“this is our land”
TRANSCRIPT
“This is Our Land” How Likely is the Palestinian Youth to Instigate a Third Intifada ?
Nils Steven Mollema
January 2017
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Nils Steven Mollema (s1251708)
University of Leiden
Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs
Supervised by Jelle van Buuren, PhD
Second Reader Edwin Bakker PhD
Msc Crisis and Security Management
“I come bearing an olive branch in one hand, and the freedom fighter's gun in the other. Do not let the
olive branch fall from my hand.” – Yasser Arafat, 1974 (BBC, n.d.)
Thesis in fulfillment of the Master of Science in Crisis and Security Management at the Faculty Campus
The Hague at Leiden University
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“I don’t believe that all the people who died for the sake of the Palestinian land should go to waste. I
believe we have a responsibility to keep working for what they originally did.”
(Student Bethlehem University #3)
Abstract
The violent means employed in the Second Intifada resulted in the death of 4,173 people. Of these, 3,223
were Palestinians, 631 of them minors. The remaining 950 were Israeli, of which 112 were minors. The
violence did not improve the situation of the Palestinian people. With the occupation of the Palestinian
Territories going into its 50th year, recent surges in violence from both sides have made a peaceful
solution in many ways more inconceivable than ever before. Increasing Israeli security measures have
created an entire generation of Palestinians which has been segregated from Israel, and vice
versa, fostering hatred and dehumanization of the other side, making engaging in violence all the more
attractive. This begs the question, how likely is it that Palestinian youth will once again organize and rise
up against the occupation of their land? Answering this question is best done through the lens of Social
Movement Theory. Historical analysis and a review of Social Movement Theory show that past intifadas
were born from frustration, collective action, strong leadership and a great deal of youth participation.
Today the frustration is there. The youth are upset with Israel, as well as their own government, the
Palestinian National Authority (PNA). Many no longer believe in the two-state solution, and they are
willing to engage in violence to find any solution, or at the very least to be heard. However, mobilization
of a social movement has been made very difficult. The PNA, under the leadership of Mahmoud Abbas,
says it is committed to a non-violent path to resolution through international diplomacy and intervention.
They have actively disarmed the population, tempered even moderate resistance, and consistently
cooperated with Israel on security matters. The PNA’s leadership is likely to be key to any successful social
movement and possible intifada, violent or otherwise. Therefore, it is unlikely that another intifada will
erupt as long as Abbas remains in power.
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Acknowledgements
For this research to be possible there are several parties. I would like to thank the men and women at:
The Netherlands Representative Office in Ramallah
Al-Haq
The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research
Birzeit University
Bethlehem University
An-Najah University
Hebron University
Al-Quds University
The Youth Peace Initiative
For their assistance in gathering data, finding interviewees, and allowing me to use their vast network of
contacts to produce as valid and reliable research as possible.
I must also thank all those that proofread and assisted in the editing of this work. Most notably, Prof. Jelle
van Buuren PhD, for supervising the writing of this thesis.
For those that wished to remain anonymous, I thank you for your bravery to speak out and for your
honesty in interviews.
At this point a disclaimer must be made. This research does in no way reflect the views of the institutions
that assisted in the research. All statements are entirely my own.
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Table of Contents Abstract .............................................................................................................................................2
Acknowledgements............................................................................................................................3
Table of Contents ...............................................................................................................................4
Map of the West Bank, Area A, B and C ..............................................................................................6
Chapter 1: Introduction ......................................................................................................................7
1.1 Context ................................................................................................................................. 7
1.2 Structure ............................................................................................................................... 8
1.3 Scientific relevance ............................................................................................................... 9
1.4 Social relevance .................................................................................................................. 10
Chapter 2: Historical Background of the Conflict ............................................................................... 12
2.1 A political road map of Palestine ........................................................................................ 12
2.1.1 Fatah ...................................................................................................................... 12
2.1.2 Hamas .................................................................................................................... 14
2.1.3 The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine .................................................. 16
2.1.4 The Palestinian People’s Party ............................................................................... 17
2.1.5 Palestinian National Initiative ................................................................................ 17
2.2 A Brief History of the Palestinian Israeli Conflict ................................................................. 19
2.2.1 The establishment of Israel .................................................................................... 19
2.2.2 The occupation in 1967 .......................................................................................... 19
2.2.3 The First Intifada .................................................................................................... 19
2.2.4 The Oslo accords (Oslo I & Oslo II).......................................................................... 21
2.2.5 The Al-Aqsa Intifada ............................................................................................... 23
2.2.6 The 2006 elections ................................................................................................. 25
2.2.7 International community in the conflict ................................................................. 26
2.2.8 The role student movements in the conflict .......................................................... 27
Chapter 3: Theoretical framework .................................................................................................... 29
3.1 Rational Choice Theory ....................................................................................................... 29
3.2 Political Opportunity Structures ......................................................................................... 30
3.3 Cultural Framing ................................................................................................................. 32
3.4 Media Discourse ................................................................................................................. 32
3.5 Transnational Activism ........................................................................................................ 33
3.6 The choice for violence or non-violence ............................................................................. 34
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3.6.1 Protest Cycles ......................................................................................................... 35
3.6.2 Political Exclusion ................................................................................................... 36
3.6.3 Legitimization of Violence ...................................................................................... 36
3.7 The Role of Social Movement Theory ................................................................................. 37
Chapter 4: Methodology .................................................................................................................. 39
4.1 Definitions of terms ............................................................................................................ 39
4.2 Research Methods and Operationalization ......................................................................... 40
Chapter 5: Results ............................................................................................................................ 46
5.1 Individual’s decisions to join the social movement ............................................................. 46
5.1.1 Collective identity................................................................................................... 46
5.1.2 Collective Action..................................................................................................... 48
5.1.3 Engaging in Collective Action ................................................................................. 53
5.1.4 Cultural Frames Resulting in Political Opportunities .............................................. 58
5.2 The International Community ............................................................................................. 61
5.2.1 The Perception of the International Community.................................................... 61
5.2.2 The Role the International Community should take ............................................... 62
5.3 The Choice for Violence ...................................................................................................... 63
5.3.1 Protest Cycles ......................................................................................................... 64
5.3.2 Legitimization of violence....................................................................................... 65
5.3.3 Policing protests ..................................................................................................... 66
5.3.4 Separation .............................................................................................................. 67
5.3.5 Romanticized view of violence ............................................................................... 68
5.4 The conditions for a movements success ........................................................................... 69
5.5 Statistics of the Palestinian Youth ....................................................................................... 71
Chapter 6: Conclusion and Recommendations .................................................................................. 76
6.1 Answering the research question ....................................................................................... 76
6.2 Conclusion and Limitations ................................................................................................. 78
6.3 Further Research................................................................................................................. 79
Bibliography .................................................................................................................................... 81
Interviews ....................................................................................................................................... 86
Appendix I – Oslo Accord I ................................................................................................................ 87
Appendix II – Oslo Accord II .............................................................................................................. 96
Appendix III – Sample Interview with coding................................................................................... 112
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Map of the West Bank, Area A, B and C1
1 http://endtimestruth.com/israel/palestinian-problem/
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Context
“To be Palestinian is to resist. It is a part of our identity”, these were the words of a young professional I
spoke to while doing research in Ramallah in the first half of 2016. These words have had a resounding
effect on this dissertation. Palestinians have never had their own nation-state. For almost their entire
history they have been under some form of foreign rule, be it by the British, the Jordanians, the Ottomans,
or the most recent example, the Israeli’s. The occupied Palestinian Territories2 (oPT) have been occupied
by Israel for roughly 50 years, since 1967 (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 156). This is one of the longest
ongoing occupations in the world. In that time, there have been countless pieces written about the history
of the conflict, the rise of Zionism and the Nakba, or "catastrophe" of 1948, referred to in Israel as the war
of independence. The First and Second Intifadas3, or uprisings, in the late 80's to the early 90's and early
2000's have been extensively researched, as have the Oslo accords and the development of the Palestinian
Authority. No less attention has been paid to the rise of Hamas, the Gaza wars, the function of
International Law, Palestinian resistance, the separation wall, and a nearly endless list of other subjects.
Yet, there is more to say and investigate still.
Near the end of 2015 there was an increase in violence across the West Bank, Gaza and parts of
Israel. From September to December there was a clear rise in incidents initiated by both sides, Involving
Palestinian as well as Israeli civilians (including settlers living in the occupied West Bank), the Israeli
Defense Forces (IDF), and Palestinian Security Forces (as shown in graph 1.1 and 1.2).
Graph 1.1 - Statics regarding security incidents in the West Bank4
2 The term occupied Palestinian Territories is a contested one. The borders of the region are still unclear, as is the name. The attempt to stay as neutral as possible, while still acknowledging that the region is contested, the term oPT was deemed most suitable. 3 A period of resistance with all three elements of longevity, central support, and the aim of emancipation. 4 These statics are gathered from media source and are not verified. They are therefore unsuitable for research purposes, but are reliable enough to show the trend in the selected time period.
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Graph 1.2 - Statics regarding security incidents in Jerusalem5
The more news about the attacks appeared in the media, the more suggestions of a third intifada
started to come out. Was this the next chapter in this conflict? Was this the start of another war? (Walters,
2015; Becker, 2015). This thesis does not attempt to answer the question of why this increase in violence
happened, or what motivated individuals to commit stabbing attacks, commit car-rammings, use pipe
bombs and other forms of interpersonal violence. These are questions that are being answered by other
researchers and other institutions. This research, instead, raises the question of why the increase in
violence did not translate into a violent, nationwide, population-wide, social movement similar to that of
the Second Intifada. In doing so it will also discuss the preconditions for a (third) intifada and how likely it
is one will occur. The main research question reads as follows:
“Which factors, be they facilitating or restrictive, can explain for the (lack of) potential of eruption of a
(third) intifada, instigated by the youth, in the near future across the oPT and Israel?”
1.2 Structure
The answer to this question will be discussed in the coming six chapters. The initial chapter of this
thesis, explores general literature regarding social movement theories, specific literature on the region
and the likelihood of a third intifada. The second chapter explains the exact methodology employed to
answer the research question. The third chapter uses in depth qualitative interviews to test the accuracy,
validity, and applicability of the reviewed literature with regard to the subject. In the fourth chapter
statistical tests are conducted to see whether these interviews are representative. The fifth chapter uses
literature, interviews and statistics to look towards the future and give a description of the possible
5 These statics are gathered from media source and are not verified. They are therefore unsuitable for research purposes, but are reliable enough to show the trend in the selected time period.
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development of this conflict in terms of social movements. The sixth and final chapter holds the conclusion
and the recommendations that follow from this thesis.
1.3 Scientific relevance
The majority of research and literature on the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians
approaches the conflict from an International Relations (IR) point of view (Norman, 2009, p. 15). This
framing has mainly been used to paint a picture of this conflict as two clashing nationalities fighting over
borders and land. This is an appropriate approach, but it has its limitations, which limitations stem from a
definition issue in terms of what type of conflict is being analyzed. In this case, only one side is an
internationally acknowledged, self-governing, highly developed nation-state, namely Israel. The
Palestinians on the other hand do not hold the same internationally recognized status as their Israeli
counterpart. The Palestinians are in many aspects under Israeli control (Pappe, 2015). Therefore, the
conflict is not between two nationalities, but rather between two national movements. The case of Israel
and the Palestinians has some characteristics of an international conflict, but it is more accurate to label
this an internal struggle, with a ruling power suppressing a group within its borders (Norman, 2009, p. 15).
Framing this conflict solely as an international one, would mean ignoring the other dynamics at play. The
conflict stems from organizations within a region actively mobilizing the public (i.e. social movements) to
challenge the governing and in the Israeli-Palestinian case, oppressing power, Israel. The presence of
social movements and their clear aim to establish an independent nation, whether alongside or in place
of Israel, makes the use of social movement theory a more pertinent one. A social movements approach
may yield different insights and uncover different dynamics than the more general IR point of view has
yielded in the past.
This research serves a broader academic goal as well. Much of the literature available in English
is based on studies set in western countries. This thesis takes the time to look at the extent to which these
theories are applicable in a non-western setting, namely the Middle East. Interviews with researchers
from the region that have devoted their careers to the study of social movements and related fields in the
region have allowed this thesis to build on extensive Arabic-language research, even though I do not speak
the language. The interviews hold interesting insights into the application of social movement theory and
show areas of potential expansion. This means that these researchers serve as a gateway into the Arabic-
language academic field, and allow for comparison with English-language texts and analysis. They are,
however, not a representation of the entire field. Regardless, they are reliable enough to be used as an
indicator of the applicability of western theories to this conflict.
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Much of this research is based on the work of Julie M. Norman (2009). Her work with social
movements in this conflict is extensive and valuable, but also becoming outdated, nearly 7 years have
passed since publication, and 9 since the interviews her research is based on were conducted. In that
time, there have been three wars in Gaza (Middle East Eye, 2014; BBC, 2014), further political stagnation,
no change of national representation, further settlement expansion and several upsurges of violence, as
well as significant changes in the region around Israel and the oPT. It is logical that these changes,
escalations, and stalemates have had an impact on the views of the youth and the population at large.
Therefore, it is academically suitable to return to Norman's research and update the research to match
the views of today.
A special focus on the views of the students across the Palestinian Territories is academically
crucial, as this is one of the least studied subjects in the conflict. It is well known that most of the leaders
who currently hold the power within the Palestinian Authority (PA), as well as the two main political
parties Fatah, Hamas and others, played prominent roles in student movements in the past (Zelkovitz,
2015). The only comprehensive English work on this subject is written by an Israeli scholar at the university
of Haifa, Ido Zelkovitz (Zelkovitz, 2015). This presents a glaring hole in the academic work on the subject.
By noting the state of student movements currently, the views of their supporters, and the relationships
to their formal counterparts, this work explores an, as of yet, nearly inaccessible field within the English-
language academic framework.
The goals of this research could have been achieved in a variety of settings. The choice for this
particular conflict has both a personal basis, as well as a societal motivation. The social motivation is
outlined below. Having family present in the area and working with the conflict on a political level since
the end of 2014 increased my interest in this specific area. Additionally, the complexity and longevity of
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict make it exceptional, and therefore fascinating to research. An internship at
the Netherlands Representative Office in Ramallah subsequently provided a large network of resources
to investigate the ins and outs of the political views of the youth in Palestine. Thus, this case was selected
based on the availability of resources to conduct an in-depth analysis, a strong personal interest, and the
potential for social change following this research.
1.4 Social relevance
From a societal point of view, this thesis is relevant as it gives an insight into a group of the
Palestinian population which at present is largely voiceless. The researched selection of the Palestinian
population has never had a chance to vote or gain influential positions in their national government, given
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that the last national elections were in 2006 (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 372). They are institutionally
underrepresented. Giving them a way to express their ideas and creating an overview of how these ideas
coexist is vital in understanding the next period of the conflict. The age of President Mahmoud Abbas has
many experts indicating a change of course upon his resignation or possibly his death (Interview Professor
Birzeit University #1). The interviewed population stated that the youth will play a significant role in
shaping the future of this conflict.
The research for this thesis was conducted during an internship with the Netherlands
Representative Office (NRO) in Ramallah. This was a unique opportunity, not only for a master’s student
but also for the NRO. Rarely do they have the opportunity to send someone into the field and get a ‘live’
view of developments. This was precisely my role during my internship with them. Therefore, the NRO
has requested a short analysis on the youth focused on youth’s political views, radicalization and
mobilization. For them and others in the field, a better understanding of the youth and a better
understanding of future developments means an improved planning process, better and more effective
diplomacy and better preparation for the future. With the Middle East at this moment in time engaged in
several conflicts, many extensively covered by western media, attention is being diverted to neighboring
countries, which poses the risk of forgetting about one of the world’s longest lasting occupations, and
thus any possible solutions. Therefore, it is important that research continues to be undertaken on this
conflict. This thesis will not hold the answers to the solution, but it helps those working to end the
occupation to do so moving forward.
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Chapter 2: Historical Background of the Conflict
2.1 A political road map of Palestine
A general understanding of the political parties in Palestine is vital for one to understand the views of
the youth. Most the of the interviewees for this research felt that Palestine was not united, because
people adhered to strongly to party lines. Many also felt that they were represented by one part or
another. When an individual says, they are represented by the PFLP, the PNI, or Fatah, what does that say
about the way they view the conflict and the way they see the future of Palestine. Therefore,
understanding the general views of the parties helps understand the positions of the youth. The most
important parties in the oPT are the Popular Front for the Fatah, Hamas, Liberation of Palestine (PFLP),
the Palestinian National Initiative (PNI), and the Palestinian People’s Party (PPP).
2.1.1 Fatah
“For many Palestinians, the Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Fatah) is not just one of several
political movements but the embodiment of secular Palestinian nationalism per se.” (Bröning, 2013, p. 57).
Founded in 1959 in Kuwait by graduates of Cairo University, Fatah is currently the largest of the Palestinian
parties (Bröning, 2013, p. 59). Ideologically Fatah has always claimed to transcend the narrow political
ideologies, even though it is a member of Socialist International (the global organization of social
democrats, socialists and labor parties across the globe, SI) (Bröning, 2013, p. 58). Fatah aims to embody
the needs and wishes of the Palestinian people regardless of religion or ideology.
In principal, Fatah stands for the reunification of Palestine per the historical borders, prior to the
establishment of the Israeli state. As is stated in their constitution, Fatah’s goal is “the complete liberation
of Palestine and eradication of Zionist political, military, and cultural existence.” (Bröning, 2013, p. 59). In
attempts to achieve this goal Fatah engaged in forms of guerrilla warfare and in ‘terrorist’ activities in the
1960’s, eventually resulting in their exile to neighboring nations. Their exile and continual resistance to
the Israeli military made them very popular among the Palestinian public. (Bröning, 2013, p. 59). The most
notable altercation between the Israeli military and Fatah was the Battle of Karameh in 1968. The success
of Fatah in inflicting large casualties on the Israelis resonated with Palestinians. In the aftermath of this
battle Yasser Arafat was announced as the leader of Fatah (Bröning, 2013, p. 61).
Under Arafat the organization became the largest of the Palestinian parties, and the largest in the
Palestinian National Authority (PNA), established following the Oslo accords, and the Palestinian
Liberation Organization (PLO), a body comprised of different political organizations from across Palestine
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that was the spokesperson for the Palestinians prior to the PNA’s establishment. Arafat’s success in
garnering major international attention for himself and his organization put Fatah at the forefront of the
conflict with Israel. Both in armed resistance and in negotiations, Fatah was the leading organization
(Bröning, 2013, p. 57). The political success of Fatah makes it difficult at times to differentiate between
Fatah policies and institutions and policies and activities of the PNA and the PLO. Mahmoud Abbas’ current
position as President of the PNA, the PLO and Fatah is an example of how intertwined these institutions
are (Bröning, 2013, p. 57). The devotion to the reunification of Historical Palestine was put aside at least
temporarily in 1974 in favor of a stronger support of the two-state solution. This shift was formalized
when the PLO accepted the so called, Ten Point Program. Even though this did not satisfy the Israelis it
showed a change in Fatah policy (Bröning, 2013, p. 60). Following the invasion of Lebanon by the Israelis,
per experts to eradicate the PLO and Fatah (Friedman, 1995, p. 129; Bröning, 2013, p. 61), Fatah entered
a tumultuous period leaving their leadership in Tunisia with no significant role in Palestinian activism.
To regain a position of power and relevance, Arafat agreed to the Amman Accord, in 1985. This
signaled reconciliation between the PLO and Jordan, calling for a confederation between Palestine and
Jordan (Bröning, 2013, p. 61). When the First Intifada broke out in 1987, it caught Fatah and its leaders
off guard. The intifada used tactics that were, at the time, foreign to Fatah, which was still focused on
armed resistance. Even though Fatah only played a minor part in the intifada itself, the PLO did play a
major role in the negotiations that followed, in Madrid in 1991. The First Intifada was one of the major
reasons for the Madrid Peace Conference, and by extension the Oslo accords, which followed in 1993
(Bröning, 2013, p. 62). By signing the Oslo Accords Arafat formally recognized the right of Israel to exist.
Officially Fatah held onto its claim to be fighting for the liberation of Historical Palestine until 2009, even
though their actions reflected a different position. This disconnect between their rhetoric and their
actions cost them support on the ground (Bröning, 2013, p. 63).
Following the Oslo accords Fatah struggled with the internal contradiction of being an all-
encompassing resistance movement and the leading political party in the PNA. This contradiction was also
clear in the outbreak of the Second Intifada. Assessments have come to different conclusions regarding
the level of involvement of Fatah leadership in instigating the unrest. What is apparent in most of these
assessments, however, is that Fatah did little to control the unrest and limit demonstrations (Bröning,
2013, p. 63). The Second Intifada brought with it a great deal of fighting between Fatah affiliated groups,
increasing the unrest within the party (Bröning, 2013, p. 64). The party was further weakened by the loss
of its leader, Arafat, in 2004. His replacement, Mahmoud Abbas, brought an end to the violence of the
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Second Intifada (Bröning, 2013, p. 64). His approach of engaging and cooperating with the Israelis was not
supported by a large segment of Fatah’s supporters (Bröning, 2013, p. 64). The discontent with Fatah
became clear in the parliamentary election of 2006 where the party suffered great losses, which went
hand in hand with a victory for Hamas. An international refusal to accept Hamas’ rise to power in the oPT,
based on the party’s more extreme and violent ideology, eventually led to a violent split of the Territories.
By 2007 (Bröning, 2013, p. 15), Gaza was under the rule of a de facto Hamas government, and the West
Bank was ruled by Fatah and the PNA (Bröning, 2013, p. 65). Although many reconciliation efforts have
been made, this situation has hardly changed since.
In summation, Fatah under Arafat before the Second Intifada was a secular revolutionary group,
that fought for the unification of Historical Palestine and a single state. Through the years, first under
Arafat and later under the leadership of Mahmoud Abbas, this goal has been relinquished for the more
pragmatic goal of a two-state solution. Thus, when referring to Fatah, one must make clear if this is pre-
Oslo Fatah or post-Oslo Fatah.
