thesis - ddd.uab.cat · cooke, b.m. ⏐ examining the gears of climate change scepticism (2018) 5...

MASTERTHESIS

Examiningthegears

ofclimatechangescepticism

MastersDegreeinPoliticalScience

BenCooke

Supervisor:EnriqueHernández

SubmittalDate:14/06/2018

DefenceDate:19/06/2018

Cooke,B.M.⏐Examiningthegearsofclimatechangescepticism(2018) 1

ABSTRACT

Theliteratureisconcentratedinstudyingsomeaspectsofanthropogenicclimatechange

skepticism,insomeregions,butissporadicinmostfacetsandgeographies.Thisstudy

attemptstopartiallyaddressthatgapbydevelopingaquantitativemodeltodiscernthe

effectofneoliberalismasasocio-economicsystem,andgovernanceasaharbingerfor

psychologicalattitudes,onclimatechangedenial.Theempiricalresults,usingasampleof

21Europeancountries,revealthatgreatereconomicfreedomhasundercutenvironmental

measurestoaddressclimatechange,andthateffectiveandstablegovernmentalpractices

haveallowedtheirrespectiveconstituenciesthepsychologicalspacetomorefullyconfront

theissue.Interactiveeffectsonideology,however,havebeenseentobelessconclusive.

Keywords:neoliberalism,capitalism,anthropogenicclimatechange,climatechange

scepticism,governmentstability,psychology,sociology.


ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

IwouldliketothankmydissertationsupervisorDr.EnriqueHernández,whoseknowledge

andgenerousguidancehasmadethisworkpossible.IwouldalsoliketothankDr.Dani

Marinovaforhercontributionandadviceregardingtheinitialdirectionofthisthesis.

Furthermore,Iwishtoexpressmygratitudetoallmyfellowcolleaguesalongwiththe

teaching&administrativestaffattheUniversitatAutònomadeBarcelonafortheirsupport

throughoutthispastacademicyear.


TABLEOFCONTENTS

Abstract............................................................................................................................1

Acknowledgements...........................................................................................................2

TableofContents..............................................................................................................3

1.0Introduction................................................................................................................41.1Background..........................................................................................................................41.2DirectionofResearch...........................................................................................................6

2.0TheoreticalFramework................................................................................................82.1Synopsis...............................................................................................................................82.2IdeologyandNeoliberalism................................................................................................102.3PsychologyinandofStability.............................................................................................15

3.0DataandMethods.....................................................................................................21

4.0EmpiricalResults.......................................................................................................244.1Correlations........................................................................................................................244.2OLSRegression...................................................................................................................254.3Multi-levelRegression........................................................................................................264.4Interactions........................................................................................................................28

4.4.1Neoliberalism/Ideology....................................................................................................284.4.2Governance(Stability)/Ideology.......................................................................................294.4.3Visualisations......................................................................................................................30

5.0Discussion..................................................................................................................32

6.0Bibliography..............................................................................................................35

7.0Appendices................................................................................................................397.1PrimaryVariableStatistics..................................................................................................397.2Correlations........................................................................................................................407.3Regressions........................................................................................................................417.4RandomIntercepts/RandomSlopesModels.....................................................................42


1.0Introduction

1.1Background

Climatechangeistodayseenasarguablythemostfundamentalthreattotheplanetas

constituted,andcertainlytheprimaryenvironmentalissue(Norgaard,2011).Global

warmingisnowconsideredindisputable,placingpressureonnaturalsystemsandeconomic

ones(Stern,2006;IPCC,2013).“Climatechangewilllikelyjeopardizestateeconomic

resources,exacerbatesocialinequality,altercommunitystructures,andgeneratenew

patternsofeconomicandsocialconflict”(Norgaard,2011:399).Studieshavefoundthat

between97-98%ofclimatechangeresearcherssupportthenotionthatthischangeis

primarilyspurredbyanthropogenicactionsaspertheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimate

Change’s(IPCC)findings,andthattemperaturesaretocontinuerisingintheabsenceofany

retaliatorymeasureto‘dangerous’levels(Andereggetal.,2010;Poortingaetal.,2010)of

emissions.Furthermore,ofthosethatremainunconvincedbytheoverwhelmingscience,

studieshaveconcludedthattheirrelativeexpertiseandscientificprominenceismuchless

esteemed(Doran&Zimmerman,2009).

Giventhesefactswefindthat,despitethecomplexityofthescienceandthelegitimate

concernsoftheexactnatureofclimatesystems,policyregardingthemitigationand

adaptationofandtoclimatechangehasbecomeamajordirectiveworldover.Fromthelate

1980’s,whentheissuefirstcameintosalience,topresentday,climatechangehasbeenon

theagendaofthemajorityofmulti-lateralintergovernmentalsummitsandhas,despite

largefailuresandseeminglyintractablelevelsofstagnancy,producedtheKyotoProtocol,

theCopenhagenAccordandtheParisAgreement,thatlatterofwhichboasts176national

signatories.Thismostrecentshowofunitywaslargelydriveninplacebytheleadershipof

theEuropeanbloc,whichpre-emptedtheagreementbypresentingtheambitious‘2030

Framework’,whichcalledfor40%reductionsinemissionsbelow1990levelsbythe

eponymousyear.Themulti-lateralandmulti-levelnatureofEuropeangovernancehas

placeditinauniquepositiontodictatepolicy(deCendra,2010,Jordanetal.,2012),andis

whythefollowingstudyrevolvesprimarilyarounditsmemberstates.


However,despitethisflurryofactivity,andariseinpublicconcerningeneral,the

phenomenonofclimatechangedenialandscepticismremainsrife,withfewsignsof

abatement(Norgaard,2011).Widespreaddisseminationofideascontrarytothescience,

mostnotablythatclimatechangedoesn’texistor,ifitdoes,thatitisnotathropogenicin

nature,isprevalent.Thisispromlematic;ambitioustargetsrequirefundamentalshiftsinthe

waythatenergyisusedandproducedandcanonlybemetwithsustainedandwidespread

publicsupport(Brulle,2011).Decarbonisationwillnotonlyrequirenewtechnologiesand

facilities,butthesenewsupplysidemeasureswilldrasticallyaffectlifestyleparameters.

Individualsandcommunitieswillhavetochangetheirbehavioursinwaysthatwillseem

unrecognisabletothemnow(Steg&Viek,2009),andwhichwillacttoupsetthe

psychologicalbalancepeopleemployintheireverydaylives(Norgaard,2016).Thepolicy

decisionsthatensuewillstemfromthissupport,andthesefuturelegislativeresponseswill

concernthemselveswithwhatisknownasthe‘energytrilemma’,whichdescribesabalance

betweenenergysecurity,socialimpactandenvironmentalsensitivity.Theseinthemselves

lieinconflictwithoneanotherasitpertainstoenergyproduction(Biesboeketal.,2010).

Thistheoreticalconflicthasledtocompetingactorsvyingforthestagetopromotetheir

owninterestsandmouldpublicopinionawayfromthesolidityofthescience,ascenario

mostclearlyseenwithintheUnitedStates,andonewhichthereforehasbeenaccorded

primacyinpreviousacademicscholarship.Seminalworksattheturnofthecurrentdecade,

mostnotablybyMcCright&Dunlap(2010;2011;2013;2014),pinpointedthatthe

phenomenonwaslargelytheresultofincreasinglevelsofpartisanship.“Whilenotthesole

driver,anthropogenicclimatechange(ACC)denialactivismbytheconservativemovement,

Republicanpoliticians,andthefossilfuelsindustryhasbeeneffectiveingeneratingwithin

theAmericanpublictheperceptionthatscientistsdonotagreeaboutACC,andthis

perceptioninfluences(bothdirectlyandindirectly)supportforgovernmentactiononACC.

(2013:199).Uscinski&Olivella(2017)concur,findingthatpartyeliteswerelargelytoblame

forthemirage.

Indeed,asMann(2014)suggests,climatechangewas‘unlucky’asanissue.Beforelaymen

wereconfrontedwithitintheearly80’s,legislationsuchasthe1970CleanAirActpassed

374-1intheHouseand73-0intheSenate.However,thatcriticaldecadeinbetweensaw


environmentalattitudesbecomeideologicalmarkers.Forinstance,theissueofacidrain

wasdecriedbythoseontheleftandboththeRepublicanadministrationandthe

DemocraticCongressactedtocombatit.Yet,commonconsensustodayisthattheissuewas

overwrought,andratherthanbeingrelievedthatsuchproblemswereeradicableoratleast

manageable,itbeganaprocessofrecriminationsbetweenthetwosidesthathasonlysince

widened.Environmentalconcernsbecameaproxybywhichwiderideologicalbattleswere

fought.“Assymbols,theissuescouldn’tbecompromised.Standingupforyourside

telegraphedyourcommitmenttotakebackAmerica—eitherfromtyrannicalliberalelitism

orright-winggreedandfecklessness”.

