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How should the church, in light of the imago dei and the Pauline “body of Christ,”

understand a theology of disability?

My aim in this essay is to illumine what a theology of disability may entail. Because of

limited word space, I hope to focus specifically on particular elements within theological

anthropology and ecclesiology such as the biblical concept of imago dei and the Pauline

metaphor of the“body of Christ.” While I will be relating these concepts exegetically and with

regards to a hermeneutics of disability, I will be dealing more explicitly with defining a theology

of disability in the latter part of this essay. By then, I hope to have built an anthropological and

ecclesiological foundation from which one can derive a definition. The significance of concepts

such as the imago dei and the “body of Christ” is that they are grounded on the theological basis

of the worth of the human person, as Nahum Sarna writes, “being created ‘in the image of God’

implies that human life is infinitely precious.”1 In a disability studies perspective, the

preciousness of a person’s life implies that all people, as diverse as they are biologically and

ethnically, have intrinsic worth precisely because they are image-bearers of the divine. Image-

bearing correlates directly to an inclusive ecclesiology: the church is constituted by a body of

believers, “disabled” and nondisabled, who are all image-bearers alike, regardless of physical

differences.

All People Are of Worth: The Universality of the Imago Dei

Before I set forth a specific definition of the divine image, I wish to briefly underline a

presupposition that is fundamental to my argument: the universality of the imago dei. According

to Cairns, it may have been nearly impossible for the early people of Israel to fully recognize

“the reality of the covenant and the universality of the [divine] image, until it had dawned on

1 Nahum M. Sarna, Understanding Genesis: The World of the Bible in the Light of History (Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1966), 15-16.

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them that there was but one God and that the gods of the other nations were idols.”2 Only by

realizing a covenant that extends to the peoples of the world and acknowledging a universality of

the divine image could “the notion of an image of God as wide as humanity” take fast hold in

Israel.3 It is in prophetic literature that one finds a flowering of language that expresses a

universality of both covenant and divine image.4 As Cairns has already implied, relationality is a

significant concept to the divine image, as this, especially in the context of the prophetic

literature, is presupposed in a divine covenant between God and Israel and, I argue, in Genesis

1.26-28, one of three passages which mention an image and/or likeness of God in Genesis. In its

ancient near Eastern context, this passage is charged with the political statement that assumes

that YAHWEH is the only true God. Moreover, an equally political statement is that all people have

inherent value because they are made in God’s image. It is this context to which I turn and will

expand.

Any viable definition of an image of God derived exegetically must note the background

out of which Genesis “grew and against which it reacted.”5 How is Genesis, specifically vv. 26-

28, a political statement? My aim here is to connect this underlying reality of the passage to an

inclusive anthropology. That Genesis is, broadly speaking, a reaction against a surrounding

ancient near East society is critically undisputed. What, then, are particular elements against

which Genesis reacted?

Imago Dei in Its Ancient Near Eastern Context: Infinite Separation and Intimacy

A schism between Israel and its Mesopotamian neighbors becomes most prominent when

one considers the simultaneous reality of infinite separation and intimacy between Creator and

creature in the biblical narrative. Sarna notes with regards to the great gulf separating the two

2 David Cairns, The Image of God in Man (Collins, 1973), 36.3 Ibid, 36.4 Ibid, 37.5 Sarna, Understanding Genesis, 4.

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that unlike its pagan neighbors, “The clear line of demarcation between God and His creation

was never violated. Nowhere is this brought out more forcefully than in the Hebrew Genesis

account…There is no natural connection between the Creator and his handiwork.”6 The divine

fiat of “Let there be!” as creation ex nihilo certainly contributes to an understanding of total

separation between Creator and creation. While in ancient Mesopotamia, even gods must be

created,7 for the Hebrews God’s existence is presupposed and his sovereignty established.

Yet, the narrative takes a turn with the creation of man, the exception to divine fiat, thus

illustrating the special relationship between God and humankind.8 Adam and Eve are

simultaneously created from dust, yet have the very breath of God stirring them to life.9 They are

creatures made from dust yet given the special divine mandate to reproduce and to rule “over

every living creature that moves on the ground.”10 Not only does the Genesis narrative suggest a

profound intimacy between Creator and creature, but the narrative also serves as a reaction

against its pagan background. The “human-centered orientation”11 of the story directly goes

against the “all-pervasive pagan consciousness of human impotence,”12 for human beings,

contrary to pagan mythological depictions, are creatures of “dignity, purpose, freedom and

tremendous power.”13

In addition, this passage exemplifies a dual purpose of both political and inclusive

theological statements. A question arises whether the Genesis narrative in fact highlights a

continuity with its pagan neighbors, as opposed to reacting against them. Upon deeper analysis,

this seems to be the case, for it is prominent in Mesopotamia for kings to rule vicariously through

