Synthese (2011) 179:75–91DOI 10.1007/s11229-009-9629-2

Thinking “difference” differently: Cassirer versusDerrida on symbolic mediation

Aud Sissel Hoel

Received: 17 November 2008 / Accepted: 7 March 2009 / Published online: 31 July 2009© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Abstract Cassirer’s approach to symbolic mediation differs in some importantways from currently prevailing approaches to meaning and signification such assemiology and its more recent poststructuralist varieties. Cassirer’s philosophy ofsymbolic forms offers a theory of symbols that does not amount to a sign theoryor semiology. It sketches out, rather, a dynamic and nonrepresentational frameworkin which an alternative notion of difference takes centre stage. In order to make theoriginal features of Cassirer’s approach stand out, I will compare it with the approachof the perhaps most influential differential thinker of our day, Jacques Derrida. Thephilosophy of symbolic forms explicitly prefigures a great many of the insights andconcerns of poststructuralism. Yet, there are some critical differences. Rather thanrejecting the concepts of objectivity, identity, and truth on the premises establishedby traditional metaphysics, Cassirer chooses to redefine these concepts through aradical conceptual reframing. The result is a doctrine that—in Derridean parlance—neither jumps beyond the oppositions of metaphysics, nor tries to resolve them in aHegelian synthesis—a doctrine, that is, that even though it appeals to origins,cannot so easily be dismissed as yet another instantiation of the metaphysics ofpresence.

Keywords Mediation · Symbols · Expression · Symbolic forms · Language ·Différance · Universal and particular · Articulation · Concept and intuition ·Intelligible and sensible

A. S. Hoel (B)Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norwaye-mail: aud.sissel.hoel@hf.ntnu.no

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1 Introduction

Today, it is a common understanding that symbols and signs are central to culturalprocesses. In Ernst Cassirer’s time, however, this was not the case. So, if we takeCassirer’s pioneering insistence on the indispensability of symbols into consideration,he can rightfully be regarded as having presaged modern cultural studies. In this arti-cle, however, I am not going to rehearse these historical continuities. Instead, I willpoint out some important ways that Cassirer’s approach to symbolic mediation differsfrom the currently prevailing approaches to meaning and signification, that is, fromsemiology and its more recent poststructuralist varieties. Indeed, my objective is tomake a case for Cassirer in the present situation, in which the hegemonic position ofpoststructuralism is on the wane.

What makes Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms relevant today is that it offers atheory of symbols that does not amount to a “sign theory” or “semiology”. It sketchesout, rather, a dynamic and nonrepresentational framework in which an alternativenotion of “difference” takes centre stage. In order to make the original features ofCassirer’s approach stand out, I will compare it with the approach of the perhaps mostinfluential differential thinker of our day, Jacques Derrida.

The philosophy of symbolic forms explicitly prefigures a great many of the insightsand concerns of poststructuralism. Cassirer too insists on the indispensability of mate-rial symbols, as well as the impossibility of escaping the circle of historically con-stituted symbolic forms. He too advances critiques of dogmatic ontology, of intuitiveknowledge, of monadic philosophies of the subject, and of approaches advocating thepure immediacy of “life”. Yet, there are some critical differences, and these differ-ences can be summed up as follows: Cassirer never places himself in an antiposition.He refuses to give up the classic concerns with objectivity, identity, and truth. Eventhough he acknowledges the irreducibly relative and contingent element in all kindsof meaning and knowledge formation, he never succumbs to relativism, scepticism,or to the current trend: antiessentialism. He reminds us, instead, that a strategy thatgoes from one extreme to the other, say, from transparency to opacity, from visionto blindness, from presence to absence, from identity to difference, will never solvethe underlying problem. Rather than rejecting the concepts of objectivity, identity,and truth on the premises established by traditional metaphysics, Cassirer chooses toredefine these concepts through a radical conceptual reframing. The result is a doctrinethat—in Derridean parlance—neither jumps beyond the oppositions of metaphysics,nor tries to resolve them in a Hegelian synthesis—a doctrine, that is, that even thoughit appeals to origins, cannot so easily be dismissed as yet another instantiation of themetaphysics of presence.

2 Negative and positive notions of originary difference

A thinker like Derrida, who takes the very possibility of “moving on” from metaphysicsas a chief problem, would voice suspicion over Cassirer’s reframing endeavours. Since,according to Derrida, the traditional concepts belong to the system that generated them,

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“every particular borrowing brings along with it the whole of metaphysics”.1 This isthe case even for thinkers who strive to overturn metaphysics. At the very momenta critic denounces a system, he accepts into his discourse the same premises of thesystem he rejects. This mechanism of simultaneous rejection and confirmation works,again according to Derrida, by necessity, and there is no way to escape it.

