Thinking About Centralization, Politicization, and Bureaucratic Control

Andrew RudalevigeDept. of Political Science

Dickinson College

Presidential Power-lessness Neustadt (1990)

“Presidential weakness was the underlying theme [in 1960]…. Weakness is still what I see.”

Moe (1985) So… what can

presidents do to help themselves?

Politicization Centralization

Defining Terms Centralization

Shift of function from staff units further from the president (in departments) to those closer (in the EOP)

“centralized” are those whose only constituent is the president himself

Normally, organizationally proximate to the president

Defining Terms Politicization

putting the appointment power to “systematic use” in “infiltrating the bureaucracy as a means of promoting political responsiveness” (Moe)

Politicization:Real Loyalty, Texas-style

“I want real loyalty. I want someone who will kiss my ass in Macy’s window and stand up and say, ‘Boy, wasn’t that sweet!’”

Caro 2002, 129

Contextualizing Presidential Choice

Does President Want to Act?

No:No Centralization or Politicization

Yes

AdministrativeAction

StatutoryAction

White House Dept/Agency White House Dept/Agency

Congress Interest GroupsCongress Interest Groups

Centralization and Politicization: So Happy Together?

Moe’s implied logic: do everything at once, until “congruence” with presidential incentives and resources is reached. Presidents “readily embrace

politicization and centralization because they have no attractive alternatives.”

There are costs associated with each: given fixed managerial budget, president can only afford so much of each Centralization

The Ollie North effect (monitoring); Political costs (especially decline of success in

Congress); Loss of EOP administrative efficiency (Krause

2004)

Politicization Difficulty of finding appropriate appointees Competence costs Political costs

Instead: Exchanging Complements?

So - if centralization and politicization are substitutes - are there conditions under which presidents will choose one strategy over the other? And, if they occur in different policy

areas, but simultaneously, could they be substitutes but look like complements?

And, could they occur sequentially? cf. Bush II Department of Education

1 2 3 40

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

1.2

1.4

1.6

1.8

2

Values by Year of Term

% political SES

% political appts (x10)

Centralization

Perc

enta

ge

Inde

x of

Cen

traliz

atio

n

0 1 2 3

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

Impact of Selected Variables on Centralization

Pol pct SES

Manage

New

Distance from Rules

Complex

Level of Centralization

Pct I

mpa

ct, S

hift

from

10t

h to

90t

h Pe

rcen

tile

Total Appointee Percentage

0

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

0.25

0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.55 0.65 0.75 0.85 0.95 1.05 1.15

Percent Employees Appointed

Prob

abili

ty P

ropo

sal F

orm

ulat

ion

Com

plet

ely

Cen

traliz

ed

Unified Government Divided Government

Senate-confirmed Appointee Percentage

0

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

0.25

0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.55 0.65Percent Appointed

Prob

abili

ty P

ropo

sal F

orm

ulat

ion

Com

plet

ely

Cen

traliz

ed

Unified Government Divided Government

Percentage SES Appointed

0

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

0.25

0.3

0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.45

Percent Appointed

Prob

abili

ty P

ropo

sal F

orm

ulat

ion

Com

plet

ely

Cen

traliz

ed

Unified Government Divided Government

Ramifications Need to think about relationship

and tradeoffs between policymaking choices: what does an appointment “buy” you?

The notion of “bureaucratic control” itself: brings our focus to earlier stage of bureaucratic involvement in policy

Other things to think about Is politicization necessarily prior,

and exogenous, to centralization? Use of simultaneous equation models

Control for policy areas or types of agencies?