Document of The World Bank

Report No: 29066

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT(TF-26063 TF-23757)

ON A

CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF US$2.49 MILLION

TO THE

WEST BANK AND GAZA

FOR A

LEGAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

June 9, 2004

MNCA4West Bank and Gaza Country Anchor

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective May 19, 2004)

Currency Unit = New Israeli Shekel (NIS) NIS 1 = US$ 0.217US$ 1 = NIS4.604

FISCAL YEARJanuary 1 December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADR Alternative Dispute ResolutionCAS Country Assistance StrategyDFID Department for International DevelopmentESW Economic and Sector WorkICR Implementation Completion ReportMoJ Ministry of JusticePA Palestinian AuthorityPIU Project Implementation UnitPLC Palestinian Legislative CouncilPSR Project Status ReportSJC Supreme Judicial CouncilWB&G West Bank and GazaUS$ United States Dollar

Vice President: Christiaan J. PoortmanCountry Director: Nigel Roberts

Country Program Coordinator: Markus Kostner Task Team Leader/Task Manager: Claus Astrup

WEST BANK AND GAZALEGAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

CONTENTS

Page No.1. Project Data 12. Principal Performance Ratings 13. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 24. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 55. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 86. Sustainability 97. Bank and Borrower Performance 108. Lessons Learned 119. Partner Comments 1210. Additional Information 20Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix 21Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 22Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits 23Annex 4. Bank Inputs 24Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components 25Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance 26Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 27

Project ID: P047111 Project Name: LEGAL DEVELOPMENTTeam Leader: Claus Pram Astrup TL Unit: MNCA4ICR Type: Core ICR Report Date: June 28, 2004

1. Project DataName: LEGAL DEVELOPMENT L/C/TF Number: TF-26063; TF-23757

Country/Department: WEST BANK AND GAZA Region: Middle East and North Africa Region

Sector/subsector: Law and justice (100%)Theme: Judicial and other dispute resolution mechanisms (P); Legal

institutions for a market economy (P); Legal services (P); Law reform (P); Access to law and justice (P)

KEY DATES Original Revised/ActualPCD: 11/25/1996 Effective: 11/25/1997

Appraisal: 04/22/1997 MTR:Approval: 06/05/1997 Closing: 06/30/2004

Borrower/Implementing Agency: PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY/MINISTRY OF JUSTICEOther Partners:

STAFF Current At AppraisalVice President: Christiaan J. Poortman Kermal DervisCountry Director: Nigel Roberts Odin KnudsenSector Director: Markus KostnerTeam Leader at ICR: Claus Astrup Hadi AbushakraICR Primary Author: Claus Astrup; Paul Prettitore

2. Principal Performance Ratings

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=Highly Unlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible)

Outcome: U

Sustainability: HUN

Institutional Development Impact: N

Bank Performance: U

Borrower Performance: HU

QAG (if available) ICRQuality at Entry: S

Project at Risk at Any Time: Yes

3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry

3.1 Original Objective:

Context: At the inception of preparations for this project, governance in the West Bank and Gaza (WB&G) was gradually being handed over to Palestinian institutions after decades of Israeli military occupation. At that time, two separate legal systems governed the West Bank and Gaza, neither of which was adequate to support a modern market economy. The legal regime applicable in the West Bank consisted of the framework in effect prior to 1967 under Jordanian rule, supplemented by Israeli military orders. The regime in Gaza was that which was in effect in Palestine prior to 1948. Both regimes were laden with cumbersome procedures relating to economic activities and were undermined by a lack of regulations in crucial economic areas such as banking, insurance and capital markets. Neither regime had kept pace with developments in global markets. Many laws were in urgent need of modernization to enable local firms to compete regionally and internationally. In addition, no adequate mechanism for alternative dispute resolution existed. The judiciary was plagued by concerns as to its independence, outdated procedures and management systems, inadequate facilities and a shortage of funding resources. There was no legal or judicial database in either the West Bank or Gaza from which legal professionals could obtain accurate information. Court decisions were not published in a regular manner, and no legal research publications or periodicals existed.

The objectives of the project were to provide assistance to the Palestinian Authority (PA) in:

starting the process of putting in place a legal framework adequate to support a modern market 1.economy and encourage growth in the private sector; increasing the efficiency, predictability and transparency of the judicial process. 2.

The objectives reflected the priorities of the Palestinian Authority as they were expressed in the Rule of Law Strategic Development Plan from October 1996, which pointed to a dire need for modernizing the legal framework in the West Bank and Gaza. The objectives of the Project were also consistent with the Bank's WB&G strategy at the time, which focused inter alia on "promotion of good governance" and "creating private sector confidence" (Memorandum to the President "Replenishing the Trust Fund for Gaza and the West Bank", presented to the Board in lieu of a CAS on December 19, 1996). Specifically, according to the Bank strategy document, the project would be expected to "support the codification and rationalization of Palestinian common and commercial law, and would help build up the judicial system and infrastructure".

The objectives were commendably modest. At appraisal, it was clearly recognized that "the proposed project would be a mere first step towards the long-term goal of establishing the rule of law in WB&G". This recognition was based both on a proper appreciation of the daunting task it would be to upgrade the WB&G legal system, and on the fact that considerable institutional and legal reform outside the scope of the project would be necessary for the benefits of this Project to be fully realized. For example, at the time of appraisal, the Basic Law (or constitution) that would provide the "sanctity" of property rights, the independence of the judiciary, etc. had not been enacted.

3.2 Revised Objective:

The objectives were not revised.

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3.3 Original Components:

The project originally had six components:

Component Cost (US$ million)A. Unification and development of legislation 1.18B. Court administration 1.68C. Judicial training 1.01D Alternative dispute resolution 0.73E. Legal information 0.42F. Project management 0.60Total 5.62Note: Contingencies estimated at appraisal are allocated across components on a pro rata basis. PA contribution was assumed to be US$0.12 million to make up the balance between the appraised amount and the World Bank contribution of US$5.5 million.

Component A (Unification and Development of Legislation) focused partly on the preparation of new llegislation or amendment of existing legislation governing economic, business and financial matters, taking into account existing and future economic and business needs, and partly on harmonizing legislation between the West Bank and Gaza.

Component B (Court Administration) was intended to improve the management of budgets, production lof statistics and case administration. This was to be achieved mainly by training of administrative staff. The preparation of a suitable legal framework to govern reform of court administration was also planned under this component.

Component C (Judicial Training). This component called for the development of appropriate curricula land training programs for judges and prosecutors, and instituting such trainings as a basis for a future judicial training center. Training of trainers activities would also be completed.

Component D (Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)) involved training instructors in mediation and larbitration; educating members of the legal and judicial community in ADR; preparing professional ADR standards; and assessing the legal framework governing the use of ADR.