2.1.2 Hamas
Internationally the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) is often seen as the great spoiler of the
peace process in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In most western nations, Hamas is recognized as a
terrorist organization, due to their refusal to denounce violence. Thus, they are not seen as a legitimate
political organization (Bröning, 2013, p. 15). The Palestinians disagree. In the oPT they are a legitimate
organization, with a great deal of democratic support. As shown by their success in the 2006 elections,
where they defeated Fatah (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 372). Hamas’ origin can be traced back to the
Muslim Brotherhood, an organization of Sunni Muslims, which originated in the 1920’s in Egypt. Hamas
was founded during the First Intifada in 1987. Originally it was a wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, but it
soon outgrew this status (Bröning, 2013, p. 16). The establishment of its military wing was not far behind,
with its first notable incident in 1989 (Bröning, 2013, p. 17). Ideologically Hamas seeks the liberation of
Historical Palestine from Israeli rule while also pushing back against the secular movement in Palestinian
politics represented by Fatah and the PLO (Bröning, 2013, p. 16). Hamas has been kept out of the PLO
because of internal resistance and outside pressure (Bröning, 2013, p. 15). Initially Hamas took pride in
this rejection by the PLO and outside parties. Recently, however, it has been seeking stronger
international support, recognition and cooperation by downplaying the importance of their charter, which
contains crude anti-Semitic sentiment (Bröning, 2013, p. 17).
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Originally Israel tolerated Hamas and paid little attention to it, as it did not consider it a threat.
Following the shooting or two Israeli military personnel, in 1989, Israel began to take Hamas more
seriously. Their leader and founder, Ahmed Yassin, was captured and sentenced to a life in prison in 1991
(Bröning, 2013, p. 17). Hamas also faced resistance in Jordan, where it was outlawed. The organization
has managed to survive their exile by so many institutions with the financial support of private donors
from the Gulf States, Syria and Iran (Bröning, 2013, p. 18). In the years following the arrest of Yassin, the
support for Hamas grew tremendously. The hard crackdown by Israel in the years following 1989, gave
Hamas the exposure it needed to be able to grow. Their supporters believed the violence Hamas employed
was legitimate. Tactics include car-rammings, suicide bombings, and other forms of terror attacks
(Bröning, 2013, p. 18). Hamas’ rejection of cooperation with Israel continued with their rejection of the
Oslo accords on the basis that the negotiations were deeply flawed, but also because of the inherent
recognition of Israel that came with the accords. Between the Oslo accords and the Second Intifada both
the PNA and Israel engaged in targeted killings of Hamas leaders (Bröning, 2013, p. 19).
During the Second Intifada, Hamas became closer to the political mainstream, as more organizations
employed terrorist tactics. Many Palestinians saw the failure of the Oslo accords as legitimization of
Hamas’ rejectionism (Bröning, 2013, p. 19). Nearing the end of the Second Intifada Israel and Hamas
agreed to a ceasefire that did not last long, as neither party fully halted operations. In 2004, Ahmed Yassin
was assassinated, opening up space for new leadership. The new leaders agreed to another ceasefire,
which has halted suicide attacks from Hamas to this day (Bröning, 2013, p. 19). The following year Hamas
chose to enter the established political institutions. Running for election in 2005, the party won most the
seats in municipal councils. They also ran in the 2006 elections, winning those as well, to the surprise of
the international community. Prior to the 2006 elections Hamas published an election platform that
continued to legitimize the use of armed resistance to liberate Palestine, but did not call for the demolition
of the Israel state and did not reiterate the anti-Semitism in their founding charter. Following the elections
the co-founder of Hamas, Mahmoud Al-Zahar, stated they would agree to a prolonged peace if
Palestinians received an independent state on the lands occupied in 1967 (Bröning, 2013, p. 20). This did
not go far enough for the international community, who produced the ‘quartet principals’ that were
rejected by Hamas. Hamas responded by proclaiming they would never recognize the Zionist state on
their land (Bröning, 2013, p. 21).
2006 saw the first of several wars in Gaza, where Hamas was now the de facto government, following
bloody clashes with Fatah. The wars were triggered by the killing of eight Palestinian civilians by Israeli
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cells. Although Israel never claimed responsibility, the ceasefire was proclaimed over. The first of the Gaza
wars became known by the Israeli operational name: Operation Summer Rain (Bröning, 2013, p. 21). In
2008-09, the world saw the second deadliest clash between Hamas and Israel, Operation Cast Lead. This
led to the deaths of 13 Israelis and 1400 Palestinians (Bröning, 2013, p. 23). The third and most recent
Gaza war was in 2014 resulted in the death of over 2200 Palestinians (BBC, 2014; Power & van Hooydonk,
2015, p. 28).
To this day Hamas has not recognized Israel, but has repeatedly stated its willingness to engage in a
ceasefire in return for an independent state along the 1967 borders (Bröning, 2013, p. 24). A clear
deviation from their original stance, although the term cease fire does imply the conflict would not be
over.
2.1.3 The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) was founded following the Israeli occupation
in 1967, as a revolutionary movement. It is built on a secular and socialist foundation. The PFLP is the
result of a merger between the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM) and several militant organizations,
including the Palestinian Liberation Army (Bröning, 2013, p. 97). The PFLP’s aim is to create a single state
through a people’s war, stemming from their anti-imperialist neo-Marxist Ideology. In this state, minority
rights would be granted only to “Palestine’s original Jewish in habitants” (Bröning, 2013, p. 98). The PFLP
does not recognize the right of Israel to exist anywhere between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean
Sea. It also publicly rejects the regimes of the neighboring Arab countries, advocating for an overthrow of
the ‘Arab bourgeoisie’ (Bröning, 2013, p. 98).
Although significantly smaller than Fatah and Hamas, the PFLP remain a significant player on the
Palestinian Political playing field (Bröning, 2013, p. 97). They are the second largest member of the
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and have significant popular support (Bröning, 2013, p. 98). The
relationship between the PLO and the PFLP has been a strained one at times, most notably when the PLO
took steps towards a two-state solution. The PFLP has often plighted for democratization of the PLO to
gain more power within the organization (Bröning, 2013, p. 99). The relationship with the Palestinian
National Authority (PNA) is not a strong one. In 1996, the PFLP boycotted the PNA elections, out of an
unwillingness to support its acceptance of the two-state solution (Bröning, 2013, p. 100). On October 21st,
2001, the PNA banned the PFLP’s military wing and arrested the PFLP’s newly elected secretary general,
as a result of strong pressure from the USA (Bröning, 2013, p. 101).
17
The violent methods employed by the PFLP throughout the organization’s history, such as hijacking
airplanes, have made many Israelis see them as the most ruthless of Palestinian terrorist organizations
(Bröning, 2013, p. 98). Internationally the PFLP is also viewed as a terrorist organization by several
international entities including the EU and the United States of America, along with Hamas and the Islamic
Jihad (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 372; The U.S. Department of State, 2016; The Council of the
European Union, 2016). In summary, the PFLP is an organization that employs violence with the goal of
removing Israel and its citizens to establish a state of Palestine within its historical borders.
2.1.4 The Palestinian People’s Party
The Palestinian People’s Party (PPP) was originally named the Palestine Communist Party (PCP), with
roots going as far back as 1919. The PCP was first established, as an anti-Zionist movement. Following the
establishment of the Israeli state the PCP was broken up as members joined Marxist movements from
Israel, Egypt and Jordan depending on their geographic location. It reemerged in 1982 when the PCP
gained its independence from the Jordanian Communist Party (JCP) (Bröning, 2013, p. 147). The PCP
joined the PLO in 1987 as the only member not engaged in armed resistance. Their leader, Bashir
Barghouthi, was one of the main leaders in the First Intifada. His creation of ‘popular committees’ is often
seen as one of the steering factors of the intifada (Bröning, 2013, p. 148). The name change from the PCP
to the PPP occurred following the collapse of the Soviet Union, in 1991. With the failure of the Eastern
European regimes the PCP/PPP deviated from its strict Marxist views, arguing that the class struggle
should be put on hold to seek reunification of all Palestinians in an independent state.
Bashir Barghouthi played an important role in the discussions leading up to Oslo accords (Bröning,
2013, p. 148). Over time, internal power struggles became more important than the goals of the
organization. Resulting in more internal debate than external action. This ultimately was the reason the
PPP lost one of its most prominent members, Mustafa Barghouthi who left to establish the PNI in 2002
(Bröning, 2013, p. 150). The PPP has lost influence over the years in the PNA and the PLO, but they have
remained true to their popular resistance methods to establish an independent socialist state and remain
supported, at the local level for their grassroots movements (Bröning, 2013, p. 151).
2.1.5 Palestinian National Initiative
The Palestinian National Initiative (PNI) was founded in 2002 in the middle of the Second Intifada, by
Mustafa Barghouthi, Edward Said, Haider Abdel Shafi and Ibrahim Dakkak (Bröning, 2013, p. 122). These
secular intellectuals that created the PNI proposed a different approach than those of organization such
as Hamas, the PFLP, and the more violent elements of Fatah. While these parties were preoccupied with
18
violence at the time, the PNI proposed a peaceful approach. The core values of the PNI are National Unity,
nonviolent resistance, good governance and social justice (Bröning, 2013, p. 122). In the 2005 presidential
elections, the PNI’s leader, Mustafa Barghouthi, was viewed by many as the main competitor to Abbas,
receiving 19% of the votes, partly due to the stamp of approval given by the PFLP. The majority of the
support came from the young educated voters with limited affiliation to the PNA and Mahmoud Abbas.
This group was believed to be frustrated with the PNA, the failure of Fatah to lead them to greener
pastures and the established elite that lead the country. Even with a popular leader the PNI has largely
failed to take on positions of real power and influence in the political field (Bröning, 2013, p. 124). With
regard to the conflict with Israel the PNI supports a two-state solution, with the borders of 1967 and East
Jerusalem as the capital of, a future Palestinian state. The party believes this must be achieved through
nonviolent means. A possible explanation for why the PNI has failed to grow beyond its grassroots
foundation is that other parties have in recent history adopted similar non-violent policies, therefore
diluting the support base of the PNI (Bröning, 2013, p. 127).
19
2.2 A Brief History of the Palestinian Israeli Conflict
2.2.1 The establishment of Israel
Prior to the establishment of the Israel as a nation state in 1948, the region between the Egypt, Lebanon,
Syria and the Jordan river, was known as Palestine. This region was never a sovereign entity and has known
many occupations and forms of external control. This region is referred to as Historical Palestine. On May
14th, 1948 David Ben Gurion proclaimed the state of Israel. This led to the first Arab-Israeli war. By the
end, Israel spread over roughly 75% of Historical Palestine, with the region the West Bank under Jordanian
rule and Gaza under Egyptian control (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 97). The war left between 600,000
and 760,000 Palestinians as refugees, most which are unable to return to their homes to this day. Most
of them found refuge to the West Bank or Gaza and roughly 36% were housed outside Historical Palestine
(Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 100).
2.2.2 The occupation in 1967
The situation remained relatively stable until the Six Day War of 1967, the second Arab-Israeli war. In less
than a week Israel successful expanded its borders, taking control of the Gaza strip, the West Bank and
the Golan Heights. This left roughly 1.3 million Palestinians under Israeli occupation (Bickerton & Klausner,
2010, p. 156). The Six Day War resulted in a growing sense of Palestinian Identity and nationalism. “Israeli
occupation (…) encouraged the evolution of Palestinian nationalism and the emergence of new leaders not
associated with the Arab governments and Arab armies that had dismally failed the Palestinians in 1967.”
(Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 156). In the same year, the PLO distanced themselves from the Arab
governments and committed to an armed struggle. This change was soon followed with the emergence
of new leadership. By 1969, Al-Fatah was the most important group in the PLO and Arafat emerged as the
new face of the PLO, a position he held until his death in 2004 (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 157).
2.2.3 The First Intifada
The period between 1969 and the First Intifada was anything but uneventful. There were conflicts
between the PLO and the Jordanians, in 1973 Egypt and Syria attacked Israel in the Yom Kippur War, Israel
and Lebanon had gone to war, and several peace efforts were conducted in the region with mixed result.
The Intifada, however, was the major Palestinian Israeli clash and is the most relevant to this thesis.
The years leading up to the Intifada were marked by tensions between the Palestinians, their Arab
neighbors and the Israelis. Palestinian refugees had issues in almost every nation they had fled to. Most
were treated as second class citizens, unable to work and failing to gain citizenship for themselves or their
20
children (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 101). Palestinians lived in a political limbo, felt their economy was
hostage to the Israel’s economy, had little faith left in Arab governments to aid them, and were
disillusioned with the PLO. Although the latter was a potent nationalist symbol, it had failed through
diplomatic and military means to gain the right of self-determination for its people (Bickerton & Klausner,
2010, p. 218).
On December 9th 1987, an Israeli vehicle plowed into a line of oncoming cars at the checkpoint at
the border in Gaza. Four Palestinians were killed and another seven were injured. This was the spark that
caused a great deal of Palestinian frustration to explode into a fully-fledged popular uprising or Intifada
(Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 220). The first year of the Intifada saw 150 Palestinians killed, a further
11,500 were wounded and many more were arrested. Roughly two thirds of those involved were under
the age of 15. Israel shut down schools, universities and other institutions. They also instilled a curfew,
yet failed to stop the rock throwing, harassment and demonstrations. The methods Israeli employed to
counteract the Intifada caused significant backlash to their reputation. The International community at
large felt the Israelis acted too strongly in response to what would be known as the ‘stone throwing’
intifada (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 220). The use of lethal force to mostly peaceful resistance enabled
the PLO to gain diplomatic traction at the international level (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 222).
The PLO took some time to take control of the Intifada, because of its originally independent and
spontaneous nature. The Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU), a small leftist confederation
of groups, were the real organizers of the Intifada in its initial stages. Arafat moved quickly to co-opt these
groups under the PLO umbrella (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 220). The PLO’s aim was made clear
between June and August 1988, with claims that they would accept an independent Palestinian state in
the West Bank and Gaza as outlined in the 1947 UN Partition Plan (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 220).
Even though the Intifada was known mostly as relatively peaceful movement, especially at its
conception, it became more violent as time passed and as Hamas gained more influence in the resistance
movement. The Qassam Brigades, Hamas’ military wing, employed far more violent methods that the PLO
supported. Hamas gained support during the Intifada and rose to be a true competitor of the PLO, even
causing debate within the PLO (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 222). Even so, by the end of the year, Arafat
was firmly in control of a much more unified PLO, in part due to his denouncement of terrorist activities
(Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 226). This led to the declaration of independence by the Palestinian
National Covenant (PNC) on November 15th, 1988 (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 223). This naturally
garnered great international attention, with many Arab countries recognizing the PLO as the exile
21
government, as well as the Russians. Israel, however, proclaimed it irrelevant and the USA also did not
recognize the declaration.
The intifada did lead the USA as well as other powerful international actors, to take an interest in
the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians. The peace process started before the end of the
decade and continued until 1993 when the Intifada was considered over with the signing of the Oslo
Accords.
2.2.4 The Oslo accords (Oslo I & Oslo II)
The build up to the Oslo accords is not very relevant to this thesis and is therefore omitted in favor of a
more elaborate explanation of the contents of the accords and the impact they have on the current
situation between Israel and Palestine.
The Oslo accords is the most influential document with regards to the current state of the Palestinian
territories. The peace agreement between the PLO and Israel, which is outlined in the first and second
Oslo Accords, is the foundation for the PNA and the power structure in the West Bank and Gaza. They
represent the only time that the Palestinians have come close to the establishment of their own state.
The first of the Oslo accords6 was signed on September 13th, 1993. There are a few key elements from
the accords that require illumination. The first, is the establishment of a Palestinian authority, originally
named the council. This authority would have governing control over Gaza and the West Bank. It was to
be the result of a democratic process. The elections would be conducted by the Palestinians and under
the supervision of the international community (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 263). Oslo I goes on to
describe a five-year transition period in which control of Gaza and the West Bank would be given to the
council. This would start with the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho. The council would be
responsible for education, culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism. Other sectors
would be discussed in later agreements between the council and Israel. The first Oslo accord leaves open
the issues of Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation
with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 264). Although
it was stated that Israel would remain responsible for external security and for internal security and public
order of settlements and Israelis (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 265).
6 A copy of the Oslo Accords (Oslo I and Oslo II) are attached as appendixes I & II respectively.
22
Following two years of negotiations, Oslo II was signed on September 28th, 1995. This agreement
elaborated on several of the issues left open in Oslo I and gave a more detailed account of how authority
would be transferred. Oslo II is important to the current status of the oPT for three key reasons. The first
of which is the recognition of the PNA as the replacement for the council7.
The second reason is that Oslo II divides the West Bank into Areas A, B and C. Area A, is comprised
of six cities: Jenin, Nablus, Tulkarm, Kalkilya (also spelled Qalqilyiah), Ramallah and Bethlehem. The
Palestinian National Authority would have full responsibility for internal security and public order, as well
as full civil responsibilities. Area B comprises the Palestinian towns and villages of the West Bank. In these
areas, which contain 68 percent of the Palestinian population, the PNA will be granted full civil authority
as in Area A. It would be charged with maintaining public order, while Israel would have overall security
authority, which would allow it to safeguard its citizens and to combat terrorism. This responsibility was
to take precedence over the Palestinian responsibility for public order. Finally, in Area C, which comprises
the unpopulated areas, including most Palestinian farmland, areas of strategic importance to Israel and
the Jewish settlements, Israel will retain full responsibility for security and public order. The PNA will
assume all those civil responsibilities not related to territory, such as economics, health, education, etc.
(Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 290). The accord outlines the transfer of area C to the PNA over three
phases at six-month intervals, with the exception of settlements and military locations (Bickerton &
Klausner, 2010, p. 290). This has not taken place to this day. Less than one percent of Area C was
transferred to PNA control as of 2016, over 20 years after the accord was signed. The same is true for the
withdrawal of IDF forces from the West Bank, which was agreed to happen from the entire area, with the
exception of Hebron (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 272)..
The third way in which the Oslo accords effect the current situation is the establishment of
security coordination between the PNA and Israel. The Palestinian Covenant agreed to revoke the
statements regarding the destruction of Israel, and the PNA committed to establishing the Palestinian
Police, which would act systematically against all violence and terror. The Palestinian police was decreed
to arrest those suspected of terrorist acts, confiscate illegal arms and to exchange information to counter
terrorist activities. The Palestinian Police was never permitted to arrest Israeli citizens. These agreements
stand to this day (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 291).
7 See Annex II, article I
23
Oslo II also outlined some smaller yet important elements of Israeli and Palestinian cooperation.
The first of these, is the release of Palestinian prisoners, an element that was very important to the
Palestinian population (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 292). The second is the joint water committee’s
establishment. The control of the water will remain in the hands of the Israelis and any change in the use
of water on the Palestinian side must be approved in the joint water committee. It is structures like these
that several interviewees took issues with, stating they don’t even have control of their own resources.
With the Oslo accords signed, it appeared as though the two parties were on a path to peace, but
this course hit a bump in the road with the assassination of Yithzal Rabin on November 4th, 1995, by a
Jewish zealot. Rabin had been the driving force behind the peace negotiations on the Israeli side. His death
opened political opportunities for those that were opposed to the peace agreements. The political divide
widened as time passed following Rabin’s death (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 273). This was despite the
majority of Israelis supporting the Oslo accords. In the initial years following Rabin’s death saw both sides
take steps to rectify the accords. The appointment of Benjamin Netanyahu as prime minister marked the
start of a different path (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 274). Both the Palestinians and the Israeli’s took
steps that led to the inevitable stalling of peace negotiations in mid-1997.
2.2.5 The Al-Aqsa Intifada
On September 28th, 2000, Ariel Sharon (who would be voted Prime Minister in 2001) visited the Temple
Mount/Haram al-Sharif. His statement that Israel would never give up the temple mount, a holy site in
Judaism which is also home to the Dome of the Rock and the Al-Aqsa mosque, which are religious sites to
Muslims, set off riots where Israeli police killed Palestinian demonstrators. This killing ignited a fuse of
frustration that exploded into the Second Intifada, better known as the Al-Aqsa Intifada. The reason for
the frustration among the Palestinians were anger toward Israel for controlling their lives, loss of faith in
the PNA for failing to make progress with the establishment of the Palestinian state, and disillusionment
with the entire Oslo process. The continued settlement expansion was another element that caused
anger, as they were seen as a threat to the Palestinian state and a contradiction of the Israeli promise to
retreat from the West Bank. The Palestinian’s had believed that Oslo would lead to the Palestinian state,
yet the deadline for a complete handover had expired and still the situation remained unchanged. As a
result, many Palestinians felt as though the PNA was colluding with Israel, leading it to be accused of
corruption and fraud (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 323).
The first six months of the Second Intifada resulted in the deaths of nearly 500 people, and more
than 8,000 wounded (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 324),most of which were Palestinians. The high death
24
tolls were the result of the type of protest methods that were employed. The First Intifada was mainly
based on popular resistance and relatively innocent acts of violence. In the Second Intifada, however,
stone throwing youths were joined by armed Palestinian police. The situation resembled all-out warfare
more than it did a protest movement. Among the methods employed were sniper attacks, car bombs and
roadside bombs. The Israelis responded with tanks and Blackhawk gunships. (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010,
p. 324). Although this intifada was most renowned for its violent nature, there were also significant
popular protests being undertaken. Some state that the intifada was hijacked by a minority of violent
protesters (Norman, 2009, p. 2). Never the less this intifada is seen in the frame of violent resistance and
had a different character than the First Intifada.