Itisthisrightsidewhichactivelyseekstounderminepublictrustinclimatescience,an

entitylabelledasa“denialmachine”andcomprisingofindustrial,politicalandmediaactors

whichmakeuptheconservativeideologyleadership(Dunlap,2014).Itwaswiththe1989

fallofcommunismandtheenvironmentalmovement'sinternationaleffortsatthe1992Rio

EarthSummitthattheattentionofU.S.conservativethinktanks,whichhadbeenorganised

inthe1970’sasanintellectualcounter-movementtosocialism,turnedfromthe"redscare"

tothe"greenscare"whichtheysawasathreattotheiraimsofprivateproperty,freetrade

marketeconomiesandglobalcapitalism(Jacquesetal.,2008).Thusdenialismbecamean

armoftheneoliberalismthatwasespoused,generated,andproliferatedintheeraof

ThatcherandReaganasaresponsetothecrisesofthe1970s’GreatSocietyregime,and

whichwasconsolidatedashegemonyduringtheClintonpresidency(Brulle,2011).This

scepticismfedoffthealreadyprevailingpolarizationwithinthemajorissuesthatdominated

theAmericanlandscape:financialruptures,economicinequality,unemployment,andso

forth.Brulle(2011:200)recognizedthatitwasgoingtobedifficult“tomobilizepeoplefor

climatechangemitigationunlessit(was)doneinconcertwitheffortstoengagetheseother

pressingproblems,whichalsohavebeengeneratedoratleastexacerbatedbyneoliberal

globalization”.Itsuggested,therefore,thatthestabilityofasocio-economicsystem,as

mediatedbythegovernment,wouldthereforebeparamountinlayingthefoundationfora

sortofbufferwhichwouldallowdrasticactiononclimatechangetotakeplace.

1.2DirectionofResearch


WhiletheUnitedStateshasbeenanalysedextensivelyduetoitsleadingroleinthe

politicisationofclimatechangescience,aquestionarisesastowhetherthepolarisation

regardingclimatechangedenialinideologythatisfoundintheU.S.isalsomanifestly

observableinEurope,albeitatalesspronouncedscale.Researchsuggeststhatin

comparisontothedevelopingworldscepticismhasincreasedinWesterncountriesinthe

lastdecadeafteramomentarydownturn,largelyonaccountofthefinancialcrisisof2008

(Eurobarometer,2009;Leiserowitzetal.,2010,Capstick,2015).Indeed,amorenuanced

lookatideology’seffectonscepticismwillperhapsoffermoreprecisemethodsbywhichwe

onemightlooktofurtherengagethepublicwiththeconcernsofACC.Ingeneral,Europe

hasseenlessanalysisintheclimatechangedenialrealmsimplybecausethestudieshave

consistentlyshownlessdisparitybetweendifferentgroupswithintheblocandtheirbeliefs

onthematter(seeFigure1,below).Thisstudynotonlyseekstoascertainthelinkbetween

neoliberalismasagovernmentalobjectiveandclimatechangescepticism,butalsotoask

whethercountrieswithmorestringentlyemployedneoliberalpracticeshavediffusedtheir

inherentanti-environmentalstanceontoitsconstituencyideologically,onanindividual

level.Doestheconstituencydolittlesavefollowtheleadofitsstateelite,orisitsuchthat

thepopulaceisguiltyofthesamebiasthattheirgovernmentshaveinstalledtocreatethe

currentparadigm?Ignoranceorwilfulignorance?Itseekstoofferasnapshotofthestateof

Europegivenitsvarioussocio-politicalpositionsand,giventhispaperisnotatemporal

studyonaccountofthisbeingbasedonthefirstsurveyofitskind,itpositionsitselftoallow

furtherstudiesaimedatunderstandingwhetheragivenpopulacebecomefurther

indoctrinatedovertimeastheshorttermbenefitsofneoliberalismsolidify.

Thispaperwilldiscusstheimplicationsofideology,neoliberalism,governmentalstability

andthecoretenetsofhumanpsychologyonthephenomenonofclimatechangedenial.A

theoreticalframeworkwillbedrawntoencapsulatetheaboveissues,inwhichfive

hypotheseswillbepresented.Ourvariables,alongsidethedatatomeasurethem,willthen

beintroducedandaquantitativemethodologydiscussed,beforetheresultsofbothamulti-

levelregressionandaqualitativeanalysiswillbepresentedinordertosythesisefullywith

thetheoreticalframework.Finallywewilldiscusstheresults,limitationsofthemethodand

avenuesforfurtherresearch.


2.0TheoreticalFramework

2.1Synopsis

ExtrapolatingfurtherfromthefindingsofMcCright&Dunlap(2013),orofPoortingaetal.

(2010),individualratherthanaggregatelevelobservancesyieldedthat“climatescepticism

appearedparticularlycommonamongolderindividualsfromlowersocio-economic

backgroundswhoarepoliticallyconservativeandholdtraditionalvalues;whilelesscommon

amongyoungerindividualsfromhighersocioeconomicbackgroundswhoholdself-

transcendenceandenvironmentalvalues.Thefindingthatclimatescepticismisrootedin

people’scorevaluesandworldviewsmayimplycoherentandencompassingsceptical

outlookonclimatechange”.Thereisaclearcross-sectionherebetweenideologyandthe

economicsystemthathascometoprevalencethroughthatideology:neoliberalism.The

effectsofeachonanthropogenicclimatechangescepticismareintertwined.Indeed,atthis

juncture,wemustdefinethemeaningofanthropogenicclimatechange(ACC).Lentonetal.

(2008),adifferentiationismadebetweentwoforms.Thefirstmeaningisfutureoriented,

summarisedbythenotionthatanthropogenicemissionswillleadtoglobalwarming,while

thesecondispastoriented,suggestingthathumanactivitieshaveconspicuouslychanged

theglobalclimate.Bothstatementsareheavilysupportedbytheevidence,thoughthefirst

isnotconditionalonthesecond.Inthispaperweshallleanmostheavilyonthesecond

definition,soastocorrespondwiththequestionaskedinFigure1,below.

Figure1:Surveyresponseto:“Temperatureriseispartofglobalwarmingorclimatechange.

Doyouthinkrisingtemperaturesarerisingasaresultofhumanactivities?”Source:Pelham,

B.(2009).Awareness,OpinionsAboutGlobalWarmingVaryWorldwide.Gallup.


IntheRahmstorftypologyof2004,afurthercategorisationismadetoclassifythebrandof

scepticismintheindividualsthemselves.Therearethree:trendsceptics,whodenychange,

attributionsceptics,whodenyblameonthepartofhumans,andimpactsceptics,whodeny

thechangewillbedisastrous.ThoughRahmstorfmakescertainthatthereisahighlevelof

correlationbetweenthethree,giventheparagraphpriorwecanclearlyassignattribution

scepticismtothisstudy.Yetweshouldremainwaryastothesourceofthissortof

scepticism;asKlein(2014)makesclear,oftentimestheright-wingeliteunderstandthe

sciencebetterthantheleft,andcertainlythoseinthecentre,inordertoargueagainstit

andfurthertheiragenda.Onanindividuallevel,however,wewillfinallyalsoseekto

ascertainthepsychologicalconfigurationsinherentinhumanitythatmagnifytheideology

thatexistsapartofandinherentinthesaidpsychology.Poortingaetal.(2011)confirmsthat

climatescepticismisfoundeduponpeople’scorevaluesandworldviews,yettoooftenwe

resorttoascribingideologyuponthisdefinition,withoutunderstandingthatthehumanity

comesbeforetheideology.AsNorgaard(2011:400)suggests,“peopleactuallyworkto

avoidacknowledgingdisturbinginformationinordertoavoidemotionsoffear,guilt,and

helplessness,followculturalnorms,andmaintainpositiveconceptionsofindividualand

nationalidentity”.Thisliesbeforetheapproachofpoliticalpolarisation,andassuchwillalso

figureintoourunderstandingofhowclimatechangescepticismmanifestsitself.


2.2IdeologyandNeoliberalism;

InParr’s2013discourse,‘TheWrathofCapital:NeoliberalismandClimateChangePolitics”,

theauthordamninglydeclaresthat“althoughclimatechangehasbecomethedominant

concernofthetwenty-firstcentury,globalpowersrefusetoimplementthechanges

necessarytoreversethesetrends.Instead,theyhaveneoliberalised(sic)natureandclimate

changepoliticsanddiscourse,andthereareindicationsofamorevirulentstrainofcapital

accumulationonthehorizon”.Thiswaslaidonthebackofthecenturybefore,wheretwo

policyregimescompetedinthehegemonicwesternworld(Brulle,2011).Ontheonehand

laymarketliberalism,stressingunfetteredcapitalism,strongpropertyrights,andaminimal

socialsafetynet,whileontheother,socialliberalism,favouringmodeststateintervention,

redistribution,andwelfareprovision.ParticularlyinthecaseoftheUnitedStates,capitalist

ownershipormanagementwasonlycosmeticallychallenged,andassuch“anti-

environmentalismhasbeen,fromthestart,akeystoneofneoliberalanti-regulatorypolitics”

(2013:197).

Klein(2014)hasdescribedthestateofaffairsashavingevolvedintoascenariowhereby

capitalistglobalizationandclimatechangesciencelieatoppositepoles,unabletogainsight

ofoneanotherandoblivioustotheinterdependencybetweenenvironmentandeconomy.