This view of the matter is much in line with the picture drawn by Richard Rortythrough his macro-historical distinction between “systematic” and “edifying” philos-ophy. Systematic philosophy is “normal” philosophy, that is, epistemology, which ischaracterized by its search for objective truth. Edifying philosophy, on the other hand,is characterized by its protest against the pretentions and overconfidence of systematicphilosophy. The latter category, therefore, comprises movements of thought that areessentially reactive, that is, intellectual movements that are “parasitic” in nature and“has point only in opposition to the tradition”.2 For this reason edifying philosophers,among whom Rorty counts Derrida, tend to “decry the very notion of having a view”.3

In Derrida’s and Rorty’s view, then, any attempt at crawling out from under theinherited system of metaphysics would lead to nothing but self-deception. Yet, if weare to follow Derrida, there are better and worse ways of not escaping metaphysics.This, of course, is where the strategy of deconstruction enters the picture. Deconstruc-tion, as conceived by Derrida, involves a double gesture. The first phase consists inan overturning of the binary oppositions of metaphysics, say, by privileging writingover speech. But as Derrida himself pointed out, simple overturnings alone do notsuffice, since they operate from within the terrain of the system they denounce andthus end up confirming it. The second phase, therefore, consists of an undermining ordestabilization of the oppositions in question, either by demonstrating the impurity ofthe privileged term, say, by pointing to the “writing” within speech, or by disorganiz-ing the field by introducing “indecidables” that cannot be contained within the givenbinary oppositions.4

Like Rorty, Derrida is leery of the ocular metaphors that set the problems of Westernthinking and continue to permeate mainstream philosophical discourse. He rejects theprivilege ascribed to intuition by tradition, as well as the privilege accorded to percep-tion by phenomenology. Yet, his approach is not merely reactive. Derrida introduces ahighly productive notion of an originary difference, termed “différance”, “arche-writ-ing”, or “trace”, that is not to be regarded as the simple opposite of the metaphysicalnotion of “identity”. Rather, différance is understood to be “the non-full, non-simple,structured and differentiating origin of differences”.5 Despite this seminal acquisition,the main thrust of Derrida’s treatment remains reactive in that he tends to emphasize thenegative consequences of this insight, as measured against the metaphysical standard

1 Derrida (1978, p. 281).2 Rorty (1980, p. 366).3 Rorty (1980, p. 371).4 Derrida (2004, pp. 39–40).5 Derrida (1982, p. 11). However, since originary difference is a non-simple and differentiating origin, “thename ‘origin’ no longer suits it” (Derrida 1982, p. 11).

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of identity.6 In other words, he tends to emphasize the ways that the differential playconstantly disappoints and frustrates our referential ambitions.

Like Derrida, Cassirer claims there to be constitutive differential structures—the symbolic forms—at work in the midst of human meaning formation. But theconclusions he draws from this observation are very different from Derrida’s. Cas-sirer operates from a different set of basic assumptions. He does not set out to over-turn metaphysics, and his strategy is not one of deconstruction. For this reason, henever resorts to the iconoclastic gestures used by Rorty and Derrida.7 Cassirer’swritings are replete with visual metaphors. Rather than renouncing intuition alto-gether, he introduces another kind of “vision” that is no longer to be seen as theopposite of discursivity. Rather than simply replacing referral with deferral, he intro-duces a new concept of identity that in fact requires the intervention of “foreign”formative principles. By putting symbol, concept, and intuition into a new and hith-erto unheard of constellation, he opens the way for a positive notion of originarydifference.

3 Essence and symbol

Cassirer’s fresh take on the problem of symbolic mediation is due to the way that hestrikes to the core of the problem: tradition’s definition of the symbolic in terms ofsubstitution and thus as something external to identity or essence.

The traditional way of framing the problem of knowledge invokes the notion ofa perfect or divine intellect, which is able to present “originals” or “things in them-selves”. Immanuel Kant famously contrasts this divine or “archetypal” intellect tohuman understanding, which is characterized by its limited and finite nature. In con-tradistinction to the pure vision or intuition of the archetypal intellect, the humanintellect is claimed to be “discursive” and dependent on “images” or bodily percep-tions.8 As pointed out by Cassirer, Kant believed he had mastered the idea of pureintuition by defining it as a mere borderline concept.9 This move does not suffice, how-ever, if we are to make a positive account of the formative achievements of the humanintellect. For in this way Kant retains the idea of a self-identical, self-sufficient, andpre-existing object of knowledge—even if only as a negative standard towards whichwe strive in vain. Human understanding is thus determined negatively through what itlacks, through the ways that it is not able to meet the divine standard of pure intuition.Even Kant, then, who was the first thinker to truly acknowledge the formative powersof the human intellect, seems to focus chiefly on the negative consequences of thisinsight. That is, he tends to focus on the way that the “thing in itself” forever willremain out of our reach, rather than on the insight’s positive side, namely that “the

6 It remains negative, despite the fact that Derrida affirms these consequences rather than lamenting them(Derrida 1978, p. 292).7 Rorty, for instance, urges us to “get the visual, and in particular the mirroring, metaphors out of ourspeech altogether”. He finds support in Derrida’s writings, which he characterizes as “meditations on howto avoid these metaphors” (Rorty 1980, p. 371).8 Kant (1987, pp. 292–293; Sect. 77).9 Cassirer (1955, pp. 112–113).

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genuine objectivity of knowledge is based and guaranteed in the free spontaneity ofthe spirit”.10 If we, like Cassirer, are to follow this latter line of thought, we have torecognize that the very notion of a “thing in itself” is a “fallacy in formulation, anintellectual phantasm”11 that precludes an adequate understanding of the processesinvolved in knowledge and meaning formation.