The PNA did very little to stop the movement, and several groups, such as the “Tanzim” were Fatah-
linked groups that worked in cooperation with Hamas and Islamic Jihad to target Israeli civilians, including
Israeli women and children (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 325). The link with groups like Fatah and Hamas
in these movements is why the Palestinian political parties can be seen as social movements. They identify
as social organizations and are at their core resistance groups with political roles to play.
Throughout the Al-Aqsa Intifada, there were several peace initiatives. The first was in late 2000 and
early 2001. In an attempt to be reelected, Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak engaged in peace negotiations
with Arafat. These were almost successful, but failed on the issues of the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif
and the right of Palestinian refugees to return. The failure marked the end for Barak (Bickerton & Klausner,
2010, p. 326). Ariel Sharon was elected, a confirmation for Palestinians that the Israelis were not serious
about peace. Sharon was notorious for his statements about never sharing Jerusalem, not handing over
any more Israeli territory and is opposition of the right to return. The appointment created opportunities
for Hamas and Islamic Jihad to garner more support and continue their violent methods (Bickerton &
Klausner, 2010, p. 327).
On June 2002, almost two years after the start of the Intifada, Israel began the construction of the
“Security Fence”8 (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 340). The concept alone was enough to infuriate
Palestinians. The ‘fence’ has been dubbed the apartheid wall by many Palestinians, as was pointed out by
several interviewees. The international community was also in opposition of the wall, with several
countries calling for its construction to be ceased and parts that were built to be destroyed. This included
the USA (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 353). Despite this the ‘fence’ has been constructed and is close
8 The security fence is an Israel term, most Palestinians refer to it as the wall or the Apartheid Wall. Both terms are representative of the same structure.
25
to finalization today. The wall’s construction sparked a debate on the Palestinian side as well. It was seen
by some as a symbol for how the use of violence and suicide attacks were harming the Palestinian cause.
Despite calls for a cease fire, both internally and externally the death toll continued to rise, the suicide
attacks increased and settlement expansion continued (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 341).
In 2002, the EU attempted to initiate a cease fire by meeting with Tanzim and Hamas officials. These
attempts failed, with Hamas and Tanzim continuing their own violent agendas. The “Quartet” of the USA,
UN, EU and Russia came out with a “road map” to peace, in October 2002, that would give Palestine and
independent state by 2005 (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 343). Even though the initial stages were
promising, with the restructuring of the PNA, the creation of the prime minister position (this was given
to Mahmoud Abbas/Abu Mazen), and the tentative support of Sharon, the “road map” came to an end
when Hamas vowed to continue the intifada, because Abbas was making too many concessions to the
Israelis (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 347).
In December 2003, the idea for a unilateral withdrawal from Gaza began to be floated around by
Sharon. It wasn’t until the spring of 2004 that it became clear that this would mean the dismantlement of
all Israeli settlements on the strip and a complete Israeli withdrawal. This plan was a response to an
intensification of violence in 2003 through 2004 in the Gaza Strip (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 350).
The death of Yasser Arafat on the eleventh of November, 2004 was a turning point in the resistance
movement of the Palestinians. He had been the face of the conflict for many years and had achieved much
in his life. Most Palestinians still see him as their emotional leader, despite his passing (Bickerton &
Klausner, 2010, p. 355). Abbas, who won the elections in January 2005, would call for the end of the
Intifada, and a commitment to none violence. Abbas’ supporters insisted he had the same aims as Arafat,
but different methods. Security forces were ordered to stop attacks against Israel, the PNA resumed
security cooperation with Israel, and Abbas held talks with Hamas and Islamic Jihad to instate a ceasefire.
This eventually succeeded in easing tensions between Palestine and Israel.
2.2.6 The 2006 elections
On January 24th 2006, Hamas won a historic victory in the PNA. They claimed 67 of a possible 132 seats in
an election that nearly didn’t happen. The Israelis originally decided to decline Palestinian citizens of
Israeli-ruled East-Jerusalemites the right to vote in the elections. Under the threat of the PNA to call off
the elections, the USA put pressure on Israel to approve the elections and allow all Palestinian nationals
to vote. Upon its victory, Hamas stated that as Israel would not recognize them as members of the
26
government, Hamas would not negotiate with them, nor recognize Israel. The international community
followed Israel’s lead despite hailing the will of the people. They would not recognize a Hamas lead
government unless it denounced violence (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 372). Hamas did not denounce
violence after its election, and Israel responded by freezing the taxes it collects for the PNA. The USA
followed by retracting their nearly 250 million dollars of aid to the PNA. Soon after most other institutions
and countries did the same, fearing the legal consequences of dealing with Hamas, which to this day is an
internationally recognized terrorist organization (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 373).
Tensions mounted between Hamas and Fatah-backed President Abbas. Eventually a clash
occurred between the two organizations, in May 2006, resulting in the death of both civilians and fighters
from both sides. Israel also got involved, with rockets be launched back a forth between Israel and Hamas
in Gaza, and the capture of 64 Hamas leaders. All of this did no good, the calm that had been in place since
February 2005 had come to an end and the violence only made Hamas look stronger, while weakening
the public image of Abbas (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 374). By June 2007, the tensions between Fatah
and Hamas lead to a split government with Hamas as the de facto government in Gaza and the PNA, with
a Fatah majority emergency government, in the West Bank (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 379). This saw
a lot of the international support return to the West Bank, but made aid to Gaza much more difficult, as
it was now being ruled by a terrorist organization. The tensions between Hamas and Israel were far from
being settled. Since 2007 there have been three Gaza wars (Middle East Eye, 2014), with both Israel and
Hamas accusing each other of ending ceasefires and initiating new conflict (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010,
p. 381). The tension between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza strip remains to this day.
2.2.7 International community in the conflict
Since the Oslo accords there have been many initiatives, including initiatives lead by, several UN
resolutions, the Arab Peace Initiative and the French Peace Initiative. All of them have had the goal of
achieving the two-state solution. These have all failed. In the meantime, facts on the ground have
gradually changed. According to US secretary of state, John Kerry, the two-state solution is in serious
jeopardy due to several factors, most notably settlement expansion across the west bank and around
Jerusalem (Diamond & Labott, 2016). When the Oslo accords were signed, there were 262,500 settlers in
1993. Today there are over 520,000 settlers in the West Bank in 247 settlements (Oxfam, 2013; B'tselem,
2015).
Kerry’s speech was in wake of resolution 2334 being passed, with no votes against and only the
USA abstaining. This resolution stipulated the international community’s continued commitment to the
27
two-state solution as well as stating out right that Israel is taking deliberate steps to undermine the peace
process with the establishment of new settlements and outposts, as well as the expansion of established
ones as shown by the following quote from the resolution. (settlements have) “no legal validity and
constitutes a flagrant violation under international law and a major obstacle to the achievement of the
two-State solution and a just, lasting and comprehensive peace.” (United Nations, 2016).
The Israeli response to both the speech and the resolution has been one of anger. Netanyahu
immediately called ambassadors from all the voting nations for and explanation. This was followed by
statements that Israel will not freeze or remove settlements as outlined in the resolution. He also stated
that Kerry’s statements are dangerous for the stability of the region and undermine the security of Israel
(Agence France-Presse, 2016; Avishai, 2016). Trump’s election has the potential to lead to a change in
direction for the USA and possibly the international community at large, with Tweets such as, “stay strong
Israel, Jan. 20th is coming” (Eglash & Morello, 2016).
Although resolution 2334 was passed after the interviews were conducted they are illustrative for
how the international community views the situation and how Israel responds to international pressure.
In recent years, the issue of Israel and Palestine has not been as high on the international agenda as in the
past, especially with the situation in Syria and other countries following the Arab spring. It remains a
conflict with a large international involvement.
2.2.8 The role student movements in the conflict
“Student activism served as the meadow upon which the Palestinian political sphere matured, evidenced
by the establishment of Fatah in 1959 and, later, by the formation of the PLO (…)” (Zelkovitz, 2015, p. 11)
The establishment of the PNA would not have been possible it wasn’t for the role of the student
movements. In the absence of national institutions, students took on the roles of leaders. Higher
education can be seen as a catalyst for social change throughout the history of the Palestinian struggle for
independence (Zelkovitz, 2015, p. 8). In fact, until the establishment of the PLO, the Cairo student
association was the only political organ representing the Palestinian issue (Zelkovitz, 2015, p. 14). As many
Palestinians had been forced to leave the land they grew up in, the diaspora played a large role in student
politics. Most organizations had a form of international cooperation (Zelkovitz, 2015, p. 19). This is also
why the first parties for the Palestinian cause were erected outside of Historical Palestine. Many of the
political parties which now operate in the oPT, began as student movements, including Fatah. Not only
28
parties were forged in universities, but also the faces of the Palestinian struggle, such as Yasser Arafat
(Zelkovitz, 2015, p. 15).
In both intifada’s students from both high school and university were one of the largest groups of
participants, and they were the driving force behind the two uprisings (Zelkovitz, 2015, p. 122). In the
‘west’, universities are often described as ivory towers with a level of seclusion from the surrounding
community. In the oPT, this is not the case. Historically they could not afford to separate themselves from
the reality around them, as demonstrated by the student involvement (Zelkovitz, 2015, p. 123). It was not
only peaceful movements that came from the universities. They were a breeding ground for radical ideas,
and some of the first ‘violent’ groups began as student movements (Zelkovitz, 2015, p. 164).
Following the Oslo accords, universities became much more controlled. There was supervision
from the PNA, in an attempt to safe guard the future of the Palestinian state. As Arafat said: “The future
begins with the ministry of education, without which our national project would not be realized” (Zelkovitz,
2015, p. 128). Paradoxically, supervision undermined the freedom that had made the universities and
student movements the bedrock of the national struggle. Over the years, the formal political parties have
sought to conquer the campuses. Where universities were once a breeding ground for new ideas, today
well-established movements dominate the discussion and are attracting students to their cause, while
actively putting down new movements (Zelkovitz, 2015; interview Haifa Professor #1). This state of
suppression continues to this day. Part of the focus of this thesis is to understand the strength of modern
student movements, given the current state of affairs.
29
Chapter 3: Theoretical framework
The theoretical framework of this thesis outlines the necessary conditions for social movements to be
established and for them to be successful in achieving their goals. To understand these conditions, the
following subjects have been examined; rational choice theory, political opportunity structures, cultural
framings, media discourse, and transnational activism. Following the explanation of these conditions is an
examination of the driving forces behind the decision of social movements to employ either violent or
non-violent methods.
3.1 Rational Choice Theory
For a social movement to have even the potential to exist there must be an aggrieved group or groups.
This is a prerequisite, but not sufficient to explain the establishment of social movements (Edwards, 2014,
p. 45). Aggrieved groups need more than their feelings to act; they must have the means to act. Thus, per
rational choice theorists, the focus of social movement theory must be on how resources are mobilized
and not the reasons behind the grievances (Edwards, 2014, p. 45). According to Edwards resources may
be tangible, for example financial means, or intangible, for example influence. Both tangible and
intangible resources are needed. According to rational choice theorists, people join social movements
based on rational, deductive reasoning. Their individual actions while they are a part of the movement
are rational as well (Edwards, 2014, p. 47). In accordance with this line of thinking, someone would never
join a social movement they believe has no chance of success based on the resources available to the
movement.
There are several other conditions for social movements to be successful. This thesis focusses on
the following conditions besides resource mobilization: Political opportunity structures, cultural framings,
media discourse and transnational activism (Norman, 2009, p. 15). These conditions are drawn from
several theoretical models including, Political Process Theory (PPT), Contentious Politics (CP),
Structuralism and Constructionism. These models do not so much contradict rational choice as they do,
expand the theory with other influences on social movements that just resource mobilization.
The rational choice theory has several limitations. The most important one to understand is that
of collective action. Why would someone spend energy and resources for a movement that one can
benefit from without investment? In economic terms this is referred to as the free rider dilemma
(Edwards, 2014, p. 45). In this thesis, collective action is defined as actions of group to achieve a common
group goal, often unachievable by an individual. A prerequisite for collective action is a collective identity
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(Norman, 2009, p. 26). A collective identity is defined as a process that extends across time and space,
involves a network of active relationships and contains a sense of emotional investment that establishes
a common unity between to individuals (Melucci, 1995, in Norman, 2009, p. 25). This plays a role in the
framing process that will be elaborated upon further on in the text. Norman (2009, p. 26) argues that in
2007 there was a collective identity in Palestine amongst the youth, but it did not result in collective
action.
Rational choice theorists outline three potential ways to get individuals to participate in collective
action. The first is social sanctions, a method that forces everyone to join the movement (Edwards, 2014,
p. 54). Most movements are too large for this to be possible, the Palestinian national movement is likely
too large for this method to be effective. The second method that may be employed is Selective incentives.
These coax people into joining a movement based on private benefits, such as financial gain (Edwards,
2014, p. 54). The third method is based on the concept of a critical mass. This assumes that actors are
interdependent rather than isolated. A social movement does not require everyone, but a ‘critical mass’
of highly resourceful individuals that are willing and able to carry the costs of the movement. Having
critical mass increases the believe that a movement may be successful, thereby making it more attractive
to join for outsiders (Edwards, 2014, p. 55). The issue with these is that they only explain the growth of a
movement, there must still be a core group of individuals dedicated to the cause beforehand. This is where
movement entrepreneurs come in. These are resource rich individuals that are willing to take the burden
of startup costs as they have an abundance of resources making collective action relatively less costly to
them (Edwards, 2014, p. 55). They are also the ones that stand to benefit the most once the social change
has occurred, making the investment more attractive to them than to other, less resource rich, individuals
(McCarthy and Zald 1977 in Ewards, 2014, p. 56).
3.2 Political Opportunity Structures
Structuralists argue that the success of social movements is greatly determined by their external
environment, most notably the political institutions and the state. The political environment must be
favorable before social movement can mobilize or be successful (Edwards, 2014, p. 78). In the most
absolute structuralist view social movements will not come into being when faced with unfavorable
political circumstance. In more tempered form of structuralism social movement are likely to emerge and
succeed if there is a favorable political environment (Edwards, 2014, p. 79). A favorable environment is
one that provides potential challengers with political opportunities for action. (Tarrow 1998 in Edwards,
2014, p. 81) This may be in a positive sense, a political process is structured in such a way that the voices
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of social movements may be heard. The opportunity to act may also come into being from a negative
standpoint. If the cause that the social movement is fighting for reaches a tipping point, creating a
necessity for the movement to act immediately (Edwards, 2014, p. 82). Political process theory outlines
how political opportunities affect the rational choices made by actors (Edwards, 2014, p. 83). Edwards
(2014, p. 83) shows that several authors have highlighted a link between the democratization of a nation
and the political opportunities available for social movements.
It is not only how democratic a nation is, which affects political opportunities of social movements.
The structure of the democratic state determines how open or closed a state is to social movements. The
regularity of elections plays a role in the ability for people to express themselves and to have a voice in
the political process. In other words: ‘political opportunities are embedded in the political structures of a
regime’ (Edwards, 2014, p. 83) a regime may be open or closed to the voices of its citizens. This is the
distinction between an authoritarian regime and a liberal democratic one (Edwards, 2014, p. 84). Norman
(2009, p. 18) names 6 factors that determine political opportunities: Political access, shifting alignments,
united/divided elites, influential allies, the degree of repression/facilitation in a system, the state strength,
and the prevailing modes of systemic repression embedded in a system. The former four factors being
dynamic and the latter two factors being relatively stable. Elections often cause changes in these dynamic
factors by opening up access for new challengers, causing shifts in the alignment and divisions of elites
and elite groups, and causing changes in the capacity and propensity to use repression against challengers
(Tarrow in Edwards, 2014, p. 85). With these changes come new opportunities for social movements
(Norman, 2009, p. 19). Therefore, the more regularly there are elections the more opportunities there are
for social movements to be established and be successful.
Political opportunities not only arise from structural shifts in power, but circumstantial ones as well.
The death of a leader, periods of political instability, regime shifts or changes in the composition of elites
may also provide an opening for social movements in much the same way planned elections do (della
Porta, 2008, p. 223).
The limitation to the PPT approach is that the degree to which a system is open or closed does not tell
us what it is open and closed for. One subject may find a much more open system than another. PPT
requires a deep understanding of the circumstances as well as of the political structure in place, as political
opportunities increase and diminish due to events both internal and external to the political structures
function. (Edwards, 2014, p. 88)
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3.3 Cultural Framing
There are examples where PPT falls short in explaining the rise and success of social movements.
Deborah Gould (2004; 2009 in Edwards, 2014, p. 100) highlights the case of AIDS-activism being driven by
the unfavorable political conditions. The movement was at its height when the political opportunities
were contracting. Political opportunities may be created by the groups themselves. This makes the
opportunities the product of social movements themselves and not the result of framing by the outside
world (Edwards, 2014, p. 101).
Constructionists argues that the mere presence of the opportunity is not enough there must be
cognitive liberation (a recognition that the opportunity is there). Often the meaning people attach to
situations determines what they view as opportunities. If one believes something to be real, it will also
have real consequences and vice versa (Edwards, 2014, p. 92). Inherent to this argument is that political
structures may have influence on political opportunities, but that these opportunities do not only arise
from the political structures and institutions, but from the people’s perception. Cultural frames make
people view the world in a certain way making cognitive liberation possible. The world around us can only
be processed once we attach meaning to a given situation (Edwards, 2014, p. 93). Elections, for example,
may be political opportunities for social movements to be established, but if in that nation the elections
are viewed as corrupt or unimportant, then the elections will most likely not result in the rise of social
movements. In other words, “people need to feel both aggrieved about some aspect of their lives and
optimistic that, acting collectively, they can address the problem” (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996 in
Norman, 2009, p. 20).
Movement leaders can use cultural frames to their advantage through frame alignment. They may
then orient their movements frames to intersect with the population’s culture and their values and goals
(Norman, 2009, p. 21). This allows them to translate politcal opportunities into the cultural frames of a
population thereby mobilizing large groups of people to their cause.
3.4 Media Discourse
Traditionally the media is the link between movements and the masses. It plays a key role in how the
public sees the world. Therefore, social movements must engage with the media. They must tell their
stories and have them heard (Edwards, 2014, p. 96).
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The media is a powerful player with its own agenda, which stems from their corporate structure
or their political interests (Ryan 1991 in Ewards, 2014, p. 97). “Good stories are dramatic spectacles, big
important events, heart-rending tales of woe and adversity – which are all the better for a few famous
faces, cute children, good-looking leaders, and innocent victims (McCarthy et al. 1996, p. 297 in Edwards,
2014, p. 97.) As a result, media tend to cover protests that are sensational, violent, emotive, celebrity-
endorsed and full of activist ‘personalities’. Social movements must try to meet as many of these criteria
as possible in the hope of getting coverage (Edwards, 2014, p. 97). The medias preference for visual
spectacle in general, is exceptionally relevant for the Palestinian case, especially when considering the
choice for either violent or non-violent methods (Norman, 2009, p. 29).
The media not only play a role in framing the issue, but also have the power to influence the way
in which an organization or movement is framed (Norman, 2009, p. 29). Social Movements can be given
power, or have it taken away, by how, mainly, traditional media frames not only the issue they are raising,
but the movement itself.
Newer forms of social media appear to have less of a personal agenda. Social media gives the
movements the power to frame their own message and distribute it to millions with no intermediary
(Castells et al., 2006, 185 in Edwards, 2014, p. 98). The same is also true for the opponents of a movement.
Social media platforms are being pressured to take more of a stand in ongoing conflicts, such as the fight
against ISIL (Gaudin, 2016; Flynn, 2016). This may mean that social media platforms will have the same
issues as traditional media have now. In the Palestinian-Israeli conflict there are also signs that the new
media has its own affiliations and does favor one side over the other. For example, navigation services,
such as Google Maps and Waze do not work in the West Bank and Gaza. They only have records of the ‘so
called ‘settler roads ‘ (Coffey, 2014).
3.5 Transnational Activism
The Palestinian case must be considered in a global context. The international community has had
a vested interest in this conflict from the very beginning, and have influenced it in many ways throughout
its duration. Therefore, many Palestinians blame the conflict on the international community. The British
are often identified as the main culprits in the creation of the conflict, while the United States is often
seen as one of the main reasons that the conflict has not been and may never be resolved (Student Birzeit
University #2). It is not only the international political system that has an influence in this conflict. The
diaspora of the Palestinian people is often highlighted as crucial in the Palestinian Israeli conflict. They are
identified by many as the easiest way for the Palestinians to gain an advantage over the Israelis and as the
34
biggest fear for the Israeli’s (Student Birzeit University #3). The support of the diaspora has been crucial
in the creation of Fatah, the PLO and eventually the PNA. (Zelkovitz, 2015, p. 18) The diaspora and larger
international involvement raises the social movement from one contained within national borders to a
global level. Thus, “the national state – the traditional target of political claims – has become ‘de-centered’
from our picture and instead exist as one ‘node’ in a network of global governance” (Edwards, 2014, p.
154). On this stage, important actors include multinational companies (MNCs), and a range of civil society
groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
Within the theory of contentious politics, the shift to the international political arena enlarges the
mechanisms and processes that impact social movements. The realm of influence grows, creating new
dynamics within environmental mechanisms. The question arises at which level solutions must be found,
the international level or the national level (Edwards, 2014, p. 157). Several interviewees identified the
international community as the one with the most power to shape the conflict. At the same time, they
state the national government and the social movement must force changes in the conflict and its framing
to change the course of international politics.
The global environment dynamics impact the relational mechanisms as well. There is an increased
reliance on new social media platforms to communicate and mobilize those involved in the social
movement, with more horizontal, interactive (many to many), person to person, communication. This has
decreased the social movements reliance on state and top-down mass media (Edwards, 2014, p. 159). The
framing or cognitive mechanisms are also impacted by the international environment. There is an identity
shift. The way activists answer the question ‘who are we?’ changes in the international context. It requires
a framing that transcends local and national borders (Edwards, 2014, p. 160). In the Palestinian case this
appears to be true with many interviewees answering questions regarding the reason for the conflict and
the role of the international community with answers that refer to humanity in general and the response,
what would you do if your country was occupied.
