness of non-
Buddhists with the pure Buddhist heritage of the Burmans.
Other scholars have detailed the ways in which development activities
contribute to cultural assimilation and the virtual elimination of non-Burman
cultural traditions. Callahan (2004) shows how changes in language policy have
aided the process of Burmanisation by outlawing instruction in many ethnic
languages, a subject explored in more detail below. Taylor (2005, 285) quotes a Shan
nationalist as regretting that today Shan boys know more about Burmese historythan their own. The government continues to deny Muslim Rohingya full
citizenship, although they too are subjected to Burmanisation through religious
policy and renaming campaigns even though they are not considered by the
government to be part of the Burmese nation (Berlie 2008).13 One concern that I
uncovered during fieldwork after Cyclone Nargis in May 2008 was that, as the
government provided (limited) funds to rebuild religious and cultural buildings
in storm-damaged areas, they were rebuilding them in the Burman style, rather
than the ethnic styles in which they were originally constructed (see also Fink 2009,
241).
Another step in this programme of Burmanisation was the governments move to
rename a number of cities, streets, geographical landmarks and even the country
itself in the late 1980s. In May 1989, the government formed a commission to re-
claim the names of many places, restoring them to their pre-colonial forms. The
government changed the name of the country from Burma to Myanmar in June
of 1989. While the government claimed that the reason for the name change was to
de-emphasise the connection that Burma had with the majority Burman ethnic
group, most people remain sceptical of the governments claims to racial inclusion,
not least because, as pointed out by an ethnic minority leader, Myanmar is
actually just another commonly used name for the country in Burmese, the language
of the Burman majority (cited in Smith 1999; see also Houtman 1999, 4354).
The process of Burmanisation exemplifies the benign disregard that Burmanleaders of the country have had for the cultures of the other ethnic groups and the
importance and centrality which they place on their own heritage. The push for
Burmanisation might not always be intentional; since one aspect of racial or ethnic
privilege is seeing ones own group as the norm, Burmans might not realize the ways
in which they reinforce their dominant identity. But because the content of Myanmar
culture is largely Burman, in order to be considered truly Myanmar (a member of the
nation) one must adopt the trappings of Burman culture. Ethnic identity may have
once been more malleable but in contemporary Myanmar it appears to be just as
ascriptive as race, and non-Burmans regularly suffer discrimination, even as they are
subjected to a programme of Burmanisation. Yet, even assimilation into Burmanculture is not always enough to shed the suspicions of disloyalty and inferiority that
accrue to a non-Burman ethnicity.
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Conditional Membership in the National Community
The rhetoric of the military government in its various forms often reflected a
perspective that conflated (non-Burman) ethnicity with disloyalty to the nation.14
Since the military controlled the country by force and was not accountable to the
citizens, it could be very blatant about this, as demonstrated by an excerpt from a
speech given by former commanding General Ne Win in 1979 that is worth quoting
at length:
Today you can see that even people of pure blood are being disloyal to the race
and country but are being loyal to others. If people of pure blood act this way,
we must carefully watch people of mixed blood. Some people are of pure blood,
pure Burmese heritage and descendants of genuine citizens. Karen, Kachin and
so forth, are of genuine pure blood. But we must consider whether these peopleare completely for our race, our Burmese people: and our country, our Burma.
(Quoted in Smith 1999, 37)
Again, we see the references to our people, our country and our Burma
that were constitutive of Burmese (Burman) nationalism of the 1930s. What Ne Win
also implied in this speech is that loyalty to the nation, proof of ones Burmese-
ness, is something that Burman people are naturally endowed with. They are the
ones with the pure Burmese heritage. However, despite their pure (ethnic) blood,
non-Burmans are required to prove their loyalty to the nation. They are inherently
suspect because of their ethnicity (which is ironic, since Ne Win himself was part
Chinese). Ne Wins speech implied that non-Burman ethnic groups do not naturally
possess a true Burmese heritage. Burmans, on the other hand, unproblematically
begin with a pure Burmese heritage; for them to be considered outsiders or enemies,
they must prove their disloyalty by, for example, demanding democracy or protesting
against the government.