In addition, and even more pressing in the context of this article, Kant’s antithesisbetween the archetypal and the discursive intellect does not leave room for a positiveaccount of the formative power of symbols. Cassirer puts it thus: “From the stand-point of this antithesis it would seem to follow that the richer the symbolic content ofcognition or of any other cultural form becomes, the more its essential content mustdiminish.”12 This is to say that the divine standard of pure intuition introduces a scalefor which the infinitely deferred endpoint would be the complete coincidence with theobject. A perfect medium, then, would be a medium that transcends itself or effacesitself in front of the object and thus permits a true communion with it. The result is,again to borrow a term from Derrida, an “onto-theological” notion of mediation againstwhich particular symbols could be valued according to their degree of “presence”.13

The formative power of symbols, then, is conceived of as something that removesus from the primal source of being, as something that cloaks and conceals the trueessence of things more than it unveils it.14

As we can see from the above, the problem of symbolic mediation touches on funda-mental philosophical questions concerning identity and truth. According to the tradi-tional account, essences are conceived of as self-identical, immaterial, and atemporalgivens, compared to which any material symbol would always emerge as derivativeand secondary. Cassirer, on the other hand, insists that symbols partake in the veryconstitution of the object as an object. Approached from its positive side, this thesisis indeed radical and rich in its implications.

4 Symbolic function and symbolic forms

Whereas Rorty enlists Kant among the “mainstream philosophers” who approach theproblem of knowledge and meaning in terms of mirroring, Cassirer contrarily empha-sizes those aspects of Kant’s thought that break with this line of thinking. In Cassirer’saccount, Kant brought to theoretical philosophy a “revolution in method” by virtueof the way that he reconceived the relation between cognition and object as generally

10 “Selbst bei Kant schien der Schwerpunkt der Lehre mehr in dem, was sie als negative Konsequenzin sich schloß, als in ihrer neuen positiven Grundeinsicht zu ruhen. Als Kern seines Gedankens erschiennicht sowohl der Nachweis, wie die echte Objektivität der Erkenntnis in der freien Spontaneität des Geistesbegründet und in ihr gesichert sei, als vielmehr die Lehre von der Unerkennbarkeit des ‘Dinges an sich’”(Cassirer 1956, pp. 184–185).11 Cassirer (1955, p. 111).12 Cassirer (1955, p. 113).13 Writing, for instance—conceived as it traditionally is as a “mediation of mediation”—would, when val-ued on the basis of this standard, be understood to involve a “fall into the exteriority of meaning” (Derrida1997, p. 13).14 Cassirer (1955, pp. 112–113).

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understood until then. Rather than starting from the object as given, Kant began withthe law of cognition. This move amounted to a break with traditional identity phi-losophy, since it allowed him to replace the “postulate of a unity of substance andorigin” with a “purely functional unity”.15 The cognitive function is thus accorded aprimacy over the object. As a result, human cognition is allotted original formative orconstitutive powers.

Kant does not, however, realize to the full the positive implications of this insightinto the primacy of the function over the object. For one, he continues to talk aboutknowledge and determination in terms of “subsumption”. Moreover, focusing as hedoes on the negative consequences, he is compelled to postulate a fixed set of privi-leged forms, the so-called “categories”. Whereas Kant conceives of the categories asthe pure forms of cognition itself, Cassirer identifies the constitutive powers of under-standing with the human capacity for using symbols. The cognitive function of Kantis thus replaced by a more general “symbolic function”, and Kant’s critique of purereason is transformed into a critique of culture. So, while Kant envisioned a uniformdirection for every genuine process of determination, the symbolic function of Cassir-er splits into a variety of particular “symbolic forms”. Each and every symbolic formis understood to take its own specific direction and thus to allow for its own particularregion of thought. Along with the function of scientific thinking, then, we find otherfunctions, such as the functions of linguistic thinking, mythical and religious thinking,and artistic perception.16 And in each and every field the principle of the primacy offunction over the object assumes a new form and requires a new explanation.17

From Kant’s perspective, for the categories to be able to perform their determinativefunction, they must be conceived of as self-thought first principles. That determina-tive principles could be derived from experience would, of course, be unthinkable.But Kant also rejects a third possibility, a “middle course” that would involve princi-ples being “implanted in us” by a creator. In Kant’s view, admitting such implantedprinciples would only be to give the sceptic exactly what he most desires.18 Cassirer’ssymbolic forms are historically constituted and thus not universal and necessary in theKantian sense. In fact, they come close to Kant’s implanted principles, except for thefact that they are implanted by human beings themselves, which, again in Kant’s view,would render their epistemic value even more questionable. Cassirer, however, insistson the epistemic value of the symbolic forms. The reason why this “third course” ofCassirer’s emerges as a possible position at all has to do with the way that he reframesthe very problem of the one and the many, that is, the problem of how to conceive ofthe relation between the intelligible and the sensible, between the universal and theparticular, between concept and intuition. And Cassirer’s most original contributionturns precisely on the role that he ascribes to symbols when it comes to correlatingthese allegedly heterogeneous and incommensurable factors.

