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P R E F A C E .

THISWork being, as its title indicates, 9 Descriptive Narrative of the Warin Italy, politics do not come within its sphere, The reader will find theaccount, in its main fe attm s, corresponding with the L etters which were writtenby the Author from the Allied Camp, and which appeared in " The Times."Wh atever variations he may find between th e latte r and th e present Narrative,are explained by th e difference which m ust always exist between le tters writtenon the spot, under the first impressioii of the moment, and a connected accountwritten several months later, when many new details have become known, whenmuch that was doubtful could be cleared up, and when many erroneous impressionscould be corrected.

W ith all this, the Work does not pretend t o m inute accuracy ; threemonths after the events this would be presumption. It is a carefully-drawnpicture of the Campaign as it presents itself to the mind of the Au tho rnow, when he has had opportunity to revisit the principal scenes of actionand to control his own impressions by the official accounts on both sides, andby the abundant materials which have been accessible to him since the endof the War.

T H E A U T H O R .

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A N A L Y T I C A L C O N T E N T S .

ABBIATEGRASSO, ustrian line of mwch 0138 ; has two roads to Pavia, 41.Adda river, occupied by the Austrians, 41crossed by the Austrians, 47, 48 ; by Gencral dlUrban, 48 ; by the allies, ib. ; lettcwlitten from its banks, describing thsurrounding conntry, 49, 50.Adige, valley of the, 52.Agogna river, 8.Alessandria, fort ificat ions of, 2 ; it s position3 ; historioal importance of, ib ; a place cgreat strength, 3, 4 ; royal extraordinar.commissioner appointed for, 5 ; the FrenclEmperor estabhshes his head-quarters at11 ; strategetica l movements around, 14.Algeria, arribal of troops from, 6, 7.ALLIES Sardiaian and French) gain the battle of Montebello, 8 ; the ir junction, an(disposition of their forces, 12; heir firsencounter with th e Austrians a t Montebello, 13 ; their first offensive movementand strategies, 14,15 ; ccupy the line of thtSesia, 15; their advance, 16 ; recapturtPalestro, Vercelli, and Novara, 17 ; hei~successful combinations, 18; heir passageof the Ticino, 19 ; their preparations folth e bat tle of Magenta, 23 st seq. ; gain thebattle of Magenta, 26 et sey. ; their enthusiastic reception at Milan, 40, 42 ; theirplan of conducting t he war, 46 ; theirremissness in not pursuing the Austriansafter the bat tles of Magenta and Me-legnano, 48 ; cross the Adda, ib. ; theirmilitary positions and various movements,48,49 ; efficiency of their pontoons, 51 ; n-difference of the peasantry of Lombardyto supplying theirmants, ib. ; heir entranceinto Brescia, 54 ; make a general advanceon the Mincio, ib. ; their various move.lnents and positions near th e Mincio, 55;figh t the bat tle of Solferino, 56et seq. ; heirstrategetic movements and s trength pre-vious to th e bat tle of Solferino, 59 el seq. ;defeat the Austrians, 64 ; the losses sus-tained by them, and the results of thebattle, 67, 68 ; recross the Mincio in pur-suit of the Austrians, 69 et sep. ; theirposition on the Mincio hills after th e bat tleof Solferino, 70 ; heir head-quarters trans-ferred to Valeggio and Monzambano, 71;their movements subsequent to the battleof. Solferino, ib. (See French and Pied-nontese.)jpenines, Piedmontese defence of the, 4 ;iisposition of the allies in the, 8, 9.'mies of the respective combatants, 2 et seq.See Piedmontese, French, and Austrians);heir magnificent appearance on tho plains

:f Lombardy, 22.listice concluded at Villa Franca, 71,er, General, at Magenta, 32.TRIA, her extravagant demands on the

Court of Turin, 1; the terms of her ultmatum, ib. ; tantamount to a declaratioof war, ib. ; despatches two corps d'nrmtinto Italy, and reinforces the different galrisons, 2 ; her military strength in Italy, ib.delay in presenting her ultimatum favourable to the allies, but fatal to herself, 4her first acquisition of Lombardy, 53 ; t himportance of the Mincio country overlooked by her, ib. (See Austrians.)

LUSTRIANS cross the Ticino, 6 ; heir intention of crushing th e Sardinians before thtarrival of the French defeated, 7 ; theiidelay in crossing the Ticino, ib. ; the?passage of the Ticino at Pavia, 8 ; akepossession of Novara, Mortara, San NazzaroVercelli, &c., ib. ; first take up their position in the angle of the Sesia an d t he Poib. ; their various manceuvres and operaticns in tlttempti~~ go advance on l'urin,and th e different places occupied by them,ib. ; commence a general movement of retreat, and evacuate all the places on theright bank of the Sesia, 8 ; defeated atMontebello, ib. ; he unintelligible folly oithoir operations, ib. ; thcir hostile inten.tions defeated, 9 ; defeated b y the alliesat Montebello, 13 ; their want of discre.tion, ib. ; defeated at Palestro and Vin.zaglio, 15; defeated a t Palestro, 16 ; theirattack on the Piedmontese, ib. ; defeatedby the Zouaves, 16,17 ; their rapid retreat,17 ; their delays and mistakes after thebatt le of Palestro, 18 ; their want of com-mnnication and intelligence of what theallies were doing, ib. ; re-cross the Ticino,19 ; their field works untenable, 21 ; theirretreat, ib. ; driven from Robiohetto, andcompletely routed, 22,23 ; at Kagenta, 23 ;their preparations for th e bat tle of Ma-genta, 26 ; defeated at Magenta, 27 et seq. ;their desperate bravery, 28 ; their mis-take at Magenta, 31 ; their desperatebravery and terrible losses, 32 ; lose thebattle of Magenta, and retrea t to the Min-cio, 33 ; their severe losseil at the battle ofMagenta, 34 ; cause of their defeat, ib, ;their evacuation of Milan, 37 ; demoralizedstate of the army, ib. ; unprepared forGaribaldi on the Southern Alps, 46 ; arerepulsed by him, and retire to Como, ib. ;expelled from Como by Garibaldi, ib. ;their retr eat across the Addn, and advanceto the Mincio, 47 et a eq . ; blow up thebridges in the ir retreat, 51 ; their meansof defending the Mincio, 53 ; their retreatacross that river, 53, 54 ; abandon Casti-glioneand Montechiaro, 54; commanded bythe Emperor in person and General I-Iesseat the battle of Solferino, 56 ; policy oftheir return across the Alincio previous tothe battle of Solferino, 67 ; general stric-

~ BAETE, amlet of, 64.Balloon, ascent of, near the Mincio, 55.Baraguay dlHilliers, General, commander ofthe 1st corps cl'arme'e,6 ;publishes his orde rof the day, 8 ; position of his corps nearMilan, 42 ; anecdote of, 44.Benedeck, t he Austrian general, 8 ; anecdote

i-nre--;,-:

of, 44.Blanchard, General, a t Montebello, 13.Bobbio occupied by the Austrians, 8 ; eva-cuated, ib. ;milita ry operaGons around, 16.Bocca scaled by tbe chasseurs and volti-geurs, 63.Bormida, a stream of the Appenines, 3.Bread, necessity of to the French troops, 51.Brescia, road from, to Montechiaro, 52 ; th emain roads in the north of the Mincio cen-tred in, 53 ; arrival of the Sardinians at,and great rejoicings, 54 ; entrance of theallied sovereigns into, ib. ; situation of, 69 ;humanity of the inhabitants towards thewounded, 70 ; false alarm and confusionat, ib.Bridges, destruction of, 49 ; of th e Addablown up by the Austrians, 51 ; of theMincio burn t by the Austrians, 70.Buffalora, bridge of, over th e Ticino, 19, 20 ;attem pted to be blown up by the Aus-trians, 21 ; position of, 25 ; captured bythe allies, 31.Buol, Count, his ult imatum addressed toCount Cavour, 1 ; arrival of his ultimatum

at Turin, 4.

turcs on the, 68 ; heir blunders, ib. ; theirstrategetic movements and strength pre-vious to the battle of Solferino, 56,57 ; heirreal position on the 23rd and 24th of June,57 st seq. ; thoir defeat, 64 ; he losses sus-tained by them, and the.results, 67, 68.Auxiliary trains, advantages derived from, 59.

CAOCIATORIELLE ALPI, under Garibaldi, 46;cross the Ticino, and arrive at Varese, ib. ;repulse the Austrians, ib. ; their variedfortunes and successes, 46, 47 ; ubjectedto regular drillings, 50.Calcinato, hill of, 52.Sambriels, Colonel of the Sardiuian cavalry,13.2ampo di Medole, 59, 60.2anrobert, Marshal, commander of th e 3rdcorps d'nnite'e,5,6 ; t thebattleofMagenta,23 et sep., 33 ; position of his corps newMilan, 42 ; at the b att le of Solferino, 65 ;his over-caution, 69 ; his correspondencewith Marshal Niel, ib.hrignan, Prince of, appointed lieutenant ofPiedmont during the king's absence, 5 ;accompanies th e French Emporor to Genoa,10.>ass Creppi, a t Milan, 45.

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ANA LYT ICA L. CONTENTS.Casale, fortifications of, 2 ; ts position, 3historical importance of, ib. ; a place ogreat strength, 3,4 ; he pivot of the strategetical movements of th e allies, 14.Cascina Nova, attack on, 31.Cassaignolles, General, 24.Castelborgo, General, the Piedmontese commander, 1.Castelletto, General d'urban's advance on46 ; occupied by the French, 71.Castenedolo, village of, 52.Castiglione, abandoned by the Austrians54 ; situation of, 69 ; scenes of confusio~at, 69, 70.Cavour, M, de, the Piedmontese minister, 5accompanies the French Emperor to Genoa, 10.Cavriana, position of, 61 ; operations at63, 64 ; captured, 64 ; the allied headquarters transferred to, 69.Cemetcry of Solferino captured, 63.Cenis, Mont, passage of the French troopracross, 5.Chambery, arrival of the French troops at, 5Chasseurs-&-pied, the ir bravery at Solferino63.Chasseurs de la Garde, repulsed at Magenta28.Chiese, th e river, 51, 52.Cialdini, General, the Piedmontese commander, 1; ictorious at Palestro, 21.Clam-Gallas, General, the disposition of hitforces, 35.Cler, General, 23, 27.Coffee, the favourite beverage of the Frencl-soldier, 51.Como, the Austrians at, 46 ; captured b;Garibaldi, ib. ; he whole country arouncdeclares for Victor Emmanuel, ib.Corniche, passage across the, 7.Cucchiari, General, the Piedmontese commander, 1.DE LA MOTTEROUGE,ivision of, 64.De la Tour d'Auvergne, the French minister

11.Dora Baltea, the line of, fortified, 4 ; itcposition examined by the French generals,9.Durando, General, the Piedmontese com.mander, 1; defeats the Austrians a t Pale.stro, 15.D'Urban, General,-See Urban.

