the woman question in aristotle.pdf
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8/11/2019 The woman question in Aristotle.pdf
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ociété québécoise de science politique
Political Rule, Prudence and the "Woman Question" in AristotleAuthor(s): Leah BradshawSource: Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, Vol. 24,No. 3 (Sep., 1991), pp. 557-573Published by: Canadian Political Science Association and the Société québécoise de science politiqueStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3229167 .
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Political
Rule,
Prudence and the
Woman
Question
in
Aristotle*
LEAH
BRADSHAW Brock
University
One of the most enduring and cherished statements of Aristotle is his
precise
definition of
political
rule,
namely,
the
appropriate
kind
of
rule
over
free
and
equal persons
(Pol. 1255b).1
When
one
rules over
those
who are
similar
in
stock and
free,'
one has a
respect
for the
equality
of
citizens,
and the ruler
does
not
see
himself as
endowed
with
any
exclu-
sive
capacity
that
would set
him
permanently
above
the ruled. Aristotle
says
that it has been
correctly
said
that it is not
possible
to
rule
well
without
having
been
ruled
(Pol. 1277b).
A
good
citizen
will know how
to rule
and
how
to be
ruled,
and
will see the
political
association
as an
arrangement among equals.
Political rule for
Aristotle
is not
the
same as
democratic
rule,
though
we often
conflate the
two.
Democratic
rule
presupposes
freedom
of
citizens,
as does
political
rule,
but
it does not
presuppose
the
kind
of
equality
that
Aristotle ascribes to
political
rule. Democratic rule he
defines as
the
majoritarianism
of
the
poor
(Pol.
1290b).
It
does
not
require
a
sharing
of
virtue or
a
general
equality
of
means,
as does
political
rule. Political
rule
requires
moderation
and affection
among
*
I
gratefully
acknowledge
this JOURNAL'S
nonymous
referees'
suggestions.
I
also
thank
my colleague
William Mathie for his
insights
on the relation in Aristotle's
writings
between the
virtue
of
prudence
and
the
practical
experience
of
ruling.
1
All
quotations
from
Aristotle's Politics
are from the
translation
by
Carnes Lord
(Chicago:
University
of
Chicago
Press,
1984);
from
Aristotle's
Nicomachean
Ethics,
the
translation
by
Harris
Rackham
(London:
William
Heinemann,
Loeb
Classical
Library,
1926);
from
Aristotle's
Rhetoric,
the
translation
by
Rhys
Roberts
(New
York:
Modern
Library,
1954);
and
from
Aristotle's Generation
ofAnimals,
the
translation
by
A.
L.
Peck
(Cambridge:
Harvard
University
Press,
Loeb
Classical
Library,
1943).
In
writing
about
Aristotle's
theory
of
political
rule
and the
exercise
of
prudence,
I
have
occasionally
used the
masculine
pronoun.
Since Aristotle did
not include females in the
practice
of either of
these
activities,
it
does not
make
sense
to
employ
gender-neutral
language
in the
discussion.
Leah
Bradshaw,
Department
of
Politics,
Brock
University,
St.
Catharines,
Ontario
L2S 3A1
Canadian
Journal
of
Political
Science
/
Revue
canadienne de
science
politique,
XXIV:3
(September/
septembre
1991).
Printed
in
Canada
/
Imprime
au
Canada
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LEAH BRADSHAW
citizens,
and
Aristotlewarnsthat
if a
city
wishes to be
made
up
of
equal
and
similar itizens
to the extent that that
s
possible,
it
will
take
care not
to
produce
great
extremes of
wealth
and
poverty
(Pol. 1295b),
or dis-
paritiesin wealth tend to lead to the dominanceof one faction over
another.
The
political
partnership
hat
depends
on the
middling
sort
of
person
is
the
best,
and such
partnerships
re
likely
to last
longer,
to
avoid
degenerating
nto
tyranny
(Pol.
1296a),
and to
produce
the
best
legislators
(Pol. 1296a).
When Aristotle
says
that
the
political partnership
hat
depends
upon
the
middling
ort is
best,
he meansthat which
is
best
practically.
The
middling
sort of
regime
is not the sort that
one
might
pray
for
(Pol. 1325b).
The
ideal
regime
would be one made
up
of
perfectly
just
and virtuouscitizens, a regimenot subjectto the winds of fortuneand
circumstance.Given
the limits of
practicalpolitics,
however,
Aristotle
seems to
prefer
the
political
association.
If
a
healthy regime
s one of
political
rule,
and if
political
rule is the
appropriate
ind
of
rule
among
equals,
then
we
might
assume that
in
a
truly political
association there is
no
real distinctionbetween ruler
and
ruled.
We
might
think that the
truly
political partnership
s a
pure
democracy
where no one
really
rules another.
But
this
is
not
what
Aristotlehas
in
mind. He
states
emphatically
hat the virtue
of
the ruler
is not the sameas that of the ruled,even in a politicalpartnershipwhere
all
citizens are
roughlyequal.
For it is
clear
that
a
virtue-[the
virtue]
ofjustice,
for
example-would
not be a
single
thing
for
[a
rulerand
for]
a
ruled
but free
person
who
is
good,
but has differentkinds
in
accordance
with
which one will
rule or be
ruled,
just
as
moderation
and
courage
differ in a man or a
woman
(Pol.
1277b).
More
particularly,
he difference
between
rulerand
ruled,
even
in
a
political
association,
has to do with
prudence
phronesis).
Prudence s
the
only
virtue
peculiar
to the ruler
(Pol.
1277b).
All
other
virtues,
Aristotlesays (meaning he moralvirtuesenumeratednthe Nicomach-
ean
Ethics)
may
be
common
to
both
ruler
and ruled. This can
only
mean
that
while
one
could
expect
a
sharing
n
most virtues
by
all
citizens
in a
political
association,
one could not
expect
to find the
virtue of
prudence
n
the ruled.
Instead,
Aristotle
expects
that one
will
find in
the
ruled true
opinion
(Pol.
1277b).
He
compares
the ruler and
ruled to
the
flute
player
and the
flute
maker,
respectively.
Just
as we
expect
the
quality
of the
instrument o
be
judged
by
the one
who
plays
it,
not
by
the
one
who makes
t,
so
we are
supposed
o inferthat the
quality
of
political
association s bestjudgedbythe one whorulesit, notbythose who make
it.
This
seems
at
first consideration
an odd simile.
Surely,
we
might
think,
a
political
partnership
exists
for
the benefit and
enjoyment
of
those who
partake
n
it,
not
principally
or the
satisfaction
of
the ruler.
