theory of knowledge in dignaga and dharmakirti by s.r.bhatt
TRANSCRIPT
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE IN DIGNAGA AND DHARMAKIRTI
by S. R. Bhatt
[1]
When Buddha Sakyamuni attained enlightenment beneath the bodhi tree more than
two and a half thousand years ago , his achievement was not only the result of
having reached the peak of meditative stabilization, of having brought great
compassion to fruition, but also of clear analytic thought. ----- Thus, the study of
logic and the nature of knowledge have been crucial to Buddhist tradition from the
outset.
The Dalai Lama
(Foreword to Buddhist Epistemology by Bhatt & Mehrotra)
[2]
The varied and variegated Indian philosophical thought can be broadly classified
into “Atmavada” (Substance ontology) and “Anatmavada” (No-substance
ontology). The Buddhist thought advocated Anatmavada whereas the rest of the
schools followed Atmavada. In order to expound and explicate anatmavada view
the Buddhist thinkers developed their own system of epistemology, logic and
language to suit their ontology and value theory. The ideas of anatta (No-
substance), sunyata (essence-less-ness) ksana santana (existence series), the theory
of pratityasamutpada (interdependent origination), and the goal of nirvana etc.
required new modes of knowing and thinking. The Buddha acquired knowledge
for his own enlightenment and also communicated knowledge for the
enlightenment of others. The essential significance of enlightening knowledge in a
liberating philosophy of Buddhism need not be highlighted. However it should be
pointed out that the Buddhist theory of knowledge is only a corollary of the
Buddhist theory of reality and the Buddhist theory of reality is consciously
purported to be directed towards realization of Nirvana for all living beings. So,
the Buddhist epistemological thinkers discussed atmasamvit (knowledge for ones
own sake) and also parasamvit (knowledge for other’s sake). Dignaga in the
beginning of Nyayapravesa writes,
Sadhanam dusanam caiva sabhasam parasamvide
Pratyaksamanumanam ca sabhasam tvatmasamvide.
i.e.,
“Giving arguments in support of one’s position and pointing out defects in the
rival’s position, along with their respective fallacies are essential for
communicating knowledge to others, whereas for acquiring knowledge for one’s
sake perception and inference and their respective fallacies are essential.”
[3]
Right from the times of the Buddha there is insistence on proper knowledge based
on right mental make up (samyak drsti). Though references are found in Pali
literature to epistemological concepts and theories, particularly about
consciousness and noetic process (cittavithi) for want of information it can only be
said that systematic theorizing is available only in the Buddhist Sanskrit literature
when the schools of Vaibhasika, Sautrantika, Yogacara and Madhyamika came
into existence.
[4]
It will be interesting and relevant to discuss the noetic process described in the Pali
literature which can be regarded as precursor to later Buddhist epistemology.
Consciousness is the focal point of noetic process. Consciousness can be defined as
‘everything taken together that has the characteristic of cognizing is to be known as
aggregate of consciousness.’ The Abhidharma tradition puts exclusive emphasis on
immediate experience rather than discursive reasoning. It insists that genuine
experience is attainable only in a kusala (pure and undefiled) citta. That is why
noetic process conducive to samadhi (meditation) leading to nirvana is put forth in
a moral setting. According to Abhidharma all empirical cognitions are conditioned
by kama (volition) which can be described as sense-relatedness or intentionality.
Intentionality has two facets--one pertaining to the object and the other to the
mental state. In every cognitive process there is an object which is intended to be
cognized and there is an intention in which an object is intended to be cognized.
This may also be characterized as subjectivity.
[5]
Consciousness in itself is self-enveloped and dormant. It is known as
'vithimukta'. When it gets activated it is known as vithicitta. The process of
consciousness is technically known as Citta-vithi. The cognitive process
begins when the cognitive senses receive the reflex of objects – external or
internal. The external objects are received through five outer senses known
as panca-dvara and the internal objects are cognized through mind known
as mano-dvara. For functioning of each type of course of cognition there is a
distinct process and a specific object.
The cognitive process which apprehends external objects is further
classified under ten stages. They are as under:-
1. Bhvanga -- -It is a passive state of mind, going on smoothly on its own
course, quite undisturbed, existing immediately prior to the
appearance of any type of object. It is also called atita bhavanga. It is
pre-reflective consciousness. Bhavanga also stands for the
consciousness which one has while in deep sleep which is more or less
passive than active. Arising and perishing every moment it flows on
like a stream not remaining the same for two consecutive moments.
Bhavanga is so called because it is an essential condition for continued
existence. It may be called life-continuum. One always experiences
bhavanga consciousness as long as it is uninterrupted by outside
stimuli.
2. Bhavanga-calana - - It is vibrated state of mind. When an object enters in
the range of a cognitive sense, it creates a simple vibration in the
smooth flow of mind just like falling of a pebble on the calm surface of
water of a tank. It is beginning of the disturbance in the passive state of
consciousness.
3. Bhavanga-viccheda -- Immediately after bhavanga-calana the smooth
flow of mind is arrested. It ceases to be a passive state and gets
disturbed and vibrated.
4. Pancadvaravajjana - Avajjana means alertness or awareness. The
cognitive senses become alert to receive the impressions of an object. It
is sense consciousness or sensory consciousness. It is turning of
consciousness towards an object.
5. Indriya/Cakkhu vijnana - If the object is a visible one the object
causes a sensation in the eyes. The same is the case with other
cognitive senses. It is sense operation upon the object.
6. Sampaticchana citta -- Immediately after the eye consciousness the
mind attends to the object as something existing outside. It is simply
marking of an object and not determining its details. 'There is
something' is cognized but 'what it is' is not known. So it is receiving
consciousness, a consciousness which receives sensations. It is the
moment of reception of the object so seen.
7. Santirana citta - It is attending to the object and trying to determine
its nature on the basis of past experience. It is a determining cognition
on the basis of past recollection. But here there is not full
determination. So it is also known as investigating consciousness.
8. Votthapana citta - It denotes the sense of determination. The
comparison of the details with past experience enables the mind to
determine it as such and such. Here discrimination is exercised and
freewill may play its part. It is determining consciousness.
9. Javana citta - It is actively involved consciousness. It is an attitude of
mind towards utilization or rejection of the object. In case the object
thus determined is an agreeable one the mind utilizes it and if it is
otherwise the mind rejects it. So it is psychologically important stage.
Since an action is judged here as immoral or moral etc. Javana literally
means running. It is so called because it runs consecutively for seven
consciousness-moments. The mental states occurring in all these
thought moments are similar but the potential force differs.
10. Tadalambana citta - - It literally means functioning on that object. It
lasts for two consciousness moments. The entire cognitive process
which takes place in an infinitesimal part of time ends with this.
[6]
In this way seventeen consciousness-moments are involved in the
cognition of an object. These seventeen moments complete full course of
cognition of an external object. It is to be noted that both matter and
consciousness are momentary but endurance of matter is seventeen times
more than that of consciousness. In other words, one matter-movement
equals seventeen consciousness-movements. When an object comes in the
range of sense organ the course of cognition begins. By the time
consciousness undergoes changes for seventeen times through different
stages, the object remains in the same stage. At the end of seventeen
consciousness-moments the full course of cognition is complete and the
duration of the object is also over. The object ceases to exist giving rise to
its effect. When the object is fully cognized it is called 'very distinct object'.