EmboldenedbybothvictoryintheColdWarandthebarrenlandscapeclearedbythe

policiesofReaganandThatcherthedecadeprior,neoliberalismhasnowtakenpoleposition

andishandilywinningthewarbetweenthetwo(McCright&Dunlap,2011).Thisistosay

thatbyitsnature,“neoliberalcapitalismcategoricallyrejectsthepolicyinstruments,

governancestructuresandculturalvalueswhichareessentialtotackletheproblem”(Klein,

2014:136).Assuch,theendportendedisominous;eitherwestaythecourseandallowthe

shiftingdynamicsoftheclimatetocompletelyreconfigureourworld,orweupendour

economicsysteminitsentiretytoavoidthefate.Initself,thisraisessomeinteresting

questionsthatwillbeaddressedmorefullyinthesection2.2.Intheinterimthough,wecan

surmiseareasonableassumptionthatinorderfortheleverstoturntowardsourcurrent

paradigm,asaspecieswemusthavebecomeensconced,unwittinglyornot,in

neoliberalismandconsequentlybytheimplicationsitholds.


Kleincontinuesbysuggestingthatfurthertothecontradictionineconomicterms,the

reasonwhywefailtofullycontendwithclimatechangeanditsimpactsarebecauseofthe

foundationsuponwhichtheWesternworldstands,anexplanationwhichhasasanadjunct

thesystemofneoliberalism.Theoverridingsensethatwecanoutsmartnature,coupled

withtheconsumeristsocietywehavebecomeenamouredwith,alongsidethenotionthatin

ordertoconfrontit,wewouldneedtosignalthedeathofthemostpowerfulindustrythe

worldhaseverknowninoilandgas,culminatesinthenotionthatwe“arelockedin—

politically,physically,andculturally”(2014:63).Evensupranationally,patriotismpitsone

countryagainstanotherratherthancreatinganenvironmentwherecooperationiskey.Rich

countriesdigintheirheelsanddeclarethattheywon’tcutemissionsandrisklosingtheir

vaultedpositionintheglobalhierarchy;poorercountriesdeclarethattheywon’tgiveup

theirrighttopolluteasmuchasrichcountriesdidontheirwaytowealth,evenifthat

meansdeepeningadisasterthathurtsthepoormostofall(Parr,2013).Thisdovetails

perfectlywiththeconservativemindsetwhichallowsinequalitytorunrampant.

Inallmannerofthings,itbecomesapparentthatneoliberalismisthebarrierbywhich

climatechangeadaptationcannotpass.Anditisnowonder.Punditsasesteemedasthe

formerchairmanoftheIPCC,RajendraPachuari,haveargued(Schipper,2007)thatclimate

changeisreversiblebyutilisinggreentechnologiesandmakingobsoletedirtyindustries,

givingrisetonewwealthproduction.Ineffect,theyseektodefeattheforcesoffreemarket

capitalismbyusingtheminthesolution,notcomprehendingthenotionthatclimatechange

andenvironmentaldilapidationare,attheirnexus,issuesofequality(Parr,2013).Creating

technologiesthatwillbeownedandpatentedonlyservestobolsterthesystemwhichledus

totheimpassewefindourselvesinpresently.Thegreenfreemarketfavoursthecurrent

systemofprivatisationattheexpenseofexploringneweconomicalternatives;forthis

reason,itismerecronyism.Neoliberalismhasbastardisedthefundamentalsofliberalismto

whichsuchaneffortmightbedirected.“Inthenameofcelebratingindividualresponsibility

andchoice,neoliberalpolicieshaveresultedincutbacksongovernmentspending,mass

privatization,trickle-downeconomics,deregulation,opencompetition,andthegradual

deteriorationofthecommons”(Bailey,2007).AseloquentlysummarisedbyAmoryLovins

(2008),“marketsmakeverygoodservants,butthey’renotgoodmasters,andthey’rea

lousyreligion”.


Atthisjuncturewecanformulateourfirsthypothesis;

H1(a):Inmoreneoliberalsocietiesweobserveincreasinglevelsofclimatechangescepticism

amongindividuals.

Thisbringsustoamorenuancedstudyoftheeffectsofideologyattheindividuallevel,asit

relatestoneoliberalism.Aswehaveseenprior,thetenetsofneoliberalismhavebeen

observedtobeindirectconflictwiththefactsestablishedinclimatechangescience.

Neoliberalsattacktheideaofpublicgoodsandopposeregulation,taxation,andotherstate

policieswhichdonotservetheshort-termcorporatebottomlineandinvestor

accumulations(Brulle,2011).Thisissynonymouswiththeconservativeright,whomstudies

havefoundtoequatedemocracywith“economicfreedom”or“freeenterprise”—property

rights,contracts,andconsumerchoice(Rossen,2015:43).Theresultisthat,intheUnited

States,75%ofDemocratsbelievethatclimatechangeisanthropogenic,whileamong

Republicansthatnumberplummetsto20%.Itmanifestsitselfintherealworldrather

blatantly.EventheEU’sEmissionsTradingScheme,apolicyseenasthebastionofclimate

changemitigation,hasseenbusinessleaderslookingtoturnaprofitbytakingadvantageof

thisneoliberalframework(Bailey,2007).

Theirmoralimperatives(detailedin2.2)againstipulatethatnoharmshouldcometothis

stateofaffairs;neoliberalismensuresthefurthersegregationofwealthinawaywhichwill

benefitthem,financiallyatleast.“Thecoreoftheproblemcomesbacktothesame

inescapablefactthathasbothblockedclimateactionandacceleratedemissions:allofus

arelivingintheworldthatneoliberalismbuilt,evenifwehappentobecriticsof

neoliberalism”(Klein,2014:138).Seeninthislight,climatechangescepticismisderived

fromtheperceptionthatthelegislativepoliciesdesignedtomitigateclimatechangehave

regulatoryimplications,countertothetenetsofafreemarketideologyinwhichunfettered

marketsareseentoprovidethebestsocialandeconomicoutcomesforsociety.Oreskes&

Conway(2010)corroboratethis,detailinghowclimatechangedenialhasbeendeliberately

orchestratedbyasmallbutvocalgroupoflaissez-faire,freemarketeers.Furthermore,

empiricalevidence(Lewandowskyetal.,2013)showsthataneoliberalideologystrongly


correlatestoarejectionofrealityasitpertainstoclimatechange,accountingforupto80%

ofthevarianceinclimatechangedenial.Againweseethatconservatives,thedefendersof

neoliberalism,continuetowholeheartedlydenythefactsofferedupbythesciencebecause

climatechange“detonatestheideologicalscaffoldingonwhichcontemporaryconservatism

rests”(Klein,2014).Assuchwefindourselveswiththesecondhypothesis:

H1(b):Conservativeideologyisaclearindicatortowardsclimatechangescepticism.

Theyaresimultaneouslyofferedamplesupportbytheneoconservativebaseaswellasthe

evangelicalChristianbloc,whotraditionallysupportanaggressiveforeignpolicyanda

culturalconservatism.Preservationofthestatusquoisthekey.Thesefaultsofthecurrent

paradigmwefindourselvesinliealsoatthefeetofthesustainabilitymovement,whoseem

unabletograspthattheeconomicandculturalimplicationsoftheirproposedremedieswill

betooseveretoswallow(Parr,2013).Assuchitpermitstheeconomichegemonytodefine

anddictatethetrajectoryoftheclimatechangeconversation.Toher,neoliberalismis

defined,aptly,asan“exclusivesystempremiseduponthelogicofpropertyrightsandthe

expansionoftheserights,allthewhilemaintainingthatthefreemarketisself-regulating,

sufficientlyandefficientlyworkingtoestablishindividualandcollectivewell-being"(2013:

5).Theleftmustthereforecomeupwithacounterpointwhichisequallyifnotmoreself-

regulating;sustainabilityhastobesustainable.Gunster’s(2016;136)determinationthat

changemustcomefromagroundswellof“diverseandrapidlyemergingsetofplace-based

socialmovementsfightingforsocialjustice,self-determination,equalityanddemocracy”

ratherthantheelitesistrue,butoverlysimplistic.Untilaviableecosystemsproutsfromthe

ideologyleftofcentre,neoliberalswillkeeponsingingthesamesong,awareofitsefficacy

thusfar.Indeed,havingnowbeenspurredintoactionbytheperceivedthreatsposedby

climatechangediscourse,theconservativemachinehasgoneintooverdriveinorderto

achieveabiasmanifestintheproletariatandsoextendtheirwinnings(Klein,2014).

Themediawascentraltothisoperationalizingmovement.Hmielowski(2013)notesthat

conservativemediausecorrespondedtoadecreasingtrustinclimatechangescience,while

non-conservativemediaintakeshowedtheoppositeeffect.Thismediawasdeployedby91

‘climatechangecounter-movements’(CCCM’s)observedbetweentheyearsof2003and


2010(Brulle,2013)whichhadanaverageofUSD$964millionincombinedbudgetinorder

todisseminatewhatwaseffectivelyfalseandmisleadinginformation,moneywhichwas

donatedoverwhelminglybyconservativefoundations.Onesuchindicativeexampleasper

Klein(2014),whoundertookasweepofconservativepositionsinmediaoutlets,wasof

conservativecolumnistandclimatechangedenierGeorgeWill,who“arguedthatthe

fanatical‘greenleft’s’chargesthatCO2emissionsandfossilfuelindustriesposea‘planetary

menace’providearationaleforthegovernmentto‘intrude’everywhere,curtailconsumer

choiceandpropertyrights,andincreasethestate’ssizeandsurveillance”.Theeffectwas

twofold.Aftertheensuingblowbackfromtheliberalleft,theconservativemediacounter-

attackedbycomplainingaboutunfairbiasinthemainstreammedia.Seekingcorrection,or

editorialbalance,themainstreammediaendeavouredtograntparitytothepositionsofthe

CCCM’s(Boykoff,2008).Thepublic,ensconcedintheinsecuritiesofaceaselesswarand

financialhardship,provedreceptivetothefearmongeringconcerningoverallliberty.

