the walrus, carpenter and oysters: liberal reform, hypocrisy and expertocracy in maori land loss in...

Critical Perspectives on Accounting 19 (2008) 1239–1262

The walrus, carpenter and oysters: Liberal reform,hypocrisy and expertocracy in Maori land loss in

New Zealand 1885–1911

Keith Hooper 1, Kate Kearins ∗

Auckland University of Technology, Private Bag 92006, Auckland, New Zealand

Received 23 February 2006; received in revised form 2 January 2007; accepted 20 February 2007

Abstract

This paper considers the Liberal Governments’ reformist agenda and resultant hypocrisy surround-ing wealth confiscation from Maori in New Zealand from 1885 to 1911. Through an analysis ofofficial records, ledger accounts and other historical documents, it shows how the government com-pulsorily acquired land from Maori and resold it at considerable profit, thus supplying a means ofincreasing state revenues. Supplementing these revenues were exorbitant survey fees, governmentcommissions from Native Reserves and local government rates in which accounting expertise madeit possible to enclose, price and levy charges. The calculative process enabled parliamentarians toargue that given the poor returns to Maori, their assets should be put into the hands of land-sellingcouncils. Maintaining a figurative distance from the mechanism of exploitation, all the while respon-sible for its enactment, successive Liberal administrations throughout the period made much of pastinjustices and expressed considerable sympathy for Maori. Maori were largely dispossessed of theirland by the end of this period—a period of relative calm where public appeasement and niceties pre-sented a more benign facade to the disproportionately heavy taxation burden on, and ultimate pillageof Maori.© 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Liberal reformism; Hypocrisy; Expertocracy; Maori; Taxation; Confiscation; Colonial finance; Landsales; Historical case study

∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +64 9 921 9999x5422; fax: +64 9 921 9990.E-mail addresses: [email protected] (K. Hooper), [email protected] (K. Kearins).

1 Tel.: +64 9 921 9999x5758.

1045-2354/$ – see front matter © 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.doi:10.1016/j.cpa.2007.02.004

mailto:[email protected]

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1240 K. Hooper, K. Kearins / Critical Perspectives on Accounting 19 (2008) 1239–1262

. . . “Now if you’re ready, Oysters dear,We can begin to feed.”“But not on us!” the Oysters cried,Turning a little blue.“After such kindness, that would beA dismal thing to do!”The night is fine,” the Walrus said“Do you admire the view?”. . ..“I weep for you” the Walrus said:“I deeply sympathize.”With sobs and tears he sorted outThose of the largest size,Holding his pocket handkerchiefsBefore his streaming eyes.“O Oysters” said the Carpenter,“You’ve had a pleasant run!Shall we be trotting home again?”But answer was there none –And this was scarcely odd, becauseThey’d eaten every one.

(Extracts from The Walrus and the Carpenter, from Through the Looking-Glass by LewisCarroll, 1871/1999)

1. Introduction

How the confiscation of indigenous wealth occurred under a reformist Liberal agenda isthe subject of this paper. Focusing on the period 1885–1911 in New Zealand, the paper linksLiberal reformism, hypocrisy and accounting expertise as key elements in a potent formulacontributing to Maori losing much of their remaining land. These key elements find theirparallels encapsulated in Lewis Carroll’s poem, The Walrus and the Carpenter. SuccessiveLiberal governments of the period are shown to demonstrate similarities in their actionsand statements to Carroll’s greedy and hypocritical walrus. Accounting and other expertsresemble the practical but implicated carpenter, with such experts more recently involvedin the seemingly impossible task of calculating redress for past injustices. Maori appearas the unfortunate victims whose land (the source of their wealth in economic terms) wasgradually ‘swallowed’ – and whose wellbeing suffered immensely.

This sorry story, which is later fleshed out with examples presented in the form of anhistorical case study, is as follows. Despite many government expressions of regret for pastinjustices done to Maori over the appropriations of their land, the acquisition of remain-ing Maori lands by successive Liberal governments proceeded apace during the period1885–19112 – until Maori land as a source of revenue was effectively exhausted. The earlier

2 After the 1884 election, members of parliament calling themselves Liberals became part of the governmentfor five years, including John Ballance, the first Liberal premier. As a party, the Liberals were not elected as suchuntil 1890. They then held power continuously until 1911.

K. Hooper, K. Kearins / Critical Perspectives on Accounting 19 (2008) 1239–1262 1241

“Land Wars” involving open violence, oppression and resistance were not repeated. Mostlyfrom 1885, transactions of Maori land into European hands occurred peaceably. Land waseither compulsorily acquired through the Immigration and Public Works Acts or throughThe Maori Lands Administration Act 1905, which essentially gave Europeans control ofMaori land through various local land boards (Loveridge, 1996; Oliver and Williams, 1991).Such legislation enabled government acquisition of land which later resold at a consider-able profit. To the revenues from land sales were added exorbitant survey fees, governmentcommissions from Native Reserves and local government rates. The effect was wealth con-fiscation, achieved, in the authors’ view, not in the brutal direct fashion employed by RomanEmperors, or dictatorial leaders such as Hitler dispossessing the Jews, Mugabe confiscatingthe farms of white farmers, or Stalin dispossessing minority races, but by Liberal govern-ments employing ‘objective’ accounting data derived by experts to demonstrate poor returnson assets held. It was in the late nineteenth century within the liberal formula of government,as Rose (1993, p. 285) points out, that “the authority of expertise becomes inextricably linkedto the formal political apparatus of rule”. Thus, various professionals including those whomight be regarded as accountants were involved in enclosing and pricing land and levyingcharges which contributed to Maori losing much of their remaining land. Moreover, theywere part of what was promoted then as fair, caring and reformist Liberal governance.

This paper is positioned to consider the means and effects of colonial New Zealandpublic finance policies with regard to social conditions, conflict and consequences, and thedistribution of property rights and wealth. It follows suggestions by Sikka et al. (1995)that academics become more active in public policy debates, in serving the public interest(Neu et al., 2001; Neu and Graham, 2005), and in local level engagement in presenting thevoices of poor and marginalised groups (Cooper, 2005), as is evident in the case of Maori.It fits under the umbrella of work signaled by Gallhofer and Chew (2000) in explicatingaccounting’s role in western domination in a bid to overcome injustices to indigenous peo-ples. In this sense, then, the paper contributes to a developing literature in what might beconsidered postcolonial studies in accounting, following earlier work by the authors in theNew Zealand context, and studies by Neu (2000a, 2000b), Neu and Graham (2004, 2006) inCanada, Gibson (2000) in Australia, and Davie (2000) in Fiji. The paper makes an explicitcontribution to a discussion on liberal reformism – as a common context for colonial devel-opment in the antipodes – and the role of accounting in Maori land transactions within thatcontext. Interestingly, in various formulations and jurisdictions, liberalism was popular atthe turn of both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In spite of the socialistic aspect ofNew Zealand colonial liberalism, there remained at heart a commitment to market philoso-phies and more importantly, given the tribal nature of Maori land holdings, a commitmentby the government to individual property ownership. Inevitably, such a philosophy wouldbe in conflict with Maori—as the historical case study shows.