ESPINASSE,General, advances on Turbigo,21 ; captures San Martino, ib. ; at thebat tle of Magenta, 29 ; his critical posi-tion, 31; his death, 32. .Eugenie, Empress of the Frenoh, appointedregent during the absence of the Emperor,10.

FANTI, General, the Piedmontese com.mander, 1.Field-works of the Austrians untenable,21.Fleury, General, visits Verona, and obtainsan interview with the Emperor of Aus-tria, 71.Forey, General, a t Montebello, 13.FRANCE,er preparations for defending theSardinian territory against Austrian in-vasion, 1; declaration of t he Emperorrespecting Italian independence, 2 ; hermilitary strength and her unpreparedstate, ib. ; her amasing activity in fpr-

warding troops and material, 3 ; theirapid transit and arrival in Piedmont, 4-(See FRENCH, nd NAPOLEON11.)Francis Joseph, Emperor of Austria, taketh e command of his forces at th e battle oSolferino, 56; letter from, to the FrenclEmperor, 71 ; concludes an armistice, ib.his interview with the Frenoh Emperorand conclusion of peace, ib.FRENCH, heir passage across Savoy an(Mont Cenis, 5 ; their arrival at Chambery and at Susa, ib. ; their arrival aGenoa, and their warm reception, ib. ; divisions of th e corps cl'arme'e, and t heir r espective commanders, 6; the tot alnumberof7 ; the rapidity of their arrival defeats thtobject of the Austrians, ib. ; concentratiorand disposition of their forces, 8, 9 ; theiimilitary movements directed by the Emperor alone, 12; he difficulties with whicfthey had to contend, ib. ; heir first confliciwith th e Austrians at Montebello, 13 ; theiifirst offensive movements, 14 ; their strategetic operations after the battl e of Montebello, 14, 15; disposition of their forcerafter t he b attle of Palestro, 17; cross thcSesia and enter Novara, ib. ; hei r forcermassed in the plain of Novara, ib. ; advantageof their new positions, 18; hei r passagcof the Ticino, 19 ; their dispositions previous to t he batt le of Magenta, 23 et seq.,gain the battle of, 27 e t seq. ; heir severclosses at the battle of Magenta, 33 ; positions of the respective corps near Milan42 ; their enthusiastic reception at Milan,ib. ; heir bravery at Melegnano, 43 ; thei~movements after leaving Milan, 49 ; theirpleasant march through Lombardy, 50different kinds of provisions supplied to50, 51 ; their tents, 51 ; their night's lodg.ings, ib. ; arrive at t he Mella, when theAustrians evacuate their positions, 54make a general advance on the Mincio,ib. ; fight th e batt le of Solferino, 56 eiseq.; heir strategetic movements andstrength, 58 ; defeat the Austrians atSolferino, 64 ; their losses, 67 ; the im-perial head-quarters transferred to Va-leggio, 71 ; he whole army take posses.sion of the left bank of th e Mincio, ib.

~ A R D A , lake of, southern shore of the,52.:arde Irnp6riale at Solferino, 63 ; effective-ness of its artillery, ib. ; ts cavalry, ib.iaribaldi, General, the Piedmontese com-mander, 1 his movements in Lombardy,38 ; his military operations on the southernslopes of the Alps, 46 ; his proclamationto the people of Lombardy, ib. ; capturesComo, ib. ; General $Urban sent to catchhim, ib. ; his varied successes and onwardcareer, 47; his great influence over histroops, ib. ; occupies Salo and Sondrio,54.keneral, greatness of the, who knows howto ta ke advantage of victory, 37.ienoa, extraordinary commissioner ap-pointed for, 5 ; arrival of French troopsat, and their warm reception, ib. ; enthu-siasm at, 6 ; ts great facilities for landingand accommodating troops, 7 ; arrival ofthe Emperor Napoleon at, and his enthu-siastic reception, 10, 11.hestrello, village of, 13.iodclard, Messrs., their balloon ascent, 55.

Joito road, 60.lovoin, Cblonel, of the Piedmontese staff, 1.Jrognard, use of the word among th eFrench, 50.hole, village of, 59 ; captured by theFrench, ib.Suidizzolo, military operations in the neigh-bourhood of, 60, 61, 64, 65.Suignard, Colonel, 25.Sun-boats, arrival of, 71.:yolai, General, th e Austr ian commander-in-chief, defeated at Montebello, 13; aban-dons Vercelli, and begins his retreat, 14 ;telegraphs victory at Magenta, 28, 30 ;strictures on the disposition of his forcesa t the battle of Magenta, 36 ; his dismis-sal, 56.$13~9, General, commander of th e Aus-trians, 35, 56.lungarians, lay down their arms, 31.RRIGATION, system of, in Lombardy, 52.talian National Society, formation of the, 2;it s successful operations, ib.TALY, history of the war in, 1 et seq. ; ecla-ration of war, ib. ; preparations both onthe part of the allies and the Austrians,1, 2 ; universal agitation in, 2 ; militaryenlistments in favour of Piedmont, ib. ; hevast forces and mat6riel sen t by theFrenoh, 4, 5 ; onthusiasm of the inhabi-tants at the arrival of the French, 6 ;French c o y cl'avnae'e of, 6 ; entry of theAustrian army into Piedmont, 7 ; theirfatal delays and mistakes, 8 ; ntersectedby numerous rivers, 12 ; river system of,51.- (See Piedmont, Lombardy, and Aus.tria.)

~AXX ING , eneral, the Austrian quarter.master-general, 56.Cellersberg, Baron de, Austrian envoy, 1.,AGO DI GARDA, ranges of hills on thesouthern shores of, 53.lago Maggiore, Garibaldi's operations near,46.ia Marmora, General, th e Pieclmontese cam.mander, 1; his organization of the army,ib.,e Fontane, the hamlet of, 59.iodi, in possession of the Austrians, 47 .their retreat from, 48 ; movement of theallies towards, ib.dombard league, historicd notices of the, 3.IOMBARDY, scenery of, 22 ; imposing sightof the allied armies on the plains, ib. ; rtersec ted by two great ar teries of comininication, 38; its strongholds, ib. ; t hnorthern line chosen by the allies, ib.beauties of the country between Milan antth e Adda, 49, 50 ; march of the alliethrough, 50 ; indifference of the pezsantry to the wants of the allied force?51 ; system of irrigating, 52 ; first acquisition of, by Austria, 53 ; importance othe Mincio country overlooked by her, 53omellina, description of the, 15 ; assistantafforded by the inhabitants to the Anstrians, 18.uzy, General, a t the bat tle of Solferino, 6iPMAHOX,General, commander of the 2rc o q ~ l'arme'e, 6 ; crosses t he Ticino, a1~coupies he village of Turbigo, 21, 2

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ANALYTICAL CONTENTS.Schlick, General, takes t he command of th eAustrian forces, 56.Sermione, island of, 65.Sesia river, right bank of the, evacuated, andcrossed by the Austrians, 8 ; by th e Sardi-nian army, 14 ; ts whole line occupied bythe allies, 15 ; their passage over, 17.Siege train, delay in bringing it up to t he

Austrian frontiers, 49.Societh Nazionale Italiana, exertions of the,46.Soleil, General, 61.Solferino, its great importance, 56 ; generalaccount of th e bat tle of 56 et sep.; preli-minary movements and str ength of theAustrian forces, 56 ; heir real position onthe 23rd and 24th of June , 57 et sep.;movements and position of the allies, 59et seq.; it s geographical position, ib. ;Scale, or ladders of, 59, 60 ; irst collision,60 ; relative position of the combatants,62 ; defeat of thc Austrians, 64 ; the lossessustained, 67 ; esults of th e battle, 67, 68;humanity of the inhabitants towards thewounded, 70 ; negotiations opened be-tween the allies and the Austrians, and anarmistice concluded, followed by peace, 71.Sonnaz, General, commander of the Pied-montese cavalry, 1,13.Spia d'Italia, of th e Mincio hills, 58.Stadion, Count, the Austrian commander,defeated at Montehello, 13.Steam, for the first time applied to mar-fare on a large scale, 12.

TAXARO,onfluence and course of the, 3.Telegraph, electric, for th e first time appliedto warfare on a large scale, 12 ; ts cxten-sive use in the French military movements,12.

Tente d'abri, utility of the, 61,

rents of the French soldiers, 51.Terrier, M., his description of the receptionof the French troops at Genoa. 5.rheatre La Scala at Milan, visited by theallied Sovereigns, 45.l'icino, Austrian passage of the, into Pied-mont, 6 ; delay of the Austrians in passing,7 ; passed on the 29th of April, ib. ; twopassages, Buffalora and Turbigo, over the,19 ; description of the, ib. ; recrossed bythe Austrians, ib. ; the great scene ofmilitary manceuvring, ib. ; passage of,effected by the allied armies, 38.Toulce d'Ivoy, Colonel, death of, 44.Trecate, Gmera l Espinasse's advance on, 21.Turbigo, passage of, 19, 20 ; village of, 21 ;combat of, 22.I'urcos, their arrival a t Genoa, 6; theirdashing bravery at Robichetto, 22 ; atMagenta, 29.Furin, preparations for t he defence of, 4 ;activity of the Government at, ib.-(SecPiedmont.)Syrol, impregnable debouch6 from the, 53.