6 Ibid, 11-12.7 Ibid, 10.8 Ibid, 14.9 Gen. 2.710 Gen. 1.2811 Sarna, Understanding Genesis, 14.12 Ibid, 18.13 Ibid, 16.

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viceroys or representatives.14 In fact, as Hamilton notes, “It is well known that in both Egyptian

and Mesopotamian society the king, or some high-ranking official, might be called ‘the image of

God.’ [...] Gen. 1 may be using royal language to describe simply ‘man.’ ”15 In this view, the

imago dei, in tune with ancient near Eastern societies, implies royalty. However, whereas in

Mesopotamian myth, divinely instituted kingship is the acme of creation and whose main

purpose is to maintain justice,16 in the Genesis narrative, “kingship has been democratized. Not

just kings but all humans bear this royal badge of divinity.”17 The Genesis narrative is

simultaneously a political reaction against and an indirect reflection of its pagan context. As

Batto writes, in the narrative’s “new universalizing theology each person is endowed with the

divine image and each person is charged with actualizing and maintaining this world in the

perfection that the divine sovereign intended.”18 A universalized imago dei corresponds to a

democratized royalty.

The Imago Dei as Inclusive Royalty

For an inclusive theological anthropology, the language of democratized royalty as

inherent to human beings, as constitutive of the imago dei, is significant, for it posits that people

in all their diversity are grounded in the royalty of God himself. If a fundamental notion of an

image denotes that from which it derives or images, then this means that human beings are by

nature both creatures of royalty and creaturely. As creatures, humanity is infinitely separated

from Creator; yet as beings of royalty, people, disabled and nondisabled alike, embody an

intrinsic worth which derives from an infinitely precious divine being. Put negatively,

14 Joseph Blenkinsopp, Creation, Un-creation, Re-creation: A Discursive Commentary on Genesis 1-11, (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2011), 26. Cf. Bernard F. Batto, In the Beginning: Essays on Creation Motifs in the Bible and the Ancient Near East (Eisenbrauns, 2013), 114.15 Victor P. Hamilton, The Book of Genesis: Chapter 1-17 (Eerdmans, 1996), 135.16 Batto, In the Beginning, 130.17 Ibid, 133.18 Ibid, 136.

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undermining the divine image is tantamount to undermining God himself. This especially is the

case when one considers a different passage in Genesis regarding the imago dei. It reads,

“Whoever sheds human blood,

by humans shall their blood be shed;

for in the image of God

has God made mankind.”19

In order to make sense of this verse, one must presuppose not simply that people are valuable

and that murder is sinful, but that they are in their very beings royal and intimately connected via

a relationship to the Creator.

Furthermore, this interpretation correlates directly to the divine mandate for humankind

to rule, as Hamilton concludes from Genesis 1. 26-28, “Thus, like ‘image,’ [the command to]

exercise dominion reflects royal language. Man is created to rule. But this rule is to be

compassionate and not exploitative.”20 One also must note that the command to rule over fellow

human beings is absent in the text.21 In sum, then, human beings, as representatives of the

Creator, have a divinely-mandated task in exercising their royalty, a type of royalty that is

inclusive. Therefore, as a polemic against its pagan neighbors, Genesis may be read as a

theological statement of inclusion.

Defining the Imago Dei via the Lens of Inclusion

In light of the context of Genesis and its theo-political statement of the royalty of imago

dei, I wish now to derive a precise definition of the divine image. Joseph Blenkinsopp gives the

possible meanings of image (selem):

19 Gen. 9.620 Hamilton, The Book of Genesis, 138, emphasis in original. 21 Ibid, 139, footnotes.

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Like its cognate in other Semitic languages (e.g. Akkadian salmu), the Hebrew

term for ‘image’ (selem), can refer to a replica of a cult object or ex voto (1 Sam.

6:5, 11), a painting (Ezek. 16:27; 23:14), or even an evanescent or phantom

figure, a silhouette, the shadowy image of a person (Pss. 39:7; 73:20). More

commonly, however, it denotes a statue, especially a statue of a deity, what in

biblical terms is called an idol (e.g. Num. 33:52; 2 Kgs 11:18; Amos 5:26).22

Given the various denotations of selem, how might one define the term in respect to Genesis

1.26-27? As image and likeness are interchangeable in the text, I will focus mainly on the

former.