This helps to explain why the military government can oppress Burmans as well as
the other ethnic groups, while still functioning under the premises of Burman privilege
and Burman-ness. By equating non-Burman ethnicity with disloyalty, it views those
ethnic identities as something that non-Burmans must overcome in order to become
part of the nation. Presumably they can accomplish this by adopting Myanmar
(Burman) culture. However, even if a non-Burman manages to successfully deny andleave behind his or her culture, statements like this from Ne Win made it clear that
their membership in the national group was still suspect and conditional. Today it is
rare to see such explicit statements from military leaders doubting the loyalty of non-
Burmans. However, part of the argument of this paper is that the equation of non-
Burman-ness with disloyalty has become institutionalised through military cam-
paigns against non-Burman resistance groups situated almost entirely in non-Burman
areas. Thus, while the rhetoric no longer directly associates non-Burmans with
disloyalty, counterinsurgency methods effectively follow the same logic and, more
importantly, Burmans are privileged in not being subject to this type of suspicion.
The perpetuation of this conditional membership is clear in incidents such as theharassment of Kachin students in Yangon in June 2011 (The Irrawaddy, June 15,
2011). The week prior to the incident, Kachin State had witnessed armed clashes
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between the military and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). Before the renewal
of that conflict, Kachin students were nominally loyal Myanmar citizens. However,
from the standpoint of the authorities, the conflict cast suspicion on all Kachin; even
those far away from the fighting, as the Yangon students were, were subject topersecution. Fredrickson (2002, 6970) reminds us that, Where nationality is ethnic,
and if ethnicity is thought to derive from the blood or the genes, those of the wrong
ancestry can never be accepted as sons and daughters of the nation. Clearly, the
perception of ethnicity as ascriptive, particularly among those with political power,
can negatively affect the national standing of those outside the dominant group.
Of course, non-Burman ethnic rebellions have also exacerbated and prolonged
ethnic conflict in Myanmar, even though over the past twenty years, most groups
have adapted their goals from separatism to federalism (Smith 2007, xi). Demands
for federalism, while justified and well reasoned, have only served to fuel the violent
paranoia of the military that Myanmar is in constant danger of being torn apart, oneof the fears that drove the second military takeover in 1962. Non-Burman
stereotypes of Burmans based on the actions of the military are also an impediment
to ethnic unity. However, it is important to acknowledge that these statements and
actions are largely a defensive response, where strengthening ones own cultural
identity is an act of survival in a context of sustained violence and enforced cultural
assimilation (Harell 1995).
Because of the overall context of repression, it is perhaps understandable that,
until recently, Burmans have displayed little overt concern for the overwhelming
levels of violence that characterise military operations in non-Burman border areas.
Many have uncritically accepted or been influenced by regime propaganda that
depicts ethnic armed groups as illegitimate, uncivilised terrorists seeking to tear the
country apart and drag it into anarchy (Fink 2008, 460). In this way, non-Burmans
and their ongoing resistance have been easy scapegoats for the persistent
underdevelopment and militarisation of Myanmar. Many Burmans may have also
been uninformed, although expanded access to satellite television and the internet is
increasing the Burman populations exposure to the conditions faced by non-
Burmans in the country, and there is some evidence of increased Burman attention to
non-Burman political concerns.
The process of cultural assimilation actually reveals one way in which Burman-
ness, as a marker of ethnicity, differs from Whiteness, a marker of race. The fact that
non-Burmans can adopt elements of Burman culture in order to be accepted into thenational community is an indicator of the fluidity of ethnicity relative to race. Again,
this suggests that, while ethnicity can appear ascriptive, its markers are often less
immediately apparent and allow for the possibility of integration. However, the
discourse on citizenship and loyalty and the tenuous position of non-Burmans within
the national community reinforces my claim that Burman-ness represents a
dominant ethnic identity that stands in for Myanmar (national) identity, which is
thus never fully or securely available to non-Burmans.
Reinforcing Burman-ness through Education
The field of education is another area in which we can see Burman privilege
reinforced and non-Burman culture and identity devalued or even attacked. Under
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the military government that ruled after 1962, Burmese was the standard language of
instruction after fourth grade, placing non-native speakers of Burmese at an
educational disadvantage from a young age and limiting opportunities to develop
arts and literature in non-Burman languages (Callahan 2003b, 163).15
While there islimited spending on education in the entire country, ethnic states have received the
smallest amounts and, fifteen years ago, literacy rates in those areas reflected that
spending inequity, at 5065%, compared to 80% nationally (Brandon 1998, 238).
