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Bridge, Gary 2019. Habit, experience and environment: a pragmatist perspective. Environment and

Planning D: Society and Space 10.1177/0263775819882715 file

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Habit,experienceandenvironment:apragmatistperspective

GaryBridge,CardiffUniversity

Keywords

Habit,vitalism,experience,pragmatism,environment,Dewey

Abstract

Contemporarydiscussionsofhuman-environmentrelationsseehabitsasenabling

forcesofchange(becoming)incontrasttotraditionalviewsofhabitasroutineand

restrictiveelementsofidentity(being).Vitallife(becoming)isrealisedinhabit

throughbodyrepetition(Ravaisson)orthroughmaterialforce(Deleuze).Thispaper

arguesforthesignificanceofthepragmatistworkofJohnDeweythatsharesthis

dispositional,enablingviewofhabit,butdeniesanydualismbetweenlifeand

mechanism.ThepaperexploresDewey’sideaofhabitsasmechanismsofnatural

formsoforganisationthathavedifferentlifeforce,dependingonthesituational

qualitiesofenvironment-humantransactions.Thisapproachalsoimplicateshabitin

problematisation.Thepapergoesontodiscusstheimplicationsofpragmatist

thinkingforunderstandinghuman-environmentrelationsandtheplacethathabits

haveininterveninginandreformingthoserelationsthroughsocialactivismand

publicpolicy.

Introduction

Human-environmentrelationsaretheheartofhumangeography.Thewaythat

humansinteractwiththeirenvironments(betheynaturalorsocial)hastakena

particularturninrecentgeographicalresearchintermsofarenewedinterestin

habits,whichareseenasintermediariesinhuman-environmentrelations.Rather

thanseeinghabitsasconservativeforcesofroutinebehaviour,recentgeographical

attentionhasfocusedonhabitsasformsofbecomingandasvectorsofchange

(Dewsbury2011;Leaetal2015;Sharpe2012).Thisisinpartaresultoftaking

environmentalprocessesasmuchmorepartofhabitformationbyconceivingofthe

environmentas‘vital’(inhavingalifeforcebeyonditsconstituentparts)ormaterials

2

oftheenvironment(inorganicaswellasorganic)ashavinglife;‘forcefulmaterialism’

asDewsburyandBissell(2015)havedefinedit.GeographersrefertoFelix

Ravaisson’sOfHabit(2008[1838])asthesourceofthevitalistideaofhabit,orto

GillesDeleuze(1995)forthematerialistversion.Boththeseapproachesaccord

autonomytolifeforce.InthispaperIcontrasttheseideaswiththeideasofhabitin

pragmatistphilosophy,whichalsoseetheenvironmentasvitalandhabitsas

projective,acknowledginglifeforce,butseeingitasemergingfromnatural

mechanismsoforganisation(ofwhichhabitisone).Isuggesthowthenaturalismof

pragmatistphilosopherJohnDeweysituateshabitaslifeforceandorganisationina

waythatalsoacknowledgesenvironmentalforcesbeyondhumanpurposes.This

explainsinparttheintractabilityofhabits(theycannotbechangedbyanactof

consciouswillalone),butitalsoseesmechanismsintheenvironment(intheway

thathabitsareinevitablyimplicatedinproblematisation)thathavethepotentialto

openuphabitstomoreconscioushumaninterventionandchange.Thisisillustrated

infourwaysforpolicyformulationandsocialactivism:throughinterventionsinthe

formationofhabits;inovercomingtheclashofhabits;intheinstitutionalisationof

habits;inhabitsasbackgroundconditionsofwiderproblematisations,suchas

environmentalism.Inemphasisingapragmaticunderstandingofhabitthepaperis

alsobuildingonagrowinginterestinpragmatismingeographymorewidely(for

example,Harneyetal2016;WoodandSmith2008).

Contemporarydiscussionsofhabit

Theanalysisoftherelationshipbetweenhumansandtheirenvironmenthasseena

shifttowardsaccordingmoreforcetotheenvironmentandtoassemblagesofnon-

humanactants(objects,non-humanorganisms)aswellashumansinexplaining

activity,action,andevents(DeleuzeandGuattari1987;DaLanda2016).Thishas

beenpartofseeinghumansasjustonecomponentinamore-than-human

environmentinvolvingaflatterontologyofwhatconstitutessignificantactivity,one

inwhichtheprivilegedplaceofhumanactionandreasonhasbeendeflated.A

more‘vital’environmentisaresultofassembledenergiesseeneitheraslifeforce,or

asvitalmatter/materiality.Thisisunderpinnedbyaprocessualontologythatsees

allphenomena(includingwhatmightbeseenasinertmaterials/objects)as

emergentorbecoming.Stabilisingforcesthatmaintaincontinuityarere-evaluated

includingtheideaofhabit–seenasamediumofongoingactivitybetween

environmentandhumanstraditionallyconceivedasroutine-andnowseenasa

forceforchange.InthisreappraisalofhabittheworkofFelixRaviassonandGilles

Deleuzehavebeentakenup,andinsomecasesincomparisonwiththepragmatist

philosophyJohnDewey.

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ComparisonsbetweenpragmatismandRavaisson’svitalismhavebeenmadeacross

disciplinaryapproaches(withthemedissuesonhabitinculturalgeographiesand

Body&Societyin2013).InhisdiscussionofthegenealogiesofhabitTonyBennett

(2013)makesthedistinctionbetweentreatmentsofhabit(includingDewey’s)that

areinthe‘organicmemory’tradition,incontrasttothe‘vitalist’traditionof

Ravaisson,Bergsonandothers.Theorganicmemorytraditionispost-Darwinianand

emphasisestheevolutionaryinfluenceoftheenvironmentonorganisms“inwhich

habitmediatestherelationsbetweeninheritedandacquiredcompetences”

(Bennett,2013,113).HenriBergson’svitalistcontributiondrawsonevolutionary

naturalismandmaterialismbut,incontrasttothesetraditions,accordsan

autonomousforcetolife(Bennett2013).BennettdiscussesBergson’s(2004[1912])

distinction(fromRavaisson)between‘habit-memory’and‘habitproper’,a

distinctionalsoevidentinDeleuze’s(1995)distinctionbetween‘sensory-motor

habits’and‘primaryhabits’.Thepointofthesedistinctionsistosuggestthatthereis

amoreprofoundformofhabit(‘habitproper’or‘primaryhabits’)thatcomesfrom

vitallifeforceormaterialforcethatisbeyondorganicmechanismsandthatmakes

habitssubjecttounconscious/subconsciouschange.

Ingeographyideasofhabithavebeenaddressedatdifferenttimesinwaysthat

reflectcertainkeytraditionsofgeographicalanalysis.Muchoftheclassicworkin

culturalgeographyattheturnofthe20thcenturywasconcernedwithestablishing

thesignificanceoftheroleofcultureandhabitsoflifein‘genresdevie’(Vidaldela

Blache1903)andsenseofplaceinthelandscapeagainstoverlydeterministic

interpretationsofenvironmentalinfluencesonhumanactivity(Sauer1925).Ina

relatedwayinthe1960sand70shumanpatternsofactivityandtheirroutinized

constraints(suchasspatialpathdependenciesandcouplingconstraints)werealsoat

theheartoftimegeographies(Hägerstrand1970).Theseapproachestosome

extentreflectthemoreKantianideaofhabitasroutine,especiallyitsfunctionin

place-making,buttheyalsopointtothemoreconstructiveaspectsofhabitinthe

socialconstitutionofmeaningandbelonging(Bissell2015).Furtherworkin

humanisticgeographyinthe1970sand80sdevelopedthephenomenological

aspectsofmeaningfulenvironmentsandtheimportanceofhabitinfeelingsof

belonging(Tuan1977;LeyandSamuels1978).