In conjunction with a divine image as viceregents or viceroys, I suggest that defining this

term must not only be tied to an inclusivist perspective of disability, but also be derived

exegetically. I will evaluate the definitions of the imago dei from an outlook of inclusion. It

becomes clear that, the degree to which the definition of imago dei is inclusively oriented is the

extent to which the ecclesiological implications of my argument will be also inclusive. I will be

responding primarily to Gen. 1.27, which reads,

So God created mankind in his own image,

in the image of God he created them;

male and female he created them.23

In analyzing the viability of a definition of the divine image, I argue, firstly, that a definition of

imago dei cannot be limited to one’s physicality. If one takes seriously a theological

anthropology as an inclusive democratization of royalty, one cannot limit the divine image to a

particular physical quality. Thus, I immediately exclude the definition of selem—based on Gen.

22 Blenkinsopp, Creation, 27-28.23 NIV.

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1.26-28’s context—as an idol. I do so on the basis of Sarna’s statement that the imago dei has no

intrinsic physical link to the Creator,24 because an idol attempts to physically reveal the identity

of a deity.

Second, the imago dei cannot be limited to one’s rationality. Traditional interpretations

have been influenced by St. Augustine, whose approach is “that the image resides in the human

power of reasoning and understanding.”25 From v. 26, St. Augustine concludes, “Thus, ‘Let us

make man to our image and likeness’ is correctly understood according to what is within man

and is his principal part, that is, according to the mind.”26 In an Augustinian view, the human

person is intrinsically a rational creature.

This definition of the imago dei, however, fails to correlate with an inclusive theology of

disability, not only because it does not accommodate those with intellectual disabilities, but also

because the divine image is about relationality. Yong’s critique of an Augustinian interpretation

is more critical: it “is discriminatory and even oppressive for such people.”27 I concur:

rationality, though it may contribute to an understanding of God,28 cannot be the main criterion

by which one defines the divine image, because there is a more inclusive definition: the divine

image as innately relational.

Nevertheless, one plus of Augustine’s theology in general that may contribute to a

theology of disability is that it is all-encompassing. By this I mean that God is utterly sovereign,

or as Yong puts it, “[...] God in God’s infinite wisdom brought forth a diversity of creatures to

manifest his glory and power.”29 While the problem of evil and God’s sovereignty are issues

24 Cf. Sarna, Understanding Genesis, 11-12.25 Blenkinsopp, Creation, 26.26 Augustine. On Genesis (Catholic University of America Press, 1990), Proquest ebrary, 186.27 Yong, Amos, Theology and Down Syndrome: Reimagining Disability in Late Modernity (Baylor University Press, 2007), ProQuest ebrary, 172.28 Ibid, 172.29 Ibid, 31.

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tangential to my argument, one crucial benefit of Augustine’s theological anthropology is that it

makes clear what the telos of those made in the imago dei is: to reflect God’s majesty. Any

inclusive theology of disability must have at its center this basic premise, for it serves to

highlight a doxological church, which I will explain later. In summary, then, an Augustinian

perspective of the intrinsic rationality of human beings, fails to contribute to an inclusive

theology of disability, for it excludes the intellectually disabled. The limitations of this

definitions leads to a more inclusive definition, namely, the divine image as relational.

An Inclusive Divine Image as Relational: Considering the Imago Trinitatis as

Interrelational

If the imago dei neither refers to a rational capacity nor a physical attribute, this leaves

one with the aforementioned notion of an inherent royalty that is democratized and universally

encompassing of all human beings, disabled and nondisabled. While this understanding of the

divine image is inclusive—by virtue of its universal applicability to all human beings—it fails to

say anything concrete about relationships between human beings themselves. Thus, I suggest an

additional way: to conceive the divine image as relational. Firstly, I contend that, even on the

basis of exegesis, this point may be contrived. If, as Sarna notes, the very depiction in Genesis of

the creation of human beings implies a unique position, or relationship, between creature and

Creator,30 then there exists a textual basis by which one may conclude at least two things. Firstly,

there is a profound, divinely-instituted intimacy between God and humankind which not only

polemicizes against a broader pagan culture, but also implies inherent relationality; and secondly,

as Haslam propounds, one may infer from Genesis that “God is portrayed as intimately involved

with God’s creation, responsive to the concerns of God’s people and desirous of relationship

30 Sarna, Understanding Genesis, 14.

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with them.”31 Based on these textually inferred points, I posit that the divine image is

relationality32—that at the core of human beings lies a divinely-woven desire (and need) for

communion. Moreover, since people, as images of God, to some degree reflect the character of

God, it opens up theoretical space for one to envision an imago trinitatis, to consider human

beings as innately interrelational and interdependent not only with each other but also with the

triune God.33 In comparison to other definitions of the divine image, this is the most

ecclesiologically relevant: whereas a functional definition highlights, at best, a universal,

democratized characteristic of human beings who are co-ruling together under God’s divine

rulership and sovereignty, a relational view envisions intimacy between fellow human beings,

fellow viceroys.

