theoretical foundations of social synergetics

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Russian Studies in Philosophy, vol. 43, no. 2 (Fall 2004), pp. 47–74.© 2004 M.E. Sharpe, Inc. All rights reserved.1061–1967/2004 $9.50 + 0.00.

V.P. BRANSKII

Theoretical Foundationsof Social Synergetics

Although in the last quarter of the twentieth century the synergetic ap-proach to social phenomena became very popular, in many cases it doesnot go beyond the bounds of philosophical journalism. This is explained,

apparently, by the fact that before one sets about applying the generaltheory of self-organization (which the German physicist [Hermann]Haken proposed calling synergetics in 1973) to society, one needs acorrect and clear understanding of the theory’s system of basic conceptsand their intricate interconnections. This is impossible without a mas-tery of the methodology of the exact sciences.1 First of all, one must

realize clearly that the central problem of synergetics is the interrelation

between order and chaos. It is common knowledge that various types of order and chaos are unstable and prone to change one into the other:here and there ordered structures become disordered (order changes intochaos), while disordered structures become ordered (chaos turns intoorder).2 Let us note that such transitions are more fundamental in char-

acter than transitions from one ordered structure to another or from onedisordered structure to another.

From the point of view of physics, the meaning of all such transitionslies in the search for stability (a state in which transitions of the system

English translation © 2004 M.E. Sharpe, Inc., from the Russian text © 2000 the

Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences. “Teoreticheskie osnovaniia sotsial’noisinergetiki,” Voprosy filosofii, 2000, no. 4, pp. 112–29. A publication of the Institute

of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences.Vladimir Pavlovich Branskii is a doctor of philosophical sciences and a professor

at St. Petersburg State University.Translated by Stephen D. Shenfield.



48 RUSSIAN STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY

from one state to another cease). As we know from experience, the striv-ing toward transition from a less to a more stable state and, in the finalanalysis, toward a state of maximum stability (under given conditions)

is a natural property of any physical system. This striving manifestsitself in two opposite tendencies: (1) a striving in closed (isolated fromexternal interactions) systems toward a state of maximum disorder(chaos); and (2) a striving in open systems toward one or another formof order (under certain conditions). Because the measure of disorder(disorganization) is a quantity that in physics is called entropy, while

the measure of order (organization) is, naturally, negative entropy, callednegentropy or “information,”3 the first tendency expresses itself in the

law of increasing entropy in an isolated system, and the second ten-dency in the law of decreasing entropy, that is, increasing negentropy,in an open system (through work performed on the system by its exter-nal environment).

The situation, however, is complicated by the fact that the dividingline between a closed and an open system is not an absolute one. On theone hand, a closed system can become open by a breakdown in its isola-tion; on the other hand, an open system can become closed by becomingisolated from its environment. So the growth of entropy may give wayto a decline and vice versa. Thus, in the world of ordinary linear sys-

tems, both the striving toward chaos and the striving toward order are,generally speaking, unstable.4

In the first half of the twentieth century a number of new dissipativesystems, from [H.] Bénard’s hydrodynamic cells (1900) to [B.P.]Belousov’s chemical clock (1951), were discovered, and they gave acompletely new meaning to the problem of the interrelation between

order and chaos. In 1967–68, the Belgian physicist-chemist of Russianorigin, Ilya Prigogine, provided a theoretical basis for all these discov-eries by showing that there exists in nature a completely new mode of the striving of a physical system toward a stable state—a unique synthe-sis of order and chaos (instead of their succession). He constructed amodel of the so-called Brusselator5—an open chemical system in which

during an auto-catalytic reaction, an uneven spatial distribution of theconcentrations of the reacting substances, that is, an ordered structurewhose character is not determined by external influences on the system,emerges spontaneously.6

Thus arose the theoretical conception of a dissipative system.7 Thespecific character of such a system consists in the fact that it is main-



FALL 2004 49

tained through a constant exchange of matter or energy or both simulta-neously with its environment. Hence the term “dissipative” (dissipationis the scattering of matter and energy). If such exchange ceases the dis-

sipative structure is destroyed and disappears. In this regard it differsessentially from ordinary equilibrium systems (Prigogine) such as crys-tals or fluids, which manage very well without this kind of exchange.8

One of the simplest and most striking examples of a dissipative systemis the aforementioned chemical clock—the rhythmical change in thecolor of a homogeneous solution in a test tube from blue to red and back

again under conditions of a constant inflow of some substances and out-flow of others. If the inflow and outflow cease, the chemical clock stops.

The most important peculiarity of a dissipative system lies in the factthat it combines order with chaos. The emergence of order in such asystem is expressed, from the quantitative point of view, in a reductionof its entropy, but this occurs at the cost of increased disorder in its

environment. The system not only emerges but also exists by absorbingorder from its environment (it, so to speak, “feeds on” order) and, con-sequently, by exacerbating chaos there.

Thus, the synthesis of order and chaos that is accomplished by a dis-sipative system consists in the fact that an ordered structure cannot existwithout a disordered one, that order cannot exist without chaos. Instead

of order and chaos excluding one another, as they do in equilibriumsystems, they are now interconnected—they complement one another

in such a way that order cannot exist without the chaos that maintains it,nor chaos without the order that generates it: “Chaos and order haveturned out to be connected in a completely unexpected fashion.”9

Besides the aforementioned aspect, the synthesis of order and chaos

in a dissipative system also has another aspect: the ordered reaction of the system to chaotic influences from the environment. Different kindsof dissipative systems are stable in relation to (quantitatively and quali-tatively) different classes of interactions with the environment. Thiscircumstance, together with the scales of entropy export (and, corre-spondingly, of negentropy import) allows us to speak of different de-

grees of synthesis of order and chaos.Dissipative systems are distinguished by such properties as openness,

nonequilibrium, and nonlinearity. Openness refers to the mode of ex-change with the external environment. This can be an exchange of sub-stances, energy, or information or all of them simultaneously (in variouscombinations, for example, substance and energy or energy and infor-




mation). Nonequilibrium presupposes the presence of macroscopic pro-cesses of the exchange of substance, energy, and information amongelements of the dissipative system itself. Nonlinearity, the capacity for

self-action, is especially significant. Because they lack this capacity,linear systems react to external impacts in proportion to the latter: smallimpacts lead to small changes in the state of the system and large im-pacts to large changes (hence the term “linearity,” which refers to thelinear character of proportional dependence). Self-action violates thisproportionality: here small impacts can have very large consequences

(“a mouse gives birth to a mountain”), while large impacts can havequite insignificant consequences (“a mountain gives birth to a mouse”).

This disproportionality in the dependence of the state of the systemon the state of its environment makes such systems, on the one hand,exceptionally stable in relation to large-scale unfavorable influences and,on the other hand, unusually sensitive to a certain kind of very small

fluctuation in the state of the environment.At the same time, the system may experience a qualitative global

shift in a certain direction that is not causally connected with the charac-ter of the small influences. One of the simplest examples of a nonlinearsystem is Prigogine’s Brusselator with its capacity for autocatalysis (inwhich the reacting substances themselves play the role of catalyst in the

reaction). From what has been said it is clear that thanks to theirnonlinearity, dissipative systems possess a very wayward character, which

distinguishes them sharply from ordinary linear systems.Just as various kinds of chaos and various kinds of order can form

ordered and nonordered structures (a hierarchy of chaos and a hierarchyof order), so dissipative systems can form chaotic and ordered struc-

tures of a higher rank. Moreover, ordered systems consisting of dissipa-tive systems, in their turn, can exist only through a specific exchangewith the environment; in the general case, an exchange of substance,energy, and information. From these systems it is possible to form dissi-pative systems of an even higher rank, and so on. Also possible are dis-sipative systems whose elements are replaced periodically by similar

elements (systems connected with the succession of generations). It isnot difficult to guess that the hierarchy of dissipative systems createsconditions for the appearance of various degrees of synthesis of orderand chaos. And just as there are transitions between various forms of order, various forms of chaos, and various forms of order and chaos, soanalogous transitions are possible between dissipative systems with dif-



FALL 2004 51

ferent hierarchical structures. Not all of these transitions are equallystable (from the point of view of the striving toward maximum stabil-ity). Among them, however, there is a transition that corresponds to the

principle of maximum stability. From the point of view of the theory of dissipative systems, it is natural to call this transition development.