URBAN,General, the Austrian commander ;his manceuvres at.Montebello, 13; attemptto intercept his division, 38 ; sent t o catchGaribaldi, 46 ; advances on Castelletto,ib. ; effects his retreat over the Adda,48.VAILLANT,Uarshal, his removal from office, 2.Valeggio, passage of, 64 ; he head-quarterrof the French, 71.Valensa, allied position at, 9.Vercelli, extraordinary commissioner ap.pointed for, 5 ; occupied by the Austrians,8 ; abandoned by tho Austrians, and re.occupied by t he Piedmontese troops, 1 4 ,strategetical movements at, ib. ; position

of, 15 ; the French Emperor's arrival ht,ib.Terona, strengthened by Austria, 53 ; head-quarte rs of the Emperor of Austria, 71.v'~cron IIXANUEL,ing of Sardinia , assumesthe command of his forces, 1 the strengthof his army, ib. ; extraordinary powersconferred on, 5 ;meets the Emperor of the

French, 11; his arrival at Novara, 21 ; hisentry into Milan, 40, 44 ; fired at in 1848,45 ; the whole country of the SouthernAlps declares for, 46 ; leaves Milan for theAustrian frontiers, 49 ; his various move-ments, ib. ; his triumphal entry intoBrescia, 54.Victory, the horrible scenes by which it isfollowed, 39.Villafranca, armistice negotiated at, andpeace concluded between tho two em-perors, 71.Vinzaglio, village of, captured by the Picd-montese, 15.Visconti, Venosta, the Sardinian commis-sioner, 46.Voltigeurs, thei r bravery a t Solferino, 63.~VABn Ttaly, 1 t seq. ; immense matQrielfor,prepared by the French, 12.-(See France,Italy, Piedmont,, $0.)Wimpfen, General, a t the batt le of Magenta,23 et sep.ZOBEL, General, attacks Palestro, 16.Zouaves, their arrival at Genoa, 6 ; placedat t he disposal of Victor Emmanuel, 16 ;their dashing bravery and success againstthe Austrians, ib. ; their heroism at Ma-genta, and severe losses, 33 ; their des-perate bravery at Melegnano, 43 ; their

losses, 44.

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T H E W A R IN I T A L Y .

D E C L A R A T I O N O F W A R , P R E P A R A T I O N S O N E O T H S ID ES , A N D E N T R Y O FT H E A U S T R I A N A R M Y I N T O P I ED M ON T .

ON the 19 th of Apri l Count Buol addressed to Count Cavour his ult imatum, by which He demanded, iuth e name of t he Aust r ian Government, the disarming of S ardinia and the disbanding of th e I tal ian volun-teers, fixing a period of th ree day s for an answer t o this demand. This ult imatum, tantamo unt to n. decla-ration of war, was presented at Tur in by Baron de Kellersberg on the 2 3rd of April , at half-past f ive P.M. ;and on th e 26th, a t hal f-pas t s ix P.w., th e Au str ian envoy, havin g received a negative answer, ,leftth e Sardinian capital with Colonel Govoin, of th e Piedmontese staff, who accompanied him to th efrontier.

Even before the Aust r ian ul t imatum was presented a t Tur in , Europe could not doubt tha t war wasimpending. Two days before, Par is and Lyons had been in a state of excitement, th e troops of th e garr isonhaving received orders to sta r t for Toulon an d Grenoble ; nd t he nex t day, the 22nd, the Momiteur informedFrance officially ha t Austr ia , refusing to consent to a general disarmament proposed by E ngland, had addresseda n ul t imatum to th e Sardinian Government, summoning i t to disarm wi thin three days ; nd that in conse-quence of these facts th e Em pero r had ordered th e concen tration of several divisions on th o frontiers of Pied-mont. ~ h e ' s a m e ay a roya l ordinance appeared a t T ur in dividing the Sardinian a rmy into f ive divis ions ofinfantry and one of cavalry, and placing th e f irst division u nder th e command of General Durando, th esecond under Fan ti , the third u nder Castelborgo, th e fourth under Cialdini , the f if th u nder Cucchiar i, andth e cavalry under General Sonnaz ; th e king reserving to himself t he command in chief , with GeneralLa Marmora as his adlatus.

This army, th e increase an d concen tration of which became, w e canno t say th e cause, bu t th e prete xtor oppor tuni ty for war, a t th a t moment occupied a l ine f rom Ivrea on the D ora Eal tea down to i t sjunction wi th th e Po, thence on th e lef t bank of this r iver as far as Casale and Valenza, and fromthis point across th e hil ls to Alessandria on the Tanaro. I t consisted of tw en ty regiments of infantry, tenbattalions of bersaglieri or riflemen, eigh t regimen ts of cavalry, forming tw o divisions of heav y and one oflig ht cav alry; an d fifteen batteries of field artill ery : i u all , nbont 70,000 men. B ut this was not al l ;there were t wo bodies of vo lunteer riflemen-the Cacciatori clelle Al pi und er General G aribaldi, and th eCacciatori degli Ap pen ini und er niIezzocapo ; an d besides this, large dep bts in some of t he regimen ts suffi-ciently strong to make u p a n ew battalion.

bastroushe creation of t his arm y had been th e work of m onths, not t o say of years ; or ever since the di-campaign of 184 9 th e military organization of th e country an d the development of it s warlike resources hadbeen one of th e chief and avox ed objects of th e successive governments. I t had been entirely remodelledsince th at time, and h ad lost th at exclusive class-colouring which formerly distinguished it, and no d onbtcontr ibuted considerably to i t s fai lure ten years ago. A s the Piedmontese arm y was to be th e nucleus roundwhich soldiers from all pa rts of Italy were t o gro up themselves, it was felt th at i t could no t remain soexclusively aristocratic, bu t must be popularized. Wh atev er has been done in this respect is generally andjus t ly a t t r ibuted to Genera l La Marmara. By a patient process of years a cadre was thua formed on a

B

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2 THE WAR IN ITALY.sufficiently broad basis to include the elements from the rest of Italy , in case of an Italian war ofindependence.

The words of th e E mp eror of th e Fre nch on New Year's day opened ou t such a possibility,-nay,indicated its probability, a nd from that moment began n race between Austria and Piedmont, each takingth e preparations of th e othe r as a pr etext for its own armaments. Scarcely had th e sound of the wordspronounced on New Year's day died aw ay, when t he Au str ian official gazette announced th e se nding of acorps d'arnzbe to Italy, the garrisons of Bologna and Ancona were reinforced, and a considerable force concen-trate d on the angle formed by the confluence of the P o an d the Ticino. The gauntlet is taken up bySardinia. On the 14 th all the army garrisoned i n the different provinces is called together, and takes upa position between C asale an d Alessandria, a nd almost at the same time the Sardinian Chambers are askedto sa nction a loan of 50 millions of francs, in orde r to be prepared for emergencies, and a pa rt of th e moneyis expended in enlarging the fortifications of Casale and Alessandria. I n March Austria sends a newcorps d'arm6e (the fifth) t o Italy, and P iedmont calls out her reserves. A t the same t ime the agitat ion beginsto tell all over Italy , bu t more especially in Up per and Ce ntral Italy . The " talian National Society,"which has formed itself under the presidency of Pallavicino, Garibaldi, and La Farina to promote the Italianmovement, has, in spite of all precautions of the Au strian a uthorities and those of the Central Italia n states,succeeded in establishing an understanding with a11 the most influential men, and by their exertions thou-sands of youths are able to come to Piedmont and enlist. I n th e m onth of March alone well-nigh 6,000volunteers were enrolled by th e comm issioner specially appointed for th at purpose i n T urin, half of the sebeing Lombards, the res t from Central Italy . Among these were numbers of youths belonging to thebest families in Italy .Thu s from ste p to step the armam ents increased on b oth sides, until, a t the mom ent when hostilitieswere on the eve of breaking out, Au stria had eight corps already in It al y and two more on the way ; h a tis, she had 200,000 m en, who in a short time were expected to be increased to 250,000 ; while the wholeSardinian force, volunteers and reserves included, must have been well-nigh 80,000 or 90,000 men underarms. Most of the volunteers who had come over were enrolled in the regular Sardinian army, only from3,000 to 4,000 being left for the irregular corps.Bu t these 200,000 men, whom Au stria had then i n Ita ly could not, like most of the Piedmontesetroops, be considered as an active army. For, besides th e considerable garrisons which th e n umbe r ofstrong places demanded, the general discontent forced the Austrians to employ at least one fourth ofthe ir armed force as garrisons to keep down the population of th e numerous towns of Up per Ita ly. Sothat in the first instance, when they resolved to enter Piedmont, they could not muster more than six corpsfor their active army. These were th e 2nd (Lichtenstein) ; rd (Schwarzenberg) ; 6th (Stadion) ; th(Zobel) ; th (Benedeck) ; and the 9t h (Schaffgotsch). The tw o remaining corps, the 6th an d l l t h , were leftin th e fortresses, furnishing garrisons for the towns of the Romagna, Venice and the other cities of t ha tprovince, while th e 1s t and 10 th were on the ir march from the frontiers of Austria. Wh ile Au stria andSardinia were thus, as it were, parading the ir arma ments, the re seem ed scarcely any sign of preparation sin France. Indeed, all insinuations in that respect were contradicted. That the army was not on a warfooting when the hostilities broke out is certain, for with the exception of the regiments which came fromAlgeria, all the o thers had a considerable proportion of their men on furlough, and they arrive d during th ecourse of th e campaign, some of them a sho rt time before th e battle of Solferino. On the othe r hand,there is equally no doubt that large stores were heaped up in Marseilles several months before tlie war began.Besides this, there were strong suspicions at th e time, of some of th e war nzat&cl having found its wayinto Piedmont before the war broke out. The conclusion to which one is driven, from these facts, is, tha tth e m ilitary o rganization of France, even on a peace footing, is sufficiently complete to allow th e sending-off,a t a moment's notice, of a n a rm y of from 100,000 to 120,000 men ; but that all the advantages given byrailways and steam comm unications are not sufficient to dispense altogether w ith prep arations made before-hand. But, although the contingency of a war was no doubt contemplated in France, i t was not expectedso soon, or else the people intr usted with the preparations were at fault ; or tlie first troops sent off wentas they stood, in many instances wi th less th an thir ty rounds of amm unition i n the ir pouches. Theartillery also was behindhand. It was intended t o have nothing bu t the rifled guns of the new modelof 1 85 8; they mere not ready in sufficient numbers, and some of the old guns bad to be sent out tomake up the complement of the artillery. The siege-train was equally unready, so were the t rai n andtransport departments. It will be remembered, that at the time Marshal Yaillant, then Minister of War,was accused of negligence, an d this accusation seem ed to be confirmed by his removal from th at post ;

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THE WAR I N ITALY. 8 'bu t it is jus t as probable, th at th e sudden decision of Au stria was the real cause of this state of halfpreparation.But, whatever th e cause, there was certainly no time lost i n applying the remedy ; nd the energy andactivity displayed in th is respect were truly marvellous. It seemed as if a new spirit had penetrated every-th in g and no d oubt this was the case, for from the first moment i t was apparent tha t routine and bureaucracyhad lost th eir sway, and t ha t one man's en ergy directed everything. From all parts of France, the troops des-tined to form the five corps of the currnge d'ltalie, ar e carried by railway to Grenoble, Culoz, Tonlon, and M ar-seilles-the four points on th e frontie r which were chosen for the c oncentration of the army. Bo th a t Toulonan d Marseilles var-steam ers, a nd othe rs belonging chiefly to th e "Com pany of the Messageries ImpBriales,"are ready to convey the troops to Genoa. From Grenoble and Culoz the regiments are sent in t he directionof the passes of Mou t Genhvre and Mont Cenis, and are ready to cross the frontiers at the first order. Wh ilethe troops stationed in France ar e thus' pushed forward in snccessive e'cheloms towards the frontier, vesselsar e sent to Algeria-that ever ready camp of France-to fetch two complete divisions, and tak e themdirect to the coast of Liguria. From t he 21st of A pril this activity never ceases for about a month, and bytha t t ime the Imperial Guard, 10 divisions of infantry-that is, 5 2 regim ents of th e line, an d 11battalionsof riflemen ; divisions or 20 regiments of cavalry, and 26 batter ies of artillery, or 20 8 guns-were onItal ian soil, besides an immense a mo unt of stores and provisions, which were heaped up in Genoa, Alessandria,and Turin.