Component E (Legal Information) would create legal libraries in both Gaza and the West Bank; lcompile and disseminate court decisions; and compile High Court decisions for publication and dissemination.

Component F (Project management) would establish a Project Implementation Unit (PIU) charged with lmanaging the project.

The components clearly supports the objectives of the project as described above. Component A intended to help provide the legal framework adequate to support a modern market economy. To this end, the following areas for development of legislation were identified: contracts; property rights; companies and partnerships; agency and distributorship; finance and banking; insurance; private international; public international; labor; and customs. The remaining components were geared towards the multi-facetted task of increasing the efficiency, predictability and transparency of the judicial process.

It might be argued that the project perhaps attempted to encompass too many aspects of the deficient

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judicial system in WB&G and consequently included too many components. While each of the components makes eminent sense in its own right, it is likely that the inclusion of all these components in one single project exacerbated the lack of focus that has characterized the efforts to reform the judicial system in WB&G.

3.4 Revised Components:

On December 28, 2001, US$2.7 million of the Credit was cancelled, reducing the Credit amount from US$5.5 million to US$2.8 million. At the same time, an additional component was added to the project, namely the construction of two central court houses (one in Gaza and one in the West Bank) for a total of US$12 million. The funding for courthouse construction was to come as a grant from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. To allow time for the construction of the court houses, the projects closing date was extended to December 31, 2003. The Project's development objectives were not revised in connection with the cancellation. The revised components are summarized below.

Component Cost (US$ million)A. Unification and development of legislation 1.18B. Court administration 0.04C. Judicial training 0.34D Alternative dispute resolution 0.33E. Legal information 0.42F. Project management 0.60G. Court house construction 12.00

Total 14.92Note: The PSR was never updated to reflect the revised costs of components following the cancellation. The table is thus based on the narrative provided in the PSR and available records from LOA.

In connection with the cancellation, implementation of three components was terminated:

Component B (Court Administration) was never initiated because the PA had not met the agreed lprerequisites. The prerequisites included hiring additional judges and court administrators, unifying the court systems of the West Bank and Gaza and endorsing the necessary legislation clarifying the roles of the MoJ and SJC in the court administration process. In addition, in 1999, USAID initiated a parallel court administration project (on grant basis), which picked up some of the activities envisaged under the Bank project.

Component C (Judicial Training) had effectively been suspended in November 2000 when the ldeteriorating security situation and restriction of movement prevented judges and prosecutors from attending trainings.

Finally, implementation of Component D (Alternative Dispute Resolution) was terminated because the ltwo pilot centers that had been established proved unable to carry out their intended work. According to the MoJ "the program proved unfeasible and inconsistent with the Palestinian legal and social system". In practice, the two centers lacked support from judges, lawyers and the MoJ and only very few cases were ever handled by the centers.

The remaining components were not revised.

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The cancellation was an appropriate response to the lack of implementation progress of the three mentioned components. Neither of the components had shown any measurable progress during more than one year prior to cancellation. With hindsight, the question could be asked whether it would in fact have been better to close the project at the end of 2001 (as was originally envisaged), and kept the Saudi financed court houses as a separate activity (in particular since the Saudi funds never materialized, see below). Work on the court house component may have diverted resources away from implementation of the project’s original objectives.

3.5 Quality at Entry:

Quality of entry is rated satisfactory. First, the project's objectives were clearly in line PA and Bank priorities at the time. And, even if the project faced several problems during implementation that perhaps could have been identified during appraisal, it is the opinion of the ICR team that in reality this was not feasible. This is in particular the case regarding the PA's lack of commitment to judicial reform, which turned out to be a major stumbling block for implementation of the project and the Bank's efforts to ensure ownership of the project. In retrospect, it could be argued that the limited appetite for reform should have been detected during appraisal. On the other hand, since the activities proposed under the project were derived from the PA's own strategy document for legal reform, it does appear reasonable for the appraisal team to assume that commitment to reform was in fact present. Another example concerns donor coordination where, for example, it turned out that a good number of the laws that were envisaged to be drafted under the project were in fact drafted under a DFID-funded project that was implemented in parallel. Again, there can be no denial that donor coordination could have been improved, but because the Bank was among the first donors to initiate work in the area of judicial reform, the responsibility for ensuring that overlaps were minimized also to a large extent lay with the other donors and the PA. MoJ's limited capacity at the time of project inception was perhaps underestimated at appraisal. Evidence to this effect is that while the project was declared effective five months after Board approval, which is acceptable without being stellar, (the delay was caused by the difficulties of MoJ in identifying a Project Manager), it took another 14 months to award the contracts for the training and ADR components. This is confirmed by a QAG-report from 1998 that notes "pressure to process the project quickly meant project start up six months before it was ready for implementation".

4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs

4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective:

The achievement of the projects objectives is rated unsatisfactory. Before detailing the reasons for the rating, it should be noted that the performance indicators established at appraisal were never systematically monitored (see annex 1), which needless to say severely hampered subsequent efforts to judge the project's achievements.

Through the drafting of a total of 22 laws some progress was achieved towards the objective of developing a legal framework adequate to support a modern market economy and encourage growth in the private sector. However, the impact was reduced by the fact that about 1/3 of the laws drafted was outside the project's predefined focus areas. In addition, only a few of the laws that were drafted have in fact been adopted by the PLC, and lack of by-laws have hindered actual implementation of the laws that were enacted. Even if enactment of laws and preparation of by-laws clearly falls outside of the scope of the project they clearly reduced the ultimate impact of the project.

Very little progress towards improving efficiency, predictability and transparency of the judicial process

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was achieved since three project components directly related to this objective were terminated prematurely in connection with the cancellation of approximately half of the Credit. The single remaining component serving this objective (component E - Legal Information) was in fact implemented in a satisfactory manner, but the relative importance of this component to the achievement of the project's objectives is too minor to make up for the failure of the remaining components. The combination of the PA's lack of commitment to judicial reform and slack supervision by the Bank were key factors in the project's failure to meet its objectives.

4.2 Outputs by components:

Component A (Legal Unification) is, on balance, rated satisfactory. 22 laws have been drafted through lthis project, according to PIU records (see annex 1). (MoJ puts the number at 30, see Annex 9). This is almost equal to the average of four per year that was envisaged at appraisal. However, of these 22 law, about 1/3 fell outside the predefined focus areas, which limited the project's impact on improving the legal environment for private sector activity. The reason for this lack of focus is partly that the Diwan did not draft yearly work plans concerning legal unification, but selected legislation on an ad hoc basis, and partly that the PA received funding from DFID with overlapping objectives.

Component B (Court Administration) is rated highly unsatisfactory. Although some eight court ladministrators received computer training and courts were supplied with limited equipment (e.g. computers, printers, faxes and in one case, a power generator) this component was terminated before implementation began in earnest. The failure by the PA to delineate the responsibilities between the MoJ and SJC effectively precluded initiation of this component.