Callahan (2003b, 164) also notes that the military government restricted publishing
in non-Burman languages in the name of national unity (another indicator of suspect
non-Burman loyalty), and what they did permit tended to be sanitised writings on
superficial cultural practices.
In his discussion of the creation of national communities based on a common
language, Anderson (1991, 45) noted the advantages enjoyed by those groups whose
spoken dialects were closest to what became the dominant, common languages-of-power. Conversely, speakers of other languages suffered persistent disadvantages
with regard to access to political power, competitiveness in the economic sphere and
inclusion in the social community. In this case, native fluency in the dominant
language of the state is a privilege that Burmans enjoy, supporting the unspoken (or
even unrecognised) assumption that as a Burman one will be conversant in the
language of political power. Speakers of other languages are not only at a
disadvantage in this way, they also receive less support for developing and expanding
their own languages. In addition, while learning a non-Burman language is a choice
that Burmans are privileged in being able to make (albeit one that very few actually
make), in most areas of the country, non-Burmans must learn Burmese as a matter
of survival.
Since the early 1990s, the government has extensively re-written textbooks in order
to emphasise a common Myanmar identity among the next generations (see, for
example, Metro 2011, Chapter 1). Recall that this Myanmar identity is roughly
commensurate with Burman culture, so that identification as Myanmar is
unproblematic for Burmans. While the government has made some efforts to
include non-Burmans in its version of the national narrative, they only appear in
roles that contribute to Myanmar national unity, such as opposing the British during
the colonial period (a presentation that vastly oversimplifies the politics of that era).
In some cases the official history appropriates non-Burman figures as Myanmar
heroes, effectively denying both their ethnic identity and their efforts on behalf oftheir own ethnic groups. For example, textbooks present U Ottama, a famous monk
who led anti-colonial agitation, as a nationalist hero fighting for Myanmars
independence, but rarely as an ethnic Arakanese. Of course, non-Burmans who
fought against the hegemony of Burman kings or the oppression of Burman-led
governments have been excised completely. These individuals appear only in the
alternative textbooks written and used by non-Burman resistance groups (Salem-
Gervais and Metro 2012).
In her exploration of white privilege, McIntosh (1988) includes the fact that when
whites learn about their own national heritage or civilisation they are presented
with a narrative in which that heritage was positively shaped by people of their ownrace. Non-Burman students learning from textbooks in which Burman figures play
transformative roles and non-Burmans are relegated to token inclusion face a
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challenge in locating themselves within the states narrative of the Myanmar nation.
Burman students, on the other hand, enjoy the privilege of unproblematically
relating to their own history, since they can immediately and consistently find those
who are similar to themselves.
The Democratic Opposition and the Perpetuation of Burman-ness
Unfortunately, many of the Burman leaders of the democratic opposition remain
blind to the privileged position of Burmans in Myanmar. This is most likely because
they view themselves as having equally experienced repression at the hands of the
military government. Despite frequently expressing support for the participation of
ethnic minority groups in political negotiations with the government, in the past
Aung San Suu Kyi has spoken about ethnic differences in (unintentional yet) subtly
dismissive ways. In a speech in 1989 she stated:
At this time there is a very great need for all our ethnic groups to be joined
together. We cannot have the attitude of Im Kachin, Im Burman, Im
Shan. We must have the attitude that we are all comrades in the struggle for
democratic rights. We must all work closely together like brothers and sisters.
Only then will we succeed. If we divide ourselves ethnically, we shall not achieve
democracy for a long time. (Aung San Suu Kyi 1991, 231)
Statements like this reveal what Roediger (1999, 11) refers to as the suppressed
question of whiteness (or, in this case, Burman-ness). Aung San Suu Kyi can call
for a move away from ethnic identity precisely because her own ethnic identity is
unproblematic. Not only does she effectively ignore the historically real and
continuing effects of ethnic conflict, she does not acknowledge the disparities in
sacrifice and suffering experienced by non-Burman ethnic groups. She asks them to
put aside their own experiences of injustice and oppression to follow her plan: Only
after building this Union can we really work towards peace and prosperity for all.
We must all sacrifice our own needs for the needs of others (Aung San Suu Kyi
1991, 226). The message is clear: the priority is forming a (Burman-led) democratic
government; only after this has been achieved will the ethnic question be
addressed (see Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies 2010).