Phenomenologyalsoinfluencedworkinhumanisticgeographythathighlightedthe

significanceofthebodyandcorporealityasthelocusofhabitinunderstanding

human/environmentrelations.Seamon’swork(1979),forexample,spatialisedthe

ideasofthephenomenologistMerleau-Pontythroughtheanalysisof‘bodyballets’

andtime-spaceroutinesofhabit’(seealsoBissell2015).Merleau-Ponty’sideasof

inter-corporealityandthesignificanceofhabitininfluencingmorecognitive

interactionaredevelopedbyLeaetal(2015)(viaCrossley’s2001work)intheir

analysisofhowmuchmindfulnessmeditationcanreflexivelychangehabits.Leaet

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alseeagencyasdistributedacrossminds,bodiesandcontextsandthesewidertime-

spaceroutinescompromisetheabilityofmindfulnesstotransformhabits.Herethey

areregisteringthetensionbetweenhabitasconservationandroutineandhabitas

capacityandprojection.

Theideaofthedistributednatureofhabit,acrossbodiesandenvironments,takesus

towardstheinterpretationofhabitingeographyasemergenttendencyor

potentiality.ThusBissell(2015)seesashabitasa‘virtualinfrastructure’comprising

propensitiesanddispositions(Bissell2015).Thevirtualinfrastructureofhabitcan

berealisedinpracticalcompetencesincopingwithnewmilieu,butwithchanging

intensities(trackedintheexampleoflong-haulairtravel)thatinturnaffectsthe

capacitiesofbodiestoact(seealsoHynesandSharpe2015).

Analysingthesignificanceofthedistributednatureofhabitfortransportgeography

Schwanenetal(2012)makeaninsightfulcomparisonofRavaisson’sandJohn

Dewey’sideas.TheyacknowledgethesimilaritiesbetweenDeweyandRavaissonin

seeinghabitasatendencyandofthedynamicandprojectiveaspectsofhabit.They

alsonoteamoreenvironmentallydistributedideaofhabitinDewey’swork,in

comparisonwithRavaisson’smoreindividualisticframing.Thisalsoappliestothe

relationshipbetweenhabitsandtheinevitableclashofhabits,bothwithinthe

individualorganism,andbetweenhabitsinamoresocialsense,intermsofcustoms

andinstitutions.ThisispartofDewey’sargumentonhabitsinrelationtosocial

changeandsocialdivision,givinghisapproachagreaterradicaledge,accordingto

Schwanenetal(discussedlater).TheyseethemaindistinctionbetweenRavaisson

andDeweyinRavaisson’sideaofhabitasawayofunderstandingtheunityand

continuityofnaturewhereasDeweyisnotpreparedto“admittotheimprovised

spontaneityofalllife”becausethis“wouldbetolosesightofthedialectical

formationofthesocialthatissocrucialtopragmatism”(HynesandSharpe2015,69,

referringtoSchoenbach2004).

Iwilltakeupthequestionofthesedivisionsbetween‘life’andmechanismsinthe

restofthepaper,sufficetosaythat,assumingtheunityandcontinuityofnatureand

theautonomousforceoflifetakesusintotreatmentsofhabitingeographythatsee

itasacontractionofwiderworldly,immanentforces,certainstabilisationsofwhich,

individuateorentrainsubjectivities(Dewsbury2015).Thismoreopeninterpretation

ofhabitasaformofbecomingisseeningeographyinnon-representational

approaches.ThusThrift(2007)shiftstheemphasisonthehistoricityofpracticesand

habits(Bourdieu1977)towardstheirspatialitiesandtheirperformativeand

processualqualities.Thisalsoentailsvirtualities,thepotentialitiesofpracticesand

theirdispersive,differentiatingqualities,(ratherthanbeingconservingand

consolidating).Thisstartstoopenupthemoreemergent,projectiveideaofhabit

withingeography.Dewsbury(2015),forexample,analysesDeleuze’sideaofhabit

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(viaRavaisson)aspassiveopennesstoachangingworldinwhichhabitisas‘an

occupation’enabledby‘materialaffordances’ofthelandscape,that,ratherthan

restrictingaction,allowssubjectstobeattentivetonewelementsthatcanbetaken

fromrepetition.Repetitionsareseenassingularitiesandaformofdifference,

ratherthaniterationsofsameness.Inthiswayhabitprovidesthebasisforan

enduringsenseofself(Dewsbury2015,32).

Thusingeographywehaveseenarangeofinterpretationsofhabit,fromneo-

Kantianconservationandroutine,(particularlyinrelationtoplace-making),through

tohabitasacontractionofmobileforcesoutofwhich(contingent)formsof

subjectivityareentrained.IntherestofthispaperIwanttoaddressthisshiftfrom

habitasmechanism/routinetohabitascontractionoflifeforcebyfirstofalltakinga

stepbacktoacknowledgethelong-standingphilosophicaldistinctionbetweenideas

oflifeforceandformsofnaturalorganisation/mechanismthatliebehindthe

distinctionsmadebetweenRaviassonandDewey.InthecourseofthisdiscussionI

argueforthevalueofDeweyanpragmatismincapturingbothvitalistideasofthe

environmentalongsideformsofactivity(especially,butnotexclusively,human

activity)asformsofnaturalorganisation/mechanism.Ratherthanreproducingthe

divisionbetweenlifeandmechanismpragmatismsuggestshowtoholdthem

togetherbutinawaythatlife(evenspontaneouslife)emergesfrommechanisms.

Thisinvolvesanexplorationofaworldlyideaofhabitandtheroleof‘experience’in

thecontractionofwidermaterialforces.Todothisthepaperfirstdiscusses

Ravaisson,DeleuzeandDewey’sideasofhabitinmoredetailbeforegoingonto

comparethem.

RavaissonandDeleuzeonhabit

RavaissonsituateshabitfirmlyinanAristoteliantraditionthatseeshabitasa

facilitativelifeforcethatreachesdownintonature(Ravaisson2008;Carlisle,2013).

Itisaproductofrepetition,notasroutine,butastheacquisitionofcapacities

throughthebody.Habitobservesa‘doublelaw’forRavaisson.Asanactivityis

repeated,thecapacityforfeelingorpassion(thatresultsfromtheorganism’s

passivityoropennesstotheworld)diminishesandthecapacityformovementor

actionisstrengthened.Atthesametimerepeatedhabitshavetheoppositeeffect

onmoralconduct,movingfromactivetopassive,fromsensationandmoral

sensibilitytowardsmoreunreflexiveaction.Habitbecomeslessandlessreflective

andmoreandmorecapable,thus“habitdemonstrate[s]continuitybetween

necessityandfreedom,willandnature”(Carlisle,2010:123).The“habit-body”isa

“dynamicunityofcapacitiesanddispositionstomove,tosense,toexperience,and

tounderstandinparticularways”(Carlisle,2013:162-3).Theseacquiredcapacities

canberealisedindifferentways–frombodyfinesseandaccomplishment(aformof

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‘grace’),throughtomoredegraded,compulsiveperformativitiesofthebodyin

formsofaddiction.ForRavaisson,moralgoodnessissuesoutofnature,asa

reflectionofdivinespirit.ItcontrastswiththemoretraditionalKantianview,which

seeshabitasroutinebehaviour,andasarestrictionorimpedimenttoreason,that

shouldbeconsideredseparatelyfrommorallife(Carlisle,2013).