15 Cassirer (1955, p. 77).16 For some reason Cassirer here switches to “perception” when he mentions the symbolic function asinstantiated in art (Cassirer 1955, p. 79).17 Cassirer (1955, p. 79).18 Kant (1929, pp. 174–175; B167–168).

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To Cassirer, being “symbolic” always implies being more than something merelymaterial. Moreover, the “spiritual”, “logical”, or “ideal” aspect of the symbolic isalways expressed in and through something sensory. This should not, however, betaken in the representational sense, as a material sign “standing for” immaterial con-tent. Rather, Cassirer conceives of the relation between the sensible and the intelligibleaspects of the symbolic as an inner relation, that is, as interwoven in a way that cannotbe accounted for in terms of the binary oppositions of the metaphysical tradition. Thesame is true of the way that he conceives of the relation between the universal andthe particular. In Cassirer’s view, the fundamental principle of cognition is “that theuniversal can be perceived only in the particular, while the particular can be thoughtonly in reference to the universal”.19

Kant, too, goes very far when it comes to integrating the sensible and the intelligi-ble. The whole of his doctrine, however, is predicated on the basic heterogeneousnessand incommensurability of these factors, which are assumed at the outset by the waythat Kant states the problem of cognition in terms of the “two stems” of sensibilityand understanding.20 Cassirer’s notion of symbolic form is designed to transcend thisopposition, and the result is a reconceived notion of conceptuality that incorporates theintuitive factor. Thus conceived, the intuitive is no longer the “other” of the discursive,and the notion of symbolic form comes to designate a “mode of seeing”, a specificconstitutive “sight”:

Each of the different kinds of “seeing” define by themselves their own order ofthe “seen,” whereby the seen and the viewpoint, the perceived and the ideated,the “present” and the “representative” can always be shown as one in the other,in correlative connection, interwoven with one another.21

A particular symbolic form establishes a specific context of meaning; it opens a specificideal horizon for possible determinations, a particular order of objectivity. Cassirer’ssymbolic forms, then, are both necessary and contingent, both infinite and finite. Evenif implanted, a particular symbolic form provides a constitutive viewpoint or measurethat makes the ideation as well as the particularization of phenomena possible. It isinfinite in the sense that it potentially comprises everything, yet finite in that it alwaysapproaches phenomena from a particular perspective.

5 Dimensions of meaning: expression and exposition

Like Kant, Cassirer is critical of empiricist explanations of perception in terms of“dead” sense impressions, which—considered by themselves—are fundamentallyalien to meaning. We need to recognize that this “unmeaningness” of sensations isa “mere fiction of psychological thinking”.22 As sensory experience, perception isalways formed perception, which is to say that it is always already meaningful. But

19 Cassirer (1955, p. 86).20 Kant (1929, p. 61; A15/B29).21 Cassirer (1996, p. 51).22 Cassirer (1957, p. 195).

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just as perception cannot be explained by reference to a “purely quantitative accumu-lation or associative combination of perceptive images,” it neither can be explainedby a “reduction to purely discursive acts of judgments and inference”.23 Accordingto Cassirer, perceptual meaning is a “living totality”. And in order to account for it,one needs to probe into a level of meaning not found in Kant—a “lower” level thatCassirer refers to as the “world of expressions”.

Cassirer distinguishes between different modalities of meaning. “Expression”(Ausdruck), which is regarded as the most basic modality, points to the fact that percep-tion always comes pregnant with meaning. By virtue of its own immanent organization,perception takes on a certain nonintuitive meaning, a kind of spiritual or intelligentorganization. This is to say that perceptual phenomena always come as inscribed intosome context of meaning. Expression is, in Cassirer’s view, a “phenomenon of life”,which is to say that humans participate in it by virtue of being living creatures. In hisdiscussion of Jakob von Uexküll, for instance, he comes close to Merleau-Ponteanideas of embodiment.24 Cassirer distributes the phenomenon of expression among theliving in a rather generous manner:

The phenomenon of expression seems to be a genuine primary phenomenon oflife that extends down to its lowest grades and levels. Even the plant kingdomseems to participate in a way in this phenomenon.25

According to Cassirer, then, expression is to be regarded as a primary phenomenon. Itis only in and through expression that the world of meaning and significance is openedfor us.

As far as human beings are concerned, Cassirer’s insistence on expression as a phe-nomenon of life should not mislead us into conceiving of it as a “natural meaning”,that is, as an “essential” meaning that is given before, beneath, and thus independentof symbolic formation. To avoid this implication, Cassirer is reluctant to put too muchemphasis on the part played by the body in human meaning formation.26 In the humanworld there is no such thing as “pure” expression. What we perceive is always alreadytransformed and articulated by some symbolic form or another, which is to say that tohumans, “pregnance” is always already a “symbolic pregnance”.27

These symbolic transformations attest to the workings of a second modality thatCassirer refers to as the “expositive function” (Darstellungsfunktion),28 and for which

23 Cassirer (1957, p. 202).24 Cassirer (1996, pp. 42–45). In fact, Cassirer’s notion of expression seems to have influenced Merleau-Ponty’s approach to perception. In Merleau-Ponty’s seminal Phenomenology of Perception, for instance,there are numerous references to Cassirer’s works.25 Cassirer (1996, p. 39).26 “The concept of mankind is defined for it not by any specific, identifiable structural features, but throughthe comprehensive totality of mankind’s achievements. The totality of these achievements can in no waysimply be read off from mankind’s “organization”, such as from the organization of the brain and the nervoussystem” (Cassirer 1996, p. 43).27 For a discussion of symbolic pregnance, see Cassirer (1957, pp. 191–204).28 Cassirer also introduces a third modality called “pure significance” (reine Bedeutung) that I will notdiscuss in the context of this article. For a brief presentation of the three modalities, see Cassirer (2004,pp. 259–264).