The
flute
player
may
be
the
best
judge
of
the
quality
of an
instrument,
558
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8/11/2019 The woman question in Aristotle.pdf
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Abstract. Aristotle
gives
the
classical definition of
political
rule as
the kind
of rule
appropriate
for free
and
equal
persons.
This
concept
of
political
rule is
complicated,
however,
by
the fact
that,
even in what Aristotle calls a free and
equal
association,
the ruler
is
separated
from the
ruled
by
his
possession
of the virtue of
prudence.
This article
explores
the relation between
political
rule
and
prudence
in
Aristotle's
writings,
and
considers particularly the case of political rule between men and women. Though Aristotle
characterizes
the
proper
relation between men and women
as a free and
equal
one,
he
distinguishes
the
male/female
political
relation from the more
general political
relation
by
saying
that men are
naturally
more fit to rule than women. We are interested
in whether
Aristotle excludes women from
political
rule because
he thinks that
women lack
the
potential
for the
virtue
of
prudence.
Resume. Selon
la definition
classique,
donnee
par
Aristote,
la
regle politique
s'applique
a
tous les
citoyens
consideres comme libres et
egaux.
Ce
concept
de
regle
politique
devient
plus complexe
des
lors
que, malgre
le
pouvoir
de
libre et
egale
association,
le
citoyen
est
separe
du
gouvernant par l'obligation
de
prevoyance que
detient ce dernier.
Cet
article
explore
le lien entre la
regle politique
et la vertu de
prevoyance
dans les ecrits
d'Aristote,
plus particulierement
en
ce
qui
concerne la relation
politique
entre les hommes
et les
femmes. Meme si Aristote considere
que
la relation entre les hommes et les femmes est
egale
et librement
consentie,
il
distingue
la relation
politique
homme-femme de
la
regle
generale
en
affirmant
que
les hommes sont naturellement
plus
aptes
a
gouverner.
La
question,
ici,
est de savoir si Aristote exclut les femmes de
la
regle
politique parce
qu'il
pense
qu'elles
ont
moins
d'aptitudes
a
maitriser
la
vertu
de
prevoyance.
but
is the ruler the best
judge
of a
political
association?
Aristotle
appar-
ently
thinks so.
Just
as
we
might
say
that a
concert
is for the
enjoyment
of
an
audience,
but we would not
expect
to
rely
on the audience for
critical reviews, so one might say that political partnerships are for the
benefit and
enjoyment
of
the
people
who
live
under
political
institutions,
though
the ruled are not
necessarily
the best
judges
of those
institutions.
Also,
even
though
Aristotle claims that ruler and ruled
can share
in
all
virtues
except prudence,
he
obviously
thinks that
the
possession
(or
lack)
of
prudence
colours all other virtues
in
some
way.
We know this
because he
says
that
justice, courage
and
moderation,
though possessed
by
ruler and
ruled,
will
manifest themselves
differently
in
the ruler
(who
has
prudence)
than
in
the ruled
(who
have
only
correct
opinion),
just
as
we would expect that these virtues manifest themselves differently in
men and
women.
If
prudence
is
the
central
thing separating
ruler
from
ruled
in an
otherwise
equal
partnership,
we need
to
know more
about
it,
and we
find a
fairly
extensive
discussion
of
it in the
Nicomachean
Ethics.
Aristotle
calls
prudence
a
true,
or
correct,
conception
of deliberation
with
regard
to
what is
expedient
as
a means to
an end
(N.E.
1
143a).
Good
deliberation
he
describes
as correctness
of
thinking
that involves
conscious
calculation
(N.E.
1142b).
Prudence
is a correct
manner of
thinking that is applied to a particular course of action. A prudent
decision
requires
not
simply
the
right
deliberation
about
something
but
applying
that
thinking
to
choosing
an
appropriate
means
to
an end.
The
connection
between
prudence
and action
is
critical
for
Aristotle. He
says
that
prudence
is a virtue that
does
not
merely
make
judgments,
but
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LEAH
BRADSHAW
issues commands
(N.E. 1143a).
The
objective
of
prudence
is to
deter-
mine
what
we
ought
or
ought
not to do.
Specifically,
prudence
is bound
up
with
judgment
about human
beings
acting
and
living together.
Aristo-
tle distinguishes prudence from both science (episteme) and art
(techne).
Science
produces
certain
knowledge
about
invariable
things,
art
produces
objects
in the
world,
but
prudence
deliberates about
vari-
able
things,
especially
political
matters
and household affairs
(N.E.
1140b).
Importantly,
while
Aristotle
emphasizes
prudence's application
to
practical,
variable
human
activity,
and
sees
its
value as
lying particularly
in
the
running
of
political
and
household
affairs,
he
nevertheless
categor-
izes
prudence
as
an
intellectual
virtue,
indeed
as one of
the two
highest
intellectual virtues. The other one is wisdom (sophia), what Aristotle
calls
a
combination of
intelligence
and
scientific
knowledge regarding
invariable
things.
The intellectual virtues
of
wisdom
and
prudence
have
a
complex
interrelation,
according
to
Aristotle.
Wisdom,
the virtue
that
is
oriented toward
the
consideration
of
invariable
things,
is the
most
divine
element
in
human
beings,
and Aristotle
says
that
the best life will
emulate
the divine.
At
the
same
time,
he
warns that
human
beings
are
not
gods,
and that
they
are called
upon
to
exercise
the
specifically
human
virtue of
prudence.
Prudence,
of
course,
is
that virtue
directed
at
variable, human things. Though it appears that Aristotle held wisdom to
be
the
higher
of the two
intellectual
virtues,
it is difficult to see
how
one
could
exercise
prudence
without
wisdom.
On
the other
hand,
it does
seem
possible,
according
to
Aristotle's
descriptions,
to
possess
wisdom
(essentially
a
contemplative
virtue)
and not to
possess
prudence
(N.E.
1178).
Prudence
qualifies
as an
intellectual
virtue,
despite
its
practical
bent,
because
prudence requires
intelligence
as well
as
practical
sensi-
bility.
Choice of
any
kind,
Aristotle
rightly
says,
always
involves an
intellectual, deliberative element, and the ability to make good choices
cannot be
acquired by experience
alone.
Experience may provide
a solid
grounding
for
doing
what is
familiar,
but
it
cannot
be an
adequate
basis
for
making
reasoned
and
difficult choices. Even
though
prudence
is
directed at
practical
activity
and
requires knowledge
of
particular
facts
even
more than
the
knowledge
of
general principles
(N.E. 1141b),
prudence
cannot exist without
some
supreme directing faculty
(N.E.
1141b).
