the youth in the context of globalization: foreign...

【Panel I : Paper 3】

The Youth in the Context of Globalization: Foreign Exposure, Economic Openness and National Pride

Organized by the Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica (IPSAS) Co-sponsored by Asian Barometer Survey

September 20-21, 2012 Taipei IPSAS Conference Room A

(5th floor, North, Building for Humanities and Social Sciences)

The Youth in the Context of Globalization:

Foreign Exposure, Economic Openness and National Pride

Chin-en Wu Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica

Associate [email protected]

This is only a rough draft. Please do not quote without author’s permission. Paper prepared for delivery at the conference “Democratic Citizenship and Voices of Asia’s Youth”, organized by the Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica, and co-sponsored by Asian Barometer Survey, National Taiwan University, September 20-21, 2012, Taipei, Taiwan.

1

The Youth in the Context of Globalization: Foreign Exposure, Economic Openness and National Pride

Chin-en Wu

Introduction

The classical model of democracy assume that for such a system to work,

citizens must become aware, knowledgeable, and active in public affairs, engaged

with other citizens and psychologically attached to their communities and nations.

Democratic citizenship comprises several desired characteristics of “good citizens”.

The first one is participation, or the behavioral aspect of democratic citizenship.

Participation, both voting and alternative forms, are a prime criterion for defining the

democratic citizen and his or her role within the political process, and it is central to

the theoretical literature on democracy. The second one is critical and deliberative

aspect of democratic citizenship. This dimension involves the citizen’s autonomous

role in being sufficiently attentive to and informed about government to exercise a

participatory role. The third one is allegiance, or the affective and normative aspect of

democratic citizenship. Allegiance refers to the affection for one’s national community,

compassion for other fellow citizens (and concern for their well-being), and normative

commitment to the organizing principles of a democracy. While the importance of

normative commitment to democratic values and norms are well known, allegiance to

the national community is especially important to democracies that are struggling

with the nation-building process.

In the wake of globalization, in each country the characteristics of good

democratic citizens are facing challenges. First of all, exposure to foreign media and

global affairs directly influence people’ cultural and national identity and also their

attachment to traditional culture. Next, globalization entails international division of

labor, hurting the unskilled labor in the developed countries and increasing income

2

inequality within and between countries. Without secure income, it is difficult to

image that citizens are willing and able to participate, be autonomy, and allegiant to

certain norms. The cultural and economic shocks are likely to be more salient among

the young generation because people of this age are still in the process of socialization

and are at the beginning of their careers.

Globalization creates double challenges facing the youth. First of all,

globalization of economic exchanges increases the economic fluctuation. In addition,

the division of labor induces the relocation of manufacturing bases from rich countries

to countries with cheap labor. Globalization of production along with the process of

automated manufacturing greatly hurt the youth in the developed countries. On the

other hand, it ensures the high employment rate in the developing countries by

drawing the youth from the rural to the factories surrounding the cities. It creates

alienation and disorder among the workers. Will the economic shocks affect young

citizens’ satisfaction with and support for democracy and demand for political

changes? In addition, what are their attitudes toward economic openness?

Globalization also creates the cultural identity tension. Facing the culture shocks,

people are likely to have either one of the two types of responses. First, exposure to

foreign media and foreign affairs are likely to weaken people’ attachment to national

community. The incoming global information and interests may also intrigue

anti-globalization sentiment which reinforces protectionism and indigenous cultural

identity. We will empirically examine the two possibilities. In addition, we will

examine whether the strength of this attachment of the youth generation stronger or

weaker than older generations. Are there differences within the youth generation?

What is the impact of education, urban residence, family’s economic condition and

Internet use on this attachment?

East Asia is one of the few regions in the world today where the bulk of the

3

countries are still governed by authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes. In addition

to the divergent political regimes, the levels of developments also differ greatly across

countries. Finally, the exposure to foreign trade also differs across countries. The

share of trade as a percentage of GDP in some countries exceeds 100 percent. The

divergence allows us to explore different response patterns across the region.