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the workings of language are the most obvious example. Human significance tran-scends expression in that it always involves some kind of productive setting of thephenomenon. In fact, Cassirer maintains that the expositive function brings objectsinto being in the sense that it transforms the phenomenon into a recognizable entityand inscribes it into an ideal context that points beyond the situation here and now.The expositive function introduces a “logical factor”, and this logical factor is, in Cas-sirer’s account, the “Open Sesame” of the characteristic human realm of meaning: ofthe cultural worlds of language, art, myth, religion, and science, as well as of the idealworlds of significations, conceptualizations, determinations, formalizations, theories,models, facts, and fictions. Human existence, then, is characterized by the way thatit continuously transcends its biological starting point and thus removes itself froma mere natural existence. Human significance, therefore, cannot be reduced to theexpressive factor alone.

Even if deemed constitutive, the symbols that are introduced by the expositive func-tion do not, in Cassirer’s view, create their significations out of nothing. As pointed outby Merleau-Ponty (with explicit reference to Cassirer), the expositive function “restson a certain groundwork”.29 Meaning, even if unspecified and fleeting, is alwaysalready there, in and through the phenomenon of expression. In the human world ofmeaning, however, symbolical exposition is just as primary. Human expressions arealways already symbolically transformed and articulated. So, just as significance can-not be derived from or dissolved in expression, expression cannot be derived from ordissolved in significance. Human meaning, then, is always already “double” and can-not be contained within the traditional opposition between “nature” and “culture”.30

It is always and irreducibly both (and thus neither).The implication of this is that humans are forever cast out from the “paradise”

that is characteristic of a purely organic life and being.31 Cassirer does not, however,lament this debarment. Rather, he conceives of it in terms of a liberation from organicbarriers. Besides, even though he appeals to “origins” (human signification is madepossible by and thus in a sense “originates” from expression), he does not conceive ofthis origin as a source of “truth”. On the contrary, it is only through the enunciatingfocus introduced by the various symbolic forms that meaning comes into itself. Forthis reason, there is no use seeking or longing for a “true” meaning before or beneaththe circle of symbols. If it were possible to step outside of the circle of mediations(which it is not, in Cassirer’s view), one would not find “true life”, a true human

29 “It is true that the ‘symbolic function’ or the ‘representative function’ underlies our movements, butit is not a final term for analysis. It too rests on a certain groundwork. The mistake of intellectualism isto make it self-subsistent, to remove it from the stuff in which it is realized, and to recognize in us, as anon-derivative entity, an undistanced presence in the world” (Merleau-Ponty 1962, p. 124).30 “But although the sensuous character of expression and the logical factor of signification cannot beseparated in the actual reality of language, the purely functional difference between them remains unmistak-able. Any attempt to dissolve expression in signification or to derive one from the other genetically remainsin vain” (Cassirer 1957, p. 111).31 (Cassirer 1985, p. 73) and Cassirer (1996, p. 45).

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existence in its unutterable richness and fullness. One would find, rather, the dull andnarrow world of a purely sensuous existence.32

6 Cassirer’s deictic notion of language

What is meant, then, by symbolic forms being “originary” and “constitutive”? In whatsense do the symbolic forms bring the object into existence? In this context the term“existence” is taken in the meaning of “the stepping out or stepping forward from theflowing constant series of appearances”.33 This is to say that the symbolic forms workas constitutive “indicators” or “signposts”. The function of naming, for instance, isexemplary in this respect. In naming a phenomenon, it emerges as something identicaland persisting. The name serves as a “‘centre’ of objectivity, in which all changingexistence is drawn together and to which it is related”.34

The view of language that follows from this approach breaks markedly with theviews associated with identity philosophy. In Cassirer’s account, the function of lan-guage is no longer understood in terms of copying or representation but rather in termsof articulation and focus:

Not by shining its light evenly on all parts of the perceptual world, but by collect-ing it in certain focal points, language creates a “centering,” an organization ofthis world. Whatever falls in this way under the beam of language emerges as agestalt from a relatively undetermined background. This distribution of accentsand the partitioning off of a “foreground” and a “background” provide the intel-lectual articulation of the world as we represent it, and of which the spokenarticulation is only an outer expression.35

Not very surprisingly, scepticism has followed the representational accounts of lan-guage like a shadow.36 Measured against the divine standard of pure intuition, languageappears as a defective instrument of knowledge. And, as a consequence, the criticsof language have tended to pay attention to all the possible ways that language failsto represent. Empiricist approaches, for instance—which Cassirer criticizes explic-itly—regard it as a deficiency that language cannot represent reality in its individualfullness. Language has only a limited amount of names at its disposal, and in theplace of the rich and endlessly diversified perceptual contents it provides nothing butmeagre general terms. As shown in the quote above, however, this alleged deficiencyis, under Cassirer’s treatment, transformed into language’s greatest strength. And yetagain he emphasizes how the latter approach, which conceives of language in termsof a differential deixis, provides an alternative to the traditional copy theories:

32 Cassirer (1956, pp. 199–200). For a further specification of the differences between a human and a purelyorganic existence, see Cassirer (1996, pp. 61–64).33 Cassirer (1996, p. 72).34 Cassirer (1996, p. 72).35 Cassirer (1996, pp. 72–73).36 Cassirer (1949, p. 877).