The
prudent
individual
may
have
a
well-grounded
practical
sense of
things
and
may
need
a
sensitivity
to
the
particular;
but
he
will
see all of this in light of his supreme directing faculty which Aristotle
calls
intelligence.
To
get
a
better
sense of
how
Aristotle
sees
prudence
as
both an
intellectual
and
a
practical
virtue,
it is
helpful
to
look at
some
of
his
examples.
He
concedes
that
those who
are
ignorant
of
general
principles
560
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Rule,
Prudence and the
Woman
Question
in
Aristotle
are nevertheless sometimes more successful in action than those
who
grasp
general principles
but are
lacking
in
particular knowledge.
For
instance,
if
a
man knows that
light
meat is
easily
digested
and therefore
wholesome, but does not know what kinds of meat are light, he will not
be
so
likely
to restore
you
to
health as
a man who
merely
knows
that
chicken is
wholesome;
and
in
other
matters,
men of
experience
are more
successful than theorists
(N.E. 1141b).
Similarly,
he
says
that
the
unproved
assertions and
opinions
of
experienced
and
elderly people
ought
to be
heeded,
since
experience
has
given
them
an
eye
for
things
(N.E. 1143b).
Aristotle's
examples emphasize experience
and
practical
knowhow as
integral
to
prudence,
but he still is
careful
to
point
out
that these things are not sufficient. Prudence is not merely correct
decision,
for it is
possible
to arrive
at the
right
decision
for the
wrong
reasons and no one
would call such decision
prudent
(N.E.
1142b).
Prudence
requires
the
correct
choice
of
action for reasons that
are
themselves correct and conscious. Aristotle
also
says
that we would not
call
someone
prudent
who
arrived
at a correct decision
for
correct
reasons but after a
painfully
slow
process
of deliberation.
Prudence
seems
to demand
quickness
of
mind,
swiftness of decision
and decisive-
ness
of action.
The
combination of
intellectual
quality
and
practical
judgment seems to constitute the core of prudence. Someone who is
prudent
understands
fully why
a
particular
course
of action is
good,
and
so chooses
deliberately
and
knowledgeably.
Virtue
is
not
merely
a
disposition
conforming
to
right
principle,
but
one
cooperating
with
right
principle;
and
prudence
is
right principle
in
matters
of conduct
(N.E.
1144b).
One needs
intelligence,
good
character
and
practical experience
to
be
prudent.
It is
possible
for
a
person
to
possess
some moral
virtues and
not
others,
Aristotle
says.
For
example,
one
may
be
courageous
but not
necessarily just; it is possible to be moderate but not courageous. But it
is not
possible
to be
prudent
without at the same
time
having
all
other
moral virtues
(N.E. 1145a).
Prudence,
the
quintessential ruling
virtue,
cannot
afford
to be a
badjudge
of
anything.
It is the most
complete
virtue
for a human
being
(N.E. 1144b).
We can summarize Aristotle's account
of
prudence by
ascribing
to
it
the
following qualities.
It
has
a
truth-telling,
rational
quality,
which
places
it
squarely
in the
realm
of intellectual
virtue.
Prudence
demon-
strates
good
character,
that
is,
habituation
in
the moral
virtues
such
as
justice, courage and moderation. Finally, prudence requires the oppor-
tunity
to make decisions and issue
commands,
meaning
that it
can be
exercised
only
in
practical
conduct
and from a
position
of
authority.
One
has to
be able to
produce
results,
and
for
this one needs
power
to execute
decision.
561
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LEAH BRADSHAW
The last
feature of
prudence-issuing
commands-is
of
particular
interest
to
us
in
light
of
the
considerations
on
political
rule. Aristotle has
said that
prudence
is the virtue
peculiar
to
the
ruler,
even
in
an
otherwise
equal partnership. We know certainly that Aristotle considered the
authority
to
issue
commands as an
integral part
of
prudence.
He
has
even
gone
as
far to
say
that it is
probably
true
that
no
one can obtain the
virtue of
prudence
without
domestic
economy
and
politics
(N.E.
1142a).
In
short,
to
exercise
prudence
one needs a domain to rule. What we want
to
know,
however,
is
whether
prudence
is a virtue that is
acquired only
by ruling
(something
that is learned
by doing)
or whether it is
a
latent
virtue
that
predisposes
some toward fitness to rule over
others?
Aristotle does not
furnish an
easy
answer
to the
question.
On
the
one hand, he says that we cannot be prudent without being good
(N.E.
1144a),
and
by
goodness
he
means an absence
of
vice
(1144a),
or a kind of
moral
judgment
that
goes beyond
cleverness.
Goodness
encompasses
natural
qualities
( a
natural
affinity
for
virtue,
loving
what
is noble and
hating
what
is
base
[N.E.
1179b]);
proper
habituation
( it
is
difficult to obtain
a
right
education
in
virtue from
youth up
without
being brought
up
under
right
laws
[N.E.
1179b]);
and
intelligence
(goodness
will be
secured
if
men's lives are
regulated
by
a certain
intelligence
[N.E.
1180a]).
Obviously,
even to
qualify
for the virtue
of
prudence, one has to have a ratherdemanding assemblage of qualities: a
natural
predisposition
toward
virtue,
good
habits and
education,
and
intelligence.
If
one
is
deficient
in
any
of
them,
it is
difficult
to
see
how
one
could
even
hope
to be
prudent,
according
to Aristotle's
stringent
requirements.
Yet not
having
the occasion or the
opportunity
to exercise
authority
and
issue
commands,
one
conceivably
could have
all the
necessary
qualities
of
goodness
and
still
lack
prudence.
Aristotle discusses
just
this situation.
Individuals can
have
all the
qualities
that
constitute
goodness, and this would mean that they necessarily would have a
proper
understanding
of
things
in
general,
but
it would not mean
neces-
sarily
that
they
have
prudence.
A
person
with
good understanding
(eusunesia),
according
to
Aristotle,
has
a
grasp
of variable
things
con-
cerning
human
happiness
(the
importance
of
community, family,
friend-
ship
for
example),
and
therefore is
concerned
with the same
objects
as a
prudent
person (N.E. 1143a).
But
the
big
difference between the
person
with
understanding
and the
person
with
prudence
is
that
the latter has
authority
and
issues
commands.
Understanding
is not the same
thing
as Prudence; for Prudence issues commands since its end is a statement
of
what we
ought
to do
or
not to
do,
whereas
Understanding merely
makes
judgments
(N.E.
1143a).
Evidently,
the
only thing
that
separates
the
good
man with
prudence
from the
good
man
without
prudence
is
the
authority
vested
in
the
former,
which allows him the
opportunity
to
cultivate the
additional virtue.