The paper is organised, first to explore liberal reformism and expertocracy, then tobriefly discuss the character of hypocrisy in politics. The historical case study comprisesrelevant background to the development of colonial New Zealand from its foundation in1840, followed by a more detailed consideration of aspects of the period of Liberal gov-ernance during which Maori disproportionately financed Liberal policies. This particularperiod is worthy of attention because of the promises it held in the development of thecolony, and the tragedy in terms of what it finally delivered. Evidence presented in the case


study is drawn from Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives (AJHR)which record specific land transfers, government revenues from territories acquired, landand survey fees, ledger accounts, and other official information. Use is also made of theNew Zealand Parliamentary Debates (NZPD) where arguments of legislating politiciansare shown to make the case for Maori land sales. The case study is also supported byolder and contemporary accounts of New Zealand history and politics with which theauthors are familiar (e.g. King, 1981, 2003; Oliver, 1968; Oliver and Williams, 1991;Sinclair, 1958, 1991; Ward, 1974). Theoretical integration and discussion concludes thepaper.

2. Liberal reformism and expertocracy

Liberalism is variously described as an ideology, a philosophy and a political traditionor movement.3 With their roots in the Western Enlightenment, liberalism’s diverse strandsgenerally emphasise liberty and individual rights. An intrinsic mediating principle is thatof ‘doing no harm’. As a political movement, liberalism became popular in the late nine-teenth century in many western countries, including in Australia and in New Zealand –and, indeed, liberal ideas were again in ascendancy in the late twentieth century in mostdeveloped countries (Catley, 2005; Rosenblum, 1989).4 In broad terms, traditional forms ofliberal governance – such as those in the antipodean British colonies a century ago –werecharacterised by the promotion of: individual freedoms; respect for the rule of law; a mar-ket economy that supported relatively free private enterprise; and a transparent system ofgovernment in which the rights of all citizens were to be protected (Mill, 1859/1946; vonMises, 1927). Liberalism’s ideals were, and are thus seen as requiring public policy to beshaped in accordance with citizen’s wishes (Dewey, 1963).

Proponents of liberalism differ notably in their opinions as to the appropriate degreeof government interference – particularly as concerns the market.5 Relatedly, they differin their opinions as to the extent to which the proceeds of market regulation shouldsupport government provision of general welfare. Both J.S. Mill (1859/1946) and (Lord)Keynes (1936) argue that some form of interference by governments is necessary to offsetinjustices and inefficiencies that occur, not least economic injustices and inefficiencies.

3 As often stated, liberalism is not a precise ideology. Important to note though is the differing use of the termin the US to most of Europe and elsewhere in the English-speaking world. Catley (2005, p. 14) summarises thekey difference thus: “In the US ‘liberal’ is often used in a way that elsewhere would mean leftist, or one whosupports the expansion of the power of the state of government. In Europe, this is reserved for the terms socialist,social democrat or leftists, and liberal there [as is more generally inferred to be the case in the version of liberalreformism described in this paper] usually means some one who does not support the expansion or use of thepower of the state in political or economic affairs.”

4 Catley (2005) attributes the swing towards liberalism in the last three decades to the crisis of stagflationoccurring in the late 1970s which diminished the dominance of Keynesian thinking in economics, and the loss offaith in Marxian ideas and communism which came with the collapse of the Soviet Bloc at the end of the 1980s.

5 Hayek (1960/1978) is one of the better known liberal supporters of the free market. A further distinction madeis that “in Europe, the term ‘liberal’ is more likely to apply to a defender of the free market; in North America, toa defender of the welfare state” (Oxford Companion to Philosophy, 1995, p. 483).


Indeed, similar arguments were apparent in the liberal reformism in the early 20th century– although social welfare reforms generally “were relatively minor and had limitedcoverage” (Barr, 2004, p. 13).

Reformist governments are almost inevitably associated with attempts to introducechanges – in a more modest or gradual fashion. Their ideas are often grounded in lib-eralism. They may well be brought into power on the premise and promise of such changesbeing broadly beneficial. However, the improvements they seek are often thwarted by theprevailing system, by economic pressures, or by divergent interests (Mill, 1859/1946). Thereare countless stories of governments interested in the maintenance of power reneging on orwatering down their election promises – and even changing their allegiances, both openlyand more subtly. Less often told are accounts involving hypocrisy – “the assumption orpostulation of moral standards to which one’s own behaviour does not conform” (ConciseOxford Dictionary, 1990), or more commonly defined as saying one thing while doinganother. Hypocrisy of course is not inimical to government – but clearly it can occur. Mill(1946, p. 187) warns that one of the greatest dangers of all forms of government lies “in thesinister interest of the holders of power.” He identifies two divergent directions of apparentinterest comprised, in general terms, of labour and capital with which governments gener-ally contend. A platform for liberal reformism can often readily be found and sold to theelectorate. It can be argued as serving the interests of labour through enhanced employmentopportunities, and those of capital by a less restrictive or even permissive legislative regime,with the economic benefits thereof financing a welfare system that benefits all, especiallythose who most need it. The vested interests of the parties involved and the inevitablechoices arising from limited revenue sources often mitigate against this presumption,however.

Liberal reformism is premised on particular sorts of changes that are not without theirown problems. According to Burchell (1993, p. 271), early forms of liberalism regarded themarket as a kind of “economic nature reserve” marked off, secured and supervised by thestate. “That is to say, the rational conduct of government must be intrinsically linked to natu-ral, private interest motivated conduct of free market exchanging individuals”. Such intrinsiclinking was disastrous for those communities not comprising “free market exchanging indi-viduals”, because no matter what was promised by liberal politicians by way of protectionfrom free market pressures, such promises would always be undermined by other priori-ties. What is more, Burchell identifies liberal government as “cheap government” geared tosecuring the conditions for optimum economic performance. In his use of the goldfish bowlanalogy, so shaped to exclude and condemn other possibilities, Burchell’s (1993) analysisreveals how communistic systems of land tenure based on self-sufficiency would be doomedby liberal governance and that promises of protection to the contrary would be worthless.

The mechanism by which condemnation of communistic self-sufficiency is generallyachieved is through various state agencies employing ‘experts’ to reach conclusions basedon economic rationalities. Preston et al. (1997), citing Rose (1993), suggest that the tactics ofarranging and disposing of things under advanced liberalism place the expert, a foundationstone of liberal government, in a new relationship with the apparatus of political rule.However, even early liberal governments were to employ experts to distance themselvesfrom the process of management (Rose, 1993). Preston et al. (1997, p. 148) continue:“The process of government may also be indirect, mediated and decentralised through the


use of multiple intermediaries”. Such intermediaries might also include technologies andbodies of knowledge such as accounting and statistics. Accounting can function as a macro-pricing mechanism embedded in micro-allocation decisions, as Preston et al. (1997, p. 157)point out “albeit in a variety of localized transactions and interpretations”. What is more,Power (1992, p. 487) observes, “it does not take much reflection on the practices of ‘creativeaccounting’ to argue that this supposed neutrality of quantification is a myth which concealsa capacity for partisan representations.”

Political power is thus exercised through a multitude of agencies and technologiesand may flow two ways. Like Rose (1993), Gorz (1989, p. 108) argues the concept ofeconomic rationality may colonise liberal governments in excluding wider social consider-ations. Moreover, “Economic rationality itself is formalized into calculations, proceduresand formulae inaccessible either to debate or reflection. We are left with debates betweenexperts, quibbling over technicalities of method not with the substance of the debate” (Gorz,1989, p.122). Thus if, as Burchell alleges, economic rationality is intrinsic to liberal govern-ment, then Gorz is correct to argue that ‘experts’ of economic rationality may well colonisegovernment.

The consequences of such penetration are such that “the reduction to technique allowseconomic calculation to emerge as a substitute for value judgement” (Power, 1992, p. 479).Experts might raise as paramount the priorities of economic targets based on quantitativemeasurements, a common argument today being what matters is what can be measured.Power (1992, p. 482) summarises the change which occurs under liberalism as incorporating“the emergence of an expert occupational class of organizers who increasingly colonize thesphere of civil society in the sense of defining the way ‘functional’ problems are perceivedand addressed”.