On the other hand, although the youth unemployment rate in East Asia is

comparatively lower than other regions of the world, it is still higher than the adult

unemployment rate. The unemployment rate for youth was 2.8 times than that of the

adult (International Labor Office 2012). We want to know whether job status

influence people’s evaluation of the political and trade regimes.

Literature Review

Globalization and Economic Shocks

Globalization mainly comprises two integrations: economic and cultural. Both

types of integrations have important impacts on the youth’ life. The backbone of the

economic globalization is the global division of production. Because the relocation of

production bases to countries with cheap labors, workers of the industrialized

countries suffer the most. High unemployment rates and worsening income

distribution has been characterizing the western democracies during the era of

globalization (Kapstein 2000; Bowlus and Robin 2004). Unskilled laborers suffer

most seriously from the international division of labor. Scholars have empirically

confirmed that the unequal distribution of income decreases satisfaction with

democracy in Western Europe (Wagner, Dufour, and Schneider 2003). Similarly,

although most East Asian countries have recovered from the 1997 Asian Financial

Crisis, rising income inequality is also a significant trend in this region.

Because the erosion of the manufacturing jobs in the industrialized countries and

4

being less experienced, many young workers are more likely to accepts short-term

jobs or jobs with low wage and minimal benefits (World Youth Report 2007). Young

people trapped in such type of works have difficulties shifting to more permanent and

better-paid positions (International Labor Office 2012).

Unemployment, dead-end jobs, and poverty in many cases tend to frustrate the

youth. This social discontent in many countries results in social unrest and sometime

the youth violence and crimes (Hugo 2003). In addition, it is likely that such

frustration may reduce young adult’s satisfaction with and support for democracy and

may even spark demands for political changes. While in the developing countries,

young workers who often migrant from the rural area to the cities and work in poor

conditions and lack adequate social protection. Although employed, they are also

likely to be discontent with the current political and economic system (International

Labor Office 2012).

Along with the globalization is economic modernization, which tends to

accompany the change in family structure from extended families to nuclear families.

This change reduces the traditional family control power over the youth but at the

same time reduce the protection the extended families can provide in times of

difficulties (World Youth Report 2007).

Globalization and Identity Shocks

The integration of culture is characterized by the cross-border information and

communication flows, which come mainly from the developed countries to the

developing countries. The spread of Western culture increases the public concerns

about the erosion of the attachment to national community and the integrity of the

traditional values (World Youth Report 2007).

Because the youth are still undergoing the socialization process, they are

5

amenable and sometime vulnerable to culture shocks. The crash of cultures may cause

disorientation among the youth. As the youth are exposed to the globalization of

culture, there are two possible reactions. One is that the youth develop a biculture

identity (Arnett 2005). They may still have the existing identity but at the same time

they develop a global consciousness (Giddens 1991). The other reaction is that the

youth perceive the invasion of foreign culture as a threat. As a result, they tend to

embrace their own culture identity more firmly and try to defend it.

The globalization of culture tends to spread from the Western countries or

affluent countries to the developing countries. The cultures in the former countries are

characterized by individualism and free market, which are often in start contrast with

the collectivism which dominant the societies in the developing countries (Arnett

2055). In a relatively backward economy, people often live in a subsistence level, and

mutual assistances are an important mechanism to ensure mutual survival (Schlegel

and Barry 1991). One can test whether frequent exposure to foreign culture induces

people to reject traditional social values and turn to the liberal democratic values. In

addition, we can check if exposure to foreign culture influence induces the young

people to embrace the idea of free trade and endorse economic openness.

DATA

We use ABS Wave-3 as the primary data source. There is no uniform definition of the

Youth. In job statistics, the youth typically refer to people age between 15 and 24. In

other cases, the definition of youth could be extended to below 40 years old. Here we

use people under 30 years old as the definition of the youth and refer the rest of

respondents as the adult. Because of the big divergence in East Asia in terms of their

political system and level of development, we can classify our country cases into four

broad categories of regime types: (1) Liberal Democracy (LD): Japan, South Korea

6

and Taiwan; (2) Electoral Democracy (ED): Mongolia, the Philippines, Indonesia and

Thailand; (3) Electoral authoritarian regime (EA): Malaysia and Singapore and (Hong

Kong); and (4) One-Party Authoritarian regime (OA): China, Vietnam and

(Cambodia). The Hong Kong and Cambodia data are not available yet.