Ravaisson’sAristotelian,moreexpansiveideaofhabit,reachingintonatureand

encompassingthetensionsofvitalenergies,hascreatedanintellectuallegacy–

fromRavaissontoBergson(2004)andhisideaof‘élanvital’and’fromBergson

throughtoDeleuzeandhisfigurationsofneo-vitalisminassemblagesofmaterials

andorganisms.InDeleuze’shands(1995)Ravaisson’svitalismbecomesmore

materialist,asmicroormolecularrepetitionsofmatteraccumulatetoform(new)

habits,mostlysub-consciously.RepetitionforDeleuzeisarepetitionofsingularities,

singularitiesresultingfromtheconstantproductionoflifeandmatterinavibrant

world.ItinclinesDeleuzeandGuattari(1987)towardsaviewofnatureas

mechanismormachine(theycallnaturea‘warmachine’),inthedualismbetween

lifeandmechanism.Howeverthatmechanismisseeninmaterialisttermsinwhat

JaneBennetthascalledDeleuzeandGuattari’s‘machinicmaterialism’(Bennett,

2010).Itisaninsistentforceofmatter,“thethousandsofpassivesynthesesof

whichweareorganicallycomposed”(Deleuze,1995,74)thatinsinuateschangeinto

‘primaryhabits’1.ForDeleuze(1995)changesinoutwardperformancearetheresult

ofintensebiologicalactivitythatisnotsensibletotheactorashabitanditinvolves

body-brain-environmentadaption(Bissell,2013:122).Againitgivesautonomyto

lifeforce(asmachinicmaterialism).

HabitforDeleuzeisacontractionofmatterandthetemporalitiesemergentfrom

thewaythatmatter(inorganicthroughtoorganic)contractstheforcesofthat

compriseitspresentcondition:“[m]aterialityisitselfatendencytoelaboration,to

temporization,theprocessofbecomingaliveoftheinorganic:totheextentthat

mattercancontracttheforcesthatproduceitsparticularform,itisthistendency,

thispotentialityorthisvirtualorientation”(Grosz2013,231).Thisvirtualorientation

isanopeningout“withitsnecessaryduplicationofthepresentandtheactualwith

theunspentforcesofthepastandthevirtual”(233).Repetitionisarepetitionof

singularitiesthatproducedifferenceemergingfromtheramifyingforceoflife.As

Grosz(2013)definesit,fromaDeleuzianperspective,“habitisthepointoftransition

betweenlivingbeingsandmatter,enablingeachtobetransformedthroughits

engagementwiththeother”(Grosz2013,217).Shegoeson(andinawaythat

1InpursuingthisargumentDeleuzeandGuattari(1987)relinquishtheirnaturalism

foramoretranscendentideaoftheconstantforceofmatter,‘forcefulmaterialism’

(DewsburyandBissell2015).PaulPattonhasarguedrecently(2016)thatDeleuze

cannotbeseenasanaturalistphilosopher,relyingashedoesoncertain

transcendentalideals,suchasthenotionof‘absolutede-territorialisation’.

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uncannilyresonateswithDewey’sideaofenvironment/organism‘transactions’-

discussedbelow)“…habitsarehowenvironmentsimpactandtransformtheforms

oflifetheyaccommodateandarethemselvesimpactedandtransformedbythese

formsoflife”(219).Thus,asorganisms,“humansemergefromacontractionof

habitswhicharestabilisedfrom‘unthinking’networksofrelations”(Colebrook2016,

258).

Theideaofhabitasacontractionofmatterwithdifferenttemporalitiesreflectshow

habithasacomplexrelationshiptotimeforDeleuze–inhisthethreesynthesesof

time.Habitinvolvesthepassivesynthesesthatconstituteapresent(firstsynthesis);

“habitisthefoundationoftime,themovingsoiloccupiedbythepassingpresent”

(Deleuze1995,79).Thesepassivesynthesesallowforsensationandreceptivityof

theorganism,thesynthesesoforganicandinorganicinteractionsandtheir

temporalities,inthebody.Memoryisamoreactivesynthesisoftime,inwhat

Bergsoncalleda‘purepast’(secondsynthesis).Ratherthanthepresentbeingan‘is’

andthepastan‘isnot’(orhasbeen)thefleetingnatureofthepresent,‘isnot’and

thepurepast‘is’throughtheselectionsofmemory(Smith2013).Buttheactive

synthesisofmemoryrequiresthepassivesynthesisofhabitsuchthat“habitisthe

constitutiverootofthesubject,andthesubjectatrootisthesynthesisoftime-the

synthesisofthepresentandthepastinthelightofthefuture”(Deleuze1991,93).

Thustimeisamanifoldofactiveandpassivesyntheses.Memorycausesthepresent

toflowbackintothepast,tobewhatthepresentisforthepast.Butwhilstmemory

particularisestimetheseparticularitiesaren’tnecessarilydifferentmoments

(O’Keefe2016).Similarlyhabittendstosmoothtime,tomakeitintogeneralities.

ForDeleuzebothmemoryandhabitmustberesistedinfavourofrepetition,asa

formofanticipationorvirtualitythatdifferentiatesandrepeatsonlysingularities

(seeO’Keefe2016,85-87)toproducethenew(future),orthirdsynthesisoftime.

ThetensionsandcomplexitiesofDeleuze’srenderingoftimearespatialisedby

geographersbydevelopinghisideasofassemblage,territorialisationandde-

territorialisation.Habitscanbeseenasmind-body-matterassemblagesthrough

which,thecontractionofmatterworks,from‘thethousandsofpassivesyntheses’of

matterallthewaythroughtodiscursiveformationsandterritorialisationsofmore

enduringmeaning.Thereareexcellentexemplificationsofthisin,forexample,

Dewsbury’s(2015)exampleoftheinstantiationofmatterviabodyroutinewithinthe

habitlandscapes(anddiscursiveformations)ofmilitarydrill(discussedabove).

TheRavaisson/Deleuzevitalistapproachseeshabitasacontractionoflifeforcethat,

throughits‘occupation’offorces,makeschangepossible.Habitsareplastic

(Dewsbury2015)andthusdistinctfromhabitasmechanismorformoforganisation,

especiallyanykindofself-legislatingorganisationthatonemightaccordtohumans.

ThislatterpointiswherediscussionsofhabitintheRavaissonian/Deleuzianmould

8

acknowledgebutthenveerawayfrommorepragmatistaccountsofhabit(seenas

socialmechanismswhichcanbereformed).Wenowturninmoredetailtothose

pragmatistaccounts.

Deweyonhabit,situationandexperience

HabitsarecentraltoJohnDewey’spragmatistphilosophyoforganism-environment

activity.Theycanbeseenasprimaryunitsoforientationoflifeactivity,orlife

function.Deweydefineshabitas:

“thatkindofhumanactivitywhichisinfluencedbyprioractivityandinthatsense

acquired;whichcontainswithinitselfacertainorderingorsystemisationofminor

elementsofaction;whichisprojective,dynamicinquality,readyforovert

manifestation”(Dewey1981a:31-2,myemphasis).

