thinking or logic teaching-english-gustav theodor fechenr

7/27/2019 Thinking or Logic Teaching-English-Gustav Theodor Fechenr.

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Catechism

or

Thinking or logic teaching

intended for And self-education

with illustrative examples

from

MG Fechner

Leipzig

in the tree gardener's bookstore

1823

Content

Introduction

First Chapter of the division of logic

Pure logical elementary teaching

Chapter Two From the logical things and the features

Chapter Three of the top laws of thought

Fourth chapter of the terms generally

CHAPTER V. Of the quantity of termsChapter Six of the quality of the terms

Chapter Seven of the relation and modality of the terms

Eighth chapter of the judgments in general

Chapter Nine of the categorical judgments

Chapter Ten of the sameness, subordination, opposition and reversal of categorical judgments

CHAPTER XI Of the hypothetical and disjunctive judgmentsChapter Twelve From the differences of the judgments and sentences in terms of their content
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Chapter X. Of the circuits in general and the categorical insbesondre

Chapter X. Of the hypothetical and disjunctive conclusions

CHAPTER XV Of the abbreviated conclusions

CHAPTER XVI Of the figured conclusions

Chapter XVII of the composite circuits

Chapter Eighteen errors and fallacies

Pure logical methodology

CHAPTER XIX From science, system and method

CHAPTER XX Of the explanations

CHAPTER XXI Of the organizations

Twenty-second chapter of the evidence

Applied Doctrine of Elements

CHAPTER XXIII Of the logical diseases (logical pathology)

Twenty-fourth chapter of the logical remedies (logical Therapeutics)

Twenty-fifth chapter of the acquisition of the knowledge and experience of the particular

Chapter XXVI continued

Twenty-seventh chapter of the reflection

Twenty-eighth chapter of the communication of knowledge

Introduction

Although the human mind is a simple creature, at which one can distinguish neither spatial nor temporal parts, so you take it according to the different types of activitieswhich he expresses, more assets to him, in which the base of these activities issought. First place, a distinction the imagination or cognitive faculty and the facultyof desire, each of which is separated into the upper and lower back at him. The upper cognition is concerned, the reason ( ratio ) and the mind ( intellect ) with the latter

belonging, power of judgment among themselves, although they often also called theentire top imagination intellect or reason in another meaning, the lower cognition isalso the (theoretical) Sensuality ( sensualitas ), and contains the external senses andinternal sense, which latter can beirechnen the imagination. - With the research and

presentation of the original laws of the imagination or knowledge assets, employs thetheoretical philosophy with that of the original laws of desire practical.

The sensuality is an asset to any perceptions ( perceptiones ), which is understoodall concepts that a given object (object objectum ) by his presence brings usdirectly. So I take a tree true if such a truly stands before me, and be seen or felt by
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me, so I take a hit if I really suffer the same, a sound when it really sounds is takenfrom my ear, and when I against a tree, a shock or sound only in general, I wouldthink, without being interacted with by their presence on me, it would not beexpected to perform. Since the items that we should perceive all really need to be

present, one can easily understand that there is always only single, specific objects

can be perceived, but nothing can be collected or connected more of them shared it,and of these one has a distinguishing feature of perceptions or ideas of sensibility of the concepts and ideas (ideas of understanding and reason).Some examples willillustrate this.

If I see a particular book, so is the idea which is thus awakened in me the sensualityof it is a perception, because it is produced by the presence of the book itself in me,and there is a single specific book, which I imagine.Would have But if I saw several

books, my features, which all agree this abgemerkt, and then connected in my mind,so I would get by combining thinking this, all gesehnen of my books jointly

zukommenden features to any perception of a book because yes no particular book caught the imagination like in me, but to the concept of a book that can take place inmy soul quite independently of any single particular book, what one already itrecognizes, because yes, the concept of a book ever on must fit all the books, andtherefore can not just introduce a single real. Similarly, when I hear a certain tone,then this provides a perception of it in me when I got noticed several tones and takenfrom these perceptions those features together, get them all anyway, so I get also bythe Confederates same no perception of a specific tone, but an idea of the tone at all, Ican make me without a sound by its very presence takes my imagination to complete.

The perceptions are either intuitions ( intuitiones ) or feelings ( senationes ),depending on the idea that excites an object directly by his presence, more to the

perceiver itself (the subject of perception) or the perceived object (the object of perception) is obtained. Therefore I say: I am looking for a house, a tree, a sound of (because in philosophy, the word perception not merely of perceptions we means of obtain the sense of sight, used), however, I feel a shock, I feel well-being, etc. . Inthat case, as in this, I get ideas by immediate presence of the objects themselves, ie

perceive, but there occurs the nature or status of the property, the house, tree or moresound into my consciousness, I refer my idea only on this, think of these items, but

not to me, whereas in the latter case, with the sensation occurs my own, the perceiver state more into consciousness, I refer the idea more of myself, make myself to objectof my imagination, but not the things that they caused.

The sensuality or the perception comprehends under the external senses andinternal sense. The external senses are the ones through which we look at the state of the physical world and feel, and they themselves are bound to physical organs, hereare the rough road so-called five senses and the physical sense of community, theinternal sense, but is the one through which we what going on in our own soul,

perceive. So it is a perception of my internal sense when I notice in myself that I'm

happy, or sad, or pensive. Even the imagination can expect with the inner sensesthrough which we conceptions that arise from absent or not at all actually existingobjects in our minds perceive.


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If only we had the assets to perceptions, we would be able to do any general termsthat get several items together to receive, such as the concepts of virtue, beauty, etc.would can not arise in us because they are nowhere individually, apart neither look nor feel can; yes we would not even be able to get an idea of sensibleobjects. Because if I would have looked at a house for example, I would not even

know, what it essentially belonged to a home, which I therefore include in theconcept of the house and what I would omit it. If I have a yellow house look eg witha flat roof, the perception would I continue to teach nothing but that such a housereally stand before me, and the yellow color, and the plate roof would be just as much

place in my opinion, than the walls and the roof at all, which I notice on thesame. Would be intuition and concept the same, so I would have to record fromhome, the indicator in the notion that a house be yellow and should have a shallowroof, which is not necessary but because it also houses other colors and with sharproofs are. With each new view, therefore my concept would change, I would have

taken from a home, and I would end up not knowing what I should imagine in such ageneral. But now the soul out of the assets of the views and feelings which go only toindividual objects, including the ability to gather up from the individual perceptionsof the characteristics which they agree with each other, these multiple perceptions toconnect zukommenden common features and summarize in one . Such a combinationof characteristics that are more common perceptions, it is called simplya term ( notio, conceptus ) and the ability to form concepts, reason. For example, if Ihave more organic beings, whether perceived by the external sense or by theimagination imagined, so my mind will compare them and notice that some of theseorganic beings get several features in common, such as root, stem, branches, leaves,flowers, wood, whereas other features may be different to them. The commonfeatures will now collect the mind, unite, and from it form the concept of the tree thatare not common features, however, omit from the definition of the tree, which can notgo beyond the perception itself, the individual must take the object as it is their

presents. The sense as does a tree with pointed leaves and white flowers true, but themind is the Zackigsein of the leaves and the white color of the flowers does notcompete with the concept of the tree he is, because otherwise a tree that no jaggedleaves and white flowers had, and of which there are but would be a tree if itotherwise was consistent in all the other features to the already formed concepts of the tree. - This activity of the mind in virtue of which he studied along commoncharacteristics and connects to it to form concepts, called the discursive activity of the mind, because he thereby runs through the features of the objects to speak ( discurrit ) to retrieve the matching. Herein is the thinking part.

In this form of thinking or concepts can now again distinguish different acts or actsof mind. Namely when multiple perceptions are given, from which the mind is toform a concept, it may not need all of the above features are included in theindividual perceptions, if they are not common to them, for example, the concept of to form the house, not the yellow color to form the concept of man, not its ClothedOne, although these features in several different perceptions, which are of theunderstanding supplied by the sensuality outfitted. Thus, by the mind of these


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features, which are not essential to the concept that he wants to make, as it looksaway, they say, he abstracting from them, and on the other hand seeks the mind of thefeatures in the formation of his term are essential, and by particularly directed hisattention to this, they say, he reflecting upon them. For example, if the mind has theviews of black and white, clothed and unclothed people in front of him, and I will

make to this the concept of man in general, he is from the black and white color of these people, so abstracting entirely as of her clothed or unbekleidetsein becausethese features may not be included in the concept of people, because otherwise theywould be common to all men, whereas it is the features that have the black and white,clothed and unclothed people in common, reflecting, for example on head , hands andfeet, mind, etc.