Component C (Judicial Training) is rated unsatisfactory, even though some noticeable progress was lachieved prior to the premature termination of the component. Prior to cancellation, several training sessions and workshops were conducted by Birzeit University for judges and prosecutors during which nearly all judges and prosecutors in the West Bank and Gaza were trained, and eighteen judges, prosecutors and support staff were trained to conduct further trainings. The subject matter of these trainings included criminal procedure, private international law, detention procedures, forensic medicine and judicial capacity-building. In addition, a conference for judges was held in May 1999 and one for public prosecutors in July 1999. A number of judges also participated in a training course held in Morocco. A training manual was also produced to in order to train trainers to conduct further sessions for prosecutors. The program of orientation for newly appointed judges was cancelled since the appointment of new judges eventually ceased. Due to the security situation in both the West Bank and Gaza it became impossible to continue trainings, and ultimately only a little more than half of the activities planned under this component were implemented.

Component D (Alternative Dispute Resolution – ADR) is rated unsatisfactory, although - in parallel lwith component C - some progress was achieved prior to the cancellation. In particular, two Arbitration and Mediation Centers were established, one in Gaza and one in Ramallah. Mediators from both Gaza and the West Bank were trained. These activities were coordinated with a Working Group established by the PIU, which consisted of representatives of relevant ministries, judges, local business representatives, members of the legal community and NGO’s. The PIU, Search for Common Ground (the consultant for this component) and the Working Group produced ADR Program Guidelines, which were distributed to members of the legal community. However, the centers only received a few cases, mainly due to the lack of support from the courts and the MoJ. At the time of cancellation of the component, only 1/3 of the funds had been spent.

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Component E (Legal Information) is rated satisfactory. This component focused on four sub-areas: (i) lpublishing and distribution of legal and judicial journals; (ii) publication of legislation; (iii) legal awareness campaign; and (iv) procurement of additional books.

(i) Legal and Judicial Journal. The Journal of Law and the Judiciary has been published on a quarterly basis, and distributed to subscribers, as well as legislators, judges, bar associations and other public institutions. The Journal contains new legislation, judicial decisions and legal research. In total, fourteen issues were printed and disseminated. Arrangements have been made with venders around the court in Gaza as well as with administrators at the Bar Associations in Gaza and Ramallah to sell issues of the journal in order to raise funds to cover the printing of additional issues.

(ii) Publication of Legislation. PIU published a six-volume set of all the legislation and decrees enacted by the PA in the West Bank and Gaza. These sets were distributed to judges in the West Bank and Gaza, members of the Diwan's office, legal departments of PA ministries and university libraries. The MoJ also established a website that includes information on the MoJ, Diwan, Public Prosecutor, the PA Official Gazette and all of the legislation adopted by the PA.

(iii) Legal Awareness Campaign. Legal awareness campaigns were conducted in cooperation with the Palestinian Bar Association and the Al Azhar University in Gaza and Al Quds University in the West Bank. For example, in early 2003 workshops were held in Gaza and Khan Younis to discuss the draft constitution. Several other workshops were held in Gaza focusing on the basic law, judicial law, criminal law and the civil service law. A training course was also held for court police in Gaza. However, travel restrictions eventually prevented expansion of this sub-component beyond its initial phases.

(iv) Procurement of Books. Specialized libraries were established in a number of courthouses and offices in the West Bank and Gaza. These specialized libraries were supplied with furniture, equipment and over 750 books each. In addition, a number of judicial libraries were established. These libraries consists of book cases and 100 books for judges’ offices. The libraries in the Diwan offices in Gaza and Ramallah were also supplied with 1000 books. All members of the legal community in Gaza and the West Bank have access to Diwan libraries while only court staff have access to those in courts. Two training courses were held in Gaza and Ramallah for forty staff of the MoJ, courts and the Public Prosecutor’s Office on managing libraries. However, it is not known whether all libraries continue to operate. According to PIU, some of the books disappeared from the libraries, and some were damaged in security incidents. Monitoring the libraries proved difficult due to travel restrictions. Part of the problem stems from the lack of a clear mandate for either the MoJ or SJC for the administration of court libraries.

Component F (Courthouse Construction) is rated unsatisfactory. Implementation of this component lwas never initiated. The Saudi Fund has informed the Bank that they remain committed to the court house construction, but is not prepared to proceed with the construction of courthouses under the current security situation in WB&G.

4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return:

Not applicable

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4.4 Financial rate of return:

Not applicable

4.5 Institutional development impact:

The institutional development impact of the project is rated negligible. The legislation enacted through the Legal Unification and Harmonization have only had a limited impact on the overall legal framework in WB&G, in particular with respect to its conduciveness to growth in the private sector. Component A (Legislative Modernization and Harmonization) may have had some development impact on the Diwan, as the Diwan will continue to coordinate work on legislative amendments based on the model developed through this component. However, on the negative side, MoJ has not made any funding provisions for the continuation of this work so the Diwan will need to rely on outside funding. In addition, since many of the laws or necessary by-laws have not yet been adopted there is unlikely to be an appreciable benefit to support a market economy in the near future. The Legal Information Component will have some development impact on the legal community, in particular judges and prosecutors, through the provision of legislation, judicial decisions and legal research. However, such activities would need to be continued and the borrower has taken few concrete steps to provide adequate funding. The cancellation of the Court Administration, Alternative Dispute Resolution and Judicial Training Components clearly negatively affected any development impact in regards to the judiciary.

5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome

5.1 Factors outside the control of government or implementing agency:

Although the resumption of violence during the intifada and the related security measures implemented by the Government of Israel led to a deterioration of the operating environment in the WB&G after September 2000, it would not be fair to say that the intifada had an decisive impact on the implementation of the project, except for Court House Construction Component and possibly the Training Component. Overall, the major factors affecting implementation and outcome were within stakeholders' control (see section 5.2 and 5.3).

5.2 Factors generally subject to government control:

During the course of the project a number of factors subject to the PA's control negatively affected implementation and ultimately, the outcome of the project. Most importantly, there was a serious lack of PA commitment to judicial reform. Of direct relevance to the project, the PA did not resolve the dispute between the MoJ and SJC regarding competencies for court administration and judicial training. Without a decision as to competencies, progress on legal reform always remained problematic. A number of the laws presented to the PLC through the Legal Unification component have not yet been enacted because they remain under debate with the PLC or have not yet been signed by President Arafat. In addition, the competent ministries have not yet adopted the by-laws necessary to ensure implementation of the laws enacted through the Legal Unification component. Lastly, the responsible bodies of the PA did little to support the transfer of cases from the courts to the Alternative Dispute Resolution Centers, and did not meet the preconditions for the initiation of the Court Administration Component.