3.6 The choice for violence or non-violence
“The world as a whole has taken decisive, frightening steps away from its painfully achieved segregation
between armies and civilian populations, between war and peace, between international and civil war,
between lethal and non-lethal applications of force. It has moved toward armed struggle within existing
states and towards state-sponsored killing, deprivation, or expulsion of whole population categories.”
(Tilly, 2003, p. 58). What Charles Tilly describes with this quote is the shift from conventional warfare to
new, more complex forms. The tactics that are employed in these conflicts, such as suicide bombings and
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the targeting of civilians, are often labeled as terrorism by actors in the field or politics and security.
Distinguishing between freedom fighting, terrorism, and civil war is not the aim of this thesis. For the sake
of this work, these labels for violence fall under the umbrella term, political violence. In this case, political
violence is defined as the employment of violent methods to further a political goal. Whether the use of
violence and the goal it is employed for is deemed legitimate by the international community or the
opposing side is irrelevant in the research, as those employing these tactics view it as a legitimate option.
Instead the focus is on what the main motivations are behind the decision to employ violent tactics over
non-violent ones.
Social movement scholars rarely say something about political violence, while it is often a crucial part
of many social movements throughout history (Goodwin, 2004, p. 259). The attention that has been paid
to political violence has been focused primarily on the creation of counter-terrorism policies rather than
the development of an academic body of knowledge. This has left gaps in the literature (della Porta, 2008,
p. 222). In her work, Donatella della Porta (2008) explains the prior research on reasons for employing
political violence and names the new challenges that are yet to be answered. According to Della Porta,
protest cycles, political exclusion, and the legitimization of violence are the main reasons presented for
the use of violence.
3.6.1 Protest Cycles
When protests are plotted on a timeline, one typically sees ebbs and flows in the number, irrespective of
the subject that is being protested. These rises and declines in protests are called protest cycles. As a
protest goes through this cycle the forms of protest, also known as the action repertoires, develop and
change. “During cycles of protest, the development of the forms of protest actions follows a reciprocal
process of innovation and adaptation, with each side responding to the other. As their adversaries
adapted their tactics to counter those of the movement, the social movements changed their tactics in
order to continue to mobilize” (della Porta, 2008, p. 222). There is a clear interaction between protesters
and those policing protests in the use of violence. With each cycle the two actors drive each other to use
‘harder’ policies often causing further escalation (della Porta, 2008, p. 222). Not all interaction leads to
violent escalation, the trend can also be reversed with strong advocacy and active diffusion of the
situation, as was seen in Italy during the 1980’s. The 1970’s had been characterized by violence and a
widespread support for non-violence defused violent forms of conflict throughout the 1980’s. (della Porta,
2008, p. 223).
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The methods of policing protests naturally play a significant role in determining whether a protest
escalates into violence. The use of paramilitary policing of social unrest in the 1970’s triggered processes
of radicalization among social movements in Italy, Spain and Northern Ireland (della Porta, 2008, p. 230).
The radicalization of movements not only lead to escalation between the protestors and the police, the
use of violence by radical left-wing groups in the Basque region spawned violent counter-movements as
well. This left Spain with violent radical movements on both sides of the political spectrum (della Porta,
2008, p. 230). In the Palestinian case this can be seen in the formation of radical movements on the
Palestinian side as well as the Israeli side.
3.6.2 Political Exclusion
As previously explained, a state may have an open or closed system to protests based on the government
system and the level of democracy. This is not as fixed as it may appear. A state may choose to open and
close its system. An open system creates opportunity for social movement. A closed system may decrease
formal opportunity, but the active repression causes radicalization of movements that continue to seek
for ways to achieve change. Therefore, exclusive and unstable democracies produce more radical
opposition and violent escalation (della Porta, 2008, p. 223) The PNA is in principal a democratic regime,
although elections have not been held regularly and there are a great number of political arrests made
every year by the PNA and the Israelis alike. It stands to reason that this would lead to more radical ideas
and expression therefore (della Porta, 2008, p. 225).
3.6.3 Legitimization of Violence
Emerging protest movements generally increase the concern of the public about law and order. This often
results in hardline tactics from conservative elites, but at the same time the demand for a more liberal
understanding of citizen rights spreads through society. The use of political violence can act as a polarizing
force in the democratic debate, often leaving a civil rights coalition weakened as hard liners may gain
momentum and push for a style of policing that alienates the activist. (della Porta, 2008, pp. 226-7). The
polarization of the debate makes more extreme rhetoric resonate more easily with the public and
supporters of a movement or cause. In the 1970’s in England and Spain violent organizations motivated
individuals to join their movements through discourses that provided potential members with rationales
for participating with the movements or organizations. Often the rhetoric points to the opposing force as
wrong based on the superiority of one race, gender, sexual orientation, or religion over the others. Terms
such as blood, honor and duty are often used in the justification of violence (della Porta, 2008, p. 227).
State repression creates martyrs and myths that take on a legendary status. Violent and extreme police
37
actions delegitimize the state in the eyes of activists by creating ‘injustice frames’. These injustice frames
give foundation to the rhetoric described earlier (della Porta, 2008, p. 228).
3.7 The Role of Social Movement Theory
The function of this thesis is not to test social movement theory, but rather to use it as an analytical tool
for analyzing the interviews with the Palestinian youth. As is clear from the outline above, social
movement theory has a great many elements. Edwards (2014), even state that social movement theory
has become too broad to be used as an effective analytical tool. Therefore, it is important to note which
elements of the theory are most relevant in this research regarding the case of the Palestinian youth. The
first two elements that are important are the collective identity and collective action. These are used to
analyses the different visions of the future that exist amongst the Palestinian youth. As the reviewed
literature states the key for social movements is to convert a collective identity into collective action. The
following six elements are used to understand how that gap may be bridged for the Palestinian youth:
rational choice, political opportunities, cultural framing, protest cycles, political exclusion, and the
legitimization of violence. The former three elements are useful in explaining the personal choice of the
individual to join a social movement, the view on international intervention and in outlining the conditions
for a social movement to be successful. The later three elements are used to gauge the form that a
possible social movement may take on, namely a violent or a non-violent form, and why. The answers to
these questions of personal involvement, international intervention, form of protest, and conditions for
success, are key in predicting the possibility of a third intifada.
Two elements of social movement theory that were described above play only a minor role in this
research as they cannot be adequately analyzed given the focus of this thesis. These elements are the
influence of the media and transnational activism. To properly incorporate these elements, one would
need to do media analysis and speak to members of international movements, which are not a part of the
research method employed. Minor mentions of these elements may be found in the analysis. These are
based on the statements of local Palestinian youth and their personal views on the subject and do not
form a core part of this thesis.
In the introduction, it was stated that social movement theory has a western bias, or at least that
most social movement literature derives from the western nations. Part of the goal of this thesis is to see
whether the same elements of social movement theory are present in a different setting and what
possible other elements also play a role in social movement establishment and success. It follows that
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while social movement theory is used as an analytical tool, there is also attention payed to possible
explanation that are not in the theory and may help add to social movement theory.
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Chapter 4: Methodology
4.1 Definitions of terms
Before moving forward to the structure of the research, the operationalization of concepts, and other
elements of the methodology it is important to outline some definitions or terms that may have different
interpretations in different contexts. For this research, there are five terms that require definitions:
intifada, violence, non-violence, radical and social movement. The definitions that follow are not based
on academic works, but rather on the views of the interviewed population. The use these terms, thus, to
understand the populations views, the reader should use the same definitions.
In the historical context, the term intifada was used to describe two prolonged periods of
resistance, with the assistance from the central governing body of the Palestinians, either the PLO (First
Intifada) or the PNA (Second Intifada), with the aim of freeing the Palestinians from the occupying power.
A period of resistance is, therefore, only an intifada if it has all three elements of longevity, central support,
and the aim of emancipation. By this definition, the period of unrest at the end of 2016 from September
to December does not qualify as an intifada, despite popular media referring to it as the ‘Stabbing
Intifada’. This period did not have the support of the PNA and several interviewees argue that the
stabbings were individual acts of frustration and could not be called an uprising with the intent to free
Palestinians.
Violence is a relative term in this conflict and an incredibly sensitive subject for the Palestinian
youth. Generally, the interviewed population reserved this word for acts with the intent to kill or at least
severely harm someone. This includes stabbings, bombings and shootings. Rock throwing and car
ramming’s are not considered violent acts, as they are, per the Palestinian population, met by far worse
violent responses from the Israelis and these acts have no chance of actually harming Israelis. Therefore,
in this thesis violent resistance or violence refers to acts with the intent to kill or severely harm.
Where violence is defined as a very narrow concept, non-violence is a much broader term. This
can be used to describe anything from planting and olive tree, to throwing rocks and ramming checkpoints
with cars. Non-violent resistance is often also called popular resistance. Most often this type of resistance
comes in the form of a rally or gathering. The definition in this case is one of omission. Any act of resistance
that does not have the intent to severely harm or kill is a form of non-violent protest or popular protest.
Radical is a term that is used in many different contexts and can mean something as simple as
threatening the status quo to something as extreme as violent acts of terror. In this thesis, a radical is an
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individual that is willing to personally engage in violence to change the status quo. Therefore, a radical is
not per se a terrorist, while a terrorist is a radical. This definition is based on the views of the interviewed
population. Even those that do promote violence label themselves radicals in most cases.
In the ‘west’, social movements are often see as non-parliamentary movements. In other words,
these are movements that operate independently from political parties. In a setting where there is a
functioning democracy and a well establish culture of parliamentary elections, this definition makes sense.
In the case of the oPT however it does fit as elegantly. The Palestinian political parties are not your
standard political parties, they are leaders of social movements. They function, first and foremost, as
resistance movements with in a system of pseudo-democracy in a pseudo-nation. This thesis frames the
conflict as one of an oppressing government (Israel) over a people (the Palestinians). The Palestinians seek
ways to resist and are organized in parties that are also leaders of social movements. Parties are actively
trying to mobilize the people to resist. Their main concern is the occupation, not governing the people.
Therefore, political parties in Palestine fall under the definition of social movement. The PNA is the only
exception as this is not a party, but a fixed administrative entity that appears to function separately from
the people and is concerned mainly with internal. With the definitions now clear, it is time to move to the
structure of the research.
4.2 Research Methods and Operationalization
This thesis is a case study of the Palestinian youth in the West Bank and Jerusalem. A case study is the
ideal way to gain a deeper understanding the Palestinian youth as it allows them to explain their views
and, more importantly their reasons for these views. Surveys and statistics can give us an insight into the
general opinions. However, a case study allows us to gain understand the mechanisms, motives, ideas,
hopes, desires, and processes behind these opinions. The case study set up is also the most suitable in
relation to the social movement theory that requires an explanation of why individuals and groups make
certain choices. The answers to this can only be gained through a case study.
To answer the research question, this thesis employs a mixed methods approach, both qualitative
and quantitative data is employed. Qualitative in depth interviews are the primary source of information.
The majority of the analysis that follows is derived from this source. Statistics on the political views of the
youth, interviews with local experts, and background literature are used to triangulate the results of the
thesis.
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To be able to successfully employ this mixed methods approach, data from a variety of sources is
required. As the focus of the thesis is the Palestinian youth between 18 and 25, interviews were conducted
to get a deep understanding of their motivation and their views regarding the conflict and possible
resolutions. The NRO has a great many partners that assisted in contacting youths from different regions,
backgrounds, genders and religions across the West Bank and Jerusalem. The interviewed population is
by no means selected to represent all the Palestinian youth, but rather to gather as many different views
as possible. This research population was chosen predominantly because of the position they hold in
Palestinian society and the role they play in the future of the conflict.
Over half of the Palestinian population is under the age of 30 and the age group 15-30 represents
roughly 30% of the total population (PCBS, 2014). They are the majority of the voting population. The size
of the youth makes them a major factor in any future movement; social, democratic or otherwise. Not
only is the youth a large segment of Palestinian society, but it is also one that has gone largely
unrepresented in central government. The West Bank and Gaza have not seen national elections since
2006, when Hamas won the parliamentary elections and the split between the West Bank and Gaza
occurred. That means that anyone under the age of 25 has never had a chance to influence representation
at the highest level of government, as they were under the legal voting age at the time. The Palestinians
under 25 are also the first demographic group to have grown up fully segregated from the Israelis under
the Oslo accords and the first to have grown up with the Palestinian Authority as their government from
the moment they were old enough to walk. The majority of this generation will also not have participated
in the Second Intifada in any significant way given their age at the time. These are sound foundations to
investigate the views of the youth aged 18-25 and see if these are significantly different than those of
older generations, which have been the subject of previous research.
The interviews are singular semi structured interviews, allowing for balance of open dialogue and
directed conversation, with a focus on the youth across the West Bank. Hamas’ control of the Gaza strip,
in combination with the Dutch ministry of foreign affairs policies in dealing with them made it logistically
impossible to include the Gazan youth in the research. This may impact the validity of the research,
although the statistical data does include Gazan youth. Jerusalemites9 were included in the interviews as
this area did not pose the same obstacles as Gaza, but are less prominent part of the research.
9 A term used commonly when referring to individuals from a Palestinian background in possession of an Israeli ID card living in Jerusalem.
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Similar interviews were conducted with university professors and local experts from NGO’s and
activist organizations in the region, for a broader context. These experts have been in the field for a longer
period, are aware of trends across time and can serve as a tool to examine this youth movement to those
of the past.
To analyze the interviews, of both the youth and the experts, a coding system was employed.
Answers from each interview were reviewed and placed in categories dependent on the subject they were
referring to. Annex III is an example of one of the interviews after having been coded. The coding system
used four colors.
Green is for individual motivation for joining a movement. This category includes elements of the
collective identity, collective action, and reasons for personal involvement or lack thereof. Answers
regarding the collective identity are easily identified. They are statements that are intended to refer to all
Palestinians. Collective action references are identified by references to a social movement. These refer
either to the goal of the social movement or the form the social movement should take. Regarding
personal motivation, the reviewed literature identifies three main reasons for personal involvement;
political repression, rational choice and cultural frames. To identify political repression, terms such as
freedom of speech, corruption, and political arrests are clear indications of political repression. Another
element the reviewed literature identifies is rational choice. An interviewee that states there is no chance
of success and will therefore not join a movement, is clearly making a rational choice. Terms such as power
imbalance and limited resources are good indication that rational choice is at play. Cultural frames are
linked to political opportunities as the reviewed literature explains. In the interviews, references to how
history is perceived and how this impacts the individuals view are good indications that cultural frames
are influencing his/her view of when opportunities lie for successful social movements.
Red indicates the role of the international community. Given the international attention that is
payed to this conflict, it follows that there are strong views on the international community’s role. The
reviewed literature also indicates that shifts at the international political level may create possibilities for
change at the conflict level. Identifying these answers is quite simple. Each interview asks this question
outright. The answer given here is the clearest answer. Further references to the United Nations, the
diaspora, the Arab nations, the EU, the USA and others are also used to operationalize the role of the
international political arena.
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Blue is used to identify answers that refer to the use of violence, whether this be condemnation
or support of violence. To analyze these answers the reviewed literature shows three main reasons;
protest cycles, political exclusion, and legitimization of violence. References to protest cycles are most
often found when historical refences are used to state the violence is acceptable. For example, we only
used violence because in year ‘x’ they did something else. Political exclusion, can be identified by
statements referring to a failure of the political system and violence being the only way to be heard. The
legitimization of violence has to do with the rhetoric that is used. Most often this comes in the form of
references to rights granted in international law or speeches/statements from leaders of movements. The
literature review does not give clear indication on how non-violence comes forward, but condemnation
of violence is easily identified.
Purple is the final color used. It refers to the reasons why a movement may be successful or
unsuccessful. The reviewed literature states that the openness of a system is vital in success of social
movements. The interview has questions directly asking about the political freedom that help gauge the
openness of the system. Political opportunities structures are also important in the cited works. These are
political opportunities built into the system, such as elections or changes in leadership. Answers that
identify opportunities for social movement to capitalize on, which occur naturally, are political
opportunities structures. An example is the death of Abu Mazen as a political opportunity. He is an old
man and will not be able to hold office for very long. This opportunity will come irrespective of actions
taken. The reviewed literature also identifies, resource mobilization as a key in combination with
leadership. Any reference to weak or strong leadership, or an individual that needs to be put in a position
of power is an indication or resource mobilization. References to steps that need to be taken actively
before a movement can be successful are the clearest indication of resource mobilization playing a role.
The results of this coding system are an overview of the ideas of interviewed population. The
answers are not limited to the reviewed literature’s options. Answers that add to the reviewed literature
regarding one of the four subjects mentioned are also highlighted in the appropriate color. As this
population is not designed to be representative of the general youth of Palestine, the composition in
terms of the ratio of support per view point are irrelevant and not directly analyzed in this thesis.
Statistical data is needed to see how well the views of the interviewed population demonstrate
the views of the Palestinian youth at large. Simple percentages are used to show the composition of the
Palestinians youth regarding the views gathered from the interviews. The representative nature of the
statistical data allows the freedom to make more general statements regarding the findings of this thesis.
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The necessary statistics are gathered on a regular basis by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey
Research (PCPSR). PCPSR is the leader in the field of policy, politics, and national opinion. They regularly
conduct surveys with a population that is representative for that of the oPT. This makes them the ideal
source for statistical data to test the representativeness of some of the conclusions drawn from the
qualitative in depth interviews. The dataset for this research is the result of the most recent round of
surveys conducted in 2016. Using the most recent data ensures that the interviewed population and the
population in the statistical data are the same removing a discussion that ideas have changed over time
and increasing the reliability of the findings. This data is used to indicate the support of the general
Palestinian youth population, for the different goals and methods of collective action as identified by the
interviewed population.
In any research structure the reliability, internal validity and the external validity must be justified.
In this research the reliability of the research is maintained by using different sources to check the findings,
in other words triangulation of data. In this case triangulation is achieved through a combination of
interviews with youths and experts and statistical data. Even though this research does not indicate aim
to outline the composition of the Palestinian youth, it does aim to outline as many different relevant
opinions as possible. By interviewing youths from as many backgrounds as could be reached, this research
ensures that if repeated the findings would be relatively similar. Although a mixed methods case study
does not have the same level of reliability as a purely quantitative method, the reliability is sufficient for
the aims of this thesis.
The internal validity of this research is achieved by mainly focusing on the opinions of the research
population. The statements of the youth themselves are the predominant factor in the analysis. The youth
know best what they feel, what they are thinking and what they are planning. The omission of
intermediaries by gathering information directly from the source increases the internal validity of the
findings in this research. The triangulation of data, described above, is also a way of keeping the internal
validity high. If the three sources of information all show similar results the odds are that what we are
attempting to measure is indeed being measured.
The external validity of this research is limited. As this is a case study the aim is not to reevaluate
social movement theory, nor is the aim to create a theoretical framework for other social movements.
The findings in this thesis refer exclusively to the Palestinian-Israeli case. The use of quantitative data as
a representativeness test for the general youth population of Palestine does allow statements in the
conclusion to be generalized to the Palestinian youth population at large.
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46
Chapter 5: Results
To answer the research question10 we must first understand the views of the youth on social movements
regarding the future of the Palestinian Israeli conflict. To begin, one must understand the interviewees
personal view on the collective identity, collective action, and the conditions needed for these to come
together. This is explained in the analysis of the individual’s decisions to join social movements. The
interviewees answered questions explaining their personal reasoning, some elaborated and spoke on
behave of their classmates, friends, and sometimes their entire generation.
Following the analysis of the individual, an examination is done regarding the international
community’s role in social movements. The international community has always had and continues to
have a large role in the development of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. It follows that an analysis of the
youth’s view on the role of the international community in the future is required.
Succeeding the discussion about the role of the international community is an examination of the
choice for violence. Several of the interviewees have openly stated a believe that violence is the best way
to achieve their political goals. The question that arises from this is, why they believe this and what form
should this violence take?
Having established the motivations and the beliefs of the individuals on the relevant subjects, an
analysis is done examining necessary conditions for a movement to be successful, as identified by the
youth and some experts in the field. No movement has been successful in resolving the conflict between
the Israelis and the Palestinians, why not and what needs to happen for a movement to achieve this goal?
These are the kinds of questions that are answered in the final segment of the results chapter.
5.1 Individual’s decisions to join the social movement
5.1.1 Collective identity
The literature review is clear, for social movements to be established and to be successful there must be
a collective identity and collective action in the name of this identity. Therefore, the first question to be
answered in this segment is whether there is a collective Palestinian identity and what that is according
to those involved in this research. A professor at An-Najah University made it clear that the question of
10 “Which facilitating and restrictive factors can explain for the (lack of) potential of the instigation of a (third)
intifada, by the youth, in the near future, across the oPT and Israel?”
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identity is a complicated and important one, by stating the following: "This is a huge question for the
Palestinians. Define for me who is Palestinian. Is the Israeli with a Palestinian background, but with an
Israeli ID, passport and citizenship a Palestinian? Or is the Palestinian who lives in the States a Palestinian.
And the Palestinian enjoying his life in the Netherlands is he Palestinian because he is originally from here?
Is one Palestinian when he has a Palestinian mother or father? This is, by the way, one of the constitutional
problems for us as Palestinians, to define this" (Professor An-Najah University #1)
Among the interviewed population there is a split as to whether there is or is not unity among the
Palestinians. To be more specific, whether the Palestinian youth is unified with a collective identity.
Roughly a quarter gave a firm yes as an answer to this question. There were also several that made the
distinction between political unity and unity amongst the people. In Palestine, there is a clear split
between the people and the politics. Due to the absence of elections and the poor function of democratic
mechanisms in place, the political sphere does not accurately reflect the people’s views. This group stated
that the people were unified, mostly by a common enemy, but at the political level there is no consensus
on how to deal with this united believe. The majority of the interviewed population, agreed that there is
no political unity, but that the people are also not unified, as they are divided according to the political
streams in the West Bank and Gaza (student Qalqiliyah #5). In this view, there is no distinction between
political parties and the people. People are viewed as political beings in this case. There are also those
that feel that in the past there was unity, but that the Oslo Accords have left the Palestinians divided.