Accountants and accounting expertise are an important element of this ‘expertocracy’– a term Leonard (2006, p. 7) defines as “statism joined to expertise”.6 This joining is notmeant to imply in this case equal status between, or, necessarily, a hierarchy of governmentsand their agents – public and private. Nor is it meant to imply expert interaction merelybetween human actors, –it also includes non-human actors such as bodies of expert knowl-edge and relevant technologies. In some senses close to, but not identical with concepts ofbureaucracy, expertocracy attempts to embrace expert interaction in hierarchical and non-hierarchical situations (Heipertz and Verdun, 2005). Thus it implies, as used in this paper,multi-directional rather than just top-down or state-directed channels of influence.7

According to Neu (2000a), accounting operated as “the software of imperialism”, facil-itating action at a distance and helping to translate imperial objectives into practice. Millerand Rose (1990, p. 1) note “It functioned as an indirect mechanism – aligning economic,social and personal conduct with the socio-political objectives of colonial powers”. Though

6 Leonard’s application of the term refers to the American progressives with their goal of increased socialefficiency enhanced particularly through scientific expertise and rational methods.

7 Moldaschi and Weber (1998) employ the concept of ‘expertocracy’ to explain the phenomena of professionalsinvesting themselves with authority, Expertocracy ignores the role of actor strategies, subsuming individual orgroup interests under a virtual interest of the organization or state (or under a one-best-way of organizationaldesign which is represented by the expert). It thus overlooks certain social dynamics, taking problems as givenand merely requiring resolution from a task-based perspective. An instrumental rationality generally prevails.


the focus of this paper is not squarely on imperialism,8 which arguably applied in previouswork by the authors (Hooper and Kearins, 2003, 2004), the notion of accounting facilitat-ing action at a distance is important here, as in Neu (2000a) and Neu and Graham (2004).Liberal reformism relied on accounting technologies for its implementation.

Unlike socialism, however, these formulae for a state of welfare sought to maintain acertain distance between the knowledges and allegiances of experts and the calcula-tions of politicians. The truth claims of expertise were highly significant here: throughthe powers of truth, distant events and persons could be governed at arms length: polit-ical rule would not set itself the norms of individual conduct but would install andempower a variety of “professional” who would, investing them with authority act asexperts in the devices of social rule (Rose, 1993, p. 285).

Moreover, these experts worked as now faceless intermediaries without substantive iden-tification beyond the actual accounts retained in the archives. Their work remains at onceintegral to the implementation of government policy and yet ‘at a distance’ from it.

That the work of accounting experts is part of a potent colonisation formulation isno longer in doubt. Prasad (1997) observes that a belief in the inferiority of indigenouspeoples encourages politicians, government bureaucrats and “experts” to make decisionsabout what is convenient for indigenous peoples. “Accounting facilitated solutions thatwere ‘convenient’ for bureaucrats and settlers” (Neu, 2000a, p. 167). It has been arguedto have enlisted and worked with and on indigenous people in order to serve complexprocesses of empire-building (Davie, 2000). And it has been “instrumental in extendingpolitical dominion over new territory” (Neu and Graham (2006, p. 73)). In New Zealand(see Hooper and Kearins, 2003, 2004), as in Canada, accounting techniques have beenshown to provide “a tentative method of reconciling the goals of colonial self-sufficiency,cost-containment and the ‘civilizing’ of indigenous peoples” (Neu, 2000a, p. 170). Millerand Rose (1990, p. 7) observe that, “The events and phenomena to which government is tobe applied must be rendered into information – written reports, drawings, pictures, numbers,charts, graphs, statistics . . . to be literally re-presented in the place where decisions are tomade about them”. Neu (2000a, p. 176), referring to Canada, claims:

We observe accounting numbers representing not only the amount indigenous peoplereceived for their land but perhaps more importantly the value that colonial officials

8 Imperialism “means thinking about, settling on and controlling land that you do not possess, which is distantand lived on and owned by others” (Said, 1993, p. 5). While notionally relevant in terms of its effect, the theme ofimperialism is not developed here as one of the key elements in the potent formulation for wresting remaining landfrom Maori during this later period. Successive governments were, by this time, well-established in occupationwithin New Zealand. Their actions, as described in this paper, do not strictly adhere to the definition of imperialismas “the process of integrating new regions into the expanding economy and [which] is largely decided by thevarious and changing relationships between political and economic element of expansion in any particular regionand time” offered by Gallagher and Robinson, (1953, pp. 5–6). However, for Maori who occupied their own landand regarded their tribal areas as independent states, such as the King Country where Europeans were not welcomeand where European courts did not operate (Oliver, 1960), the threat of imperialism (or something like it) mightseem to have applied. For linkages between imperialism and professions (including, in particular, accounting) inthe development of the British empire, see earlier work by Johnson (1973, 1982) and Johnson and Caygill (1971).For more recent work in this area, see Annisette (2000).


placed on the indigenous people themselves. . .the colonial government’s desire tosave money and the desperate position of the indigenous peoples encouraged colonialofficials to not only minimize purchase prices wherever possible but also to structurethe transactions in such a way that a capital payment for the land was not required.

As illustrated in this paper, similar techniques of monopoly land acquisition were fol-lowed in colonial New Zealand with the added feature of deducting from the purchaseprice significant transaction costs. A useful facet of accounting to governments and theirmediating institutions is, as Miller and O’Leary (1993, pp. 188–9) observe that:

The expertise of accounting is closely tied to the claim that it can produce a factualand calculable knowledge of economic relations. To be able to collect, store, process,communicate and render comparable factual data about economic relations is one ofthe ideals upon which accountancy was established . . .. Accounting held out a promiseof demarcating a financial domain that would be neutral, objective and calculable andthat would allow the corporation to governed and administered according to the facts.

Thus, expertocracy succeeded in removing itself from the more subjective political realm,and became the purveyor of a supposedly objective truth. It is by removing the mechanismsof dispossession from the realm of political decision-making that Liberal politicians in NewZealand were able to maintain a facade of sympathy for Maori. A discussion of hypocrisyappears next.

3. Hypocrisy in politics

Hypocrisy is an age-old phenomenon, sometimes a central theme and often referred toin literature and philosophy. Shakespeare acknowledges the role of deceit and hypocrisyin politics. Indeed, hypocrisy is a constant theme in his chronicles of the Lancastrian andYorkist Kings: Lord, Lord, how this world is given to lying! (Shakespeare, King Henry IV,Part 1), Seventeenth century French philosopher, Blaise Pascal (1670/1995, p. 100) locateshypocrisy as an essential condition within human relations.

Human society is founded on mutual deceit; few friendships would endure if eachknew what his friend said of him in his absence . . . Man is, then, only disguise,falsehood, and hypocrisy, both in himself and in regard to others.

Fernandes (2001) takes insights from Swift’s masterpiece Gulliver’s Travels to explainhuman behaviour in the context of legal systems, political science and colonization. Toillustrate an extreme tendency toward hypocrisy, Fernandes cites a passage about the natureof government and the character of the chief minister of state, who:

applies his words to all uses, except to the indication of his mind; that he never tellsa truth, but with an intent that should you should take it for a lie; nor a lie, but withdesign that you should take it for a truth; that those he speaks worst of behind theirbacks are in the surest way to preferment; and whenever he begins to praise you toothers or yourself, you are from that day forlorn (p.302).