A fully inclusive theology of disability, then, rejects a substantive view of the imago dei

as exclusive but affirms a functional and relational conception as inclusive. From this brief

survey, it becomes clear that offering a precise definition of the imago dei/trinitatis is difficult.

For this reason, I have used multiple lenses which contribute to a better understanding of an

inclusive theology of disability, since any one lens fails to grasp the richness, or complexity, of

the divine image.34 In his effort to set forth an anthropology within a trinitarian framework and a

systematic theology of disability, Yong writes that while one may glimpse the image of God

through Jesus Christ the imago dei/trinitatis “remains to be unveiled definitively only as the

eschatological revelation of God is unfolded by the power of the Holy Spirit.”35 While Yong

implies that a precise definition of the divine image prior to the eschaton is impossible, for the

31 Molly C. Haslam, “Imago Dei as Rationality or Relationality: History and Construction” 92-116, in A Constructive Theology of Intellectual Disability: Human Being as Mutuality and Response (Fordham University Press, 2011), Fordham Scholarship Online (2012), 107.32 Cf. Jean Zizioulas, Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church (Darton, Longman and Todd, 1985), 122; cf. Blenkinsopp, Creation, 26.33 Yong, Theology and Down Syndrome, 180-81.34 Ibid, 182. 35 Ibid, 191.

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purposes of my argument I suggest that the best way to conceive this biblical concept is a

synthesis of both functional and relational views: human beings made in the imago trinitatis,

made to reflect the communion of the triune God, are intrinsically interpersonal and are called to

fulfill the divine mandate to rule over, but not exploit, creation—or, as I argue, to rule with

others. I owe to Yong the idea of co-rulership, as his overarching thesis in Theology and Down

Syndrome is that disabled and nondisabled alike “are equally instruments of God’s reconciling

and transforming power.”36 Exercising dominion becomes co-exercising; being becomes

communion; and an imago dei becomes an imago trinitatis. To expound what an imago trinitatis

is, one must explain it ecclesiologically, for the church is, at the crux of her existence,

interrelational and communal.37

The Pauline “Body of Christ” in Its Greco-Roman Context: Considering a Trinitarian

Ecclesiology in Light of the Imago Trinitatis

In the following section I will argue for an inclusive ecclesiology that builds on preceding

sections regarding the imago dei/trinitatis. By utilizing the Pauline body metaphor based on 1

Cor. 12 and Rom. 12, I contend that the “body of Christ” contributes not only to inclusivity but

also to developing a trinitarian ecclesiology. If the divine image means to be intrinsically

relational and to co-rule within a framework of democratized royalty, ecclesiology is the social

space by which both these implications are concretized: in the church, both disabled and

nondisabled alike become communion and co-rule as one body of Christ; share the same Spirit in

a charismatic fellowship; and overflow in doxology to the Father.

Before I expand a trinitarian ecclesiology, I will define, based on the Pauline texts

mentioned, the body of Christ. One should note that this is not an isolated term for the church, as

36 Ibid, 225.37 Zizioulas, Being as Communion, 112.

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there are other related terms; as such, I defend the metaphor as that which “most significantly

expresses the heart of Pauline ecclesiology.”38 While its importance for establishing Paul’s

ecclesiology is largely undisputed among Pauline scholars,39 the term must not only be defined in

Paul’s Greco-Roman context, but also correspond to an inclusive imago trinitatis of both

interrelationality and co-rulership.

Contextually, during Paul’s time the body (soma) is commonly used as an analogy for a

broader social entity such as the state40 or a community, as Martin explains, “Paul’s use of the

body analogy in 1 Corinthians 12:12-27 stands squarely in the Greco-Roman rhetorical

tradition.”41 In this tradition the “physical givenness of the human body mandates the hierarchy

of the social body.”42 The hierarchy is divided into social classes. Akin to this rhetorical

tradition, the Corinthian body is a divisive community between the so-called “weak” and

“strong.”43 If Paul’s rhetoric must be seen in its Greco-Roman context, which by nature may be

hierarchical, to what extent, then, does Paul further a social hierarchy?