5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control:

The Steering Committee met only a few times during the duration of this project (at the mid-term review, in July 1999, it was noted that until then, the Steering Committee had in fact never met). The Steering

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Committee composed of representatives of the MoJ, SJC and the Attorney General, was to provide programmatic guidance and support to PIU. The result was that the Committee played no role in implementation of this project. The reason the Committee did not meet on a regular basis was the conflict over mandates of the MoJ and SJC concerning court administration and judicial training. No serious attempts were made to remedy this situation or to devise another body to provide programmatic guidance.

5.4 Costs and financing:

The Bank provided US$5.5 million from Trust Fund Credit for implementation of this project. However, with the cancellation of three components, US$2.7 million was returned to the Trust Fund for Gaza and West Bank. Of the US$2.5 million that was disbursed under the project, approximately 30 percent went for project management, which appear excessive. Finally, the Saudi Government pledged US$12 million for construction of courthouses, but these fund were held back in the face of the eruption of violence in WB&G.

6. Sustainability

6.1 Rationale for sustainability rating:

The project’s overall sustainability is unlikely, as three of the important capacity-building components were cancelled before implementation was completed. Moreover, no concrete measures have been taken by the PA to ensure continuing activities regarding the Legal Unification and Legal Information Components (see 6.2). Moreover -- as mentioned earlier -- although some 22 laws were indeed updated and harmonized through the project's Component A (Legal Unification), the impact of updated and harmonized legislation was muted by the fact more than two-thirds of the legislation addressed through this project has not yet been enacted, and even the laws that were in fact enacted have for the most parts not been implemented because by-laws, which guide implementation, have not been drafted by the responsible ministries.

6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations:

No measures have been undertaken to ensure the continued operation of the ad hoc working groups established under the Legal Unification Component. However, since the inception of this project, the PLC has taken a more active role in initiating legislation, so there is less need for strong involvement from the MoJ. Specifically, the Diwan's competencies are probably used for technical aspects of legislative reform, such as checking draft legislation for conformity, with more legislative initiatives originating with the PLC and other ministries. Although the Diwan has stated that there remains a strong need for dissemination of legal information, no adequate measures for transition of the Legal Information Component have been made. In particular, the MoJ has not reserved any funding for the continued dissemination of legal information, and is not likely to do so given the current abysmal state of PA finances. The Diwan stated the MoJ will request funds for such activities from other donors in the future. Publication of the Legal and Judicial Journal may possibly be sustainable since funding is derived from sales of earlier issues. Finally, although the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on several occasion has reconfirmed their commitment to the construction of court houses, it remains to be seen when the situation improves sufficiently to enable the release of the funds.

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7. Bank and Borrower Performance

Bank7.1 Lending:

On balance, project preparation is rated satisfactory. On the positive side, the project concept represented a pro-active and comprehensive response to the need for judicial reform in WB&G, and successfully identified critical issues to be addressed based on the PA's and the Bank's priorities at the time. As the PA had recently adopted its Rule of Law Strategic Development Plan it was reasonable to expect the it would make serious efforts at legal reform. On the negative side, it is questionable whether the project focused sufficiently on areas where the Bank had a comparative advantage. This, in particular since the project was not prepared on the back of a solid piece of ESW, and since (as acknowledged in the project document ) the Bank had -- at least at the time of appraisal -- only relatively limited experience in the area of legal and judicial reform. The highly diverse set of components in the project raise the question whether the Bank focussed its resources on areas where the impact would conceivably be greatest.

7.2 Supervision:

The Bank’s supervision performance is -- viewed over the entire life-span of the project -- rated unsatisfactory. In the early years of project implementation, supervision efforts were adequately focused on both overall development impact and fiduciary aspects, and supervision inputs were sufficient. An unusual top management interest in the project led at one point to a system of monthly reporting, and the field based country director (who is a lawyer himself) provided direct oversight and guidance. A QAG supervision review in July-August 1998 rated the overall quality of supervision highly satisfactory. Nevertheless, despite these efforts, it must be concluded that the Bank failed to force the issue of the PA’s lack of commitment to reform (see section 7.5), and as a result failed to break the deadlock that ultimately prevented progress under the project. The unwillingness on the Bank’s part to confront the PA should, however, be seen in the broader context of donor engagement in an extremely fragile political process, which may shied donors (including the Bank) away from putting sufficient pressure on the PA. In the later stages of project implementation (notably after the outbreak of the intifada in September 2000) practically no programmatic guidance was provided by the Bank to the PIU and the PA. Supervision missions became sporadic and generally not adequately staffed. In addition, the quality of the PSRs is generally poor -- in particular with respect to monitoring and evaluation of performance indicators. Moreover, the ratings provided in the PSR's were -- with hindsight -- not consistently candid throughout the life of the project. Ex post procurement reviews were never carried out. The preparation of this ICR was hampered by the lack of records maintained by the borrower, which -- although ultimately the borrowers responsibility -- could have been encouraged by the Bank had supervision been more intensive. There was also a lack of coordination by the Bank with other donors. This led to a diversion of resources from prioritized legislation under the Legal Unification component due to similar project funding from DFID, which had stricter guidelines on how funds could be spent. It also resulted in USAID funding a similar project geared towards alternative dispute resolution.

7.3 Overall Bank performance:

Overall Bank performance is rated, on balance, unsatisfactory.

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Borrower7.4 Preparation:

Please see section 7.5

7.5 Government implementation performance:

PA implementation was overall highly unsatisfactory. This is evidenced by a number of failures on behalf of the PA. Fundamentally, the PA's commitment to legal reform turned out to be seriously lacking. Of direct implication for the project, there was no cooperation between the MoJ and the SJC due to an underlying conflict about delineation of their respective competencies. This effectively undermined effective implementation of the judicial training and court administration components, and to some extent the ADR component. During the course of the project the PA took no concrete step to resolve this conflict. Only recently has the PA established an ad hoc committee under the Office of the President to clarify the roles of the MoJ and SJC. It remains to be seen whether this committee is successful. In addition, the Steering Committee, which was supposed to provide guidance on project implementation, met only several times during the course of the project. The failure of the Steering Committee to meet on a regular basis led to a situation where the Diwan made decisions on program activities without the involvement of other stakeholders, particularly the SJC. This created considerable obstacles in implementation of several components, particularly the ADR Component. In addition, the Diwan did not establish any systematic mechanism for public consultation on draft legislation, thus preventing adequate involvement of civil society organizations and members of the business community.

Another major shortcoming of the PA was its the failure to adopt legislation in a timely manner. This was due either to delays by the PLC or the Office of the President. The Diwan was often slow in publishing adopted legislation in the Official Gazette, thus delaying its enforceability. In addition, many ministries were slow to adopt by-laws necessary for the implementation of legislation. The PA also failed to arrange for funding to continue legal information activities, and failed to adequately support the ADR centers. In the West Bank and Gaza there is still considerable confusion as to the roles of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, which has proven an obstacle to legal reform. And while security concerns and political instability in the West Bank and Gaza undisputedly diverted attention away from legal reform initiatives, security issues also to some extent became a convenient excuse for lack of progress on certain components that may have not been related to security measures.