Interesting was that even those that felt there was no unity identified elements, when asked indirectly
about the subject, stated that are shared between most those that were interviewed.
The answers to both the direct and indirect questions regarding the elements of the collective
identity yielded the following results. Feeling Palestinian, supporting resistance against Israel, viewing the
land from river to the sea as Palestine, and a history of dealing with occupation in one form or another
were unanimous or nearly unanimous inclusions in the collective identity. Democracy and diversity were
also inclusions by a majority of interviewees. A student from Birzeit University made a clear statement
with regards to diversity: “Diversity is the Palestinian identity, there is no one race, shape, or religion for
Palestinian identity. Each rich city in Palestine has its own identity and that can be observed by anyone
that visits Palestine. The richness of Palestine history regarding trade, religion, conflicts, etc. made it very
complex to define a Palestinian identity as it becomes very diverse.” (student Birzeit University #4). What
he says is that although there are differences, we are all Palestinian. A history and a culture is the unifying
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feature of us all. This includes, but not limited to, language, geographic land, heritage, traditions, and
food. Unification along these lines cross geographic borders. Refugees in other countries, whether that
be Lebanon or the United States of America, can identify with these aspects of the Palestinian collective
identity. Interestingly, when asked directly about violent resistance only one interviewee stated a
rejection of these types of actions. The majority, felt that resistance is important in being a Palestinian
and that each person has the right to do this in their own way. Here it is appropriate to refer to the opening
line of this thesis: “to be Palestinian is to resist”. This appears to be the simplest way to explain the
collective identity of the Palestinians regarding this conflict. The question that remains is how to resist.
This brings to the forefront the question of collective action and the traditional dilemma of whether
collective identity leads to collective action.
5.1.2 Collective Action
Indulging in collective action in Palestine can take many forms. It can be done through small youth
movements, focused on resistance in different forms. For example, the Right to Movement group that
organizes group runs as form of resistance and protest to the occupation and the restriction on Palestinian
movement. Another example is the Youth Peace Initiative (YPI). The YPI has the goal of overcoming the
separation between Palestinians and Israelis. Meetings between youths from both sides of the wall are
organized. At these meetings, debates are held to try to come to resolutions regarding the conflict. The
hope is that these plans and ideas that are developed in these meetings will eventually be a base for future
negotiations and that the youths involved in this program will be the future leaders of the national
entities.
Although option for non-political social movements exist, most of those that were spoken to saw
the political parties and the political institutions as the primary forms of social movement available to
them. Therefore elements, such as trust in leadership, belief in the political system and the freedom of
expression within a party are crucial determining factors for many to join or not to join a social movement.
The objectives of collective actions that follow are often strongly linked to a certain political party. This
fits with the reviewed literature, through the political opportunities structures. As the system in Palestine
is relatively closed for non-political actors to be effective, the only opportunities that are available for
social movements are with political parties.
Of those that were interviewed about half of them are currently actively involved in social
movements in one form or another. All of those that were interviewed have an opinion on what methods
collective action should employ and what the aims of this action should be. There are three commonly
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mentioned goals for collective action that have been identified by the interviewed population, each linked
to a certain method of achievement. The aims that were presented are the enforcement of Oslo, an all-
inclusive single state and a single state exclusively for Palestinians.
5.1.2.1 Peaceful Resistance to enforce Oslo
The first option for collective action, is peaceful resistance and negotiations aimed at the establishment
of two separate states, one Palestine and one Israel. This is the solution that is currently supported by
Fatah and to a degree being executed by the PNA. This is a solution supported by a relatively large minority
of the interviewed youth. These are most often the supporters of post-Oslo Fatah. Those that act on behalf
of Fatah in student councils, always expressed this view on the conflict, but were often unable to explain
why they believed this was the best way forward in a personal way. They often used the same words and
phrases, creating the impression that this was a rhetoric they learned rather than believed in. This rhetoric
most often revolves around the international community being the only option for the Palestinians. They
see the UN and International humanitarian aid as the best way forward. When pushed for an explanation
why they believe the international community can help in this situation the post-Oslo Fatah supporters,
are rarely able to give a clear answer as to what kind of form this support should take. Others have been
able to give more detailed explanations.
A student from An-Najah University gave the following explanation: “I believe the Palestinians
don’t have the power the Israelis do. If I had the power and I think that I have right to take this land I
wouldn’t give any meter of it. This is Israel it has the power and Israel thinks that it has the right to have
this land so why would they give this up, so I don’t think they would compromise a single square meter of
the historical land of Palestine eventually. (…) The Palestinian state will be created mainly by convincing
the international community that we are human beings that are living on this land, with this dispute, with
this conflict, who need to be recognized as a nation with a state with a right to freedom of movement,
with a right to life. When they are convinced they convince their governments and their governments
change it.” (student An-Najah University #3). This is a different approach than that of the PA, as is
explained in the International Community segment of the analysis. What is clear is that this individual has
a clear vision how he thinks this can be achieved and why. He and others have given several reasons to
believe in the peaceful resistance approach to enforce Oslo.
The first is a believe that Israel has earned the right to exist. As was mentioned by a participant
from Qalqiliyah: “Israel has earned the right to exist. They have earned that through power.” (Qalqiliyah
#4). This is not a popular opinion, and was given by an individual that was clearly anxious about being
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interviewed. This individual did not finish his interview. His reason was that he felt uncomfortable and
was afraid the PNA would find out this was his view.
The second reason to support this plan stems from a bounded rational believe that violence will
not solve this conflict. Those that state this either see that violence breed more violence and/or they
believe that there is no victory possible against the much larger military power of Israel. As stated by a
professor from the Haifa university: “You can come and shoot this guy (an IDF soldier) with an AK, but
Israelis will not respond to this type of shooting. If you come with an AK, the Israelis comes with a tank. If
you come with a tank, the Israelis will come with F16. So, you can imagine where that will lead to for you.
They are quite pragmatic; they (the Palestinians) know their limits of power” (Professor Haifa #1).
The third reason presented is that the “smell of the something is better than nothing at all”
(student An-Najah University #2). Meaning, the Palestinians may want the historical Palestine as their
state, but having a smaller state is better than no state at all. Many that adhere to this believe also state
that they will accept the two-state solution, but not as a permanent solution as was openly stated by
Birzeit University student #3: “I can support this, if it ends the occupation. But I don’t see it as a permanent
solution. It is a step to the eventual goal of the restoration of the historical Palestine. It is not the best way
to reach this goal however.”.
The fourth reason for the support of this method and aim of collective action, is the view that the
Israelis are people as well. Those that use this reason believe that one of the main reasons for conflict is
misinformation. In their eyes, separation has led to a lack of contact between Palestinian and Israeli youth.
This has made them susceptible to ‘brain washing’ through propaganda and other mediums. The
participants in the YPI often have this view. They see interaction as a tool, to educate those on the other
side of the separation wall. They have seen the effects of seeking contact with other youths. To them the
‘enemy’ has become personalized and humanized. This makes it harder for them to call for violence
against the Israelis and more capable of accepting the presence of an Israeli state. The question with this
group remains whether the interaction with the Israeli youth is what caused this believe, or whether the
willingness to interact is enough to make one see the other side as human. There have also been
individuals that have had interactions with none-military Israelis, that do not see them as humans and
continue to call of violence against the Israelis in general. They are less prone to supporting a two-state
solution or an all-inclusive one state solution.
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5.1.2.2 An All-Inclusive One State Solution
The second aim of collective action that was proposed was for a single state with equal rights and
freedoms for all its citizens. This solution is the clearest example of a desire for peace and rights and has
less to do with national pride, although it is sometimes qualified by Palestinian rule over the nation and
the exclusion of the Zionists from the state. Not all that supported this as an aim believed it to be possible.
This was, for many, the ideal solution, but an unattainable one currently, including student An-Najah
University #3. He described the ideal solution as follows: "If we have this proposition of making a one state
in which the Palestinians and the Israelis and the Palestinian citizens of Israel and all other ethnicities and
other religious communities to live equally in this state, with the right to vote the right to election and the
right to do everything equally. I think that this is the perfect solution now. I would work for that more than
the two-state solution by the way.", but went on to state that Israel will not allow this to happen.
The all-inclusive state could be achieved by peaceful mean or violent ones. As is stated by PCPSR
Interview #1: "to be for the one state solution, need not mean that you are for non-violence or renounce
violence." Those that believe this to be possible through peaceful means were often the ones that would
be willing to live in a state called Israel with equal rights for all. Once this was established the natural
demography of the nation would result in a democratic shift in power to the Palestinians and the nation’s
name and flag could be changed through this process. There were only very few that had the insight to
see this was even theoretically possible and even fewer that believed the Israelis would allow this to
happen.
The individuals that believed this was possible through violence would target the Zionists and
drive them out of the land. As outlined by a polling expert, the support for violence is very strong amongst
the youth: “The support for violence, this is the most desperate, the most hopeless, the ones that thinks
things will not change unless force is utilized. So, to them Israelis understand nothing but the language of
force. Only by inflicting pain and suffering on the Israelis, not by talking to them, and convincing them of
the value of a one state, only by inflicting pain will they come around” (PCPSR interview #1). The violent
supporters for a one-state solution, repeatedly say that Jews can remain if they were not a threat to the
stability and safety of the nation. How exactly that could be determined however remained unclear in all
cases.
5.1.2.3 A Single State for Palestinians
The third possible objective of collective action is a single state for only the Palestinians across the
Historical Palestine, implying a repeal of the Oslo accords. This has the greatest support amongst the
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interviewed population. Most of the political parties in Palestine formally support this aim, but many,
including Fatah, have since then taken steps that would indicate a wavering commitment. Hamas is often
seen as the face of this aim, especially as they are the face of the armed resistance in the current political
structure. Hamas too has not always stood strong in their commitment to this, but have managed to keep
this image with many of their supporters. Hamas supporters are not the only ones that favor this collective
action. Most PFLP, pre-Oslo Fatah and Islamic Jihad supporters also prefer this path.
Some of the PFLP supporter and pre-Oslo Fatah supporters have even taken this a step farther
calling for a dismantlement of the PNA. The most extreme example of this is from a student at Bethlehem
university: “the first step is the PNA should vanish and then maybe something will happen.” (….) “The PNA
is basically the Israeli authority number two” (student Bethlehem #3). As is apparent from the language
used, this aim, goes hand in hand with armed resistance. Exactly why the choice for violence is made is
explained at a later stage in more detail.
The support for an exclusively Palestinian state, stems from three sources. The first is a clear lack
of believe that the current political set up is able to give the Palestinians an independent state. Most
supporters have lost faith in the PNA, Mahmoud Abbas and almost everyone in the current regime. Many
refer to the democracy as being broken in a similar way as Student An-Najah University #2: “This authority
is illegal. Somehow it is illegal. When Abbas came to power, he was talking about democracy, but every
president in Palestine has 4 years of office. So, now he became 8 years more, so it became illegal. That is
first. Second, somehow it is forced. We can’t just change it. It became just insane. You can’t just change
the reality now”. These individuals feel they have been abandoned by their government and don’t feel
represented by it at all. They have also never had the chance to influence change through democratic
process. Most see their state a democratic, but when that is taken away they argue there is no other
option for them to influence policy.
The second reason that comes forward from the interviews is frustration. Many of Palestinians
have never spoken to an Israeli civilian. Even fewer wish to do so. They know the Israelis only as the
enforcers of the occupation. They are frustrated by their situation and want the freedom to move. They
have grown so frustrated with this that they have internalized this frustration and are aiming it at the
Israelis, no longer being able to see them as human, but only as the reason for their suffering. This in some
cases results in an unwillingness to deal with the other side. Thus, they want to see all Israelis leave this
land. Many firmly believe that all Israelis can on a days’ notice migrate to another country, because all
Israelis have a second passport. This is true for many Israelis, but by no means all of them. When
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confronted with that fact, many simple deny it and call the information false and Israeli propaganda.
Frustration in this case has led to irrationality.
The third reason given is that several of the interviewees have a romantic view of violent
resistance. The classic proverb is that everything was better in the past. It appears that is also true here,
in the minds of some youths. They see the Second Intifada, where violent resistance was highly prevalent,
as a success. This, despite the limited physical evidence of improvement following violent resistance. The
victories of violent resistance that they refer to are minor victories. For example: “The PLO indeed. It was
great. When they took Palestinian prisoners. They took airplanes along with the PFLP (in 1970). They took
hostages until they released the prisoners. They benefit the Palestinians, they were reasonable in their
demands and had the power to negotiate. Now the PA, doesn’t have the power to negotiate on. When
Israel says no, its no. We can’t have anything to put pressure on Israel” (student Birzeit University #2). This
quote demonstrates a believe that terrorist actions work, and that negotiations are only successful when
you have a gun to someone’s head. There is an apparent unwillingness to negotiate. The supporters for
this collective action do not appear to be interested in peace, but are interested in victory at the expense
of Israel.
5.1.3 Engaging in Collective Action
As mentioned above, roughly half of those that were interviewed are engaged or have been engaged in
collective action in one way or another. Each has their own reasons for either joining a social movement
or not joining a social movement. As a group the interviewees identified six reasons for joining a
movement: financial gain, frustration or anger, a belief in the new generation, a belief that a new
movement can be started, a belief that a pathway to success exists, and indoctrination by political parties.
The reviewed literature assumes that people must be pushed to join a social movement. It is as though
the assumption is that a natural state is one of not being involved. This thesis also examines barriers for
joining a social movement. The interviewees identified eight reasons why they personally did not join a
social movement: a lack of representation, fear of destabilizing the situation, a sense that movements
that were once strong no longer hold the same strength, fear of persecution, the power imbalance
between Palestine and Israel, depression or hopelessness, and a belief that the role of the institution is to
engage in collective action and not the individual.
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5.1.3.1 Why do the Youth Engage?
"Money plays an important role. Naïve people are also a problem. When you bring 17 and 18 year old’s
and give them money and say you should be with us. They say you can have this money and give us your
allegiance then of course these youngsters will agree. This is what most of the movements do. They give
money and they bring in naïve people and put them in places that then they make trouble with other
groups." (student An-Najah University #1). This quote outlines one of the ways that political parties in
Palestine attempt to get individuals to join their cause and engage in collective action. By no means is this
a new approach to get people engaged. The cited works also mention appealing to one through personal
benefits can tie them to a cause without having to change their mentality or convincing them that the
cause is worthy. This does not work for everyone and is therefore not the only tool that is used to increase
engagement.
Political indoctrination is also a way that one can get individuals to join their cause. Fatah is often
accused of this, as they have control of the PNA and through this control over school systems and other
mechanisms that may shape the mind of the youth. Other parties have also been accused of having such
practices. The evidence is clear in some cases. One Hamas representative openly stated that his goal in
the university is to attract people and shape their mentality to fit that of Hamas. Others, such as student
Birzeit University #3 has accused the students of not being able to think for themselves: "I think the youth
should be freed from their leader’s opinions, Especially in Fatah and Hamas. The youth in these parties are
basically hypnotized to do whatever the leaders say.” (student Birzeit University #3). It needs to be stated
that the shear fact that one agrees with the current policy does not mean they have been indoctrinated.
The point that is being made is that unless one actively seek other sources or information and other
policies, they will come to the same conclusion as the party in power do to the control these parties
exercise on the information flows to the people, according to several interviewees.
Many of the people that engage in collective action, especially those that do so through non-
political entities, have a belief that there are still pathways to success. These may be the ones that are
being implemented currently, or ones which are not yet in the execution process. The second group is
where the YPI members tend to fall, as they are seeking new policy options that may break the stagnation
of the negotiations. The former groups are often those that are active in political organization, such as
Fatah, the PNA or Hamas.
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There are also those that are not sure whether there is still a pathway to success, but have faith
in the younger generation to carve a new path, or that the situation will change with a change in power.
This follows the logic of structuralist and the political opportunity literature. The change in power that
they refer to is a shift from the old generation currently in power to the youth. In their eyes this would
change the dynamic so that paths that were closed may be opened or new paths may be found that were
currently unthinkable. One such individual is Student An-Najah University #3: " I think there should be
another movement formulated by the youth that does not apply any ideology as well, but it should be
more involved with the international community. I think we should have a movement with Palestine that
hold members from the international community. In the past there was, it existed in Fatah. We had
members from the EU, from the Chinese.”. He sees this as a new way forward and is willing to invest in the
development of the ideas of the youth. A small number of individuals have found their motivation to join
in collective action in a lack of representation in the current social movements. This may at first sound
counter intuitive, but they feel that they should engage in the development of a movement, because there
is not a movement out there that currently represent their views and they believe that there should be as
well as that there is the political opportunity to develop such a movement. One such individual that is at
least contemplating starting a movement is Student An-Najah University #1: “There is no other
organization that thinks the same as I am. Maybe there will be. Maybe I will do something. This is why I
want to keep doing what I am doing. I want a movement that cares for all people.”. The idea that this
freedom exists is up for debate, as many more have argued that no such freedom or opportunity for
startups exist.
Frustration, as mentioned earlier, is a source of fuel for collective action as well. Many
interviewees pointed to this as the reason for the rise in violence at the end of 2016. Most of the
individuals that identified frustration as a source for their drive to engage in collective action, were also
the ones that preferred violence over a non-violent approach. The frustration often stemmed from
political suppression, from both the PNA and the Israeli government. One example of an individual that
was clearly frustrated by the repression was Student Birzeit University #1. He was arrested and stayed in
prison for 6 months. When asked why he was arrested he gave the following answer: “Israel see Hamas a
terrorist group. As I am a part of Hamas. But I am a student, a peaceful student. I don’t carry any weapons.
The fact that I call myself Hamas is in itself enough to arrest me. For Israel, this is enough for a charge.
They put a check by your name". The feeling that he was arrested for doing nothing is one of the reasons
that he was angered. In his eyes, as well as several others, these types of actions are the reason for the
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stabbing attacks. How this could be the case is discussed in the segment devoted to the choice for violence
later in the thesis.
5.1.3.2 Why don’t the Youth Engage?
A lack of the representation among the active social movements is more often than not a deterrent for
engagement in social movements. Several interviewees stated that there is a lack of leadership in the oPT
and they are unwilling to engage in activities as a result. Many feel the PNA has all the power to do
something, but that they are engaged in the wrong type of social action. Some even go as far as to say
that the PNA has abandoned the Palestinians and have sold the case to the highest bidder. Birzeit
University student #2 embodies this feeling very clearly in the following statement: "they can’t get me any
rights when they go to the UN. They went to the UN a few times to get our rights. We did not get it; we did
not get safety. For example, Nadims Nuara’s death, he is a martyr he is 17 years old, shot by an Israeli
sniper. Sajeh Darwish, a classmate in Birzeit also was shot in his village while he was feeding his horse. He
was shot by an Israeli settler because he wanted to. Nobody stands with the Palestinians, even the PA
doesn’t afford standing with these people. That is why I don’t support the PA and I don’t feel represented,
because they don’t represent what we really feel as Palestinians”
A fear of making the situation worse is a common fear among the youth as well. The youth is
divided when it comes to whether the situation is better or worse than the past. Some believe that there
is a form of peace between the Israelis and the Arabs at large, a 'cold peace', but a peace none the less.
Others feel that the occupation is worse than it has ever been. The truth is difficult to ascertain as the
arguments used are often the same facts with a different context. Such as the wall, the stabbings, the
separation and the negotiations. The clearest dividing line between these groups is their desire. Those
that feel there is a form of peace are often the same people that desire freedom and peace and would
accept integration or the two-state solution. This is the same group that sees the conflict in waves and
phases. While those that are adamant that the occupation is only getting worse are those that wish to see
their land reunited as a whole and wish to see the Israelis all leave the area. The supporters of this view
are those that most often describe the conflict as a continual struggle that doesn’t stop until the Historical
Palestine is reinstated and internationally recognized.
Social movements, especially student social movements, no longer have the same power as they
used to, as was outlined in the historical context. As a result, the interviewees feel that it is not a smart
investment of energy to work for these movements. As is elaborated on in the framing section. The
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student movement was once the backbone of the Palestinian independence movement. Since the
establishment of the PNA, these movements have lost a lot of their power. This is not only true of student
movements, but also of Fatah according to many individuals. When Fatah signed the Oslo Accords, many
felt that they had sacrificed the strength of the movement to achieve a margin of the original goal, thereby
handicapping the resistance in the future. Therefore, there is a distinction made between the post-Oslo
Fatah supporters and the pre-Oslo Fatah supporters.
The fear of persecution is a very real problem for the Palestinians. As is shown by this statement
of a Hamas member at the Birzeit University: “I have the same believe as Hamas. It is not my job though.
I work in the student frame. I just don’t want to get arrested tonight. You know we get arrested for saying
these things right?” (student Birzeit University #1). The fear of announcing one’s opinions, consequently
means they most likely will not act on these opinions in any meaningful way either. The first time this
became clear was in Qalqiliyah. A group of 5 girls in Qalqilyah refused to be interviewed after they found
out the types of questions that were being asked. One man, also in Qalqiliyah left the interview midway
and literally ran away during an interview. Both instances showed how prevalent the fear of percussion is
from the political institutions in both Palestine and Israel alike. It is not only jail time that is feared
however, social stigmas and exclusion are also strong deterrents in Palestinian society. One does not want
to be labeled a normalized individual. That is why many in the YPI do not even tell their families they are
a part of these movements. It is easy to understand how these institutional and social issues are barriers
to joining a social movement.
Power imbalance between Israel and Palestine is one that is apparent in almost every important
policy area, per many interviewees. In many of their eyes, Israel has the military arena, the media arena
and has the greater international support. For many this is too big of a hurdle to overcome. Therefore,
they resign to trying to make the best out of their circumstances.