It may be that the object does not meet with all the ten stages. It may be
that object comes into existence but does not attract cognitive process at the
outset. So there can be abrupt beginning or abrupt end. In such a situation
the cognition process is not complete and the object is not fully or properly
cognized. Thus the object can be clear (vibhuta) or obscure (avibhuta).
[7]
These ten stages of cognitive process arise in quick succession being
regulated by the principle of pratitya samutapada. The preceding and
succeeding stages are marked by similarity as they are caused by the same
object.
Thus, the total process of cognizing consists of ten stages from Bhavanga to
Tadalambana. First three stages are preliminaries. They stand for the mental
preparedness for receiving the impressions. The remaining seven are
concerning the awareness of the object and are known as cittotpada (arising
consciousness of an object). Bhavanga is comparable to deep sleep. It is a
lazy state of mind. After seventeenth moment there is bhavanga pata
(cessation of cognitive process or vithi-bhanga).
MANODVARA VITHI:
The internal objects like thoughts, feelings, sentiments etc. are cognized in a
slightly different way as it involves the role of mind only.
THE CONCEPT OF CITTA:
The concept of citta plays a very significant role in Buddhist epistemology.
Cinoti iti cittam, on the basis of this etymology, citta can be understood as
that which builds up its own continuity. This means that citta is a complex
of several factors or events which occur in succession. These successive
events can be named as caitta. There is no separate entity called citta apart
from the caittas. In fact, citta is a convenient and conventional term to
denote a variety of psychic events in an organized unity. For all practical
purposes caittas which are mental states alone are real and citta is just a
fiction (prajnapti sat).
[8]
Manas:-
Another epistemic term employed by the Abhidhammic tradition is manas.
Manas is both a cognitive sense and the receiver of the sense impressions.
As a cognitive sense it functions at par with the other five senses. Whereas
these five senses namely eye, ear, nose, tongue and skin apprehend
external objects, mind apprehends internal states. The other function of
mind is to receive the sense stimuli and here it comprehends both the
objects of its own field and also the objects of the fields of outer senses. In
its overall functioning mind precedes and succeeds sense perception. It
precedes in the form of attending to the sense stimuli and its succeeding is
in the form of discrimination and selection of the sense stimuli. It is in this
sense that we say, 'Eyes don't see but mind sees it'. That is why the
Buddhists use the word 'door' for the senses.
[9]
In the Abhidhammic tradition perception is described as of two types. One
is sensuous and the other is non-sensuous. The sensuous perception is due
to five cognitive senses, which have their respective fields of functioning
and corresponding objects. Every cognitive sense has its own distinct
jurisdiction and class of objects to be cognized. There is no over-stepping
and intermingling in their jurisdiction. Nor can they usurp the functioning
of mind which is another factor involved in the process of cognition.
The non-sensuous perception is Yogic Perception. It is available only in
heightened state of consciousness.
[10]
To sum up, the cognitive process is interplay of mind with the five senses.
Each sense has its own mode of functioning e.g. 'Eye' has the nature of
seeing, its capacity is activated by consciousness along with the totality of
causes and conditions including the object, the eye consciousness and
accessories like light etc. The object appears, the eyes see and the eye
consciousness knows. The process gets completed in what is known as
manovijnana dhatu which consists in grasping of the object of consciousness.
Before the start of the cognitive process citta is in a latent or natural state of
existence. It is known as vithimukta citta or pakkatimano. It is also known as
nibbuta citta. Bhavanga is such a state of citta. The cognitive process starts
with bhavanga and ends in bhavanga (nibbuta citta). In its functioning as
stated earlier citta is conditioned by emotional afflictions and ideational
defilements but when it is freed from all this then it becomes bodhi citta
which is prakrti prabhasvara citta (naturally luminous citta).
[11]
II
Distinct from the Theravada analysis of consciousness we find a full fledged
epistemology in later Buddhism. Dignaga and his illustrious successor Dharmakirti
have been the impelling force responsible for the development of the medieval
Indian philosophy in general and epistemology and logic in particular. They have
been the epistemological thinkers of the first order and their contributions to the
philosophical thought have been unique and distinct. Both have been brilliant stars
in the firmament of Indian philosophical horizon. It is therefore highly significant
to study, analyze and evaluate the seminal contributions of Dignaga whose
thoughts find culmination in Dharmakirti. The main objective of this write-up is to
expound and understand their philosophical ideas in the field of epistemology in
the background of metaphysics and value-theory. It should be our endeavor to
study both the constructive and critical aspects of Dignaga-Dharmakirti
philosophical tradition with special reference to theory of knowledge so as to bring
to the fore and evaluate its seminal contributions with a view to put them before
the modern world scholarship for appreciation.
[12]
In the Dignaga-Dharmakirti tradition precursors like Maitreya, Asanga and
Vasubandhu made pioneering attempts to construct epistemology on the Buddhist
pattern. Maitreya discussed in detail the nature of reality and modes of knowing.
He is the forerunner of the art of debate (vadavidhi) in Buddhist circles. Asanga
followed Maitreya by and large but differed in respect of theory of proof.
(sadhana). Vasubandhu carried forward and systematized this enterprise. However,
it was Dignaga who put Buddhist epistemology on a solid footing and gave it a
distinctive character. He imparted a new direction to Indian epistemology by
giving a new mode of understanding the nature of knowledge and ways of
knowing, in propounding a formal system of logic and a differential theory of
language. He did it by interspersing the treatment of ontological issues within
them, a style that was later on followed by Gangesa in the Nyaya School. It was
innovative of Dignaga to point out that epistemology has to be structured keeping
in view the requirements of ontology (Meyadhinamanasiddhih). For this he
composed distinct and independent treatises. The most significant work of Dignaga
is Pramana-samuccaya with auto-commentary. It consists of six chapters dealing
with pratyaksa (perception), svarthanumana (inference which is only cognitive for
ones own sake), parathanumana (syllogistic inference which is verbalized for the
sake of others), hetu-drstanta (reason-example), apoha (negation of the opposite)
and jati (analogue). Another work ascribed to him is Nyaya-pravesa which deals
with anumana and its fallacies. Another small but very valuable work is Hetu-
cakra-damaru which outlines a formal system of logic. Forth work is Alambana-
pariksa. Fifth work is Trikala-pariksa. Another work ascribed to him is Nyaya-
mukha. Tibetan versions of all these works are available but lost original Sanskrit
versions of some of them have been restored.
[13]
Dharmakirti is a prominent Buddhist thinker belonging to the syncretic phase of
the Sautrantika-Yogacara tradition. He not only mastered the systems of Asanga,
Vasubandhu and Dignaga but also excelled in them. He has several works to his
credit but Pramana vartika can be regarded as his magnum opus in which he
expounds his thought in a systematic and detailed form. It is advancement on the
views of Dignaga propounded in Pramana samuccaya and it surpasses them. It
consists of four chapters. The first deals with analysis of the pramanas in general,
the second with pratyaksa as pramana, the third with svarthanumana (inference)
and the fourth with pararthanumana (syllogism). The next work of Dharmakirti is
Pramana viniscaya. It is an abridgment of Pramana vartika. The third work is
Nyaya bindu which is a further abridgment. There are five other small tracts
devoted to specific topics. Hetu bindu is a short classification of logical reasons
based on the Hetu cakra damaru of Dignaga. Sambandha pariksa is an
examination of the problem of relations. (See for details my paper in Journal of
Indian Council of Philosophical research, Volume XIII, Number 3, May-August,
1996). Vada Nyaya and Codana prakarana are treatises on the act of carrying on
disputation. Santanantara siddhi deals with the reality of other minds. It attempts
to refute solipsism.