It was, as often happens i n th e beginning of warfare, a trial of speed wit h-th e adversary, bu t itwas of greater mo ment on this occasion th an usual. No t even th e Piedmon tese imagined themselves t obe a match, single-handed, for the large forces which Austr ia had concentrated on their frontiers. The object,therefore, of the Austrians was clearly to crush the Piedmontese before their French allies could come up ;and the endeavour of the Piedmontese, on the contrary, was to avoid, as much as possible, a general engage-ment until the ir trans-Alpine friends could arrive.W it h this view the Piedmontese had long ago prepared a defensive position for their army. It isalmost impossible to imagine a worse frontier-line for defence th an tha t of Pied mon t towards Lomb ardy.First, it formed a concave line, giving all the advantages of a central position to the aggressor ; hen thisline was divided by the Po, making a concentrated system of defence difficult, if no t impossible. Finally,i t was outflanked by Piacenza long before this war was even thou ght of. The Piedmontese saw this evil,and looked for some more defensible position farther back : it was found in the angle formed by theconfluence of th e P o an d th e Tanaro.Exc ept towards the east, Piedmont is surrounded on all sides by a semicircle of mountains. The plainenclosed by this semicircle is divided almost i n its centr e by the river Po, which, rising in Mo nt Gensvreon the western frontier of Piedmont, runs in a n easterly direction towards the Ad riatic ; ut about thecentre of the course through the Piedmontese plain, the P o makes s sudden bend to the south for about tenmiles, after which it resumes again its easterly course. The river Tanaro, rising in t he he art of theAppenines in the south, runs up to it at right angles to within distance of fifteen miles ; t then takesa parallel direction, in which it continues until it comes to the point where th e latt er m akes its suddenbend to the south ; hen, after uniting with the Bormida, another of th e streams of the Appenines, it runsup at a sharp angle towards th e Po, joining it a few milee lower down. On the left bank, a little above th epoint where th e Po makes i ts bend to th e south, lies Casale ; nd a t the confluence of the Tanaro and Bormidais built the fortress of Ale~sandria.~Casale, th e ancient capital of th e Marquisat of Montferrat, was onceconsidered as the chief stronghold of the Ghibellines in this part of Lower Italy, while Alessandria was builtby the Lombard League in the 12th century, in order to overawe Montferrat.Both places fell and rose i n importance, as peace or war prevailed in the plains of Uppe r Ita ly ; andthey regained all their former position when it became urgent, as in the times of the Lombard League, toform a stronghold a nd a focus of resistance against an other foreign power from th e North . These twofortresses in the centre of the country, not more th an fifteen miles apart, and near th e confluence of the twoprincipal rivers into which a11 others flow a t right angles, form to gethe r a position of grea t streng th.Mu tually protecting each other, and difficult of access on account of the rivers, all the m ilitary resources ofthe country can be concentrated behind them, and then employed in any direction where a display offorce may be required, while no enem y can pass them without exposing his line of retreat.

* Both ar e names well known from th e wars of th e Guelfs an d Ghibellines, showing that even then their importance wasunderstood.B 2

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4 THE W AR I N ITALY.A ll these advantages l lad been long s tudied and understood by the Piedmontese, and no e%rt wasspared to m ake Casale an d Alessandria as stron g as possible. Special gran ts of money were made by

th e Parliam ent for this object, a nd every one will s t i ll remember th e snbscription begun by Ma nin forth e 10 0 guns of Alessandr ia ; or Alessan dria and Casale-no longer enemies, as in th e days of th e Guelfsan d Ghibellines-were t o be th e places d'armes where all I t al y could assemble and muster for th e f ightagainst th e s tranger.W h a t gave aclditional importance to these two fortresses i n the lat e war, was th e necessity ofprotecting t he roads by which th e Frenc h army was to arr ive,-namely, th at over th e Mo nt Cenis, andthat from Genoa over the Appenines. With these for t resses on the two chief rivers as a base, anyof th e transverse rivers became a tempo rary line of defence, by which t he A ustri ans could be ke ptin check unt i l th e French ar rived . It was w ith this view th at th e D ora B altea l ine was forti t ied onth e road to Turin, and Novi on the Scrivia occupied, to ward off atiy atte mp t of th e Austrians to close thedefile of t h e Appenines.

Thi s was the defensive position in which t he S ardinian arm y was to wait for the arr iv al of i ts all ies.In he hills of Montferrat , which lie belween the P o a nd th e Tanaro, protected in front and f lank by these tworivers, hav ing in Casale and Ale seandria tw o te tesde pont from which t o fall on t he flank of an advancing enemy,the Sardinian arm y not only could avoid a general engagem ent with a superior enemy, bu t coold likewisetak e advantaage of any circumstance which mi ght favour an offensive movement. To th is place d'ccrmes, then,the Sardinians had gradually sent their arm y battalion by battalion, and regiment by regiment, accompaniedeveryw here by the blessings and th e enthusiasm of th e people ; o that when the A us tr ian u l t imatum came,th e main body of th e Sarclinian arm y was in this defensive position, with detachments at Chivasso on th eDora Bal tea and a t Novi on the Scr iv ia , to watch the road to Tur in and the road to Genoa. The gar risonof Genoa and Turin alone remained behind, while a few regiments of l ight cavalry were on thefrontiers t o observe t he movements of the ene my ; and they were to fall back s lowly towards th e restof the army.

B ut w hile the S ardinian arm y had already occupied its defensive position, th e defences theinselves wereby no means completed. The sudden resolution of the Austrians here shoved its effect, and it was moreth an ten days af ter the Aus tr ians crossed th e Tic ino before the works a t A lessandr ia and Casale werefinished.The u l t imatum of Count Buol i s dated the 19 th of A pr i l ; i t does not reach i t s des t inationunt il th e 23rd, while i t s contents are known to the parties most nearly concerned so early as the 21st.Th e result made itself felt ; before the mem orandum was even presented, th e railway had carriedf rom 40,000 t o 50 ,000 men to the Piedmontese f ront ier, and a t least an equal number was concentra tedi n Marseilles and Toulon. Ten s teamers of th e Messageriev Imp6riales were lying in th e Joliett e harbour,ready to take t he troops on board. A num ber of the old paddle-wheel frigates, converted int o transports,were close by, for similar purpose. Several line-of-battle ships and large tra nspo rts were on the ir way t ofetch the African divisions. Oth er transports, chartered for s tores , were already loading with the greatestexpedition. Thus, if the re h ad been a t ime fixed n ot of th ree days, bu t of twenty-four hours, th e Frenchdivisions, having already had a s tar t of forty-eight hours , would have been equally in S ardinia a t th e en d ofth at period. It was this delay betwcen the w riting and th e presenting of th e ult ima tum which decided th erace in favour of th e allies, and not, as w as said, th e deference t o t h e wish of England, in consequence ofwhich th e Aus tr ian arm y only en tered on the 29th .

By th e 26th, when the period f ixed b y the u ltimatu m ha d elapsed, th e F rench had had full f ive days toprepare, and before th e Austrian envoy left Turin, with th e answer to th e ultimatum, two complete Frenchdivisions, Bazaine an d Bouat, were alrea dy on Sardinia n soil, th e first a t G enoa an d the second over th eMo nt Cenis-that is, one only two hours from Alessandria by mil, and th e other not so much from Turin.Now, supposing th at th e A ustrians had availed themselves of th e first moment to cross th e Ticino, this couldnot have been very well done before the next morning, the 27th, Baron Kellersberg havin g left Tu rin only onthe evening of the 26th ; t would have taken their f leetest troops thre e days to march to Novi, or to th eDora Baltea, and by the 30th more than 60,000 French troops might have joined the Sardinian army. A sfor rcaching the Sardinian army before th e French could come up, it was, therefore, no more t o be th ought

, of after th e 26t11, th e day f ixed for the answer to t he ultimatum.A s soon as the Aus tr ian u l t in~a tum ad been answered , no t ime w as los t in T ur in in making the las tarrangements rendered necessary by the war. Alread y on the 23rd, a t noon, th at is , several hours before

the Aus t r i an u l t ima tum wa s presented, th e Chamber, which hnd been prorogued for t he E aste r holidays,

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THE M7AB I N ITALY. 5met on the sudden summons of the Government; a nd on the proposal of the minister-presidentCavour, conferred extraordinary powers on the King , investing him wit h f d l legislative and executiveauthority i n case of war, an d giving him power to tak e every measure necessary for t he defenceof th e country, among th e rest t ha t of limiting individual freedom and liberty of the press d uring thetime of war.

On t he 26th, in pursuance of these extraordinary-powers, a royal decree appoints three extraord inarycivil commissioners, one for Genoa, ano ther for Alessandria, and a th ird for Vercelli and Novara, wi th fullpowers, and dependent only on the Commander-in-chief of t he Army , and t he Minister of th e Interior.The troops still left as garrisons in Tu rin and Genoa take th eir departure for the army, amidst theacclamation and good wishes of th e people, and the national guard assume thei r duties. Th e kin g appointsth e Prince of Carignan as lieutenant of th e kingdom during his absence.