Paul’s Apparent Language of Hierarchy and His Subversion of Status: The “Lower” Made

“Higher”

While he certainly uses hierarchical language, Paul does not maintain the Greco-Roman

status quo of hierarchy, or, as Martin puts it, Paul claims that the “normally conceived body

hierarchy is actually only an apparent, surface hierarchy.”44 On the one hand, Paul acknowledges

a surface-level hierarchy—by virtue of their being different parts of the body and diversity

38 Andrew D. Clarke, “The Task of Leaders” 131-155, in Called to Serve: A Pauline Theology of Leadership (Continuum International Publishing, 2007), ProQuest ebrary, 155. 39 Cf. James D.G. Dunn, “ ‘The Body of Christ’ in Paul” 146-62, in Worship, Theology and Ministry in the Early Church, Eds. M. J. Wilkins and T. Paige (SOT Press, 1992), 146.40 Dunn, “ ‘The Body of Christ’ in Paul,” 155-56. 41 Dale B. Martin, The Corinthian Body (Yale University Press, 1995), 92.42 Ibid, 93.43 Cf. 1 Cor. 8.4-13, 12.22; Rom. 1444 Martin, The Corinthian Body, 94.

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within the body—as Paul says in vv. 22-24, “On the contrary, those parts of the body that seem

to be weaker are indispensable, and the parts that we think are less honorable we treat with

special honor. And the parts that are unpresentable are treated with special modesty, while our

presentable parts need no special treatment.” Not only are there inherent differences within the

body, but these diverse parts also require different treatments: the “weaker” and “less honorable”

parts are indispensable and treated with more concern, whereas other parts need no special care.

Yet, on the other hand, Paul subverts this apparent hierarchy. While Paul is undoubtedly

using hierarchical language by distinguishing between the “weak” and the “strong,”45 he

overturns the status quo by questioning both the “conventional attribution of status” and the

“normal connection between status and honor.”46 The body must not simply let those of lower

status “be more compensated for their low position by a benefaction of honor. Rather, [Paul’s]

rhetoric pushes for an actual reversal of the normal, ‘this-worldly’ attribution of honor and status.

The lower is made higher, and the higher lower.”47 Paul’s indirect subversiveness takes the form

of divine support, as vv. 24-25 read, “But God has put the body together, giving greater honor to

the parts that lacked it, so that there should be no division in the body, but that its parts should

have equal concern for each other.” While the question remains of what it means that God puts

the body together, including both disabled and nondisabled members, this is tangential both to

my argument and also to Paul’s rhetoric: Paul is primarily concerned with subverting “normalcy”

in order to create greater unity and oneness within the body. “Normalcy,” Paul seems to be

saying, is when the community becomes mutual, reciprocal, as each member of the body not

only recognizes the body’s diverse parts, but also seeks to become inclusive.

45 Cf. Rom. 14.1, 15.146 Ibid, 96.47 Ibid, 96.

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The latter clause in v. 25—that the body’s “parts should have equal concern for each

other”—underscores an inclusive ecclesiology in two ways: first, God gives honor to make up

for a lack of it from the community; second, God gives honor “so that… its parts should have

equal concern for each other.”48 God’s giving honor ought to lead to equal concern for one

another. Paul’s ecclesiological vision for the Corinthian body is not isolated, but finds additional

support in Romans, as Paul likewise says in the latter epistle that “each member belongs to all

the others.”49 While the Corinthian body is noted for its divisiveness that stem from a hierarchy

between the so-called “weak” and “strong,” Paul calls for a subversive reversal whereby the

apparently “strong” are called to learn humility, to become “lower,” and the apparently “weak”

are honored by God himself, acknowledged as indispensable members of the body, as implicitly

“strong.” The overarching claim Paul makes in the Corinthian body passage (vv. 12-27) is that

“the Strong [is to yield] to the Weak; and the higher-status Christians to those of lower status.”50

In sum, I contend that the Pauline “body of Christ” may be defined as an inclusive community

that embodies oneness and unity within diversity: it is one body with many parts, each belonging

to the other. Though it may have an apparent hierarchy between the “weak” and the “strong,” as

Paul’s subversive, yet inclusive ecclesiological vision for the Corinthian body suggests, Paul

questions the status quo of the social body by calling for a reversal of roles.

Ecclesiological Implications of the Body Metaphor: In Dialogue with a Theology of

Disability

The Pauline body metaphor has implications of mutuality and reciprocity between

members. In responding to the Corinthian divisiveness and abuse between church leaders and

members, Paul does not attempt to overthrow the body’s hierarchy but desires to engender “its

48 Emphasis mine.49 Rom. 12.550 Martin, The Corinthian Body, 103.

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organic qualities, emphasizing its dependence on mutuality and mutual respect.”51 The body’s

“governing ethic throughout is mutual upbuilding.”52 And while Clarke disagrees that Paul’s

ecclesiological vision does not support egalitarianism,53 I contend that an implication of the

Pauline body metaphor, if truly mutual and reciprocal between members, is that the community

maintains equality, so that those that appear “weak” such as the poor, widowed and disabled in

fact become “strong”; and so that those that appear “strong” recognize the former and humble

themselves, rather regarding oneself with “sober judgment.”54 Paul’s implicitly subversive usage

of the body metaphor serves as a unifier within the context of diverse members. He calls, as

Chester notes, for “perfect unity and the breaking down of all potential barriers that exist

between [the body’s] members. This means, then, that it should also be characterized by

complete equality amongst its members, and the absence of any kind of conflict on any level.”55

The Pauline metaphor is egalitarian.