[14]
In the Pramana vartika Dharmakirti undertakes a systematic exposition of the
Buddhist conception of ‘sarvajnata’ along with other arguments for proving the
authoritativeness of the Buddha vacana. He gives an elaborate account of the
nature, criteria and means of knowledge. He logically argues for the tenability of
the theory momentary-ness and flux. He explains the meaning and significance of
the fundamental Buddhist concept of ‘pratityasamuptada’. He delineates upon the
nature and means of moksa (nirvana) along with an exposition of the ‘Four Noble
Truths’. He provides a logical foundation to the theory of ‘Vijnaptimatrta’, a
central thesis of the Vijnanavada School. He discusses the theories of karma,
samsara and rebirth in the Buddhist context. He makes significant contribution in
the exposition of the theory of ‘apoha’ in its ontological, epistemological and
linguistic dimensions.
[15]
III
The Indian philosophical thought has developed only through mutual discussions,
debates and encounters among different schools, systems and thinkers. “Vade vade
jayate tattva bodhah” has been the guiding spirit in philosophizing. Right from the
times of the Vedic thought it has been enjoined that the truth can be approached,
understood and expressed in diverse ways and therefore the game of
philosophizing can be played by mutual supplementations and complementarities.
The development of philosophical thought in each school has not been in isolation
or exclusion but in intimate interactions so much so that one can not understand
much less appreciate the schools of Indian thought without at the same time being
well-versed and steeped in the prevailing systems. There can be mutual corrections
and borrowings. There can be agreements to disagree. But there cannot be mutual
ignoring or overlooking. Dharmakirti is no exception to this rule of the game.
There have been sharp and brilliant philosophical responses by and to Dharmakirti.
He undertook close encounters with the then prevalent ideas, theories and
viewpoints and ably defended Buddhist position from the attacks and counter
attacks of the rival systems and thinkers. He even developed and perfected the
mode of debate (Vada- vidhi). His encounters with Samkhya-Yoga, Nyaya-
Vaisesika, Purva and Uttara Mimamsas, Lokayata thinkers and Grammarian
philosophers like Bhartrhari, Jaina thinkers and many others are notable and worth
merit. His critical examination of the theories of Sphota of the Grammarians,
Samavaya and other relations of the Naiyayikas, of the Nyaya proofs for the
existence of the Creator God etc. is really penetrating and innovative. This
tradition was carried forward ably by Santaraksita in Tattva-samgraha and by his
commentator Kamalasila in his Panjika.
[16]
IV
Every school of philosophy (Darsana) in India has attempted a theory of
knowledge (pramana sastra) on which its metaphysical structure is built. The
ultimate goal of all philosophizing, and for that matter of all human enterprises, is
to realize freedom from pain and suffering, and experience peace and bliss. For the
realization of the summum bonum of life knowledge of reality (tattva jnana) is an
essential and necessary prerequisite. It is believed that a theory of knowledge is
propaedeutic to a theory of reality because for knowing the reality one has to know
knowledge itself. This belief is grounded in the fact that to philosophize (in Indian
context) is to reflect on the nature of reality given in experience. Every experience
is caused by and pertains to an object that is a part of reality. It has a built-in self-
transcendence, a trans-phenomenal character, an intentionality, pointing to an
object (arthavisayakatva). This reference to the object may be cognitive or non-
cognitive (emotive, volitional etc.). A cognitive reference consists in revelation of
the object (jnanamarthaprakasakam) or in making the cognizer aware of it
(arthadhigama) in terms of its existence, nature, relations and functions. Though
every cognitive reference reveals an object, there is always a possibility of going
astray in this reference and there is no guarantee that it will faithfully and
adequately reveal its object. It may reveal its object as it is or other than what it is.
This possibility of error in cognitive reference (visamvada) necessitates an inquiry
into its veracity. That cognition is knowledge (prama /pramana) which is true or
which is non-discordant with its object. There has to be indubitability with regard
to the truth of the cognition in terms of its non-discordance. The truth-claim of
knowledge has to be well evidenced. The entire epistemological pursuit begins
with and centers round this task. Dignaga and Dharmakirti also have provided a
firm epistemological basis to their theory of reality by constructing a theory of
knowledge in keeping with the ‘process ontology’.
[17]
“All successful human action is necessarily preceded by knowledge”. With this
prefatory remark Dharmakirti defines the scope and aim of epistemology in the
Nyaya bindu. Human action may be either purposive or instinctive. Human
purpose is again something either desirable or undesirable. A purposive action
based on knowledge consists in attaining the desirable and avoiding the
undesirable. Knowledge is efficacious in causing successful action in the sense that
it results in the attainment of the desirable aim and avoidance of the undesirable
one. A cause may be productive (karaka) or informative (jnapaka). Knowledge is a
cause of successful action in the latter sense only. It enables us to reach the real,
which alone has practical efficiency. However, it must be made clear that practical
efficiency (arthakriyakaritva) is only the test of the truth of knowledge and not its
laksana (criterion or definition). In the Pramana vartika he defines knowledge as a
cognition that is not in discordance with its object (Pramanamavisamvadijnanam).
He further maintains that a cognition that is perfectly in accord with its object will
also be characterized by novelty (ajnatarthaprakaso va). It is revelatory of an
object not yet known because the object is momentary in nature and only that
knowledge will accord with object that arises at that very moment when the object
is also in existence. It is the first moment of cognition, the moment of the first
awareness. Unlike the thinkers of Nyaya School he maintains that continuous
cognition (dharavahika jnana) is not true. Dharmottara in his commentary on the
Nyaya bindu explains it as follows: “In common life when we say that truth is
being spoken what we mean is that it makes us reach an object. Similarly, that
cognition is true which makes us reach an object it points to. In fact, knowledge
does not create an object and does not offer it to us, but just makes us reach at it.
By making us reach to it nothing else is meant than attending to it.”
[18]
Dharmottara further specifies that knowledge is of two types. It is intuitive when it
springs from inside. It is discursive when it is acquired by directing our attention
toward an object with the help of the senses and the cognizing consciousness. Only
discursive knowledge is analyzed in epistemology.