The recording of this now common features in the concept called determination,and their connection with each other combination. The determination is still differentfrom the reflection: Because you can reflect or look at a feature in an intuition,

because it appeared to the first prestige to fit the formation of the term, or we do notyet know whether it fit or not fit to be to could, whatever you want to explore first byreflection, but after it rejected as unfit. For example, when I initially reflecting thecharacteristic white color, because it seemed at first sight as if it would be included inthe concept of people with, or I only want to investigate whether it belongs to thenotion of man after but find that there are black people, so I'll leave the determinationof the reflection does not follow, but abstracting again from the white skin color, butif I have, however, reflected on the head of the people, and now find that all peoplereally will play a head so I'll then follow the determination of reflection, that is, I

suppose really the feature of the head with the concept man, and combine it with theother features that I had already recorded. From these various activity statements to adifferent abstraction, reflectivity, and combination Determinationsvermgen assetsalso in the mind. - Incidentally, it is well to note that the mind is not only able to form

perceptions of their common characteristics through collection concepts, but that hecan also make other terms of concepts again, by reflecting on their commoncharacteristics. Example of justice, goodness, gentleness, and the other good qualitiesof the people who are inherently terms, he may, by that which belongs to them

jointly, summarizing or combined, form the concept of virtue. Another example: If someone looks at a number of individual insects, he can together take the samecommon features, and it formed the concept of insect at all, also when he sees several

birds he can from these also form the concept of bird at all; as well as the concepts of fish, mammal in, etc., etc., but now he can look at all the individual terms, insect,

bird, fish with his intellect, and as he examined them together common features,resulting form the concept animal again, and he now has previously formed the term

plant so he can re-summon the Community Characteristics of the terms animal and plant, and from the concept of an organic being formed, etc., so that one sees how themind can always rise higher in his terms, until he finally comes in a very general,which are common to all objects, like the concept of being. - The mind must besupported in all its activities from the judgment. One can only imagine namelyobjects for themselves, but also in relation to other ideas. For example, a house I can


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only imagine simply for themselves, but I can imagine based on the yellow color, inthe first case I have only either the pure concept or pure intuition from home, but inthe other case, by the relationship between I the yellow color and the house sit, I say:I judge such as the house or the house is yellow is not yellow or yellow, etc. are allthe houses are judgments. It is easily seen that the combination of determination and

is really just a judgment, and it is therefore the judgment itself also expect tounderstanding, which includes those activities. - Find one now the basis of a judgment in another, so that one derives from the other off, so this is calledclosing. For example, if I say, all organic beings are alive, the dog is an organic

being, so the dog is alive, so I have made, because I have the sentence: The dog isalive, the judgment: all organic beings are alive, derived. The closing is the peculiar

business of reason, and because a still uncertain judgment when its truth is to bederived or inferred from another, last can only be concluded from such a thing isuniversal and unconditional itself - otherwise would have its truth will not close itself

again - one writes also the reason the consciousness of the absolute and general, andits relation to the Conditional and Special to such a well known and unconditionalgeneral term an idea, which is the highest up to which the human mind cancollect. This subheading includes the ideas God, freedom.

In the transactions of the mind, the power of judgment and reason, ie in the form of concepts, judgments and conclusions is thinking, therefore solely belongs to theupper imagination, because the sensuality provides the only means of their

perceptions of food for thought. Now you can look at the thinking in two ways: once just by looking at the concepts that are found in thinking, considered in their relation

to each other, without taking into consideration the objects themselves, which are presented by it. For example, if I say that man is rational, or: The animal is notreasonable, so I can here refrain from the objects that are presented by the terms of humans, animals and rationality, whole, and pay attention only to whether the conceptof a is really related to the other, as in the first case, or whether it is presented as notrelated to it, as in the second case, or whether a term is commonly referred to another (eg all men are mortal) or general (eg some men are mortal), etc., so that it thereforemakes no difference here, of what items I speak, because I prefer only the form of thesentence, whether it is affirmative, negative, general or special, etc. intoconsideration. In this respect, therefore, the rates are: God is almighty, the animal isgreedy, the tree is green, its all the same, because here the ideas of powerful, greedy,all green on one kind of God's ideas, animal, tree are related, although animal, tree,etc., are very different from each other. Looking at just the thought of this page, it iscalled a formal or analytical thinking, probably also thinking par excellence, whereyou do not care about the items that are intended, but merely the way in which ideasare connected. But it takes the same time in thinking on the subjects of consideration,which are thought and considered the relationship of the ideas do not amongthemselves (as in analytical thinking), but to their objects, it is called a materiales or synthetic thinking, or cognition, when the analytical thinking, thinking is called par excellence. Therefore, the formal truth is to distinguish the thinking of the substantivetruth. A sentence can be formally quite right and true, if it is not repugnant to the laws


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of formal thought, but wrong material. If I say for example: All the flowers are white,so this set is formally correct, because such a general relationship of not conflictingideas as to how this can really happen under the laws of formal thinking from whiteto flower, and here it is all the same whether the ideas flower or tree or white or black there remain basic, provided only that the ideas themselves are connected to each

other in a proper way, therefore, the judgment has a right shape. Material is, however,or under the laws of recognizing the sentence: All the flowers are white, wrong, because if I really prefer the imaginary objects themselves, and white flower color into consideration, I find that not all flowers are white. The sentence, however:animal is animal, would be formally wrong, because it would remain just as wrong if I also take animal put an object, which I just always wanted to, so that so here itsfalsity not by the nature of the object itself may be limited, but in the incorrect type of connection of the ideas themselves, and therefore must be in the form of a

judgment. - Besides these two types, either just ideas to consider in relation to each

other, or for use in relation to their objects, you can also consider to what extent theideas of certain objects a feeling of pleasure or pain arouse in us the extent to whichsuch the viewing pleasure of a beautiful face, or an ugly grimace disgust aroused inus, and that is called the receptivity for such kind of pleasure and pain, what ideasexcite in us tastes.

After these three ways of looking at our ideas, breaks the theoretical philosophyinto three main sections, the logic that deals with the original laws of formal thinking,and thinking teaching is Schlechtweg; metaphysics which, or of the original laws of substantive thinking of knowledge is, and therefore is called epistemology, and

finally into the aesthetics or the theory of taste, which is the law of representation andrecognition of objects, how they excite a feeling of pleasure or displeasure in us.

It follows from the foregoing, of course, that logic can not comment on the natureof objects to teach ourselves, because they do not consider the ideas in relation tosuch, but only in relation to each other. By logic no new truths can thus be found, butthey can still check whether the truths we think we have found really match with thenature of our thinking power, they can show the way to derive from really foundtruths others follow quite , and errors that result from a tangled, incorrect thinking,uncover. The logic can we not teach thinking, but they can but the laws by which the

thinking is done, clearly put before our eyes, and so put us in a position to detectwhen not observing the same, the mistakes, they can show us what we have to payattention to if we want to examine the formal truth of a concept, or Urteiles circuit.

First Chapter

Of the division of logic

+

Question. What is logic? answer. logic is that part of theoretical philosophy,which makes us acquainted with the laws of (formal or analytic) thinking. But


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it does not consider the thought, insofar as it refers to specific objects, but onlyteaches the laws of thought in general, therefore, indicates the way in which allobjects must be thought, if they were ever so different. In this respect they arenow considered just the way of thinking in itself, it is also said that they prefer merely the form of thought into consideration, whereas the matter of thinking,

under which one understands the real imaginary objects, disregard or abstracting.

F. How to share a logic? A. A distinction is first and foremost the generaland specific logic. The former is concerned with the form of thought in general, andis also elementary logic, the latter are rules for thinking in particular sciences, andtherefore can not be shown separately from these.