Itbecomesapparent,inthislight,thatdenialisnotnecessarilyindicativeofalowerstateof

knowledge,butratherasaconsequenceof“anacuteperceptionoftheprofoundeconomic

andpoliticalconsequencesofclimatechange”(Gunster,2016).Increasedscepticismhas

beenfoundinthepasttobeprimarilyassociatedwithsocio-economicfactorsoutsideof

education;higherage&wealth,privilegedlocation&lifestyle,amaledesignation,andmost

predominately,conservativepoliticalandenvironmentalviews(Whitmarsh,2010;Klein,

2014;McCright&Dunlap,2011,Bramanetal.,2012).Themodernlifehasbeenboth

createdandinsulatedbyindustrialcapitalism,andtheconservativedefendersofthis

neoliberalismintervenetoensurethepeoplekeepthefaithbytakingtheonlyavenue

availabletothem:“byclaimingthatthousandsuponthousandsofscientistsarelyingand

thatclimatechangeisanelaboratehoax…Theydenyreality,inotherwords,becausethe

implicationsofthatrealityare,quitesimply,unthinkable”(Klein,2014:38).Indeed,ifwe

takealookatclimatechangeinterventionasamicrocosmoftheideologyoftheleftwesee

thetruthofKlein’sretellingofa2008quotemadebyaratherlucidpresidentofa

conservativethinktank,JosephBast:“Climatechangeistheperfectthing.…It’sthereason

whyweshoulddoeverything[theleft]wantedtodoanyway.”Ideology,specificallythatof

theright,hasswungneoliberalismtoworkinitsfavour,andthemaintenanceofthesocio-


economicsystemisparamounttoensuringtheledgerremainsheavieronthatrighthand

side.

WhilethishasbeenshowninAmericainparticular,nostudieshaveestablishedthetrend

withinEurope;thishighlightsthesecond,linkedhypothesis;

H1(c):Neoliberalismaccentuatestheeffectofrightleaningideologyinpredictingclimate

changescepticisminEurope.

Lookingatthisfromanevenwidermacroperspective,thestakesbecomemenacing.There

isaheavilyimbuedsenseoffear,andpotentialguilt,thatthefreemarketsystemhas

triggeredaseriesofoutcomesthatwithoutregulationwouldindeedthreatenhugeswathes

ofhumanity(Parr,2013,Klein,2014).Ifthisweretobeprovedcorrect,thenthemoral

pretencewithwhichtheyfoughtsohardforcapitalismcomesuphollow.Sothethinking

goes,assoonastheyadmitthatclimatechangeisreal,theywilllosethecentralideological

battleofourtime.Yetintheinterestsofintellectualhonesty,weshouldnotethatleftists

arenotimpervioustothismosthumanoftraitseither.Confirmationbiasisahuman

affliction,andso“ifconservativesareinherentsystemjustifiers,andthereforebridlebefore

factsthatcallthedominanteconomicsystemintoquestion,thenmostleftistsareinherent

systemquestioners,andthereforepronetoscepticismaboutfactsthatcomefrom

corporationsandgovernment”(Klein,2014:32).Thisunderstandingwillbefactoredinto

theconclusionsdrawnattheendofthispaper.Inanycase,asitpertainstothepoliticsof

climatechange,wecanseethatfarfromasimpledisagreementwiththefactsasespoused

bythescientificcommunity,anthropogenicclimatechangescepticismremainstheprovince

ofideologyandthesocio-economicdriversbehinditmorethananyothersinglefactor.

2.3PsychologyinandofStability;

Aspreviouslystated,pastresearchhasoftencentredondemographics,lifestyle,knowledge,

valuesandideology,withaparticularemphasisonthelatter.(Whitmarsh,2010;Klein,

2014;McCright&Dunlap,2011,Bramanetal.,2012).YetaccordingtoNorgaard(2006)and

Gifford(2011),thisanalysisseemstomisstheinherent,baselevelinstinctsthatdrive


humanity.Whileallscepticismisofcoursepsychological,adistinctionhastobemadebeen

endogenousandexogenousdrivers.Here,incontrasttothesectionprior,welookatthe

former,andhowtheyrelatetotheconstructthatisbuiltaroundthembyexternalforces.

Forifwesimplylookatideologyasthefoundationstoneofanyanalysisofclimatechange

scepticism,wemightbetemptedintoassumingtheunsupportedclaimthatpeoplehave

stoppedcaringabouttheenvironment,thepoor,orfuturegenerations.Ifwedidnotdig

deeper,itwouldseemirrationaltosuggestotherwiseinexplainingourcollectivepassivity

(Norgaard,2011).

Norgaardundertakesanethnographicapproachinordertorootoutthebasecause;she

conducted46interviewsandattemptedtocategorisethe‘strategiesofdenial’which,

broadlyspeaking,wereeitherinterpretiveorcultural.Allintervieweeswerewithinone

communityintheruralwestofNorway,andwhilethisclearlymakesthesubjectofexternal

validityproblematic,itdidrevealatrendtowardscognitivedissonancepredictedbyseveral

studiesprior(Stoll-Kleemanetal.,2001;Lorenzonietal.,2007);Norgaardrecordedboth

awarenessandconcernovertheissueinhersample,butalsothesensethatitwasanissue

thattendedtostickinthethroat.ItwassynonymouswithwhattheBritishsociologist

StanleyCohenreferredtoas‘implicatorydenial’,wherebyknowledgeaboutawarina

regionfarflungfromyourown,andthewomenrapedandchildrenstarvedtherein,are

givenshortshriftbecausetheyare“notseenaspsychologicallydisturbingorascarrying

amoralimperativetoact…Unlikeliteralorinterpretivedenial,knowledgeitselfisnotat

issue,butdoingthe‘right’thingwiththeknowledge”(Cohen,2001:9).Humanityrequires

thesedelineationsbecausewithoutthem,stabilityinthehumanmindwouldbe

compromised.

Applyingthistotheaforementionedclimatescepticcampaigns,wecanseethattheyhave

aninherenthandicapadvantageoverthosethatwouldpromoteaction:“peopleactually

worktoavoidacknowledgingdisturbinginformationinordertoavoidemotionsoffear,

guilt,andhelplessness,followculturalnorms,andmaintainpositiveconceptionsof

individualandnationalidentity.Asaresultofthiskindofdenial,peopledescribeasenseof

‘knowingandnotknowing’aboutclimatechange,ofhavinginformationbutnotthinking

aboutitintheireverydaylives”(Norgaard,2011:404).Poortingaet.al.(2010:20)refersto


a“finitepoolofworry”.Thisapparentcowardice,orwilfulignorance,though,remindsus

thattodisregardanissueofsuchmonstrousimportcouldbeasdifficultasattemptingto

solveit;tocurtailfeelingsofempathyastoextendthem,ortotemperone’semotionsby

exertingcontrolone’sthoughts(Rosenberg,1991;Hochschild,1983).Ourparalysisinthat

caseisnotareflectionofourgreedorinhumanity,butratherbecausetheissueismorbid,

whichisinfactanechoofourcharity.Inanycase,itbecomesclearthatjustbecause

individualsindicatethattheydonotpersonallyworryabouttheimpactsofclimatechangeit

doesnotnecessarilymeantheythinkthatthereisnothingtoworryabout(Carolan,2010).

InNorway’scase,Norgaard(2011)identifiedcertainculturalnormswhichrenderedit

impropertoexpressemotionsthattheyheldprivately,despiteotherculturalnormsof

egalitarianismandenvironmentalconsciousness.Thisproducedthenetnegativeeffectof

sweepingeverythingundertheproverbialrug.Lookingevenmoreintentlyatthesituation,

onemustaskwhysuchculturalnormsexisted;theauthorcontendsthatsociallyorganised

denialinacountryofNorway’saffluenceholdsarelationshipwithstudiesofprivilege.This

iswherethepsychologyinterceptswiththeconceptsofneoliberalismmentionedearlier.

“Ongoingchangesinsocialorganization,especiallythetwinforcesofglobalizationand

increasinginequalitycreatesasituationinwhich,forprivilegedpeople,environmentaland

socialjusticeproblemsareincreasinglydistantintimeorspaceorboth.Socialinequality

helpstoperpetuateenvironmentaldegradationmakingiteasiertodisplacevisible

outcomesandcostsacrossbordersoftimeandspace,outofthewayofthosecitizenswith

thepotentialtime,energy,culturalcapital,andpoliticalclouttogeneratemoraloutrageand

takeactioninavarietyofways”(2011;410).Nationssignificantlylessfortunatethan

Norwaywillbeimpactedbyclimatechangemuchsooner,andassuchacontradiction-in-

termsensueswhereby,onarelativescale,theissuebecomeslessofaconcerntothosewho

havethemeanstoreckonwithit.Andasglobalcapitalismensuresthat,withinthe

economicparadigmwecurrentlyoccupy,wealthsegregationwillcontinuetogrow,notonly

willtheissueremainunresolved,itwillgetsignificantlydirerinlightofaffluentcountries

movingtobarricadethemselvesfromtheinsecuritythatpervadesinthedevelopingworld.