And so, development is the growth in the degree of synthesis of order

and chaos that is conditioned by the striving toward maximum stability.It is no coincidence, therefore, that the creators of the theory of dissipa-tive systems noted that “evolution may be regarded as a problem of

structural stability.”10 It is obvious that the concept of development inthe indicated sense is universal in character, being equally applicable to

inorganic, biological, and social phenomena. The generality of this con-cept is explained by the fact that its definition uses conceptions of order,chaos, and stability, the universality of which is not open to doubt. Againstthe background of the invisible ocean of the reciprocal transitions of

chaos and order, the birth of the simplest dissipative systems as an el-ementary form of synthesis of order and chaos and their transition tomore complex forms of synthesis (thanks to the formation of dissipativesystems with a more complex hierarchical structure) is, apparently, objective reality’s universal mode of attaining a state of maximum stabil-ity. In view of the instability of all transitions from chaos to order and

vice versa, maximum stability can be achieved only by overcoming thevery opposition between chaos and order.

In light of what I have said, it is sufficiently evident that man (likeany other organism) constitutes a typical dissipative system that canexist both physically and spiritually only if there is a constant exchangeof substances, energy, and information with its environment (eating,

breathing, heat exchange, excretion, reproduction, cognition, produc-tion of utilitarian and spiritual values, communication, and so on). Amultiplicity of such systems forms one or another social organization orcorporation (a family, a school, a firm, and so on). Such a corporationconstitutes, in turn, a dissipative system: it exists only through a specificexchange of substances, energy, and information with its environment.

Corporations of one rank form dissipative systems of a higher rank; as aresult, a hierarchical dissipative structure emerges, which in the finalanalysis, coincides with the state (in sufficiently developed societies).The state too can exist only on condition of an exchange of substances,energy, and information with its natural and social environment.

Thus, any society is a dissipative system. Moreover, it is a system




with periodically changing elements, for the dissipative structure (so-cial regime) within certain limits exists independently of the successionof generations (elementary dissipative systems).

At first glance, it may seem that to describe a society in the languageof dissipative systems is merely to reformulate long-known truths. How-ever, we shall soon see that the application of the “dissipative” conceptof development to society leads to very unexpected and far-reachingconsequences. So the creators of the theory of dissipative systems werequite perceptive when they wrote: “It is interesting to apply the theory

of structural stability to the problems of social and cultural evolution.”11

We saw that from a phenomenological point of view, development is

nothing but a process of overcoming the opposition between order andchaos in view of the fundamental instability of both ordered and chaoticstructures. Now we have to find an answer to the question of why devel-opment occurs rather than how it occurs. In other words, we must un-

cover the inner mechanism of development, that is, penetrate its essence,which cannot be observed directly and has always given scientists andphilosophers a great deal of trouble.

If we suppose that development is based on a process of selection,then to explain development we must answer three questions: (1) whatis the set from which the selection is made; (2) who makes the selection;

and (3) by what standard is the selection made. The first factor is aptlycalled the thesaurus, the second the detector, and the third the selector.

The literal meaning of thesaurus is “treasure house.” The name con-veys the meaning of the factor under discussion very accurately: it is theset of variants for selection. The richer the set, the better the chances of finding something really valuable (from the point of view of the person

making the selection). The question arises: how does the set arise andwhat is the nature of its elements? The answer to this question lies insuch an important concept of the theory of dissipative systems as bifur-

cation. The point is that every dissipative system has its specific magni-tudes (control parameters), which characterize the fundamental propertiesof the system. For example, in the case of the Brusselator the role of

such parameters is played by concentrations of the reacting substances.Each parameter has a critical (threshold) value: when that value is reachedin the course of the system’s quantitative evolution, a qualitative leapoccurs. This is a point at which the line of evolution branches out andthe process is called bifurcation (from the English fork ).12 The initialquality as it were branches out into new qualities. The number of branches



FALL 2004 53

that originate in a given point of bifurcation determines the discrete setof possible new dissipative structures, to which a given (actually exist-ing) structure can pass in a leap (saltation).13 Every such structure corre-

sponds to a possible correlation among the elements of a system. Thesecorrelations can arise spontaneously as a result of the combination of interactions internal to the system with the system’s external inter-actions with its environment. It is important to note that the aforemen-tioned structures may differ very considerably from the initial structure.A dissipative system in a state of bifurcation is reminiscent of [V.M.]

Vasnetsov’s painting A Knight at the Crossroads [Vitiaz’ na rasput’e],and the spectrum of possible alternatives may be no less extravagant

and dramatic. From what has been said it is clear that it is preciselybifurcation that determines the set of possible paths of development,that is, the thesaurus for the selection.

At first glance, it appears that the choice among the indicated alterna-

tives is a matter of pure chance (or, as the physicists say, the result of random fluctuation). One gets the impression that the bifurcational leapfrom one dissipative structure to another is not determined in any way.On close inspection, this opinion turns out to be mistaken: responsibil-ity for the choice in reality lies with the inner interaction among theelements of the system that plays the role of detector. In the general

case, such interaction is a clash between contradictory causes, some of which are in a state of competition and others in a state of cooperation.

Competition signifies activity in different and even opposite direc-tions,14 while cooperation signifies activity in a single direction. Sinceancient Greek activity sounded like “energy,” joint activity acquired thename “synergy.”15 It is not difficult to guess that the end result of selec-

tion will be determined in the general case not by any one of the inter-acting causes but by the resultant of them all, in other words, by thesuperposition of all these causes. It is clear that this resultant is deter-mined not only by the qualitative, but also by the quantitative aspectof interaction, that is, by the interrelation of “forces” among opposedcauses. The latter depends on the distribution of cooperative tenden-

cies or the “interrelation of forces” (“synergetic”) among the afore-mentioned causes. Hence it is clear that the detector, so to speak (rephrasing Einstein’s well-known utterance), is devilishly “cunning”but not “malicious,” for he himself does not know in advance what thefinal result of the selection will be.

At first glance, it may appear that a thesaurus and a detector suffice




for an unambiguous choice. Deeper analysis, however, shows that this isnot so. The point is that (as follows from the real practice of selection)one and the same detector may choose from one and the same thesaurus

quite different elements, if one is following different rules; and, con-versely, different detectors may choose one and the same element fromdifferent thesauri, if their rules coincide.

And so, the third factor of the selection—the selector—is the guidingrule on the basis of which the choice is made.