O n t h e 2 7 t h , a t t e n A.lI., a solemn mass is celebrated in t he m etropolitan church at Turin, to invoketh e blessing of H eaven on t he army. The kin g himself is present, as well as th e Prince of Carignan, th eministers, th e Fre nch embassy, th e senators, most of th e deputieg th e magistrates, municipality, wi thfunction aries of all degrees, officers of th e army, as well as of t h e n atio nal guard, and a l arge assemblyof people.

A n immense crowd collects after the service on the Piazza del Castello, where th e royal palace stands,waiting to see th e king depart for the army, as had been announced th e previous day. A s there is no signof an advance of the Austrians, the departure is deferred.

E ut Tu rin was n ot th e only place in Sardinia which was in a fever of exc i tement on the 26th andth e following days. Th e Au stria n ultimatum being known, as well as th e declaration in the Afoniteur aboutth e concentration of th e five French corps d'armCe o n th e Sarclinian frontier, every one mas waitinganxiously for their arrival.

The Savoyards were th e first who got a glimpse of them. There being as yet no railroad across theMo nt C'enis, the troops had two clays' march to m ake i n Savoy, from St. Je an M aurienne until theycame again to a railroad at Suoa ; t was therefore necessary for them to start sooner tha n those whowere sent b y Genoa. Already on th e 25th, about noon, th e first detachment of French troops arrived atth e station of C hambery, amid t he acclamations of t he population assembled th ere since morning. Th etrain contained the 19 th battalion of chasseurs-%-pied and the 1st battalion of th e 43rd of th e line, bothbelong ing t o th e 3 rd corps cZ'arnzEo (Canro bert). A t four PJI. another , t ra in brought th e remaining tw obattalions of the 43rd, and from tha t time every three hours another train passed th e frontiers of Sav oy oni ts road t o t he Mon t Cenis ; as th e t ra ins a rr ive a t S t . Jea n M aurienne , th e t roops march on to thepassage of th e Mo nt Cenis, which is thus encumbered for days by long lines of troops, making their way acrossin spite of rain and snow, which are not wanting.

Wh ile this stream of Fren ch battalions is poured into Sardinia, over the M ont Cenis, another streampasses by Mont MBlian ; t is composed of th e troops which have been concentrated a t Grenoble a ndBrianqpn. Bo th unite at Susa, where the railway again begins.

By th e tim e t he first French battalions were effecting this passage over th e Alp s from the west,Genoa received w ithin its walls th e first detachm ent coming by sea. On the 26 tb , a t e igh t AX , t h escrew line-of-battle ship I'Alge'silms, th e steam frigates Redoubtable and Dvyncle, and th e steam tran spo rtsUlloa, Mogadov, and Christophe CoZomb entered th e por t of Genon. I n th e evening two more frigates andanother transport followed; and before th e ne xt morni ng arrived, a division of six complete regiments,about 10,000 men, and their provisions had been landed.The reception given to th e troops at Genoa is very graphically described i n a letter to th e K&b byIf, dmo nd Texier, which we here insert :--

" I arrived at Genoa on th e first day of the disembarkation, and J need not te l l you tha t th e c i ty woreth e appearance of a fdte. This long-expected disembarkatio n had attr acted a n enormous crowd, drawn fromall parts of Piedmont, and even from t he neighbonring states. Every one wished to be certain th at th eFren ch had landed. The quays of this vast city of Genoa, which spreads i n th e form of a horse-shoe fromth e centre of the bay, its houses and palaces arranged in tiers one above t he other, presented a noblespectacle. Th e terraces near th e sea were crowded by women, who, with the ir heads covered by those longwhite veils called poxxotto, waved hanclkerchieEg and scattered flowers below. Hundreds of boats wereskimm ing out of th e port t o meet our ships, and each as i t passed alongside discharged a volley of flowersupon our soldiers. I t was enthusiasm approaching delirium. To every shout raised from th e quays or theboats, the soldiers replied b y cries of Five I'Italie ! nd women, children, men old and y oung, wildly clapped

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6 THE WAR IN ITALY.th eir upraised hands,-like people shipwrecked, who, having given up al l hope of deliverance, see th e life-boats coming to their rescue."W he n the first frigate entered the harbour, the shouts broke into a universal Vivat ! Ital y feltherself liberated !

" f ever enthusiasm was sincere, intense, pathetic, i t was so at this moment. The whole populationwas in tears. 'Oh, Holy Virgin ! ' exclaimed an old woman, weeping as she spoke, ' hey are then come ! 'and all the people around me wept also, as they shouted, Vive la Framce / Viuent les soldats F m p a i s lDuring the disembarkation the shouts never ceased, and the first soldiers who landed were literally stifled ,with embraces.(( W he n th e first French flag was lowered from th e AlgZsiras into the boats, every head was uncovered,and all G enoa, by a spontaneous movement, bowed before the banne r which had become th e Zubarzcm of Italy.Even now Genoa wears the aspect of a Frenc h rathe r than of an Ital ian city. Fre nch uniforms are seen inevery street, in every open place. Fifteen regim ents of th e line have already arrived, witho ut counting

Zouaves a nd Turcos. These last, with the ir swa rthy faces an d strang e manners, ar e the lions of the hour.They ar e not quartered in the city like th e othe r troops, bu t are encamped outside the gates, in thePolcevera valley.

" I n t he evening, above all, Genoa presents a singular appearance. N o one, seeing citizens an d soldierswalking about arm in arm, would guess th at this is a purely commercial city. A t eight o'clock a hundreddrum s and bugles meet on th e Piazza Ducale, and sound th e "retre at." The people follow the drums,keeping step, and th e drumm ers show redoubled vigour. Ital ian melodies mingle wit h Fren chpopular airs, cries of ' Viva la Frmzcia l' with those of ' Vive l'halie 1' and from this confusion ofsounds results a w arlike enthusiastic harmony, which seems to brea the forth gunpowder, and is th epresage of victory." W h a t is remarkable here, is th e patriotic feeling of t he people. Eve ry one has th e same thoug ht,the same object, and to att ain it no sacrifice is deemed too great. The volunteers, who are mostly youngmen belonging to the best families of Ital y, are drilling from morning til l night, in the sun or in the rain,with an obstinate will, and the y already manceuvre like old troops. Some Fre nch officers who have beenpresent at this drill tell me they should have no fear of acting with such allies. The Sardinian troopsare full of ardour, an d desire a t any cost to repair the disaster of Novara.

" One ought, to see this migh ty rush of a whole people, to be convinced th at th e first want of Ita lyis independence."An d from this time an uninterrupted influx of troops continues from the west and the south. A s fastas steamers and railways can carry them th ey arrive at Genoa and a t the foot of the A lps, which they crossby forced marches. Those coming by sea encamp outside Genoa, while those coming over the Alp s areconcentrated at Susa and toward Pignerola in the country of the Waldenses. It was only in case of thegreatest necessity tha t the detachments would have been sent immediately t o the front, and th at necessitydid not exist up to the 29th, when the Austrians crossed. So th at during three days, from t he first arrivalof the Frenc h troops on Sardinian soil, not only the divisions could be completed, bu t likewise many of th epreparations made which could not be finished in the hurry of th e departure. W he n the telegraph broug htth e news of th e Au stri an passage of the Ticino, there was always sufficient tim e t o reach th e positionsassigned to th e different corps, to which the y were closer than th e Austrians. The Frenc h had also th e useof railway4 which the Austrians had not, after they had crossed the frontier.

W e said the armde d'ltalie consisted, of five corps and the imperial guard. Of these the 1 st(Baragnay d'Hillie rs) was composed of th re e divisions of in fan try and one of cav alry ; th e 2n d corps(M'Mahon), tw o divisions of infa ntry an d one brigade of ca valry ; he 3rd corps (Canrobert), thre e divisionsof infantry and one division of cavalry ; t he 4 th corps (Nie l) th ree divisions of infantr y an d abrigade of cavalry ; he 5t h corps (Prince Napoleon), two divisions of infantry and a brigade of c avalry ;th e im perial guard, tw o divisions of infan try and two divisions of cavalry. Ev ery infantry divisionwas composed of four regim ents of t h e line, each of th re e battalio ns, and a bat tali on of chasseurs-&-pied,nall thir teen battalions. W it h the exception of the regiments which had come from Algeria, very few of thebattalions counted m ore tha n from 600 to 700 men, so th at th e divisions of infan try were from 8,000 to 9,000men. The divisions of cavalry were formed of f our regim ents of fo ur squad rons each, i n all less th a n 50 0horses. TO each divison, infantry as well as cavalry, a batter y of artillery was attached, and th e corps itselfhad as many b atteries of reserve as i t counted divisions.

Of this host, which, when completed, numbered fully from 150,000 to 160,000 fighting men, two-

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THE WAR I N ITALY. Ithirds came by sea to Genoa and one-third over the Alps. Although th e original distribution of t he corpsd'armle was altered in some instances, it may be said th at th e six divisions of infantry and tw o of cavalry,forming the 3rd and 4th corps (Canrobert, Niel), came by th e Alps. A ll th e o ther divisions of infantrycame by sea to Genoa. Before the evening of th e 26th, 8,700 men were landed ; by the evening of the29th, 27,951 men and 990 horses; by the 1s t of M ay, 61,000; and by the 16 th of May, 87,000 men an d5,000 horses an d mules. The official tota l of men landed b e i ~ g , efore the end of the campaign, 113,075men and 17,812 horses and mules.

V er y few cavalry landed at Genoa, exc ept a few regimen ts of chasseurs, the 2n d and 3rd, whichcame direct from Algeria, and 120 guides ; all th e rest of the cavalry, tha t of the imperial guardincluded, was sent by th e Corniche. Th is passage across th e Corniche was by no means favourableto the efficiency of this arm of th e service, for ow ing to the ovations with which the cavalry wasreceived all along th e road, such care as the be ginning of a campaign above all demands, seems no tto have been paid to the horses ; and the result was, th at the cavalry of th e gu ard had to leave fromone-fourth to one-third of its horses, with sore backs, in the depbts near G enoa.A s for the landing of t he troops, it was done well and rapidly : the huge Bretagn e liner, for instance,discharged he r 2,440 men, and sailed again in three hours. No dou bt the facilities were great, ther e being along line of new quays most of th e way round the harbour, with water sufficiently deep for small ships ;bu t all these advantages would have been lost, had it not been for the energy which was impressed on thiswhole movement, and the clear directions which seemed to guide this energy.No t merely troops, however, were brought by sea, but the greate r p art of the military stores andprovisions also came th at way, an d were heaped up in Genoa, which became th e great centre of supplies.Connected by sea with Marseilles and Toulon, and by railway w ith Alessandria, Turin, and the line ofoperations in Piedmont, as well as in Lombardy, it was the most convenient place for t h t purpose. Thetown itself, with its storehouses and other commercial facilities, was, as it were, made for the purpose.