Q. How is the general logic divided? A. First of the pure and theapplied. Pure logic, the rules of thought on all to how they originally held in higher cognition, the applied contrast refers to the various conditions into consideration, of which the application of those rules depends, eg on the conditions which cause us tofalse judgments can, and forestall the means such.

Q. How is divided pure logic? A. In the (pure) and the elementary theory(pure) methodology. The former considers the chores of the mind, individually andconcepts, judgments and conclusions, and specifies the rules by which it shall do so,the latter teaches to give means of proper treatment of those operations of our scientific knowledge a the thinking skills appropriate form, and it has therefore to dowith what is seen in statements, dispositions and evidence.

F. How to share the logic applied a? A. In a (applied) and an elementaryteaching (applied) methodology. The former is concerned with the theory of theorigin of the logical appearances and error (logical pathology), and the doctrine of themeans against errors (logical therapy), the latter deals with the acquisition andcommunication of knowledge.

Pure logical elementary teaching

Second Chapter

From the logical things and the features

Q. What is meant by logical things and a logical absurdities? A. A logical thing( ens Logicum ) is that which can be thought of according to the laws of mind, even if it is not really experience finds in the world, a logical absurdity ( nonens Logicum ),

however, what also can not even be imagined. The logical thing and absurdity isindistinguishable from the real things and probably nonentities, of which the former experience in the world really finds, the latter not.


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Q. What are examples that illustrate this? A. An animal, what the shape of adragon, or possessed of such a size that it reached to the moon with the back, would

be a logical thing, because there is nothing to prevent us, we to think such an animal,whereas it would be a real absurdity, because it is not really experience finds in theworld. A square circle, however, or a leaf, that would at the same time and in the

same place green and not green, you should keep not only real, but also for logicalabsurdities, because these also could not even imagine. One can see from theseexamples that many logical things can be, which are not real things, therefore,contrast has any real thing, insofar as it related has on us can be thought of as alogical thing, because otherwise it could not at all be thought and therefore would befor us as well as not there. - By the way, is a logical thing - and only such can be usedin the logic of the question - basically nothing more than a concept or an idea of themind.

Q. What is meant a thing? A. Through features.

Q. What is characteristics? A. Characteristics ( notae ) are ideas which areincluded as components in other ideas, and so several ideas can be different fromeach other. For example, the leaf of the tree is a feature, because it is an idea that isincluded as part of the presentation of the whole tree, and you can distinguish themfrom the ideas of an animal, house, etc. thereby. It also features the well-knowncharacteristics, specifications, characteristics, predicates characters. Be resolved onlyinsofar as such a thing, it may be thought, and one thing that did not feature wouldhave existed as well as not for our minds, could not be imagined.

Q. How can you distinguish the characteristics? A. In inner and outer,affirmative and negative, significant and non-significant, original and derived,directly and indirectly, fertile and infertile.

Q. What are internal and external features? A. Internal or absolute characteristicsare those taken for an object to determine, but the external features, which is alsocalled relative or relationship or ratio characteristics which determine only the ratioor relationship that has the object to a different things. Thus, stem, root, leaf, flower,inner characteristics of the tree, because they define the concept of the same withoutany regard to other items, however, that the tree is grown in the ground, or that his

master a certain direction against another tree has, are external or relationshipcharacteristics, because they only push a relationship to other things of the same.Thething to which the ratio by means of the relationship Merkmales is expressed, as inthe above case, the earth is called the Mitbezogene or correlate. Therefore require allexterior features a correlate.

Q. What are affirmative and negative characteristics? A. Affirmative or positivefeatures are those by which one imagines something as really belonging to a things,negative or negative contrast by which to exclude something of a thing. For example,red, warm, affirmative features are quickly because they express properties that a

thing really exists, however undyed, are not warm negative characteristics becausethey exclude properties of the existence of a thing. Is a negative one feature deniedagain, so it creates an affirmative feature, eg uncolored is not as much as the colored


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affirmative feature.

Q. What are essential and non-essential features? A. Main features ( essentialia,attributa ) are those that must come by the imaginary things at any time and getnecessary if the term is not intended to be a completely different from the thingitself. In contrast, non-essential features are ( accidentalia ), which is also calledrandom, by the way that they do not get an object with resistance, and therefore canalso be thought away from it, without changing the concept in general. So, for example, the characteristic of voluntary movement in a major animals, because it isso common to all animals and resistant that a creature that lacked this feature would

be to look for no animal but a plant or something else would have to be; however, thefeature of four feet is a non-essential in the animal, as there are also animals withmore or less than four feet, and the concept of the animal generally remainsunchanged, the same, though I do not think the feature of four feet to it. - CombinedThe essential features of a thing make its essence, and are this things either

exclusively owned ( attributa propria ), or come even other objects to, ( attributaCOMMUNIA ), so the feature of voluntary movement on earth, at least, the animalcreatures exclusively own, the essential feature of the diet but also comes to the

plants. - Physical characteristics can be no essential because they merely expressrelationships to other objects, but this can change.

Q. What are original and derived characteristics? A. Original Features ( notaeoriginariae, primitivae, radicales ) are those which are inferred not only from other features derived ( see derivativae consecutivae ), however, such a thing other than thefeatures episodes the same shall be settled. Thus, the sharpness is an original featureof a cutting tool, its ability, however, to divide other bodies, based on this knowledge,an original feature of a circle is that all its points equidistant project from a certain

point, that he is a crooked line, a derived from it.

Q. What are direct and indirect characteristics? A. Immediate or nextcharacteristics are those which are the object of equal resolved itself, indirect or however remote those that are first come until the to another feature of the object, andonly so far on object itself refers. For example, the sheet would be a direct feature of the tree, because it applies equally to the tree itself, the green color against acollateral of the same feature, because it applies only to this Journal, and only bymeans of on the tree.

Q. What features are fertile and infertile? A. Fertile features are those fromwhich many other features can be derived, and which may therefore serve todistinguish an object from many other objects. Infertile characteristics, however, arethose in which this does not occur.

Chapter Three

By the highest laws of thought

Q. Can the mind in obtaining characteristics of process on free things toarbitrariness, or he is bound by certain laws? A. He is, as nothing happens in theworld without laws, bound by certain laws, which he must watch if his thinking is to


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have (formal) truth. Who thinks this contrary, thinks logically inaccurate or wrong. The logic teaches us not only to observe these rules but rather are founded sodeeply into the nature of our mind that they each also followed unconsciously, whenhe only enjoys the ordinary common sense. The logic here has nothing more to dothan to make our minds clear.

Q. What are the highest laws of logical thinking? A. The principle of oppositionor resistance dispute ( s repugnantiae principium of contradiction ), the principle of continuous equality ( princip identitatis absolutum. ), the principle of exclusion of theMiddle or third parties ( pr. excluded middle tertii s ) and the principle of sufficientreason ( pr. rationis sufficientis ). These four principles are commonly takes as the

basic laws of thought. Pitcher called the principle of contradiction and the principleof thesis, and sets him a principle of antithesis, the principle of sufficient reason, buthe also called rate of synthesis, a set of proportional or relationship have equality asthe main laws of thought to the side .

Q. What is the principle of contradiction? A. One can express it this way: Noneof things come to contradictory characteristics, or: Every things only unanimousfeatures to come. Ie it is called contradictory characteristics such one of which almostcancels what the other has set, and can be thought therefore never united in onethings. Such contradictory characteristics are as green and not green; mortal and notmortal. One can also express this principle as follows: There can be no A think thiswould not A at the same time, if one A at all any feature or thing, what one you justalways want to understand.

Q. What are examples which illustrate the principle of contradiction?A. According to the principle of contradiction is one can not think of a thing is bothround and not round, a thing is also a table and not a table, a tree wearing the sametime fruit and no fruit. All this would contradictions, which would abolish the onefeature that the other has set.

Q. What do you call that which can be thought according to the principle of contradiction, or is really thinking? A. What can be meant by the same, is logically

possible, and to that extent it will really think logically or really a logical thing. Thata logical thing but not the same as experience in the world would be provided

vorfindend is mentioned above. - Anyone who thinks the principle of contradictionapparently opposed, therefore apparent contradictions of the say that he thoughtabsurd.