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This provides the foundation for the interpretation that does not simply acceptthe given as a sum of elements that are similar in nature and in value, but whichdivides them up into the relatively important and relatively unimportant, into“typical” and “coincidental” qualities.37

In Cassirer’s approach, then, the common names or general terms of language are notto be seen as insufficient substitutes or convenient abridgments, but rather as enti-ties serving a far more superior function, namely a genuine synopsis of the spirit, acondensation of meaning through intellectual articulation.

7 Symbol, sign, and trace

Cassirer’s thesis of the primacy of function and his emphasis on relations seem toanticipate the differential definition of signification that is at the heart of semiologicalstructuralism. And so, it has been maintained that, had it not been for his unfortunatechoice of terms, he would certainly have been recognized as the founder of philosoph-ical structuralism.38 To my mind, however, Cassirer’s terminological choice is neitherunfortunate nor incidental. Indeed, my argument is that his choice of the term “sym-bol” in preference to the term “sign” points to a systematic philosophical differencebetween the two approaches when it comes to the way they understand and explainsymbolic mediation.

Ferdinand de Saussure’s choice of terms is just as carefully weighted as Cassirer’s.One of the primordial characteristics of the linguistic sign, as defined by Saussure,is its arbitrary nature. This is to say that the bond between the two elements of thesign, the “signifier” and the “signified”, is unmotivated, that is, not based in a “naturalconnection”. Saussure goes on to contrast the semiological concept of “sign” withthe concept of “symbol” as traditionally conceived (he uses the pair of scales thatsymbolize justice as an example of a symbol). Symbols, he claims, are never whollyarbitrary; in symbols one always finds residues of a natural connection. According toSaussure, then, systems of expression “that are wholly arbitrary”, such as language,“realize better than the others the ideal of the semiological process”.39 He concludes,therefore, that the thesis of the arbitrary nature of the sign weights against the use ofthe term “symbol”.40

Derrida’s move from semiology to “grammatology” consists in a radicalization ofsome of the key features of Saussure’s structuralist account, such as the thesis of thearbitrariness of the sign and the differential definition of meaning. Whereas Saussureregards these two qualities as correlative, Derrida goes further by maintaining that thelatter lays the foundation for the former.41 This is, in fact, what Saussure himself comesclose to saying when he treats meaning in terms of linguistic “value”. The notion of

37 Cassirer (1996, p. 73).38 Caws (1988, p. 16).39 Saussure (1959, p. 68).40 Saussure (1959, p. 68).41 Derrida (1997, p. 52).

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“value” is introduced to emphasize that the difference constitutive of significance isa primary difference, that is, the very source of linguistic meaning, and not only itssecondary effect:

Everything that has been said up to this point boils down to this: in languagethere are only differences. Even more important: a difference generally impliespositive terms between which the difference is set up; but in language there areonly differences without positive terms.42

The implication of this is that language emerges as the domain of articulations.Thought, considered apart from language, “is only a shapeless and indistinct mass”.43

Derrida seizes on this notion of an originary differential structure, of “arche-writing”,“différance”, or “trace”, as the source of linguistic meaning or value, and he even takesit further by generalizing it into a universal condition for meanings of all kinds:

The trace is in fact the absolute origin of sense in general. Which amounts tosaying once again that there is no absolute origin of sense in general. The traceis the differance which opens appearance and signification.44

Derrida’s account of originary difference, then, precludes any notion of “natural” or“motivated” meanings and significations.

Even if, in Derrida’s account, originary difference has always been at work, Westernphilosophy has never acknowledged it. It has, rather, tried to neutralize the differentialplay “by a process of giving it a center or of referring it to a point of presence, a fixedorigin”.45 It has, in other words, tried to reduce the play by ascribing to the structure acentre that governs the structure while itself escaping it. According to Derrida, how-ever, any attempt at arresting the play of differences is futile, since differential play isirreducible—even within the limits of the system itself. Whereas Saussure envisions astatic system of signification that, due to its stasis, allows for positive signs regardlessof the negative character of their constituents,46 Derrida renounces even this notionof self-identity. He goes on to claim that residues of the metaphysics of presence areleft in Saussure’s account in and through his very use of the term “sign”. Throughoutits history, the concept of the sign has been defined as “as sign-of, a signifier referringto a signified, a signifier different from its signified”.47 This is to say that the conceptof the sign, by its very definition, has been determined by the opposition between thesensible and the intelligible. By insisting on a rigorous distinction between signifierand signified, Saussure leaves open the possibility of thinking a signified independent

42 Saussure (1959, p. 120).43 Saussure (1959, p. 111).44 Derrida (1997, p. 65).45 Derrida (1978, p. 278).46 “But the statement that everything in language is negative is true only if the signified and the signifierare considered separately; when we consider the sign in its totality, we have something that is positive inits own class” (Saussure 1959, p. 120).47 Derrida (1978, p. 281).