7.6 Implementing Agency:

Please see 7.5

7.7 Overall Borrower performance:

Overall Borrower performance was highly unsatisfactory.

8. Lessons Learned

There were four significant lessons learnt from the WB&G Legal Development Project:

Exclusion of key stakeholders in preparation and implementation significantly reduce benefits. The lexclusion of key stakeholders results in their limited incentive to cooperate gainfully in implementation of the project.

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Follow-up on key indicators needs to be sustained throughout the entire duration of the project and lrequirements regarding periodic reporting by the borrower should be enforced. In this case, closer oversight might have allowed for a revision of project objectives/and or components at an earlier stage. Enforcement of periodic reporting can help to keep the borrower more focused and ensure that accurate records are maintained in situations of high turnover of program staff. More generally, close supervision is necessary to ensure implementation and resolve issues that arise during the implementation of the project. This is especially true in cases where progress towards project objectives is dependent on concrete steps to be taken by the borrower.

Careful coordination with other donors is important to maximize benefits. Uncoordinated activities lcan easily result in duplication of efforts or diversion of efforts into lower-priority areas.

Lastly, the Legal Development Project confirmed the general lesson from reform projects: reform, lincluding judicial reform, is a long-term process, highly dependent on political will. To have the maximum impact, technical reform initiatives should ideally be planned to complement political progress on creation of the legal and political foundation for reform initiatives. Specifically, based on the experiences from this project, it may be questioned whether it makes sense to pursue legal reforms in conflict-affected areas, where immediate needs have a natural tendency to take priority.

9. Partner Comments

(a) Borrower/implementing agency:Foreword:

When Palestine National Authority (PNA) returned home, it was faced with destroyed infrastructures in all aspects of life, especially in the field of law. There were two different legal and judicial systems in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (WB&G), as well as five different law systems effective. These law systems included remainders of the Ottoman and British laws, with some Egyptian laws effective in Gaza Strip, and the Jordanian law operative in the West Bank, as well as the Israeli military orders promulgated by the Occupation Authorities, revoking some Palestinian laws.

These laws, in force in the Palestinian territories, lacked unity of source as they were derived from different historical and official sources. They were also different as to the references and foundations on which they were based; some laws followed the principles of Islamic Fiqh (jurisprudence), others of the British Law, others of the Latin Law, while other laws were built on synthesized foundations of more than one school of law.

Such reasons, among others, necessitated a single Palestinian legal system to be put in place across the Palestinian territories; a system that is prepared by Palestinian experts, enacted and passed by Palestinian parliamentarians, and announced by a Palestinian president.

The Fatwa and Legislation Bureau (FLB) was charged with the task of achieving this goal and embarked on taking the following steps:

First, in 1996, the FLB, in cooperation with the International Australian Foundation for Legal Documents, prepared a strategic development plan aimed at:1- Unifying and developing/advancing/updating the laws already existing in the West Bank and Gaza Strip;

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2- Improving courthouses buildings and facilities;3- Unifying judicial procedures and systems;4- Developing a computerized legal and judicial database; and5- Building independent forensic capacities.

Second, this study was presented to the World Bank (WB), which after reviewing it, was convinced of its feasibility and importance, and consequently decided to grant the PNA a loan of US$ 5.5 millions over a period of four years. This period was, however, extended to six years and the loan was reduced to US$ 2.5 millions. An agreement with the WB was reached, stipulating that the loan should be used to achieve the following goals:i) Unifying and developing legislation in WB&G;ii) Training and educating judges and prosecuting attorneys/prosecutors;iii) Creating the system of alternative procedures for conflict resolution, e.g. mediation and arbitration;iv) Providing legal information; andv) Improving and enhancing court houses management.

The FLB was able to achieve some of these goals. It was fully successful as to the goal of unifying/consolidating and advancing/updating Palestinian laws, unifying more than 90% of the WBG laws. The FLB also made a striking success in terms of providing legal information. It combined the Palestinian laws in six volumes, issued the Journal of Law and Judiciary, and set up a web page incorporating all the laws promulgated in Palestine. However, the FLB failed to achieve the other goals in full due to hindrances, barriers and obstacles imposed by Israel, which prevented the Institute of Law at Beir Zeit University from implementing the Contract it concluded with the FLB to train and educate judges and prosecutors, prosecuting attorneys, compelling it to annul the respective Contract. The FLB was also forced to abrogate an agreement with an American company to create alternative methods of conflict resolution as this program proved to be unfeasible and inconsistent with the Palestinian legal and social systems.

The goal of improving and advancing courthouses management/administration was also not fully achieved due to insufficient numbers of judges and judicial staff at the time, and because there was no specific body responsible for such management. This, however, did not keep us from providing courthouses with libraries and equipment.

Third, the FLB set up a unit staffed with competent people to implement the agreement concluded with the World Bank. The Unit provided the parties concerned with monthly reports, and prepared reports on expenditures to the Ministry of Finance. It was subject to constant inspection and observation by the Public Audit Commission, and its annual accounts and balance sheet were yearly audited by certified auditors.

I. Program for Unifying and Advancing Legislation in Palestine

This program aimed at unifying and upgrading the Palestinian laws in effect, and preparing new draft laws that would meet the ambitions of the Palestinian community in a democratic state with a free economy and a stable investment-encouraging political situation.

This goal was set after an examination of the laws and legislation that were inherited from previous periods but still in force in the country’s northern and southern governorates. The laws were also studied as to their consistency and conformity with the judicial system and economic policy intended in Palestine. The study was guided by judicial systems in countries of the region and some western countries with advanced economies.

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This program was also targeted at preparing and equipping local staff to formulate and amend laws as need be, and to develop new laws in the future.

To implement the program, the FLB, in cooperation with the Project Administration, approached all PNA’s ministries and agencies with the aim of identifying and listing the laws to be updated and unified, and learning the guidelines of the visions, trends and philosophies of these institutions. Legal committees were then set up, comprising local expertise and competencies in law drafting including judges, lawyers and members of the academia (both from the PNA and from other institutions), to formulate the new laws. In addition, contracts were concluded with experts of different specializations from neighboring Arab countries to benefit from foreign expertise and to provide support to the local legal teams/committees.