Economic Status of Youth

We first examine the economic status of the youth by looking at the self-reported

income and job status. One can find that the youth has somewhat higher income than

the adult.

0.23

0.24

0.23

0.16

0.13

0.16

0.29

0.24

0.16

0.14

0.31

0.32

0.19

0.120.06

0.27

0.31

0.22

0.130.07

0.22

0.29

0.30

0.11

0.09

0.13

0.31

0.30

0.16

0.10

0.25

0.21

0.21

0.21

0.12

0.18

0.18

0.21

0.28

0.15

0.2

.4.6

.81

Per

cent

age

LD ED EA OAAdult Youth Adult Youth Adult Youth Adult Youth

Figure 1 Youth and Income Distribution

Lowest LowMiddle HighHighest

On the other hand, more youth said that they can save. It is likely because that youth

at this stage do not have families and thereby do not bear the cost of raising family.

7

0.70

0.80

0.500.54

0.690.73

0.68

0.740

.2.4

.6.8

Per

cent

age

Res

pond

ing

Inco

me

Can

Cov

er th

e N

eeds


Figure 2 Youth and Needs Coverage

On average, the youth have higher unemployment rate than the adult. Especially in

the relative affluent countries of LD and EA, jobless rate is two times higher among

the youth than the adult. The youth have higher percentage of students but lower

percentage of homemakers.

8

0.200.000.04

0.14

0.63

0.04

0.25

0.090.00

0.62

0.140.000.06

0.12

0.67

0.22

0.11

0.150.05

0.47

0.260.000.04

0.11

0.59

0.14

0.260.090.00

0.52

0.030.010.08

0.10

0.78

0.04

0.15

0.100.03

0.690

.2.4

.6.8

1P

erce

ntag

e


Figure 2 Youth and Employment Status

Homemaker StudentUnemployed othersemployed

The survey also asks the respondents whether they think wealth and poverty, success

and failure are all determined by fate. We find that the young respondents' attitudes

differed from the rest of the population. On average, the youth believe less in fate in

LD, EA, and OA.

9

0.28

0.21

0.60 0.59

0.50

0.42 0.43

0.32

0.2

.4.6

Per

cent

age

Res

pond

ing

succ

ess

and

failu

re a

re d

eter

min

ed b

y fa

te


Figure 4 Youth and Fatalism

Studies have indicated that the meaning of democracy vary across citizens. Popular

understandings of democracy range from “social equity”, “good government”, “norms

and procedures”, to “freedom and liberty”. We check if youth think differently about

the essential characteristics of democracy. The survey question asks respondents to

choose only one from each four sets of statements as the most essential characteristics

of a democracy” In one set of statement, the question list four statement: (1)

Government ensures law and order; (2) Media is free to criticize the things

government does; (3) Government ensures job opportunities for all; and (4)

Multiple parties compete fairly in the election.

10

0.35

0.13

0.34

0.17

0.32

0.15

0.37

0.16

0.21

0.18

0.42

0.18

0.21

0.24

0.40

0.15

0.37

0.16

0.31

0.17

0.35

0.17

0.30

0.18

0.34

0.12

0.40

0.15

0.33

0.14

0.33

0.21

0.2

.4.6

.81

Per

cent

age


Figure 5 Meaning of Democracy and Youth

Law and order Media FreedomEnsure job opportunities Multiple parties

In liberal democracies, more young respondents name job opportunities as the

most essential characteristics of a democracy than the adult respondents. This reflects

the labor market uncertainty facing the young generation and is consistent with the

higher unemployment rate among the youth cohort. In electoral democracies and

especially one-party authoritarian regimes, by contrast, which have relatively low

GDP per capita and the unemployment rate for youth is comparatively much lower.

Fewer youth think ensuring job opportunities is the most essential characteristic of

democracy.