A nd in th is grea t storehouse were laid up, it is calculated, six months' provisions for th e w hole army,and almost a year's for the cavalry.

Besides these provisions, th e grea ter pa rt of the siege artillery, reserve am munition, gunboa ts i npieces,-in fact, everyth ing which comes under th e denomination of military stores, came to Ge no a;although of pontoons and field artillery, not a little came by the Mont Cenis, by Grenoble, an d byBrianqon. But, on th e whole, i t could not escape attentio n th at very little artillery passed in comparison withthe number of troops, and yet there was the full complement of artillery i n the field.Wh ile the French army thus was concentrating at Genoa, and a t the foot of the Alps, and the Pied-montese army was ready in its position between the Po and the Tanaro, the Austrians did not cross the Ticinobefore th e 29tl1,-that is, thr ee days after th e ultimatu m had been rejected by Sardinia. This is said to havebeen done in deference to the wishes of the British government. This may b e; bu t readiness tolisten t o such counsels evidently came from the conviction th at a mistake had been committed, out ofxhich, perhaps, the British government m ight show the way. Besides which, th e A ustrians had pro-oably not been prepared for the rapidity w ith which the French h ad come up ; heir intention of crushingthe Sardinian army before the arrival of its allies, was thus defeated ; nd so they did not know w hat to do.They had threatened to march into Sardinia, consequently they could not do less without losing allprestige from th e very beginning, and yet th ey had no longer a hope of effecting any thing if the y did makethis offensive movement. Un der these circnmstances, it was natura l tha t they should listen to an ythin gthat offered some prospect of getting rid of the difficulty.

Being deceived in this hope, they took th e resolution to cross the Ticino on the 29th in tw o colunins,at Pavia and a t Bereguardo. A t the first of these two places the brigade Fistetics, of the 5t h corps, was thefirst to pass, and it w as followed by the entire 3rd corps (Schwartzenberg), the vanguard pushing on th roug hGarlasco to the Terdoppio river, and th e rest of the column remaining a t Gropello. W hile this columnpassed a t Pavia, the 7t h corps (Zobel), coming down from North ern L ombardy to cross a t Vigevano, foundthe bridge broken there, and ha d to pass on a pontoon bridge at Bereguardo, and march to Gambolo.The same day, a detachment was sent across from Sesto Oalende to A ron a on the L ago Maggiore, tocut th e telegraphic wires ; which being effected, the detachment withdrew.

On th e 20th, the 5t h corps (Stadion) followed the 7t h over the bridge of Bereg mrdo , andtook its place at Gambolo, the 7th advancing to Mortara. The 8t h corps (Benedeck) followed th e

' 3rd by Pavia, both moving on to Garlasco. On the 1st of May th e 2nd (Lichtenstein) followed these twolast-named corps,

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THE WAR I N ITALY.Wh ile t he last troops had n ot yet crossed, th e Austrian righ t already held Novara, th e cent re Mortarri,

and th e left Ban Nazzaro, th at is, i t was extended over a distance of 25 to 30 miles on th e r iver Agogna, th esecond transverse river along the Po to Pavia.

Th e movements which follow from the 1 st of May to th e tim e of th e advance of th e allies at the endof the m onth, have gr eatly puzzled t he world, and have given rise to the most extrao rdinary conjectures andsupposed plans. A nd ye t nothin g was more simple ; he events had only to be taken as they occurred, andno more importance a t t r ibut ed to them than they deserved.

Th e Austr ians first take up a position in t he angle made by th e Sesia and th e Po, they push forwardin the direction of Turin, crossing the Sesia at Vercelli on t he 2 nd i n force, while a small detachment crosseslower down a t Caresana on the 3rd. On the same day they br idge over an a rm of the P o a t Cambio, theymak e a demonstration against Frasinetto, an d have a cannonade with th e Piedmontese at Valenza. On the 4th)th e 8 t h corps (Benedeck) passes to t he right b ank of th e Po, a t Cornale, on a bridge constructed during th enight by the engineers; they march to Voghera and Tortona , and blow up the ra ilway br idge there . Thebridge which Benedeck had made being carried away by th e flood, he had t o wait for th e construction of anew one, which was ready in twenty-four hours, after which h e retires, carrying wit h him a quantity ofprovisions, cattle, &c. W hi lst this advance take s place on th e r igh t bank of th e Po, t h e advance continueson th e left bank. On the 5t h) th e Austrian s bring a considerable force to Vercelli on the Sesia, and thenpush forward to Trino and Tobello, as well as Tranzaro and San Germano, and thro w up works in thislat ter place and Vercelli. On t he 7tl1, still larger bodies are sent towa rds Vercelli, and th e movementextends towards Ivrea , on the Dora Bal tea . O n th e 8th, the Austr ians again make a movementtowards Valenza, and blow up the railway bridge. On the 9th, a general movement of retreat begins.The y evacuate T rino, Livorno, Tranzano, Xanthia, &c.-in fact, all places on t h e rig ht b ank of th eSesia. Keepin g merely a detachment a t Vercelli , th e bridges which they had constructed over th eSesia are again removed. On the l l t h , a body of Austr ians pasqes the Po a t La Ste l la , and anotherdetachment from Caste1 Ban Giovanni goes up the valley of the Trebbia. The 9 th corps re turns toPavia. On th e 12t11, the y establish themselves in force a t Stradella and Caste1 Ban Giovanni. 011t h e13t h) they occupy Bobbio, in th e valley of the Trebbia, and rush on t o Casteggio, on the road to Voghera.On the 14th) they re t i re f rom Bobbio. From the 14 th to th e 19th, they mass themselves on th e roadto Voghera, and fortify the bridge at La Stella. I n the direction of the Sesia they make a requisition in th eneighbourhood of Vercelli, and recross th e Sesia, blowing up tw o arches of the railw ay bridge. On t h e201511, t h e y make a reconnaisance to Montebello, which e nds in a defeat ; after which th ey retire i utothei r positions behind th e P o and th e Sesia, Gyulai transferring his head-quarters from llo rt ar a t oGarlasco.

From this shor t rZsumZ of the Austr ia n operations" up to the combat of Montebello, it will be seenth at t he Au strians first take u p a position righ t in front of th at occupied by th e Sardinians, between Casaleand Alessandria; they mak e demonstrations against these two positions, and e xtend themselves to th er ight as if to ga in th e road to Tu rin; and then on the le ft , as if to advance aga ins t the defiles ofthe Appenines. They withdraw th eir left column and strengthen thei r righ t wing, massing largebodies there ; the n they withdraw those troops, again extend thei r left, and go on unt il they are beatena t Montebello.

It is clear th at these operations were th e resu lt of no settled plan,-they were th e manceuvresof a blind man feeling his way first t o th e righ t an d th en to t he left, until he comes against a wall.The re is no thing very new and strange i n this, for traces of it may be found a t almost every page ofth e Aust rian military history, th at of th e Arc hdu ke Charles not excepted. There never being n prefer-ence for doing anythin g in particular, a general reconnaissance is ordered, t o make th e enemy show hisforces and develop hi s plan. It is this circumstance which causes so much divergence in th e accountsof t he ir operations, th e Austr ians calling th at a reconnaissance which thei r enemies call a defeat.

Wh ile th e Austrians were thu s losing precious time, th e allies exerted themselves to their utmostto concentrate their forces. W it h th e exception of a few battalions belonging t o th e 1s t French corps whichwere sent up t o Novi in th e valley of the Scrivia, not a man of t he French arm y stirred until the telegraphbrough t the news of th e advance of th e Austrians. O n th e 39th, Marshal Baraguay d'Hilliers publishes hisorder of th e da y; and the 1s t an d 2nd corps c ross the Appenines par t ly by ra il and par t ly on the high-road, and a re concentrated a t Novi a t th e entrance of t he Appenines. A t th e same t ime tha t the 1s t and2nd corps concentrate on the northern slopes of t he Appenines, th e 2nd and 4t h corps, coming from thefoot of the Alps, pass throug h Tu rin to th e front. The first troops which reach the Sardinian capital on the

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THE W4R I N ITALY.30 th of April, are th e objects of great ovations. lta rs ha l Canrobert, and G eneral Niel, have already arrivedand have examined, in company with th e King , the positions on the Dora Baltea, and on th e Po.

Th e object, of course, could merely be to take such measures as would enable t he allied armies t o con-centrate witbou t being disturbed by anything the Austr ians could undertake ;with A le~s andr ia s a f lank ingposition, and th e 1st and 2n d corps a t the entrance of th e defile of th e Appenines, the re could be not m uchdanger of any interruption of the road to Genoa; so the chief at traction was toward t he Mont Cenisroad, especially as th ere seemed rather a tendency of t he A ustria ns to push forward in th at direction.W it h th is view, the 3rd and 4th French corps were massed towards th e centre of the allied posit ion atValenza, and t he Bardinians were thu s enabled t o move more freely from Casale and watch t he enemy's move-ments on that l ine, and towards th e Dora Baltea. Th e retreat of the Austr ians fkom their advancedpositions i n th at direction relieved them from all furthe y apprehensions, and th e Fren ch arm y could nowconcentrate in al l safety and prepare to take the offensive,

Afte r the f irst few days, it had become tolerably clear th at th e Aus trians had no hostile intentions,eithe r i n the direction of Genoa or of Tnrin ; their operations did not produce m uch connter-movement in th e allied armies, except when, for a moment, they occupied Bobbio, and th e Zouaves weresent off in that direction ; but reassured on th is p oint, every one was waiting impatiently th e arri val ofthe Emperor .

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THE A R R I V A L O F T H E EM P ER O R, H I S S T AY A T A L ES B AN D RI A, A N D T H ECOMBAT O F MONTEBELLO.