[19]
V
Indian thinkers generally adopt a causal approach to knowledge. Knowledge is
taken to be an outcome of a particular causal complex in which the most efficient
instrumental causal condition (karana) is technically known as pramana. In the
Buddhist tradition, the word pramana refers to both the process of knowing and
the knowledge acquired on that basis. The Buddhist thinkers do not entertain the
distinction between the process of knowing (pramana) and its outcome
(pramanaphala=prama). Whether or not pramana and pramanaphala are to be
sharply distinguished has been a hotly debated issue between Nyaya and Buddhist
thinkers. Nyaya thinkers insist that pramana as a process leading to prama should
be distinguished from the latter, which is its result (phala). For them prama is the
pramanaphala, and pramana is the karana of prama. Buddhist thinkers, however,
maintain no distinction between the two. The act of cognizing completely
coincides with the cognition of the object. The Naiyayikas are
paratahpramanyavadins. For them pramana is the evidencing condition for the
truth of knowledge and prama is the evidenced knowledge. For Buddhist
knowledge is self-evidencing (svasamvit). This follows from the theories of
dvairupya and sakarajnana propounded by Dignaga. Every knowledge is produced
with two-fold appearance, viz., svabhasa (of itself) and
visayabhasa/arthabhasa/arthakara (of the object). In being svabhasa a cognition
cognizes itself. In being visayabhasa it establishes its truth because of its being in
the form of the object (arthasarupya), i.e., non-discordant with its object. To be in
the form of the object is the sufficient condition of its being true. Thus a cognition
is never devoid of a form of its own.
[20]
The doctrines of svaprakasa and svatahpramanya go together. Not only is every
cognition a cognition cognizing itself, but it also evidences itself. Thus the
difference between the Buddhists and the Naiyayikas is in their understanding of
the nature and role of pramana. For the Buddhists pramana means that by which
an object is known (pramiyate artho aneneti) whereas the Naiyayikas understand
pramana as that which is the most efficient causal condition giving rise to and
evidencing the truth of knowledge (pramayah karanam iti pramanam). Dignaga,
however, concedes that from functional point of view if a distinction is needed it
can be drawn.
[21]
In the Dignaga-Dharmakirti tradition two different views are available about the
nature of pramanaphala. According to one, pramanaphala consists in the
cognition of the object (visayadhigama). According to the other it is self-cognition
(svasamvitti). Both these views are complementary and not conflicting and are
available in the works of Dignaga, Dharmakirti and Dharmottara. Santaraksita
gathers them together and brings out their distinction. He maintains that according
to the Sautrantika tradition which believes in bahyartahvada, sarupya is pramana
while visayadhigati is pramanaphala. According to Vijananavada, sarupya is of
course the pramana but svasamvedana is the pramanaphala. In the ultimate
analysis these views are not different because visayadhigati and svasamvedana are
not two different phenomena as they are two facets of the same knowledge-
situation in Buddhist epistemology.
[22]
The idea that the truth of cognition is to be determined in terms of its reference to
its object leads Buddhist thinkers to propound the theory of
meyadhinamanasiddhih as different from the Nyaya and Samkhya view of
manadhinameyasiddhih. These are not to be taken as contradictory views but
complementary only. Between reality and knowledge there is an intimate organic
relation of mutuality. Reality is dependent on knowledge for being known
(prakasa). This is noetic dependence. Knowledge is dependent upon reality for its
origin (utpatti) and evidencing of its truth (jnapti). This is ontic dependence. The
Buddhists emphasize ontic dependence whereas the Naiyayikas highlight noetic
dependence. However, to make the distinction clear it must be admitted that the
Buddhist thinkers argue that epistemology is to be structured to support ontology
but the Naiyayikas insist that epistemology should lead to structuring of ontology.
The Buddhist view led to acceptance of the position of pramanavyastha
(separation of the spheres and functioning of pramanas) whereas the Nyaya view
resulted in establishing the position of pramanasamplava (commingling of the
different pramanas in their operation). According to the Buddhists there are two
kinds of objects of knowledge, viz., the unique particular (svalaksana) and the
generalized concept (vikalpa/samanyalaksana). The Naiyayikas refuse to draw
such a distinction. This has resulted in a sharp distinction of philosophical
positions of the two schools.
[23]
It has been one of the most significant tasks of philosophy to put forth a criterion
of truth and a mode of its ascertainment. An enquiry into the problem of truth is
necessitated because all cognitions are not alike in their truth values. Had they
been so there would have been no need to evidence them. The very possibility of
error in cognition demands its subjection to critical examination with a view to
establish its veracity. If the veracity of cognition is to be established the question
arises as to what sort of criterion is to be resorted to. The problem of pramana has
been raised and discussed precisely because of this. According to Dignaga and
Dharmakirti the truth of knowledge is intrinsic to it and consists in its coordination
with the object. This is technically known as meyarupata or arthasarupya.
(Arthasarupyamasyapramanam, Nyaya-bindu, I.19; Tasmat prameyadhigateh
sadhanam meyarupata, Pramanavartika, II.306.) Knowledge is caused by its
object and therefore it must possess the form of that object. In other words, since
knowledge is determined by its object this determination is expressed as
knowledge having the form of the object. Thus when we have a distinct cognition
of something blue this cognition is determined by something blue and not
something yellow, and this determination is made by the form of something blue in
the cognition itself. In order that cognition has to be true it has to represent its
object in its proper form. This is possible only when the cognition is arising in the
form of the object. The truth of cognition therefore consists in sameness of form
with its object. The same thing has been stated by Dignaga as, “Whatever form of
the thing appears in the cognition, as, e.g., something white or non-white, it is an
object in that form which is cognized.” (Pramanasamuccayavrtti, I.9)
[24]
When Dignaga and Dharmakirti talk of sarupya as pramana it should not be
misunderstood as advocacy of similarity of cognition with object because
cognition can never be similar to its object. Cognition and object belong to two
different categories One is epistemic and the other is ontic. Therefore it will be
meaningless to talk of their similarity. All that it means is that every cognition
necessarily refers to its object and every true cognition has to refer to its object as
it is. To refer to the object as it is has been figuratively expressed as the cognition
having the form of the object. This point is made clear by Prajnakara while
commenting on Pramana vartika II.309, with the example of a new born child who
showing similarity to his father is said to have taken the form of the father,
although he has no such function as taking his father’s form. It is just a
metaphorical way of saying things.
[25]
According to the Dignaga-Dharmakirti tradition there are only two types of objects
of knowledge, viz., grahya (the given, perceived) and adhyavaseya (mentally
construed, conceived) and accordingly there are only two types of true cognitions
viz., pratyaksa (perception) and anumana (inference). (Dvividho hi pramanasya
visayo grahyasca yadakaramutpadyate prapaniyasca yamadhyavasyati. Anyo hi
grahyam anyascaadyavaseyah, Dharmottara’s commentary on the chapter on
pratyaksa). Corresponding to these two types of cognitions there are two types of
akara or pratibhasa (form or reflex of the object). The perceptual cognition
consists in a pratibhasa which is niyata (definite or fixedly determined) because it
is caused by the object independent of perceiving consciousness and therefore
objectively real. In the case of conceptual cognition the control of the object is
remote and hence the pratibhasa here is aniyata (indefinite and vague). Both
Dharmakirti and Dharmottara have made this point very clear. As Dharmaottara
puts it, “The perceived object giving rise to awareness generates a regulated mental
reflex (i.e., a reflex limited to that object). It is just like a patch of colour which
giving rise to a visual awareness generates definite mental reflex limited to that
patch. The conceptual awareness on the other hand is not directly generated by the
object. Thus in the absence this causal factor regulating the mental reflex there is
no fixed or definite mental reflex.”
[26]
Dignaga insists that every niyata pratibhasa has to be in coordination with its
object because it is produced by that object only. An object can not produce any
such pratibhasa
which does not accord with it. Logically therefore he rules out any possibility of
deviation from its object in a niyata pratibhasa. That is why he defines pratyaksa
simply as ‘kalpanapodham’ and does not feel the need to add the adjective
‘abhrantam’. Dharmakirti, however, does not agree with him and maintains that an
object may sometimes fail to give rise to its genuine pratibhasa. This point will be
elaborated under discussion on pratyaksa.