The emphasis on job opportunities, however, does not mean that the youth

demand greater equality in general. With respect to the other three sets of questions

regarding the most essential characteristics of democracy, their opinions do not

significantly differ from the rest of the respondents. The statements related to income

equality include “government narrows the gap between the rich and the poor” and

“basic necessities, like food, clothes and shelter, are provided for all” In addition, the

11

youth do not particularly perceive the idea of “people receive state aid if they are

unemployed” as the most essential characteristics of democracy. The story is clear.

The youth do not believe in fate and do not particularly demand social welfare and

unemployment benefits. They just need job opportunities.

0.28

0.40

0.320.34

0.390.42

0.37

0.43

0.390.380.370.36

0.260.26

0.300.27

0.32

0.37

0.320.36

0.320.290.29

0.27

0.1

.2.3

.4

Per

cent

age

Res

pond

ing

Job

Opp

ortu

nitie

sth

e m

ost E

ssen

tial C

hara

cter

istic

LD ED EA OA

One Two

Three o

r More One Two

Three o

r More One Two

Three o

r More One Two

Three o

r More

Figure 6 Generations Living Together and Meaning of Democracy

Adult Youth

Furthermore, one can easily assume that the youth would demand greater

government intervention in providing job security if they have fewer family supports.

We examine this assumption by link the generations of family members live in this

household and the youth’s demand for government intervention in job security. The

figure show a pattern that family factor play an important role in the youth’s attitudes

toward democracy. In the relative less affluent part of OA and ED young respondents

tend to see job security as the most essential characteristic of democracy if fewer

generations of family members live in the same households. Families in East Asia

provide a strong support that ameliorates the unemployment threats.

The following question is whether the youth’s economic status may affect their

12

regime preferences and to the whole political economic system. In LD and OA,

unemployed youth tend to support democracy less.

0.60

0.510.48

0.610.56 0.58

0.530.60

0.54

0.620.56 0.57

0.660.70

0.620.610.63

0.40

0.56

0.450.43

0.570.54

0.2

.4.6

.8P

erce

ntag

e R

espo

ndin

g D

emoc

racy

Is A

lway

s P

refe

rabl

e

LD ED EA OA

Studen

t

Unemplo

yed

emplo

yed

Studen

t

Unemplo

yed

emplo

yed

Studen

t

Unemplo

yed

emplo

yed

Studen

t

Unemplo

yed

emplo

yed

Figure 7 Youth, Job Status, and Preference for Democracy

Adult Youth

Compared with the adult respondents, the youth are prone to system change. Because

of the discontent, the unemployed youth are more likely to accept the idea of system

change.

13

0.42

0.540.540.500.51

0.530.54

0.45

0.55

0.40

0.51

0.00

0.200.18

0.25

0.180.22

0.19

0.270.310.32

0.260.29

0.2

.4.6

Per

cent

age

Res

pond

ing

Sys

tem

Sho

uld

Cha

nge

LD ED EA OA

Studen

t

Unemplo

yed

emplo

yed

Studen

t

Unemplo

yed

emplo

yed

Studen

t

Unemplo

yed

emplo

yed

Studen

t

Unemplo

yed

emplo

yed

Figure 8 Youth, Job Status, and System Change

Adult Youth

The Youth’s Attitudes toward Globalization

Across countries, youth are less loyal to their countries in liberal democracies. In

contrast, young respondents in China and Mongolia tend to agree citizens should

always remain loyal only to his country, no matter how imperfect it is or what wrong

it has done. Comparing the young and adult respondents, their opinions do not differ

significantly in liberal democracies. Young respondents are less loyal to their

countries in ED, EA, and OA. As to the question of being proud to be a citizen of a

country, there is no significant differences across countries and age groups.

14

0.440.47

0.860.83

0.730.68

0.910.89

0.2

.4.6

.81

Per

cent

age

Res

pond

ing

Sho

uld

Rem

ain

Loya

l


Figure 9 Youth and Loyal to Country

Compared to the rest of the East Asian Countries, greater percentage of young

respondents in liberal democracies replies that they are willing to live in another

country if they get the chance. Comparing the adult and the young respondents, it is

clear that across East Asia the young generation is more will to go and live in another

country.