Theorderingorsystemisationinvolveshabitsin“settingupamechanismofaction,

physiologicallyingrained,whichoperates‘spontaneously’automaticallywhenever

thecueisgiven.Butmechanizationisnotofnecessityallthereistohabit”(Dewey

1981a:50).BythisDeweymeansthathabitsarealsoenabling(seealsoSchwanenet

al2012).LikeRavaisson,DeweytakesanexplicitlyAristotelianinterpretationof

habitsascapacitiesratherthanconstraints,whichareasmuchenvironmentalas

purelyorganic.Theyare“thingsdonebytheenvironmentbymeansoforganic

structuresoracquireddispositions”(Dewey1981a:15).Thus“functionsandhabits

arewaysofusingandincorporatingtheenvironmentinwhichthelatterhasitssay

assurelyastheformer”(p.15,myemphasis).Sincehabitsare(inpart)inthe

environmenttheyarealsonotconfinedwithinorganisms,letalonehuman

organisms.Theycomprise“mind-body-environmentalassemblages”(Bennettetal

2013,12)thatareconstantlyinterrelated,suchthatcertainorganicactionsarealso

environmentaladjustments.Thistensionbetweenhumanhabitsandenvironment

canbethoughtofastretchingorstrainingofhumanorganicrelationswiththeir

environments,whichisencapsulatedinDewey’scoreideaof‘transaction’.

Transactionreferstotheongoingco-constitutionoforganismandenvironment.By

thisDeweymeansthatenvironment-organismrelationsarenotthoseofinteraction

betweenrounded-outobjectsandcompletehumansbutareratherco-constitutive

processualrelationships.Thusorganicresponsestoanobjectoranenvironmental

featurearenottoitbutintoit(Dewey,1896:358).Organicactivityisnotconfined

totheorganismitselfbutis“asmuchinprocessesacrossand‘through’asin

processes‘within’skins”(Dewey2008b:119;Sullivan2001).Thisdissolvingofthe

distinctionsbetweenorganismandenvironmentispartofDewey’swiderpragmatist

9

efforttodissolveothertraditionalphilosophicaldualisms:-ofsubject-object,mind-

bodyandculture-nature.

Habitsarebundlesofenvironment-organismtransactionsandareinparticular

associatedwithallmobilehigherorganisms.Theycontainformsofintelligent

responsetotheenvironment,instilledinbodies(whatDeweycalled‘had’knowledge

-knowledgethatisintelligentbutnon-cognitive,asopposedtomorereflective

‘known’knowledge).Habitsapplytohigherorganismsasaresultoftheirmore

complexorganisationinthewaythattheytransactwiththeenvironment:

“Incontrastwithlowerorganisms…ahigherorganismactswithreferencetoa

spreadoutenvironmentasasinglesituation.Whatthesehigherorganismsdois

conditionedbyconsequencesofpastactivities:thereislearningorhabit-formation.

Inconsequence,anorganismactswithreferencetoatime-spread,aserialorderof

events,asaunit,justasitdoesinreferencetoaunifiedspatialvariety…Theaction

calledorganicisnotjustthatofinternalstructures;itisanintegrationoforganic-

environmentalconnections”(Dewey1981b:213,myemphases).

Therearetwokeypointshere.Thefirstisthatorganicactivityisasmuchafunction

ofenvironmentalrelationsasitisofrelationsthatareinternaltotheorganism.The

secondisthattheideaof‘situation’iskeyforDeweyanpragmatism;“theexistence

ofsituationsisaprimaryfact”(Dewey2012,239fn).Ifhabitsareprojective

dispositions,situationsareextensiveandenduringfields,ormodalities,ofthose

dispositions.Thisisafunctionofthefactthathigherorganismsrelyonmorevaried

andcomplexmixesofenvironments,whichincreasestheirvulnerabilitybutalso

enrichestheirhabitsandcapacitiesforresponse.

Thesituationalcontextsofhabitsbecomeespeciallyimportantwhenenvironment-

organismfunctioningencountersobstaclesordifficulties.Wheresituationsbecome

unfamiliartohabitualaction,orwhenestablishedhabitsclash,theybecomewhat

Deweycalled‘problematicsituations’(Dewey1986).Insomesensesthisunsettled

situationisafailureofhabitaslifefunctiontoensurethatlifegoeson.Thisis

experiencedqualitativelybyhigherorganismsinfeelingsofunease,apprehension,

fear-whicharesituational(notindividual),“itisthesituationthatis,forexample,

apprehensive”(Dewey1981b:xi).Theexperience(includingemotionalforce)ofthe

disturbance,issituational,asarethesubconsciousattemptstoresolveit(re-

arrangingenvironmentalmaterials,re-arrangingthesituation).Theprimaryenergies

ofhabitarebrokendowninthesituation–sothereissituationalconditioningat

workaswell.Ifproblematicsituationschallengehabitthenitishabitthatisthefirst

stepinre-framingtheproblem-solution(Dewey1986).Materialsinthesituationin

part-frametheemergentproblem-solution(ratherthansimplyrelyingonsomekind

ofrecallfromorganicmemory).

10

Apragmaticapproachthusplaceshabitinrelation(onacontinuum)to

problematisationandenquiry.Thereisa‘patternofenquiry’(Dewey1986)inwhich

habitiscentral.Habitisboththemediumandthemeanstoinitiatetransformation.

Equally,habitsproduceactionsand“theactmustcomebeforethoughtandhabit

beforetheabilitytoevokethoughtatwill”(Dewey1981a:25).Habitsarethebasis

for(moreoccasional)reflectivethoughtiftheproblematicsituationcannotbe

resolvedbyembodied,non-cognitiveaction.Thebaseoftheadjustmentisbiological

butthecontinuityofresponsecanbepushedallthewayintothecognitive/reflective

realm:“...Theneedforthisredirectionisthebase,biologically,oftensionandin-

tension,ofat-tentionandin-tention”(Dewey2012,223).‘Thought’asanatural

phenomenonistypicallysocialratherthanindividual,involvingcommunicationand

conflictoverproblems.‘Mind’issomethingachievedthroughcommunication,

ratherthanbeinganindividualcognitiveability.Clashesofhabitsinitiateformsof

reasoning:thecommunicativeorganisationofconflictingordiversehabits(Dewey

1981b;Bridge2005).

Habitsalsohaveaprofoundroleinthepragmatistepistemologyoforganism-

environmentrelations,aspartofawiderinterpretationoftheideaofhuman

‘experience’.Theenvironmenthereisthe“wholebiosocioculturalcontextofthisor

thatexperience”(Fesmire,2015,51).AsDeweyargues:

“experienceisofaswellasinnature.Itisnotexperiencethatisexperiencedbut

nature–stones,plants,animals,diseases,health,temperature,electricityandsoon.

Thingsinteractingincertainwaysareexperience…Experiencereachesdowninto

nature;ithasdepth.Italsohasbreadthandtoaninfinitelyelasticextent.It

stretches”(Dewey1981b:12-13,emphasisinoriginal).

Experienceencompassesmorethanwhatisactively‘known’.Itislimitedineffects,

bothinevolutionarytimeandbeingdependent“on[natural]forcesthatgotheir

ownwaywithoutourwishorplan”(Dewey1981a:200).Butasanobjective(rather

thanindividualorsubjective)force,experience(ofhigherorganisms)contributesto

theshapingofemergentnaturalprocesses.Thisisinpartbecausehigherorganisms,

especiallyhumans,areextensivelyinterconnectedwithdifferentenvironments,via

‘situations’orfieldsofhabitdispositionsof‘mind-body-environmentalassemblages’

(Bennettetal2013,12).

ComparingRavaisson,DeleuzeandDewey

Ravaisson,DeleuzeandDeweythusseehabitsasenablingdispositionsandforces

thatareimplicatedinchange.Neverthelesstherearemarkedcontrastsbetween

DeweyandRavaisson’s/Deleuze’sviewsofhabit.Thiscanbeseeninanumberof

11

interrelatedwaysthroughtheirideasofhabitinenvironment-organismrelationsand

thedistinctionsbetweenlifeandmechanism.