THE corps ZZgislafif having on th e 2 nd J un e voted t he augme ntation of the c ontingent for 1859 from100,000 to 140,000, a nd sanctioned a loan of 500,000,000 francs by national subscription, the Empe rorne xt d ay conferred on the E mpress the dignity of Regent during his absence, and published a lmc lam ationto the French people, in which he announced this resolution, and recommended her and his son to the care ofth e armyrem aining in France, and of the whole people. On the lO th,at five P.M., e left th e Tuileries in an opencarriage, accompanied by the Empress, and proceeded through a dense and enthusiastic crowd to the stationof the Lyons railway. The Em press accompanied him as far as Mo nterea u; an d thence, almost witho utstopping, the imperial train proceeded to Lyons and Marseilles, where it arrived th e ne xt day. The Emperorembarked at once on board th e yacht Reine Hortense, and arrived in the afternoon of th e 12 th at Genoa.The following two letters from the Times correspondent at this l at te r place give a graphic accountof the Emperor's reception.

"GENOA,7th May.-At last all doubts and fears are set at rest by the actual arriv al of Napoleon 111.to take the command of the forces he has so rapidly thrown into this country. Long before an y vesselneared the port, half Genoa, warned by a gun fired from the Lighthouse Battery, and the Fren ch tricolorfloating out from the signal tower, was ou t on foot in th e streets, or lined the road w hich runs round theport a s far as th e landing-place on th e west side of our harbour, which for so many da ys successively haspresented the appearance of a disturbed anthill, or beehive, crowded as it has been daily with red-tronseredbipeds, each armed w ith th e sting th at Austria is soon to feel." A t half-past one P.N., th e Reine Hortense-originally the Emperor's own yacht, bu t given by him toPrinc e Napoleon, on th e occasion of th e latter's marriage-slowly steamed in, and rounded to amid th ethun der of royal salutes from th e town. H er Majesty's steam-frigate Terrible, an d several large Frenchtransports which arrived to-day, took up their positions in the deep water at th e Old or Eastern Mole. A tthis moment the scene was very striking. A s t he smoke blew away, or lifted here or there, it openedvistas of manned yards and vessels draped in flags from truc k to hull, and waving specks of every colourin th e rainbow,-hats, shawls, au d handkerchiefs,-while th e deep roa r of ma ny thousand voices welcomedNapoleon to the land h e comes to free.

" Th e general e ffect of the arrival once observed, I jumped into a boat and hurried to the arsenal, towhich a pass admitted me, that I might see the Emperor ' et his foot upon the conquered shore.' Gaily -decked boats and ships, dressed i n flags, formed a road which exten ded from th e Mole to the mouth of thearsenal, and along this, as I approached, was p assing a handsom e b arge, bearin g by may of figure-headwhat appeared to be a large gilt swan, evidently on its way to meet His Imperial Majesty. The arsenalitself presented a brilliant sight. The Impe rial Guard were in full possession, lining th e edge of the wateras well as the battlements, with their tall fur caps, except at the landing-place, which, as the post of honour,was held by the Genoese nfilitirr A long line of chairs on th e eastern'side was occupied by ladies,apparently vying wit h each other i n th e splendour of the ir parasols ; while a large vessel oppo site heeledover, as I have seen Thames steamers do, with its freigh t of beauty, m any a toilette fit for the mostexclusive salon being mercilessly exposed to the chances of tarred rope and struggling crowd"Sho rtly after my arrival renewed shouts warned us of the Emperor's approach, and a t te n minutespast two the barge I had before observed passed on towa rds th e landing-place, now crowded with uniformsand decorated officers. The Em peror sat where th e steersm an would do in an ordin ary boat, betweenM. de Cavour and the Prince Carignan, and bowed repeatedly in aclrnowledgment of the enthusiastic shoutswhich greeted his appearance, and broke out again a t the instant th at his foot touched Italian soil. Fromth e arsenal he passed a t once by a covered bridge which crosses th e Carlo Alberto Stree t, to theRoyal Palace in the Strada Balbi, which belonged formerly to Girolamo Durazzo, the last Doge ofGenoa, displaced by Napoleon I. i n 1805, a nd mas sold by his successors to the Crown of Savoy.Fo r the first time since; th e Ianding of the ir allies, th e Genoese seemed thoroughly excited,and for a short time lost that impassiveness they have shown throughout, which some say iscaused by th e instinc tive mistru st of war nat ura l to a commercial city ; others by perfect satisfactionwith th e course events ar e taking. They cheered, and jumped up an d down to see, and clapped their

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THE WAR IN ITALY. 11hands, an d pushed for places with a n eagerness instruct ive enough t o on e who observed th at among th emost enthusiast ic were men of th at party which but a few month s ago sought th e present hero's l ife. Le tNapoleon keep his word, i f he would go down a white-haired man to th e grave, and seek to establish noFrench rule in It aly ; for the present enthusiasm springs from hatred to th e Austrian, no t love t o the Gaul,and the poniard which threatened him, though sheathed, is sharp as ever.

(( 18th May.-The opera (Ione' (of which the very effect ive libretto is founded on Bulwer'snovel , 'T he Last Days of Pomp eii ' ) began a s usual a t eight , to a crowded bu t sadly inat ten-t ive house, th e thea tre i tself bri l l iant ly l ighted and decorated w ith t he Fren ch an d Sardiniantri~o lor~ s. Soon after nine, and just before t he bal let began, a general hush ' running through thepit warned us of his Majesty's approach, and in a few minu tes he appeared, and came forward atonce to the front of th e box, turn ing sl ightly pale, it seemed t o m e; showing thus an emotion which, i findeed it existed, can hardly have been caused by an y dou bt of his reception after wha t had passedduring the day. A t al l events, th e huzzas at t he arsenal fade out of my mind when I think of thetremendous electrical shout th at ran through th e theatre, not given i n regular t ime and for a defini teobject , as is our way in England, but each voice giving ou t i ts separate cry of (T iv e 1'Empereur !' 'V i val'Italia ! ' or (Viva 1'Allianza ! ' and then cheering i ts own sentiment with 'Evviva, Evviva ! ' epeatedindefinitely. Every person in the theatr e stood up, the ladies, three and four to the box, coming forwardand waving their handkerchiefs; while the men behind them clapped th eir hands and cheered,compelling th e Em pero r to come forward three times to receive their applause before th e ballet wasallowed to proceed. Napoleon sat in the centr e of th e box, which ia not , l ike the royal box a t HeyMajesty's Theatre, merely distinguished by its size, bu t is admirably fi t ted t o display i ts occupan&,filling th e centr e of th e second tier of boxes, an d bulging forward i n a semicircle into the house,supported on marble pi llars which form th e entrance to the pi t, so th at I had every opportunity ofexamining him carefully. On his M ajesty's left were the Prince de Carignan, rege nt of th e kingdom,and Count Cavour ; on his right, Prince Napoleon and t he French m inister, D e la Tou r d'Auvergne ;th e royal personages only sitting , while the Syndic of Genoa stood behind their chairs. Once, in defiance ofall etiquette, a voice cried, ( Viva Cavour ! and a few cheers hai led the popular name; but th e count gave al i t t le start and shrink a t the sound, and his friends in the royal box seemed to ( chaf f ' him on th e subject.

((1 id not see the royal party leave the theatre, which they did at th e end of th e bal let ; bu there th e exi t was too rapid t o allow of th e display of much enthusiasm. I met them, however, ontheir way, about half-past ten, i n the streets, splendidly illuminated along their whole course, and wasmuch struck by th e effect when the dull roar tha t preceded them ,bur st into a shout l ike thu nder, as theyswept round th e corner of th e Via Nuovissima past me into the Piazza Annunziata, preceded and fol lowedby splendidly-mounted gendarmerie, and disappeared, leaving comparative silence wh ere the y had been.

a The tow n was glorious, indeed, last n ight ; ever had i t worn such a gala dress since th e marriage ofth e then D uk e of Savoy in 1842. Th e streets, one blaze of flags and light, wi th golden garlands surroun dingth e favourite wato'hwords of Itali an liberty, w ere thron ged with Genoese citizens and F renc h soldiers, a well-behaved, intelligent, admiring crowd ; while th e churches seemed pinnacles of fire, raised in honou r of the irdeity by worshippers of the sun ; ut there are those who will never forget Genoa, always beautiful, nevermore so than as i t was seen from th e sea last night . The y wil l remember th e am phitheatre of star-l ikehouses rising silently from th e sea, the strangely impressive sense of quiet and repose afte r th e noisy stre etsand theatre, the Carignano church and th e Lant erna on t he e xtreme rig ht and left , landmar ks of the domainof light-the cathedral in th e centr e raising its bright fron t above its neighbours-the sea, smoo th as glass,hardly breaking t he l ines of bright sparks and m any-coloured lamps which it reflected ; he clouds above, agrand foil to the shining ci ty, al l th e darker for a gathering thunderstorm, which every now and then, by asingle flash of lightning, seemed to show man th at his utmo st efforts were bu t a poor imitation of nature.He avy rain, indeed, closed wh at guests and hosts alike m ust thi nk a v ery successful d ay ; bu t it di d no tcome on t i l l midnight , and the n saved the use of an extinguisher.

((T he Ki ng of Sardinia came down from head-quarters early this morning, stayed two hours, andreturned. I t i s not known what Kapoleon 111.'~ext movement will be."On t he day of his arrival at Genoa, th e Emper or addressed the army i n an order of th e day, in which heannounced th at he has come to put himself a t the head of the army. On Saturday th e 1 4t h he left for Alessan-dria, where he arrived at four P.M., it would be endless to repeat amid th e enthusiasm of the people. H e esta-blished his head-qu arters a t Alessandria, which from t ha t m oment became t he focus and centr e of all activity.

Eve n before this happened, the most superficial observer could see t ha t al l this mo vement of troops0 2

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12 THE WAR I N ITALY.and material was directed by one mind and one will, that of the Emperor at Paris ; but it became muchmore th e case after his arrival among th e troops. H e was th e soul of everything; nothing was clonewit hou t his sanction, even the minu test details being referred t o him. Those details, which form, accordingt o th e organization of continen tal armies, th e chief dutics of the chief of t he staff, were all under t hepersonal direction of the Emperor himself. It was probably with this view that Marshal Vaillant waschosen for th e post, ther e no t being much chance of his doing anythin g without authority. I t was this whichbroug ht such a unity and precision int o everything as mere rarely before attained i n auy campaign. Thegrea t engine for th is centralization was th e use of th e electric telegraph. The re was a regular teleg raphdepar tment a t tached to each corps d'arme'e, carrying wires, poles, and inst rum ents mit h i t, an d havin ga certain num ber of sappers at it s disposal. Whichever way the colps d'wde advanced, the telegraphfollowed immediately ; f it changed its direction and th e telegraph became useless, it was taken down, andpu t up whe re it was required. Th us all conflicting messages, mis take s of aides-de-camp, &.,were avoided,and a rigid and clear means of communication established with head-quarters.