[27]
VI
Vasubandhu, Dignaga and Dharmakirti on perception (Pratyaksa)
There are two types of object to be known and accordingly there are only two ways
of knowing which are pratyaksa and anumana. Corresponding to unique particular
(svalaksana) we have pratyaksa (perceptual knowledge) and corresponding to
samanyalaksana/ vikalpa there is anumana (inferential knowledge). Pratyaksa is
pure sensation, a direct sense apprehension of the unique particular. Anumana is is
a mental construction in the form of generalized images. What is known in
pratyaksa is not knowable in anumana and vice versa. Pratyaksa is foundational
pramana in so far as anumana depends upon it. Anumana presupposes pratyaksa
(pratyksaprsthabhavi). However both are equally important (tulyabala).
[28]
In the Vadavidhi Vasubandhu defines perception as “Tato’rthadvijanam
pratyaksam, i.e., ‘perception is a cognition produced by the specific object.’ It is
exclusively caused by the object as distinct from inference which is a mental
construction. It is free from all conceptualization. Though he does not explicitly
say so, this is his intension. The word ‘tato’ points out exclusive role of the object.
[29]
Instead of defining perception in terms of ‘object-generated’ cognition Dignaga,
being an abstruse logician, defines it as “kalpanapodha, i.e., ‘free from mental
construction’ perhaps because the idea of perception being ‘opposite of inference’
can be better expressed with the help of the technique of double negation. For the
Buddhists all knowledge is either perceptual or conceptual (inferential), there being
no third variety. Thus perception is not inference and inference is not perception.
This is known as pramanavyavastha. . From this it follows that perception can be
defined as ‘opposite of inference’. In fact there is no basic difference between
Vasubandhu’s and Dignaga’s definitions. The same thing has been positively
stated by one and negatively by the other.
[30]
A perceptual cognition is solely determined by its object and not in any way
constructed by its object. The expression ‘kalpana’ is defined by him as
‘namajatyadiyojana’ which means association of concepts and words. So to say
that it is ‘kalpanapodha’ means that it is free from all mental constructions
(kalpana, vikalpa) in terms of dravya (substance), guna (quality), karma (action,
relation), jati (class character) and nama (verbalization). It is just what is given to
us in immediate experience. It is the immediately given sensum in complete
isolation from all conceptual and verbal determinations. Thus the theory of
pratyaksa as nirvikalpaka was spearheaded by him. Perceptual cognition arises
when an object gives rise to its reflex (pratibhasa) in the cognizing consciousness
through the senses. It is called prati+aksa and not prati+visaya because even
though the object is emphasized here the senses are the specific cause whereas
object is only a common cause.
[31]
The usual definitions of perception in terms of ‘sense-object contact’ given by
Nyaya-Mimamsa and Jaina schools and in terms of ‘modification of internal
cognitive sense’ (antahkaranavrtti) given by Samkhya and Advaita Vedanta are
not acceptable to Dignaga , as perception is pure sensation (pratibhasa) caused by
the object in the cognizing consciousness. A cognitive sense has its own object and
its own function. Its object is unique particular (svalaksana) which alone being real
and efficient can produce sensation. Its function is to make the object present to the
cognizing consciousness. Thus perception consists in an awareness of presence of
the object, its mere presence and nothing more. To construct a determinate
awareness of the object whose presence has thus been sensed is another function
which follows in the wake of the first. This is known as mental construction
(pratibhasa pratiti) which is the function of mind. Accordingly, a distinction is
drawn between “Nilam vijaniti” (cognizing blue) and “Nilamiti vijaniti” (cognizing
that it is blue) following the Abhidharma.
[32]
According to Dignaga erroneous cognition is not perception as it arises due to
conceptual construction. All errors are consequences of faulty mental
constructions. At the level of pure sense data there is no question of error because
the sense data are wholly given by the object and there can be no error. That is
why he does not include the term ‘abhrantam’ in his definition of pratyaksa.
[33]
Dharmakirti following Dignaga defines perception as ‘kalpanapodha’ (free from
mental construction) but adds the adjective ‘abhrantam’ (non-erroneous). The
object of perception is svalaksana, which is unique particular having nothing in
common with any other object similar or dissimilar. This object is not a mental
construct (samanya laksana, vikalpa) in the form of substance, quality, relation,
class character and linguistic expression. He defines kalpana as
‘abhilapasamsargayogyapratibhasapratiti’. It is mental construction. Every
mental construction is determinate cognition and not just pure sensation.
Determination is function of cognizing consciousness and as such it can not be
regarded as a part of perceptual cognition. He draws a clear distinction between
pratibhasa (indeterminate) and pratibhasapratiti (determinate). Pratibhasapratiti
is kalpana which is paroksa. Pratibhasa is perception and not the later which
follows the former. Pratibhasa is incapable of verbalization ( anabhilapya)
whereas pratibhasapratiti (determinate cognition) alone is capable of verbalization
(abhilapasamsargayogya). It has potential verbalization. His argument is that no
verbalization can take place in the absence of conceptualization and there is no
conceptualization in perception. In other words, perception, which is pure
sensation, is only to be experienced. Though it is necessary that there can not be
verbalization without conceptualization, the reverse is not the case.
[34]
Differing from Dignaga Dharmakirti says that perceptual cognition should be
defined as free from error, because cognitive sense can also be a causal factor for
error. Accordingly he analyses four types of error, caused by defective cognitive
sense, spatial placement of object, spatial placement of cognizer, and mental state
of cognizer. He mentions instances of error caused by colour blindness, rapid
motion, travelling in a boat, mental sickness, and so on. Dharmottara points out
that these four different illustrations represent four different types of error. The
cause of colour blindness is located in the sense organ (indriyagata), the cause of
motion resulting in the cognition of fiery circle is located in the object
(visayagata), the cause of illusion of moving trees is located in the external
circumstances that condition the perceiver (bahyasrayasthita), and the cause of
hallucinatory illusions is located in the internal circumstances (adhyatmagata)
[35]
Perceptual cognitions are classified by Dignaga and Dharmakirti into four types:
sense perception (indriya pratyaksa), mental perception (manasa pratyaksa), self-
perception (svasamvedana pratyaksa) and mystical perception (yogi pratyaksa).
Sense perception is caused by external object. Mental perception consists in mental
awareness of an object which is derivative from the object of immediately
preceding sense perception. Self-perception is internal awareness of all mental
phenomena like knowledge, desire etc. The concept of self-perception is one of the
most significant contributions of Dignaga. According to him each cognition
cognizes itself while cognizing an object. The scope of self-perception has been
enlarged by Dignaga to include the awareness of conceptual constructions also.
The intuitions apprehended by yogis are perceptual direct awareness.