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of the constitutive play of signifiers.48 To avoid this eventuality, Derrida replaces theterm “sign” by the term “trace”, which is meant to denote a structure “which does notlet itself be summed up in the simplicity of a present”.49

8 Dynamic differences

There is a strong affinity between the accounts of symbolic mediation as set forth byCassirer and Derrida. This affinity has to do with the fact that both thinkers make a“Kantian” move to the conditions of possibility of knowledge and meaning, whilesimultaneously acknowledging the impossibility of making such a transcendentalmove—at least in the form in which it was conceived by Kant himself. The aspect inKant’s thought that both thinkers take hold of and develop further, is the principle ofthe primacy of the function over the object, as presented above. The “revolutionary”potential of this principle has to do with the way that it replaces the metaphysicalopposition foundational to modern epistemology, the opposition between subjectivityand objectivity, with the transcendental correlation of the two factors.50 It breaks withthe substantialist approaches of tradition and opens the way for dynamic and relationalapproaches to knowledge and meaning. Cassirer and Derrida show adherence to thisprinciple in their move from “forma formata” to “forma formans”,51 in their emphasison the processual character of meaning formation, and, on the whole, in their over-arching concern with the very formation of form, with the conceptuality of conceptsand the structurality of structures.

For all that, one of the main difficulties and ambiguities associated with Kant’stranscendental turn has to do with the fact that, as pointed out by Cassirer, the newapproach was expounded in the language of eighteenth century faculty psychology.52

Kant draws on traditional classifications of the human “faculties”, and for this reasonhis own concepts of “receptivity” and “spontaneity”, of “sensation” and “understand-ing”, constantly threaten to degenerate into the very metaphysical oppositions that hisown critical acquisitions were designed to overcome. Even if Cassirer and Derridamake a “Kantian” move to conditions of possibility, their constitutive structures arenot “transcendental” in the same sense as Kant’s atemporal categories of understand-ing. Being symbolic or semiological in nature, the constitutive structures of Cassirerand Derrida are themselves historically constituted. As pointed out by Geoffrey Ben-nington in the case of Derrida, however, this should not be taken as a mere “histori-cizing or culturalizing relativization of the transcendental.”53 Rather, the constitutivestructures of Cassirer and Derrida could be conceived of as “quasi-transcendental.”

48 “The maintenance of the rigorous distinction—an essential and juridical distinction—between the sign-ans and the signatum, the equation of the signatum and the concept, inherently leaves open the possibilityof thinking a concept signified in and of itself, a concept simply present for thought, independent of arelationship to language, that is of a relationship to a system of signifiers” (Derrida 2004, p. 19).49 Derrida (1997, p. 66).50 Cassirer (1955, p. 158).51 Cassirer (1985, p. 43).52 Cassirer (1957, p. 194).53 Bennington (1993, pp. 280–281).

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Yet, the emphasis on historically evolving symbols and signs brings them at such agreat distance from Kant’s transcendentalism that they are better considered as “post-Kantian” thinkers. They also differ from Kant in conceiving of the primary, constitu-tive structures as differential structures, that is, in realizing that the primacy of functionamounts to the same as a primacy of difference.

Both Cassirer and Derrida, then, insist on an irreducible symbolic mediacy at theheart of human meaning formation. If we take a closer look at how they conceive ofthe mediating function of symbols, however, their approaches quickly start to diverge.The crucial difference between the two is that whereas Cassirer conceives of the sym-bolic function as phenomenologically grounded in the world of expression, Derridaprecisely rejects any such attempt to ground the play of signifiers in a more “primor-dial” level of experience. In Derrida’s account, the instituted trace is, as we have seen,not only conceived of as that which makes signification possible but appearance aswell. In this way Derrida, as pointed out by Martin C. Dillon, effectively “disenfran-chises perception as an origin of sense”.54 In Derrida’s account, sense or meaning isreduced to signification, that is, to an effect of a purely negative and differential playof signifiers. The result is a stance on symbolic mediation that Dillon has denomi-nated as “semiological reductionism”. This reductive motive in Derrida’s thought hasto do with unspoken presuppositions he inherits from the very logocentric tradition hereacts against. It is the same presuppositions that impel him to focus on the negativeconsequences of originary difference. In the remainder of this article, then, I will tryto show that if one lets go of these presuppositions, as Cassirer attempts to do, a verydifferent and positive notion of originary difference will result.