In the case of arbitrary internal interaction in a dissipative system of

any nature, such a rule is provided by the objective law governing theinteraction.16 What I have said above makes it clear that for dissipative

structures this law is the corresponding principle of stability: in dissipa-tive systems “the search for stability plays the role of natural selection.”17

Bifurcation is an unstable state of a system. Moreover, different bifurca-tions generate different kinds of instability. In their turn, different types

of internal interactions may be connected with different criteria of sta-bility. So the principle of selection (the selector) is the definition of thestate that the system must attain in order to be in a state of maximalstability under the given conditions.18

Thus, a necessary and sufficient condition for an unambiguous (or atleast close to unambiguous) selection is the combination of a thesau-

rus, a detector, and a selector.19 The general picture of the operation of selection is as follows. Random quantitative changes accumulate and

reach a critical threshold at which they create qualitatively new mate-rial (bifurcational structures) for selection; the interaction (“struggle”)of conflicting causes establishes the procedure for choosing concreteelements from this material; and the law of stability, to which this

interaction is subject, carries out a preliminary sorting of the material,playing the role of a selection filter. The result of selection is a muta-tion or fluctuation,20 that is, the realization of one of the bifurcationalstructures. Our attention is drawn to the unusually complex and deli-cate character of the mechanism of selection, which is masked by thefact that all the selection factors (thesaurus, detector, and selector) act

together and merge in the process of selection into a single whole.This merging gives the whole process of creating a qualitatively newformation a highly puzzling appearance. It is not therefore surprisingthat to the observer who is not aware of the described factors of selec-tion and their interrelations the birth of a new quality as a virtuosocombination of unusual elements with a cunning (intricate) structure



FALL 2004 55

seems to be a real “miracle,” an irrational act that does not lend itself to rational analysis (the mystery of emergence, to which in the twentiethcentury Henri Bergson, Samuel Alexander, and other philosophers de-

voted so much attention).In light of what has been said, synergetics may be regarded as the

theory of the formation of new qualities.21 This can be justified, in par-ticular, by a fact of no little importance: synergetics explains in a rigor-ous mathematical fashion (by means of systems of nonlinear differentialequations) how an old quality branches out into new ones (the theory of

bifurcation). The bifurcation mechanism explains “how purely quanti-tative growth can lead to a qualitatively new choice.”22

The operative mechanism of selection becomes even more compli-cated when we pass from elementary dissipative systems to compositeones, the elements of which are themselves dissipative systems. Of spe-cial interest are the generational systems that I have already mentioned.

Here it is necessary to draw a distinction between local bifurcationsexperienced by system elements (microevolution) and global bifurca-tions experienced by the system as a whole (macroevolution). In courseof the succession of generations, there is a gradual accumulation of lo-cal bifurcations and local mutations based on them. As a result, therearises a new control parameter—the number of local mutations—which

has its own threshold (critical) value. When this value is attained, thecorrespondence between the structure of the generational system and its

elements is violated and there appears a global bifurcation—a set of possible new structures of the system as a whole. In this way a globalthesaurus takes shape. A global structure is selected from a set and isembodied in reality (a global mutation) by interaction among the ele-

ments of the system and by the global selector—the law of stability of the system as a whole. It is important to emphasize that the process of selection and its consequence—qualitative change of the generationalsystem—are, in the final analysis, essentially connected with the suc-cession of the generations of its elements.23

The question arises: how can the theory of development set out above

be verified? For this we must first of all see what are the chief phenom-enological signs of development that require rational explanation. It turnsout that the characteristic features of any developing system are com-

plexity (of internal structure), diversity (of forms of manifestation), andadaptation24 (to the external environment).25 These features have beenstudied particularly closely in dissipative systems in living nature.26




As regards complexity, our attention is immediately drawn to the fol-lowing hierarchy: cells—tissues—organs—organisms—biocenoses—biosphere.

It suffices to recall that man’s cerebral cortex alone consists of about100 billion nerve cells—a number of the same order of magnitude as thenumber of stars in our galaxy. No less impressive is the diversity of forms in which biological dissipative systems manifest themselves.

Now let us look at the consequences that flow from the synergetictheory of development set out above. First of all, the mechanism of se-

lection described above presupposes that the result of selection mustpossess a property such as hierarchical structure. This property is con-

nected with the tendency of both homogeneous and heterogeneous dis-sipative systems, under certain conditions of interaction with the externalenvironment, toward unification (integration).27 Such unification givessystems of a certain type under the stated conditions an advantage from

the point of view of the principle of stability for the following reason: itleads to the replacement of competition between these systems by coop-eration, and this leads to a more efficient exchange of substances, en-ergy, and information. In other words, by creating a dissipative“superstructure” the original dissipative systems profit in terms of sub-stances, energy, and information in their own dissipative exchange. The

principle of maximum stability requires that such unification (integra-tion) be repeated at a higher level (of integration of the systems that

have arisen as a result of primary integration). The multiple integrationof systems of different rank inevitably lends the structure of the whole ahierarchical character. I stress that this tendency is especially character-istic of dissipative systems, inasmuch as it acquires a special signifi-

cance in the presence of exchange.28

Thus, selection facilitates the spread of hierarchy because in thebifurcational set of possible structures hierarchy is preferable from thepoint of view of the principle of stability. The tendency in favor of hier-archy makes it understandable why in the process of a system’s devel-opment its structure tends to become more complicated.

On the other hand, inasmuch as the most diverse successive bifurca-tions appear in the process of the transformation of random quantitativechanges into qualitative ones, many possible directions of hierarchizationarise. It follows that the result of selection must also possess a propertysuch as branching. This means that under some conditions of inter-action with the environment one direction of hierarchization is prefer-



FALL 2004 57

able, while under other conditions another direction is preferable.29 Thisdiversity in directions of hierarchization inevitably introduces diversityinto the development even of identical dissipative systems that undergo

identical bifurcations but have different interactions with the environ-ment. External interaction here will be nonspecific in the sense that itwill be only the occasion for the system’s hierarchization, not its cause.The cause will be the specific characteristics of the system itself.

The diversity observed in the development of dissipative systems istherefore a natural consequence of the bifurcation mechanism (“the play

of bifurcations” in Prigogine’s expression). But perhaps the most sig-nificant result of selection is a property such as the new nonlinearity or

a different type of feedback. As I have noted, a dissipative system iscapable of self-action. At times, therefore, it can play tricks that themost extravagant and whimsical mind would never dream of. Its reac-tion to an external influence can be quite disproportionate (excessively

large or excessively small). It turns out that selection can modify (vary)the capacity of a system for self-action, choosing forms of that capacitythat lend the system greater stability: a sufficiently rich thesaurus and adetector that uses a sufficiently demanding selector can lead to the for-mation of fundamentally new types of feedback. In other words, thereappear types of self-action in which a reaction to external influences is

achieved that secures the greatest stability of the system.30 It is obviousthat the maximal correspondence between the behavior of the system

and the environmental conditions (adaptation, “goal-directedness,” and“rationality”) will then be achieved automatically.31

Hierarchization, branching, and the formation of a new type of feed-back together constitute what in the theory of dissipative systems custom-

arily goes by the name of self-organization.32 This process differs fromthe process of organization in that its essence is explained by the nature of the system itself (and not by the action of external factors): “We call asystem self-organizing if without specific influence from without it ac-quires some kind of spatial, temporal, or functional structure.”33 It is obvi-ous that the theory of self-organization on the basis of selection provides

an exhaustive explanation of all the aforementioned phenomenologicalindicators of development (complexity, diversity, and adaptation).

The synergetic theory of selection that I have presented treats selec-tion as a universal mechanism of the development of any dissipativesystem.34 Inasmuch as a society is such a system, this theory cannot butbe applicable also to its development.