While the criticism of government and military policies made by Aung San SuuKyi and her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD) is important, it too
ignores the historical tensions both between Burmans and non-Burmans, and among
the non-Burman groups themselves. Although she has repeatedly denounced the
oppression of non-Burman ethnic groups, in her past statements Aung San Suu Kyi
(1991, 231) has disregarded the exclusion and deception that characterised the period
leading up to independence and essentially glossed over, if not completely rewritten
Myanmars recent ethnic history with statements such as: We won our
independence [in 1948] through the unity of the various nationalities. This type
of claim excludes and dismisses conflicting accounts of the independence struggle
from non-Burmans and, more importantly, oversimplifies a complex political historythat will need to be honestly acknowledged as part of a process of national
reconciliation in Myanmar.
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The point here is not to vilify Aung San Suu Kyi or any of the Burman democratic
opposition leaders. Indeed, the NLD has also expressed strong support for non-
Burman political aspirations. NLD leaders signed on to the Kalay Declaration in
2011, a document calling for a second Panglong gathering that would aim toestablish Myanmar as a federal rather than unitary system and Aung San Suu Kyi
frequently discusses the need for a political solution to ethnic conflict. However,
many non-Burmans remain sceptical that the Burman leaders of the democratic
opposition fully recognise the differential experiences of suffering between the two
groups, understand the nature of non-Burman grievances, and acknowledge the need
for non-Burman voices to assume the central role in political talks. In a positive
development, members of the 88 Generation Students political group began a tour of
war-torn ethnic areas in April 2012. Their stated goal was to listen to the voices of
the people in order to better understand the situation in those areas (Hpyo Wai Tha
2012). This could indicate a positive (and from the perspective of many non-Burmans, necessary) shift in attitudes among some Burman leaders of the
democratic opposition towards a more self-reflective and less domineering position
vis-a`-vis the non-Burman ethnic groups.
Burman stereotypes about non-Burmans have hindered inter-ethnic understand-
ing even within inter-ethnic coalitions. After the governments bloody repression of
protests in 1988, many Burman students fled to the jungles to join non-Burman
groups that had already been waging a war against the military for decades. Despite
the friendships and alliances that were established during this period, the language of
Burmans writing about their experiences often betrays their views of the foreignness
of non-Burman opposition groups. In an article reflecting on those first encounters,
Naw May Oo (2010), a Karen scholar, explains how Burmans coming to the jungle
judged Karens as savages based on cultural differences and misunderstood Karen
fear of them (perfectly justified based on their previous experiences with Burman
soldiers) as evidence of their backwardness. She laments the use of labels, such as
Karen-style justice, which a Burman writer used to describe the harsh ways he saw
rebel militias treating people who had violated laws. Rather than explain these
actions as conditioned by a context of violence and conflict, he attributes these
practices to Karen in general and Naw May Oos concern is that this type of
language not only implies a divide between cultures, but contrasts Karen practices to
the presumably universal and civilised justice of the Burmans.16
Burmans continue to assume a central place in Burmese politics, whether as powerholders or as members of the democratic opposition. The NLD and other opposition
groups are dominated by Burmans, and those groups that do have majority
populations of non-Burmans are always labelled as such, for example, the Shan
National League for Democracy. Burmans also maintain a privileged position in the
international perception of Burmese politics. Many observers have called for a three-
part dialogue, between the military government, the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi,
and the ethnic minority groups. Left unquestioned is the assumption that the
NLD, as the pre-eminent opposition party, implicitly represents Burman interests. In
assessing white working class alignment with Whiteness, Roediger (1999) notes that
the refusal to acknowledge (let alone critically question) white privilege meant thatcross-colour alliances were always fragile and in danger of being undermined
(usually to the eventual detriment of white workers). In the same way, the refusal to
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acknowledge Burman privilege has been an impediment to cross-ethnic co-operation
and solidarity against the greater threat posed by the military government and now
by a government that continues to pursue some of the same policies.
Experiences of Oppression
One of the most obvious differences between the position of Burmans and non-
Burmans is the difference in the ways that the military regime has treated each group.