562
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Rule,
Prudence and the
Woman
Question
in Aristotle
Now
it
should be clear
why
Aristotle
says
that
prudence
is a
virtue
peculiar
to the ruler in
an otherwise
equal,
political
association.
Even
among
those who are
equal
in
significant ways-having roughly
the
same virtues, the same amounts of wealth, the same habits and
education-the ruler is
unequal
in the
possession
of
prudence
because
he rules.
Only
the ruler has
prudence
because
only
he has
the
authority
to
carry
out his
judgments
in
action. When Aristotle
says
that
the ruled
in
a
political
association have true
opinion
(doxa
alethes),
and
that this
true
opinion
is
their
virtue of
citizenship,
he means that
they
are
capable
of
recognizing
and
deferring
to
prudent leadership
(Pol.
1277b).
Aristo-
tle writes
in
the Nicomachean Ethics that when we
employ
the
faculty
of
Opinion
to
judge
what another
person says
about matters
that are
in
the sphere of Prudence, we are said to understand (that is, to judge
rightly,
for
right judgment
is
the
same as
good understanding)
(N.E.
1143a).
A
good
citizen
in
a
political
association would have the
capacity
for
right judgment,
which
would
lead him to form the correct
opinion
about
prudent
leadership.
That same
citizen
may
well
acquire prudence,
indeed
possess
all the
necessary
elements for
it,
but
only
if
he takes
his
place
as ruler in a
rotation of office. The rotation of office
in
political
association is
possible
and
actually
desirable,
Aristotle
says.
Political Rule over Women
Now
I
want to look at a
particular
case of
political
rule: that
which
exists,
according
to
Aristotle,
in
the household between
husband
and
wife.
Aristotle
depicts
the
proper
relation between husband and wife as a
political
one,
which,
as we
already
know
from his
general
reflections
on
the
subject,
is the
appropriate
kind
of
rule
for
equals.
Aristotle
has
acknowledged
that
in most
political
offices,
it
is
true,
there
is
an
alternation
of
ruler and
ruled,
since
they
tend
by
their nature
to be
on an
equal footing and to differ in nothing (Pol. 1259b). He goes on to say,
however,
that
in
the
political partnership
of husband
and
wife,
there
is to
be no
such alternation.
The husband
permanently
rules his
wife. We
know
immediately
what
the
implications
of this
are
for women.
If,
as
we
have
discovered,
it is
possible
to
acquire
prudence only
by
ruling
(and
we know that
prudence
is one
of the
two
highest
virtues
open
to
human
beings),
then we
can deduce from this one
simple
statement
of Aristo-
tle's that
women are
effectively
barred from
the virtue
of
prudence.
Unlike
citizens in a
political
association,
who share
the
potential
for
prudence and the hope of taking their turn at rule, women in a political
partnership
with men
have no
potential
or
hope
for
prudence.
Aristotle
says clearly
that
the
male,
unless constituted
in
some
respect
contrary
to
nature,
is
by
nature more
adept
at
leading
than
the female
(Pol. 1259a).
563
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LEAH
BRADSHAW
It is
not at all
obvious from
reading
Aristotle's Politics
why
he
deems the
appropriate
elationbetween
men and women
in
the
house-
hold as
an
equal, political
one,
yet
at the same time
proclaims
that the
maleby nature s moreexpertat leadingthan the female. All Aristotle
has
to
say
about the natural
rulingexpertise
of men
in
the
Politics is
that
those who
rule
permanently
over
others seek to establish differ-
ences in
external
appearance,
ormsof
addressand
prerogatives....
The
male
always
standsthus in
relation o
the female
(Pol. 12596b).
This is
a remark
about
conventions,
not natural
characteristics,
and seems
to
mean
nothing
morethan
that those
who
are
in
authority
or a
long
period
of time
look and
act the role.
Surely
this
is no
explanation
or
why
the
male
is
more
expert
by
nature than the female at
leading.
In one other passingbut criticalremark n the Politics, Aristotle
says
that women are
to be ruled
by
men in
a
political
manner,
appropri-
ate for
equals,
because
the
female
possesses
the deliberative
aculty,
though
n the
female,
he
adds thatthe
deliberative
aculty
lacks author-
ity
(Pol. 1260a).2
His claim
that the
intellectual
aspect
of women's
judgment
is not
authoritative
or their conduct is the
only
decisive
statementthat
Aristotle makes in
the
Politics
regarding
a fundamental
difference
between men
and women.
Since
we know
from
our
investiga-
tion of
prudence
that there
are three essential conditions for its
exercise-good character, proper habituation and intelligence-we
want to
see
if we
can
locate in
Aristotle's
writings
some account of
natural
defect in women
that led him
to
conjecture
hat the
delibera-
tive element in
females s
without
authority,
and
hence
to claim
that
men
are
by
nature
more
fit to
rule
than women.
We know
that the female is
capable
of
deliberation
because Aristo-
tle
says
so
explicitly
(Pol. 1260a).
We
know,
too,
that
deliberative xcel-
lence,
or
intelligence,
is an
important
lement
of
prudence,
the element
in
fact that ties
prudence
o
intellectualvirtue.
The
reason
why
Aristotle
says thatwomen shouldbe ruled n a mannerappropriateor equalsis
because
they
have
this
faculty,
so this
tells us
something
of
the
impor-
tance that
Aristotle
places
upon
deliberation
reason)
n
the
hierarchy
of
human
activities. Women
are
not
to be
ruled
in
a monarchical ashion
(appropriate
or
children),
or
in a
masterly
fashion
(appropriate
or
slaves),
according
to Aristotle
because,
unlike children and
slaves,
women
are
capable
of
reason.
If
Aristotle thinksthat women shouldbe
ruled
permanentlyby
men,
it
obviously
is
not because
he thinkswomen
are
intellectually
deficient. On the
contrary,
the
deliberative
capacity
appearsto be the very grounduponwhich men and women areequal:
hence
the
appropriateness
f
political
rule between them.
2
The
Greek
term is
akuron,
meaning
without
authority.
Akuros can
pertain
to
persons,
denoting
that
they
have no
power
or
authority;
or it
can
apply
to laws or
sentences,
in
which
case
the term
takes on
the
rather more
pointed
meaning
of no
longer
in
force,
cancelled, annulled,
or
set aside.
564
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Rule,
Prudence and the
Woman
Question
in Aristotle
Turning
to consideration of
the moral
virtues,
we
see that Aristotle
is clear
that men
and women
are both
capable
of
habituation
in
the moral
virtues,
yet
in
every
case
where he
speaks
of
these,
he
is careful
to
point
out that the moral virtues are not exactly the same for men and women.