Often cited in this area, Machiavelli (1513/1999) advises the mastery of hypocrisy inorder to avoid being exposed. He relates examples of captors and governors appearing tobe moral when being ruthless. With regard to taking a principality by force, Machiavelli(1999, p. 16) suggests some guiding principles. “Three ways to hold them securely: first bydevastating them; next by going and living there in person; thirdly by letting them keep theirown laws, exacting tribute.” Dominance in a colonial society involves, according to Machi-avelli, injuring people who are displaced by new settlers because the former are likely to bepoor and scattered they cannot seek revenge (Skinner and Price, 2002). Nonetheless, Machi-avelli warns that unless such displaced peoples are “crushed”, they should be “caressed”.The approach is one of apparent sympathy.

Moreover, Machiavelli advises, the enactment of unpopular measures should be dele-gated to others, such that those in charge – for Machiavelli, the Prince – keep in their ownhands the means of winning favours. This tactic is said to be workable with a naıve work-force or in situations where grievance and other procedures would not ultimately exposethe Prince for his hand in the unpopular measures. Over time though, the deception wouldprobably lead to an even greater loathing of the Prince (Buttery and Richter, 2003). Accord-ing to Machiavelli (1513/1999), because the common people are impressed by appearancesand because there is distance, hypocrisy is easy to maintain as few people are so close tothe Prince that they see what he actually stands for.

Brunsson (2002) reflects on hypocrisy in organisational and political realms, arguingthat “hypocrisy is a way of handling several conflicting values simultaneously” (p. xiii).Hypocrisy, he suggests, operates as a solution seemingly possessing moral advantagesrather than posing as a problem. Hypocrisy works because most people believe that talkpointing in a certain direction increases the likelihood of action occurring in that direction.Governments and organisations with powerful ideologies are much less likely to employhypocrisy, Brunsson claims, than are other more liberal, multi-ideological organisations.Hypocrisy may be seen as a solution to the dilemma of handling inconsistent norms and atthe same time wishing to avoid conflict. Liberal governments which are generally multi-ideological can win legitimacy not by fighting for a single interest but by being associatedwith several interests and incorporating those interests into their values. Such a situationinvites colonisation by experts, as evidenced in Brunsson’s (2002) example of a smallmunicipality in Sweden. There, local politicians divided by conflicting objectives, allowedadministrators and several external actors to build stronger power bases, resulting in thepoliticians abandoning their planned cuts and concentrating on expectations engenderedby the budget as a plan for the future. In other words, these politicians took refuge infuture expectations and sought a solution in hypocrisy. Hypocrisy allows higher ideals tobe propounded even if they cannot be acted in accordance with.9 Moreover it reinforcespolitical popularity.

Despite its acknowledgement in literature and in philosophy as a dimension of humanrelations and a feature of the political landscape, hypocrisy features remarkably infrequentlyas an explicit focus in academic studies on accounting, management and organisations.This paper stands as a deliberate exception, focusing on the hypocrisy apparent in colonial

9 As La Rochefoucauld (1664) observed: “L’hypocrisie est un homage que le vice rend a la vertu” (Maximes,218).


liberalism, and the implication of expertocracy within that formulation. The historical casestudy from New Zealand follows.

4. Historical case study

4.1. Background

New Zealand was annexed by Great Britain in 1840 with the ensuing establishment ofcolonial rule and European-style law and regulation including a fledgling taxation regime.Taxation by pre-emption was instituted, as was a customs tax. Early colonists had lobbiedto found a colony without cost to the colonial taxpayer, with others apparently wanting toestablish “a new civilized state without harm to Maoris” (Sinclair, 1991, p. 64). The formerideal largely won out at the expense of the latter.

The early years of colonial rule saw a period of considerable anarchy. A shortage of capitalfor development was ‘resolved’ (in substance) by a taxation burden placed on the indigenousMaori population. Although the situation was in some ways similar to many other colonies,New Zealand differed in that its indigenous Maori population outnumbered Europeansthrough to around 1858, and boasted “formidable fighting prowess” (Sinclair, 1991, p. 74).With government coffers bankrupt in 1845, Governor, George Grey set in place a numberof initiatives, restoring the government monopoly on the purchase of Maori land through to1862. Increased settler demand for land fuelled Maori resistance to land sales, with relationsbetween Maori and European deteriorating after Grey’s departure in 1853. The scene wasset for further battles over land in the New Zealand Land Wars of the 1860s and 1870s.

In practice, the government’s supposedly paternalistic pre-emption policy in respect ofland until 1862 became a draconian capital gains tax, robbing Maori of resources from afinite source (Hooper and Kearins, 2003). Following the Land Wars, a confiscation policywas introduced to punish rebel tribes, though not all were punished as the government tookland in an arbitrary fashion. After the Land Wars came the requisitions of Maori lands forpublic works purposes, often with meager and sometimes no compensation. The effect ofboth confiscations and public works proclamations was to levy, in substance, a wealth tax noton individuals but on particular tribes as land was held collectively without any tradition ofindividual ownership (Hooper and Kearins, 2004). Maori tribes were also subjected to hostof other government fees (many of them levied at exorbitant rates), as well as rates and dogtaxes. By the 1880s, Maori held nearly one third of New Zealand as Native Reserves and,with the progressive Liberal Party coming to power, had reason to expect to retain controlof their remaining lands. Appendix 1 provides the contributions to colonial revenues fromthe sale of Maori land, as well as from rents and commissions from Maori land held in trustby the government, for the current period, supplementing the case style narrative elected forhere. It complements analyses for earlier periods provided in Hooper and Kearins (2003,2004).

To provide further context for the case that follows, it is fair to say that the period ofLiberal governance in colonial New Zealand was in some ways socialistic. Liberal leaders,though imbued in the doctrines of “individualism and laissez-faire, also believed that onlystate intervention could cure the countries’ ills” (Sinclair, 1991, 172). An official summary


notes: “The Liberal government reinforced an established pattern of state involvement in theeconomy and regulation of society. Its old age pensions and workers’ dwellings anticipatedthe welfare state”10 (Te Ara, 2006). The most noteworthy Liberal leaders “hoped not forthe destruction of capitalism but for a “reconciliation between capital and labour on a fairand equitable basis” (Sinclair, 1991, p. 175). Liberals were united in their belief in the roleof the state – on pragmatic rather than ideological grounds, however (King, 2003). With theaspirations of many settlers being unrealised as they languished in the towns, they saw it asnecessary to legislate for the desired social and economic order (Sinclair, 1991). It has beensaid that “if the [New Zealand] Liberals had one common and dominant preoccupation, itwas how to best use land, widely recognised as the country’s richest resource” (King, 2003,p. 260).

The 1890 election saw the return of twenty Liberal members endorsed by labour groupsand the beginning of party government in New Zealand. Maori votes were a lesser consid-eration for the Liberal Party as Maori had their own representatives in Parliament and manyMaori were not registered to vote. Implementing the Liberal government vision of welfareand state regulation meant uncovering additional sources of revenues preferably, from theLiberals’ point of view, without alienating the majority of European voters – both townand country. Maori land was the politically expedient choice which matched the Liberals’plans for closer settlement and the establishment of small farms – and not wanting to goto the London loan market (Te Ara, 1966a). With refrigeration opening up export marketsfor meat and dairy products, smaller farms had become viable. Land settlement policy was“based on the principle of ‘one man, one farm’, and land legislation . . . directed towardscloser settlement of farm land and the prevention of undue aggregation” (Te Ara, 1966b).Even more Maori land was set to pass into European hands.