Many scholars and activists have noted the effects of the militarisation of the ethnic
states on Myanmars periphery (for example, Fink 2008; Karen Human Rights
Group 2011b). Local and international organisations have exhaustively documented
abuses by the Myanmar military (as well as abuses committed by various ethnic
insurgent armies). These include the indiscriminate use of landmines and the use of
non-Burman civilians as human minesweepers (Moser-Paungsuwan 2001; Land-mine Monitor 2010; Karen Human Rights Group 2011a); forced appropriation by
the Myanmar army of local food and resources (South 2011); extrajudicial detention
and torture (Amnesty International 1988); military attacks on civilians and denial of
humanitarian aid (Karen Human Rights Group 2010); sexual violence (Shan
Womens Action Network 2002); forced portering (Human Rights Watch 2011);
forced migration (South 2008) and many more offences.
Additionally, a recent report by Amnesty International catalogued targeted
government repression of non-Burman political activists, especially in the period
leading up to the 2010 elections. These actions included arbitrary arrests and
detention; torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment; unfair trials;
rape; extrajudicial killings; forced labour; violations of freedom of expression,
assembly, association, and religion; intimidation and harassment; and discrimina-
tion (Amnesty International 2010, 55). While Burman political activists also faced
some of these threats, the degree of violence was and is unequal. When dealing
with the Burman opposition, the government has tended to reserve the kind of
repression it visits on non-Burmans to only the most threatening Burman activists.
Although the violent suppression of (mostly Burman) rebellions in 1988 and in
2007 was well publicised and contained no shortage of atrocities, these events still
take place infrequently among the majority Burman community, whereas within
non-Burman communities they can be regular occurrences. While they may still
experience oppression in a variety of ways, Burmans in Myanmar are privileged inthat they are not subjected to the same treatment as the members of other ethnic
groups.
Of course, the unequal experience of violence is itself the product of a self-
reinforcing feedback loop. It is perfectly logical for the Burmese military to focus its
campaigns (and thus, its violence) in non-Burman areas because these are the regions
that contain active rebellions, insurgent groups or other types of security threats.
While the mostly urban uprisings of 1988 and 2007 were temporary threats to the
government, the groups leading them were, for the most part, not armed, and did not
pose a threat to the sovereignty of the government. Among other Burman-
dominated resistance groups, the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) collapsed in1989 and the All Burma Students Democratic Front (ABSDF, a military group
formed of former students who participated in the 1988 protests) has not been an
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armed threat to the military itself, although it has co-operated with ethnic
insurgencies (Lintner 1990). Thus, one could argue that the militarys campaigns
against non-Burman insurgents are merely a response based on tangible threats
rather than an ethnic bias. It is admittedly difficult to prove that these campaignsrepresent conscious discrimination against non-Burmans on the part of the military
and its leaders. However, rather than seeking to prove intention, my interest here is
in noting both the institutionalisation of this differential treatment and the way in
which its absence represents a privilege of Burman-ness. Although the reasons for
the differential treatment may be complex, Burmans do enjoy an existence that is
subject to less direct violence from the military than non-Burmans.
Geography also plays an important role in creating differential experiences of
oppression. Non-Burmans and those of mixed blood who live in the central region
generally experience less direct repression than non-Burmans who live in ethnic
states on the periphery. While urban, central-Burma dwelling non-Burmans can stillbe subject to discrimination and suspect devotion to the Myanmar nation, the daily
security conditions of their lives are not as precarious. In this way, the geographical
bounded-ness of non-Burman communities in the ethnic states acts to make ethnicity
more ascriptive. That is, while non-Burman status might not be immediately
apparent in an urban centre in the central heartland, the military has been free to
conduct violent campaigns against communities in the ethnic states, knowing that
these campaigns will target those most suspect (in its eyes) as citizens.
Individuals in non-Burman states also experience insecurity as a result of the
contestation of government authority by armed opposition groups. This creates a
zone of uncertainty in which citizens are unsure of what actions or decisions will
ensure their safety. Callahans (2007, xiii) assessment of the situation is worth
quoting at length:
Citizens in the ethnic minority states of Burma live under the authority of
multiple states or state-like authorities . . . The range of competing systems
of authority sometimes creates ambiguity . . . [and] much of the population is
left with limited strategies for survival or improvement . . . Although few
ordinary citizens anywhere in the country have significant opportunities to
influence the policy choices of various political authorities, those who live in
ethnic minority states are among the most disenfranchised.