By means of these electric wires the Emperor from Alessmdria moved lhis mass of men andmattriel. One must have seen an arm y of from 100,000 to 150,000 men, with all its numerous wants, inorder to form a correct idea of the work required to make it movable ; and in this campaign there welewants which do not commonly occur. First, th e numerous rivers which intersect th e plains of Up per It alyin every direction required an unusual pontoon train, and special care had to be bestowed on thisdepartment, which in ordinary campaigns forms a quite subordinate part of th e mathiel. The rapiditywit h which t he rivers w ere bridged du ring th e advance of th e army, and th e almost complete absenceof accidents, proved th at t he dispositions made beforehand were equal t o the requirements. Th en therewas the siege train, which, intended as it was against the formidable quadrilateral, had to be dis-proportionately large ; and the g~unboats,which had t o be prepared and sent out for t he Lago di Gardaand t he Mincio.

B u t besides these ext raor din ary requirenlents, th e ordinary wan ts for th e mobilization of so large a forcewere enormous. The first thin g was to organize an auxiliary trai n for t he army. This was done bycontracts mith private individuals, who supplied th e carts of t he country. A s t he arm y was not to live 011r e q~~ is i t ions ,veiythin g had t o be brought from France, w ith th e exception of fresh meat, which wascontracted for. A dd t o this, th at while these preparations were made for the future, th e army had t o be fedfrom day to day, and one cannot but admire th e talent of th e man who directed all these different effortstowards their common aim.

Thi s was, however, only possible by t he assistance of th e telegraph, th e railways, ancl th e steam com-munication by sea. A ll these inventio ns were for th e first tim e applied t o warfare on a la rge scale, an dcertainly the re never was a more complete success achieved o n a first trial. It is the more surprising, assome of these means were in an imperfect st ate ; for instance, on m ost railways thero was bu t one line ofrails, the stations were far too small, and th e ma th iel rath er scanty ; yet, in spite of this , th e railway didwonders, and wi thout a n accident dur ing the campaign. I t was when everything was over th at the onlyaccident occurred, between Turin and Susa.

Thi s colossal sti r and movement of m en an d stores, which now appears so well directed, presentedat th e time to th e spectator th e most hopeless scene of confusion. A train with pontoons passing one waymeeting anot her laden with guns passing in an opposite direction,-here one wi th a battalion of infantry-th ere anoth er wi th gu ns and projectiles-a th ird loading wi th cavalry horses-a fou rth wi th provisions;and so on, day an d night;.

I n t he m idst of this activity occurs th e combat of Montebello.B y th e t ime the Emperor a rr ived in Alessandr ia th e mass of t he French a rmy had taken up i ts

position in front, to th e righ t of th e Sardinian army, which, as has been explained, withdr ewat th e approach of th e Austrians i nto its position behincl the P o and Tanaro, between Casale an dAlessandria. A s th e French divisions arrived one after another, th e Sardinian arm y concentrated onit s own left abou t Casale, Frassinetto , and th e hills of Bfontferrat behind them. The fou rth Fren ch corpscoming from the west took its position between Valenza ancl Bassignana, on th e point where the Tanarojoins th e Po. The second corps (MLMahon) to the right of the fourth, extended from the righ tban k of th e Tanaro through Sale to th e left bank of the Scrivia at Castelnnovo S criv ia; the first corps(Baraguay d'Hilliers) again to th e right of this , from the Scrivia to the spurs of th e Appenines at Vogheraand towards Cas te lla ro; the third corps was behind the f i rs t as rese ne a t Pontecurone, while the Iml ~er i a lGu ard a t Alessandria formed th e general reserve. Th e Iring's head-q uarters mere a t San Salvatore.

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THE WAR IN ITALY. 13The allied armies thu s occupied a position along the bend of the To, on the r ight bank of i t , from

Casale to the foot of th e Apennines, embracing as it were the A us tr ian army, which was on the lef t ban$holding t he i nne r l ine along the bend.Th e Austri an general, having giv en u p hi s offensive intentions, if he ever e nter tain ed any, was

n ow on ly i n t en t o n d i s c ~ v e ~ i n gt which s ide the all ies would make th eir own offensive movement. I norder to ascertain this , Count Stadion of th e 5t h corps was ordered to move forward from Strad ella towardsVoghera. Besides two brigades of his own corps, he ha d tw o oth erg form ing General Urban's flyingdivision, placed under his command, in all about 20,000 men, w ith whom he w as to move forward toward sVoghera unt i l he met the enemy in force .

Accordingly, he s tarted i n the morning of the 20 th of May from Stradella. The two brigades ofGeneral Ur ba n forming th e left column advanced by t he m ain road toward s Casteggio, while th e brigadier-general of the 5t h corps, leaving this road, went to th e r ight toward s Casatisma, on th e road from Casteggioto Pavia, an d th e brigade of Gaal (5th corps) was sti l l farther t o th e r ight toward s the village of Branduzzo.The Austria n reconnaissance was thus advancing in a l ine between th e spurs of th e Appenines, which themain road to Voghera skir ts, almost to th e banks of th e Po.The French had thei r v idettes in advance of Montebello;" t he y consisted of Sardinian cavalry.

The Austrian division Urban, passing through Casteggio by eleven A.M., advanced on Montebello.The Sardinian cavalry fell back towa rds Ginestrello, tryin g to retard the advance of the Austrians. Th eSardinian cavalry, consisting of th e re gimen t of Mon tferrat, and some squadro ns of oth er regiments, in al l800 to 1,000 men, und er th e command of General Sonnaz, on thi s occasion made some brilliant charges,which somewhat retarded th e advance of th e Austrians, and gave time for the divis ion Forey to come up.By th e t ime th at General U rba n had debouched from Ginestrello, t he f irs t brigade of General Forey'sdivision was on the spot. A t th e outskir ts of th e village of Ginestrello, toward s Voghera, run s thelit t le s tream Fossagazzo; this had been th e limit of t he French outposts, and was occupied by tw obattalions of the 84 th regiment ; hese battalions occupied the banks of the s tre am on b oth s ides of themain road, and were sooned joined by two battalions of t he 74th) which General Forey brought up,together with a battery of arti l lery. This lat ter having taken a position on the road, one of the battalionsof the 74th was sent to the lef t , towards the ra i lway l ine ; the Sardinian cavalry was likewise sentto the left .This battalion of the 74th, under Colonel Cambriels, and the Sardinian cavalry, became the object ofrenewed attacks on th e part of the enemy. They, however, kep t thei r groun d bravely, th e Piedmontesecavalry by its bril l iant charges, repeatedly checking t he columns of the Austrians, and the battalion ofinfantry receiving them i n tu rn with a well-directed f ire. General Blanchard, with th e 2nd brigade of th edivision Forey, arr ived just in t ime t o put a n end to this unequal f ight. A s soon as this reinforcement hadtur ne d th e left, th e village of Ginestrello was taken, afte r considerable resistance. This being done, th efirs t brigade was sent to th e r ight of th e road ,on the s lopes of th e Appenines) towards Montebello, an doccupied one of these slopes ; while the arti l lery, protected by th e Piedmontese cavalry, advanced towardsth e same point by this road. The second brigade was left en e'chelon to the lef t of t he road, to watch themovements of th e Austria ns in t ha t direction. By half-past six the village of Montebello was carried, andth e A ustrians were falling back in every directio-n.

Each s ide had lost about 1,200 or 1,500 men i n dead an d wounded, for which th e Fr enc h got inexchange a few prisoners and emp ty ammunition-waggons. Alread y in this firs t engagement great wa nt ofdiscretion on th e par t of the Austria ns was apparen t i n leaving t he divis ion of General U rb an to i ts fate,withou t tryi ng to extr icate i t . The other division of t he 1st Frenc h corps complained th at on their s ide,too, more migh t have been done, for the y could have been brought u p so as to t ake p art i n the engagement.T h a t it was not done, was attr ibuted to t he wish on th e pa rt of Baraguay d 'Hill iers to give General Forey a nopportun ity t o clear himself of ally imputa tion which mi ght have remained on him since the Crimean cam-paign ; he more probable cause seems to have been th e orders of th e Emperor n ot to r isk hastily a generalengagement.

* Mr. Bossoli's sketch represents the moment of the attack on the village of Montebello, which is seen on tha height, aswell as the country to the left, and Casteggio behind.

7/30/2019 The War in Italy - 1859

19/79

14 THE WAR I N ITALY,

O F F E N S I V E M O VE M EN TS O F T H E A L L I E D A R M I E S A N D B AT TL E O F P A L E S T R O .THE reconnaissance" of Montebello was the las t atte mpt on t he pa rt of Gynlai to ascertain th eplans and intentions of the all ies . It mus t have been quite satisfactory, for, from th at moment, he was

persuaded th at t he allies inte nded t o make their offensive movement on his left, and he consequently massedhis arm y on tha t side. Already on t he 19 th he abandoned Vercelli and withdrew his outposts to the leftba nk of the Sesia. H e had scarcely done so when th e division Cialdini, whioh had been watching th emovements of the Au strians along the Sesia, entered Vercelli . On the 21st the same divis ion forded the Sesiai n tw o columns, and established its outposts on th e left bank of th at river. This was th e first offensivemovement on th e part of the allies , th e f irs t s tep for carrying out the plan of the Emperor.

This plan he himself explains in his bnlletin of the 5 th of Jun e, w hich says :-a Th e French army, massed rou nd Alessandria, had gre at obstacles t o overcome. I f it marched

on Piacenza, i t had to besiege tha t place and force th e passage of the Po, which is, at th at point, 900 m& tresbroad ; nd t his difficult operation had to be carried out i n th e face of an arm y of more tha n 200,000 men.

I f the Em peror passed the r iver a t Valenza, he found the enemy concentra ted on the left bank a tMortara, and he could not attack it in thi s position, except by separate columns mancenvring in a coun tryintersected bx canals and rice-fields. The re was, consequently, on bot h those points an obstacle almostimpossible to overcome ; he Emperor, consequently, decided to t ur n i t, and 'h e gave the change' (donnab change) to th e Austrians b y massing his army on the r ight, and by occupying with i t Casteggio and evenBobbio o n t he Trebbia."

To execute this turning movement of which th e Empero r speaks, it was determined to concentrateth e whole army, wit h t he exception of a few detachments remaining in Al