Q. What is also to be noted in the law of contradiction, that he might not bemisunderstood? A. It could of external features that express mere relations, andrelationships seem as if their thinking could also contradictory things combined inone. For example, you probably said by the same people: it's large, and in somerespects again: He is not great. But the first time you look at it maybe in relation to anant, the elephant in relation to a second time, so the highlights here a relationship not

based on what has been set by the other, as against the ant man, however great,against the elephant is not large, and the apparent contradiction is therefore only inthe expression, not the cause. Should be noted, furthermore, that the law of


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contradiction is only of the same period and the same room, for a man may eg todaynot tomorrow be fun and funny, or red in the face and arms not red. However, it issimply impossible to imagine a person who would be both funny and not funny, andred at the same spot and not red.

Q. What is the principle of continuous equality or sameness? A. You push it likethis: Every thing is equal to itself, or: Every thing is consistent with itself, or A isequal to A. Because that is a thing only can be thought through features, and onlyaccount for the combined features of all the things the term, as well as thecharacteristics of an imaginary thing and the concept of same must be completely thesame. Further, this principle means nothing. For example, the term: Circle, andcharacteristics, line, be everywhere equidistant from a point, taken together, have allcome out to one, because I think just it only the circle, as I summarize the featuresmentioned.

Q. What conclusions can be drawn from the principle of sameness? A. The thingwhich come all the characteristics of a term to which the term itself must be settled,and which lack the features, the can not get the concept itself, further what is thecharacteristics of a concept that applies the concepts themselves, and are the featuresare different, the concept itself is different.

Q. What is the principle of exclusion of the third or middle? A. It is also calledthe principle of complete determination and pushes it like this: How an object isdetermined conceived as continuous, must come to him from all possible almostopposite characteristics one. So a thing must either round or not round, as white or non-white, are thought to be alive or not alive. Of such downright opposite or contradictory features of the mind is always forced to choose one, and settle a thing(both at the same time he can after the first principle is not) and there is no third or middle feature what he about taking one of the two opposite could include in theterm, hence the name of this principle. One can also express this principle as follows:Each imaginary determined as continuous objects must either get each feature or not.

Q. What is the law of sufficient reason? A. It puts it this way: Combine each setto end with a presupposed as a reason or shorter, Sit nothing without reason. After the

previous principle namely every thing from two contradictory characteristics

although must get one, the mind can by no means arbitrary one of which enclose thethings he must be induced or compelled by something, either the one or the other, aseither green or not green, alive or not alive to settle the things. This now is whatcauses the mind to which to set a feature preferably before the other, is the reason,and that which depends on this reason, the result. According to this principle isrequired of anyone who claims something, even knowing why he says it, and the onewho wanted to settle things a bit, without being able to specify a reason for it, wouldgrossly violate the laws of thought. Therefore, we must also talk with exercises indispute (disputations) not to fight with, yes, yes, no, no, but defend his own opinion

by reason of the enemy and try to refute reasons. - The logical reason is probably theway to distinguish from the real reason: the former is merely the reason thatsomething is so and not otherwise thought of, but the second that something is really


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in a certain way.

Q. What is the principle of antithesis? A. It can be expressed as follows: Under opposite determinations of a thing you may put only one, and if this is a set, then youmust cancel the other. This principle of antithesis follows from the principle of theargument or appeal.

F. ? What is the principle of inclusion-wise or proportionate equality A. It isexpressed as: Two terms that coincide with a third, or linked, relate to each other inthe same proportion, or even two things that a third identical, are similar If the thingitself so A is the things X, and X is the thing to the thing B, then B is also the thing belike the A things. This rate depends on the extent together with the principle of sufficient reason, because the equality of the thing with the things X A and B things,here is the reason that also A and B is equal to itself.

Chapter Four

Of the terms in general

Q. What is a term? A. A term ( notio, conceptus ) is a happening withconsciousness linking several common characteristics or ideas of the unity of thewhole. It is formed by comparation (comparison of several performances),abstraction (reticle of the various features thereof), reflection (on inspection, their

common features); Determination (recording of the common features in the whole to be formed), and combination (Association of recorded features discussed the whole)as in the introduction. Incidentally, these various actions of the mind are not separatedin reality as if they are presented here, but rather where they flow together, and areseparately only because of the ease of looking at us.

Q. What is meant by abstract and concrete terms? A. If we a term very pure andset apart for himself, so it is called an abstract concept, but a practical, how you havelinked him with other ideas, or with respect to certain objects thinks. So, for example,virtue, excellence thought an abstract concept, whereas, if I think a virtuous man, so I

think the term virtue concrete; him by thinking with the idea man, linked him to refer to these.Similarly, the concept of green color, absolutely thought an abstract concept,

but thought of a leaf, it is concrete. - On each term is abstract because it is just itformed by abstraction, Single, Looking Away from the various of his ideas, but he is

by thinking it in relationship, specifically, and as such, the terms have only benefit for us when she thought concretely related to objects.

Q. In what ways we are accustomed to consider the terms to make their logicalnature clearly? A. In terms of their quantity, their quality, and their relationmodality.


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Chapter Five

The quantity of the items

Q. What is the quantity of a term? A. In the set of ideas that you think related byhim. This quantity can then be either the volume or quantity of the contents of aterm.

Q. What is meant by the scope and content of a term A. The scope or the sphereof a term ( see ambitus sphaera notionis ) do all of those things to which the term can

be obtained as a feature, whereas the content of a concept ( complexus notionis )consists of those ideas that are thought the same as united.

Q. What are examples of this? A. From the conception of man, the scope is theEuropeans, Asians, Africans, Americans and Sdindier, because all of these can berelated to the concept of man as a feature, whereas making the content of the concept

of man, the ideas of the head, chest, abdomen, hands and feet, mind, reason,language, etc., because all these features put together the concept of man first. Thusthe scope of the term tree will form the oak, the beech, the fir tree, the fruit trees, etc.,whereas its content, the root, stem, leaves, etc.

Q. What is to be included under a concept, and a concept? A. Of the things thatmake the extension of a concept to which the term can be thus obtained as a feature,they say: you are under the terms contained of the things, however, which make upthe content of a concept, they are included in the terms. Root, stem, leaves, however the same in the term, as oak, beech, fir tree are included under the term in the above

case. Imagine a phrase from another, ie, subsume it under.Q. What is the relationship and scope of the concepts in terms of their quantity to

each other? A. The greater the extension of a concept is, the smaller its content andvice versa. For example, the scope of the term human is larger than the scope of theterm Negro, because there are people under the terms contained except the negroesare many other ways people, whereas the content of the term Negro is greater thanthe term of the person, because the Negro still have the black skin color come out of the other characteristics of a human being too, the woolly hair, etc.. Similarly, thescope of the term character is greater than that of the term triangles, because it

contains in itself, or may be referred to it as a feature, not only all the triangles, butalso quadrilaterals, pentagons, round shape, etc. On the other hand, the content is theconcept of triangle greater than the figure of the term, because it contains, in additionto the characteristic of the confined space within limits, which plays the figure, eventhe that these boundaries are formed by three lines along with many others, to bederived from it. - The reason for this relationship between the scope and content of aconcept is that when recording several features in the content of a concept, all thosethings need to be ruled by the same extent, which does not belong to this feature. If one were, for example in the term human being also the feature of white color, so

increased the quantity of its contents, so then this person would term can no longer berelated to the negro, and by then it would exclude from the concept, the scope wouldthe same decrease.


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Q. What is meant by simple and compound words, single words and commonterms? A. A simple term ( notio simplex ) is the one whose content is so small thatit only consists of a single characteristics, and that it by no dissection can bedecomposed into several ideas, a composite ( not composita. ), however, is such,where such a decomposition in several characteristics or performances still take

place. From the above it follows that basic terms must have the greatest extent proportionate. A single term ( notio individualistic ) is a term whose scope is so smallthat it deals no other more broad ideas among themselves, a general or common (not.universalis ), however, still contain ideas are under. Single items must have relativelythe largest content.