Intermsofhabitprocesses,forRavaissonhabitcanbeviewedasaformofrepetition

resultinginarangeofperformativeoutcomes.These‘performativepractices’are

understoodastheongoingintensivedynamicsofhabit,whererepetitionis

productiveofdifferencethat(unnoticed)canproduceapermanentchangein

dispositions(DewsburyandBissell2015).Deweyagreesthathabitscanbeacquired

byrepetition(keyforRavaissonandDeleuze)butthisisnottheiressence(Pedwell,

2016).Ratheritisthemodeofresponse;thewayofrespondingtosituationsthatis

key.Tothinkaboutrepetitionleadingtohabit“putsthecartbeforethehorse”

(Dewey1986:39):itisbecauseorganismshavehabitsthatrepetitionispossible.

Ratherthanthepossibilityofaestheticrefinementinbodilymovement(forexample)

beingamanifestationofakindofharmonicresonanceoforganismandenvironment

(asRavaissonsuggests),Deweyseesenvironmentalchangeasinevitable,resultingin

problematicsituations.Habitsarethosebundlesofenvironment-organism

transactionsthatarechallenged,aswellasbeingtheinitialmeansoftheirresolution,

transformation,oradaptation.

Therearealsocontrastingattitudestoenvironment-organismboundariesand

relations.Ravaisson’sandDeleuze’sinterpretationofthepassivityandpermeability

oftheorganismtothevitalenvironment(aslifeforceormaterialforce),andthe

imperceptiblechangesunderlyingmotor-sensorychangesto‘primaryhabits’that

result,fromaDeweyanperspective,seemstooone-directionalandone-sidedin

favouroflifeforce.Itmissesouttheorganisingenergiesandmodesofresponse

thatwecanseeintherelationshipbetweenhabits,andbetweensituationandhabit.

Intransactionaltermshabits“incorporateanenvironmentwithinthemselves.They

areadjustmentsoftheenvironment,notmerelytoit”(Dewey1981a:38,emphasis

inoriginal).ThevitalforceofrepetitionconceivedbyRavaissonandDeleuzeas

primaryhabitscannotimplychangethroughsimplelifeforce;thepushisalreadyin

part-organisedtosomedegree,itisalreadyparthabit(asaresultofprior

transactions).ThisiswhyDeweyarguesthathabitsandbehaviourcannotbe

changedbyreflectivewill,butonlyenvironmentally.AdifficultyofRaviassonand

Deleuze’saccountsofvitalismasakindofinsistentforcethatpermeateshabits,I

suggest,isthat,undertheguiseofsuggestingthecontinuousinterpenetration

environmentandorganism,itstrangelyreproducesacertainseparationbetweenthe

two:oneinwhichanenvironment(spiritualormaterial)isendowedwith

autonomouslifewhichaffectsthereceptive/passive‘habitsproper’

(Bergson/Raviasson)or‘primaryhabits’(Deleuze)oftheorganismtoinstantiatethe

change.Apragmatistconsiderationoftheorganisingenergiesoftransaction,

situationandexperiencepointtowidersocio-environmentalconditioningsthat

12

pointtocomplexgeographiesbetweenthe‘forcefulmaterialism’and‘affectmilieu’

identifiedincurrentgeographicalresearch(DewsburyandBissell2015).

Thisbringsustothedistinctionbetweenideasoflifeforceandmechanism.This

debatehaspersistedindifferentguisesinphilosophyoverseveralhundredyears.

Ravaissonwasinsomesensesrespondinginhistime(OfHabitwaspublishedin

1838)tothegrowinginfluenceofnaturalsciencewhichthreatenedtoexplainmuch

ofhumanlifeinmechanisticterms,andtowhichtheideaofvitallifewasarepostto

defendatheisticideaofspirit.Intermsofthecontemporarydebateoverhabits

Deleuzetakestheideaoflifeforcebutasamechanismoftheconstantforceof

matter.IncontrastDeweyseeshabitasmechanismthatdifferentlyorganiseslife

force.

Testa(2017)hasarguedrecentlythatinHumanNatureandConductDewey

developedastrongcriticismofideasoflifeforce(suchasBergson’svitalism,and,by

implication,Ravaisson’sonwhomBergsondraws)that“assumeadualismbetween

lifeandmechanism”(Testa2017:9).Deweyarguesthatalllifeismechanism.Inthe

caseofhumanorganismsitisaphysiologicalstructure,reachingintothe

environment,whichconstitutesamodeofspontaneousresponse.Butaswehave

seeninhisideaofhabit“mechanisationisnotofnecessityallthereistohabit”

(Dewey1981a:50,emphasisinoriginal).Italsopermitscreativityorvirtuosity(an

intelligentratherthanroutineuseofmechanism).

Dewey’spointthat‘alllifeismechanism’ismadeinanumberofways.Firstisthe

basicdifferentiationbetweenorganicformsoflifewithmorecomplexorganisms

havingmoreinteractivemechanisms:

“Alllifeoperatesthroughamechanism,andthehighertheformoflifethemore

complex,sureandflexiblethemechanism.Thisfactaloneshouldsaveusfrom

opposinglifeandmechanism,therebyreducingthelattertounintelligent

automatismandtheformertoanaimlesssplurge”(Dewey1981a:51)

Habitsasmechanismscantakedifferentforms,intermsoflevelsofskill,orintensity,

andhavedifferentlevelsofenergyacross(andindeedwithin)organisms.Thus,

ratherthanaseparationofcreativeélanvitalfromhabittoallowsomeforsomesort

ofspontaneityinnature,Deweymaintainsthatallformsofaction,frommechanical

actionthroughtothatofthecreativityoftheartist,arejustdifferenttypesof

mechanism.AsTesta(2017)argues,habitforDeweyisability,anartthatisformed

bypastexperience.Habitscanbeexpressive:thevirtuosoartistorperformeristhe

accomplishedtechnician“whofusesmechanismwiththoughtandfeeling”(Dewey

1981a:51).Therearehabitsthatarefullofenergyandexpansivenessandother

habitsthatstagnateanddelimitgrowth:‘living’and‘dead’habitsrespectively

(1981a).Flexiblehabitshavetobeinstantiatedinanautomaticway,justasmuchas

13

inflexibleones.Theforceandimpactoflifeenergycanalsochangewithin

mechanisms,aslivinghabitsbecomedeadones,asintelligent,reflexivehabits

becomeinflexibleandroutine.Mechanismsofsocialhabit(customs)organisemore

impulsive,spontaneousbehaviour:“themeaningofnativeactivitiesisnotnative:it

isacquired.Itdependsoninteractionwithamaturedsocialmedium”(1981a:65).

Thustheforceofhabitvarieswiththechangingnatureofthe(biosocial)

environment.This,Isuggest,hasadoubleeffect:intheorganisationofrepetition

‘goingin’tohabit(incontrasttothelineareffectofmaterialism)andintheway

repetitionis,orisnot,‘takenup’–theforce(orotherwise)thatithas.Someforces

maymisfire,ornot‘catch’inthisway.Lifeforcerequiresorganisation.Thatiswhy

Deweycriticisesthe‘aimlessspurge’thatheattributestopartofBergson’s(andby

implicationRavaisson’s)ideaofvitalism.

Mechanismsofhabitinteractinginamaturedsocialmediuminevitablyleadtoa

pluralityofhabitualdispositionsorwaysofresponding.Inseeinglifeforceas

insistentpressurecontractedbyhabitsintotheaestheticsofbodilypracticesand

subjectivities,contemporarygeographicalresearchhasbeenlessconcernedwith

thisfieldofcontestationofhabits.Conflictoverhabitsandthepluralityofhabits,for

anindividualorganismoragroupofhumanorganisms,finallybringsthecognitive

phaseofactionintoplay.Againingeographythefocusonhabitandaffecteclipses

anyconsiderationsoftherelationshipbetweenhabitandcognitionor‘thought’,

especiallywhenthelatterisassumedtobeassociatedwithsovereignwillandreason.