Finally, the struggles of non-Burmans are detached from those of the Burman-led
democratic opposition, which reinforces the minority position on the periphery (in
terms of importance and relevance as well as geography) and the normative, central
position of Burman ethnicity and culture. Since before independence, non-Burman
groups have been compelled to engage in military struggle against the regime, which
has ignored their efforts to broker political settlements; the tactics of the Burman
opposition, on the other hand, have usually remained within the system, only
occasionally resorting to violent conflict. The privilege of being able to choose tactics
serves to reinforce the legitimacy of the Burman struggle for democracy, particularly
in the eyes of the international community, which valorises non-violent campaigns.We need look no further than the current political reforms from the Myanmar
government.
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As noted at the beginning of the paper, since taking power in March 2011, the
government has eased restrictions on freedoms of speech and press, released some
political prisoners and generally created opportunities for increased political
participation by the democratic opposition. The same period has been marked bya worrying increase in violence in some ethnic states, most notably Kachin State
since June 2011 and ethno-religious unrest in Rakhine State in June 2012. This
violent uptick reinforces the notion that Burmans and Burman issues remain central
to any political reforms the Myanmar state is willing to carry out. Additionally, the
reluctance of the military (now civilian) government to consider political solutions to
ethnic conflict is further evidence that non-Burmans choice of response strategies is
limited.
In all of these ways, Burman people in Myanmar are privileged by their Burman-
ness, even as many of them have continued to experience some degree of oppression
by the military government. In fact, it may be this continued oppression thatprevents them from being able to see their ethnic privilege. Roediger (1999) discusses
the emotional and cognitive obstacles that poor, underprivileged or otherwise
disadvantaged whites faced in acknowledging their own racial privilege. In his
narrative, (white) economic elites enhanced this challenge through their efforts to
reinforce racial allegiance of poor whites at the expense of class solidarity with poor
non-whites.
In Myanmar the former military government has engaged in similar efforts to
impede alliances between Burmans in the democratic opposition and non-Burman
ethnic groups. But beyond this, the self-understanding of the (primarily Burman)
democratic opposition movement has also made it harder for most Burmans to
acknowledge differential experiences of suffering between the communities. The
stories of Burman activists persecution at the hands of the government have
dominated the overall narrative of government repression in Myanmar since 1988
and many have appealed to a sense of solidarity with non-Burman ethnic groups
based on common experiences of oppression. Paradoxically, this shared sense of
suffering itself blinds most Burmans to their own privileged position and to the
discrimination and atrocities that non-Burmans disproportionately experience.
Without denying the legitimacy of Burman experiences, posing the question of
privilege pushes Burmans to consider the possibility that there are qualitative
differences in the suffering they have experienced and that these differences reflect a
structural disadvantage faced by non-Burmans.
Contesting the Dominance of Burman-ness
Given the degree to which the government, military or civilian, has monitored and
controlled the lives of Burmese people of all ethnicities, is it reasonable to suggest
that even those Burmans who are not associated with the military government are
implicated in Burmanisation and in the privilege that accrues to Burman-ness? Can
they be held responsible for a process that has in some ways been imposed upon
them? Some writers suggest that the military regime has fostered an environment in
which Burmans have been forced into acting out their privilege by the oppressivepolitics of the government (Gravers 1999, 76). I would argue that space still exists for
challenging Burman privilege and opposing the dominance of Burman-ness.
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Non-Burman scholars and activists have written for years about the dominant
position of the majority ethnic group, yet they have usually been told (as we saw in
the case of Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD) that their concerns could only be
addressed once democracy had been achieved. Slowly, expatriate Burman writers arestarting to realise that the question of ethnic relations must be central in Burmese
politics, possibly even prior to issues of democratic governance and political reform
(see, for example, the New Panglong Initiative 2001).
Political activist Aung Myo Min, who lives in Thailand working on human rights,
is one of the few Burmans to publicly and explicitly acknowledge not just the
violence that non-Burman communities face, but the vastly different degrees of
oppression faced by Burman and non-Burman communities.
Human rights violations still continue in every area of Burma especially in the
ethnic areas of Burma. Burmans are not being treated like ethnic people, butbecause of the civil war and the four cuts system in the ethnic areas the [non-
Burman] people suffer a lot. More than the Burman people. (The Irrawaddy,
July 1, 1999)17
Statements like this, and occasional articles criticising Burman ethnocentrism
written by Dr Zarni, a Burman scholar and activist (for example, The Irrawaddy,
October 17, 2009), are almost shocking in their rarity. The simple, yet challenging,
fact remains that, just as with Whiteness, Burman dominance and privilege can be
overcome only through active struggle and repudiation by Burmans. This is a difficult
truth to face, not least because many Burmans also perceive themselves as having
suffered at the hands of the regime.