Building on Paul’s ecclesiological vision for the Corinthian body of mutual harmony and

egalitarianism, a theology of disability not only highlights inclusivity, but also echoes an imago

dei/trinitatis as embodying communion, that is, living out within the social body a vision of

interrelationality, interdependence, and democratized co-rulership. Encompassing only the

anthropological notion of being viceregents or viceroys fails to encapsulate the communal

concept of ruling with one another, both disabled and nondisabled alike. And although one may

understand a democratized ecclesiological vision as undermining interdependence, I argue that

the Pauline body metaphor, because it draws from the human body to undergird organic unity56

51 Clarke, “The Task of Leaders,” 149.52 Ibid, 155.53 Ibid, 134-36.54 Rom. 12.355 Andrew Chester, “The Pauline Communities” 105-120, in A Vision for the Church: Studies in Early Christian Ecclesiology in Honour of J.P.M. Sweet, eds. Thompson, Michael B., Markus N.A. Bockmuehl, & J.P.M. Sweet (T&T Clark, 1997), eBook Collection (EBSCOhost), 111.56 Dunn, “ ‘The Body of Christ’ in Paul,” 148.

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and oneness, goes hand in hand with interdependency. Generosity is one instance in which those

who are needy are interdependent on other members of the body—the more organic the giving,

the greater the unity within the body, as it strives to embody the sort of community that Luke

illustrates in Acts: a joyful, doxological community that not only partakes of meals and the

Lord’s Supper together, but also gives “to anyone who had need.”57 Similar to the Lukan

depiction of the community, Paul’s body metaphor invites the inclusion and participation of all

members in order to foster a people who are organically living out co-rulership within the setting

of a church. As with a democratized royalty, an inclusive ecclesiology likewise operates on a

presupposition of the intrinsic worth of human people.

A Brief Look Back: Utilizing the “Body of Christ” as a Lens to Understand Leviticus

In conjunction with a theological anthropology of relationality and democratized

functionality, how does the body metaphor shed light on an OT example of cultic practice which

excludes priests with disabilities? How, for instance, is one to approach Leviticus 21.16-24

which rules out a priest with a “defect”?58 While, as Gorman notes, this passage seems to be

“insensitive at best, and reprehensible at worst,”59 it must be noted that those with “blemishes”

may still eat the priestly food, holy and most holy.60 Also, as Kiuchi says, these “blemishes” are

hard to identify and probably uncommon61—presumably, they are considered to be congenital.62

In lieu of an inclusive ecclesiology and a “body of Christ” as interrelational, how might one

understand these exclusionary instructions?

57 Acts 2.45, cf. 58 Lev. 21.17-23.59 Frank H. Gorman Jr., Leviticus: Divine Presence and Community (Eerdmans, 1997), 123.60 Cf. Lev. 21.2261 Nobuyoshi Kiuchi, Leviticus (Intervarsity Press, 2007), eds. David W. Baker & Gordon J. Wenham, 397.62 Ibid, 398.

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First, one must realize that these instructions are set “within the context of the larger

priestly system of purity and holiness.”63 Second, it is significant that those with “blemishes” are

not excluded from “covenantal community… . In so far as they belong to the priestly lineage,

they are fed by the offerings.”64 Unable to officate, these priests are capable, unlike the rest of the

laity, to partake of priestly food.

Third and most important in terms of ecclesiological relevance, one must perceive that

“[In Lev. 17-26] Holiness is understood primarily in relational terms. The community actualizes

its holiness as it enacts just social relations… [Holiness] is a relational category that comes into

being in, by, and through enacted relationships based on justice, integrity, honesty, and

faithfulness.”65Gorman’s overarching thesis for Leviticus is that holiness is concretized in

relational terms, although the consistency of the purity code likewise excludes “blemished”

sacrificial animals.66

Contextual insight into these exclusionary instructions in Leviticus allows one to place

more emphasis on a broader theme of concretizing holiness in relationships, as opposed to the

content of the instructions themselves. Moreover, the overall structure of ch. 21 seems to

demonstrate that relationships are foregrounded, as instructions regarding marriage and familial

relations (cf. vv.1-15) are listed first and lead into actual physical qualifications for priests (cf.

vv. 16-24).67 Therefore, within a larger context of holiness and the purity code, vv. 16-24 are,

despite its exclusionary instructions, nonetheless a call for all to live in holy communion with

one another.