[36]
In Dharmakirti we find detailed analysis of these four types of perception with
greater clarity and depth. So far as indriya pratyaksa is concerned it is most
fundamental and pervasive type of perception. Such knowledge consists in
presentation of an object to consciousness through the medium of the senses. The
cognitive sense are only medium (dvara), not agent. Their function consists only in
creating a sort of link between cognizing consciousness and objective reality
outside. Manasa pratyaksa immediately follows indriya pratyaksa. It is in fact the
element of attention when indriya pratyaksa arises. That is why Dharmakirti in the
Nyaya-bindu defines it as, “mental sensation which follows sense perception,
which is its immediately preceding homogeneous cause”. (For details refer my
book on Buddhist Epistemology). Svasamvedana pratyaksa is cognition cognizing
itself along with cognizing its object. Cognition of all mental states also comes
under it.( For details refer to my book) . Dharmakirti defines yogi jnana as
intuition of yogi that is produced from sub-culminational state of deep meditation
on transcendental reality. It is experience realized in the state of samadhi.
Dharmakirti states that yogi pratyaksa is generated by deep contemplation, and it is
vivid and free from conceptual construction.
[37]
VII
Dignaga and Dharmakirti on inference (anumana)
The other mode of knowing accepted in the Buddhist epistemology is inference
(anumana) which subsumes other pramanas like sabda. It is both a mode of
knowing and a way form of reasoning. Thus it has epistemic and logical aspects
inseparably coalesced into one. The earliest formulation of Buddhsit theory of
inference is available in the Yogacarabhumisastra of Maitreya and
Prakaranaaryavacasastra of Asanga, though in the Kathavatthu several terms of
reasoning and logic are available. A systematic study of the theory of inference is
introduced by Vasubandhu in the Buddhist tradition. Dignaga gave it a new
direction and impetus. His analysis of inference was so strikingly original that
Nyaya circles also had to take cognizance of it. A distinctive contribution of
Dignaga has been to draw a distinction between inference as a pure thought
process and its linguistic expression (prakasana/akhyana). The former is purely
propositional and the latter is sentential. The other innovation of Dignaga is
advocacy of a variety of inference which may be called analytical entailment
(svabhavanumana), in which one concept is so connected with another concept
that the former can be inferred from another. The most important and innovative
contribution is presentation of a formal schema of different relations of hetu
(reason, probans, middle term) with sadhya (probandum, major term) known as
hetucakra, and pointing out the conditions of validity of inference on that ground.
This is an attempt to construct a formal system of logic. Dignaga’s system of
inference is further explicated and elaborated by Dharmakirti. His special
contribution is systematic formulation of the negative entailment relation with its
eleven varieties. Lastly, in Dignaga we find a new understanding of the concept of
anumeya. According to the Nyaya logicians sadhya is anumeya, but for Dignaga it
is paksa characterized by sadhya which is anumeya. The later Naiyayikas
emphasize the co-locus-hood (ekadhikaranya) of hetu and sadhya in paksa,
whereas Dignaga talks of hetu and sadhya as co-properties (dharma) of paksa.
Dignaga’s formulation of theory of anumana was further explicated by
Dharmakirti in his Pramana vartika and Nyaya bindu and other works. His main
contribution lies in elaboration of the doctrine of trairupya linga.
[38]
The process of inference is a thought process consisting of antecedent knowledge
(premises) and consequent knowledge (conclusion). The two must have entailment
relationship (gamaka-gamaya bhava) which is technically known as avinabhava or
vyapti (necessary concomitance). Avinabhava constitutes the logical ground for the
process of anumana. The antecedent leads to, or gives rise to, the consequent and
is therefore a gamaka (that which entails). The consequent results from the
antecedent and is therefore the gamya (that which is entailed). This entailment
relation is due to an existential tie (svabhava pratibandha) which is a necessary
relation between a logical mark (linga) and the object of which it is a mark
(lignin). In the Buddhist view the logical mark and the object of which it is a mark
are concepts only, and not things or events or metaphysical reals, as in other
systems.
[39]
Anumana has been defined by Vasubandhu in the Vadavidhi as, “Nantariyakartha
darsanam tadvido anumanam.” That is, anumana is knowledge arrived at on the
basis of inseparable relation of hetu with sadhya by a person who knows that
relation. This definition is acceptable to Dignaga and Dharmakirti but keeping the
concept of trairupyalinga as the focal point they give another definition which is
expressed by Dharmakirti in the Nyaya bindu as, “Trairuyallingad yadanumeye
jnanam tad svarthanumanam.” This definition takes into account the distinction
between svarthanumana and parathanumana, the latter being linguistic expression
of the former. Dharmottara gives etymological definition as, “Lingagrahana
sambandhasmaranasya pascanmanamanumanam. Here anumana is defined as that
cognition which is implied by the perception of the linga that characterizes the
paksa and the remembering of the necessary concomitance between the hetu and
sadhya.
[40]
The process of inference involves three basic terms and their interrelations. The
three terms are minor (paksa), middle (hetu or linga) and major (sadhya or lignin).
There are three types of relations among them. The first two are constitutive of
premises, one being relation of middle term to minor term known as
paksadharmata, and the other is relation between middle term and major term
known as vyapti (necessary concomitance). The third relation is anumiti
(conclusion), a relation between minor term and major term.
[41]
Paksa stands for the subject under consideration in the inferential reasoning.
Every inferential reasoning pertains to some individual or class of individuals
about which we want to infer or establish something. It is technically known as
paksa. Etymologically paksa (pacyate iti paksah) means that to which hetu and
sadhya belong as its properties. In this sense it is referred to as dharmin, the
underlying substratum to which hetu and sadhya are ascribed as dharmas. This
idea was later developed in Navya Nyaya as ‘ekadhikaranya’ or
‘samanadhikaranya’. Paksa is subject under consideration in inferential
reasoning. Therefore it is called anumeya and defined as jijyasita viseso dharmi.
Though at the level of objective reality Buddhists do not entertain the distinction
between dharma and dharmin at the conceptual level, which underlies all our
worldly behaviour, such a distinction is very much necessary because no
conceptualization can take place without bringing in distinctions in terms of
dravya, guna, karma, jati and nama. Since paksa may stand for an individual or a
class of individuals a distinction is drawn between two types of concept
corresponding to a paksa, namely, having universal denotation (sakaladesavrttitva)
and having individual or particular denotation. (ekadesavrttitva). From another
point of view distinction can again be drawn between ‘time bound’ (as in
karyanumana) and ‘time free’ (as in svabhanvanumana) paksa. In Pracina Nyaya
paksa is regarded as ‘samdigdha sadhyavan’ but in Buddhist it is ‘jijnasita
sadhyayavan’ and in Navya Nyaya there is transition to ‘sisadhayisa’. This
development in thought is very interesting.
[42]
The hetu or linga (middle term) is a pivotal element in the process of inference. It
is a necessary mark of the sadhya (major term) and therefore becomes the ground
or reason for its inference (hinotiiti gamayati paroksartham). In order to serve this
function it has to satisfy three formal requirements. Only after meeting these
requirements it becomes valid middle term (sadhetu) and renders the inferential
reasoning valid. The three conditions are:
i) its necessary presence in subject’s totality (anumeye sattvam)
ii) its necessary presence in similar instances only, although not in
their totality (sapaksevasattvam)
iii) its necessary absence from dissimilar instances in their totality.
(asapakse casattvameva niscitam)
Qualified by these three conditions the middle term is known as trairupya linga
(three-featured middle term). The middle term is a property of the minor term.
Dignaga defines it as that apprehended property of the minor term which is
pervaded by the major term.