* * *

The social thesaurus (the set of possible social structures) is created bysocial bifurcations. These are social crises associated with revolution-ary situations, which occur periodically in all societies. It is generally

known that a society as a social system finds itself in such a case in anunstable state, pregnant, as people usually say, with a social explosion(revolution). A crisis of this kind plays the role of a global bifurcation,the conditions for which usually mature in the course of crisis situations(local bifurcations) that affect specific social institutions and even in-dividuals. There occurs something similar to what Marx once described

when he said: “You burrow well, old mole.” Such a chaotic multiplic-ity of local crises is, as a rule, associated with a generational change.35

The growing discrepancy between the old social structure (in the gen-eral case, the form of government and property) and new social ele-ments (new people and new corporations) gives rise in publicconsciousness to a set of ideas about possible variants (“scenarios”) of

a different social structuring. These ideas (or at least some of them)usually reflect with one or another degree of precision real possibili-ties for the reconstruction of the global social structure. Consequently,a crisis state of a society presupposes the objective emergence of a setof possible new social structures, the realization of any of which canrestore the lost correspondence between the global structure of the

social system and its elements. Then there arises the problem of choice,and now it no longer affects the unconscious dissipative systems butsuch delicate creatures as living people with all their ideas, opinions,and experiences.

As history shows, the specific character of the social detector lies inthe fact that its function is carried out, in the final analysis, by the struggle

(interaction) of various (including alternative) social ideals. It is pre-cisely the clash (at times very cruel) of these ideals that determines ex-actly which of the possible structures of the social order will be chosenand realized: “It is fascinating when two plots collide head on”(Shakespeare). Here our attention is drawn immediately to three points.First, the struggle of ideals can by no means be reduced to a purely

mental encounter between subjective images of some kind; it presup-poses the social confrontation of their bearers in the form of living people,sometimes ready to make extreme sacrifices for the sake of realizingtheir ideals. Consequently, the struggle of ideals has its ultimate practi-



FALL 2004 59

cal manifestation in the collision of sacrifices.36 Second, the result of social selection of bifurcational possibilities (or, as people usually say,of historical alternatives) depends, as is to be expected, not only on the

qualitative but also on the quantitative correlation of forces among thebearers of the various ideals. For this reason, the result of selection maybe completely unexpected for all the bearers of ideals, inasmuch as inthe general case it is determined by the resultant of all the social forcestaking part in the interaction, and may not correspond to any of the ide-als. This is one of the riddles of history (“the irony of history”) that

Hegel aptly called “the cunning of world reason.”37 It is precisely thisrather cloudy and mystical formula that splendidly describes the spe-

cific character of the social detector.Third, the fact that social selection is always carried out by a struggle

of ideals clearly demonstrates its fundamental difference from biologi-cal selection: while the entire responsibility for the latter is borne by the

struggle for existence, responsibility for the former lies with quite adifferent struggle, the struggle for transformation (or what Nietzschecalled “the struggle for power”).38 While the struggle for existence aimsat conformism (adaptation to the environment), the struggle for trans-formation aims at transformism (change of the environment). In thestruggle for existence, the elements of the system are, so to speak, “not

greedy for fat—staying alive is good enough”; in the struggle for trans-formation, these elements are “crazy about fat.”

As for the social selector, this is usually one of the principles thatguide the bearers of ideals in their struggle: (1) the principle of funda-mentalism (irreconcilability); (2) the principle of compromise; (3) theprinciple of arbitration (neutralization); and (4) the principle of con-

vergence (synthesis). The first principle preaches the cult of victory(“no concessions to the enemy—fight to the victorious end!”). Com-plete victory requires the complete and unconditional capitulation of the vanquished, not only in the physical but also in the spiritual sense.The spiritual defeat of the vanquished signifies that he repudiates hisown ideal, for the sake of which he has made so many sacrifices, and

adopts the victor’s ideal. The most vivid and consistent historical em-bodiment of this cult of victory was the triumph of a victorious mili-tary commander in ancient Rome with its solemn ritual worked out tothe last detail.39

The principle of compromise requires a search for mutual conces-sions and a readiness to “forgo principles” on some points, that is, to




retreat from some demands of the warring ideals. The principle of arbi-tration signifies the mutual neutralization of alternative ideals and transferof the choice to a “third force” (an external ideal different from those

engaged in the struggle). Finally, the principle of convergence requiresthat a way out of the critical situation be found through the formation of a new ideal on the basis of a synthesis of the warring ideals.

It is not difficult to see that the successful use of one or another prin-ciple as the selector depends on the correlation of forces among thebearers of the hostile ideals. If the bearer of ideal A is significantly stron-

ger than the bearer of ideal B, then the principle of irreconcilability willbring him success, while the principle of compromise will bring him at

least partial failure. Conversely, for B to try to make the choice betweenhistorical alternatives by relying on the principle of irreconcilabilitywould be equivalent to suicide, while the principle of compromise mightget him home and dry. If A and B are equal in strength, the principle of

irreconcilability becomes senseless (a stalemate) and even dangerous toboth (mutual exhaustion).

* * *

The synergetic theory of social selection that I have briefly described

provides a simple and clear solution to two of the most important anddifficult problems of the philosophy of history—the problem of histori-

cal determinism and the problem of social progress. Let us examinethem in turn.

The result of social selection is a social mutation—the realization of one of the possible social structures that were present unseen in the stormy

atmosphere of social crisis but whose existence no member of the givensociety could even suspect. And here the old and “painful” questionrears its head: could things have been otherwise? And this question canbe raised not only by the vanquished but also the victors and, if there areneither vanquished nor victors, then generally by any member of thenew social system.

The question posed lies at the very heart of the problem of historicaldeterminism. It would seem that the question allows for only two an-swers: positive (voluntarism) and negative (fatalism). Contrary to ex-pectation, the synergetic theory of selection demonstrates that there is athird answer that avoids this dilemma.

As I have shown, the choice of a corresponding bifurcational struc-



FALL 2004 61

ture is determined unambiguously by the social detector and the socialselector, that is, by the correlation of forces among the interacting idealsand the principle to which their interaction is subordinated. So if the

correlation of forces and the principle in question are fixed (given), thena different historical path cannot be selected. Conversely, if they are notfixed, then, insofar as the social thesaurus (generated by the bifurcation)contains a number of alternative structures, history in this case can go“both thus and otherwise” (Aristotle). But then a new question arisesimmediately: what determines the correlation of forces and the prin-

ciple of their struggle? History places responsibility for this on threefactors: (1) interaction with the external environment (both natural and

social); (2) the proper activity (monadic character) of the interactingelements of the social system, conditioned by the interaction of their subelements and contemporaneous to the bifurcational event; and(3) the history of interaction between elements of the system that pre-

cedes the event under consideration (the non-Markov character40 of thehistorical process). These factors give the problem of historical deter-minism quite different meanings depending on whether it is posed inrelation to the past or the future. If the bifurcational event has alreadytaken place, that is, if the historical path has been chosen, then all threefactors are given and therefore the correlation of forces together with

their principle is also given. Thus, in relation to the past the question“And might things have been otherwise?” is meaningless, for history

has already been decided and it is impossible to influence the past. Al-though this history is always not pure necessity but a unity (an “alloy”)of necessity and chance, in the past we are always dealing with a real(realized) unity of the two, and nothing in it can be changed, however

we might wish, for example, that Cleopatra had seduced the future Ro-man emperor Augustus, that Napoleon at Waterloo had not entrusted hisreserves to General Grouchy, and that Stalin after World War II hadrepudiated the idea of world revolution.