63 Gorman Jr., Leviticus, 123.64 Kiuchi, Leviticus, 398. Cf. Gorman, Leviticus, 123; cf. Lev. 21.2265 Gorman, Leviticus, 100.66 Ibid, 125-26.67 Kiuchi, Leviticus, 398.

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Ecclesiologically, then, in order for one to reimagine an inclusive theology of disability

via a lens of the Pauline “body of Christ,” one must not only extend the call to be holy within

relationships to all people—not just priests—but also strive to focus less on “outward

appearances”68 but on the heart. In Pauline language, the fact that an eye is different from a hand,

and a head from foot, is ultimately only a matter of outward difference, extrinsic qualifications.

If inner holiness is what counts, then the so-called “blemished” priests, or the apparently “weak,”

are included in the covenantal community and the priesthood; likewise, if extrinsic qualities are

deemphasized and replaced by a vision for inner holiness, then one may perceive both horizontal

and vertical aspects of holiness as depicted in Leviticus or in 1 Cor. 12: people pursuing

relationships both with one another and with God. The just enactment of holiness in an

interrelational, mutual context opens up theoretical space not only for one to perceive the early

levitical priesthood as, at its core, relational, but also contributes to a Pauline ecclesiological

notion of the participation of all members of the body in the Lord’s Supper. If levitical law

allows, or encourages, so-called “blemished” priests to partake of priestly offerings, in a Pauline

context, both disabled and nondisabled as members of the “body of Christ” not only equally

partake of Christ’s body, but also embody inclusive co-rulership.

Reimagining a Theology of Disability in Light of a Trinitarian Ecclesiology

Ecclesiologically, and with regards to a broader Pauline ecclesiology, I will draw from

the anthropological implications of imago dei/trinitatis such as mutuality and reciprocity,

egalitarianism, and interdependence and interrelationality, in order to argue and develop a

trinitarian and inclusive ecclesiology: that members of the co-ruling body participate in Christ,

share the same Spirit, and overflow in doxology to God. I contend that a theology of disability

must be trinitarian, not only to align with contemporary theological thought, but also because of

68 Cf. 1 Sam. 16.7

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the fundamental idea that the immanent Trinity is interrelational, as Zizioulas writes, “Personal

communion lies at the very heart of divine being.”69 A trinitarian ecclesiology is grounded in the

imago trinitatis by virtue of the anthropological implication of the immanent Trinity as

interrelational and communion: the very relational nature of human beings made in the divine

trinitarian image derive from the inherent interrelationality of the triune God.70 Operating on the

presupposition that the imago trinitatis derives its interpersonal nature from the interrelational

triune God, I argue that the church should understand an inclusive theology of disability

precisely in her embodiment, as one body of Christ, of democratized royalty and co-rulership and

of the very interrelationality of the divine being.

It should be noted that the universality of the church has not been developed, because I

have already mentioned a universality of the imago dei. Thus, I presuppose in light of Pauline

ecclesiology that the idea of a universal church most likely derives from later Pauline letters (e.g.

Eph. & Col.)71 and may be utilized regardless of whether they are authentically Pauline.

On an Inclusive Trinitarian Ecclesiology

While there is no explicit mention of the Trinity in the Pauline corpus, as that particular

doctrine of God is not developed till a later period, one may infer from Paul’s identification of

Jesus as a divine being72 that the participation of the believers in Christ is central to Pauline

ecclesiology, as Moule writes, “[...] Christ (or the Lord) seems to be the ‘place’, the locus, where

believers are found.”73 Paul’s vision for the church is undoubtedly christocentric—one might

even say trinitarian—as his usual epistolary opening statement suggests: “Grace and peace to

69 Zizioulas, Being as Communion, 53.70 Ibid, 64.71 Cf. Clarke, “The Task of Leaders,” 135-36; Dunn, “ ‘The Body of Christ’ in Paul,” 153; Robert J. Banks, Paul's Idea of Community: The Early House Churches in Their Historical Setting (Paternoster, 1980), 41-70.72 Cf. Phil 2. 6-11; I. Howard Marshall, The Origins of New Testament Christology (Apollos, 1990), 2nd ed; C.F.D. Moule, The Origin of Christology (Cambridge University Press, 1977), 53.73 Moule, The Origin of Christology, 56, emphasis in original.

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you from God our Father and the Lord Jesus Christ.”74 If one maintains the “body of Christ” to

its fullest metaphorical extent, one must emphasize equally, as Dunn emphatically writes, “the

church both as the body of Christ, and as the body of Christ.”75

A christological body is a community that is grounded in active communion and

participation with Christ. The sacrament of baptism is a prime example of this, as Paul illustrates

in Romans, “We were therefore buried with [Christ] through baptism into death in order that, just

as Christ was raised from the dead through the glory of the Father, we too may live a new life.