Q. What are examples that illustrate this? A. The concept of being is a simpleconcept that you simply can not dissect in more features, but precisely because of itsemptiness, he has the most extensive scale as one can in all things, the feature of

being or existence relate. The concept of movement is already a composite as one can

distinguish in it the characteristics of change of Zeitlichsein and Rumlichsein, sincemotion is a pre-existing spatial variation in time. But the movement has also been asmaller extent, because they can not relate to all things as a feature. - A single conceptis the notion of a specific nature, such as a certain plant, a particular animals, but thatit should not be confused with an intuition, because it is not directly related to theindividual subject, not by its direct action on the sensuality, but only indirectly in themind, created by linking its individual features. A common term is any term that canrefer to different objects.

Q. What is species-and genus terms? A. Both terms refer to the scope of theterms. A species concept ( notio specialis ) is the one that contains only individualthings among themselves, a generic or generic concept ( notio generalis ), however, aterm that contains the specific concepts among themselves. Thus, the term lily is aspecies concept, because its scope only includes individual things, that all individuallilies among themselves, whereas the term plant is a generic term, because it containsthe specific concepts lily, rose, carnation, etc. among themselves. The generic termsare divided into lower and higher. Namely several generic terms may be includedunder another generic terms again, and this is because of the higher generic term, sothat the generic terms insects, fish, birds will be so included under the higher generic

animal, and that the generic terms animals and plants under the even higher: organiccreature. - The highest is the generic term, which includes all other generic termsamong themselves, and he has therefore the largest scale but have the smallestcontent, so that he could be based on all sorts of objects as a feature, they therefore

believe it to themselves. However called or highest generic terms including those thatare high in only a particular number of things. So is the highest generic term for allindividual races, the term man, although he himself is actually the term of an organic

being.

Q. How naturalists call the lower and higher classes? A. The genus, which

initially contains more lower classes among themselves, is called the order containingmultiple orders among themselves, class, and contains several classes amongthemselves, a realm of nature .


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Q. What are the intermediate species, next genera and species removed?A. Between genera ( genera media ) are the ones that are higher than one but lower than the other species, so are held between them. For example, tree is an intermediatespecies between fruit trees and plants, because it is higher than the species of fruittrees, lower than the plant genus; those he includes among themselves; under this he

is self contained. - The genus under which a species is directly called for that the next( genus proximum ), but the one under which it is available only indirectly throughintermediate species, a remote ( genus remotum ).

Q. What is subordination and appointment of the terms? A. Subordinateconcepts ( notiones subordinatae ) are those which are contained under another concept. For example, the concepts of bird, fish, animals are subordinated to theconcept. Therefore, all species of the genera and species are all lower to higher subordinate. The term, which is subordinate to the other, is called the lower or closer ( see angustior inferior ), but the one which contains the other below it, or more

upper ( superior latior s ). So man is a higher concept than Negroes and Kalmuck, plant a tree and a higher herb. The higher term, the lower one all. - Alderman terms( . coordinatae not ) are those which are both contained in the same time or at a thirdterm. Thus, insect and fish are coordinate terms, because they are both included under the term animal, leaf and root are also coordinate terms, because they are included inthe term plant. Each coordinate terms can not be both subordinate to each other andvice versa. Depending coordinate terms are genera or species, it is called secondaryspecies or sub species. Thus, rodents and ruminants addition genres, mouse, rat, sideways. - The longest term is also the highest generic concept, has the largest scale, can

be subordinated to any other, yet, attach to, but everyone has subordinated tothemselves.

Q. What laws apply concerning the higher and lower terms? A. What belongs tothe higher terms or contradicts that also comes to or contradicts all under his lower terms, or in other words: what belongs or is contrary to the whole sphere of a termthat comes to or contradicts any part of this sphere. Furthermore: What belongs to alllower terms or contradicts that also comes to or contradicts their higher terms. Thefirst law arises from the, drawn from the set of continuous equality inference thatwhat is true of the characteristics of a concept, and the concept must apply itself:

Because of the higher concept is just one which contains all lower among themselves,and so on as a feature it must be related. The other law arises from the fact, that thehigher concept of that is created by linking the common characteristics of its lower terms, therefore, what is common to all the lower terms are necessary in the higher terms must also be found. - By the way, many features may be located on lower termsthat do not get the higher, because just because of their smaller scale their content isgreater.

Chapter Six


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Terms of the quality of

Q. What is considered in terms of the quality? A. The degree of consciousnesswith which the terms are intended in a linked ideas. After this distinction is clear,sharp, detailed and complete or perfect terms.

Q. What is the clarity ( claritas ) of a term? A. In that degree of awareness of thecharacteristics of a concept by virtue of which one is able to distinguish its objectfrom other objects at all. According as the number of things that the object of theconcept can be distinguished, large or small, depending on the clarity of the termthereof is larger or smaller. The opposite of a clear definition is a dark ( not.obscura ). So many people have only dark notions of what philosophy, what is logic,ie they do not know these sciences belonging to differ from others. Taking a conceptclearly, is called to develop it.

Q. What is meant by clarity ( perspicuitas ) of the terms? A. Those degrees of

awareness of the characteristics of a concept by virtue of which it is capable, just todistinguish these features from each other again. The clarity of a concept is thereforenothing else than the clarity of its features and also has various degrees. Is theopposite of clarity, the lack of clarity ( imperspicuitas ) which is also confusion( confusio ) is called when the characteristics of a concept not been determined butmay be from each other. Therefore a clear concept does not need to be clear. So I canknow how to distinguish adequately of the other sciences, philosophy indeed, but

perhaps not specify the characteristics that make up the essence of philosophy, because I know they can not be separated and distinguished. So in this case I have aclear or no clear conception of philosophy. - Conversely, a clear concept must always

be clear: Because concepts can be distinguished only by the consciousness of different features in them, and this consciousness is even more necessary for clarity,as in mere clarity.

Q. In which relationships can be considered the clarity of the concepts? A. Theclarity of a term can refer to the content, as also refer to the extension of aconcept. Those who also is the intensive and analytical clarity, is produced bydecomposition of a term in the characteristics of which it is composed anddevelopment thereof; these, extensive or synthetic clarity by distinguishing the lower

terms, which are contained in the higher . That happens through explanations, thisresult of divisions. Set, the concept of philosophy would become clear to me, so that Iknow to distinguish the same from all other sciences, I wanted to but that he wouldgive me extensively and intensively clear, so I would look for to distinguish thevarious sciences in terms of its scale that are included under the term philosophy, sofirst and foremost the theoretical and practical philosophy, it should be meextensively even more, so I would in theoretical philosophy, logic, metaphysics andaesthetics, in practice the legal doctrine that ethics and religious doctrine differentiateto seek me, to the clarity to drive even further, I would look at each of these scienceagain the clean section to be distinguished from applied, etc., in this way I wouldmake the philosophy extensive or clear synthetic or divide them. So now I also notionof philosophy would clearly intense or analytically, I would break it down into its


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characteristics; that philosophy is a science and that it is investigating the recentreasons and purposes of human knowledge and activity. To achieve an even higher degree of intense clarity, I would the terms science, knowledge, activity, reason,dissect purpose of the new, and so pass through continued dissecting to ever higher degrees of clarity, explain the concept more and more. - Easy terms can no intense

clarity, although clarity possess: Because they do not contain any variety of featuresin yourself, so can simple terms as that of the existence, not even explain individualterms, however, can come no extensive clarity, having no contain variety of thingsamong themselves, and therefore they can not be divided. - The clarity of which has

been discussed here is, the logical, intellectual or discursive, in contrast to the sensualor aesthetic, which is a vividly making of what has been generally presented isthrough examples, as often as in this booklet happens.

Q. What is meant by detail and perfection or completeness of the terms? A. Bothare higher degrees of clarity. The detail is in fact a term that degree of consciousness

of its characteristics by virtue of which it is capable of up to dissect these featuresagain, thus the clarity of the features themselves So in the above examples, the term

philosophy is detailed in terms of its scale dissected. Since you can continue thedissection of the characteristics of a concept always on, so the verbosity has itsdegrees. The highest degree of logical detail the completeness or perfection of theterms, which then takes place when you came through continued dissection in suchterms that can not be further dissect; regarding the content in a simple, regarding thescope of individual terms.