ForDeweyconflictbetweenhabitsrequiresresolutionandthatdemandsreflective

judgementonhabitorthejustificationbetweenconflictinghabits.Itisherethat

Dewey’scriticismoftheseparationofmechanismandlifeinrelationtohabithas

realbiteintermsofwidersocialcritique.Habitcanbecome(orbeenforcedas)a

mechanismthatisopposedtolife,informsof“over-mechanisation”(Testa2017,11)

inwhichorganicmechanizationisturnedintoinorganicmechanisation.This,for

example,informsDewey’sanalysisofthereificationofindustriallabourinwhich

livingpatternsofinteractionbecomeroutinehabitandthemechanisationof

productionturnsthehabitsofworkersintomechanisticones:reinforcinganhistoric

divisionbetweenthelabour/workingclassandleisure/bourgeoisclasses.Thusa

dualityoflifeandmechanismcanbecomeaforceofsocialdominationand

oppression2.Deweygoesontosuggesthowdualitiesoflifeandmechanismcanbe

overcome,throughinterventionsaimedatmelioratingandreformingthe

environmentandsituationofhabits.

ThefinalcontrastbetweenRavaissonian/Deleuzianandpragmatistapproachesto

habitisintherelationshipofhabittotimeandspace.Deleuze’semphasison

2HereDewey’ssocialcritiquehasconnectionstoideasofreificationandalienation

inMarxism(Bridge2013).

14

emergenceandconstant-becomingputshabitinthepresentasacontractionof

naturebutwithapassiverelationtotimethroughthe“thethousandsofpassive

syntheses”oforganiccomposition,“themovingsoiloccupiedbythepassingpresent”

(Deleuze1995,79).Memoryisamoreactivesynthesisoftimebutonethat

particularisesthroughanalogy(andthuslosesdifferenceornovelty).Deleuze’s

orientationistovirtuality:thepressofthefutureinthepresent,throughthe

repetitionofsingularities.

Incontrast,theDeweyanapproachtohabitemphasisesa‘live’presentinfusedwith

thepossibilitiesofthepast,inwhich“thepresentiscomplex,containingwithinits

selfamultitudeofhabitsandimpulses”(Pedwell,2016,110).Progressisanincrease

inpresentmeaning(110)inenvironment/organismtransactions.Intermsofmy

argumentsaboutthelinksbetweenhabit,situationandexperience-enduringand

extensivespatio-temporalsituations(ofhuman,non-humanandobjectrelations)in

experiencearepotentiallyrelevanttotheimmediateproblematicsituation.Dewey

(2012)seemstoimplythattheseextensiveandenduringenvironmentsinstantiated

inhabitandactioncanbethoughtofasakindofmeta-situation.Unliketheever-

becoming,emergent,future-forcingemphasisofRavaissonandDeleuze,this

operationofcombinedexperiencethroughhabitchargesor‘inhabits’thepresent

(Pedwell2016)3.Whilststillsharingaprocessontologythispragmatistapproach

opensupthepresenttomoreactive,action-orientatedinterventionthan

Deleuze/Ravaisson-inspiredgeographicalresearchinwhichhabitisa‘passive

synthesis’inapassingpresent.

Achargedpresentoffersthepotentialforare-arrangementofhabitenvironments

andthepossibilitiesofchangingthemechanismsofhabitsthroughsocialreform.In

thenextsectionIconsiderseveralaspectsofthis:educationpolicyandthe

formationofhabits;overcomingtheclashofhabitstoenablecollaborative

mobilisationforwelfarereform;therelationshipbetweenhabitsandinstitutions

throughinstitutionaldesignandinnovationforsocialreform;theroleofhabitin

framingenvironmentalpolicy.Thiscapturestherangeofinfluencesofhabit:from

theirformation;conflictofestablishedhabits;theinstitutionalisationofhabits;and

habitsasthebackgroundconditionofwiderproblematisations,suchas

environmentalism.

3Thisorientationtoacomplexpresentreflects,Isuggest,Dewey’swidersuspicion

oftreatmentsofchangeasever-becoming,inwhathecallsphilosophiesofflux,

whichactuallyreveal“theintensityoffeelingforthesureandthefixed”(Dewey

1981b:49).Philosophiesofflux(inwhichheincludesBergson’sideas)“[defy]

changebymakingituniversal,regular,sure”(49),yetanotherquestforcertainty,

ratherthan“acalltoeffort,achallengetoinvestigation,apotentialdoomofdisaster

anddeath”(49).

15

Habit,situationandpublicpolicy

InthissectionIconsidertwohistoricalinterventionsinhabitformationandtheclash

ofhabitsfromDewey’sowntime(inwhichhewaspersonallyinvolved)beforegoing

ontodiscusscontemporarypragmatist-inspiredanalysesoftherelationship

betweenhabitsandinstitutionalchangeandtheroleofhabitinpragmatist

environmentalpolicy.Inallthesecasestherelationshipbetweenhabitsand

problematisationarekey.

Afocusonthemechanismsofhabit(andconcernwithover-mechanisation)relates

stronglytotheformationofhabits,especiallyintheyoung.AsaphilosopherDewey

isprobablybestknownforhisworkoneducation(Dewey1980;2008a).Hethought

thateducationpolicyandpracticecouldhelpcultivatemoreintelligenthabits.He

criticisedtheUSschoolingsystemforitschalk-and-talkapproachtolearningandits

mechanisedwayofinculcatinghabits(intheformofsocialcustoms)intopupils,an

approachthatdeniedthemtheirnaturalcapacitiesasproblem-solvingorganisms

transactingwiththeirenvironment.Therewascreativepotentialthatcouldbe

encouragedintheyoungbeforetheirhabitsbecametooset.ThisiswhyDeweyput

somuchemphasisoneducationasacatalystforsocialreformmorewidely.

ForDeweytheproblemwiththeeducationsystemwasthatitembeddedand

reproducedcertaintraditionalvalues,thatatabroader,philosophicallevel,

separatedtheoryfrompractice,bodyfrommind,culturefromutilityandthe

labouringfromtheleisureclasses(Westbrook1991,172-3).In1894heestablished

theLaboratorySchoolinChicagotoinstigatehisideasofcooperativeproblem-

solvingeducation.Inthisapproachpupils’habitswerechallengedbyproblematic

situations(introducedaspartofthecurriculum)throughwhichtheirdifferenthabits

andperspectiveswerebroughttobearinordertosolve,incollaborationwithother

pupils(ratherthanasindividuals).Aswesawintherelationshipbetweenhabitand

enquiry,habitsarealsothefirstmoveintheformulationofproblem-solutions.Thus

inteachingchildrenhowtothinkitwasimportantnottoforce“alineofaction

contrarytonaturalinclinations”(Dewey1980:41,seeWestbrook1991,172)butto

incorporate‘presentoccupations’intothecurriculumtousethosedispositionsin

situationsthatbestopenedthemuptootherinfluencesandinclinations,through

cooperativeenquiry.Theschoolasamicro-socialworldallowedexperimentation

withformsofcooperativeenquiryandproblemsolvingthatwouldusherinmore

establishedformsofknowledge(suchasscientificknowledge).Inre-orientating

educationawayfrommechanisedhabittohabitasfuelforcreativeandcooperative

problemsolvingtheDeweyschoolhadconsiderablesuccess(MayhewandEdwards

1966)

16

Aswellaspolicyworkontheformationofhabitsinchildren,theclashofalready-

establishedhabitsofadultscanbebothobstructiveandproductiveforfurthersocial

reform.Thesignificanceofhabitinexperimentsinsocialreformwasevidentinthe

caseofthe19th/20

thcenturysettlementhousemovement,inwhichmiddle-class

philanthropistslivedandworkedinlow-incomeneighbourhoodstotrytofacilitate

differentformsofwelfarereform.Thismovement,inspiredbyToynbeeHallin

London,spreadacrosscitiesoftheUSandformedanascentwelfaremovement,

someoftheinitiativesofwhichwerelaterinstitutionalisedbytheUSFederalState.