Believing in a transparent approach to choose the right person for the right job, the Project Administration set several selection criteria for the committees in charge of preparing the draft laws. These criteria included:• The FLB, based on the technical elements provided by the authority or agency concerned, draws up a framework for the draft law to be prepared.• The FLB, through communication with courts, universities and the Bar, lists the names of specialized and experienced members of the academia in the relevant fields.• The FLB selects the members of the committee that will carry out the task based on the members’ experience, specialization and his or her other skills necessary for the preparation of the draft law.• The Head of the FLB, together with the Project Manager, select members of the committee for each draft law. They contact and interview the nominees while taking into consideration that, members to each committee should be equally representing West Bank and Gaza.• The Project Administration concludes contracts with the selected experts, specifying the implementation period and the expert’s remuneration.• The FLB nominates one of its members as a focal point, liaising between the committee, the Project Administration and the FLB, and conveying to the committee the viewpoint of the FLB.• The Head of the FLB takes a decision setting up the committee needed for drafting the law.• The staff members of the Project Office in WBG shall monitor the committee's administrative work and facilitate their job tasks by meeting their requirements.

A committee will use the following mechanism:• Each committee works according to a plan of action to be agreed between the committee members and the Project Administration.• A committee rapporteur is appointed.• The committee meets once a week in the West Bank and Gaza, alternately, until the first draft of the law is developed.• Specialists and people involved and working in the field of law are contacted and sent copies of the draft law for a feedback: comments and suggestions.• A copy of the draft law is sent to the relevant ministry/institution for their remarks.• The committee studies such feedback and makes use of it when preparing the final draft. • The draft law is hence ready for discussion through workshops in West Bank and Gaza for further remarks and suggestions.• The draft law is then finalized and submitted, together with explanatory notes, to the FLB, who will have it properly framed (preparing a preamble), and sent to the Cabinet.• The Cabinet decides whether to submit the draft law to the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) for discussion.

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Forty draft laws were prepared, many of which were submitted to the PLC. Some of these laws were adopted and others are still under due consideration.

Following are the draft laws that were prepared:

1. The draft law of Civil Procedure Code Appeared in issue No. 38 of the Palestine National Gazette (Al-Waqa’i Al-Falastiniyyeh)

Promulgated and being administered

2. The draft law of Criminal Procedure Code Appeared in issue No. 38 of the Palestine National Gazette

Promulgated and being administered

3. The draft law of Arbitration Appeared in issue No. 33 of the Palestine National Gazette

Promulgated and being administered

4. The draft law of Leases At the PLC5. The draft law of Standards and Specifications Appeared in

issue No. 36 of the Palestine National GazettePromulgated and being administered

6. The draft law of the Notary Public At the PLC7. The draft law of Court Fees Appeared in issue No. 47 of the Palestine National Gazette

Promulgated and being administered

8. The draft law of Execution At the PLC9. The draft law of Evidence Appeared in issue No. 38 of the Palestine National Gazette

Promulgated and being administered

10. The draft law of Court Formation Appeared in issue No. 38 of the Palestine National Gazette (Al-Waqa’i Al-Falastiniyyeh)

Promulgated and being administered

11. The draft law of Industry At the PLC12. The draft law of Land and Buildings Tax At the PLC13. The draft law of Trade Unions Submitted to the Cabinet14. The draft law of Movable Property Mortgage At the PLC15. The draft law of Constitutional Court At the PLC16. The draft law of Zoning and Construction “Cities Planning” At the PLC17. The draft law of Experts Submitted to the Cabinet18. The draft law of Pharmacists Association Submitted to the Cabinet19. The draft law of Juveniles Submitted to the Cabinet20. The draft law of the State Council Being prepared by the FLB21. The draft law of Surveying Being prepared by the FLB22. The draft law of Religious Courts Procedure Being prepared by the FLB23. The draft law of Veterinarians Association Being prepared by the FLB24. The draft law of the Media Being prepared by the FLB25. The draft law of Publicity and Publication Being prepared by the FLB26. The draft law of Regulation of Declarations /

Announcements?? Being prepared by the FLB

27. The draft law of the Public Debt Being prepared by the FLB28. The draft law of Promotion of Competition and Prevention

of Monopoly Being prepared by the FLB

29. The draft law of the Printing Press Being prepared by the FLB30. The draft law of Craft Practicing Being prepared by the FLB

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Workshops: The Project held 42 public workshops in the West Bank and Gaza. The invitees included:• Judges• Lawyers• Members of the FLB• Members of the Legal Department of the PLC• Members of the Academia• Specialists in each law• Advisors to ministries and other institutions

A large number of other local workshops were also held in the premises of the Legal Frameworks Development Project.

II. Legal Information Program

This program is intended to providing sources of legal information, including through publication and distribution of the laws passed by the PNA, and through establishing legal libraries and printing Palestinian legislation and the Journal of Law and Judiciary. The objective is to acquaint researchers and people in the field of law with the recent international legal developments and information that would support and help them in decision-making. Such steps would also provide them with ways of learning legal provisions, court judgments and general information about the legal system. Following are the most important achievements of this program:• Providing the libraries of the courts and the Ministry of Justice with legal reference materials and researches.• Supporting the establishment and development of an information network to help the Ministry of Justice research and formulate legislation. In this connection, a web page for the Ministry was set up, comprising all basic information about the Ministry of Justice, the FLB, the Public Prosecution Department, the PNA official gazette, and the Palestinian legislation promulgated since the establishment of the PNA.• Issuing the Journal of Law and Judiciary, a specialized periodical that publishes legal researches, legislation and judicial judgments. The publication is targeted to encouraging research, raising legal awareness in Palestine, publishing analytical legal studies of comparative legislation and verdicts of the Supreme Court. By the end of 2003, 14 issues of the Journal including the trial issue were published.• Founding specialized legal libraries in all the courts of Gaza’s and the West Bank’s governorates. These are equipped with the necessary furniture, computer equipment, as well as with a collection of specialized books and references as follows:

1. The Central Courthouse and Conciliation Court/ Gaza A specialized library2. The Public Prosecution Department/Gaza A specialized library

3. The Central Courthouse and Conciliation Court/ Khan Younis A judge's library (5) 4. Court of Conciliation/ Rafah A judge's library (3) 5. Court of Conciliation/ The Eastern Region A judge's library (3) 6. Court of Conciliation/ Deir al-Balah A judge's library (3) 7. Court of Conciliation/ Jabalia A judge's library (3) 8. Courts of First Instance, Conciliation and Appeals / Ramallah A specialized library 9. Public Prosecution Department/ Ramallah A specialized library 10. Courts of First Instance and Conciliation/ Jerico A specialized library 11. Courts of First Instance and Conciliation/ Hebron A specialized library

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12. Courts of First Instance and Conciliation/ Bethlehem A specialized library 13. Courts of First Instance and Conciliation/ Nablus A specialized library 14. Court of Conciliation/ Tulkarm A judge's library (3) 15. Court of Conciliation/ Salfeet A judge's library (2) 16. Court of Conciliation/ Qalqilyah A judge's library (2)17. Court of Conciliation/ Jenin A judge's library (2)

• A specialized library is an integrated one as to furniture, equipment, information containers, and has 750 books each (see the enclosed lists).• A judge's library consists of a bookcase and 100 books located in his office.