15

0.29

0.59

0.26

0.45

0.23

0.45

0.27

0.44

0.2

.4.6

Per

cent

age

Res

pond

ing

be W

illin

g To


Figure 10 Youth And Going and Living in Another Country

Young respondents in liberal democracies follow major events in foreign

countries more closely than respondents in other part of the region. Young

respondents follow such events more closely than the adult respondents in ED and EA.

0.610.59

0.42

0.50 0.50

0.54

0.470.45

0.2

.4.6

Per

cent

age

Res

pond

ing

Follo

w C

lose

ly


Figure 11 Youth and Follow World Events

16

Young respondents watch or listen to foreign programs in television, DVDs,

movies, or radio more often than the adult.

0.50

0.64

0.58

0.68

0.79 0.77

0.29

0.45

0.2

.4.6

.8P

erce

ntag

e R

espo

ndin

g W

atch

ofte

n


Figure 12 Youth and Watch Foreign Programs

Attitudes about defending a country’s way of life do not vary significantly across

the youth and the rest of the respondents. In liberal democracies, fewer people agree

this need to defending lifestyle instead of becoming more and more like other

countries. Across the region, young generation is slightly less willing to defend the

existing way of life.

17

0.720.66

0.870.82

0.88 0.87 0.870.83

0.2

.4.6

.8P

erce

ntag

e R

espo

ndin

g S

houl

d D

efen

d


Figure 13 Youth and Defending Way of Life

As to people’s view toward foreign good, young respondents tend to favor less

trade barriers. Fewer young respondents in the liberal democracies, electoral

authoritarian, and one-party authoritarian regime agree that the governments should

protect our farmers and workers by limiting the import of foreign goods. Only

respondents in the electoral democracy tend to agree the need to restrict the import of

foreign products.

18

0.67

0.61

0.89 0.89

0.750.72

0.68

0.58

0.2

.4.6

.81

Per

cent

age

Res

pond

ing

Sho

uld

Pro

tect


Figure 14 Youth and Trade Barriers

In addition, young respondents are also more likely to reject the statement that

foreign goods are hurting the local community. In sum, young respondents on average

are more likely to welcome free trade.

0.510.49

0.760.72

0.620.58

0.63

0.56

0.2

.4.6

.8P

erce

ntag

e R

espo

ndin

g H

urt L

ocal


Figure 15 Youth and Economic Openness

19

Information Exposure and people’s Attitudes

Here we examine the relationship between exposure to foreign information and

the youth’s political attitudes. By political attitudes, we look at attachment to national

identity and toward the progress of globalization. The young respondents who expose

to foreign programs are not more likely to think citizen should always remain loyal

only to his country or be proud of his country.

0.22

0.53

0.34

0.63

0.22

0.38

0.32

0.51

0.23

0.40

0.24

0.48

0.26

0.44

0.29

0.45

0.2

.4.6

Per

cent

age

Res

pond

ing

Will

ing

To

LD ED EA OA

Not Clos

ely

Closely

Not Clos

ely

Closely

Not Clos

ely

Closely

Not Clos

ely

Closely

Figure 16 Youth, Following Events, and Live Abroad

Adult Youth

On the other hand, young respondents who follow foreign events or watch

foreign programs more often are more willing to go and live in another country, if

given the chance.

20

0.23

0.46

0.35

0.67

0.21

0.40

0.30

0.47

0.23

0.46

0.24

0.44

0.21

0.360.41

0.54

0.2

.4.6

.8P

erce

ntag

e R

espo

ndin

g W

illin

g To

LD ED EA OA

Not Ofte

nOfte

n

Not Ofte

nOfte

n

Not Ofte

nOfte

n

Not Ofte

nOfte

n

Figure 17 Youth, Watch, and Live Abroad

Adult Youth

In liberal democracies and one-party authoritarian regime, young respondents

who follow major events in other countries are less likely to endorse trade barriers

that restrict importing manufacturing products. Respondents who watch foreign

programs are more likely to endorse economic openness.