Student An-Najah University #2 states that many people don’t want to join a movement because
they are depressed. They don’t see what can still be done that hasn’t be tried yet, so they are on the verge
of giving up: "The thing is after this intifada came down and people start maybe to get more disappointed.
I think they have tried everything, they have tried negotiations for 22 years now, that didn’t work out so
far. They tried the intifada. That didn’t work out. So, people got depressed." & "This is difficult. I don’t think
so. Whatever you do someone comes up and says no this is unacceptable. If we agree on the 67 borders
the Israelis will say no, we can’t give that then. If we take less land, then the Palestinians will not agree.
That is why I see this as a looping endless conflict. We need real leaders that know what their people want
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and why" This is a view reciprocated by many individuals. Several have the feeling that they have tried
everything and there is nothing they as a people can do anymore other than stay put and live their lives
on their land.
The final reason that was presented by interviewees for not participating in the collective action
in a direct way is that it is not their role. Several members of the student councils use this argument when
asked about how important the occupation is on their agenda. Others too have stated that in their
environment people value friends, family and themselves more than the struggle for Palestine. They
would rather leave that fight to the PNA and other institutions.
At this juncture, it is important to remember that no social movement involves the majority of a
population and the reviewed literature emphasizes the importance of a critical mass. The fact that these
circumstances stop half of the interviewees from participating in collective action, does not mean they
are the reason the social movements have yet to yield the desired results for most Palestinians.
5.1.4 Cultural Frames Resulting in Political Opportunities
The theoretical framework of this thesis outlines how the cultural frames of a population or an individual
may impact how they view the political opportunities for social movements to be established and to be
successful. The interviewees brought to light many elements of the Palestinian culture, from different
spheres. Each region in the oPT may be viewed as having a separate culture and resulting in a different
view on the conflict and what paths are the best to take. For example, the economic situation one grew
up in, or being born within a refugee family have a clear impact on how these individuals see the future
and the opportunities available to them. Due to the constraints of this thesis, not all of these can be
discussed at length. Therefore, four perceived key cultural frames are discussed below; the democratic
Palestine, the effect of interaction and new media, the history of the student movements and the political
divide in Palestinian society. These are considered key, because they are relevant for the greatest portion
of the interviewed population.
5.1.4.1 Democratic Palestine
Elections are often viewed as a political opportunity that would motivate people to come into action.
There are three reasons that have been outlined in the interviews as reasons for the elections to be a
political opportunity. The first stems from their collective identity. Most interviewees stated that Palestine
is in its foundation a democratic country. Thus, they believe elections should happen. This structure brings
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with it a structural opportunity for social expression with each election. Palestinian youths that were
included in this research felt robbed of their opportunity to express themselves and influence the
development of resolution between Israel and Palestine. The second is that they believe elections will be
the result of reconciliation or lead to reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas and the political
reunification of the West Bank and Gaza. The third reason is that they believe elections will result in a
change in leadership causing a return to the older forms of resistance. The search for a new approach
would cause a reunification of the Palestinians, as leaders would need the support of the people in a
restructuring effort. Continuation along the current path does not require the same support as the
institutions are able to follow this course without a popular vote, as shown by the past ten years, where
the institutions have functioned in a disconnect with the people. A believe that the reinstatement of
resistance would unify the people is especially popular in the lower economic classes and in refugee
camps. These are the same places where a romanticized view of the Second Intifada and armed resistance
is prevalent.
5.1.4.2 Interaction and New Media
Interaction between Palestinians and Israelis seems to breed a believe that resolution is possible among
the Palestinian youth. As mentioned early resolution need not mean peaceful coexistence. Those that
have interacted with Israelis often see the origin of this conflict as a result of brain washing, miss
understanding, separation and media control. These individuals actively seek contact with Israelis, do not
view them all as evil or the enemy, but sooner see them as humans that have been misinformed. Israelis,
in their eyes, are open to a different view of Palestinians. This group sees opportunities to create windows
of opportunity. Most of this group believes they can make a difference outside of politics through grass
root movements such as the Youth Peace Initiative. They see the power that social media gives them to
frame the conflict as they see it, without a middle man to distort their framing.
There is also another group that sees the power of the new media. They see the same chance to
frame the conflict and ‘free’ the minds of the people. Only their goal is not to use this to help the Israelis
understand that the Palestinians are people as well. Their aim is to free the people from the control of the
PNA. They envision a rise against the PNA to create an opportunity for a new movement to emerge,
namely one that returns to armed resistance of Israel.
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5.1.4.3 Student Movements
The history of the student movements make some believe that this is the way forward, but also makes
them the target of the PNA, demonstrated in the following quote: "(…) because Fatah is afraid they will
lose the elections, they are not taking the steps towards having these elections realized. (…) If a student is
or a movement is trying to express their positions and it doesn’t go a long with the P(N)A, they will be put
in jail." (Professor An-Najah University #1)
There is a discussion about the form that student movements should have. The professors often
spoke about the student movements as vital and important, both within the university and outside of it.
They saw the change in focus, from liberation to more a more institutional focus, of the student
movements as a positive development. Several students spoke out against the student movements. They
called the movements controlled, weak, powerless, and ineffective in the conflict with the Israel. The
students that were interviewed generally wanted the student movements to have more freedom and to
refocus on the conflict. This excludes those that were in the student council, who feel the liberation
movement is a job that should be handled at a higher political level.
There can be no doubt that the student movements of today are not as strong as those in the past.
The student movement has lost a lot of its power and although many experts have said that these hold
the key to a new social movement in Palestine, the structures that are in place and the mentality towards
student movements have changed. Students vote for student representation based on the conflict, but
based on internal university affairs. This is a stark difference from the historical role of student parties
prior to the establishment of the PNA. Those that grew up with strong student parties as the face of the
conflict tend to believe this is where the next wave of social movements should come from, while many
youths feel the institutions should represent them and be the face of social movements of the future.
5.1.4.4 The Political Divide
The political party that one supports plays a strong role in an individual’s framing of the conflict. Each
party as described before has its own vision on the conflict. The information they communicate to their
supporters are crucial in the process of opinion forming for the individual. Several of the interviewees
mentioned the strong control formal parties try to exercise on their youth counter parts, as though they
no longer think for themselves, but just communicate the party line blindly. Resulting in a divide in the
population. In many interviews, it was apparent what answers would be given once the political
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orientation was known. One can divide the political views of the youths that were interviewed into five
groups. Hamas, Pre-Oslo Fatah, Post-Oslo Fatah, Left wing resistance, Independent. Each of these has a
few key elements that members identify with. For Hamas supporters, these key elements are, support for
an Islamic political structure, support for violent resistance and a goal of reunification of historical
Palestine. Pre-Oslo Fatah supporter can be identified based on their support of a secular political
structure, support of violent resistance, and the goal of the reunification of historical Palestine. Post-Oslo
Fatah supporters are identified by their support of a secular political structure, a preference for non-
violent resistance and negotiations, and the support for a two-state solution per the 1967 boarders. Left
wing resistance supporters can be identified by their support for a secular political structure, a demand
for violent resistance, the goal of the reunification of historical Palestine, the abolishment of the PA and
the goal of removing all Israelis from the Palestinian land. The independents do not identify with any of
these groups, often identify with singular elements of parties, but are not truly affiliated with any of them.
Interestingly there are several examples of people voting against their own preferences. The clearest
example of this are the pre-Oslo Fatah supporters. During the interview the feeling was that they would
vote for Hamas when asked, but they would still vote for Fatah, despite their adamant rejection of the
Oslo accords, the two-state solution and a strong rejection of current Fatah leadership.
5.2 The International Community
The importance of the international community in this conflict has previously been established. What still
requires explanation is the view of the Palestinian youth on two key questions regarding the international
community. The first of these questions is, what is the general attitude of the youth towards the
international community? The second is, what role do the youth want the international community to
play? The interplay between these questions is apparent, as how one views the international community
currently impacts how the role they envision for it in the future.
5.2.1 The Perception of the International Community
“(…) there is no doubt in my mind. We have to do it alone.” (Qalqiliyah interview #3)
“There are protests, there are prisoners starving themselves out of protest and no one is acting.
Resolution 194 regarding the refugees and letting them return to their land. Until now the UN has failed
to let Israel agree to this. So, do you think they can end the occupation?” (Jalazone interview #2)
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“I am not that proud of being an Arab, because you see that all the Arab countries are not doing that
much to us. Not giving us that much support. I mean the people are good, they feel the empathy for us.
The leaders just don’t care.” (Student An-Najah University #1)
These three quotes paint a very clear picture of how the Palestinian youth feel about the current
policies of the international community. Many feel abandoned by the UN, the western nations and the
Arabic neighbors alike. The United states is the country that is most often referred to as an issue for the
Palestinians and the resolution of the conflict. The claim is that the United States is biased and too
supportive of Israel. Some go as far as to say the ISIS is an American method to destabilize the region and
remove Arab resistance against Israel. The International Criminal Court (ICC) is also not viewed in a
positive limelight. It is described as a failing institution by many Palestinians. In their eyes, Israel is not
being held accountable for breaking international law. Several interviewees have also stated the Arabic
nations are no longer interested in the conflict. That these views exist does not mean the interviewees do
not understand why these choices were made by international institutions. Some understand what drives
international politics quite well, but do not agree with the results and wish to see the international
community act in a different manor.
5.2.2 The Role the International Community should take
The thoughts on the role of the international community in the future is divided into three lines of
thinking. The first is we don’t need them anyway. The second is a desire to tangible political action. The
third is a desire to see military intervention.
The thought that there is no role left for the international community is the strongest in the fringes
of society. This includes the refugee camps and the poorest of the population, although some higher
educated individuals also feel there is no longer a place for the international community at the table. In
their eyes the UN, the USA, the EU and others have had their chance and have failed to support the
Palestinians. At this point they believe the international community can only do more harm than good as
shown by the following quote: “There is no role for them at all. We don’t want the west and we don’t want
the Arabs either.” (Qalqiliyah interview #3)
The majority of the interviewees expressed a desire to see the international community back up
their rhetoric with political instruments. As a young professional working in the PNA stated: “They cannot
keep issuing statement. I don’t want to hear statements anymore. Whether from the EU or Holland or
anyone. Yesterday EU statement of demolitions. What do I do with these statements? These do not cause
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change. What causes a change is when there are measures taken?” (Young Professional #1). The political
tools that the youth sees as legitimate and strong options include a boycott of all Israeli goods or at least
settlement products, calling Israeli leaders to the ICC, enforcing a fairer coverage by the media on the
conflict, and acting as neutral mediator at meetings between the PNA and Israel. Most of the interviewees
were aware that the official position of most western countries is a support of the two-state solution. In
the eyes of the youth these steps would be in line with this point of view. When asked how they would
get the international community to commit to this many did not have an answer, but those that did
referred to social media as a key. This allows them to access the international populations directly. Several
interviewees explained that if they could explain the reality of the situation to the populations of the
western countries it would be enough to change their minds. These populations would in turn vote for
governments that implement these policies and so the situation would change. This requires the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict to be so important to western voters that it would determine their votes. Whether
that is the case is a big question.
The third and final way the youth wish to see the international community get involved is through
military support. They wish to see not only UN forces, but also Arab forces and other nations militaries
stand up to Israel. The very few that support this vision believe the diaspora is a weapon as well. They see
themselves as superior with the support of these institution and the diaspora. One such believer is
Jalazone interview #2: “They must fight the movement, with political, economic and armed measures. They
must deny the existence of Israel. They don’t have a right to live here.”. When asked how this might be
possible no one that was interviewed had a sufficient answer. They claimed the Palestinians had the right
to the land and it was the obligation of the international community to come in and help.
With the role of the international community now clear, it is time to move on to the choice for
violence and what the driving forces are behind this decision.
5.3 The Choice for Violence
Having clearly established what options for collective action there are per the Palestinian youth, the youth
is facing a choice. This choice simply put is between violence and non-violence. The literature review
names three reasons that a social movement might result in political violence: protest cycles,
legitimization of violence, and policing protests. These were present in the reasoning of the Palestinian
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youth. There are two other reasons that have been brought to the light in the interviews: separation and
a romanticized view of violence.
Before, examining these reasons an explanation must be given of what is considered violence and
what is not. Violence knows many gradations, and in this conflict, there have been many different forms
of violence. Everything from fighter jets bombing cities and regions to stone throwing have occurred. For
the sake of this research the definition that is used is dictated by the interviewees. The consensus is that
stone throwing and car ramming at checkpoints are not violence they are protests, although there are a
few that see this as violence already. For this research, everything that exceeds this level is considered
violence. That includes, stabbing attacks, car bombs and the use of guns. Having established this, it is time
to examine the five reasons to support violence according to the Palestinian youth.
5.3.1 Protest Cycles
As indicated by the reviewed literature the history of a conflict has an impact on the type of methods
employed by the social movements in the form of protest cycles. The brief historical overview in this thesis
shows that the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians is ever present, but has peaks and valleys
in terms of the intensity of the conflict. Intensity need not refer to violence, but to the level of attention
that the conflict got internationally and how much it captivated both sides at the time. The conflict has
had a relatively low intensity since the Second Intifada, despite some significant, yet minor peaks including
the Gaza wars and what many have dubbed the ‘stabbing intifada’. Due, in large part, to the position the
PNA has taken, by committing to peaceful negotiations. This mirrors the expectations from the literature
review, that a conflict will continue to escalate to more violence until a consorted effort is made by both
sides to minimize the use of violence. The peak of violence was in this case the Second Intifada. Following
this both sides have avoided engaging in a large scale violent conflict.
The reviewed literature is unclear in how this peaceful period will hold up when a permanent solution
remains out of reach. In the case of several individuals a lack of a permanent solution is a reason to re-
escalate the conflict using violence. Formal parties may have made peace, but many do not agree with
this policy, referring back to past waves of conflict and the impact that these had on their lives as a reason
to reengage in violent methods. As indicated by the following quote: “I don’t want to kill Israelis. If they
want to leave this land I will never kill him. But, if he wants to stay here and kills us, they many things that
are bad. I don’t want to kill him or them, but if he leaves this land that is good. If they want to still here I
cannot stay quiet. It is for me. They killed my grandfather, or the dad of grandfather. I don’t want to kill
them that is a critical point. If they want to stay here I can’t.” (Student An-Najah University #2). This
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student clearly indicates that the responsibility for acts committed by the parents or grandparents of
Israelis is passed down the generation per this individual. A son may be held responsible for the acts of
his father. The past cycles of protest have a definite impact on the decision to employ violence in the fight
for independence. Some even go as far as to state: “I don’t believe that all the people who died for the
sake of the Palestinian land should go to waste. I believe we have a responsibility to keep working for what
they originally did.” (student Bethlehem university #3). Responsibility to those that have passed is not the
only way in which protest cycles impact the decision for violence.
A sense retribution, punishment and retaliation also play a strong role. As shown by Student An-
Najah University #1: “(…) if someone slaps you in the face. I don’t expect you to turn the other cheek and
let him slap you. You have to slap him back.” (Student An-Najah University #1). The degree of retaliation
is highly variable. Some wish to see them punished in a judicial way and wish to claim back their land.
Others go a step further as demonstrated here: ”I can’t stand side by side with someone who killed my
ancestors. Not even my ancestors, it’s something inhuman. No one died from my family, but I know people,
really know them closely who’s brothers and sisters died. I know someone who’s friend died in front of
their eyes. He bled to death in his arms. I don’t think it’s reasonable to ask this person; how about we
forget the past and how about we start a new page where we all live together and elect whoever we want;
of course not. To me, killed is the least these people deserve.” (Student Bethlehem #3). For these individual
the idea of peace is impossible and there is no possibility of learning to live together. This group is a
minority on the interviewed population, but is often the clearest in their rhetoric and overpowers those
with a more nuanced view, as was demonstrated in a view group interviews.
5.3.2 Legitimization of violence
Groups that actively encourage the use of violence have a set rhetoric used to encourage members to
engage in violent behavior. This process is referred to as the legitimization of violence. The literature
review shows the choice of violence is often driven by a belief that it is a legitimate and acceptable option.
In the case of the Palestinians there is a general belief that the use of violence is acceptable. Even most of
those that do not encourage its use, or belief that it is productive state it to be a legitimate option.
Interviewees refer to international law. Per international law they as inhabitants of this land have the
right to resist a military occupation, in whatever way they can. This according to the interviewees. In their
eyes, they are acting in self-defense against Israel. In the interviews two questions were raised when this
argument was used.
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The first, is the question of targeting civilians, as this is illegal per International Humanitarian Law (IHL)
(International Commitee of the Red Cross, n.d.). Most of those that belief in the use of violence argue
there is no such thing as a civilian on the Israeli side: “Q: Is there a difference for between soldiers and
civilians on the Israeli side? A: No. There is no difference. They are all trained, have all been in the military
and all have weapons. Violence is acceptable against all of them, because they build their homes on our
civilian privately owned land.” (Qalqiliyah interview #3). Per this rational they are not breaking
international law themselves. This allows them to legitimize the use of violence against what could be
considered civilians.
The second, is the question of violent acts within Israel’s borders, as the use of force within another
nation’s borders is another issue of debate in international law (Mishra, 2016; International Committee
of the Red Cross , 2016). For most this is not an issue. As explained earlier, a part of the identity of the
Palestinians is that this is all their land. Therefore, it is not Palestinians using force in Israel, but Israel using
force in Palestine. While most of the international community considers the occupation of Palestine to
have started in 1967, many Palestinians argue that the occupation started with the inception of Israel, in
1948. These two arguments are actively propagated by groups that support violence, like Hamas. It allows
people to ‘legitimately’ support and use force across all Historical Palestine. Whether these arguments
are reasonable or true is irrelevant for the internal legitimization of the individual.
5.3.3 Policing protests
Although closely related to protest cycles the methods of policing protests have a separate impact on the
choice for violence or nonviolence. Policing protests are continually present in both the ebbs and flows of
cycles. They increase and decrease over time, but most often once employed the choice to shift down to
a less extreme method of policing is rarely made. The ‘stabbing intifada’ has been over since December
2015 and yet the shoot to kill order at checkpoints remains in place a year later. Many interviewees are
angered by the policing methods used, especially those employed by the Israelis. When asked about the
employment of violence on the Palestinian side, many interviewees replied that their violence is nothing
compared to that of the Israelis.
The use of excessive violence is not the only reason that policing protests is identified as a
problem. Many also point to the system of arresting an individual prematurely and locking them away for
excessively long periods of time as a reason for anger. An individual in Jalazone explained:
“A: I have been arrested and injured by them. In 2013 I was arrested and the year before I was injured.
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Q: How, what happened?
A: I was injured during a peaceful demonstration. I was watching.
Q: Where was this?
A: At the entrance of the camp, on the main road. In 2009, I was arrested by the Israelis for 24 days. And
in 2013 it was for 2 years. I was sentenced as a result of concession from other guys.
Q: Did you have a trial at all? How does this process work?
A: They claimed that he was a participant of a political party that is terrorist organization according to
Israel (probably Hamas) and throwing stones.” (Jalazone interview #2)
This individual felt he was locked away for no reason other than stating his views and sharing
these views with others. According to him, and others with similar stories, these practices are violations
of human rights. If the Israelis will not adhere to these norms, why should the Palestinians. This is how
many legitimize their preference for violence. Both this and excessive force used by those policing protests
are used are reasons to engage in violent behavior. This wraps up all the reasons identified by the
literature review. We now move to the reasons not in the reviewed literature, first is separation.
5.3.4 Separation
“I have never spoken to an Israeli and I don’t know if I want to. (There was a small exchange here between
him and the translator, where the translator expressed his disbelieve that he would not be willing to sit
down and speak with them. His point being that you cannot have a solution without them.) I have lost a
very close friend in this conflict, three of my cousins are in jail and it makes it very difficult to be able to
talk to them in a normal way. Maybe I will to talk to one that is not a Zionist, but never can I talk to a
settler.” (Student Birzeit University #3)
This quote illuminates how difficult it is for most individuals to leave the past and engage with the
other side, in this case Israelis. On both sides there have been steps taken that have deteriorated the
casual interaction between the parties. With the wall erected and social deterrents of normalization in
place, it takes a great deal of effort and energy to engage with the ‘enemy’. The following quote shows
that this effort may be key in decreasing the tendency for violence: “(…)2 years ago from now I had not
met any Israeli and never believed that I should. Until I met them and its personally good for me, because
I always want to know how they lived, because if you know your enemy then you can educate yourself for
the conflict. What changed me is when I saw how they reacted, how their attitude changed when they saw
me, how I looked how I react about the situation that happened. Something changed in me. I wondered
what would happen if more Israelis so Palestinians, if they would have another mentality with different
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perspectives. It didn’t happen so far, because they are afraid of meeting Palestinian’s and coming to
Palestine and the Israelis are hopeless of meeting Israelis.” (Student An-Najah University #3). This
student’s narrative clearly indicates that the segregation of people leads to more extreme and radical
ideas about the opponent, like the term enemy is one he barely uses anymore where as he did in the past
a lot.
The statement that separation leads to more willingness to use violence is supported by the fact
that, with one exception, every participant in the research that supports the use of violence has not talked
to an Israeli and is not willing to. This is contrasted by the fact that almost all of those that have engaged
with the other side have indicated a shift to a more passive view, similar to student An-Najah University
#3.
5.3.5 Romanticized view of violence
It was previously stated that the supporters of violent resistance amongst this generation of youths may
have a romanticized view of violence and the success of such forms of resistance. There are two ways that
the romanticizing of violence are identified: the way martyrs are viewed and the perception of successful
resistance prior to the establishment of the PNA.
5.3.5.1 Martyrs
“Q: What is your opinion on celebrating them (martyrs)?
A: Every Palestinian who gives his life for his homeland is called martyr, because they gave up their life
for us. When you decide to give up his life for others then… Don’t think for a second these are happy
celebrations; they are burning inside, they are burning. But it is a way to relief these feeling. They say
thanks god he is a martyr. It’s a kind of religious thing.