In relation to the future matters stand quite otherwise. Here none of the three factors indicated, on which the correlation of forces and the

principle of their interaction depend, has had its effect yet, and thereforeboth the correlation of forces and its principle are not determined unam-biguously. Moreover, if the investigator of a society is himself an ele-ment of that society, then through his activity he may influence (directlyor indirectly) the formation of one or another correlation of forces andthe adoption of one or another principle of their interaction. In view of




social bifurcations, unambiguous prediction of a future social mutationis impossible here, and only a probabilistic forecast can be made (a sur-vey of possible scenarios for the development of events and an assess-

ment of the probabilities of these scenarios). However, there is apossibility of turning a forecast into a prediction and of confirming theprediction, to speak in the language of physics, experimentally. To doso, it is necessary to influence the correlation of forces between thewarring ideals and the principle of their struggle in such a way as tobring about the correlation of forces and the principle of interaction that

will ensure the choice of a bifurcational structure that the investigatorfinds desirable (a scenario for the development of events that he finds

preferable). If theory and practice coincide, we can say that the predic-tion has been confirmed. Then no one will dare to assert that this is acoincidence. This is what a social experiment is. And all world history isa chain of such experiments.41

The situation here, of course, is essentially different from predictionin physics. There, such “adjustment” of the experimental data to thetheoretical prediction is quite inadmissible. In this connection, a well-known physicist once said that there is nothing more dangerous than acoincidence between the forecast of a bad theory and a “dirty” experi-ment. However, from what has been said it follows that what is consid-

ered a “dirty” experiment in physics is a quite “clean” experiment inhistory. Why is there no contradiction between the meaninglessness of

the question “And could things have been otherwise?” in relation to thepast and its meaningfulness in relation to the future (“Can things beotherwise?”)? It is because in the first case we pose a question concern-ing a real unity of necessity and chance that has already been realized,

while in the second case our question concerns a possible unity of ne-cessity and chance that has not yet been realized.42

Thus, only the synergetic theory of selection provides a solution tothe problem of historical determinism that allows it to be combinedwith responsible social activism, avoiding the two extremes of blindfatalism (“all is predetermined”) and of irresponsible voluntarism (“all

is permitted”).The synergetic theory of selection provides a no less cogent answer

to the question of the existence and criteria of social progress. Fromthe point of view of this theory, social progress is a chain of mutationsof the social system that leads to the attainment of a greater degree of realization of some universally significant ideal. It is precisely the



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degree of realization of the ideal that constitutes the criterion of transi-tion from a less perfect to a more perfect—or, as people usually say,from a lower to a higher—state of society.43 Hence two things immedi-

ately become evident.First of all, it is clear that there can be no objective criterion of social

progress independent of social ideals. If, for example, the economicideal is to create an industrial monster capable of instilling fear in thewhole world, then the preferential development of heavy industry at theexpense of agriculture may constitute economic progress. Conversely,

if the ideal is to achieve an abundance of cheap home-grown farm pro-duce, then the intensive development of agriculture at the cost of con-

straining the development of heavy industry may be regarded asprogress.44 If the political ideal for the citizens of a given society is arepublic, then they will regard a transition from a monarchy to a repub-lic as political progress; but if their ideal is monarchy, then they will see

the same political progress in a transition from a republic to a monar-chy. Analogously in the ethical field, if a Spartan regime is the ideal,then stricter adherence to this regime will constitute ethical progress,but if an Epicurean regime is the ideal, then the same progress will beseen in the rejection of the Spartan regime.

A very similar picture is observed in the esthetic sphere, where the

concept of progress in the indicated sense works just as well as it doeson the other floors of the social building. When the aesthetic ideal is an

artistic work that corresponds to the ideal of the average person, artis-tic progress is seen in the perfection of the reproduction of variousfeatures of real objects; but when this ideal is a work that correspondsto the ideal of the spiritualistic person, a thoroughgoing exclusion of

the portrayal of objects (a striving toward abstraction) will be regardedas artistic progress. It is obvious that if the criterion of artistic progressis taken to be a greater degree of realization of some universally sig-nificant esthetic ideal, then no difficulties with the concept of progressarise in the history of art.45

Second, the synergetic theory of selection explains why faith in

progress is periodically lost in a society. The trouble is that the “pro-gressive” development of a society requires that a certain social ideal berealized in the process of social development. But this is possible onlywhen a most influential, dominant ideal appears in the interaction of ideals and imposes its imprint on the whole of social development. If anideal is only a resultant of a multiplicity of ideals then one cannot speak




of the realization of any specific ideal, and the criterion of progress be-comes vague and diffuse. Where there is no clear-cut criterion it is, natu-rally, difficult to speak of progress. But when the relative equilibrium of

ideals is broken and a dominant ideal makes its appearance, faith inprogress is restored as decisively as it was lost in the “age of confusion.”

Now we must turn to the social meaning of another important con-cept of synergetics that has acquired the name “attractor.” As experienceshows, hierarchization cannot continue without limit and at some stageit comes to a halt. The limiting state that a system can reach as it under-

goes hierarchization is determined unambiguously by the nature of thesystem itself and by the character of the environment with which the

system interacts. In an environment with certain properties, a systemthat has reached the critical (threshold) state of hierarchization becomesunstable, and then the reverse process of dehierarchization—the gradual(stage-by-stage, stepped) disintegration of a complex system into sim-

pler systems—begins. Generally, the simpler systems do not coincidewith the original elements from which the system was formed. As aresult of this process, an ordered hierarchical structure turns into achaotic conglomerate of simpler structures (destruction of the system,collapse, catastrophe). Dehierarchization, however, also has a limit. Whenthis limit is reached, it is not the original ordered system but the chaotic

conglomerate into which it has turned that turns out to be unstable. Andthen the process of hierarchization starts anew. But this is no longer the

same process as before, for it involves the stage-by-stage (stepped) uni-fication of new elements, the formation of new structures, and the emer-gence of quite new interactions.

From what I have said it is clear that there must be limiting states of

a system in respect of both hierarchization and dehierarchization. Thefirst is naturally called the simple attractor, and the second the strangeattractor (from the English attraction). This term is connected with thefact that the aforementioned limiting states attract, as it were, the rest of the states toward themselves. Expressing ourselves figuratively, we maysay that the simple attractor is the limiting state toward which order

tends (“strives”), while the strange attractor is the limiting state towardwhich chaos tends. Thus, the development of a system, if observed overa sufficiently long period, is generally not reducible to hierarchization(transition from the simple to the complex) alone, but is an extremelycomplex and intricate process of stage-by-stage (multi-step) successionof processes of hierarchization and dehierarchization (transition from



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the complex to the simple). Moreover, the detailed specificity of thissuccession depends on the combination of the special characteristicsof the developing system with those of its external environment. The

question arises: what is the essence of this process? Does it have anykind of special meaning that is hidden from an outside view or can-not be observed directly? At first glance, such a process may seemquite senseless: all that is created during hierarchization is then de-stroyed; development becomes something like “beating the air” (akind of “Sisyphean labor”). One gets the impression that the selec-

tion on which so many hopes were laid does not bring the systemcloser to a stable state, but moves it further away from such a state.