Chapter Seven

Of the relation and modality of the terms

Q. What is the relation of the terms? A. In those definitions of what they comeonly in respect to other terms, ie in the same mutual relationship. This ratio can now

be four-fold nature: it concerns namely the sameness and difference, the agreementand the conflict, the interior and exterior, the matter and form of the terms.

Q. What terms do you call all the same or identical? A. Those which have all thefeatures in common. - Similar or related terms ( . cognatae not ) are those which,although not all, but a lot of characteristics in common. Different terms mean interms of the features that are not common. - Terms that are all the same or completelyidentical, also called exchange terms, because you can put an arbitrary place of theother. You can only make so far more criteria than either of them different people or the same people at different times, or be thought of as characteristics of differentthings, otherwise they would only constitute one and the same concept.

Q. What are unanimous and conflicting terms? A. Unanimous ( consentientes,convenientes ) are those which can be combined in the presentation of an objecttogether. If you are opposed to illegal or conflicting called in a broader sense. The


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opposition can now take place either directly or indirectly. In the first case it is alsothe pure or perfect opposition ( oppositional contradictoria, diametralis by simplicemnegationem s ), and the opposite to this kind terms: conflicting, contradictory,negative, or almost directly opposite terms. It takes place when one of the opposingconcepts as such contains a negation of what has been put in another term.Of directly

opposite terms ( not. contrariae, see contrarie oppositae, oppositae by positionemalterius ) which is also called contrary, positively or indirectly opposes raises one tothe other by mere negation, but even by their own positive characteristics. Of contradictory terms all but two are held, and one of them has to get every objectaccording to the law of exclusion of the Middle. Of merely conflicting terms morethan two can occur and they can also be thought away all of an object.

Q. What are examples to explain the former things? A. round and white areunanimous concepts, because they fall into each performance unite, when I think about a thing, so this does not prevent the least that I still me who knows,

think. Round and not round but or knows and does not know are contradictory or directly opposite terms, because of an almost negates what the other sets, only onecan be thought of both in one and the same idea, and both at the same time butthought away, can you can not. Round and square or sad and happy are conflictingterms, because the fact that something as I sit around, I prevent that it can not also beset as a square, the same case is sad and happy at.

Q. What is the interior and exterior of a term? A. The interior consists of a termin its essential features, the appearance of contrast in its nonessential, either thetextures ( affections ) or conditions ( relationes are).Thus the interior of the concept isanimal: that it is an organic entity that moves from free arbitrariness, and its foodfrom freely studied, however the exterior of the term animal is the feature of four feet, or of life in the country .

Q. What is meant by the concepts of matter and form? A. The matter of theconcept is to those ideas which are linked by the same unit, but the shape. in themanner of their connection Since the logic of what is presented by the terms, quiteapart, a closer examination of the matter of the terms is not the same.

Chapter Eight

Of the judgments in general

Q. What is a judgment? A. A judgment ( judicium ) is the determination of therelationship or the relationship that takes place between given concepts, and isexpressed through words, a set of (propositional, enuntiatio ). I say as man is mortal,so here I determine the relationship between man and mortality and thus judge.

Q. What can you distinguish in every sentence? A. matter and form. The matter of the judgment to make accessible from the ideas which the relationship betweenone thinks, as above man and mortality, but the shape is the way how the relationship


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between these concepts is thought. The logic looks on the nature of the matter andconsidered all judgments from formal teaching of thinking just the same shape.

Q. In what ways we are accustomed to consider the sentences in order according totheir form zulernen know? A. As the concepts in terms of their quantity, quality,relation and modality. The quantity determines the scope of the subject in a sentence,the quality of the nature of the predicate, the nature of the relation between the link itself gegebnen a verdict ideas, and the modality of the relationship in which thesentences are to our knowledge assets. Schicklichsten on it, put in relation to theconsideration of the judgments of the reason is.

F. How to distinguish the judgments in terms of their relation? A. In categorical,hypothetical and disjunctive.

Chapter Nine

Of the categorical judgments

Q. What is a categorical judgment? A. A categorical judgment (judgmentsettlement) is one in which the term is relative as a (affirmative or negative one) onthe other trait. Such judgments are often also called judgments such. The above

judgment: Man is mortal, is a categorical, because the term is related mortality is as afeature on the term humans. All judgments that are not themselves categorically are

at least composed of categorical, and by the peculiar logic operation thereof, will onlyhypothetical and disjunctive judgments forth. Also the quantity and quality of judgments initially relates only to categorical.

Q. What is meant by subject, predicate and copula in a categorical judgment?A. subject is called the one idea, to which the other is referenced as a feature;

predicate but, what is related to the subject as a feature.Thus man is above thesubject, the predicate mortal. The subject is usually preceded by in a sentence, butcan also, without change in its nature something to be placed behind the predicate, asa man, when the sentence is then an offset is mortal. The copula or the connecting

word in categorical judgments is really nothing other than the word, although it isoften only contain hidden in it. For example, the sentence: The man has intellect, islogically developed: Man is a mind-to-do. - Often copula and predicate merged intoone word. For example, a person thinks, which is as much as man is a thinking. Somesentences seem to have no subject, as it thunders, it rains. However, one must think of the predicate associated with at least a vague subject but here. Such sentences arecalled logically imperfect.

Q. How much categorical judgment forms are there in terms of quantity?A. Three. Namely, the predicate is either connected with a single subject, or with

many subjects a certain type or a certain kind with all subjects in the first case, the judgment is a single or individuales, the second a special or particulate, in a thirdgeneral or universal. Guttenberg invented the art of printing is a single sentence;


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many people live sake of eating, a special, all animals are unreasonable, a commonone. Signs which indicate the extent of the subject, the pronouns are for each of these

judgments, the one, the same, etc., for the special: some, few, many, several, etc., for the general: all, every, no, etc. Designated judgments are those where the subject is a

peripheral character of this kind in itself, has any inscription where it

missing. (Certain judgments . jud determinata ) is called the general and individual judgments; indefinite ( indeterminate ) specific.

Q. How much categorical judgment forms are there in terms of quality? A. Alsothree: affirmative or affirmative, negative or negative and infinite, limiting or limitative. In the affirmative judgments, the predicate, the subject is taken as real inthe content of the subject, or what is the same, presented as brought into the sphere or scope of the predicate, in negating sentences, the subject is thought beyond the sphereof the predicate; in the infinite, it is placed in the sphere of a term that is outside thesphere of another, or what says the same thing, by negation of a feature set is another

in the content of the subject.Q. What are examples of this? A. Affirmative sentences are: The lion is strong,

the plant is green, because in both cases the subject is in the sphere or scope of the predicate, strength and green color, or features than those in the added content of theterms lion and plant. Negative judgments, however, are: The gold is not white, thesun is not running around the earth, for here the subject from the scope of the

predicate or predicate is excluded from the content of the subject. Limitative judgments: The human soul is immortal, the dress is undamaged. Here I bring thesubject through the negation of mortality in the sphere of eternal life, the dress bynegation of damage under the sphere of wholeness. - The limitative judgment is thusdistinguished from the negative sense that in the former the subject of the sphere of an affirmative feature excluded, but not brought into the sphere of a differentaffirmative feature, with the latter but just by the exclusion from the sphere of anaffirmative feature in the another affirmative is set.

Q. What are the short term has been given the categorical judgments in terms of their quantity and quality? A. They have referred to the first four vowels, so that Ais a common and yet affirmative, E a general negative one and the same time, aspecial and at the same time I affirmative, O negative one at the same time andexpressing a particular opinion. Hence the Latin verse:

Asserit A negat e universaliter sed ambo; Assarit I, O negat particulariter sed ambo.

The limitative and individual judgments here are unmindful, because the conclusionsin respect of which this short marking method is chosen, the individual judgments of the general and the limitative be equally appreciated the affirmative: examples of thismarking method are:

A. All animals are organic beings.E. No animal can live without food.I. Some people are taught.O. Many people are not taught.