21

0.55

0.48 0.480.49

0.790.74 0.73

0.70

0.620.57

0.610.58

0.68

0.60 0.58

0.51

0.2

.4.6

.8P

erce

ntag

e R

espo

ndin

g A

gree

LD ED EA OA

Not Clos

ely

Closely

Not Clos

ely

Closely

Not Clos

ely

Closely

Not Clos

ely

Closely

Figure 18 Youth, Following Events, and Economic Openness

Adult Youth

Next, a respondent who think a citizen should always remain loyal only to his

country is more likely to defend the country’s way of life. This relationship is a bit

tautology. In addition, a respondent who disagree that a citizen should always remain

loyal only to his country is also more likely disagree the two statements that “we

should protect our farmers and workers by limiting the import of foreign goods” and

“foreign goods are hurting the local community”.

22

0.650.58

0.790.760.680.68

0.900.85 0.830.82

0.900.90

0.760.73

0.880.85

0.2

.4.6

.81

Per

cent

age

Res

pond

ing

Agr

ee

LD ED EA OA

Not Lo

yal

Loya

l

Not Lo

yal

Loya

l

Not Lo

yal

Loya

l

Not Lo

yal

Loya

l

Figure 19 Youth, Loyal, and Defending Way of Life

Adult Youth

0.460.47

0.560.51

0.630.62

0.780.74

0.550.50

0.640.61

0.520.50

0.64

0.57

0.2

.4.6

.8P

erce

ntag

e R

espo

ndin

g A

gree

LD ED EA OA

Not Lo

yal

Loya

l

Not Lo

yal

Loya

l

Not Lo

yal

Loya

l

Not Lo

yal

Loya

l

Figure 20 Youth, Loyal, and Economic Openness

Adult Youth

Finally, young respondents who are proud of one’s country are important are

more likely to defend the country’s way of life in all sub-regions. In addition, such

respondents are more likely to endorse erecting trade barriers that restrict importing

23

agriculture and manufacturing products across all regimes.

0.560.52

0.740.69

0.81

0.62

0.870.83

0.79

0.57

0.890.90

0.75

0.57

0.880.85

0.2

.4.6

.81

Per

cent

age

Res

pond

ing

Agr

ee

LD ED EA OA

Not Prou

dProu

d

Not Prou

dProu

d

Not Prou

dProu

d

Not Prou

dProu

d

Figure 21 Youth, Proud, and Defending Way of Life

Adult Youth

0.590.55

0.680.62

0.810.74

0.890.90

0.64

0.44

0.760.75

0.59

0.45

0.69

0.58

0.2

.4.6

.81

Per

cent

age

Res

pond

ing

Agr

ee

LD ED EA OA

Not Prou

dProu

d

Not Prou

dProu

d

Not Prou

dProu

d

Not Prou

dProu

d

Figure 22 Youth, Proud, and Trade Barriers

Adult Youth

As indicated, the western culture is characterized by individualism. The

globalization of western culture is likely to have an impact on citizens’ social values.

24

Empirically, the association between following foreign events and watching foreign

programs are not significantly associated with democratic values and traditional social

values. One possible reason is that the two questions ask foreign events and programs

but not the Western events and programs. If one is only exposed to information with

the region, we will not expect to observe the individualized effect.

Social Economic Status and people’s Attitudes

In LD, there is an interesting pattern. For the youth, it is the poorest youth who

are more willing to go and live abroad. For the adult, it is the richest who want to go

and live abroad. Many young people in these countries have difficulties finding

decent jobs. Work in the other countries becomes a natural way to escape the trap. In

contrast, the ability and willingness of the adult to move to other countries are much

lower. The wealthy are more interested in migrating by investment.