Selection as it were runs wild.Meanwhile, there is one question that during the initial period of the

development of the theory of selection always remains in the backgroundbut comes to the fore during the mature period: is there feedback be-

tween the results of selection and its mechanism? Or, in other words,what kind of influence do different results of selection exert on the fac-tors of selection?46 As will become clear on further analysis, the essenceof the process of the succession of hierarchization and dehierarchization,of the striving toward increasingly integrated forms of order and in-creasingly differentiated forms of chaos, consists in superselection—

the selection of the factors of selection themselves.47 This means a searchfor a completely new thesaurus, detector, and selector. It is obvious that

the result of selection to a decisive degree depends on these latter. If thethesaurus turns out to contain much more complex structural forma-tions, and the role of detector is assumed by a more “qualified” inter-action, subject to a “wiser” law, then the result of selection will not be

long in coming: it will differ sharply in quality. The situation here isreminiscent of that in which the task is to find a new mineral with uniqueproperties. It is obvious that the probability of finding such a mineral ismuch greater if the search is conducted in a region that is rich in miner-als, if the specialist engaged in the search is highly qualified, and if hisinstruments are well constructed. Now it is clear why there is need for

what at first glance is such an unpleasant procedure as dehierarchization:it creates completely new elements that can serve as the basis for theformation of a spectrum of completely new structures (a new thesau-rus). These new structures could not have arisen on the basis of the oldelements. In addition, the interaction of these new elements proceeds inaccordance with a new law (a new detector and a new selector). Conse-




quently, it is precisely dehierarchization that endows changes in the de-velopment of a system with a radical (not cosmetic) character. This iswhy the synergetic theory of development is marked by an attitude to-

ward chaos that is quite different from the attitude taken in the classicaltheories of development: “To create chaos is sometimes very useful.”48

The chief result of superselection consists in the qualitative deepen-ing and quantitative acceleration of selection. It is precisely thanks tothis circumstance that selection acquires the power to perform “miracles.”As is well known, the most important discovery of the theory of dissipa-

tive systems is the following: in contrast to a closed physical system inan equilibrium state, in which the probability of the formation of or-

dered structures on a macroscopic scale is vanishingly small, in an opensystem far from equilibrium, the probability of the formation of suchstructures can be as great as you like.49 Even if it were small at first, thediscovery, as a result of superselection, of a new thesaurus, detector, and

selector would make it as great as you like.50 Superselection manifestsitself in an especially striking and dramatic manner in the struggle be-tween the two opposite tendencies that can be observed throughout hu-man history—the tendency toward the unification of social institutionsand the tendency toward their disintegration. In the political sphere, thisstruggle often takes the form of the periodic formation of vast empires

and their catastrophic destruction. The imperialist slogan “expansion iseverything” (Cecil Rhodes) and its anarchist counterpart “destruction

too is a creative act” (M. Bakunin) express the essence of this collisionvery well. There arises a very important and interesting question. Howdoes superselection manifest itself in the sphere of cultural develop-ment? It must be noted right away that this is the most complex and

difficult of all the problems encountered by synergetic theory in its ap-plication to society.

We have already seen that superselection presupposes the existenceof a multiplicity of attractors (limiting states of the hierarchization of adissipative system). Each such attractor represents a local (relative)limit to complexity, that is, a degree of synthesis of order and chaos

that exceeds all degrees of complexity known at the given level of development of the system. There arises, however, the natural ques-tion: where is all this going? Is there a global limit to the complexity of dissipative systems, or a global (absolute) attractor? In his well-knownfuturological work Summary of Technology [Summa Technologiae],the Polish writer Stanislaw Lem formulated this question as follows:



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“Is there a ceiling to the complexity of systems?”51 And Prigogine, thecreator of the theory of dissipative systems, gave a rather evasive52 buton the whole negative answer: “Complexity in nature cannot be reduced

to some principle of global optimality”;53 therefore “there are no limitsto structural stability [that is, to the system of attractors in dissipativesystems—V.B.].”54

Indeed, within the framework of ordinary selection there are nogrounds for the existence of a limit to complexity. It is always possibleto find a thesaurus, detector, and selector with which it will be possible

to choose a formation more complex than any previously known one.However, the situation is quite different in the case of superselection.

Precisely because superselection selects the factors of ordinary selec-tion, it selects, in particular, selectors by their degree of stability (transi-tion from the principle of a looser to that of a stricter stability), and thereis a limit to the sequence of such selectors in the form of the principle of

absolute stability. It is according to this principle that selection of the-sauri and detectors is carried out. Thus, the limit to complexity is set bysuperselection precisely because the selection of the factors of selectiontends in the direction of the full synthesis of order and chaos. Properlyspeaking, the global limit to complexity is nothing but such a synthesis.Real processes of development in inorganic and organic nature confirm

this view of things. Thus, it is quite obvious that the limit to complexityin inorganic nature is the biological cell (with its genetic code), while

the limit to complexity in living nature is man (with his brain that pos-sesses consciousness).55 There arises, however, the question: is there ananalogous limit to the development of social systems? In other words, isthere a limit to the cultural development of mankind?56

In order to answer this question, we must take a closer look at the lawof superselection. The point is that this law, as I showed above, presup-poses two opposed tendencies in the development of a society: (1) thestriving of social systems toward stability (equilibrium), and (2) the con-stant striving toward change (destruction of equilibrium). The first ten-dency is caused by the connection between social selection (like any

selection) and the principle of stability; the second, by the generation,as a result of overcoming old social contradictions, of new contradic-tions that give a new impulse to development. At first glance, such acombination of mutually exclusive tendencies in a single system seemsimpossible. However, there exists one mode of development in which itbecomes possible. This occurs when (and only when) in the process of




development an “attenuation” or “softening” of contradictions (a re-duction in their acuity) takes place. The concept of the attenuation of acontradiction means that: (1) new contradictions arise on the basis of a

deeper unity of the elements of a system, that is, of their higher inte-gration into a whole; (2) the degree of opposition between contradic-tory causes is reduced (the antagonism between them is terminated);and (3) the scale of the sacrifices necessary for the resolution of con-tradictions is reduced.

The mentioned attenuation of contradictions becomes understand-

able and natural if we take into account the fact that the law of superselection operates in society not directly but (in contrast to nature)

through the law of the differentiation and integration of ideals, leadingto the formation and realization of a universal (“absolute”) ideal. It is acurious fact that the idea of the differentiation and integration of objec-tive reality was formulated in its general form already in the philo-

sophical systems of Hegel and Herbert Spencer, and the idea of thelaw-governed differentiation and integration of universal knowledge inthe works of many historians of science. At the same time, right up untilrecently, theorists have manifested a strange inconsistency by avoidingthe last step in these generalizations—to recognize the law-governeddifferentiation and integration of universal desires in history. Therefore,

the operation of the law of the differentiation and integration of idealscan be interpreted as the idealization of particular (“relative”) human

ideals. It is obvious that the product of such meta-idealization must be auniversal (“absolute”) ideal. It is not difficult to understand that it isexactly the tendency toward the formation and realization of such anideal that must generate the tendency toward the “attenuation” and

gradual disappearance of social contradictions, for the existence of coun-teracting social factors is associated with the existence of opposed ide-als (the struggle between ideals and anti-ideals). An absolute ideal cannotbut lead to the general displacement of competition by cooperation.Naturally, I speak only of a tendency, that is, of some kind of stochastic(probabilistic, statistical) law that does not exclude local deviations from

the indicated process (fluctuations).The realization of an absolute ideal must lead to the formation of

some kind of limiting dissipative system, which it is natural to call asuperattractor . A superattractor is characterized by these features:

(1) A full synthesis of order and chaos, that is, an order that is stablerelative to absolute chaos. This means, on the one hand, complete unity



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of action on the part of the elements of the system—global cooperationinstead of the combination of local cooperation and local competitionthat we encountered previously. Thereby, it would seem, absolute order

is established in the system and chaos disappears altogether. But, on theother hand, global cooperation itself acquires a chaotic character in thesense that it unpredictably changes direction in order to compensate forchaotic influences from the external environment.