Stabilitycanpropelyouintoproblemsolving,butitcanalsoinsulateyoufromfutureharm.

Inreview:Giventheexhibited,explicitdesireofhumanityforcomfort,toeaseinsecurityor


uncertainty,itwouldthereforefollowthatnationswhichallowedtheirconstituentsa

marginoferrorinlieuofasmoothlyrunning,stablegovernmentalmachinewouldalso

allowthemthespacetocontemplateclimatechangeinallitsimplicationswithoutthesame

commensurateleveloffearasinothernationswheretheburdenofsurvivalisalreadyhigh.

Thatistosay,beneficialculturalhabitscanbeformedthroughstrong,positiveleadership

withlongtermtargetswhichaidintheclimatechangeissue.Ofcourse,itisprudentto

recognisethatstabilitymightgeneratecompetinginterests.Theparadigmoutlinedabove

couldbeturnedonitshead;namely,ifagovernmentismorestable,ithasmoreofabuffer

zonetoitselfchangethestatusquo.Yetonecouldalsoconcludethatthepopulace

underneaththem,assumingtheconsiderationofanaffluentWesternnation,willgenerally

belessinclinedtoupsettheirownprivilegedbalance.Aparadoxensues.Wemustturn

thereforetoaninteractionbetweenideologyandgovernmentstability,whichproducesthe

finaltwohypotheses:

H2(a):Insocietieswithstrong,stableandeffectivegovernanceweobservedecreasinglevels

ofclimatechangescepticismamongindividuals.

H2(b):Stableandeffectivegovernanceoffersasocio-economicbufferwhichaccentuatesthe

ideologyofitsconstituencyinpredictingthelevelofclimatechangescepticism.

Thisbearshallmarkswiththesystemjustificationandsocialdominanceorientation(SDO)

theoriesasespousedbyscholarssuchasJost&Hunyady(2005)andFeyginaetal.(2009)in

thecaseoftheformer,andJylha&Akrami(2015)inthecaseofthelatter.Accordingto

systemjustificationtheory,ourappraisalsofoursocialandinstitutionalarebalancedby

epistemicneedstomaintainasenseofcertaintyandstability,existentialneedstofeel

secureandsupported,andinterpersonalneedstointeractwiththoseinthesamebroad

position(Ledgerwood&Hardin,2008).Combined,theseneedsmotivatetheindividualto

perceivethesystemasfair,legitimate,beneficial,andstable,aswellasthedesireto

maintainandprotectthestatusquo(Jost,Liviatan,etal.,2009).Intheshorttermthiscan

bedesirable,asitcanassuageanxiety,uncertaintyandfear,butthelong-termimplications

ofpursuingthesystemjustificationgoalcanbenegative,whereitinterfereswithforming

intentionsortakingactiontocorrectinjusticesorsystem-levelproblems(Wakslaketal.,


2007).Consistentwithself-interest,thosewhoareadvantagedbythesystemtypically

engageinsystemjustificationmoreenthusiasticallythanthosewhoaredisadvantaged,and

assuch,inlinewiththepreviousparagraph,itindicatesamajorobstacleinaccomplishing

positiveenvironmentalchange.Thisistosay,themorepeoplearemotivatedtodefendand

bolstertheexistingsystem,themorelikelytheywillbetodenyenvironmentalproblems,

insofarasthesechallengethesystem’slegitimacyaswellasitsstability(Feyginaetal.,

2009).

SDO,incontrast,isconceptualizedasameasureofanindividual'spreferencefor

hierarchywithinanysocialsystemandthedominationoverlower-statusgroups.Inastudy

ofKahanetal.(2012),itwasfoundthat“peoplewithstrong‘egalitarian’and

‘communitarian’worldviews(markedbyaninclinationtowardcollectiveactionandsocial

justice,concernaboutinequality,andsuspicionofcorporatepower)overwhelminglyaccept

thescientificconsensusonclimatechange.Conversely,thosewithstrong“hierarchical”and

“individualistic”worldviews(markedbyoppositiontogovernmentassistanceforthepoor

andminorities,strongsupportforindustry,andabeliefthatweallprettymuchgetwhatwe

deserve)overwhelminglyrejectthescientificconsensus”.Inessence,itreinforceswhatwe

havedeterminedpreviously,inthatpeoplefinditcognitivelydistressingtorealisethatwhat

theyconsiderasnobleisdamaging,andthatwhattheyconsiderasbasewasvirtuous.

Underthispretext,climatechangemitigationeffortscouldbemoresuccessfulifframedas

beingclearlybeneficialforeverybodyandnon-threateningtotheexistingsocialorder.

Asafinalappealtopsychology,Iturnnowtothatmostopaqueoffields,morality.Inmoral

foundationtheorytheexactnatureofautopicsocietyispoliticallydebatedinlightoffive

coremoraldomains(Haidt&Graham,2007).Inthesematter,thereisadigressionbetween

adherentstotheleft,whomidentifythe“individualisingfoundations”–harmandfairness–

andthosewhoadheretoright,whosupportafurtherthreebasemeasureswhichare

importantincommunitybuilding–in-grouployalty(e.g.patriotism),authority(i.e.hierarchy

andobedience),andpurity(i.e.transcendenceofbasenature).AsKlein(2014:44)

continues,“Ithasrecentlybeenproposedthatthedifferencesinmoralconsiderationsmay

beattheheartoftheobservedpoliticaldivisionsaboutclimatechange.Theeffectsof

climatechangequitenaturallyspeaktothemoralconcernsofharmavoidanceandfairness


(e.g.climatechangewillharmthemostvulnerableintheworldfirst),butnotnecessarilyto

moralityfocussedonin-grouployalty,deferencetoauthorityandpersonalrestraint”.Atthis

juncture,theprospectofasixthfoundationcomesintoplay,whichbringsusfullcircle.This

istheconceptoftherighttoeconomicliberty,unrestrainedfromtheegalitarianimpositions

thatthecontemporaryliberalswouldburdenconservativeswithunderdifferentguisesof

‘fairness’.Fromthisperspective,governmentinterventionandwealthredistributionare

potentialmoralviolations,seenasunjustbecausetheypresumethatpeoplehaveamoral

obligationtothewelfareofothers(Iyeretal.,2012).Andalthoughthiswouldmakeacase

forneoliberalism,whichweevaluateasunderminingequality–insofarasclimatechangeis

aboutequality,assuggestedearlier–thisruminationbearsouttheimmediatehypothesis

above,intheratherobviousconclusionthatitisimperativeforadegreeofideological

consensusinorderforanystabilityingovernancetobereached.


3.0Data&MethodsThemethodologychosenfortheanalysisofthethreehypothesesoutlinedinthetheoretical

frameworkisaquantitativeanalysis.Theempiricaldataextractedcombinesmulti-leveldata

onboththeindividualandcountrytiers.Inthecaseoftheformer,Idrewondata

encapsulatedwithinthesecondreleaseoftheeighthroundoftheEuropeanSocialSurvey,

whichgaugedtheresponsesofover33,000participantsacross23countries.Amongstthe

slewofquestionsfieldedinthesurvey,andwithinthe‘PublicAttitudestoClimateChange’

module,Ibeganbyidentifyingmydependentvariable.Withrespecttothequestion“Do

youthinkthatclimatechangeiscausedbynaturalprocesses,humanactivity,orboth?”,

respondentscouldgiveananswerrangingfrom(1)“Entirelycausedbynaturalprocesses”to

(5)“Entirelycausedbyhumanprocesses”.Therewereafurtherfiveoptionsindicating

‘Refusal’,‘Don’tKnow’,‘NoAnswer’,‘NotApplicable’,and‘Idon’tthinkclimatechangeis

happening’which,likesimilarresponsesintheindividuallevelindependentvariables

chosen(expandeduponbelow),wereremovedfromtheanalysissoastonotswaythe

samplepool,leavingmewithascaleof1-5,withahigherscoreindicatinglessofadegreeof

anthropogenicclimatechange(ACC)scepticism.

Individuallevelcontrolvariables,asperthetheoreticalframework,centredonage,

education(numberofyearsineducation),ideology(scale0-10,lefttoright),andnet

householdincome(measuredindeciles).Healthasdeterminedbylifeexpectancywasnot

incorporatedgiventheinclusionofage,norwasrace,giventheblurredethnographiclines

Europehaswouldensurenoconclusiveconclusionscouldbereached.Operationalisingthe

aggregatelevelvariablesprovedtobeslightlymoredifficult.Giventheceilingofferedbythe

ESS,Ilookedfordatasetswhichcouldextractinformationforall23countries.Thevariables

tobeidentifiedwereoneswhichsoughttoisolatemeasuresofqualityofeducation,

historicalperformanceonclimatechangeissues,perceivedcapabilitytocombatclimate

changeinthefuture,neoliberalism,andthestability/strengthofgovernance.Thequalityof

educationindicatorwasgarneredfromtheUnitedNationsHumanDevelopmentIndex,

whichconsistsofaneducationparameterwhichranks188countriesonascaleof0-1

determinedbyacombinationofliteracyandenrolmentrates.Theliteracycomponentis

weightedattwo-thirdswhiletheenrolmentmeasure,consistingofapooledprimary,


secondaryandtertiarygrossenrolmentrate,isweightedatone-third.Theperformance

variablewasgeneratedbyGermanwatch’sClimateChangePerformanceIndex,which

evaluates56countries(withtheEUasawholecountedasanadditionalentity)basedon

fourteenindicatorswithinthefourcategoriesofGHGemissions,renewableenergy,energy

useandclimatepolicy.Next,IutilisetheUniversityofNotreDame’sGlobalAdaptation

Initiativetocometoacompositescoreregardingthecapabilityofagivencountrytotackle

futureclimatechangedilemmas.Byfactoringa0-1readinessscoreanda0-1vulnerability

score,theuniversityyieldsameasurebetween0-100calledtheND-GAINIndex.