4.2. Fine promises

Evidence suggests that during the 1880s, colonial governments in New Zealand hadbegun to feel uncomfortable over their predecessors’ record of dealings in Maori land, whichhad provided a convenient and ready source of colonial revenue. An economic depressionand the so described ‘uninspired leadership of Sir Harry Atkinson’ gave rise to the formationof the Liberal Party under the leadership of John Ballance (King, 2003; Oliver, 1968).

When the Liberals came to power in 1890, Maori made up 10% of the population andretained 30% of the land (King, 2003). The Liberals were elected on a platform of reform,with promises to “burst up the big estates” and “put the small man on the land” (Richardson,1981, p. 200). Given the Liberal’s pre-election promises, Maori (and their Parliamentaryrepresentatives) expected better control over their remaining lands. “He had heard it statedthat this government above all others was the government that would redress the wrongs”(H. Tapua (Member of Parliament (MP), Western Maori), NZPD, Vol. 74, p. 161). Indeed,as this MP reminded Parliament, Liberal leader, Balance, had toured the remaining Maorilands, assuring the tribes of his party’s good intentions.

10 The Old Age Pensions Act 1898 was the first measure of its kind in any British country. The amount of thepension was £18 to those who were over 65 and met such criteria as being of good character. Most Maori receivedless than the full rate and Asians (many of whom had flocked to New Zealand’s gold fields) were excluded.


I say it deliberately – and I say it in the presence of the fact that I am criticized severelyin some parts of the colony for expressing this sentiment – that it is not the desire ofthe government to strip the Native of their lands. On the other hand, it is the desire ofthe government to assist the Natives in preserving a portion of their territory, in orderthat their prosperity and their existence and their happiness may be maintained in thefuture (Ballance to Arawa Tribe, AJHR, 1885, G-1, p. 42).

Once in government, Ballance continued to repeat his claim of promoting Maori wellbe-ing: “It is our sincere desire to promote in every possible way the happiness and prosperityof the Native people” (Ballance to Waikato Tribe, AJHR, 1885, G-1, p. 13). Perhaps, mostreassuring was the promise that from then on, Maori would receive equal consideration toEuropeans. “The government of which I am a member propose to treat the Native peoplejust the same as they would Europeans” (Ballance to Wanganui Maori, AJHR, 1885, G-1,p. 4). What he did not mention was that 17% of the government’s revenue was comingfrom the sale or lease of Maori land and was helping to pay for an expanding programmeof European immigration and farm settlement.11 Contrary to the spirit of what was beingsaid, experts employed by the government recognised, facilitated and reported on the poten-tial for government gain from sales of Maori land. In a report on land at Taheke, ThomasMcDonnell writes of Maori wanting 12s an acre, while he will offer 2s. 6d. an acre andadmits that “Private individuals might be inclined to give more.” He concludes that, “TheGovernment are in every way gainers by the present arrangement” (AJHR, 1873, Vol. 3,(G-8)).

4.3. Taxation by survey, public works and commissions

In order to open up land for settlement, the boundaries of Native Reserves had to bedefined. Surveys were expedited, with Maori responsible for paying survey charges. TheWest Coast Commission Report (AJHR, 1882, G-5, Appendix II, No. 2, pp. 9–10) is illus-trative of the costs involved. An instance in the report concerns the 18,000 acres of the StonyRiver block returned to Maori after the war of 1865. The report claims Maori were anxiousto have the block surveyed so that they could lease it to Europeans and divide ownershipamong six or seven hapu (sub-tribes). With four survey parties in the field, the work wasestimated to take two years at a projected cost of £9,500. To enable completion, so as tofacilitate “the occupation of the country by European settlers which is certain to follow”,the report recommended doubling the number of survey parties, claiming that additionalreason for speeding up the survey work was that “the Natives at present are in an excellenthumour and very desirous to have the work done” (p. 10).

By 1885, Maori were recorded as protesting the exorbitant survey fees they had beencharged (AJHR, 1885, G-1, p. 45). Maori claimed in some cases the survey fees were greaterthan the value of the land. Premier Ballance, to whom these complaints were addressed,

11 European immigrants were also beneficiaries from the sales of Maori lands, acquiring land often initiallythrough Crown lease, and later, through specially established government agencies, borrowing capital sums atspecial low interest rates to acquire freehold titles. Such loans were not routinely available to Maori (Sinclair,1991).


concurred: “I agree you have a very solid grievance and I shall see at once that it is remedied”(AJHR, 1885, G-1, p. 45). He promised that in future Maori would pay no more for surveysthan the government rate. But Maori had already surrendered land to pay the exorbitantgovernment survey charges while in the process providing another source of governmentrevenue. Six years later, survey costs were still an ongoing debt burden for Maori to address– even if they did not plan to sell their land:

The above amounts [totalling £28 817] represent liens on Native lands for surveyperformed by the Government either for purposes of the Native Land Court or inexpectation of purchase of land by the Government. In the case of the former liensare recovered when the Native Land Court finally deals with the land, and in the lattercase the liens are written off when the land is finally purchased by the Government(AJHR, 1891, Session II, G-10, p.55).

Under The Native Land Act 1873 (s106), the Governor was entitled to “take and layoff for public purposes one or more line or lines of road or railway through said lands”.Sometimes compensation was granted for land acquired for public works, but not always.For example, the construction of one road (from Kaihu to Maunganui Bluff) was delayed“owing to difficulties with the Natives”. The difficulty consisted “in the demand for paymentfor the land taken by the road”. The Chief Surveyor’s Report (Roads to Open up Lands ForSale, AJHR, 1881, C-4, p. 31) concludes, “It would be wrong in principle to pay for thisroad which has been taken under rights secured by the Native Lands Act. The need for theroad, adduced in the report, was, “for the number of settlers [that] will be ready to locatethemselves there.”

Such arbitrary seizure of land for public works eroded the principles of The NativeReserves Act 1864 (enacted following the Land Wars) which designated all Maori-ownedland ‘Native Reserves’, but permitted perpetual leases to new settlers of Maori reserve landsat artificially low rentals. However, until The Native Reserves Act 1881, which requiredthat the reserves were to be managed by the administrators and accountants of the PublicTrustee, Maori Reserve Lands remained largely in tribal control (apart from parliamentaryconfiscations through various Public Works Acts). From 1881, with their lands administeredby the Public Trustee, Maori were dependant on disbursed rental incomes. The amounts ofthe rents were decided by ‘experts’ as admitted to a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry:“Sufficient reserves being made for their sustenance now and all time, the Governmentundertaking then to pay them a rent fixed by an expert” (AJHR, 1891, Session II, G-1, p.34).These ‘experts’ were never identified in the public records but it may be surmised that theywere generally government officials employed either in the Ministry of Native Affairs orby the Public Trustee.12 Later, in 1894, when Liberal policy switched to promoting selling

12 From records in the National Archives it appears that many government employees of the period possessedbook-keeping abilities and would refer to themselves as accountants and undertake valuations for the government.For example, one government employee, W.K. Mclean, worked in the Ministry of Native Affairs as a bookkeeper.In 1873 he left the government service to set up independently as an accountant/valuer in Napier (see Hooperand Kearins, 1997) – some 21 years before the New Zealand professional body, the Institute of Accountants wasestablished in 1894. Both government employees and independent accountant/valuers contributed their expertiseduring this period.


rather than leasing Maori land, it was argued in parliamentary debate that such rentals were‘peppercorns’ (NZPD, Vol. 86, 1894, p. 379).