In addition, the libraries of the FLB in Gaza and Ramallah were each provided in mid-2003 with 1000 titles bought from the Book Exhibition held in Cairo.• A group of the staff members of courts, public prosecution and the Ministry of Justice were given specialized librarianship training. For this purpose, two training courses were held in Gaza and Ramallah to qualify some of the Ministry, courts, and public prosecution’s cadres in organizing and keeping the libraries at their departments. The courses also aimed at teaching the staff how to provide library services satisfactorily. Forty participants from Gaza and Ramallah were involved in these courses.• Six volumes of the Palestinian legislation promulgated by the PNA were issued by March 2003, and a high number of these were distributed to:- All the judges of Gaza and the West Bank;- All members of the PLC;- All members of the FLB;- All members of the Legal Department of PLC;- All PNA ministries and institutions (the Legal Departments); and- Libraries of the Palestinian universities.

For more information, see the enclosed lists:• Two seminars were held in Gaza and Khan Younis as part of the legal education program, to raise the knowledge and awareness of the Palestinian public.• A training course was held for the judicial police in Gaza.

III. Program for Judicial Education

This program is designed to providing training courses for newly recruited judges and public prosecutors. It also holds workshops for first-grade (senior?) judges in order to strengthen their judicial, and acquire new skills that would support them in providing a better judicial service. This is achieved through:• Conferences and workshops for judges and public prosecutors; and• Training of trainers workshops (TOTs) so as to ensure continued training and exchange of experience among judges.

Within the framework of the program implementation, there was an invitation for bids. The successful bidder was the Institute of Law at Beir Zeit University. Implementation of the project was started in February 1999 according to the plan prepared by the Project Administration, and continued up to November 2000 when it was halted due to difficult mobility and closures imposed by the Israeli authorities. The Minister of Justice had set up a technical committee of senior judges of Gaza and the West Bank to support the implementing authority (the Institute of Law at Beir Zeit University) and to supervise the program activities, which included:

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• Following-up on the implementation and application of the educational programs in cooperation with the Project and Beir Zeit University, the implementing authority.• Supervising the provision of trainers and teaching instruments, and defining the targeted recipients in order to achieve the goals of the program.• Examining all the reports prepared by the implementing authority (the Institute of Law at Beir Zeit University).• Opening channels of communication with Arab and international judicial institutions and reaching consensus on the details of the training programs and conferences.• Defining the national goals and standards of judicial education.

As a result of this joint work, the following activities were carried out:

First, Workshops:• A TOT workshop (for judges and public prosecutors trainers) held in cooperation with Dr. Livinstong Armitag?, Oct 9, 1999.• A workshop on penal procedures held in cooperation with Dr. Abdul Rahman Tawfiq, Nov. 28, 1999.• A workshop on the Palestinian-Israeli agreements and their relationship to the Private International Law, held in cooperation with Dr. Mohammad al-Wakeeli.• A training workshop for newly appointed public prosecutors held in cooperation with Dr. Livinstong Armitag?, Sep. 13, 1999.• A workshop on detention and on-bail release controls and criteria for judges, held in cooperation with Judges Nasri Awwad and Isaac Muhanna, Aug. 5, 1999.• A workshop on forensic medicine and criminal laboratory for judges and public prosecutors, held in cooperation with Dr. Mu'men al-Hadeedi, Dr. Mohammad Mosmar, and Judge Nasri Awwad, Aug. 28, 1999.• Several meetings and discussions for building/upgrading the capacities of judges and public prosecutors.

Second, Legal Conferences:• The first conference for judges, held in Jerico, May 1999.• The first conference for public prosecutors, held in Ramallhah, July 1999.• A number of judges participated in a training course, held in Morocco.

IV. Program for Alternative Solutions for Conflict Resolution (Mediation and Arbitration)

The goal is to establish a program for alternative solutions as a court-adjunct program to help reduce the backlog of cases and improve the efficiency and quality of legal services. This program provides alternative ways for conflict resolution (arbitration), which would encourage local and international investment through the following activities:• Training a committee of mediators and arbitrators to work through two Ministry’s centers in Gaza and the West bank.• Spreading awareness among the Palestinian Community about an opportunity through mediation and arbitration centers to be created.• Founding 2 judicial mediation and arbitration centers; 1 in Gaza for the southern governorates, 1 in Ramallah for the northern governorates.

To implement this Program, the Administration of the Legal Frameworks Project invited bids. The

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successful bidder, Search for Common Ground Institution, started implementation with the following activities:• Designed a framework and a plan of action for the program for alternative means and conflict resolution.• Prepared schedules and training materials and tables, and held workshops for local judges, arbitrators and mediators, in addition to another workshop on community awareness.• Selected and trained arbitrators from Gaza and the West Bank; established a mechanism for their participation in the centers to be created;• Founded and furnished 2 arbitration centers in WB&G, selected the cadre needed, and defined the job description for each member;• Held several training workshops for the two centers' employees in Gaza and the West Bank;• Contacted the courts in WB&G to inform those in charge, of the role of the centers and of how cooperation and coordination would be made;• Held a conference for all the judges of the West Bank and Gaza to make clear the role and mechanism of the arbitration centers, and to prepare an action plan for the centers.

The arbitration centers in WBG received some cases and tried to settle them, but the work done fell short of the expectations for reasons and challenges we will mention below. Consequently, the Project Administration decided to terminate the contract with the implementing authority at the beginning of 2000.

Program for Developing the CourtsThe purpose of this program is to enhance the administrative systems and capacities, and to equip the courthouses with the latest state-of-the art communication media and equipment. These would help the staff of the courts provide a better service for the public, through:• Training the Central Administrative Department’s team and defining the job description for each;• Training the courts’ administrators to improve personnel management, and to establish, organize and designate responsibilities;• Creating an advanced system to enhance records management and archiving and another administrative information system, as well as having the court administrative affairs computerized; and• Providing courthouses and public prosecution offices with the sophisticated equipment necessary for smooth operation such as computers, fax and Xerox machines.

This program was, however, postponed until the PNA employs an adequate number of judges and court administrators, and unifies the law systems in WBG. Later, the program was totally cancelled as it became clear that the harsh political conditions and events taking place would always be an obstacle to implementation.

Despite all challenges, the Project Administration was able to do the following:• Trained more than 80 court administrators on using the computer hardware and software needed for their work;• Supplied all courts with computers, printers, fax and photocopying machines as a first step towards completing the program;• Supplied the courts complex in Gaza with a power generator; and• Provided the public prosecution offices in Gaza with power generators and air-conditioners.