For
example,
although
both
men
and women have the
capacity
for
courage
and
moderation,
Aristotle
says
that we
apply differing
stand-
ards or
expectations
to
each sex.
A
man would be
held
a coward
if
he
were as
courageous
as a
courageous
woman,
and a woman
talkative
if
she were as
modest
as
the
good
man
(Pol.
1277b).
Taking
issue
with
Socrates' claim that the moral
virtues are
the same for
everyone, regard-
less of
sex,
Aristotle
says explicitly
that
justice,
courage
and moderation
are
not the same for men and women:
There
is a
ruling
and a
serving
courage, and similarly with the other virtues (Pol. 1260a). And finally,
in
the
Rhetoric,
Aristotle identifies the male excellences
of the
soul as
temperance
and
courage;
the female excellences
of
the
soul
he
desig-
nates as
self-command
(temperance)
and an
industry
that is
not
sordid
(Rhet. 1361a).
Why
should the moral
virtues,
and
by
extension,
habituation,
be
different
for men and women? The
answer
cannot lie
with
differences
in
deliberative
capacity,
or
intelligence,
since we have
already
established
that this is the
ground
upon
which
men
and
women are
equal.
Aristotle
does not think that there are ruling and serving moral virtues
because of
any
fundamental
sexual differences
in
reason
or intellect.
As
Stephen
Salkever
points
out in
his
analysis
of
Aristotle's
treatment
of
the moral
virtues in the
Rhetoric,
sophrosune
[moderation
or
temper-
ance]
is the
common
virtue
between men
and
women,
and the virtue
whose
potential
expression
the
two
sexes share
is of
infinitely
more
importance
and
worth
than the one that divides them. 3
If
there is
any explanation
for Aristotle's distinction
other
than
mere
convention,
then it
must lie
elsewhere,
perhaps
in
what
Aristotle
calls natural character or endowment. Natural character Aristotle
describes
in
the Nicomachean Ethics
as
an endowment
obviously
not
under our
control;
it is bestowed on those who are fortunate
in the true
sense,
by
some divine
dispensation
(N.E. 1179b).
Still,
he
says
that
natural
character has to be tilled
if
it is to flourish.
All
sorts
of
circumstances-bad
habits,
poor
education,
defective
laws-can
stunt
natural
character,
but Aristotle also
discusses
at
length
a constitutional
defect that
may
thwart an otherwise
good
natural character.
The
defect
is
too
much
passion.
He that lives at the dictates
of
passion
will
not hear nor understand the reasoning of one who tries to dissuade him;
but
if
so,
how
can
you change
his
mind
by
argument?
And
generally
speaking, passion
seems not to be amenable to
reason,
but
only
to
3
Stephen
Salkever, Women,
Soldiers,
Citizens: Plato and Aristotle on the
Politics
of
Virility, Polity
19
(1986),
243.
565
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LEAH
BRADSHAW
force
(N.E. 1179b).
A
common
interpretation
of Aristotle
claims
that
he
thinks
women
were ruled
by
their
passions
in
just
the
manner
described
above,
but
there is
no
evidence
in
any
of
his
writings
to
support this view. We know that Aristotle thinks women quite capable
of
deliberation and amenable
to reason. He states
clearly
that
women
are not to be
ruled
by
force,
a manner of rule
appropriate
only
for those
incapable
of reason.
Aristotle does not
think
that
women are
purely
emotive
creatures,
with little or no
capability
for rational
thought.
While
a
nature ruled
by
passion
is
a serious obstacle to
the cultivation of moral
virtue,
and a
common
enough
problem
among
human
beings,
Aristotle
does
not
attribute this
condition
universally
to the female sex.
There
is
another constitutional
defect, however,
that interests
us: the state of character wherein one understands and deliberates
correctly
about
things,
but
is
incapable
of
acting
on that
understanding.
Unlike the individual who
lives at the dictates of his
passions,
this
type
of
person
knows what he
ought
to
do,
but
cannot
carry
out his own
imperatives.
He has the voice of
reason,
but does not
obey
it. As
Aristotle
puts
it: The weak
deliberate,
but then are
prevented
by
passion
from
keeping
to their
resolution
(N.E. 1150b).
This is a
condi-
tion of
character that
Aristotle labels incontinence
(akrasia),
and while
it is not
exactly
vice
(incontinence
conflicts
with a correct
decision,
whereas vice entails a wrong decision), nevertheless it is similar to vice
in
the
consequences
it
produces
(N.E.
1151a).
Aristotle
compares
the
incontinent
person
to a state which
passes
all
the
proper
enactments
and has
good
laws,
but
which never
keeps
its
laws
(N.E. 1152a).
Incontinent
people
deliberate
correctly
but are
too
weak to
carry
out
their own
judgments: they
apparently
have no
authority
over
their
own
passions.
Aristotle
points
out
that incontinent
people
are
incapable
of
pru-
dence. The same
person
cannot be
at once
unrestrained and
prudent,
for it has been shown that Prudence is inseparable from Moral Virtue.
Also,
Prudence does not
consist
only
in
knowing
what
is
right,
but also
in
doing
it,
but
the unrestrained man does
not
do the
right
(N.E.
1152a).
We
recall that
in his
description
of
political
rule,
Aristotle
had said
that
the
ruler
has
prudence;
the
ruled have
correct
opinion.
An
inconti-
nent
person,
as
Aristotle has
described
him,
may
well fall
into the
category
of
good
citizen under
political
rule.
He has the
right
under-
standing
of
things,
knows
good
judgment
when he sees
it,
but
requires
some
authority
other than his own
resolve to make
him
obey
reason.
Aristotle says of the incontinent:
There
is
a
person
who
abandonshis
choice,
against right principle,
underthe
influence
of
passion,
who is
mastered
by passion
sufficiently
or him
not
to act in
accordance with
right
principle,
but not so
completely
as to
be of
such
a
characteras to believe
that the reckless
pursuit
of
pleasure
s
right.
This is the
566
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Rule,
Prudence
and
the Woman
Question
in
Aristotle
unrestrained
man:
he is
better
han
the
profligate,
and not
absolutely
bad,
for in
him the
highest
part
of
man,
the fundamental
principle,
is
preserved
(N.E.
1151a).
The fundamental
principle
to
which Aristotle refers
is,
of
course,
reason,
and it is the
preservation
of this
principle
in
the
incontinent
person
that
makes
it
possible
for
him
to be ruled
in
a
political
manner,
despite
the fact that his flawed character makes
it
impossible
for him
ever to
acquire prudence.
Aristotle's
depiction
of
the
incontinent,
or
unrestrained,
man
is
particularly
interesting
to
us,
because it seems
to hold
out
an
explanation
of
the
peculiar
condition
of
women,
who are
supposedly equal
to men
in
some
way,
yet
destined to be ruled
permanently by
them.