With control of Maori Lands vested in the Public Trustee, successive Liberal governmentsremained figuratively at a distance from land-holding tribes, while various ‘experts’ madedecisions pertaining to respective Maori rental accounts as to commission, interest, andsalaries and disbursements. To meet expenses, from time to time Native Reserves weresold. Orange (1987) observes that “Reserves did not give Maori the expected benefits”;by way of example, she records how the “Dunedin reserve was lost to Maori use throughjudicial and administrative manipulation” (p.274).

The records of the Native Reserves Accounts in the late 1880s illustrate such calcu-lative manipulation. They disclose the extent to which rents received from leasing Maorireserves were controlled for the government through the Public Trustee13 (Butterworth andButterworth, 1991) and subjected to management commissions. A typical excerpt from theNative Reserves Ledger is provided below.14

No 132, Mungaroa Account

Receipts Disbursements £ s d

Balance at 31st December 1883 6 15 0 To Erin Turoa, share of rent 7 17 6Rent 20 0 0 Hemi Kuti, share of rent 7 17 6

Public Trust Office, commission 1 0 0Public Trust Agent, commission 1 0 0Balance (since paid) 9 0 0

26 15 0 26 15 0AJHR, 1885, G-5, p. 1

The account reveals a Public Trust commission on rents of around 10% and a holdingbalance in each account totalling to £3,350, or 30% of the rental income, which representmonies not disbursed, and for the government a source of interest.15 Moreover, such accu-mulated undistributed balances became a source of credit for European settlers developingleased Maori land.

The ledger summary of the North Island Native Reserves Accounts for year ended 31December 1885 shows that in the Auckland General Account, for example, from rentalreceipts of £106, government commissions and expenses took a further £17, or 16% froman undistributed balance of £427 (shillings and pence omitted) (AJHR, 1882, G-5, p. 3).The government charges are in addition to the disbursement fees shown in the individualaccounts (see, for example, the Mungaroa Account shown above) as payments to the PublicTrust. Thus, government agencies were consuming over one quarter of the rent monies,while enjoying the undistributed balances.

13 Butterworth and Butterworth (1991, p. 7) state categorically “Because the Maori Trustee is a creature of statute,it has always been possible to require him, by statutory direction, to carry out certain Government policies”.14 Pounds, shillings and pence (£, s and d) were commonly in use throughout the British Empire at this time, as

in New Zealand until decimal currency was introduced in 1967.15 Interest earned on undistributed Maori cash balances, Government commissions from dealings in Maori land

and disbursement fees for administering Maori accounts are not included our calculations of revenue provided byMaori. For taxation purposes, these sundry fees (even though they were seen by Maori and admitted by PrimeMinister Ballance as exorbitant) are regarded as being offset by Government expenses.


Maori protested the levies on their lands, but – in spite of the Liberal parliamentarypromises to remedy exorbitant charges – nothing was done at an administrative level (AJHR,1885, G-1, p. 45). The levies on Maori land incomes managed by the government were notsubject to parliamentary, but rather to bureaucratic approval.16 The extra charges appliedmeant it was little wonder that “Maori felt themselves to be steadily impoverished” (NZPD,29 September 1893, vol. 82, p. 865–866).

Further, by a combination of artificially low rentals, perpetual leases, excessive com-missions and undistributed revenues, the administrative system strengthened growingarguments that such Maori land should be divested. The outcome of rational argumentregarding low returns on such ‘assets’, or ‘waste lands’ as they were alternatively spokenof in Parliament, was the Advances to Settlers Act 1894, which provided cheaper and moreextensive credit to farmers – now to be financed by overseas loans. By the end of the 1890s,the earlier alliance forged between town and country that had brought the Liberals to power(Oliver, 1968) was disintegrating, with the Liberals beginning to lose support in the towns(Richardson, 1981). Aware of its reliance on settler votes, the Liberal government main-tained relations between the races were being exacerbated by continued Maori refusal topay rates or to contribute to roading (King, 1981).

4.4. Constitution of Maori land councils and Maori land boards

Such land as remained in nominal Maori ownership by the turn of the nineteenth centurywas either undeveloped due to the inability of Maori to obtain development funds, or leasedto settlers. Settlers leasing Maori land denounced Maori/Public Trustee landlordism as theirpreference was to farm freehold land. Parliament instituted Maori land councils in 1900,allowing control of land to be devolved from the Public Trustee. Such councils, the Liberalsargued, were in line with earlier pre-election promises made to Maori:

You have all a voice in the election of your own Committee. We propose to give yougreat powers of self government over these and not take from you any of the powersyou now possess” (Ballance to Maori, AJHR, 1885, G-1, p. 28).

But although a voluntary principle underpinned the system put in place in 1900, it waseroded over time, and the stage set for further legislation.

Maori leaders, Apirana Ngata (MP) and Peter Buck (MP) had believed that they hadsecured from the then Liberal Prime Minister, Richard Seddon,17 a cessation of land pur-

16 Fry and Nigro (1996) quote Weber’s argument that, “Bureaucracy assumes and reinforces the characteristicsof the culture in which it resides. Specifically, rules in the bureaucratic organization act as the functional equivalentof laws in the legal-rational culture. Much as people defer to laws in the legal-rational culture because they arelaws, so too do they defer to rules in the bureaucratic organization because they are rules” (p. 39).17 Seddon was leader of the Liberal party and prime minister of New Zealand from 1893 after Ballance died

in office. He was an even more popular figure, said to have “remarked of himself after one of his many feats ofconverting a hostile into an enthusiastic audience, that he had played them like a piano”. This account goes on:“in fact at the height of his form, he played the whole country like a piano, and seldom did his hands fall upondiscordant notes. So secure was his hold upon the general public that he could commit actions which would havebeen fatal in lesser men.” In listing some of these actions, Oliver (1960) concludes, “He could do all this andremain popular because people liked him; and they liked him because, through all such shady circumstances, heappeared to be, and was, a generous and simple man” (pp. 152–3).


chasing activity (Armstrong, 1996). But, the settler community wanted more freehold landand pressured the government to find way of forcing an increase in supply. In relation tothe government, it was said:

It was not their desire to dispose Maori of their lands but it was desirable that thehundreds of thousands of acres of surplus land which were at present lying idle shouldbe opened for settlement and it was quite certain they would never be settled undera Maori Land Committee. (Kirkbride, M.M. (Manukau), NZPD, 1905, Vol. 132,p. 689).

Some Members of Parliament expressed disapproval of the Liberal Government’s pro-posals: “We give them no voice in saying what is to be done with their land. I think thatit is an unnecessary and unwise way of doing this work” (Ormond, J. D. (MP for HawkesBay), NZPD, 1905, Vol. 135, p. 1081).

In the event, the Government passed The Maori Lands Settlement Act 1905 replacingthe former land councils with Maori Land Boards with members to be appointed by theCrown, with at least one of the three members to be Maori. These European-dominatedMaori Land Boards comprised government-selected valuation ‘experts’ – and facilitatedthe sale of the formerly leased Public Trust-administered land to Europeans. The Act hassubsequently been seen as greatly expanding the use of compulsory vesting (Loveridge,1996) of ‘unrequired’18 or unleased lands in the newly constituted Boards. Such land couldthen be sold – with fees deducted for survey, legal and mortgage costs from the proceeds.

Ormond again voiced Maori fears in Parliament to the 1905 Act, which, in effect,confiscated Maori land.