Q: And streets being named after him and these types of things. These are not a celebration?
A: That is a celebration as a hero. He is a hero because he gave up his life.
Q: Do you believe that to be right?
A: Yes, he is a hero, because he gave up his life. I want to struggle a different way. It is not easy to give
up your life, I don’t want to do that.” (Young professional #1)
The reference to an individual willing to give up their life for their country as a hero is not a new
one by any means. Most western nations use similar rhetoric when it comes to their soldiers. A distinction
must be made between a soldier in the military and an individual. With military personnel, it is safe to
assume they are acting in line with a strategy as a part of a larger whole. With the individuals in these acts
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the same assumption is not as safe, even though several interviewees would state otherwise. This is the
type of rhetoric that legitimizes the use violence. Even those that belief stabbing attacks to be ineffective
or detrimental, view the individuals that do this as heroes. The idea of being celebrated may get
individuals to commit a violent act. This act may then be as a part of a social movement or as an individual
for purely personal reasons. The interviewees belief that these individuals did this on behave of the nation.
There are news sources and experts that state that some of these individuals are simply looking for a
socially acceptable form of suicide (Walters, 2016)
5.3.5.2 Before the PNA
As has been made clear earlier, there are many that belief the PNA has been the downfall of successful
social movements. They actively suppress them and are, in some eyes, an extension of Israel. For many
the idea that the PNA was better before Abbas, that Fatah was better before the PNA or that the PLO was
better than the PNA, comes down to the movements view on the use of violence. The earlier movements
often encouraged violent resistance or at least did not actively do anything to stop it being employed. This
changed after the Second Intifada. As shown by the following quote: “I have mixed feelings. Some of what
they do is right. Some of what they do is wrong. It is wrong to throw Palestinians in jail is not right. They
do this to people that speak out against the PA. Not for crimes but for talking. It is good that they were
involved in the Second Intifada and that they used force then.” (Qalqiliyah interview #3). The belief is that
without the violent resistance as a threat the negotiations are useless. “They (Palestinian representation
under Arafat) try to have strength points against Israel so they can negotiate, unlike Abu Mazen. He only
negotiates without strength points.” (Student Birzeit University #2). Many believe the use of violence is
rational. Without it Israel has no reason to comply and thus the administration of Palestine must allow
the use of violent resistance to give them power. The issue with this is that Israel has far superior military
capabilities and will not be deterred by violence per Professor Haifa university #1. Those that see this are
reasonable in his eyes. The other are romantics that do not see the reality of the situation.
5.4 The conditions for a movements success
Having examined the reasons why an individual may join a movement and what expectation they have
for these movements, it is time to look at what conditions are required for a movement to be successful.
The literature review states the main reason for a successful social movement is the ability to engage the
required amount of resources, given the presence of a collective identity and the willingness for collective
action of a critical mass. This ability to engage these resources and dependent on political opportunities,
at the three levels: Palestinian, Israeli and International. Besides these conditions, the interviewees add
70
the following conditions: distribution of power and framing of the conflict (link to ISIS, and the religious
versus land conflict).
That both the PNA and Israel have policies in place that limit the political opportunities of social
movements has been previously established, in the section on personal reasons for joining a movement.
The political opportunities at the international level have not been discussed at such length. Many
interviewees see the international community as the final chance to have a successful movement, but
admit there are limited political opportunities as the structural opportunities are scarce, given the slow-
moving nature of international politics. as demonstrated by this quote: “I don’t think he (Abbas) can do
any more than he is doing right now. If he does anything else, then the whole world will be acting against
what he does. I have already experienced other ways for a solution, like the armed uprising. Look at what
that gave us, taking into consideration the Israeli power militarily and look at how the world treated us
after that. They want us to act as they impose us, not as we want to. Abu Mazen is also under this
imposition. We are under siege and can’t be in similar power as Israel” (Jalazone interview #1) the
structure of international politics give Palestinians have only two openings for success. One is through
social media as outlined earlier. The second is through diplomacy, although this is not as accessible for
local social movements, it can be strengthened by social movements at an international level. The
previous quote brings to light another issue, the balance of power.
Many interviewees expressed the belief that the political opportunities were limited in Palestine,
but even if the PNA did engage with social movements, and support them actively, there would not be
enough resources available to them to be able to country the Israeli strength. The interviewees stated
demonstrated that Israel has the political power, the economic power, and the military power. Even if the
Palestinians would be willing to embrace the Israelis the Israelis won’t do the same for the Palestinians as
it threatens the very bedrock of their national foundation. Therefore, the Israeli agreement is an
important reason why a movement would be successful or not. The interviewed youth see the only way
to break this balance of power is at the international level through framing. If they can cut off Israel from
international support they feel political opportunities will emerge and more resources will be at their
disposal.
The framing of the conflict in general is crucial in the eyes of experts. Israel attempts to frame this
conflict as one of religion and ethnicity per interviewees. In this frame, Israel has a legitimate claim to the
land, but the Palestinians nearly unanimously agree that this is conflict about land irrespective of religion.
In the current climate, a frame of Jews versus Muslims would also be a threat for Palestinian social
71
movements given the international developments in the region and the growth of ISIS. “They (ISIS) are
terrorists. They harm the Palestinian cause. Da’esh claims to be Islamic, and every party representing any
religion harms the Palestinian cause. If we look at the Palestinian conflict as religious, then the Israelis
have a right to this land. I don’t think however that it will ever spread to Palestine.” (Qalqiliyah interview
#5). This demonstrates how the conflict is impacted by ISIS. If the Palestinians are seen as Muslims instead
or Palestinians, then there is a risk their independence movement will be labeled as Islamic terrorism
rather than a fight for independence. This will have consequences for the support of from abroad and the
resources that are available to social movements seeking independence in any form.
5.5 Statistics of the Palestinian Youth
In the previous segments of this chapter interviews with students and experts have been used to examine
the collective identity, the collective actions, the role of the international community, the choice for
violence and the conditions required for a successful social movement in the oPT. The tables below show
how several of the points raised above are viewed by a representative sample of the Palestinian youth.
The first table (table 5.1) outlines the youth support for political parties in the oPT. The following five
tables (tables 5.2-5.6) show the level of support for several options of collective movement. These
statistics allow for a more accurate answer to the research question, regarding a potential third intifada.
Table 5.1 Youth support for political parties in the oPT (West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem)
Political Party Frequency Percentage (%) Valid Percentage
(%)
Cumulative
Percentage (%)
PPP 1 .4 .4 .4
PFLP 10 3.8 3.8 4.2
Fatah 70 27.0 27.2 31.5
Hamas 63 24.4 24.6 56.1
DFLP 5 1.8 1.8 57.9
Islamic Jihad 3 1.2 1.2 59.1
Independent Islamists 7 2.6 2.6 61.7
Independent Nationalists 14 5.5 5.6 67.2
None of the above 84 32.5 32.8 100.0
Total 257 99.2 100.0
Missing 2 .8
Total 259 100
72
Table 5.1 shows there are three large groups. As expected Fatah and Hamas get the most support
from the youth, as they are traditionally the largest parties, as stated in the historical overview earlier.
Each of these gets roughly a quarter of the youth populations support. Fatah, is still slightly larger than
Hamas. What is more interesting is that the lack of political representation identified in the earlier parts
of the analysis is very clear in this table as well, with almost a third of the participants indicating they do
not support any of the largest political movements in the oPT. Table 5.1 only shows those parties that got
a vote of support in the questionnaires. Among the parties not getting any votes are the PNI, Fida, and
the third way headed by Salam Feyyad.
Table 5.2 shows the expected result. The majority (65.1%) of the youth in Palestine does not
wish to live together with the Israelis. We do see that the discrepancy is not as large as one would
expected based on the interviews. Despite this being a very uncommon response in the interviewed
population, over one third (see table 5.2) in of the youths support the one state solution, with both
Israelis and Palestinians living together.
Table 5.2 Youth support for abandon the two-state solution and demand the establishment of one
state for Palestinians and Israelis
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
1) Strongly
support
20 7.7 7.7 7.7
2) support 70 27.2 27.2 34.9
3) oppose 118 45.6 45.6 80.5
4) Strongly oppose 48 18.6 18.6 99.1
5) DK/NA 2 .9 .9 100.0
Total 259 100.0 100.0
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Table 5.3 Youth support for joining more international organizations
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
1) Strongly
support
74 28.5 28.5 28.5
2) support 121 46.8 46.8 75.2
3) oppose 56 21.8 21.8 97.0
4) Strongly oppose 5 2.1 2.1 99.1
5) DK/NA 2 .9 .9 100.0
Total 259 100.0 100.0
The interviewed population saw the most support for the PNA come for their work in the
international political arena. This is reflected in the statistics of table 5.3. just over three quarters of the
Palestinian youth support joining more international bodies. The interviewees stated this would help
build the legitimacy of the future Palestinian state.
Table 5.4 Youth support for resorting to popular non-violent and unarmed resistance
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
1) Strongly
support
25 9.8 9.8 9.8
2) support 113 43.7 43.7 53.5
3) oppose 92 35.6 35.6 89.1
4) Strongly oppose 23 8.9 8.9 98.0
5) DK/NA 5 2.0 2.0 100.0
Total 259 100.0 100.0
Table 5.5 Youth support for a return to the armed intifada and confrontations
74
In the interviews, it became clear that even those individuals that vote for parties currently
propagating for peace and are actively disarming the Palestinians (for example Fatah), may support a
violent and armed intifada. Tables 5.4 and 5.5 do show an interesting difference with the expectations
from the interviews. While there were some interviewees that stated they supported an armed
movement, almost all stated they supported popular resistance. Yet, in the statistics we see that a larger
group supports an armed intifada than unarmed resistance. These two concepts are not mutually
exclusive, but it is possible that some of the population believe that they are and therefore believe they
had to choose between the two.
Table 5.6 shows the largest deviation from the expectations based on interviews. Most of the
people interviewed stated that they supported the PNA, at least to a degree. The statics tell a different
story. Not only does a large group not support the PNA’s current policies, almost half of the youth
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
1) Strongly
support
53 20.6 20.6 20.6
2) support 117 45.1 45.1 65.7
3) oppose 76 29.5 29.5 95.2
4) Strongly oppose 10 4.0 4.0 99.2
5) DK/NA 2 .8 .8 100.0
Total 259 100.0 100.0
Table 5.6 Youth support for dissolving the PNA
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
1) Strongly
support
41 15.8 15.8 15.8
2) support 85 32.7 32.7 48.5
3) oppose 93 35.7 35.7 84.2
4) Strongly oppose 29 11.1 11.1 95.3
5) DK/NA 12 4.7 4.7 100.0
Total 259 100.0 100.0
75
population does not support the idea of the PNA and wishes it to be dismantled. In the interviews, only
the PFLP supports and some scarce individuals made such claims. The statistics show that almost half of
the people see the PNA as a hindrance to their goals for the oPT. This finding combined with the previous
statements, make it clear that there is a large group, possibly even a majority amongst the youth that wish
to abandon the Oslo Accords and go down a different path.
76
Chapter 6: Conclusion and Recommendations
6.1 Answering the research question
The literature review and the history paint a clear picture of what would be needed for a third intifada to
take erupt. There needs to be political opportunity, frustration amongst the people, a trigger event similar
to those that preceded both the First and Second Intifada, and the freedom from the governing body and
popular leaders to engage in protest. All these elements would need to coincide, although not all are
equally important. In the Palestinian case, the freedom from the PNA/PLO to engage in a strong social
movement is essential, because of the already existing and continual political and physical repression
exercised by Israel. A trigger event is also among the most important currently absent factors. Political
opportunity and frustration are, although not less important, less of a necessary point of focus, as there
are enough individuals that believe they can create their own political opportunity and the frustration is
nearly permanent. A trigger event is therefore needed to spark those who believe they can create political
opportunity into action, and to engage those that are frustrated. Looking at the results of this research
the case could be made for the impending occurrence of a third intifada as well as for it being unlikely for
one to occur in the near future.
There are five arguments that are derived from the results that suggest an intifada may soon
happen. The first is frustration. Before both previous intifadas frustration was high among the Palestinian
population, which is currently the case as well. There is frustration regarding leadership, the PNA, the
occupation, the treatment of Palestinians by the IDF and the progress being made towards a Palestinian
State. These are very similar sentiments to those that fueled the Second Intifada. A strong collective
identity also became apparent in the results. The reviewed literature shows that a social movement
cannot be successful without a collective identity. The third argument is the willingness of the people to
act. If we take the interviewees at their word, many are willing to go to great lengths to achieve their
goals, even if those are not always aligned. Not only do they state their own willingness to act, they also
indicate that they believe many other people share that sentiment. This may indicate the presence of a
critical mass, which is the fourth reason and intifada may occur. Several interviewees stated that given
the opportunity many Palestinians would join a movement for freedom. This is supported by the statistics,
which show a majority would support another armed intifada. This, in turn, is linked to the fifth reason
for a potential third intifada, the believe that a political opportunity can be created, although this is only
the view of the minority of the interviewed population.
77
As stated earlier, a case can also be made against the likelihood for a third intifada, for six reasons.
The first of those is that the PNA is actively supporting Israel to stop protests, especially violent ones,
while each of the past intifadas had the support, or at least non-intervention, of the ‘government’ at the
time, whether that was the PLO or the PNA. With two governmental institutions cooperating against
them, it is difficult to see how a social movement could possibly be successful. The second reason is linked
to the first. There is fear among the Palestinians, both of persecution and of any movement not having a
chance of success. According the some this belief stems from a lack of leadership which is the third reason
an intifada may not happen. Both previous intifadas had strong leaders at the heads of organizations, in
Arafat, Marwan Barghouthi11, and several others. According to the interviewed population, there are
currently none with the same ability to mobilize enough resources, including influence in the international
arena, funding for a conflict, and inspiration for the Palestinian population to feed off of. Resource
mobilization, however, is not the only issue. Several interviewees stated that they believe there are simply
not enough these resources available and that there is no way for them to get these at the present
moment. This is due to the international support for Israel and the military capacity of Israel. However,
even if these resources were available, interviewees have stated there is no consensus on what to use
them for. The divide at both political level and, to a lesser degree, the population level makes effective
and efficient resource mobilization difficult, if not impossible. The sixth and final argument in support of
the unlikeliness of a third intifada is the lack of political opportunities. The majority of the interviewed
population feels that they cannot create their own political opportunities, due to a lack of resources, and
also don’t see an opportunity arising any time soon. Even with the death of Abbas, several interviewees
believe this would be handled internally by the PNA. The only way they would be able to imagine a political
opportunity would arise is if there was to be a shift in the position of the international community. This,
however, does not appear likely given the current developments in the Middle East.
Based on these arguments it seems that the stronger case is made by the group that does not
believe an intifada is likely to occur in the near future. There are simply too many changes that must occur.
First, Hamas would have to reconcile with Fatah and the PNA. To achieve this, the international
community must also remove Hamas from the list of terrorist organizations, to allow for more open
discussions and a functioning democratic Palestine. There would have to be a shift on the international
level away from supporting Israel, towards holding them accountable for their actions. Only if this were
to occur, Israel's power over the Palestinian population may be limited in such a way that more individuals
11 The leader of the Tanzim Brigades, a military group associated with Fatah.
78
believe an intifada would be successful. The statistics show that most youth would support an intifada,
but supporting one and believing it would be successful are two different things, as was made clear by the
interviewed population. Moreover, leaders must step up who allow for social movements to be
established and thrive. These are a lot of conditions to align in a short window of time. Therefore, this
thesis carefully concludes that a third intifada is unlikely to occur in the near future, if conditions remain
the same. In conclusion, so long as the PNA is led by Abbas and are actively working to suppress social
movements in the oPT, then a third intifada is unlikely to erupt.
At this juncture it is important to note that predicting the future is impossible, and in the past
significant changes have occurred in short periods of time, with very little warning. If the right trigger
occurs at the right time, it is possible to see a major shift on an international scale that could change the
entire dynamic currently at play. Triggers have in the past overcome concepts such as fear, political
repression and rational choice, therefore it is impossible to say with certainty that these conditions will
remain and that a third intifada will not occur.
6.2 Conclusion and Limitations
This thesis set out to answer the question of what conditions would explain for the (lack of) potential for
a third intifada. On the path to answering this research question there were many sub questions that
required an answer. One of these was what might be the best type of literature to help understand the
conflict. Social movement literature proved to be exceptionally helpful in this regard, although it is
unfortunately, as previously stated, affected by western bias. Reflecting on the results of the research, it
becomes clear that almost all of the elements outlined in western social movement literature were
present in the Palestinian case. However, the reviewed literature was not inclusive enough to encompass
all elements of the Palestinian struggle. There were several instances where the interviews revealed new
elements, which were particularly relevant in this case study. A striking example of this were the elements
of segregation and romanticizing violence in the choice to employ violence or non-violence. The definition
of a social movement also proved to be different from the traditional western one in this context, with
political parties not being separate from social movements, but rather one of the major driving forces
behind them.
It was also found that the Palestinian youth do have a common identity, based first and foremost
on the recognition that this is their land. Resistance is a manner of expressing this believe, which surpasses
several segregating lines, such as place of birth, education level, exposure to violence, and political
orientation. This is also where the title of this thesis is derived from. Although there is unity in population’s
79
view on the land, there is no clear unity on the aim of collective movement, nor on the methods that
should be employed to achieve these aims. There are those that support a single state for all, a single
state for only Palestinians, a two-state solution and any variation in between. There is a large group which
supports violence and an armed intifada, but very few that are willing to instigate this. Even though there
may well be a critical mass supporting an intifada, getting them started is a tall order in the current
climate. For this strong leadership would be needed. In this thesis, it has been outlined how this leadership
is being actively repressed by the PNA, leading to many calling the authority an obstacle to successful
resistance, and even an extension of the Israeli government. As a result, there are limited political
opportunities for the development of an effective social movement. It appears only a trigger that would
cause a shift in the international political stance on the conflict may limit Israel’s power over the
Palestinians, opening up space for a successful social movement and a third intifada. It is important to
remember that a successful intifada need not be violent one, although given the support for violence it
does seem likely it would be. For the time being, however, a third intifada appears unlikely.
This thesis naturally has its limitations. The interviewed population is by no means representative
of the entire Palestinian population, and although the statistics do help support more general claims they
do not help to understand the thinking and reasoning of people in those regions that were not
represented in interviewed population. Nobody from Gaza was included in the interviews, while in that
region completely different dynamics are at play than in the West Bank. Therefore, Gaza is deserving of
extra, individual attention. There are also some limitations in the interviews, including my appearance and
international background. This may have influenced interviewees to give a different answer than they
would have to a Palestinian interviewer. The fact that I do not speak or read Arabic also limited the quality
of answers in certain interviews, as there was a definite difference in quality between translators,
although they were all competent enough to give adequate translations. The main limitation of not being
versed in Arabic, however, was in the reading materials. It was not possible to include student magazines,
political manifestos or other such materials in the analysis. The final limitation to this thesis and its answer
to the research question is the scope of the thesis. The youth is only a part of the population, and even
though it is a large part, and it would be the most likely to engage in, and instigate, the next intifada, older
generations could also play a significant part.
6.3 Further Research
This thesis made clear choices with regard to what was researched and what was left out. There are a
great many elements that are closely related to the main research question and the case which was
80
examined. Many of these elements require further elaboration either to strengthen the conclusions of
this thesis, or to answer closely related questions. The first area of expansion that comes to mind is
conducting similar research in Gaza, which has a completely different structure than the West Bank and
East Jerusalem. Therefore, it is likely that the views of the Gazan youth, and the reasons for them, will
also vary dramatically from those in the other areas of the oPT.
Furthermore, this thesis chose to pay only minor attention to transnational activism and the role
of the media in a possible new intifada and successful social movements. By conducting research within
the Palestinian diaspora and international organizations interested in the Palestinian case one may find
new avenues and get different ideas regarding Palestinian social movements. Other relevant areas for
further investigation include the generation gap in the oPT, the relationship between armed and unarmed
resistance (are they mutually exclusive?), the individual radicalization process, the differences between
political views of Palestinians across historical Palestine, the Israeli youth’s view on the conflict, and the
ideologies and roles of the smaller political movements. One final addition, is a repeat of this research
following the appointment of the next President of the PNA, following Abbas’ death or resignation from
power.
81
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Interviews12
Finalist of The Next President of Palestine #1
Finalist of The Next President of Palestine #2
Finalist of The Next President of Palestine #3
Interview NRO consultant #1
Interview Young Professional #1
Interview PCPSR Researcher #1
Israeli Youth from YPI #1
Jalazone interview #1
Jalazone interview #2
Jalazone interview #3
Professor An-Najah University #1
Professor An-Najah University #2
Professor Birzeit University #1
Professor Birzeit University #2
Professor Birzeit University #3
Professor Haifa University #1
Professor Hebron University #1
Professor Hebron University #2
Student Al-Quds University #1
Student Al-Quds University #2
Student Al-Quds University #3 (group)
Student An-Najah University #1 (YPI member)
Student An-Najah University #2
Student An-Najah University #3 (YPI member)
Student Bethlehem University #1 (group)
Student Bethlehem University #2
Student Bethlehem University #3
Student Birzeit University #1
Student Birzeit University #2
Student Birzeit University #3
Student Birzeit University #4
Student Hebron University #1 (group)
Wadi Foukin Interview #1
Wadi Foukin Interview #2
Wadi Foukin Interview #3
Qalqiliyah interview #1
Qalqiliyah interview #2
Qalqiliyah interview #3
Qalqiliyah interview #4
Qalqiliyah interview #5
12 For those interested in the transcribed interviews, please contact the author or the supervisor of this thesis.
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Appendix I – Oslo Accord I
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Appendix II – Oslo Accord II
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Appendix III – Sample Interview with coding
Student An-Najah University interview #3
23-06-2016
This interview was conducted without a translator and was recorded.
Background
Q: What is your name age and university?