Ourlasttwoaggregatevariables,neoliberalismandstability,functionnotonlyascontrol

variablesbutasmoderators,inhypothesis1(c)and2(b),respectively.Theformeris

quantifiedbyTheIndexofEconomicFreedom,asmeasuredbyTheHeritageFoundationin

consortiumwithTheWallStreetJournal1,whichprovidesascoreof0-100basedon

criterionregardingtenfactorsincludingtrade,investment,financial,labour,andbusiness

freedom.Finally,themeasureforstability,themosttreacherousofourindicatorsandthe

mostheavilycriticised.CalculatedbytheWorldBank,theWorldwideGovernanceIndicators

seektocapturesixkeydimensionsofgovernanceinover200countries:voice&

accountability,politicalstability&lackofviolence,governmenteffectiveness,regulatory

quality,ruleoflaw,andcontrolofcorruption.Onascaleof0to5(higherthebetter),each

ofthesesixmeasuresisevaluated.Inordertooperationaliseaworkingvariable,Ihave

consolidatedthesixvaluesintoacompositeforeachcountrybytreatingeachvalueas

beingofequalweight;Imuststressthatthisgoesbeyondthescopeofthemeasurements

thattheWorldBankhastakenituponthemselvestodo,andassuchonlymagnifiesthe

subjectivityalreadyinherentwithintheirmeasurements(whichiswelldocumented).Itwas,

however,theonlysuchmeasurefoundwhichcouldevenremotelymeasurethestabilityor

strengthofthegovernmentsinquestion.

Thecountriesanalysedwithinthestudyareasfollows:Austria,Belgium,theCzechRepublic,

Estonia,Finland,France,Germany,Hungary,Iceland,Ireland,Israel,Italy,Lithuania,The

1Notethattheself-professedmotivationforthesetwoinstitutionstocreatetheindex,asperitsexecutivesummary,wastopromulgatethebenefitsofeconomicfreedom.


Netherlands,Norway,Poland,Portugal,Russia,Slovenia,Spain,Sweden,Switzerlandand

theUnitedKingdom2.

Havingestablishedthevariables,itisthepurposeofthisdissertationtotestconclusionsto

thefivehypothesespreviouslylaidout.Inthefirst(H1(a)),wewishtoestablishalink

betweenaggregatelevelneoliberalismandindividuallevelanthropogenicclimatechange

scepticism.Thesecond(H1(b))contendswiththerelationshippredictedbetweenrightwing

ideologyandACCscepticism,whilethefourth(H2(a))willexaminetherelationshipbetween

governmentefficacyandstabilityandACCscepticsm.Thethirdandfifthhypotheses

establishinteractiveeffectswhichbuildontheresultsoftheH1(a)&H1(b)fortheformer,

andH1(b)andH2(a)forthelatter.One(H1(c))measurestheeffectofdifferentlevelsof

neoliberalismontheleft-rightscale’srelationshipwithACCscepticism.Similarly,theother

(H2(b))measurestheeffectofdifferentlevelsofgovernmentalstabilityontheleft-right

scale’srelationshipwithACCscepticism.Wewillachievethisbyfirstrunningarandom-

interceptmulti-levelregressionmodel.Astraightquantitativeanalysiswillbeusedto

analysethevalidityofthefirst,secondandfourthhypotheses,whileagraphic

representationoftheinteractionwillbeusedtomakeconclusionsonthethirdandfifth

hypotheses.Throughthesemethods,wewillbeabletounderstandtherelationshipsheld

betweenideology,neoliberalism,governmentstabilityandrawpsychologyasitpertainsto

the21countriesanalysedinEurope.

2Twoofthesecountries,IcelandandIsrael,wereomittedintheStataanalysisinlieuoftheirnotbeinganydataavailablefortheClimateChangePerformanceIndex.Thiswasdeemedacceptableastheydidnotoccupytheextremeswithinanyoftheothervariables.


4.0EmpiricalResults

4.1Correlations;

Wefirstrecordthecorrelationsbetweenthevariables(Table1)3,wherewecan

immediatelyseethatnoissuesregardinglevelsofcorrelationbetweenthecontrolvariables

aretoohighforusecomeintoplay;allvariablesareindependentenoughofoneanother,

absentofmulti-collinearityconcerns.Theyareallalsostatisticallysignificant4.Regarding

eachvariablesrelationshiptoclimatechangescepticism,wecomeacrossnointuitive

surprises.Beliefinanthropogenicclimatechangeispositivelycorrelatedwithhigher

householdincomesandwithmoreyearsofeducation.Conversely,itisnegativelycorrelated

toideology,left-rightscale(whereright-wingisaccordedahighernumber)andolderage.

Table1:IndividualLevelVariableCorrelations

(1)VARIABLES ccnthumClimatechangeskepticism

1

Yearsoffull-timeeducationcompleted 0.082***Ageofrespondent,calculated

-0.118***

Placementonleftrightscale

-0.095***

Household’stotalnetincome,allsources

0.029***

*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001

3StatisticssummarisingthedistributionofthevariablesaredetailedinAppendix7.1.4Giventhenatureofmulti-levelregression,aggregatelevelcorrelationsareonlyshownintheappendices(7.2);itisofsomeinterestthatthecoefficientbetween‘Neoliberalism’and‘Stability’,ourtwocontrolvariables,isquitehighat0.759.Otheraggregate-aggregatecorrelationsarealsoobservedtobehigh.


4.2OLSRegressions;

InTable2wesee,againwithhighlevelsofstatisticalsignificance,thatwithintheindividual

levelvariables,thefollowingcoefficients/relationshipsareobserved:Foreveryyearof

educationcompleted,acorrespondingincreaseof0.014unitsofclimatechangescepticism

indicatedgreaterbeliefinanthropogeniccauses.Asimilarrelationshipsexistforthe

measureforhouseholdincome.Conversely,foreveryunitincreaseonascaleof0-10in

ideology,weseea0.028unitincreaseinbeliefofnaturalcausesratherthanhuman.

Similarly,foreverytenyearsofage,a0.043unitincreaseinthesameisseen56.These

changeeffectsarenotsubstantial,andwillhaveimplicationsonourfindings,whichwillbe

discussedbelowindetail.

Table2:IndividualLevelVariableRegression

(1)VARIABLES Model1 Yearsoffull-timeeducationcompleted 0.014***

(0.001)

Ageofrespondent,calculated -0.004***

(2.1*10-4)

Placementonleftrightscale -0.028***

(0.002)

Household'stotalnetincome,allsources 3.8*10-4**

(1.53*10-4)

Constant 3.792***

(0.029)

CountryFixedEffects ✓Observations 36,447R-squared 0.055

Standarderrorsinparentheses***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1

5WhileweseethattheR2valueofof0.055,whichsuggeststhattheindependentvariablesaccountfor5.5%ofvarianceinclimatechangeskepticism,isminimal,wedonotseektofullyexplainthevarianceandbeliefsinclimatechange,butonlytoestablisharelationshipbetweenthecontrolvariablesandclimatechangescepticismitself.6Theannexcontainsbothacorrelation(7.2)andaregression(7.3)tableforthe‘educationlever’variables:theindividuallevel‘yearsofeducation’completedandtheaggregatelevel‘qualityofeducation’


4.3Multi-levelRegression;

Theresultsofthemulti-levelregressionbetweentheindividuallevelEuropeanSocialSurvey

variables,andtheaggregatelevelcountryvariables,isasfollows(Table4):

Table4:Multi-levelRegression;

(1)VARIABLES Model1 IndividualLevelVariables

Yearsoffull-timeeducationcompleted 0.01386***

(0.00114)


(0.000234)

Placementonleftrightscale -0.0257***

(0.00192)

Household'stotalnetincome,allsources 0.000433***

(0.000159)

AggregateLevelVariables

Neoliberalism -0.01077*

(0.00608)

QualityofEducation -2.155***

(0.762)

GovernmentStability&Efficacy 0.251***

(0.0762)

ClimateChangePerformance -0.00234

(0.00241)

ReadinessforClimateChange -0.00347

(0.0071)

Constant 5.632***7

(0.485)

Observations 33,741Numberofgroups 218Standarderrorsinparentheses

***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1

7Thisinterceptdesignationiseffectivelymeaningless,asnosituationcanarisewhereallindependentvariablescanbe0.8ThiscounthasbeendecreasedbytwoonaccountofIsraelandIcelandnothavingadataentryforthevariable‘ClimateChangePerformance’.