[43]
According to the Buddhists there are three types of hetu, namely svabhava
(essential identity), karya (effect) and anupalabdhi (non-cognition). On the basis
of these three types of middle term there are three types of inferences, named as
svabhavanumana, karyanumana and anupalabdhi anumana.
[44]
Svabhava hetu is defined as the one whose mere existence is sufficient for the
establishment of sadhya. For example, in the inference, “It is a flower because it is
a rose”, the hetu, namely, rose is sufficient for proving the sadhya, namely, flower.
The two have sameness of reference (tadatmya). Both are existentially identical,
and have the relation of analytical entailment. The second type of hetu is karya
hetu which is in the form of an effect necessarily presupposing its cause. The
causal relation is a relation of succession different from the relation of identity
which is that of simultaneity or co-existence. The third type of hetu is anupalabdhi
which is negative in nature. It is defined as ‘non-cognition of such an object that
otherwise fulfills the conditions of cognizability. The non-cognition of a thing is
sufficient to infer non-existence of that thing on the ground that if it were present it
would have been necessarily perceived when all other conditions of perceptibility
are fulfilled. Dharmakirti has discussed eleven varieties and Moksakaragupta has
added five more to this. Sadhya (major term) is that property of the minor term
which is to be proved or inferred. The object of inferential reasoning (anumeya),
therefore, is not the major term alone but the major term as being the property of
the minor term.
[45]
There are two more terms that occur in the process of inference. They are
sapaksa (homologue) and asapaksa or vipaksa (heterologue). Homologue is
similar to minor term in so far as it necessarily possesses the major term as
its property. For example, if fire is the property to be inferred in relation to a
hill then all those instances like kitchen etc. where fire is known to be a
property constitute homologue. A homologue is similar to the minor term
only in the respect that both of them comprehend a similar property.
Dissimilar to homologue and the minor term is the heterologue. In other
words, it is that which is never a possessor of a property possessed by the
minor term and the homologue. It is of three types, (a) different from
sapaksa (anya), (b) contrary to sapaksa (viruddha) and (c) absence of
sapaksa (abhava).
[46]
Paksadharmata constitutes one of the necessary grounds for the process of
anumana. It consists in judjmentalization of the perceptual cognition of hetu
located in paksa. It stimulates the process of anumana.
[47]
The other ground of the inferential process is vyapti which is the relation
between hetu and sadhya which can be understood in terms of necessary
dependence (avinabhavaniyama). The Buddhist conception of vyapti stands
for an invariable necessary connection. Vyapti is a necessary bond because
of the fact that it is rooted in what is technically known as svabhava
pratibandha or existential dependence. Existential dependence means
dependent existence. It may be in the form of a causal relation or an
analytical entailment. For example, the dependence of effect on its cause
enables us to infer the cause the moment the effect is known to us.
Similarly, an analytically deduced fact by its very essence depends upon the
fact from which it is deduced. Thus there is svabhava pratibandha between
cause and effect and between the deduced object and that from which there
is deduction. The example of the former type is the relation between smoke
and fire and of the latter type is the relation between rose and flower. We
can deduce one fact from another only if there is existential dependence. It
can be asked why is it that we can deduce one fact from another only if there
is existential dependence. The answer given by the Buddhist logicians is that
this is so because effect which is not dependent upon another object cannot
be invariably and necessarily concomitant with the later. In other words, if
effect is not tied up by its existence to another object, it can not be
necessarily concomitant with the latter. There will be no invariability
(avyabhicara). Thus the possibility of deducing one fact from the other
depends upon an invariable and necessary connection which precludes the
existence of the one without the existence of the other. Therefore, if two
facts are existentially connected we can assert that one of them can not exist
independently of the other and therefore from the presence of the one
follows the presence of the other.
[48]
The most significant and fundamental contribution of Dignaga is to give a
formal schema of nine valid and invalid types of anumana/anumanabhasa
based on three logically possible relations of hetu with sapaksa and
asapaksa. His work titled, “Hetucakradamaru” is a primer of ‘Buddhist
Formal Logic.’ (For details see my book ‘Buddhist Epistemology)
.
[49]
VIII
Dignaga and Dharmakirti on differential theory of language (apoha)
In the Buddhist system language is a part of epistemological discourse in the
context of verbalized cognition. Language is not a separate source of knowledge,
nor does it describe reality. The real is only perceptual and perceptual is
inexpressible. Only conceptual knowledge is expressible in language. Language is
a result of mental construction and hence it refers to mental concepts only.
[50]
The method of apoha has been a technique of philosophizing cultivated and
developed in the Dignaga-Dharmakirti tradition of Buddhist thought. It has been
used in dealing with ontological, epistemological, logical and linguistic issues with
great ingenuity and precision to understand and appreciate the basic doctrines of
Buddhist view and way of life. It helps in proper understanding of the nature of
reality, thought and language from Buddhist perspective. It is an approach based
on the theory of differentiation and mutual exclusion. It views anyonyabhava
(mutual exclusion) between every element of reality (in the form of dharma known
as svalaksana), between every conceptualization of reality (in the form of
samanyalaksana known as vikalpa) and between meaning of every linguistic
expression (in the form of abhilapa known as nama or sabda). Every element of
reality, thought and language is discrete from (svato vyavartaka) but inter-relatable
with the rest of its kind and fine-tuned inter-netting is possible between and among
them. All are pratityasamutpanna and thus they are interdependent. Generally
Apoha has been known as a theory of meaning and its ontological, epistemological
and logical dimensions have not been emphasized. It is interesting to note that
according to the Buddhist view every svalaksana and every vikalpa is a counter
correlate of its opposite (anyapoha). Therefore no apprehension of any one,
whether it is perceptual or conceptual or linguistic, is possible without delimiting it
by excluding the rest. Every determination is negation in this sense. The reality in
itself is indeterminate and any attempt to determine it has to proceed through
anyapoha only. It is to be undertaken by the principle of double negation. Every
dharma is distinct and discrete and it can be understood as the counter correlate of
its opposite. To use the terminology of Class Calculus, it is like a class that is the
counter correlate of its complement class. The same holds good with regard to a
vikalpa and a sabda.
[51]
The meaning of a word stands for the relation of word and concept. In a verse
attributed to Dignaga it is stated that words originate in concepts and concepts
originate in words. The two are interdependent and interspersed. The nature and
function of the two are similar. A concept is a mental construct. It is an exclusion
or differentiation of one mental construct from all other mental constructs. By its
very essence it is an exclusion of the other. It is the negation of all supposed
possibilities other than itself. Likewise, a word coveys its meaning by negating its
contrasting meaning. It is the affirmation of its own meaning necessarily by the
negation of its opposite meaning. A word expresses its meaning per differentium.
Without negation it expresses nothing. A word conveys a positive meaning
qualified by exclusion of its opposites. For example, all that the word ‘cow’
expresses is the exclusion of ‘non-cow’ and thereby communicates its meaning.
The meanings of words ‘cow’ and ‘non-cow’ consist in the negation of each other.
It is to be made clear that only the contradictory meanings are to be negated. Thus,
we can have joint assertion of ‘white’ and ‘cow’ but cannot assert ‘cow’ and ‘non-
cow’ together.