0.23

0.71

0.27

0.63

0.31

0.57

0.36

0.56

0.40

0.53

0.26

0.44

0.26

0.43

0.29

0.47

0.24

0.48

0.30

0.41

0.17

0.29

0.22

0.41

0.27

0.41

0.19

0.55

0.28

0.43

0.32

0.44

0.28

0.47

0.31

0.50

0.32

0.49

0.26

0.49

0.2

.4.6

.8P

erce

ntag

e R

espo

ndin

g W

illin

g To

LD ED EA OA

Lowes

tLo

wMidd

leHigh

Highes

t

Lowes

tLo

wMidd

leHigh

Highes

t

Lowes

tLo

wMidd

leHigh

Highes

t

Lowes

tLo

wMidd

leHigh

Highes

t

Table 23 Youth, Income, and Live Abroad

Adult Youth

The relationships between job status and attachment to national community

25

exhibit contrasting patterns in different part of the region. In LD, unemployed youth

are more loyal to their countries, be proud of their countries, and willing to defend the

existing way of life. In contrast, in ED and OA, unemployed youth are less loyal, not

proud of their countries, and not willing to defend way of life. Compared with

employed youth, the unemployed youth do not support free trade less.

In general, better educated respondents are more willing to go and live in another

country if they are given the chance. The trend is more clear among the adult

respondents.

0.10

0.67

0.28

0.53

0.42

0.62

0.18

0.260.31

0.450.39

0.53

0.15

0.210.23

0.390.39

0.55

0.28

0.51

0.25

0.400.38

0.51

0.2

.4.6

.8P

erce

ntag

e R

espo

ndin

g W

illin

g To

LD ED EA OA

1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3

Figure 24 Youth, Education, and Live Abroad

Adult Youth

IN EA and OA, educated young respondents are less willing to support the idea

to protect farmers and workers by limiting the import of foreign goods. They also are

less likely to agree on the statement that foreign goods are hurting the local

community.

26

0.83

0.33

0.700.66

0.540.58

0.910.920.880.880.880.90

0.790.84

0.750.78

0.700.63

0.770.78

0.64

0.550.49

0.45

0.2

.4.6

.81

Per

cent

age

Res

pond

ing

Agr

ee

LD ED EA OA

1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3

Figure 25 Youth, Education, and Trade Barriers

Adult Youth

Urban youth are less loyal to their countries in EA. They are less proud to be

citizens of their country in EA and OA. Urban youth across the region are more

willing to live abroad.

27

0.35

0.68

0.34

0.59

0.26

0.53

0.18

0.46

0.32

0.52

0.42

0.55

0.24

0.44

0.16

0.27

0.35

0.62

0.13

0.35

0.20

0.45

0.11

0.25 0.26

0.54

0.26

0.410.40

0.50

0.20

0.37

0.2

.4.6

.8P

erce

ntag

e R

espo

ndin

g W

illin

g To

LD ED EA OA

Metro

Region

al City

Small C

ity

Countr

yside

Metro

Region

al City

Small C

ity

Countr

yside

Metro

Region

al City

Small C

ity

Countr

yside

Metro

Region

al City

Small C

ity

Countr

yside

Figure 26 Youth, Urban, and Live Abroad

Adult Youth

Finally, we check the effect of internet use. In LD and OA, young frequent

internet users are more likely to reject the idea that a citizen should always royal to his

country. In ED, frequent internet users, however, endorse such idea. In EA, frequent

internet users are less proud to be citizens of their countries. In ED and EA, this group

is more willing to live abroad.

Frequent internet users in LD, EA, and OA are more willing to remove

restrictions on foreign goods and do not consider foreign goods a threat to the local

community.

28

0.2

.4.6

.81

Per

cent

age

Res

pond

ing

Agr

ee

LD ED EA OA

regula

r

irregu

lar

seldo

mreg

ular

irregu

lar

seldo

mreg

ular

irregu

lar

seldo

mreg

ular

irregu

lar

seldo

m

Youth, Internet Use, and Trade Barriers

Adult Youth

Conclusion

As the youth see job opportunities as the most essential characteristic of democracy, it

is important to providing job opportunities. Labor market deregulation and freedom of

transfer of personnel across the borders would be some of the policies that facilitate

jobs creations.

the youth in the context of globalization: foreign...

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