(b) Cofinanciers:N/A

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(c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector):N/A

10. Additional Information

None

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Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix

OutputsComponents Indicators Target Achievements Rating

Component A

Legal Unification

Number of laws in the different stages of the drafting process per area and per year

4 laws completed through drafting process

22 laws drafted (see note 1), almost equal to the average of 4/year envisaged at appraisal.

Satisfactory

Component B

Court Administration

1) Number of administrative functions transferred from the MoJ to the new Administrative area in the judiciary

2) time by which to have the annual strategic plan and the long range strategic plan completed

3) number of court decisions written using word processing with computers

1) 2 by the end of the FY, 2 by the end of the second FY, 2 by the end of fourth year

2) Completed by January 1 of each year

3) 2nd year – 20% 3rd year – 30% 4th year – 40%

N/A

N/A

N/A, but 80 Court administrators received computer training and courts were supplied with limited equipment

Highly Unsatisfactory

Component C

Judicial Training

1) Number of judges trained as faculty

2) Number of education programs delivered

3) percentage of participation by the judges in training programs

1) 3 in the 1st year

2) 3 in total

3) 1st year – 50% participation in full program following years, 80% participation in full program

N/A

N/A

N/A, but several training sessions and workshops were conducted, during which nearly all judges and prosecutors in participated

Unsatisfactory

Component DAlternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)

Number of cases that go to ADR vs. total number of filed cases

20% of total number of cases go through ADR process

N/ATwo ADR centers were established received only a few cases and was eventually discontinued.

Unsatisfactory

Component E

Legal Information

Develop and implement record management system through training program and purchase of record keeping equipment

Uniform maintenance of records and ability of the trial courts to have records retrieved rapidly

A periodic legal journal was produced; new legislation was published; legal awareness campaigns were conducted; several specialized legal libraries were established.

Satisfactory

Component F

Construction ofCourthouses

Implementation never initiated as funds from the Saudi fund was not transferred due to security condition.

Unsatisfactory

note (1): Civil Procedure Code; Criminal Procedure Code; Law on Arbitration and Mediation; Law on Classification of Courts; Court Fees Law; Notary Public Law; Law on Evidence; Law on Leases; Law on the Execution of Court Decisions; Industry Law; Law on Property Tax; Law on Money Laundering; Law on Movable Assets; Traffic Law; Law on the Constitutional Court; Law on Specifications and Measurements; Electronic Signatures Law; Publication and Advertisement Law; Law on Handicrafts; Land Survey Law; Pharmaceutical Associations Law; and Media Law,the Civil Procedure Code; the Criminal Procedure Code; Law on Arbitration and Mediation; Law on Specifications and Measurements; Court Fees Law; Law on Evidence; Law on Classification of Courts; Law on the Constitutional Court; Law on Movable Assets; Law on Property Taxes; Industry Law; Law on Leases; Law on the Notary Public; Law on the Execution of Court Decisions; The pharmaceutical Associations Law; Law on Handicrafts, Law on Media, Land Survey Law and the Publication and Advertisement Law.

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Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing

Expenditure Category ICB NCB Others N.B.F Total Cost

1. Works 0.00

2. Goods 0.71 0.71

3. Services 1.00 3.56 4.56

4. Operating Expenses 0.23 0.23

Total 1.00 4.50 5.50

Procurement Method

Project Cost by Procurement Arrangement (Appraisal Estimate) (US$ million equivalent)

Expenditure Category ICB NCB Others N.B.F Total Cost1. Works 0.00

2. Goods 0.40 0.40

3. Services 0.32 1.01 1.33

4. Operating Expenses 0.76 0.76

5. Undisbursed 0.31

Total 0.32 1.40 0.76 2.79

Procurement Method

Project Cost by Procurement Arrangement (Actual/Latest Estimate) (US$ million equivalent)

Component Bank Govt Cof Bank Govt Cof Bank Govt Cof

A. Unification and development of legislation 1.18 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.00 64 0.00 N/AB. Court administration 1.56 0.12 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 3 0.00 N/AC. Judicial training 1.01 0.00 0.00 0.34 0.00 0.00 34 0.00 N/AD. Alternative dispute resolution 0.73 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 45 0.00 N/AE. Legal information 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.00 64 0.00 N/AF. Project management 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.76 0.00 0.00 127 0.00 N/AG. Court house construction 1/ 0 0.00 12.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 N/A N/A 0.00

Total 5.5 0.12 12.00 2.49 0.00 0.00 45 0.00 0.00

Appraisal Estimate Actual/Latest Estimate Percentage of Appraisal

Project Financing by Component (in US$ million equivalent)

1/ The appraisal estimate of this component was prepared in connection with the signing of the administration agreement between the Bank and the Saudi Fund in December 2001.

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Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits

N/A

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Annex 4. Bank Inputs

(a) Missions:Stage of Project Cycle Performance Rating No. of Persons and Specialty

(e.g. 2 Economists, 1 FMS, etc.)Month/Year Count Specialty

ImplementationProgress

DevelopmentObjective

Identification/Preparation1996 1 Counsel1996 1 Sr. Counsel/TTL

Appraisal/Negotiation1996 1 Sr. Counsel/TTL1997 1 Chief Counsel1997 1 Financial Management Specialist1997 1 Procurement Specialist

SupervisionJune 1998 1 Sr. Counsel/TTL S SMarch 1999 3 1 Jr. Counsel, 1 Sr.

Counsel/TTL, 1 chief CounselS S

June 1999 1 Legal Consultant S SDecember 1999 1 Chief Counsel S SJune 2000 1 Sr. Counsel/TTL S SOctober 2000 1 Sr. Counsel/TTL S SJune 2001 1 Sr. Counsel/TTL S SDecember 2001 1 Sr. Counsel/TTL S SJune 2002 1 Sr. Counsel/TTL S S March 2003 1 Country Officer/TTL S SOctober 2003 2 1 Country Officer/TTL, 1 Legal

ConsultantU U

ICR March 2004 2 1 Legal Consultant, 1

Country Officer U U

(b) Staff:

Stage of Project Cycle Actual/Latest EstimateNo. Staff weeks US$ ('000)

Identification/Preparation 8 31Appraisal/Negotiation 7 30Supervision 38 150ICR 8 24Total 61 235

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Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components(H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable)

RatingMacro policies H SU M N NASector Policies H SU M N NAPhysical H SU M N NAFinancial H SU M N NAInstitutional Development H SU M N NAEnvironmental H SU M N NA

SocialPoverty Reduction H SU M N NAGender H SU M N NAOther (Please specify) H SU M N NA

Private sector development H SU M N NAPublic sector management H SU M N NAOther (Please specify) H SU M N NA

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Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory)

6.1 Bank performance Rating

Lending HS S U HUSupervision HS S U HUOverall HS S U HU

6.2 Borrower performance Rating

Preparation HS S U HUGovernment implementation performance HS S U HUImplementation agency performance HS S U HUOverall HS S U HU

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Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents

N/A

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