The three persons appointed by the government take possession and they can selllease, or do as they like with what all have pledged the Maori should have exclusiveright to deal with. (Ormond, J. D. (Hawkes Bay), NZPD, 1905, Vol. 135, p.1087).

In reply, the Liberal Government avoided the question and reiterated its pre-electionposition that it was interested only in the “happiness and prosperity” of Maori.

An honest endeavour is being made to settle these Maori lands. It is in the interestsnot only of the Maori but of the colony that these larger areas of Maori land shouldbe settled and brought under cultivation. (Pitt, A. (Attorney General), NZPD, 1905,Vol. 135, p. 1080).

Thus, land vesting by the newly constituted Maori Land Boards was rationalised anda steady stream of revenues from land sales to the Government enabled (Oliver, 1968,p. 150).

4.5. Allocation of development funds and improving returns

Along with the selling of their land, Maori were shut out from the government sources offunding, available to others, to buy and develop small farms. Maori were seen as spendthrift

18 This constitution of land earlier as ‘assets’ or alternatively as ‘waste land’ and here as ‘unrequired’ is deliberateas it parodies the newly instrumental regard in which land came to be held by the developing expertocracy.


and easy-going, constitutionally unable to develop their assets (AJHR, 1907, G-1c, p.15). In 1907, a Commission on Native Lands and on Native Land Tenure expressed theproblem:

It is difficult for the Maori owner to acquire his own land be he ever so ambitious andcapable of using it. His energy is dissipated in Land Courts in a protracted struggle,first, to establish his own right to it, and secondly, to detach himself from numerousother owners to whom he is genealogically bound in the title. And when he hassucceeded he is handicapped by want of capital, by lack of training – he is underthe ban as one of a spendthrift, easy-going, improvident people (AJHR, 1907, G-1c,p. 15).

The difficulties Maori faced with regard to working their land were raised in the Petitionof Te Wherowhero to the Native Affairs Committee in 1905. “There is no channel open tous whereby we can get hold of any money to enable us to work the lands and raise moneyon the lands. Pakeha settlers may be absolutely without any money at all but they are placedon Government lands, and the Government immediately provides for them with the cash towork the thing to a success” (AJHR, 1905, I-3B, p. 4).19

The Liberals’ policy to increase the supply of, and improve the returns from land wasreinforced by reports from ‘experts’. A Government Lands Royal Commission Reportof 1905 noted that there was much unoccupied Native Land in the North Island pro-ducing nothing and paying no rates, yet participating in the road and rail networksthat surrounded it. Some six million acres were deemed suitable for settlement. Thereport claimed, “The Natives show no disposition to undertake this work [sheep farm-ing] so far as they are concerned, it will probably remain for many years a wilderness”(AJHR, 1905, C-4, p. xviii). The report recommended that these lands be acquired forsettlement.

While the Liberals justified the selling of Maori land as a means to increase the prosperityof all by developing dormant assets, Maori petitions and protest continued to object to thegovernment’s profiteering. As one iwi, the Ngatimaniapoto, complained in a petition to thegovernment, “Within the Ngatimaniapoto many lands have been sold to the Government,sold from 1s 6d. up to 4s. and 5s. per acre, 7s. per acre being the largest price ever given, andthese lands have been resold by the Government to settlers from £1 to £2 10s. per acre. Howmany millions of pounds have the Government received of profit when the purchased landwas from Maoris?” (AJHR, 1905, I-3B, p. 17) However, in spite of such protests The NativeLand Act 1909 specifically stated that Maori customary title was not to prevail against thegovernment (Ward, 1974, p. 306).

The period of Liberal rule in New Zealand ended in 1912. The Liberals had endeavouredto ensure a continuous flow of future revenues by leasing to settlers over 750,000 acresof land acquired (AJHR, 1920, G-9, pp. 2–3). The Reform Party had come to power, withleader William Massey promising state leaseholders they could freehold their land (Te Ara,2006). The estimated area of land held by Maori up to World War I was 4,787 million acres

19 Interestingly, much the same policies were applied in Canada with regard to the native peoples, as Neu (2000b,p. 275) explains, “In terms of agriculture, colonial officials were unwilling to provide the necessary assistance tomake farming possible.”


(Report of Secretary of Native Affairs, AJHR, 1920, G-9, pp.2–3). Maori land ownershiphad decreased from 30% of New Zealand’s land area in the 1890 to 7% in just over 30years of mostly Liberal governance. The story does not end there, however. Maori are stillseeking redress today for the loss of their lands.

5. Integrating discussion

The historical case study reveals how Liberal governments and their agents effected thetransfer of much remaining Maori land into mostly European ownership. This loss of Maoriland occurred at a time of a growing public awareness of Maori discontent and expressionsof sympathy on the part of the Liberals. Having electioneered by calling for justice to Maori,promising future protection and maintaining a facade of sympathy, successive Liberal gov-ernments systematically extracted revenue from Maori at a disproportionate rate, ultimatelydepriving them of most of their remaining useful lands.

In highlighting hypocrisy, the paper does not claim that these Liberal politicians werenecessarily bad people intent on deceit. Their platform was consistent with the gen-eral formulation of liberal reformism popular at the time – supporting the developmentof relatively free enterprise and respect for the rights of all. They won the support oftown and country, and promoted elements of a welfare state. One interpretation sees theinterests of labour, capital and Maori as all potentially able to be served, but this is todeny the divergent interests at stake and the inherent lack of equity between the partiesdespite Maori still holding considerable land. Maori, it proved, were not part of the Lib-eral’s vision of land ownership. Rather, without so many direct statements to the effect,the plan was to more steadily reduce their options to labour or welfare. They were notfree-market exchanging individuals, nor was their communistically-held land consideredproductive in an economic sense. No, the Liberals’ fine promises were clearly underminedby other priorities. Their policies clearly favoured European settlers – and in the processtheir own vested interests. To stay in power, and to sustain their development and wel-fare policies, they needed land and revenues. Maori land was a readily available sourceof revenue with low political risk as most Maori were disenfranchised. Liberal voterstended to be European migrants with ambitions to establish their own farms. With aneye to developing export markets, and an ideology of support for facilitating enterpriseand welfare, Liberal governments concurred with their wishes for low interest governmentloans and cheap land.20 But the enactment of these policies did not occur “without harm”to Maori.

How then did hypocrisy work to preserve the Liberals’ rule for so long? It enabled thesimultaneous handling of conflicting values (Brunsson, 2002) – the appearance of serving

20 Echoes from the European-dominated Land Boards of the 1900s resonate today. Paul Morgan, a representativeof Ngati Rarua Te Atiawa iwi, is quoted as observing:

For 135 years his people’s lands, some 1400 ha, had been administered on behalf of its owners by asuccession of government appointed boards, commissioners and trustees. “They managed to collect rents,”he says of the government’s paternalistic mismanagement. “There was no investment, there were passiveadministrators . . . it was a disaster (National Business Review, 23 July 2004, p. 15).


all interests without presenting the actual doing so as problematic. Soothing utterancesallayed open conflict. The Liberals appeared moral while being ruthless – in good measureby the enactment of expertocracy: statism joined to expertise. The three elements – liberalreformism, hypocrisy and expertocracy – worked together. The politicians professed high-sounding ideals and sympathy for Maori, while enacting laws and empowering their agents– at a distance – to undertake tasks that contributed to the impoverishment of Maori. Asnoted earlier, the poor and scattered have difficulties in seeking revenge. Physical fightingwas no longer a good option; and the ‘civilised’ political debate was geographically distantand scarcely penetrable to those whose votes did not really count. Both options – fightingand debate – relied on the strength of numbers and being on at least equal terms to havea chance of winning. When they raised issues in the House, Maori were caressed, whileelsewhere being crushed.