For if we have been united with him in a death like his, we will certainly also be united with him

in a resurrection like his.”76 The community actively participates in Jesus’ death and resurrection

and their participation with Christ signifies their own death and resurrection in and through

Jesus. Not only is baptism considered to be a sacramental act of profound intimacy between the

member and Christ, but it also is the member’s concrete enactment of being communion and

being imago trinitatis: the believer, as the baptismal formula says, is personally identified with

the “persons” of the Trinity. As part of a liturgical tradition, the baptismal formula seeks to

“celebrate, acclaim, or invoke Jesus as the risen and living Lord, in whom the community of

faith has its life and its hope.”77 Insofar as this sacrament, in which any believer may participate,

is enacted within the social context of church for the whole community to see, the “body of

Christ” becomes inclusive, inviting all members to communally embody in their lives the death

and resurrection of Jesus. The communal embodiment of Jesus’ work is exemplified in Paul

himself, who says to the Corinthians, “We always carry around in our body the death of Jesus, so

that the life of Jesus may also be revealed in our body.”78 Baptism, more broadly speaking,

74 1 Cor. 1.3; 2 Cor. 1.275 Dunn, “ ‘The Body of Christ’ in Paul,” 162, emphasis in original. 76 6.4-5.77 Victor Paul Furnish, Jesus According to Paul (Cambridge University Press, 1995), 24.78 2 Cor. 4.10

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signifies that “all of us who were baptized into Christ Jesus were baptized into his death.”79 A

baptized “body of Christ” have the shared experience of Christ in his death and resurrection and

must therefore be inclusive.

The “body of Christ” is not simply christological but also pneumatological. The context

of 1 Cor. 12 concerns the charismatic fellowship of members, who are given specific spiritual

gifts that derive from the “same Spirit,” the “same Lord,” and the “same God at work.”80 The

body, being “baptized by one Spirit so as to form one body” and “given the one Spirit to

drink,”81 is pneumatologically constituted, by which I mean that “the Holy Spirit is at work in all

human lives to shape us in the image of God in Christ.”82 The imago trinitatis as interpersonal,

therefore, also stems from the idea that the members of the body are being formed and sanctified

by the Spirit. For a theology of disability, the benefit of the body as pneumatological is that it

undergirds the common pneumatological experience of all believers, thereby becoming inclusive

ipso facto.83

Finally, the “body of Christ” is theological: all members are called to participate in a

continual doxology of God, not only because of the salvific work of the triune God, as seen in

the sacrament of baptism and the common pneumatological experience, but because the church is

concretizing communion, the very interrelationality of the Trinity, through her active

participation both with others and with God. A community of those made in the imago trinitatis

that actualizes active communion overflow in doxology of the divine being through whom they

have their being,

“For from him and through him and for him are all things.

79 Rom. 6.380 1 Cor. 12.4-6.81 12.1382 Yong, Theology and Down Syndrome, 191.83 Ibid, 197-98.

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To him be the glory forever! Amen.”

Conclusion

A theology of disability that draws from the imago dei/trinitatis and the Pauline “body of

Christ,” above all highlights both an interrelationality between members and God and between

members themselves. If the imago dei highlights co-rulership, democratized royalty, and

relationality, the imago trinitatis, which builds on the former, underscores communion,

inclusivity, and interrelationality by virtue of its close connection to the church. This

ecclesiological vision frees conceptual space for one to champion, as Yong and Creamer do, a

theology of embodiment which both challenges and subverts “the notion that we can engage

theological topics from a detached, intellectual (i.e., disembodied) position.”84 Embodying the

communion of the triune God, though it seems idealistic, must be taken seriously if the church is

to be the “charismatic and inclusive fellowship of the Spirit.”85 Following Paul’s ecclesiological

vision of mutuality and reciprocity, inclusion, and egalitarianism, I conclude by drawing from

the levitical notion of priesthood that, through faith in Christ, the church is “a royal

priesthood.”86 As such, the church should understand, in light of the imago dei/trinitatis, a

theology of disability as the active, inclusive and democratized embodiment not only of a

communal pursuit of inner holiness, but also of the very interrelationality and communion of the

Trinity.

84 Deborah Beth Creamer, “Disability and Christian Theology” 35-73, in Disability and Christian Theology: Embodied Limits and Constructive Possibilities (OUP, 2010), 57.85 Yong, Theology and Down Syndrome, 203-04.86 1 Pet. 2.9

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