(2) A superattractor cannot be assigned either to the class of simpleattractors or to that of strange attractors, for it overcomes the very oppo-

sition between these types of attractors. It is therefore appropriate to callit a superstrange attractor.

(3) Inasmuch as a superattractor is the material embodiment of anabsolute ideal, and this ideal represents absolute unity in an absolutediversity of desires, a superattractor is also an embodiment of such unity.That is why the path toward it lies through the consistent unfolding of

the entire diversity of desires.(4) In contrast to biochemical and biological evolution, in which the

limit to complexity is attained in a finite time, a superattractor is unat-

tainable in principle within a finite period of time. To use mathematicallanguage, you can approach a superattractor asymptotically for as longas you like without ever quite reaching it (within a finite interval of

time). In this respect, such a system is reminiscent of the so-called limitpoint in mathematics. The endlessness of motion toward a superattractor

is, in the final analysis, a function of its connection with the transforma-tion of the object by the subject (transformism), which comprises thespecific characteristic of social activity. Biochemical and biological evo-lution are finite because they are based on adaptation to the object (con-

formism). In the process of adaptation only the subject changes, whilethe object remains unchanged. Otherwise adaptation would lose its mean-ing. Conversely, in the transformation of the object changes in the object begin to interact with changes in the subject, and this process ispotentially endless.

Thus, the theory of social self-organization leads to the conclusion

that in the potentially endless process of development there must exist afinal limiting state with unique properties. The cause of the system’sstriving toward the superattractor is the natural process of superselection.

From what I have said it is clear that the synergetic approach to socialphenomena is by no means reducible to the rephrasing of well-knowntruths. As a result of this approach, a new system of social concepts is




formed and new social laws are brought to light that it would havebeen impossible to discover without using these concepts. By takingthe aforementioned laws into account, we obtain essentially new solu-

tions to old social problems such as historical determinism, the crite-rion of social progress, the causes and nature of social crises, theexistence of a limit to humanity’s cultural development, and the sourcesand role of social utopias. Other questions are solved in an essentiallynew way. For this reason social synergetics is a new scientific disci-pline, which might equally well be called synergetic culturology and,

possibly, synergetic sociology.

Notes

1. Recently serious studies have appeared, which show how to approach theanalysis of this difficult problem. A.P. Nazaretian’s monograph Agressiia, moral’ ikrizisy v razvitii mirovoi kul’ tury. Sinergetika istoricheskogo protsessa (Moscow,1996) and G.G. Malinetskii’s article “Nelineinaia dinamika—kliuch k teoreticheskoiistorii?” (Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost ’ , 1996, no. 4) deserve special at-tention. As this article cogently shows, the task lies first of all in uncovering thesocial meaning of such fundamental concepts as bifurcation and attractor . Giventhe enormous complexity of social systems and changes in them, the greatest diffi-culty in clarifying the social nature of these concepts is to find a theoretical “sieve”that would separate the main facts from the less important ones without losing any-thing essential. Nazaretian’s monograph (as we shall see later) actually contains ananswer to the question of how such a “sieve” can be found. It must be an investiga-

tion of the interrelations between the utilitarian (“technocratic”) and the spiritual(“humanistic”) tendencies in the development of mankind—a clarification of how itis possible in a long-term historical perspective to attain technocratic-humanisticharmony, for only this can save mankind from the threat of self-annihilation.

2. See, for example, D. Kareri, Poriadok i besporiadok v strukture materii (Mos-cow, 1985), pp. 13, 159; P. Etkins [Atkins], Poriadok i besporiadok v prirode (Mos-cow, 1987), p. 183.

3. The term “information” is given here in quotation marks in order to empha-size that it is incorrect simply to equate information with negentropy. Although theycoincide quantitatively, there is an important qualitative difference between them:information appears only where one ordered system is “reflected” in another, that is,where there is a relation between one order and another. To identify order as anobjective property of a physical system with information is incorrect to say the least.

4. A linear system differs from a nonlinear one by its passive character, that is,its incapacity for self-action (capacity to experience only external influences).

5. In honor of the Brussels school of physical chemists, who first developed thegeneral theory of dissipative systems. For a description of the Brusselator, seeG. Nikolis [Nicolis] and I. Prigozhin [Prigogine], Samoorganizatsiia v neravnoves-nykh sistemakh (Moscow, 1979), pp. 102–3.

6. The initial substances and energy needed by the chemical reaction that is



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occurring in the system are introduced continuously into the system, and the endproducts of the reaction are removed.

7. For the definition of a dissipative system, see I. Prigozhin and I. Stengers,Poriadok iz khaosa (Moscow, 1986), p. 197; and Nikolis and Prigozhin, Samo-organizatsiia, pp. 71–72.

8. For example, the better isolated a monument to a person is from externalinfluences the longer it is preserved, while a person buried under the ruins of abuilding destroyed in an earthquake and deprived therefore of air, food, and heatquickly ceases to exist.

9. T.S. Akhromeeva, S.P. Kurdiumov, and G.G. Malinetskii, “Paradoksy miranestatsionarnykh struktur,” in Novoe v zhizni, nauke, tekhnike. Matematika,kibernetika (Moscow, 1985), p. 29.

10. Nikolis and Prigozhin, Samoorganizatsiia, p. 22.11. Ibid., p. 488.

12. G. Khaken [Haken], Sinergetika (Moscow, 1980), p. 138.13. A discontinuous qualitative change in a system is usually called a mutation.14. It must be emphasized that competition is only one component of inner inter-

action; the second, no less important component is cooperation.15. It is precisely this circumstance that provided a pretext to call the theory of

dissipative systems (structures) synergetics, although the first term is, without adoubt, the more precise.

16. From what has been said, the fundamental difference between goal-directedand random selection (no sharp distinction between these concepts is drawn in Dar-winian theory) is clear: the former presupposes a law-governed search guided by adefinite rule, while the latter presupposes a random search by an arbitrary choice of the variant.

17. G. Nikolis and I. Prigozhin, Poznanie slozhnogo (Moscow, 1990), p. 89.18. “A chaos-generating dynamic system [a dissipative system—V.B.] functions

as a specific kind of selector , rejecting the enormous majority of random sequences[bifurcational branches—V.B.] and retaining only those that are compatible withthe corresponding dynamic laws [criteria of stability—V.B]” (Nikolis and Prigozhin,Poznanie slozhnogo, p. 224).

19. Note that if a single selector does not suffice to achieve a completely unam-biguous selection it is in principle always possible to introduce an additional selec-tor that will make the selection unambiguous.

20. “Fluctuations are a physical analogue of mutations, while the search for sta-bility plays the role of natural selection” (Nikolis and Prigozhin, Poznanie slozhnogo,p. 89).

21. G. Khaken [Haken], Informatsiia i samoorganizatsiia (Moscow, 1991), p.45. “Such astonishing potentialities of matter in the presence of both a nonlineardynamic and nonequilibrium conditions . . . evokes in us a feeling of profound won-der” (Nikolis and Prigozhin, Poznanie slozhnogo, p. 212).

22. Prigozhin and Stengers, Poriadok , p. 269.

23. Thus, in a generational system there operates the law of correspondence of theglobal dissipative structure to its dissipative elements. Chaotic change in the elementsupon reaching the corresponding threshold leads periodically to a structural “explo-sion,” as a result of which the old global system is replaced by a new one.