Conclusion
What we have seen in the case of Myanmar is an effective merging of ethnic and
national identity; to be Burman (the ethnic group) is to be (truly) Burmese or
Myanmar (a citizen of the nation). The unquestioned assumptions that underlie this
association are similar to those that anchor Whiteness. In both cases, one group
enjoys not only unproblematic inclusion in a particular national community, but
also access to a specific set of privileges, while simultaneously denying all of that to
varying degrees to those in other groups. Even though many Burman people seethemselves as having been oppressed by the military government, this paper argues
that they retain a privileged status within Myanmar, simply because of their ethnicity
and the way in which Myanmar culture has been constituted by Burman culture.
Despite this gloomy assessment, I will suggest in closing that it is the very
permeability of ethnicity that points, at least initially, to a way forward. I have
already noted the ways in which non-Burman disadvantages are enhanced by
geographical location; that is, military repression is focused on non-Burman areas,
while many non-Burmans living in central Burma (and particularly in urban areas)
experience little to no discrimination based on ethnicity. This suggests that, removed
from the areas of volatile ethnic resistance and military response, there are fewerbarriers to ethnic reconciliation (although dividing non-Burmans into loyal and
disloyal groups is still problematic and could encourage assimilation). It also
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reinforces the critical importance of lasting politicalsettlements to ethnic conflicts in
border areas through inclusive and accommodating dialogue.
However, even these political settlements are only an initial step towards
dismantling Burman privilege. In addition to greater inclusion of non-Burmanvoices in the political decision-making process, the government of Myanmar will
need to open to public discussion the question of what it means to be Myanmar
and members of all ethnic groups will need to grapple with the challenges posed by
essentialised ethnic identities (see Sadan 2007, 35). Admittedly, this would be an
enormous step, given the pathological insistence on unity among political groups
across the spectrum. While a government obviously cannot countenance armed
rebellion, can there be space for loyal opposition expressed through ethnicity?
Without attention to continued differential treatment of non-Burmans in many parts
of the country as well as the privileged position of Burmans with regard to the
national Myanmar identity, ethnic reconciliation in Myanmar will remain elusive.The purpose of this analysis has not been to suggest that all Burmans are
chauvinists, looking down on or actively discriminating against non-Burmans.
However, drawing a lesson from viewing Whiteness as a set of power relations, the
more insidious impediments to ethnic unity in Myanmar are the ways in which
Burman dominance has been institutionalised over time and the ways in which
Burmans either cannot see it or actively ignore or deny it. One of the compelling
aspects of a theory of Whiteness and White privilege is that instead of blaming
whites or accusing all whites of being racist, it focuses on the historical construction
of racial identities and their institutionalisation in contemporary power structures.
This does not, however, absolve whites (or Burmans, in my appropriation of the
concept) of acting to contest these institutions and practices. In fact, adopting a
perspective that is sensitive to Burman privilege puts the focus squarely on Burmans
as the only group in a position to challenge structures of Burman privilege. This
perspective does not place the responsibility for ethnic unity and harmony solely on
Burman shoulders, but does insist that dismantling the supremacy of Burman-ness
can occur only from within the sphere of Burman privilege.
Acknowledgement
The author would like to thank John Buchanan, James Chamberlain, Ian Holliday, Patrick McCormick,
Rose Metro, Ashley South, Jack Turner, Abigail Vogus and Kit Young for their helpful comments on
drafts of this article. However, the views expressed herein are entirely the authors and should not be
attributed to anyone listed above. Additionally, two anonymous reviewers provided extensive comments
that substantially helped to make the argument stronger and more precise.