In asserting the irreducibility of symbolic mediacy, both Cassirer and Derridaascribe a constitutive function to cultural inscription. This is to say that, in some senseor other, symbolic intervention brings the object into existence. However, whereasDerrida seems to regard the instituted trace as a prerequisite for the perceptual phe-nomenon or meaning to arise at all, Cassirer regards it rather in terms of a furtherdetermination of a phenomenon that is always already given—if only in a fleetingand yet unspecified state. Contrary to Derrida, then, Cassirer does not consider thesignifying function to be self-subsistent. It is, above all, this idea of a self-subsistentsignifying function, combined with his logic of supplementarity which makes Der-rida conceive of any act of referral as an endless deferral. As pointed out by Dillon,the referent, conceived of as the “other” of language, is thus left as epistemologicallyempty. The signifier and signified appear as “opposed poles” that are “separated by theprohibition of a bar that cannot be lifted”.55 In Cassirer’s account, however, the sym-bolic forms are not understood to supplement their target. Rather, they are understoodto intervene in an always already organized phenomenon by establishing a measureagainst which the phenomenon is articulated further. In the latter account, then, theconstitutive forms retain their epistemic function, their power to reveal—even if the“revelation” in question is no longer taken in the absolutist sense of the metaphysicaltradition.

54 Dillon (1995, p. 12).55 Dillon (1995, p. 13).

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As mentioned above, Derrida is very clear that simple overturnings only confirmthe systems they renounce. This notwithstanding, he seems to resort to this strategyin his criticisms of intuition. The “vision” of the metaphysical tradition is replaced by“blindness”—a productive blindness, to be sure, but still a blindness.56 The problemwith iconoclastic gestures such as these, however, is that they only serve to strengthenthe metaphysical oppositions between the sensible and the intelligible, between intui-tion and concept, between subject and object, rather than undermining them. So, evenif they seem radical in terms of their implications, strategies of overturning are notradical enough, since they leave the underlying system untouched. Cassirer’s morequiet-mannered strategy of reframing is in fact the more radical, since it leaves noneof the traditional oppositions intact.

To both thinkers, the notion of “play” is important and internally correlated with thenotion of difference. However, their different starting points make them conceive ofdifferential play in quite divergent ways. In Derrida’s account, the notion of differentialplay designates the constitutive play of signifiers, which makes signification possible.But since this play consists of a constant movement of supplementarity, differentialplay is also what makes signification impossible. Derrida opposes “play” and “centre”,and introduces play at the points in which tradition seeks foundation: Play replacespresence, origin, and reference. Due to the necessary “detour of the sign” (Derrida,1982, p.9), meaning and signification are always the result of the substitutional playof signifiers. Meaning never gathers itself into a synthesis, rather, it spreads, dissem-inates. We can lament this play or we can affirm it, but there is no way to reduce orneutralize it.57 Cassirer, on the other hand, who does not conceive of the workingsof symbols in terms of supplementation, takes a very different approach. To Cassirer,“play” (Spielraum) has to do with the way that the symbolic opens an ideal realm andthus “frees” human beings from the narrow limits of a mere organic existence. It alsohas to do with the way that the expressive world of human beings is shot through andthrough by ideal horizons and vectors. And most importantly, it concerns Cassirer’sunderstanding of the very process of determination. Cassirer conceives determina-tion, not in terms of a pre-given centre or origin, but rather in terms of an active andinterventional centring or accentuation, on the relational (and thus differential) modelof figure and ground. This is to say that determination requires the implantation ofa viewpoint that works as a constitutive principle of relevance, a guide, or a pointof orientation. Thus conceived, determination is seen as a double-edged process: Itdifferentiates only through a process of integration, and it integrates only through aprocess of differentiation. As a result, “identity” and “difference” are no longer con-ceived of as opposites but emerge as internally correlated factors in one and the sameprocess.

The main problem with Derrida’s account of originary difference is that he contin-ues to retain the metaphysical interpretation of identity as a negative standard againstwhich he measures the work of différance as well as the possibility of meaning, knowl-edge, and communication. The critical comment Cassirer directed at Kant would be

56 See for instance Derrida’s discussion of vision and drawing in Memoirs of the Blind: The Self-Portraitand Other Ruins (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).57 Derrida (1978, p. 292).

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just as valid here if directed at Derrida: It does not suffice to make the divine standardinto a mere borderline concept. It is, more than anything, this negative standard thatprevents Derrida from developing a positive notion of originary difference. The nega-tive standard inflicts not only his understanding of identity but even his understandingof the symbolic: Measured against the divine standard, human understanding emergesas finite and limited. It is symptomatic, therefore, that Derrida conceives of finitude asa lack that is in need of supplementation. It is the sign, or more precisely, the play ofsignifiers, which supplements this lack.58 But the supplement not only adds to whatis in need of supplementation, it also supplants it. Thus, as we can see from this, Der-rida’s definition of the symbolic remains entirely negative, not only in its workings(language is understood as a system of differences without positive terms), but evenin its very justification for being (the task of the symbolic is to supplement a lack).In a characteristically roundabout and backwards manner, then, Derrida ends up con-firming that the symbolic will always remain exterior to essence. This is, of course,very far from how Cassirer conceives the matters. He refuses to retain the negativestandard of divine intuition, even as a borderline concept. And he acutely observesthat the definition of the symbolic and the essential as mutually exclusive factors con-tinues to be a major source of confusion. In Cassirer’s account, symbolic interventionsdo not supplement anything. Their workings could rather be understood in terms ofhorticultural metaphors: They are spliced onto the phenomenon to form a graft; theyare implanted into the “ground” of sensibility and make the phenomena grow beyondthemselves; they are rooted but always transcend their point of departure.

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