Like the
incontinent,
the female has the
capacity
for
reason
and
deliberation;
also
like
the
incontinent,
the female nevertheless
needs to be
ruled
by
others
since she
apparently
has no
authority
over her
passions.
As one
com-
mentator has
put
it: The deliberative
faculty
of women
is
ineffective
[akuron;
Pol.
1260al3]...
This means
not
that
women are less
intelli-
gent
than
men,
but
primarily
that
they
are less able
to
impose
their
judgments
on their emotions. It
is
not that
they
do
not value self-control
as men
do,
but that
they
have less
capacity
to exercise it
effectively. 4
Did Aristotle
think that women on the
whole were incontinent and
unrestrained? Is this
why they
have to be ruled
by
men? Is this
why they
can never
rule,
and never
acquire
the virtue of
prudence?
Aristotle does seem
to
identify
a kind of
incontinence
that is
pecul-
iar
to women.
He admires self-restraint and
says
that self-restraint
(of
passion,
or
showing pain)
is
a much more admirable
thing
than endur-
ance of a
passion
or a
pain.
Self-restraint entails
mastery
of
oneself,
whereas endurance
is
only
successful resistance
(N.E.
1150b).
Evi-
dently,
for
Aristotle,
self-restraint is
very
much a masculine
attribute,
whereas endurance
is characteristic
of
females.
He
has this
to
say
about
masculine
responses
to
fatigue:
One who is deficient in resistance to
pains
that most men
endure with success is soft or luxurious
(for
Luxury
is
a kind of
softness):
such a
man
lets
his
cloak
trail
on the
ground
to
escape
the
fatigue
and trouble of
lifting
it,
or
feigns
sickness,
not
seeing
that to
counterfeit
misery
is to be
miserable
(N.E.
1150b).
We are sur-
prised,
he
continues,
when a
man is overcome
by pains
or
pleasures
that
most men can
withstand,
unless his failure to master
his
inclinations
is
owing
to
some
innate
tendency
or
disease. Instances
of
such
innate
tendency
or
disease Aristotle
gives
are the
hereditary
effeminacy
of the
royal
family
of
Scythia,
and the inferior endurance of the female
sex
as
compared
with the male
(N.E. 1150b).
In
identifying
the inferior
endurance of the
female as an
innate
quality,
Aristotle
implies
that the
4
John
M.
Rist,
The
Mind
of
Aristotle:
A
Study
in
Philosophical
Growth
(Toronto:
University
of
Toronto
Press, 1989),
152-53.
567
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LEAH BRADSHAW
female sex as a whole suffers
from some
physiological
weakness,
not
necessarily
a character
flaw,
but
a
biological, gender-based
disposi-
tion.
If
there were a
physiological
basis for female
weakness,
this
would
ascribe to women a kind of natural incontinence that would affect
their
participation
in moral
virtue and
preclude
them
from
acquiring
prudence.
Physiology
and
Gender
Difference
Is
there
any
basis
in
Aristotle's
corpus
for
defending
such a
biological
view
of
female
incontinence? Aristotle
furnishes no
clue whatsoever in
the Politics
or
the
Nicomachean
Ethics,
but
he examines in some
detail
the
physiological differences between the sexes in the Generation of
Animals.
In an
infamous
passage
from this
work,
Aristotle
says
that
the
female is as it
were a
deformed
male
(G.A.
737a).
This statement
actually
is
made in
the
context
of
a
discussion of the
respective
male and
female
roles
in
reproduction.
In
the
act of
reproduction,
according
to
Aristotle,
the male
produces
the
principle
of
soul,
that
which fashions
the
material into
shape,
whereas
the
female furnishes the
material
(G.A.
737a). This,
in
our
view,
he
states,
is
the
specific
character of each
of
the
sexes:
that
is,
what
it means
to
be male
or
female
(G.A. 738b).
Aristotle
has
grounded
maleness and
femaleness in physiological differ-
ences,
and
it
seems that
he has
afforded the
male
the
formative role in
reproduction.
The
physical part,
the
body,
comes
from
the
female,
and
the Soul
from
the
male,
since the
Soul is
the essence of a
particular
body (G.E. 738b).
The
respective
roles of
male
and
female in
reproduc-
tion are
described
as
active
(causing
movement)
and
passive
(being
set
in
movement)
(G.E.
729b).
In
characterizing
the
female as a
deformed
male,
Aristotle
is
doing
so within
the
narrow
parameters
of
physiologi-
cal
reproduction.
He
thought
that the
female was
deformed insofar
as
she did
not
produce
the
principle
of
soul
(sperm)
but
only
the
material
required
for
reproduction.
Aristotle's
assertions
in
the
Generation
of
Animals
have led to
much
speculation
concerning
his
alleged
depiction
of
the
inferiority
of
women,
but
we have
to
be careful
to remind
ourselves that the Genera-
tion
of
Animals
is an
empirical
study
of
biology
and
physiology,
not
a
speculative
tract on
the
moral
or
spiritual
qualities
of
animals. Within the
text
itself,
Aristotle
makes
statements that
should detain
us
from
infer-
ring
from
his
comments
about
biology
that women
are deformed men
either
spiritually
or
morally.
For
example,
Aristotle
says
that in the act
of
reproduction,
when
the semen
has
entered the
uterus it 'sets' the
residue
produced
by
the
female and
imparts
to it the
same movement
with
which it is
endowed
(G.E. 737a).
Whatever we
may
now think
about
cause
and
effect
in the act
of
reproduction,
and however far-
fetched
this
description
of
conception
may appear
to
moderns,
we
568
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Rule,
Prudence
and the
Woman
Question
in Aristotle
nevertheless can see
from
this
passage
that Aristotle
thought
that
when
the male
principle
of
soul was matched
with
the female
physical
matter,
what resulted was
a human
being
with both
soul
and
body.
And
this is true whether the offspring is female or male. The fully formed
female
is not without
soul,
according
to
Aristotle,
and therefore
is
not
deformed.
Another
example
warns us
further
against
making
too much of
the
male/female
distinction in
the
Generation
of
Animals.
Aristotle
says
that in
those
creatures
in
which
logos
and
body
are
distinct
features-
and
this
includes
all the
higher
animals as
well as
human
beings- the
body-that
is
to
say
the
physical
matter-of
the
active
partner
and the
passive
partner
must be
different
(G.E.
729a).
In
separating logos
from
body in higher animals, Aristotle clearly is distinguishing that which the
different
sexes
share-logos-from
that in
which
they
differ-the
body.