OnekeycatalystofthismovementwastheHullHousesettlementinapoorItalian-

AmericanneighbourhoodinChicago,runbyJaneAddams,apragmatistcollaborator

withDewey(DeweywasontheBoardofTrusteesofHullHouse).

Intryingtoestablishcollaborationbetweenmiddle-classphilanthropistsand

working-classresidents,classandethnicdivisionswerenegotiatedthroughthe

‘interspatialities’(Jackson2001)ofHullHouse,usingdifferentcontextsofinteraction

tobreakdownandreshapeunderlying,embodiedhabits.Danceclasses,arangeof

sportingactivities,dramaandmusicalperformancewereallusedaswaysofeasing

theembodiedencounteranddevelopingtrustandcollaborationbetweenHullHouse

andneighbourhoodresidents.Workingonhabitinthiswayhelpedprovidethe

platformforstrongercollaborationonwidersocialinitiatives-overchildcare,air

pollution,neighbourhoodlaundryfacilitiesandmutualsavingsschemes,tonamebut

afew(Addams1969).

Aswelltheclashofhabitsproducingtheconditionsforexperimentalsocialreform

habithasalsobecomethefocusformoreformalpolicyintervention.Ina

contemporarycontextoneprominentexampleis‘nudge’policy,which

acknowledgesthesignificanceofhabitinhumanbehaviour,butusesvariouscues

andincentivesto‘nudge’habitualbehaviourinadifferentdirection(Thalerand

Sunstein2008).FromapragmatistperspectivePedwell(2017)critiquesnudgepolicy

pointingtoitsoverly-individualisedideaofhabitanditsnarrowfocusoncertainacts

oreventsthatprovidetheopportunityfornudging‘bad’choicestowards‘good’

ones4.IncontrastPedwell(2017)arguesforapragmatistapproachwhichoffersa

deeperanalysisoftheenvironmentalconditioningofhabitsandtheunderstanding

thattheyaredispositionsormodesofbehaviourthatrequiremuchmorebroadly

coordinatedandcollaborativepolicyresponses.Thisseesinterventionsin

societal/environmentalratherthanindividualterms.InthesameveinSchwanenet

al(2012)lookingattransportgeographiesseethewiderenvironmentofhabitas

crucialinchangingpatternsofbehaviour,inthiscaseencouraginglesscaruseinthe

bidforlow-carbonmobilities.TakinginspirationfromDewey’semphasison

4Its‘libertarianpaternalism’isalsoatargetofpragmatistcritique–seealso

Jonesetal(2011).

17

changingtheobjectiveconditionsofhabit(ratherrelyingonchangesofthoughtor

intentionontheonehand,ornudginghabitsontheother)Schwanenetalusehis

ideaofcustomassocialhabitstorecommendthatbroaderinfrastructuralchange

andawiderangeofstakeholders(beyondindividualcarusers)arerequiredto

transitiontonon-carbasedmobility.Theytoolooktotheyoungergenerationand

educationinitiativestoencouragetheformationoflow-carbonmobilityhabits,

pointingtosocietieswherethesecustomsaremoredeveloped(suchasthecycling

cultureintheNetherlands).

Thelevelofoperationneededtodealwiththedistributednatureofhabit,in

combinationwithDewey’sideathatsocialhabitscongealascustomsandare

institutionalisedinvariousways,means,Iwouldargue,thatinstitutionaldesignisa

particularlyappropriatelevelofinterventioninpragmatistpolicy-making.This

accordswithpragmatist-inspiredeconomicthinking,whichseesinstitutionalforms

ofactivityasbeingbasedonhabits(Veblen2002[1919]),whatGronow(2008)calls

‘habitualinstitutionalism’.Thischallengestheutilitarian,individualistcost-benefit

(rational-choice)approachesthatdominatecontemporarypolicyassessmentsand

interventions.Italsoopposesbehaviouraleconomics,whichdoesfocusontherole

ofhabit(suchasinnudgepolicy),butinwaysthatareoverlyindividualisehabits,

andareconcernedwithacts,ratherthanmorecontinuousdistributedmodesof

action,asPedwell(2017)argued.

Pragmatist-inspiredinstitutionalandpolicyanalystsexplorevariousinstitutional

designmechanismsthatgetusbeyondrational-choicemechanismsofincentive

compatibilitybetweeninstitutionsandcitizens,orbehaviouralarchitecturesthat

seektonudgetowardsgoodbehaviour.Theyadvocateinstitutionalexperimentation

asawayofdealingwiththeeffectsofnewtypesofinteractionsandentanglements

onhabitsinhuman,non-human,objectassemblagesthatproducenewproblematic

situations.

Pragmaticanalysisalsosuggestsasecond(higher)-orderfunctionofdemocratic

inputinthemonitoringoftheoutcomesofdifferentinstitutionalchoicesthatresult

fromexperimentation.Thisisalsoawayofstructuringdisagreementoverdifferent

institutionalchoices,aswellasdealingwiththeassociatedcostsofinstitutional

experimentationfordifferentsectionsofthepopulation(KnightandJohnson2011).

Institutionalexperimentationandmonitoringinvolvesarangeofdeliberative

forums,suchascitizen’sjuriesandpublicevaluationcommittees.Thisiswhat

ArchonFunghascalledpragmaticequilibrium–wheredemocraticagreementis

achievedthroughthepragmatictestingoftheconsequencesofdifferent

institutionalformsandpolicyarchitectures.Hecontrastspragmaticequilibriumto

thefamous“reflectiveequilibrium”ofRawls’s(1972)cognitive,rationalistapproach

topoliticaldisagreementandconflictinliberal,pluralistsocieties.WhatIarguehere

18

isthatthispragmatic,experimental,action-orientedapproachtoinstitutional

innovationexplicitlyengages,andproductivelyacknowledges,theroleofestablished

habitsandtheclashofhabitstoamuchgreaterextentthanitscognitive,rational-

choiceequivalent.Fungoutlinesaseriesofinitiativesthatdemonstratethis

institutionalexperimentation,suchaslocal,community-ledinstitutionalinnovations

tocounterracistpolicingpracticesandoverschoolreformincertainAfrican-

AmericanneighbourhoodsinChicago(Fung2001),aswellastheuseofcitizen’s

juriestodecidenewpoliticalinstitutionalarrangementsintheformofanewvoting

systeminBritishColumbia,Canada(Fung2007;seealsoWrightandFung2003).