ItisnotedthattheClimateChangePerformanceandReadinessforClimateChange

indicatorshavebeenfoundnottobesignificant.Themultivariateequationispresented

below;

Climatechangescepticism=0.014*eduyrs–0.004*agea–0.026*lrscale+4.3*10-4

*hinctnta-0.011*Neolib–2.155*QualEdu+0.251GovStab–0.002*CCPerf–0.003*CCRead+5.63

Withalltheinformationnowinhand,wecananalysethedataasitpertainstohypotheses

1(a),1(b)and2(a).Fortheformer,therelationshipbetweenneoliberalismandclimate

changescepticismisfoundtobestatisticallysignificant.However,itisnotseentobe

substantivelysignificant:onascaleof0to100,everyonepointincreaseinneoliberalism

onlydecreasesthebeliefofclimatechangeasahumaneffectby0.011,onascaleof1to5.

Thatistosay,ifacountry’sneoliberalismscore(keepinginmindthatthelowestscorein

oursample,Russiaat58.2,is23.5pointsawayfromourhighest,Switzerlandat81.7)

increasesbytenpoints,wewillonlyseeaswingtowardsclimatechangeskepticismof0.1

outofapossible4units.

Movingtoourhypothesis1(b),wearecontendingwiththelinkbetweenideologyand

climatechangeskepticism.Theregressionshowsthat,whiletherelationshipissignificant,it

isagainnotsubstantive.Aonepointincreaseinideology(i.e.towardstheright,onascale

of0to10)onlychangesourdependentvariableby0.03points;itisextremelyminimal,

whichconflictswithmuchoftheliterature.Lastly,analysinghypothesis2(a),the

relationshipbetweengovernmentstability&efficacyandclimatechangescepticismisboth

statisticallyandsubstantivelysignificant.Foreveryonepointincreaseingovernance(ona

scaleof0to5,withthelowestandhighestrankingsinoursampleagainbeingRussiaat1.77

andSwitzerlandat4.29)weseeafull0.25swingawayfromclimatechangescepticism.

Overall,then,theresultssuggestthatthehypothesesconcerningneoliberalismand

ideology’spotentialrelationshipwithclimatechangescepticismareestablished,andwecan

rejectthenullhypotheses.Yetitisalsofoundthattheeffectofbothneoliberalismand

ideologyissmallintheEuropeancountriessampled.Concerninghypothesis2(a),wecan


bothrejectthenullhypothesisanddeterminethatthequantifiableeffectofgovernance

capabilityonclimatechangeskepticismissignificant.Lookingtothetheoreticalframework

inretrospect,wecanseethatthepriorresearchlargelyboreoutourassumptionstobe

true,thoughitisseentobemuchlessextremeaneffectinEuropeasitisintheUnited

States,wheremuchoftheliterature(particularlyconcerningneoliberalismandideology)

wasbased.Thisisnotsurprising,asitiswelldocumentedhowcapitalistandpolarized

Americais,toadegreenotgenerallyassociatedwithEurope.

4.4InteractionsInordertointerpretthedataforasuccessfulunderstandingofthedynamicsatplayourtwo

remaininghypotheses,wemustemployinteractionmodelstofreeboththeslopeandthe

interceptfortheinteractiveeffectofneoliberalism(H1(c))/governance(H2(b))onideology,

beforeseeingitsresultanteffectonclimatechangescepticism.Fortheformerweplot

neoliberalismontheX-axisagainstthemarginaleffectoftheleft-rightscaleonclimate

changescepticismontheY-axis,withtheneoliberalismindicatorasthemoderatingvariable

onideology.Forthelatterweplotgovernance/stabilityonthexaxisagainstthemarginal

effectoftheleft-rightscaleonclimatechangescepticismontheY-axis,withthethestability

indicatorasthemoderatingvariable9.TheresultsarepresentedinFigure’s2and3,

respectively,onthenextpage.Wenote,too,thatahistogramisincludedonthegraph,

whichmarksthepercentageofcountriesfallingunderthevaluesofneoliberalism/

governance(stability)asindicatedontheX-axis’.

4.4.1Neoliberalism/Ideology

WithrespecttoFigure2,below(in4.4.3),wecanseethatforthefirstfewcountriesonthe

leftofthegraphthereisnosignificantvariationinthemeasure,astheconfidenceinterval

includeszeroupuntilaneoliberalismvalueofabout63.Onthecountriesontherightside

ofthegraph–i.e.withhigherlevelsofneoliberalismthan63–theeffectontheleft-right

9TheRandomIntercept/RandomSlopesModelsforbothNeoliberalism/IdeologyandGovernance(Stability)/IdeologyareaffixedinAppendixA4.Theyincludethestandarddeviationsofboththeslopeandtheinterceptacrosscountries(therandomeffectsparameters).


scalerelationshipwithscepticismdecreasesasitprogresses.Further,wheremanycountries

cluster,inthemid-70’sscoresforneoliberalism,theconfidenceintervalnarrows,suggesting

wecanbemoresureoftheexactvariationintheleft-rightscale/scepticismrelationship.

Theinteractiveeffectofneoliberalismonideology(i.e.theslope)iscalculatedat-0.002:the

graphshowsthattheeffectofaone-unitincreaseofideologyonskepticismisreducedby-

0.002acrossvaluesofneoliberalism.Thisisanoddfindinggiventhefindingsofhypotheses

1(a)and1(b);theinteractionmutestheeffectofideologyonclimatechangescepticismas

neoliberalismgoesup,ratherthancompoundingit.However,itisnotedthatthenon-

interactiveeffectofneoliberalismis0.012inthismodel,asopposedto-0.011inthe

regressionmodelusedin§4.3,whichisthesourceoftheunintuitiveresult.10Weconclude

thatthereisastatisticallysignificantbutminorinteractiveeffectofneoliberalismon

ideologyasitpertainstoclimatechangescepticism.Wecanrejectthenullhypothesis,yet

theinteractiveeffectmitigatesratherthanaccentuatesideology;itisintheopposite

directionfromwhatwaspredictedinH1(c).11

4.4.2Governance(Stability)/Ideology

WithrespecttoFigure3,below(in4.4.3),wecanseethatforthefirstthreecountries

(Russia,ItalyandHungary)ontheleftofthegraphthereisnosignificantvariationinthe

measure,astheconfidenceintervalincludeszeroupuntilastabilityvalueofabout3.05.For

theremainingcountries–i.e.withhigherlevelsofstabilitythan2.5–theeffectontheleft-

rightscalerelationshipwithscepticismdecreasesasitprogresses.Further,wheremany

countriescluster,ataboutastabilityscoreof3.3,theconfidenceintervalnarrows,

suggestingwecanbemoresureoftheexactvariationintheleft-rightscale/scepticism

relationship.Theinteractiveeffectofstabilityonideology(i.e.theslope)iscalculatedat-

0.024:thegraphshowsthattheeffectofaone-unitincreaseofideologyonskepticismis

reducedby-0.024acrossunitvaluesofstability.ThisisconsistentwithhypothesesH1(b)

10Thenon-interactiveco-efficientforideology,asperAppendix7.4(ii),is0.084,positiveratherthannegativeasper§4.3.ThishasnobearingonH1(c),despiteitsinconsistency.11Allcoefficients,asperAppendix7.4(i),aresignificant,againwiththeexceptionofclimatechangeperformanceandreadinessforclimatechange.


andH2(a):Stabilityhasamitigatingeffectonideology’srelationshipwithclimatechange

skepticism.12Thez-statistic,reflectingtheaveragenumberofstandarddeviations

neoliberalismisawayfromitsmean,is-3.77.Weinferthatthereisaminorinteractive

effectofneoliberalismonideologyasitpertainstoclimatechangescepticism,yetonethat

isstatisticallysignificant,andthuswecanrejectthenullhypothesisandconfirmthetenets

ofhypothesis2(b).13

4.4.3Visualisations

Figure2:MarginsEffectsPlotforIdeology/NeoliberalismonClimateChangeScepticism

12Itshouldbenotedthatthenon-interactivecoefficients,asperAppendix7.4(ii),are0.321forstability,and0.061forideology.Again,ideologyisnowpositiveratherthannegativeasitwasin§4.3.ThishasnobearingonH2(b),despiteitsinconsistency.13Allcoefficients,asperAppendix7.4(ii),aresignificant,againwiththeexceptionofclimatechangeperformanceandreadinessforclimatechange.