The
active and
passive
designations
attributed
to
male and
female
per-
tain
to
their
sexual
and
reproductive functions,
not
necessarily
to their
moral or
intellectual
ones.
Of
course,
there is
an
erotic
element
to
sexual
relations and
repro-
duction that
Aristotle
never
mentions.
Even
though
body
and
logos
are
distinct
features,
as
Aristotle
says,
one
wonders how
much
logos
is in
fact
affected
by
bodily
differences.
In
particular,
one
wonders
whether
the weakness that Aristotle attributes to women-their inferior endur-
ance
and
their
female
incontinence-can be
traced
to
the
physiological
differences
between men
and
women
that are
described in
the
Genera-
tion
of
Animals.
Here
again,
though,
we
are left
only
with
speculation
since
Aristotle
himself
nowhere
makes
these
inferences. If
anything,
his
discussion
seems
to lead
us
away
from
this
kind of
conjecture.
In
discussing
gestation
for
instance,
Aristotle
comments
upon
the
pain
that
females
experience
giving
birth.
Human
females,
he
says,
suffer
more
than
other animals
in
this,
yet
the
cause
of
this is
to some
extent
attributable to their manner of life, which is sedentary, and this means
that
they
are full
of
residue.
Looking
at
tribes where
the
women
do
hard
physical
labour,
Aristotle
observes
that
the
women
find
delivery
an
easy
business.
And
so do
women
everywhere
who
are used to
hard
work
(G.A.
775a).
Since
Aristotle had
linked
female
weakness
specifi-
cally
to
the
incapacity
to master
pain
and
fatigue,
this
remark is
interest-
ing.
Aristotle
apparently thought
that
Greek
women led
sedentary
lives,
characterized
by
difficult
pregnancies
and
painful
births,
and
this
may
well
have
influenced his
thoughts
on
how
Greek
men and
women dif-
fered in their practice of moral virtue. If women are overcome for much
of
their
adult
life
by
the
pain
of
bearing
children,
then this
might
be
good
reason
why
women
could
not,
in
Aristotle's
view,
master
their bodies
and
passions
with
reason.
At the
same
time
though,
by
comparing
Greek
women
to
tribal
women,
Aristotle
indicates
that
the
painful
condition of
569
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LEAH
BRADSHAW
womanhood
may
be more a cultural
phenomenon
than
a
natural state
of
affairs.
The
Generation
of
Animals is a
fascinating
but
ultimately
inconclu-
sive foray into the complex differences between men and women. We
know
from
it
that Aristotle had
strong opinions
about
reproduction,
and
the
soul-forming
role of
the
male
in
the act of
conception.
We know that
in
describing
the
physical
act of
conception,
he
designates
the male and
female roles as
active
and
passive, respectively.
But
Aristotle does not
himself adduce
any
conclusions from these observations
about essential
moral,
spiritual
or
intellectual differences between men and women.
He
seemed
to think that women
had to endure a lot
of
pain
as a
consequence
of
their role in
reproduction,
but in
the end he
questions
whether
this
is
a
universal, natural kind of suffering. In short, it is difficult to find in
the Generation
of
Animals
any
conclusive
evidence
that
Aristotle
thought
there was
a
natural,
physiological
basis for the inherent weak-
ness
of
women.
Conclusion
To
summarize Aristotle's
thoughts
on the
political relationship
between
men
and
women,
we
can
say
the
following.
Male and female
belong
in
an
equal partnership because they share the highest human capacity: that of
reason,
or
deliberation.
Despite
the
equality,
however,
Aristotle
says
that the male is more
fit
to
rule than the female because:
(1)
the
male has
adapted
manners
of dress
and
style
that are
appropriate
for
rulers;
and
(2)
the
female lacks the
authority
to
carry
out her own deliberations.
According
to Aristotle's own
definition of
prudence,
which is
the virtue
specific
to
rulers,
women
are
necessarily
excluded from
acquiring
this
virtue since
they
are
excluded
from
ruling.
We wanted to know
if
Aristotle
furnished
any grounds,
other than
merely
conventional
ones,
for why women should be the equals of men, yet naturally incapable
of
authority.
We
found some
indication
in
Aristotle's
writings
that there
might
be such a
ground.
He
apparently
identified a weakness
specific
to
women
that
resembles the more
general
condition
of
incontinence,
as
that
condition is described
in
the Nicomachean Ethics. The inconti-
nence
of
women
seemed to Aristotle to
consist
in
the female's inferior
endurance
of
either
pain
or
passion.
When we turned to
the Generation
of
Animals to
locate
further
evidence
of the natural
incontinence
of
women,
we
did
not
find
much
proof. Though graphically portraying different roles for the sexes in the
physical
act of
reproduction,
Aristotle
does not
suggest
that these roles
are,
or should
be,
paradigmatic
for the
moral and
spiritual
development
of men and
women.
Furthermore,
he
suggests
that
the
weakness
of
women
may
be more
culturally patterned
than natural.
In the
end,
we
are
left
wondering
just
how much of women's
incontinence
and lack
of
570
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Rule,
Prudence and the
Woman
Question
in Aristotle
authority
is
owing
to
their
habituation
in
dependency,
and how
much is
owing
to natural causes.
Aristotle
may
not have been
bothered
nearly
as
much as
we moderns
are
by
this
nature/nurture
dilemma,
for he
writes:
Incontinents through habituation are more easily cured than natural
incontinents,
for
habit
is
easier
than
nature
to
change.
Indeed,
the
reason
why
habit is also difficult to
change
is
that
it is like nature
as
Evenus
says.
'Habit,
I
say,
is
longtime training,
my
friend,
and in the
end,
training
is
nature for human
beings'
(N.E.
1152).
It
is
perhaps appropriate
at the close of this
investigation
of
political
rule,
prudence
and the woman
question
in
Aristotle
to
say
something
of
why
the
project
should
be
of
interest
to us
in
the
present.
Aristotle's
general
reflections
on
political
rule are valuable for democrats.
Even
in
the kind of political arrangement that is appropriate for equal citizens, he
writes that
there
is
a difference between the virtues
of
ruler
and
ruled.
Only
the
ruler
possesses prudence,
a
virtue that is
acquired
in
the
practice
of
leadership.
Prudence for
Aristotle
is
one of the two
highest
intellectual virtues
practised by
human
beings,
and
it
is
a virtue
that
is
tied
intrinsically
to
political
life. In
a
political
association
composed
of
equals, everyone
is
potentially
capable
of
prudence.
This
connection
between
prudence
and rule
may help
us to see
how,
even
in a democratic
community, good
leadership requires
a virtue that
is
specific
to
those
who rule, but does not necessarily thwart democratic, participatory
politics.