[52]
We have to attempt to understand afresh the Buddhist theory of Apoha, in the
context of language, as a continuity of thought from Dignaga to Ratnakirti. It does
not seem to be correct to hold that there have been three stages in the development
of this theory centering round Dignaga-Dharmakirti as Negativists, Santaraksita-
Kamalasila as Positivists, and Jnanasrimitra-Ratnakirti as Synthetics. Such a view
runs counter to the very assertions of each later thinker coming after Dignaga who
claims to follow Dignaga and Dharmakirti in his responses to Nyaya –Mimamsa
critiques of the Buddhist position by reformulating the ideas of his predecessors.
Neither Santaraksita and Kamalasila nor Jnanasrimitra and Ratnakirti state that
they are differing or deviating from their masters. They only claim to expound the
views of their masters to clarify the doubts, queries and misunderstandings of the
critics.
[53]
For a proper understanding of the Buddhist philosophy, and its doctrine and
practices, one should always remember the advice, or rather the injunction, given
by Nagarjuna that there are two distinct standpoints to approach them, viz., the
empirical (samvrti) and the trans-empirical (paramartha). He avers, “Dve satye
samasritya buddhanam dharmadesana”. He makes it clear that both are necessary
and useful in a successive order. He says, “Vyavaharamanasritya paramartho na
desyate. Paramarthamanagatya nirvanam nadhigamyate.” This is a very
categorical and unambiguous statement. Most of the misunderstandings of the
theory of Apoha have arisen because of overlooking of this advice.
[54]
The Buddhists of the Dinnaga and Dharmakrti tradition, like the Upanisadic
thinkers, draw a clear distinction between the ‘tattva’(ens) and the
‘padartha’(object of knowledge and linguistic representation). The tattva is pure
existence apprehensible (grahya) through perceptual cognition that is bare
sensation (pratibhasa) of the tattva as its object. The tattva and its sense
apprehension are beyond the ken of the intellect and language. The intellect can
only attend to the sensation, and can conceptualize and verbalize it as a padartha in
the form of dravya, guna, karma, jati and nama. This is known as kalpana that
plays its role through vikalpa and sabda. It should be made clear that the intellect
can play its legitimate role only if there are sensations to be attended to. Its task is
to transform pratibhasa into pratibhasa pratiti. The object then is conceptualized
(adhyavasita). The point to be noted is that the real (vastutattva) is never the object
of thought and language. It can only be perceived and can never be conceived. Of
course every genuine conceptualization has to be preceded by sensation. So
conceptualization is pratyksaprsthabhavi, i.e., arises in the wake of perception
only. The real is presented in perception and it is represented in conception. Only
when the real is first presented in perception and represented in conception it can
stimulate practical activity (vyavahara or pravrtti).
[55]
As stated earlier according to Buddhist tradition there are two types of object of
knowledge. One is the grahya that is perceived and the other is adyavaseya that is
conceived. The grahya is svalaksana, the unique particular, and the adyavaseya is
samanyalaksana which is generalized representation. Concepts and words pertain
to samanyalaksana only, and they have nothing to do with the real, svalaksana,
directly. So in the context of language the Buddhist draws a distinction between
referent and referend. Word directly refers to referend only. The object ,say a cow,
is directly grasped or sensed in perceptual cognition whereas the object in
conceptual awareness is determined as ‘cow-ness’ or ‘cow form.’ In the knowledge
arising from utterance of the word ‘cow’ what we determine is an ‘object’ out there
on which we superimpose cow-ness this cow-ness is to be interpreted as exclusion
of non-cows. Here the determination is in the form, “It is not a non-cow”, it
excludes our non-cow supposition. On hearing the word ‘cow ’we not only
apprehend cow-ness but also determine an external object as being excluded from
non-cows. So upon hearing the word ‘cow’ we have a mental image of cow in
general which takes the form of something excluded from non-cows. But the object
of our practical activity is induced by that verbal knowledge is a particular and real
object which is characterized by being excluded from non-cows.
[56]
The theory of Apoha, in the context of language is an arrangement only (vyavastha
matra) to understand meaning of a word and language. According to it a word does
not directly refer to a real (vastutattva) that is ineffable. It is only an
adhyasa(superimposition) on it. Or, it can be its abhasa in the intellect. Though
Dignaga gave a systematic formulation to the theory of Apoha and made use of it
in philosophizing about reality, thought and language, it is Vyadi who is his
precursor in propounding this theory of language and advocating padavada as
different from Vajapyayana who propounded vakyavada. Bhartrhari reconciled the
two in the Vakyapadiya. Dignaga also attempted a similar reconciliation. So he
should not be regarded as padavadin or vakyavadin alone. Likewise he would
accept both Abhihitanvayavada and anvitabhidhanavada in different contexts. It
will not be proper to regard him as an exclucivist. The theory of apoha is very
much comparable to the theory of sphota of Bhartrhari.
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Suggested readings;-
1. Dignaga-- Pramana samuccaya
2. Dharmakirti—(a) Nyaya bindu with Tika of Dharmotttara
(b) (Pramana vartika)
3. Santaraksita---Tattva samgraha with Panjika of Kamalashila
4. S.R.Bhatt---- Chapter on ‘Logic and Language in Buddhism’
published in ‘Companion Encyclopedia of Asian
Philosophy’,
Routledge, London & New York, 1997
5. S.R.Bhatt Buddhist Epistemology,
& Greenwood publishing House, Connecticut, USA, 2000
Anu Mehrotra
6. S.R.Bhatt Noetic process (Citta vithi)—A Theravada Buddhist View
Dharma and Abhidharma, Vol. II, Somaiya Publications,
Mumbai.
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Sideshwar Rameshwar Bhatt
Former Professor and Chair. Department of Philosophy,
University of Delhi, India.
e-mail < srb_indiaphil (at) yahoo.co.in>
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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
About Prof. S.R.Bhatt
Professor S.R.Bhatt is an eminent philosopher and Sanskritist. He was General
President of Indian Philosophical Congress and Akhil Bharatiya Darshan Parishad
(All India Philosophy Association). He retired as Professor and Head, Department
of Philosophy, University of Delhi. He is internationally known as an authority on
Ancient Indian Culture, Buddhism, Jainism and Vedanta. His research areas
include Indian Philosophy, Logic, Epistemology, Ethics, Value-theory, Philosophy
of Education, Philosophy of Religion, Social and Political Thought etc. He has
lectured in many universities and research institutes of India, China, Sri Lanka,
Japan, South Korea, North Korea, Turkey, Germany, United States and Trinidad.
He is a member of many national and international associations. He is a Regional
Coordinator of Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, USA, which has
brought more than 170 volumes on world cultures and civilizations.
Prof. Bhatt has organized more than 50 national and international conferences,
seminars and workshops. He has authored and edited 18 books and has more than
100 published research papers to his credit. His important publications are The
Philosophy of Pancharatra; Studies in Ramanuja Vedanta; Knowledge, Values and
Education; Buddhist Epistemology; The Concepts of Atman and Paramatman in
Indian Thought; Major Religions of the World; Buddhist Thought and Culture in
India and Korea(Ed.) ; Buddhist Thought and Culture in India and Japan (Ed.);
Glimpses of Buddhist Thought and Culture(Ed.);Nyayamanjari of Jayanta Bhatta
(Hindi translation from Sanskrit)
Source: http://www.kjf.ca/109-TABHA.htm