Figure3:MarginsEffectsPlotforIdeology/StabilityonClimateChangeScepticism


5.0Discussion

Aclearstoryemergesfromtheseresults.Withregardstoneoliberalism,wefindthatthere

isacausalrelationshipwherebymorecapitalist,free-marketsocietiesengenderapublic

morescepticaltothescienceofanthropogenicclimatechange.Thestudyalsoconfirmsthat

thefindingsdonebyMcCright&DunlapintheUnitedStatesaretransferable,namelythat

ideologyhasacleareffectonscepticisminEurope,albeitamoremutedone.Interestingly,

however,itfindsthatdespitethesuccessfulconclusionsgeneratedfromthefirsttwo

hypotheses(regardingneoliberalismandideology,asdetailedabove),theinteractiveeffect

ofneoliberalismonideology’seffectonclimatechangescepticismisnegative:as

neoliberalismisappliedinincreasingvalue,ideologyplayslessofaroleinpredicting

scepticism.Furtherresearchonthiswouldbeinteresting;itcouldbeonaccountofEurope’s

politicsbeinglesspartisan,indicatingalowercorrelationbetweenneoliberalismandwider

ideology.Asitconcernsgovernancestabilityandefficacy,bothourhypotheses–2(a)&2(b)

–havehadtheirnullrejected.Stabilityingovernmenthasbeenshowntodecreaseclimate

changescepticism,anditsinteractiveeffectonideologyhasbeentomutethe

ideology/climatechangerelationshipfurther.Itwouldbeinterestingtoseewhethera

similarresearchmodel,whenappliedtotheUnitedStates,wouldyieldthesameresults.As

alludedtoearlier,greaterstability,alongwithfinancialsecurity,couldhavetheeffectof

psychologicallybarricadingoneofffromtheproblem,ratherthanallowingonethe

breathingspacetotackleit.TheideologicalpartisanshipthatisinviewintheUnitedStates

wouldmakethisdelineationbetweenattitudespresumablymorestark.

Thelinkbetweenthehypothesesregardingneoliberalismandthoseregardinggovernment

stabilityandeffectivenessisplaintosee.Ifwecantransitiontoamoreregulated,less

capitalistmindedsociety,theimplicationswillbesevere.Willsocietiesthatarenolonger

achievingthesamefinancialgrowththatneoliberalismhasunleashedinthepastfour

decadesberesponsivetoashiftinsocio-economicpractice?Onefearsthatiftheydonot,

thestabilityofthegivengovernment,itsrobustnessandefficacy,willcraterinthefallout.

However,previousresearch(Norgaard,2011)suggestsourcurrentlifestyleparadigmisnot

entirelytoblameforthisimpasse.Greedisnotthesolereasonwhyscepticismabounds;

thereareanumberofpsychologicalfactorsthatalsoaccentuateourapathy.Fear,guilt,a


senseofhopelessness,theyalladdtotheclamourthatthedemographics–age,education,

race,ideology,etc.–populate,aswell.Thereisaclearlinkbetweenideologyand

psychology,thelatterinformingtheformer.Theconclusionsofthelasthypothesissuggest

thatstablegovernanceaccentuatestheeffectofaprogressiveconstituencyinpredicting

lowlevelsofscepticism,inpartbecause–assaidearlier–itprovidesaneconomicbuffer

andgreatersocialsecurityinwhichtheissuecanbepsychologicallyapproachedandsolved.

This,however,requiresaleftleaning,non-neoliberalideology.Similarly,stablegovernance

couldbeusedtoaccentuateneoliberalismitself,ifthesocietyisalreadyright-wing;itwill

acttoprovideaneconomicbufferandgreatersocialsecuritywhichinsteadwill

psychologicallyblindtheconstituency.

Furtherstudieswouldbewelcomeintheattempttoclearlydelineatethelinesand

interactionsbetweenideologyandpsychologyasitpertainstoclimatechangescepticism;

governmentstabilityisjustoneproxybywhichwecanestimateit.Amorerefined

methodologyrepletewithensuingdatasetsquantitativelymeasuringpsychologicalfactors

wouldbeaboon.Atpresent,verylittleresearchhasbeendonetoassessthiswithrespect

topubicopiniononclimatechange,andawidemajorityofthishasbeenqualitativerather

thanquantitative.Forexample,theeffectofreligion–insomecaseswiththeinherent

beliefthatitishumandestinyto‘master’nature–wouldbeanintriguingavenuetogo

down.Similarly,theeffectofcentrists,whomaybeconsideredtobetoolukewarmonthe

subjecttodeploythesortofurgencythatthescienceoftheissuesuggests,andthusbolster

theoveralleffectofthesceptics,wouldalsobefascinating.Furthermore,thedatasetused

forthisdissertation,the8throundoftheEuropeanSocialSurvey,isthefirstofitskindto

includeaquestionnaireexploringpublicattitudestoclimatechange.Asecondsurvey,or

more,wouldbehelpfulinunderstandingthetemporalperspectiveofclimatechange

scepticism.

Thelimitationsoftheresearchalsoextendstothesheergravityofstudiesdoneonthe

UnitedStatesattheexclusionofallelse.DuetotheUnitedStates’brazenexamplesofACC

denial,theyhavetendedtoattractthelion’sshareofthespotlight.Thestudiesdoneonthe

subjectregardingEuropehavebeennarrowedtonationalstudies,ratherthanperspectives

ontheblocasawhole;theresearchdoneontheoutlookofthethirdworldisevenmore


disheartening.Finally,withregardstotheaggregate,countryleveldata,theoftcriticised

WorldGovernanceIndicatorsusedtocomposetheGovernance/Stabilityindicatorinthis

thesiscouldalsouserefining.Commonobjectionshavebeenthattheyarearbitrary,non-

reproducible,composedwithhiddenbiases,lackinginconceptualclarity,overlycomplex,

andnon-temporal.Itisunderstoodthatgovernance,likemostfacetsofpolitics,isahighly

subjectiveproponent,yetindependentofthiswerecognisetheconclusionsgeneratedfrom

H2(a)andH2(b)willonlygosofarasthesolidityoftheindicatorswillallow.

Ingeneral,theconclusionofthisarticleisthatclimatechangescepticismisnotfully

understoodandrequiresmoreresearchacrosstheboard.Ithasbeenfoundthat

anthropogenicclimatechangescepticismhasfluctuatedinthepastthirtyyearsunderthe

influenceofnumberofdifferentfactors,yetthroughoutthegapbetweentheseverityofthe

problemandthelackofpublicsaliencehasbeendiscerniblethroughout,allacrossthe

Westernhemisphere.Asaresult,nonationisfullypreparedtoeithermitigateclimate

change’seffectssocially,economicallyorpolitically,orevendiscussitontruefacevalue.It

isonlywiththesupportofanenlightenedandunbiasedpublicthattheproblemcanbe

addressed.


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7.0Appendices

7.1:PrimaryVariableStatisticsDistributionStatistics

VARIABLES Range Relationship Mean SD

Climatechangescepticism 0-5 Inverse 3.42 0.80Yearsoffulltimeeducationcompleted 0-54 Normal 13.04 3.85Ideology(LefttoRight) 0-10 Normal 5.16 2.24Age 15-100 Normal 49.14 18.61Neoliberalism 0-100 Normal 71.64 6.50Qualityofeducation 0-1 Normal 0.86 0.04Stability 0-5 Normal 3.61 0.57Climatechangeperformance 0-100 Normal 53.81 11.09Readinessforclimatechange 0-100 Normal 65.80 4.52


7.2:CorrelationsAggregateLevelCorrelations

(1) Variables ccnthum Neoliberalism QualEdu Stability CCPerf. Neoliberalism -0.0562*** 1 QualEdu -0.0849*** 0.755*** 1 Stability 0.0269*** 0.759*** 0.528*** 1 CCPerformance 0.0217*** 0.288*** 0.128*** 0.570*** 1ReadinesstoCC 0.0118* 0.528*** 0.472*** 0.772*** 0.527***

*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001EducationLeverCorrelations

(1)Variables eduyrs eduyrs 1QualEdu 0.174***

*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001


7.3:RegressionsEducationLeverVariableRegression (1)VARIABLES Model1 Yearsoffull-timeeducationcompleted 0.0163***

(0.000876)

QualityofEducation -0.347***

(0.0857)

Constant 3.565***

(0.0730)

Observations 42,913R-squared 0.008Standarderrorsinparentheses

***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1


7.4:RandomIntercepts/RandomSlopesModels

(i)Neoliberalism/Ideology

(1)VARIABLES Model1


(2.4*10-4)

Household'stotalnetincome,allsources 4.2*10-4***

(1.6*10-4)


(0.001)

Placementonleftrightscale 0.084*

(0.046)

Neoliberalism -0.012*

(0.007)

c.lrscale#c.Neoliberalism -0.002**

(0.001)

QualityofEducation -1.625*

(0.867)

Stability 0.281***

(0.088)

CCPerformance -0.002

(0.003)

ReadinesstoCC 0.008

(0.008)

Constant 4.375***

(0.552)

Standarddeviation-Slope 0.017Standarddeviation-Intercept 0.092Observations 33,741Numberofgroups 21Standarderrorsinparentheses

***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1


(ii)Governance(Stability)/Ideology

(1)VARIABLES Model1 Ageofrespondent,calculated -0.004***

(2.4*10-4)

Household'stotalnetincome,allsources 4.3*10-4***

(1.6*10-4)


(0.001)

Placementonleftrightscale 0.061***

(0.024)

Stability 0.321***

(0.086)

c.lrscale#c.Stability -0.024***

(0.006)

QualityofEducation -1.666**

(0.842)

Neoliberalism -0.013**

(0.007)

CCPerformance -0.002

(0.003)

ReadinesstoCC 0.007

(0.008)

Constant 4.475***

(0.536)

Standarddeviation-Slope 0.014Standarddeviation-Intercept 0.089Observations 33,741Numberofgroups 21Standarderrorsinparentheses

***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1

thesis - ddd.uab.cat · cooke, b.m. ⏐ examining the gears of climate change scepticism (2018) 5...

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