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Q. What is said of the modality of categorical judgments? A. They also

determined three forms of judgment: the problematic, assertoric, and apodictic. In thefirst, the relationship between subject and predicate is merely presented as possible;

presented in the other and really made as happened, made in the third as

necessary. Examples of problematic judgments are: Human life can last over onehundred years, and the war may soon break out, of assertoric: Life is short, and thewar has broken out of apodictic: The man must die, and the war must break out.

F. Let probably still other significant differences, except for the mention in terms of quantity, quality and modality to the categorical judgment forms, discover,? A. Themain forms of categorical judgments are quite exhausted by theseapproaches. Insofar, however, as the judgments expressed by words, so be at ratesyou can still distinguish them verschiedne forms, which can be represented by thefollowing scheme. The sentences are:

1) easy ( propositiones simplices )2) put together ( prop. compositae )

a) apparently composed ) compound sentences )Vergleichungsstze

b) Hidden composed ) Ausschlieungsstze a)exclusively in the narrow sense b) exzeptiv

) restriction sets

a) restrictive in the narrow sensereduplikativ b).

Q. How did the simple composite of the rates differ? A. A set is simple, in whichthe subject is both the predicate only of a main term, even if the terms of subject and

predicate are not easy, and the sentence or particularistic is universal, whereas whenthe subject or predicate or both are repeatedly is composed of the set, because itconsists of several judgments basically, is why you also exponibel calls him in the

broad sense, and the composition is a hidden, exponibel in the strict sense.

Q. What are examples of this? A. Simple sentences are: The boy is teachable,and people love the pleasure. A compound sentence is: The people and animals areliving creatures, because he actually consists of two sentences: People are livingcreatures, the animals are living creatures. As well: the glass is fragile andtransparent, is, logically developed: the glass is fragile, the glass is transparent.

Q. What are joining or copulative sentences and Vergleichungs or comparativesentences in which you share the apparently composite? A. In the copulativesentences several subjects or predicates are connected to each other, in the

comparative is a thing settled a feature in higher grades as another. Examples of copulative sentences are listed in the previous answer; comparative sentences are:The tiger is more cruel than the lion, the child is weaker than the man These rates


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were developed hot: The lion is cruel, The Tiger is even more cruel. The man has acertain degree of strength, the child has a lower degree of strength.

Q. What is Ausschlieungsstzen or exclusive sets and restriction or restrictive?A. exclusive or exclusionary in the broader sense are the sentences in which anexclusion at all restrictive and in a broader sense, in which a restriction occurs atall. A set as restrictive in the narrow, if the subject to the exclusion of all other himsimilar things something is settled, the block is exclusive in the strict sense, but if thesubject only to the exclusion of a certain part of it is somewhat resolved, the record isexzeptiv sense, if the restriction is done by a special admixture; reduplikativ mind if itis only expressed by a recurrence.

Q. What are examples of this? A. exclusive in the strict sense are the sentences:The cuckoo alone can hatch its birds of others; Only unfilled seed-bearingflowers. The latter sentence would be fully developed so hot: Many flowers areunfilled, these are seed-bearing, the others are not seed-bearing. Exzeptive sentencesare: The Greeks dealt with a lot of fine arts, except the Lacedaemonians. Walks are

pleasant except in bad weather.Restrictive in the narrower sense: the sciences treatedas branches of industry can not thrive. Money as a means to good ends has greatvalue. Reduplitative sentences are: The general as a commander must be strict. Thegreed, as greed is always to blame. - Flow rates, which are restrictive in the strictsense, expresses it, that what is said to apply only in certain respects. By contrast,rates reduplikative that the word that is repeated is to be taken in its truest, mostessential importance, which may explain the above examples.

Chapter Ten

Of the sameness, subordination, opposition and reversal

the categorical judgments

Q. What judgments do you call all the same or equally valid ( identicaaequipollentia )? A. Those in which matter and form are the same. Thereforemonotony judgments can only differ in that they are referred to by different words, somake different sets, or insofar as they are thought by different people or differenttimes.

Q. What is the subordination of judgments? A. judgments where represent thesubject and predicate in the same way two terms, in which one but the scope of thesubject is greater than in the other, called subordinate ( subalterna ), and While

judgment is the one in which the subject is the broader term, the subordinating( subalternans ), but that in which it is the lower, the child ( subalternatum ). Thus,the following sentences are subordinate: 1) The Europeans are clothed; 2) TheGermans are clothed; 3) The Saxons are clothed. Europeans is another term than theGermans, because they are included under him thus, if 1) and 2) are compared, 1)under the ordering, 2) the subordinate sentence. In contrast, if 2) and 3) are

compared, is 2) the subordinating and 3) the child, because the German conception of the subject is beyond the subject of Saxony. - Must come after the above-mentionedlaw, that what belongs to the higher concept, also contained all lower under him, the


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truth conditions of subordinating the judgment of the child.

Q. What is understood. ? to under unanimous and opposite judgmentsA. Unanimous judgments ( consentientia ) are such that both can be thought of astrue at the same time, however, or conflicting opposite ( opposita, repugnantia ) thoseof which abolishes what the other sets, of which therefore can be thought of only onething to be true. The opposition of the judgments can now be an immediate, direct,adversarial, or indirect, indirect, contrary according to the terms. It is contradictorywhen, in the judgment done a nothing more than the negation of what was set indifferent verdict; contrary, however, if by setting something in a judgment (ie, not bymere denial) what the other judgment was set, is repealed.

Q. What are examples of this? A. Unanimous verdicts are: The man who loveslife, Man is mortal. Directly opposite: Man is mortal; Man is not mortal. Contrarian:This house is completely of stone; This home is completely out of wood. - Directlyopposite judgments are only two possible each time, and one of them must be true, if not each already contains a contradiction in itself. For example, would the judgments,the quadrangular soul is mortal, the square soul is not mortal, neither of them true,since the concept of a square soul is conflicting itself, contradictory judgments canthink of more than two without one of them necessarily true ought to be.

Q. What are subkontrre judgments? A. Such, one of which is particularlyaffirms what the other very negative (ie, I and O); eg Some animals are carnivorous,some animals are not carnivorous, or Most animals have feet, some animals have nofeet. It is easily seen that subkontrre judgments both may be true.

Q. What is meant by inversion ( conversio ) of the sentences? A. A set is calledReverse: Making the predicate in the subject and the subject to the predicate. Thisreversal may now be in three ways, place 1) simpliciter (pure or unchanged), if quantity and quality to be reversed judgment be left unchanged; 2) peraccidens if thequantity of the judgment, and 3) by contra positions, if the quality of the judgmentchanged will. The judgment with which the change is carried out, is in the first twocases, the reverse or conversum , in the which is converted to the invertingor convertens . At the contra position is the first judgment, the contraponierte, theother is contraponierende.

F. ? What are examples of this A. Rein are reversed: No animal is reasonable, noreasonable person is an animal; lucky few are virtuous, some virtuous arehappy. (Generally speaking: No A is B, no B is A. Some A are B, some B are A.) Per accidens are reversed: All plants are organic beings, and some organic beings, plants,all cats are carnivores, some predators are cats. (General: All A is B, some B is A.) Bycontraposition are reversed: All men are mortal, no man is an immortal, all animalsare alive, no non-living thing is a beast. (General: All A is B, no non-B is A.)

Chapter Eleven

Of the hypothetical and disjunctive judgments Q. What is a hypothetical judgment (inferential judgment)? A. The matter of the


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hypothetical judgment consists of two categorical judgments, but the shape and thesame essence but the fact that these two categorical judgments are related to eachother as cause and effect. Examples of hypothetical judgments are: If the planetsmove around the sun, their calm is only apparent, furthermore, if the man has reason,he also will. In both examples, the first categorical judgment contains the reason why

the other is set, the latter is therefore to be regarded as a consequence of the first.Q. What distinguishes the hypothetical judgments? A. The antecedent

(antecedent, condition, hypothesis, ratio, conditio, membrum prius see antecedens ),which makes the thought of as a basic judgment, and the consequent (the hindlimb,Conditional, thesis, rationatum, membrum posterior consequens s ) containing theinference from the antecedent. In the judgment thus: If man is virtuous, so he has agood conscience is the first sentence of the first clause, the second of the

postscript. One can, however, also make the postscript to the first, eg The man has agood conscience, if he is virtuous, which alters only the form of the sentence (the

judgment expressed in words), but not the judgment itself. The particles, if so, whichare used to describe the shape of the hypothetical judgment 1) are particulaeconsecutivae called.