We were interested also in Aristotle's
depiction
of
a
particular
kind
of
political
association,
that
which exists between male and
female
in the
household,
for
in
this instance Aristotle deviates
from his
general
rule
governing political
association. There is to
be no
alternation
of ruler and
ruled
in
the
household. Women are
properly
ruled
by
men and hence
are
permanently
excluded from
acquiring
the
virtue of
prudence.
We know that Aristotle
thought
that the
lack of
authority
in
women,
and over women, was pervasive among the Greeks, and that he thought
this
a bad
thing.
He did not think that women
belonged
in
political
decision-making.
Aristotle
speaks critically
of those
regimes
that
allow
the
political participation
of
women.
He
says
that
tyrannical
institutions
are
characteristic
of
popular
rule,
and
among
such institutions
he lists
lack of rule over
women,
children
and
slaves,
and
general permis-
siveness
(Pol.
1319b).
Democracies and
tyrannies
come
under attack
for
permitting
dominance of women
in
the
household so that
they may
report
on
their husbands
(Pol.
1313b).
And in
his
analysis
of the
decay
of Sparta, Aristotle places a large part of the blame for Sparta's
demise
on the women:
they
created more
uproar
than the
enemy
(Pol. 1269b).
While
Aristotle
obviously thought
that
women
exhibited certain
patterns
of behaviour
that made
them unsuitable candidates
for
political
office,
and while
he
elaborated
upon
the
physical
differences
between
571
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LEAH
BRADSHAW
men and women in
their sexual and
reproductive
activities,
he
did not
in
fact
provide
any
definitive reason for
why bodily
differences
should
determine
political
or
intellectual
capabilities.
We know that Aristotle
reactedstrongly againstSocrates'suggestion n the Republicthatmen
and
women are
potentially
capable
of
the
same
ruling
virtue. He
tried
to
refute
Socrates' claim
that the moral virtues
are the
same
for
men and
women,
and
he
certainly
seems to be one of
the
early
proponents
of the
masculine male
andthe
feminine
emale.
Aristotle
n
fact
says
that
male and
female
have
differing
unctions
n
the
household
from
the
time
of
birth,
and
that these
functions,
though
grounded
n
mutual
need,
also
produce
pleasure
for
one
another
(N.E.
1162a).
A household
of active
males and
passive
females,
all of whom extend their sexual roles
into
every sphereof humanactivity, may providea certainkindof pleasure
and
utility,
but
even
Aristotle does not
suggest
that
such
a household
yields
virtue. What
he does
say
is
that true
friendship
s
possible
only
between those who
are
equal
in
virtue,
and these
kinds of
friendships
will
be
rare
(N.E. 1156b).
There are those who
argue
that Aristotle did
not
defend the
equality
of men
and
women because
of his
concern
that
such
equality
would
destroy
the
natural
harmony
and
hierarchy
of
family
and
community.5
Aristotle
may
well
have had
good
reason for
anticipating
that the
encouragement
of
similar virtues
in
males and
females wouldupset traditionalamilialandpoliticalstructures,butour
concern
here has been to
investigate
whether
Aristotle had
any
natural
or
essential reasons
for
why
women
lack
authority,
why
they
shouldbe
excluded from
the
activity
of rule and
the virtue
of
prudence.
The conclusion s that
Aristotledoes not
give
a
persuasive
natural r
essential
explanation
or
the exclusion of
women
from
rule. The
only
substantial
weakness that he
attributes o women is a
physical
one
(not
an
intellectualor moral
one),
and even
here
Aristotle s reluctant o
give
this
weakness universal status for all women in
all cultures.
Even
if
womenaregenerallyweaker thanmen, we mustwith Socratesask the
question
whether his
has a
meaningful
mpact
upon
the
capacity
to
rule
(Rep.
456).
Aristotle
certainly
knew
that
by
advisingagainst
women
ever
having
political
authority,
over
either
themselves or
others,
he
was
excluding
them from one of
the
highest
virtues attainable
by
human
beings.
If,
indeed,
as
Aristotle
says,
in
the end
training
s naturefor
human
beings,
then we
can
expect
that
it is
only
in
the
training
or self
and
political
rule
that
authority
becomes natural for both men and
women.
What hat
training
does to familialand
community
relations,
f
it
is extended equally to males and females, and whether the changeis
desirable,
s
certainly
an
important
matterfor
consideration,
but
it
has
not
been our
concern here. Our
concern has
been
to
investigate
whether
5
Arlene
Saxonhouse,
Family, Polity
and
Unity:
Aristotle
on Socrates'
Community
of
Wives,
Polity
15
(1982),
202-19.
572
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Rule,
Prudence and the
Woman
Question
in
Aristotle
Aristotle
supplies any
natural or essential
grounds
why
women should
be excluded from
political
rule,
and we have found that he does not.6
6 There is a substantial
body
of literature written on
Aristotle from feminist
perspectives.
Some of
the most acute criticisms
of Aristotle's views on
women are Susan
Moller
Okin,
Women
in Western Political
Thought
(Princeton:
Princeton
University
Press,
1979);
Jean
Elshtain,
Public
Man,
Private
Woman
(Princeton:
Princeton
University
Press,
1981);
Kathy Pauly Morgan,
Woman
and Moral
Madness,
in
Lorraine
Code et
al.,
Feminist
Perspectives: Philosophical Essays
on Methods and
Morals
(Toronto:
University
of Toronto
Press,
1988);
Dianah
Coole,
Women
in Political
Theory
(Brighton,
Sussex:
Wheatsheaf
Books,
1988);
and Caroline
Whitbeck,
A Different
Reality:
Feminist
Ontology,
in Ann
Garry
and
Marilyn
Pearsall, eds.,
Women,
Knowledge
and
Reality
(Boston:
Unwin
Hyman,
1989).
Okin
finds that Aristotle
relegated
women
to an
altogether
subhuman
position
(87),
Elshtain claims
Aristotle
thought of woman as a household animal (49), and Coole identifies in Aristotle an
absolute
(ontological)
distinction between
male and female
(47).
The
findings
of this
article do
not accord with
any
of these
interpretations.
While
I
do
not
deny
that
Aristotle
barred free
Athenian women from
equal
social
and
political
status
with their
male
counterparts,
I
argue
that the differences
in
political
status
between men
and
women are
grounded
in
Aristotle's
understanding
of
differing physical
(especially
sexual)
constitutions,
and
prudence.
There is
no
evidence
that
Aristotle
thought
women
defective
in
their
power
of
intellect or
reason,
that he
thought
women less
than
human,
or that he
thought
men and
women to be so different
that
they
did not share
the
same
ontological
status.
573