Distance between those in the House and those involved in the actual transfer ofland from Maori to mostly European hands is a key element of expertocracy, as evi-dent in Neu and Graham’s (2004, 2006) studies of the Canadian situation. Within thelegal framework set up by successive Liberal Governments in New Zealand, accoun-tants can be seen to have utilised both discretion and rational methods. Appearingbenignly motivated, but as legitmated servants of the ‘public good’, these experts fixedrents for Maori land vested in the Public Trustee but under inactive management –and deducted expenses. Incomes and distributions for each tribal block of land wererecorded. It could be thus be shown that Native assets were yielding very low returns,a result on the one hand unsurprising as the land was leased at very low rents, whilehaving to bear extortionate management expenses. On the other hand, with demandfor land strong, it was surprising in a market context that the rents should have beenset so low. The case was nevertheless made for selling land due to its low returnsand the need to increase the general prosperity for settlers and Maori. Through alegal framework which allowed the undervaluing of Native land, exploited the gov-ernment’s position as a monopoly purchaser, raised transaction costs, and utilised theagency of the local Land Boards, expertocracy could by degrees prize the oyster fromits shell. By such means, settler (voter) demand for land could be satisfied, while gov-ernment revenues were augmented. Whatever Maori might have felt about these localexperts, the Liberals themselves were able to maintain a pose of befriending Maoriand working for their greater prosperity and happiness, while expressing regret for theirlosses.

Like the oysters in Lewis Carroll’s poem when invited to a picnic, Maori had beenled by the Liberals to believe all would be well. The evidence suggests that althoughmuch of their land had already been sold or confiscated by former governments in vastblocks, Maori were being reassured they now had a government which was on theirside. The personal assurances from Liberal leaders of their concern to protect their wel-fare and land remain on record. Yet, by degrees and with expressions of regret, like theoysters, their land was consumed. As a Maori Member of Parliament, Wi Tako Ngatataobserved “We shall take the oyster by degrees out of its shell – we shall keep an accountagainst the oyster, and when at last it is opened, the oyster will go up into the Treasury(NZPD, 8 September 1882, p. 868). The allusions are interesting given the argument ofthis paper.


6. Conclusion

If a lesson can be drawn from the events outlined, it is to explore beyond the rhetoric– indeed as academics are wont to do – and raise moral issues as to the implication oftechnologies such as accounting in serving high-sounding ideals – such as liberty, protectionof human rights and – not least – prosperity for all. It is in the public interest to show how itwas possible to cheat one whole people while appearing sympathetic. The paper illustratesexpertocracy as an important element in implementing the Liberal Government reformistagenda which, in this case is mediated by hypocrisy. Hypocrisy is pervasive and yet appearsoften under-analysed.

What can be said of those experts who served masters of hypocrisy, and of the technolo-gies they employed? First, these experts are less visible and often ignored in conventionalhistories. Any retrospective blame comes down on whole societies or on governments whocan be shown to have acted hypocritically, rather than on experts such as accountants –but these experts are almost certainly interested and benefiting from their role. It cannot besaid that the accountants in this case were hypocritical although it is likely they would haveknown hypocrisy to have been part of the formula of appeasement.

Second, early accounts in New Zealand convey a sense of facticity and of neutrality whereboth are suspect. These accounts simply did not recognise the contribution to governmentrevenues outlined here. The aggregate figures they present belie the disgruntlement on thepart of those Maori who bore the brunt of them in being forced to disproportionately payvarious levies and charges – often associated with works that served mainly to dispossessthem of their land.

Third, and finally, it is pointed out that the tendency of accounting to serve its mastersis deeply-embedded. Accounting acts as a key technology in achieving a redistribution ofassets, particularly where accounts can be shown to reveal a poor return on assets. Sucha result has a narrow focus but presents a distinctive ‘objectivity’ and a kind of technicalfairness. It permits experts to press for the generation of more efficient returns often bychanging ownership of operational assets, while providing politicians with rational argu-ments in terms of economic growth. The elements of expertocracy – as might be understoodthrough this analysis – fragment responsibility, with hypocrisy shown to be a key elementin the New Zealand Liberal formulation of that fragmentation. Hypocrisy functions as asupposedly more humane solution to the problems engendered by conflicting values and anunfair system of redistribution, allowing those in power to be seen to publicly comfort theirvictims with smooth utterances: “I weep for you, I deeply sympathize”. However, in linkingstatism and expertise, expertocracy implicates accounting and other valuation experts inpostcolonial histories such as this one. Like Lewis Carroll’s “carpenter”, as shown herethey should not be seen as entirely innocent.

Acknowledgement

The authors gratefully acknowledge the provision of funding by the Crown ForestryRental Trust for a larger project, a history of Maori and taxation 1840–2001, data fromwhich are included in this paper.


Table A.1Customs and land sales revenues

Average Revenue for each decade – % figures include only customs and land sales

1890s 1900–1909 1910s

Customs £2,122,517 0.88 £3,267,060 0.93 £7,375,461 0.96Sale of lands £297,914 0.12 £256,624 0.07 £301,836 0.04

Table A.2Revenue by ethnicity 1890s–1910s

Land sales from Maori sources and customs revenue by population percentage

1890s 1900s 1910s

European population £1,997,398 0.83 £3,096,063 0.88 £7,031,703 0.92Maori population £423,033 0.17 £427,621 0.12 £645,594 0.08

Appendix A. Supplementary analysis

The following analysis shows how colonial revenues were augmented by revenues fromMaori Land and, in effect, continued to place a greater burden of taxation on Maori duringthis period. Table A.1 reveals that although the absolute amount of revenue from landsales remained relatively steady over three decades, the Government’s total budget wasincreasing. Thus, land as a particular source of revenue was diminishing in importance andwas being replaced by taxes on incomes.

Table A.2 presents tax revenues calculated on an ethnic basis to be declining as a percent-age of total Government revenue.21 In this table, tax revenue from the European populationwas chiefly derived from customs duties, and tax revenue from Maori comprised revenuesfrom land sales and rents as well as from customs duties.

It can be seen that Maori supplied increasing revenues over these three decades, althoughtheir relative contribution declined in percentage terms from 17% in the 1890s, to 12% in theearly1900s and to 8% in the decade beginning 1910. Although the relative aggregate amountsof revenues from land sales and rents had declined, Maori being 5% of the population were,in the decade beginning 1910, supplying 8% of the Government’s revenue – an unevencontribution, reflected in the statistics presented in Table A.3 (which again derives datafrom government revenues from land sales and rents, and custom duties).

In terms of taxation per head, Maori were worse off than were Europeans. In the decadebeginning 1910, Maori contributed almost double that of Europeans on a per capita basis.Such a contribution is, in part, a reflection of the decline in the proportion of Maori toEuropean in the New Zealand population.

21 Given, for tax allocation purposes, an equal consumption of liquor, tobacco and other dutiable items then theimplication is that Maori would bear a proportion of customs duties according to their relative population number.Some historians suggest that Maori would have paid more than a proportionate share of customs duties (Gardner,1981). However, a simple division of customs duties by relative population numbers is used in our calculations toallocate customs taxation. If anything, then, this research understates the burden borne by Maori.


Table A.3Average revenue per head of population

1890s 1900s 1910s

European population £2.90 £3.57 £6.50Maori population £9.80 £8.92 £12.21

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the walrus, carpenter and oysters: liberal reform, hypocrisy and expertocracy in maori land loss in...

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