Notes
1 The government officially changed the name of the country to Myanmar in 1989; in referring to
either an institution of the state or the people as a whole contained within its borders, I use Myanmar
when speaking about the country after the change and Burma when speaking about the country
before the change. I use Burmese to refer to the citizens of the state.2 As a result of elections in November 2010, Myanmar is now led by a civilian government. The military
still retains the strongest voice in political matters, however, as most of the leaders of this civiliangovernment are former military officers and the vast majority of Parliamentary seats are controlled by
the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), which has close connections to the former
22 M.J. Walton
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military government. Additionally, the military itself remains an autonomous entity, not subject to
civilian control.3 The term Burman is used to refer to the majority ethnic group in Myanmar, although other authors
use the term Bama or Bamar (the English transliterations of the word in Burmese, the language of
the Burman majority and the lingua franca in the country).4 I use the term non-Burman rather than ethnic minority, which most writers use. Non-Burman
writers and political activists have expressed concern over the ways in which the term minority re-
inscribes the position of non-Burmans as peripheral, although it has also limited their ability to frame
their struggle within UN human rights provisions that focus on minority protections (A. Smith
2007). Some non-Burmans have adopted the term ethnic nationality, which they believe implies less
of a subordinate position to the majority (Ashley South, personal communication).5 See Zaw Oo and Win Min (2007) for a thorough review of ceasefires up to that year. Since the new,
quasi-civilian government took power it has signed several more ceasefires, but the slow pace of
political negotiations reflects the governments reluctance to recognise the political concerns of non-
Burman groups as legitimate.6 The challenge of separating race and ethnicity is compounded by the fact that speakers of Burmese
often use the same word for both categories. Scholars and writers generally translate lu myo asrace, while translating tain yin tha as ethnic group. In fact, the word lu myo is a much more
inclusive term with flexible content that appears to have changed along with common English
categorisations. Most Burmese speakers would respond to the question Ba lu myo le? [What race
are you?] by stating their ethnicity (or sometimes, adding to the confusion, their religion), suggesting
that there is an indigenous categorisation system (or systems, since members of different ethnic groups
might also understand the word differently) that does not neatly map onto the race/ethnicity
distinction.7 Mills capitalises Whiteness when referring to the identity that is shaped by and benefits from
systematic white supremacy, as opposed to white which merely refers to the biological features of a
particular group. He also suggests that Japanese identity within East and Southeast Asia during World
War II and Hutu dominance over Tutsis in Rwanda both represent localised versions of Whiteness in
which members of one ethnic group consider themselves to be superior over others and constructpolitical and social institutions to reflect this standing.8 For more detailed analysis of the process of hegemonic identity formation among the non-Burman
ethnic groups, see Fink (2003), Gravers (2007), Harriden (2002) and South (2007).9 Population figures are a contentious topic in Burma, stemming from census figures which often conflate
ethnicity with religion. Although the census categories claim to classify people by ethnic group, they
often classify members of non-Burman ethnic groups as Burman because these non-Burmans
identify themselves as Buddhist (Smith 1999, 30). The naming of ethnic groups is also a contentious
topic, as they are rarely represented by their own names for themselves. While I recognise that using
either Burmese or English names for these groups is problematic, I have done so because they will be
more familiar to readers. For a more detailed overview of these various groups, beyond the scope of
this paper, consult Smith (1994) or Smith (1999, 2739).10 See Union of Burma (1999) for a partisan account and Walton (2008) for a critical appraisal.11 See Morrison (1947) on Burman atrocities against Karen during the war.12 While some writers have presented the threat of ethnic separatism as the primary motivation behind the
1962 coup (see, for example, Maung Maung 1969), there were other concerns on the part of the military,
including the divisive political factionalism of the Parliament and limited economic development (see,
for example, Taylor 2009, 293295; Smith 1999, 196).13 See Lambrecht (1995) for more details of government treatment of Rohingyas. Discrimination against
the Rohingya is not limited to the Myanmar government. In response to Rohingya concerns that they
will be subject to further marginalisation because their identity will not be represented in the 2014
census, a senior National League for Democracy (NLD) leader said, I dont want to answer because
even in our organisation the Rohingya question has not been settled. Even in our leadership some of
them think that the Rohingya is a very delicate question (Hindstrom 2012). During the violent unrest
in Rakhine State in June 2012 between Muslim Rohingyas and Buddhist Rakhine, Ko Ko Gyi, a
member of the 88 Generation Students democratic opposition group declared that The Rohingya arenot a Burmese ethnic group and that foreign countries that criticised Myanmars policy towards the
Rohingya were guilty of impeding Myanmars sovereignty (Ponnudurai 2012).
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14 Burman dominance is also apparent within the military itself. Steinberg in 2001 noted that there is
now no senior member of the Burma military ruling elite who comes from a minority (73). Selth (2002,
264) points to the way in which religion is reflective of loyalty, claiming that Muslims and Christians
are actively discouraged from joining the Tatmadaw. The upper ranks of the military remain mostly