1) You do not believe the word, if so, whether the form itself, they serve only to indicate the same.

Q. What else is around to notice even of the hypothetical judgments? A. On the

nature of categorical judgments that make up the fabric of the hypothetical, whether sold singly, generally, affirmative or negative, etc., are, in the logical view of thehypothetical judgments are not taken into consideration, for the logic considered somerely the form of judgments, which consists in the hypothetical in the peculiar logicoperation of the two categorical judgments, and all is the same, even if the categorical

judgments would have to be ever so different, it is enough out to make a hypothetical judgment that they are related to each other as cause and effect, and this ratio should be only just explained. - If the hypothetical judgment of more than two judgments, itis a composite, eg, if the virtuous man always happy and the wicked would stillunhappy, so there would be no merit to practice virtue and avoid vice.

Q. What is the essence of a disjunctive judgment (opposition of judgment)? A. If you determined that several present opposite characteristics of one to the exclusion of the other is to be based on a term without specifying however that, as one falls adisjunctive judgment . Examples disjunctive judgments are: The pleasure is either a

permitted or that are not allowed; This man is either a German or an Englishman or aFrenchman.Here I have indeed determined only so much that of the oppositecharacteristics, German, English, French (they are opposite or indirectly contrary)one should come unto men, but which, at the same time is indicated by the statementthat if a feature is actually included in the term, then the rest are excluded, that I notmen, if I really think it to me as an Englishman, even at the same time to think of asFrench, which by virtue of any case the nature of the conflicting terms would not be

possible.

Q. What is further to be noted by the disjunctive judgments regarding their matter


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and form? A. The matter of disjunctive judgments actually consists of severalopposite categorical judgments. The therein opposite predicates called separationmembers ( membra disjuncta so) like top German, English, French are. The one ratioof the separation elements, one by which it must be the true characteristic of theassessed object, constitutes the form of the disjunctive judgment and is determined by

the particles either, or ( particulae disjunctivae same, or called) also probably only byone. The separation members may be located directly opposite, as permitted above,and not allowed, or indirectly, such as German, French, English, in the first case thereare only two members of separation, in the past there may be several.

Q. What can be in terms of the modality of the hypothetical and disjunctive judgments remember? A. Your parts taken separately are problematic, butconsidered as a whole according to their shape, they are apodictic, ie they are set asnecessary. In the hypothetical judgments, neither the antecedent is in fact thought to

be necessary for even the hindlimb, but probably the combination of the two as cause

and effect. So you think in the disjunctive judgments not each of the individualopposite categorical judgment, of which it consists, as necessarily true, and the wholesentence is but a necessary set because this only determines precisely that of several

present possible features one of the object had come.

Chapter Twelve

Of the differences between the judgments and sentences in terms of content 2)

2) Although the logic of the content or does it actually matter and the origin of the sentences in the mind off, but it will not be inappropriate to discuss in this connection a lot about it, how it is done in most textbooks of

logic.

Q. How is analytic and synthetic judgments differ? A. Analytic judgments arethose where, refers a feature that you thought contained in the term of the subject tothis as a predicate. The others are called synthetic. For example: the food intended for the conservation of creatures is an analytic proposition, because the term food I ever think to myself with a feature that creatures thereby be obtained. In contrast, thesentence would be: The foods are tasty, synthetic, because the characteristic of taste isnot yet in terms of food. Thus, the sentence would be: The light is shining, an

analytical, because I was already thinking in terms light to shine as a feature with meincluded, however: the light is fast, is apparently a synthetic proposition, because asthe concept of speed would have in the light. - In analytic sets so you take out afeature of the concept of the subject itself and connects it afterwards as a predicate sothat, in synthetic one takes it fro somewhere else. - Tautalogisch is an analytic

proposition, when the subject is connected to itself as a predicate, for example, breadis bread, a living creature lives. - It is easy to see that our knowledge can actually byforming analytic judgments can not be extended, since they testify only to what weknow already, but may by the same our attention more executed passes to individual

features of a term and thus the clarity of thought be promoted. We can really increasethe scope of our knowledge merely by forming synthetic judgments.

Q. How theoretical and practical sets differ? A. Those are some of the makeshift


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of knowledge; these that say something to the expedient of action.

Q. What are indemonstrable and demonstrable records? A. The first areimmediately certain, ie, those not derived from other propositions whose truth(demonstrated) can be, but is clearly for themselves. The others are indirectly certain,ie, those whose truth can be derived from other sentences and must.

Q. What is a principle? A. principle, axiom or principle is a certain theoreticalimmediately set which can therefore be derived from any other, but even used toderive other sentences from it. Thus, the above-mentioned laws of thought, of theopposition, the consistent principles of equality, etc.. Examples of principles of mathematics are that two straight lines do not include a space, adding that like attractslike, are the same.

Q. What is a postulate? A. postulate or requirement set is a practical set, whichindicates that something should be brought forth, and as it certainly immediately

implies that there could also be produced. These postulates are: to draw between two points is a straight line, to extend a straight line indefinitely. Namely nobody can prove that it was actually possible (if that is not evidence of the experience ismentioned), but why is not it say that in this somewhat incongruous sentences isrequired, since each of the immediate certainty of the feasibility of the Demanded isconvinced. - From these postulates in the ordinary sense to distinguish the so-called

postulates of practical reason, which do not demand to do something, but rather,something that can not be proven, to believe without proof to the moral interest will,as the existence of God and the human freedom.

Q. What is a theorem or theorem and a task or problem? A. The former is atheoretical proposition whose truth must be derived only from the other, the latter a

practical set of rules governing the execution of an action, which proved to be of onlythat they could be executed. An example of a theorem is, that the angles in eachtriangle together two straight right make up, because it must be proved only fromother mathematical theorems, an example of a task is: An equilateral trianglerecorded. A problem is 1) Qustion. ie, a sentence which indicates what is to beexecuted, 2) the resolution that the manner of execution displays, and 3) thedemonstration, which is derived from other propositions that the Required'm really

produced by the method specified in the resolution . - The theorem merely the thesisand demonstration latter proof are essential, the former of which contains the to be proved sentence itself - To make it so again hollow short, an axiom is just sometheoretical, a postulate a direct certain practical set; a theorem a certain indirect or evidence capable and needy theoretical, a practical problem like a record. - It should

be noted that this and the following foreign expressions Corolarium, LemmaScholion are often used especially in mathematics.

Q. What is an additive or Corolarium, also well known Porisma or Consektarium? A. A sentence that can be easily viewed directly from what went

before in the lecture, and therefore needs no detailed evidence. So you can be the proposition that in any rectilinear triangle the three angles together make two rights,recognized as Scholion, that when held angles in a triangle is a right or an obtuse


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(greater than a right), the other two angles, each must be acute (less than a right).

Q. What is a Lehnsatz (not dogma) or Lemma? A. A sentence that took over inthe presentation of a science from alternative science, and because its truth hasalready been established there is no proof of the new.

Q. What is a Scholion or a note? A. A set of non-essential part of the presentation in the context of a science, but is only activated in a side intent, mostlyto what is offered, to explain more.

Q. What is an empirical judgment? A. Such whose truth is based on evidencefrom the experience, but not from other judgments.

Chapter Thirteen

Of the circuits in general and in particular the categorical

Q. What is a conclusion ( ratiocinium, syllogism )? A. The truth of a stilluncertain as imaginary as the judgment of a certain imaginary dissipation.

Q. What is different in the finals? A. matter and form. Matter or substance tomake the judgments, which make up the conclusion, however, the form of thesyllogism consists precisely in the peculiar logic operation of judgments in virtue of which the judgment as a fundamental truth of the other is set. This form is part of theword therefore ( ergo indicated).

Q. What is different in the matter of the conclusions? A. Those sentences w

thinking or logic teaching-english-gustav theodor fechenr

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