Finally,(andbriefly)beyondmoreimmediateinstitutionalconcerns,habitcanalso

providethecontextforthewidestpossiblelevelofproblematisationandpolicy-

framing.Environmentalpragmatismhasadistinctiveapproachtoenvironmental

ethicsandpolicyinarguingagainstprominent(non-anthropological)argumentsthat

placeanintrinsicvalueonnature,separatefromhumaninterests(LightandKatz

1996;Weston1985).Centraltothisispragmatism’s‘transactionalrealism’(Sleeper

1986)thatdeniestheseparationoforganism-environmentinwhich,asIhave

discussed,habits(includinghumanhabits)andvaluesare‘in’theenvironment,just

asmuchastheenvironmentisinhabit.Apluralityofhabitsandvaluesinhereinthe

environment,towardswhichadeliberativeapproachtoenvironmentalethicsmust

beaddressed(ratherthanthemoreprominentunitary,all-encompassingapproach)

aspartofmoreparticipatory,democraticprocessofenvironmentalpolicy-making

(Norton1991;Minteer2012).

Conclusion

Apragmatistapproachtotheroleofhabitastheintermediaryinorganism-

environmentrelationshasanumberofaspectsthatrecommenditforgeographical

analysis.First,likethecurrentDeleuzeorRavaisson-inspiredresearchthe

pragmatistideaoforganism-environmenttransactionsacknowledgesavital

environment.Throughitsideaofexperienceasobjectiveforceitalsorecognisesthe

continuityofhumanlifewithnature.However,byrefusingtograntautonomous

forcetolife(élanvital),itavoidsthemoretranscendentalaspectsofvitalist

approachestohabit(spiritforRavaisson,aninsistentmaterialismforDeleuze).This

insistentempiricalorientationofpragmatismsuggestshowhabit,ratherthansimply

beingcontractionoflifeforce,isamechanismoforganisationoflifeforceswith

differentlevelsofexpression,someofwhichmaybeimprovisedorspontaneous

(suchasmechanismsunderlyingartisticexpression)inthewaythatavitalist

approachsuggests,butothersofwhichmightbe(over)mechanisedandpersistent

inwaysthatconstrictlife.

19

Ithinkthisgivesscopetoproblematizethemechanismsofhabitmuchmorethanits

vitalistrenderingingeography.Ratherthancreatingdualismsbetween’habit

memory’and‘habitproper’(thelatterresultingfromlifeforce)apragmatistview

seeshabitasonacontinuumoforganisationalformsthatmediatenaturalforces

(associatedwithdifferenthigherorganisms;frommechanisedtomoreexpressive

habitswithinorganisms).Thismakeswhatisanemergentdispositionalviewofhabit

muchmoreopentoproblematisationandintervention.Attentiontomechanisms

andlevelsoforganisationstartstodistinguishdifferentenvironmentsofhabit,which,

forhigherorganisms,areextensiveandcomplex.Thisgivesscopeforgeographical

analysisofenvironmentsofhabitandtracingtherelativitiesofspace(treatedas

extensivesituationsorfieldsthatsuchhabitsencompass).Apragmatistideaofhabit

alsoproblematizestime,butratherthandeflatingtheroleofthepresentasDeleuze

does(partofthewider20thcenturycritiqueofthemetaphysicsofpresence),

pragmatismusesaprocessontologytounderstandthepresentasfundedor‘live’

andopentopossibilitiesofintervention.Inthispresent,habitsareinterruptedby

problematicsituationsbutarealsothefirstpointoftheirresolution.

Aswellasproblematizingdifferentmechanismsofhabit(forthepurposesofanalysis

andintervention)aDeweyanapproachtohabitalsosituateshabitinrelationto

differentformsofproblematisation.Whereasvitalistapproachesingeographysee

habitscontractingimmanentforcesrealisedin‘affectivemilieu’(Dewsburyand

Bissell2015)forpragmatiststhepartnerofhabitisproblematisation,because,aslife

function,habitencountersfrequentdifficultiesorobjections.Theaffectualmilieuof

thevitalistscorrespondstothesituationalqualitiesofaffectinpragmatismbut

which,inthelatter,areunderstoodasthepromptsofemergingproblematic

situations.Thisproblematisationdemandsexperimentalaction,involvinghabitsand

situationalmaterials,andonlymorelatterly,ifatall,morereflexiveformsofaction

incontrolledenquiryinwhich‘thought’isasharedcommunicativeactivity.

Analysinghabitinrelationtoproblematisationandenquiryagainmeansexploring

habitsandtheirspatio-temporalrelations-fromextensiveandenduringsituations

ofhabitdispositionstothesharper,moreemphaticandmoreimmediate

problematicsituationswherehabitsaredisrupted.Deleuzian-inspiredgeographical

workhasshownhowhuman/non-human/materialassemblagesinfuse‘plastichabits’

(Dewsbury2015).Pragmatismacknowledgesthis‘thingliness’oftheworld

(Colebrook2015)whilst,atthesametime,showinghowtheseentanglements

problematizehumanlifethroughhabit.

Thepossibilitiesofinterventionincomplexmechanismsofhabitweresuggestedin

thepreviousexamplesofpolicystrategiestoaddresstheformation,clashand

institutionalisationofhabits.Pragmatismrecognisesthathabitsarenotjust

significantintermsofpolicyinterventionbutarealsoopentomanipulationand

dominationinthe‘over-mechanisation’ofhabit(betweenthelabouringandleisure

20

classes,forexample).Theseissuesbringpragmatismintoproductiveconversation

withthecontinuinginfluenceofMarxismandCriticalTheoryonsocialand

environmentalcritiqueingeography(Bridge2013).Atthesametimepragmatism

recognisesthedifficultiesoftheMarxistprospectuspreciselybecauseitfailsto

addresssocialhabitsthatpersistbeyondrevolutionarydisruption.

Apragmatistapproachtohabitopensupresearchonpersistentmechanismsof

socialdominationwiththemorevitalideaofhabitenvironmentsingeography.

BuildingoncurrentgeographicalworkthatstartstotakeBourdieu’sideason

embodiedhabitsbeyondthesocial(Leaetal2015)apragmatistapproachcombines

agreatersensitivitytothecomplexesofactors(human,nonhuman,objects)

implicatedinhabitmilieuwhilstmaintainingacritiqueofmechanismsofhabitthat

arepersistentandsignificantinsocialrelations.Inthisregardthereisalreadya

significantbodyofworkwithinpragmatistphilosophyandsociologyonformsof

social-environmentaldominationthroughhabit,suchasMacMullan(2009)on

‘habitsofwhiteness’andSullivan’s(2013)analysisofracismasaformof

discriminationanddominationthatpenetratesthroughtheskinofthehuman

organismproducing‘oppressioninthegut’.

Pragmatism’spositioningoftherelationshipbetweenhabitandproblematisation

alsoopensupawiderterrainofinvestigationthatdrawsonastrongstrandof

Foucault-inspiredpoststructuralistanalysisingeography(Murdoch2005;Crampton

andElden2007).Foucault’sworklookedathowdifferentcomplexesof

problematisation,forexampletheproblematisationofpopulationdensityandideas

ofvulnerabilitytodiseaseandcontagionintheplaguetowninDisciplineandPunish

(Foucault1977),havebeenseentocoalesceintopersistent(spatialised)formsof

governmentalityandsurveillance,resultingincertainformsofsubjectivity.

Exploringthefieldofproblematisationwithawiderideaofthepossiblesitesof

problematisation,including,butalsobeyond,‘governmental’ones(seeKoopman

2011;BarnettandBridge2017),andfromtheperspectiveofhabitratherthan

subjectivity,furtheropensuptheterrainofinvestigationonformsofsocialpower

(andthepossibilitiesofresistanceanddemocraticaction).Italsoopensupother

theoreticalquestions,suchasthedegreetowhichproblematisationsleadtonew

concepts(Deleuze–seeKoopman2018)ortonewactions(Dewey)asformsof

critiqueofsocietyandspace.

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