24. Adaptation is also called “goal-directedness.”




25. See, for example, V. Grant, Evoliutsionnyi protsess (Moscow, 1991), p. 13.26. The examples from biology that follow are merely illustrative in character

and are by no means intended to limit the generality of the considered phenomeno-logical indicators of development.

27. This is manifested with especial clarity in the structure of so-called colonialorganisms, a particular example of which are the siphonophorae.

28. Not only cooperation but also competition is connected with such exchange.29. There may also occur a bifurcation in which neither of the bifurcational struc-

tures is stable under given conditions. In that case the direction in question turns outto be a dead end.

30. I emphasize that the possibility of the emergence of very complex forms of feedback is created by the very hierarchization of dissipative systems, while thediversity of these forms is created by the diversity of directions of hierarchization.At the same time, the bifurcational mechanism of the emergence of such forms

gives their formation a discrete (discontinuous) character, excluding the existenceof a continuous series of intermediate forms.

31. I note that from the point of view of the synergetic theory of development,nonlinearity is a special case of goal-directedness and rationality, while, conversely,goal-directedness and rationality are a special case of nonlinearity. For man is also adissipative system and therefore he too possesses nonlinearity. But his nonlinearityis of a specific kind. It is this specific nonlinearity that customarily goes by the nameof rationality.

32. In the simplest cases, self-organization refers to the spontaneous formationwithin a dissipative system of spatial (the Brusselator) or temporal (the chemicalclock) heterogeneity.

33. In the language of old-fashioned philosophy, this was called generation asdistinct from fabrication (Khaken, Informatsiia, pp. 28–29).

34. Hence it is clear that the Darwinian and also the synthetic theory of biologi-

cal selection are only special cases of this general theory.35. In particular, local centers of the new education for new generations usuallycome into contradiction with the old system of government; as a result, the numberof people in society who are discontented with the existing regime multiplies.

36. Behind the ideals, of course, stand (utilitarian and spiritual) interests, but theessence of the struggle is described more accurately in terms of a clash of ideals, foran ideal directly shows how the social regime should be transformed.

37. One of the most striking examples of such an “irony of history” is the clashbetween the military plans of the Soviet and German high commands at the end of 1942 on the approaches to Stalingrad. The Soviet plan envisaged the encirclementof the German army in the Caucasus (Operation Saturn), the first stage of which wasthe encirclement of the Stalingrad German group (Operation Uranus). The Germanplan envisaged the relief of this group (Operation Winter Storm). Neither side knewof the intentions of the other. The simultaneous execution of Saturn and Winter Storm led to a result that neither side had expected: the German forces were unable

to relieve the Stalingrad group, while the Soviet forces were unable to encircle theCaucasus group.

38. For this reason, the synergetic theory of social selection differs fundamen-tally from the theories of social Darwinism. The latter simply extrapolated the theoryof biological selection to society, ignoring the specific character of social laws. So-



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cial synergetics not only does not ignore their specific character; on the contrary, itemphasizes it.

39. This is exactly that case of social selection for which the Hegelian formula isinapplicable, for the correlation of forces takes shape in favor of one of the idealsengaged in the struggle.

40. As we known, stochastic processes (that is, processes subject to a law formedthrough the interaction of a multiplicity of random events) may or may not be Markovprocesses. In a Markov process, change in the state of a system at a given moment isdetermined by its state only at the preceding moment and does not depend on themode by which this state was reached.

41. Hence it is clear, inter alia, that calls to refrain from social experiments amountto calls to refrain from social choice, which in turn amount to the demand to “stophistory.”

42. Given that the future passes into the past, there is nothing surprising in the

fact that a question that had meaning in relation to the future becomes eventuallymeaningless. And then the harsh truth for the defeated triumphs—“Victors are not

judged” (Stalin). It is always possible, of course, to say that had the correlation of forces in the past been different, the choice might have been different. But the wholepoint is that given the realized unity of necessity and chance there cannot be a differ-ent correlation of forces.

43. The idea that such a criterion exists is especially characteristic of historicalmaterialism.

44. It stands to reason that if the economic ideal is a balanced state of the economythen economic progress will be understood as requiring the proportionate develop-ment of both heavy industry and agriculture.

45. The difficulties connected with the use of the concept of artistic progress, of which B. Croce, T. Monroe, and others wrote in their time, resulted from ignoringthe link between this concept and the concept of esthetic ideal.

46. It is characteristic that in Darwinian theory this question did not arise at all,while in the contemporary theory of biological selection it is only just beginning tobe posed: “The highest level of integration is expressed in the evolution of the verymechanisms of evolution—a problem that contemporary evolutionary doctrine isonly starting to outline” (A.V. Iablokov and A.G. Iusufov, Evoliutsionnoe uchenie[Moscow, 1989], p. 237; see also K.M. Zavadskii and E.I. Kolchinskii, Evoliutsiiaevoliutsii [Leningrad, 1977]).

47. From what has been said it is clear that a distinction has to be drawn betweenrandom selection, goal-directed selection, and superselection.

48. Akhromeeva, Kurdiumov, and Malinetskii, “Paradoksy,” p. 47. I speak here,of course, not of just any kind of chaos but of constructive chaos (which should notbe confused with destructive chaos). Constructive chaos prepares the ground fornew development; destructive chaos leads to the system’s dissolution. “Construc-tive chaos is constructive through and by virtue of its destructiveness and destruc-tive on the basis of and through its constructiveness. In destroying it constructs and

in constructing it leads to destruction” (E.N. Kniazeva and S.P. Kurdiumov,“Sinergetika kak novoe mirovidenie: dialog s I. Prigozhinym,”Voprosy filosofii, 1992,no. 12, p. 18).

It is a curious fact that in the process of self-organization we can without diffi-culty find analogues of both Aristotle’s well-known four causes and Hegel’s no less




celebrated three dialectical laws. Thus, the thesaurus assumes the role of Aristotle’smaterial cause, the detector the role of his efficient cause, the selector the role of hisformal cause, and the attractor the role of his final cause. Correspondingly, the lawof bifurcation assumes the role of Hegel’s law of the transformation of quantitativeinto qualitative change, the law of the interaction of competition and cooperationthe role of his law of the unity and struggle of opposites, and the law of the alterna-tion of order and chaos the role of his law of the negation of negation. What is more,the real connection between such laws can be discovered, apparently, only on thebasis of the ideas of goal-directed selection and superselection. Otherwise, theselaws (like these causes) may provide material for quite fruitless speculation.

49. Nikolis and Prigozhin, Samoorganizatsiia, p. 287.50. This is a decisive argument against creationist attacks on the theory of evolution.51. S. Lem, Summa tekhnologii (Moscow, 1968), p. 239.52. Nikolis and Prigozhin, Poznanie, p. 276.

53. Ibid., p. 88.54. I. Prigozhin, Ot sushchestvuiushchego k voznikaiushchemu (Moscow, 1985),

p. 137.55. The circumstance that the biological cell, strictly speaking, goes beyond the

limits of nonliving nature, while man goes beyond the limits of living nature doesnot contradict what has been said, for living nature is the limit of the development of nonliving nature, while society is the limit of the development of living nature.

56. It is characteristic that Prigogine also, albeit with less uncertainty, gives anegative answer to this question: “Is evolution as a whole capable of leading to . . .a global principle [of stability—V.B.] or, on the contrary, does every humanitariansystem embody a unique realization of some complex stochastic process, for whichit is impossible to establish rules in advance?” Prigogine thinks that the secondalternative is more correct (Nikolis and Prigozhin, Poznanie, p. 276).

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theoretical foundations of social synergetics

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