A: I am …., I have just graduated from An-Najah University national university. I am an industrial engineer.
I was born in 1992 in Nablus. I have lived there all my life. My family are from there. My father and my
mother were both born there and lived there. They worked abroad, but are both from Nablus.
Q: Where abroad did they work?
A: My dad spent 7 years in Romania, to study medicine and then traveled to Paris. My mom she used to
travel regularly every month and week, because she represents 14 Arab countries in her work for children
and women programs.
Q: You are the first interview to have had parents that worked abroad. Are you religious?
A: I am not, obviously (gestures to beer).
Q: Are your parents religious?
A: They are traditionally religious. They are religious, but not extremely.
Q: So, it’s not that they pray 5 times a day?
A: No, they don’t.
Q: It is more of a passive religious thing then?
A: Yes, I told you they are traditionally religious, because they come from religious traditional conservative
families. They are more religious in Ramadan for example. But, mostly they are not.
Q: Are you an only child?
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A: No I am in the middle. I have younger and older brothers. One of them is an engineer and lives in
Nablus. The other one is studying in Birzeit University, accounting.
Q: If you could define yourself in one word, what would that word be?
A: You would stereotype that, but a Palestinian.
Q: What do mean by that?
A: I think this is a normal answer for a Palestinian man who is meeting another international or man from
outside of Palestine. If I was more specific I would call myself, not to compliment myself, very Palestinian.
Like I have a lot of confidence in myself to present a lot of the Palestinian levels and communities.
Q: How would you define your nationality?
A: Palestinian.
Q: That makes sense with your other answer. I sometimes get people that call themselves human or
outgoing or something like that so their definition of nationality remains a question.
The Palestinian Israeli conflict
Q: Looking at the current situation how do you see the conflict developing?
A: With the existence of occupation you mean?
Q: I mean given everything there is now, how do you see this developing?
A: Can you be more specific, do you mean socially, economically, politically?
Q: Umm. Let’s start with attitude in the conflict between Israel and Palestine and then we can get into the
other things later.
A: I think, like in 5-10 years. The people in Palestine will be hopeless and won’t believe in peace anymore.
They have already lost their faith in the leadership and the last thing was the two-state solution which is
now almost expired and so people will invest less in peace. I do not want to say we won’t believe in peace,
but we will invest less in peace. This will generate and attitude to either adapt to live with the status quo,
or drag them to the zone of violence.
Q: Does that mean you also believe the occupation is a fixed thing?
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A: This is the pillar of this thing. The occupation is the thing that is dragging the people out there. If the
occupation is ended, like I disagree with a lot the quotes that the last day of occupation is the first day of
peace. This is too perfect. I’m not a perfectionist. I think the last day of the occupation is first step to start
the first thing of the peace. Like, we have a lot of things to do to achieve peace, social, political, human
aspect problems that we need to solve, before getting to peace. I think the occupation is the main pillar
of dragging people to that zone.
Q: Then you don’t see the occupation changing for the time being?
A: It is. It is going to be more extreme, because it is convincing the people, the Israeli society, that there
is a need of this occupations existence. It secures your state. The people believe this. This is why they are
shifting to the right. I know how dynamic is the political views of the Israelis. They are shifting to the right;
the left is being more pink and believing in things that don’t exist. Most of the people now are supporting
the right governments. Because, they believe the right governments will secure the state. Even if they
want peace they also want their securities. There is this vague perception that the government creates by
either convincing the people that the Palestinians want to kill them or that the Palestinians are going to
violate and peace agreement. So, yeah, the occupation is really affect what is going to happen in the Israeli
and the Palestinian society.
Q: When you say, the leftist side is pink and believes in things that don’t exist, what things do you mean?
A: Ok, I think the left is really hopeful. Let’s be really practical. There is 120 Knesset member; 13 in the
joint Arab list and 6 in Merits. This is how we count if we raise anything in the Knesset. This is how we
count, they will count Merits with them. But I know that the reality in Israel is that there is no peace
coming. Even if they try it is just the left that is criticizing what is happening with the government, but the
majority of the people and the supporters in Israel know this is too good to be true. They believe in Frank
Sinatra I think. Because, it happened lately that the government abandoned every NGO that works to
peace, it started giving red lines to people trying to work towards that. As an example, Mohammed
Mandeni. He is an advisor to Mahmoud Abbas and a lot of other examples like Breaking the Silence and
other NGOs. They you can see organization in Israel that are trying to make people more committed to
this attitude that is create by the government. So, yeah.
Q: It is clear there is an in-depth knowledge. Most of the people I have spoken to have struggled to give
specific examples and answers in these situations.
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A: I have been studying a lot the Israel society to understand how they think. To see if we have an
opportunity to work together. I just started working with this program and I think that I need to study to
really have a chance to do this or not.
Q: Do you then, because you see the occupation is going to get worse or makes the situation worse at
least, what do you think will be necessary to the occupation to be lifted?
A: Do you mean the occupation should be ended or what should be changed, because I can’t answer the
question if it is what should be changed. What should be changed? It should not exist.
Q: Ok, so how do we make it not exist?
A: This is what we are trying to do. We are trying to reach out to the Israeli people, to the Israeli population
and public opinion. To convince them that there are human beings living on the other side, because I know
they are brainwashed. What we think; what we consider the IOP or IOF and they call the IDF. What we
consider as criminals they consider as heroes. I’m not saying that is wrong, it is their identity. Eventually
they are brainwashed systematically from the government of Israel. So, I think we should reach out to the
people who are obliged in believes and ethics to go into the military. We should reach out to those people
and convince them that we are not just numbers or spots you see from your planes and your tanks. We
are people and we want to enjoy our life and enjoy living. We also want the prosperous future of ours.
So, if they see that in us we would cross off a lot of things. They would form pressure groups to pressure
the government or the occupation. In order for it to end. The problem is now different, in terms of there
are two opinions now, there is Israeli left right and middle. Politically from Merits, Lickoud and Labor. And
there is the settlements opinion. This is now a great deal and great issue for Israel. The government is
supporting the settlements. A year ago, I heard an analysis on one of the Israeli channels and it was saying.
Ok we have a BDS problem, how can we avoid the BDS. So, one of the settlers said we are going to have
our own state in Judea and Samaria as settlers and then Israel wouldn’t be boycotted. You would have 2
states.
Q: You would have almost three.
A: We would have three or four considering Gaza now. We have a lot of initiatives and conventions. We
go to Geneva to the Oslo accords and these things. What I am saying exactly is the ideology of settlers
who are trying to annex and to produce this fear to let the people of Palestine to believe there is no state
of yours, there will be no state of yours. There will be just fragmented ghettos of yours. Cities divided by
checkpoints. Your cities are not going to be connected. Your connection will of course be abandoned. This
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goes back to your first question, that is really needed. The attitude of people. When the people see that
you would anticipate how their attitude would be.
Q: If you say that you need to change the Israeli perception, because that is what you are speaking about
correct?
A: Yes, completely right.
Q: How would you go about doing that? What is the best way to do that?
A: I think there is no best way, but there are a lot of approaches to that.
Q: But, if you could decide.
A: I would invite all the Israelis to come to Palestine. To come and see how we live. To see that there is no
incitement in our education. W educate people because we want to be educated. There is no violence in
the streets. We don’t want to kill the Israelis. It’s not about the Jews. We don’t have a problem with
religion. We would respect if you are Jews as religious people or as an ethnicity, but if we have our own
state we don’t care. The Israelis should come to Ramallah to Palestine. If they see we are human beings,
they would totally change their minds. I started to believe in this when I met some Israelis. They were
surprised that there are Palestinian people who spoke, who drink, who play basketball, who weed. They
don’t see that really. They don’t believe that. The only thing that, like, if you go to Israel and ask them
about the Palestinian hobbies they would say that they like to dig tunnels, they like to throw rockets to
bomb themselves, because they have been educated like that. They are the ones who have this incitement
in their education system. So, if I have the chance to decide. I think I would go to the approach of
convincing the Israeli society that they are being brainwashed and they should be more curious. That it is
in their interest to end the occupation, because the people will no longer think of the Jews as good people.
If the occupation exists, they would see that the Jews are trying to do what happened to them in the
Holocaust to another people. When they see that their tragedy is being reflected on another nation I think
they would stop. Especially when this nation has the legitimate right and privilege to live on this land. The
land, if I want to be more specific, I believe we have all this land. From the river to the sea. But we have
made compromises so we can live in peace, so 1967, 1948 to 1967, 1973, 1988, 2001 and then the Oslo
accords, we have a lot of peace agreement. But I believe we made our decision in Oslo and now we want
Palestinian land our state with a just right of the plight of refugees, with the right to set borders, this is
what we want. But the Israelis don’t believe in that because their government is brainwashing them that
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we want to violate all these rules and we want to kill them eventually. I think no it is not in our interest to
do so.
Q: You say that our land is from the river to sea. So basically, that would be Gaza, West Bank and what
now is Israel, correct? (nods) Do you then believe that Israel has a right to exist?
A: I believe we have signed. I don’t want to be whatever he has said. I don’t want to be like this man who
is not giving his own personal view. I’m saying we have signed something and we should stick to it.
Anyway, it is a matter of perspectives. There are two narratives, the Israeli one and the Palestinian
narrative, I would say my narrative, that we are promised and we are the chosen people of god for this
land, we have been here for thousands of years. I am not going to be committed to the narrative of my
ancestors of the history. Eventually I think both nations should compromise to live in peace. I think yes,
we have the right to live from river to sea, but I still also believe Israelis existed and should have its border
and its prosperous future eventually yes.
Q: Would it matter to you if there was one state, but everyone was treated equally. Would that be an
acceptable solution?
A: Equal, so there would be no second-class citizens, then I think this would be the perfect solution. If
equally.
Q: So, you don’t feel like the Israeli population needs to per se leave?
A: No, no, no. If we have this proposition of making a one state in which the Palestinians and the Israelis
and the Palestinian citizens of Israel and all other ethnicities and other religious communities to live
equally in this state, with the write to vote the right to election and the right to do everything equally. I
think that this is the perfect solution now. I would work for that more than the two-state solution by the
way. Yeah.
Q: Do you think that Palestinians can achieve any kind of peaceful solution on their own? Two-state, one-
state doesn’t matter, just some form of tangible solution? Without the international community, without
these foreign entities coming in, without the UN and these kinds of organizations.
A: To achieve the vision of the Palestinians?
Q: Or just a form of peace and what that would be if you think it is possible.
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A: No, I don’t think so. I believe the Palestinians don’t have the power the Israelis do. If I had the power
and I think that I have right to take this land I wouldn’t give any meter of it. This is Israel it has the power
and Israel thinks that it has the right to have this land so why would they give this up, so I don’t think they
would compromise a single square meter of the historical land of Palestine eventually. This is a political
term but. I think the Palestinians can achieve something with the international law which applies all over
the world, but this would take hundreds of years.
Q: That would be only the Palestinians? You wouldn’t need the international community for that?
A: I think we need them for that.
Q: What is their role?
A: The Palestinian state was created mainly by convincing the international community that we are human
beings that are living on this land, with this dispute, with this conflict, who need to be recognized as a
nation with a state with a right to freedom of movement, with a right to life. When they are convinced
they convince their governments and their governments change it. So, eventually the international
community has a lot of influential part to do with is. Basically, the political and official one as I said. And
then they can help with building the culture, the economy, the social presence and more the attitude of
the people. That should be, like we have been living in this conflict for more than 100 years. I don’t believe
that this conflict started in 1948 it started in 1918. When Belfour gave the promise to the Israelis. I think
we should over step this thing with the help and support of the international community.
Q: Very specifically, what would you expect them to do and what do they need to do to come to solution?
A: This is a really generic question, because I can talk in terms of the international law or I can talk in all
spaces like the US and the OQ. So, I think that states should oblige Israel to commit to the international
law.
Q: How would they go about doing that?
A: They would like cut off the impunity that Israel have. They would stand up and cut their tie with Israel
financial or even emotionally. If I talk about peace, then there should be negotiations between the
Palestinians and the Israelis there should be more comprehensive objectives that should apply. A
framework that should not be changed ever. Lines that should not be crossed and timelines that should
be upheld. We have signed Oslo and in 1999 we should have had our own state. We have passed this date
by 17 years and we still have no state.
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Q: It is interesting to me that when I say international community, everyone jumps to the US and the EU.
No one says anything about the Arab countries, is there a role for the Arab countries to play here?
A: I think should, but I don’t think they will, because the Arabs now have their own problems, starting
from Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, everywhere. The Middle East, I don’t want to talk about a conspiracy
theory. Basically, the Arabs are now really fucked up, this is off the records (both laugh). They are in a lot
of trouble now. I think they have a lot of interests with the international community, that they would help
Palestine through the international community. As an example, Qatar and the Emirates would support
the Palestinians through other countries, through political leaders that they feel should be in charge,
through the states, through the EU, whatever. Jordan has always been supportive, but they can’t cross
the lines because they have their own agreements with other countries. Egypt, have their own internal
security and their own internal problems. They are very supportive and always have been, especially in
Gaza. Now they can’t play a big role because of the problems that are existing. Mainly the biggest problem
I believe the biggest problem is ISIS.
Q: Normally I bring up ISIS near the end, but you bring it up now. An organization like ISIS, does it have an
influence on the conflict here beyond taking attention away from it? Let’s start with the question, is there
a foundation from ISIS in Palestine?
A: No. It will never exist in Palestine. ISIS does not represent Islam at all. The Palestinian Islamic movement
in Palestine is not related to ISIS. If ISIS is by any chance going to be in the region they would kill every
Islamic person in here, because they think we are out of Islam. So, no, there is no organization here that
represents ISIS or will exist. The type of not Islam that ISIS is will definitely not exist in Palestine in 100
years, in a 1000 years.
Q: That is a very comforting thought. Do you think that the ISIS situation changes or influence the
perception of the outside world on the Palestinian movement?
A: Of course. You mean that the International community would view the Palestinian situation wrong
because the majority of the Palestinians are Muslims?
Q: That is what I am getting at.
A: Of course, of course. Not just the Palestinians, but all the Islamic world. 57 Islamic states. I can give you
this answer for whatever question about ISIS. If I was given the opportunity to let ISIS end the Israeli state
and give me my Palestinian state, I would reject that. I think it I am going to have my state I would have
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it with my own human values. ISIS doesn’t have any human values in it. It doesn’t represent any religion,
not even Islam. I mean many Palestinians, not just me, mostly the Palestinians, would not accept that ISIS
should play any role in Palestine. If they were given the chance to the participation of ISIS to help the
Palestinian cause. They would reject that, because eventually we would end with another occupation.
One against the Islam. In the perception of the Palestinians, the Islamic Palestinians at least.
Q: Ok, A very comprehensive answer. You are also the first person to understand where that question
came from. Everyone assumes that I mean Hamas when I ask that question and I don’t. I mean exactly
what you said what you said in that I think there is a relationship between the two. Do you believe there
is a role for violence to be played in the conflict between Israel and Palestine?
A: Be more specific, I can’t follow.
Q: Have you ever participated in any kind of violent demonstrations or a demonstration that was initially
peaceful or that turned violent?
A: No, but I need to make it clear that violence in the eyes of Israel is different that violence in the eyes of
the world. Because, Israel would consider throwing a rock as violence. I don’t want to say it’s not a violent
action, but its different than holding a gun or throwing rockets. Mostly I would support in the peaceful
demonstration that to go for violence. Of course, I have participated in 100s of demonstrations that have
children and youth that throw rocks, but they were shot at. Like many of colleagues in the university they
were shot at similar demonstrations. What I used to do was holding flags to try to set thing in front of the
soldiers to make it clear; I am not going to be violent, I don’t want to be violent and you should not be as
well. I try to talk to them. Eventually they would throw the tear gas and do whatever they can to
disseminate this demonstration, so the violence in terms of the eyes of the Israeli government is any
Palestinians, any gathering of Palestinians heading towards any entity of the Israeli occupation.
Checkpoints, settlements, whatever it is. So, there is no role for violence I think violence will not achieve
anything, in terms of a solution. But, we need again to define the terms violence, because sometimes it is
legitimate for the Israelis, when it is systematic by the IOF.
Q: So, this is what I mean by violence. I think there is, in terms of an uprising there is already a sort of
gradation to it. I would agree with you that throwing rocks doesn’t qualify as a violent uprising. But when
I talk about something like the Second Intifada, that would be a form of violent uprising, when you talk
about car bombs and these types of situations. Then there are the more military type actions, I would say
that as much as Hamas say they support the more, what the west would call, terrorist actions, I would say
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they are more supportive of military action. Do you think either one of those can be effective or is there
no room for either?
A: Again, I will say it. I and the majority of the Palestinians will denounce any kind of violence, of course
car bombs, putting bombs in busses, killing civilians and using this kind of violence against Israelis, but the
international laws gives us the right to resist. I’m not saying we should carry weapons, but when you go
to what happened in Gaza. The Palestinians now have this rule. Every 7 years, there is another intifada in
the West Bank and every 2 years there is another war against Gaza. So, Gaza is this place 60km surrounded
with borders, that take almost 20 kilometers from that 60 squared. So, what I see in the last war,
statistically because I am an engineer, 2200 Palestinians in Gaza were killed, mostly civilians, hundreds of
thousands were refugees left without food, water and education. What I see is 10,000 home units bombed
and dropped to the ground. Now there is a debate in the US whether what happened in Gaza from Hamas
is terrorism or not. Was it a war or was it an aggression? I would call it an aggression, because there is no
balance of power between Israel and Gaza or Israel and Palestine in the end. But what happened is, I
blame it in the beginning on the unilateral withdrawal from Gaza. Israel could have passed out Gaza to
the PA, but this is not in Israelis interest. The terrorism and violence that is generated from Gaza is a very
generic word as well, because we should consider if it is war or not. Anyhow I denounce any violence at
all. It will not be productive to the Palestinian cause. I now believe that Palestinians now see that the
violence and these actions will not be productive, because we have been trying a lot and it did not work.
Even if we are convinced it is the only we believe it is not productive anyway.
Internal Palestinian conflict
Q: Normally I now jump into the role of the youth in this conflict, but first I would like to go more internally
into Palestine. Do you feel represented by the PA?
A: I partially do. But I think, it could be better. If we have elections, local government, parliamentary,
presidential elections. It could be more legitimate to the Palestinians. As a youngster, I think no. As a
Palestinian I think yes, but as a youngster no. I think the participation in all those governments is really
clear and not influential. It’s just like, we are not represented and now we are trying to be more
represented. I think in October there are going to be local elections on the 8th of October and now I think
that the youth will participate and formulate their own lists to be nominated. They would not accept to
be represented by 1 in 15 in the elections.
Q: Do you feel that there is a party that represents you?
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A: Yes, Fatah.
Q: Do you feel there is enough freedom to start a new party?
A: No.
Q: Do you think there should be?
A: Yes.
Q: When you say there isn’t enough freedom, how is it limited?
A: By the people themselves. Why I choose Fatah is because I think Fatah is not and doesn’t apply any
ideology and with this it holds the majority of the Palestinians, the atheists, the Muslims, the ignorant,
the agnostics, the Buddhists, the Samaritans, the Jews, a lot of people. I think there should be another
movement formulated by the youth that does not apply any ideology as well, but it should be more
involved with the international community. I think we should have a movement with Palestine that hold
members from the international community. In the past there was it existed in Fatah. We had members
from the EU, from the Chinese.
Q: Do you mean Palestinians who live there or?
A: No, I mean people form there that believe in the Palestinian cause. I think another party should exist
without an ideology. It is limited by mainly the people, because the people are not open up to this, SO,
far they are not. The easiest way to the brain is religion, the easiest way to life is socialism, the easiest
way to money is capitalism. So, people are not opened up to choose no ideology in the party. But also the
existence of Hamas and Fatah as the main powerful parties also limits the formulation of a new party of
course. I agree with that. But, what the main thing is the people themselves.
Q: So, do you think that the PA plays a role in… I have heard stories of how people at universities have
been arrest, not only by Israelis, but also by the PA. Why is that? Where does that come from?
A: From the problems between Hamas and Fatah. Mainly the people from Hamas who get arrested in the
West Bank and the people form Fatah in Gaza. But I think this doesn’t come from nowhere. I have been
in this debate, because in the Universities of course Hamas people say they are arrested for nothing, for
being Hamas. This is what they claim. But I think there is also a law that applies to all the Palestinians and
eventually they will be in jail and they wouldn’t be arrested if they didn’t have money that isn’t explained
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by any economy, there are weapons, so, if I want to answer your question. I would say the PA does not
play a role in limiting democracy, but the conflict between Hamas and Fatah does.
Q: Does that mean that power consolidation, that both parties are doing, is the problem? (nods). You say
They arrest each other, but if they are part of those parties, then they are not starting a new one. What
about the people that have branched of these parties to start something new and they get arrested?
A: There hasn’t been any initiative like that so far. Because I would go to my first answer that people have
lost hope in peace and that people don’t have the courage to start this. They are not, we don’t have this
culture of startups. So, we can’t even politically think of a startup, whether it is a new movement or it’s a
party. But, what I think is that it has different entities. The universities, the work environment, the local
councils, but it is not consolidated yet. If it would be there would be people to support it, but they haven’t
initiated this so far. This is what I believe.
Q: So, if you were to describe the role of the youth in the resolution of the Israeli Palestinian conflict?
A: The youth in Palestine or also in Israel. (Palestine first) I think the youth should be freed from their
leader’s opinions, Especially in Fatah and Hamas. The youth in these parties are basically hypnotized to
do whatever the leaders say. So basically, the youth should create this think tank. Let’s take it from here.
They youth in Fatah are represented by Fatah. Fatah drives the PLO, the PLO and the PA are driving
Palestine so if any of the Fatah youth would describe the solution for this conflict they would describe it
with, yeah, I want the two-state solution with the fundamentals of east Jerusalem, with 67 border, solving
the plight of the refugees, the prisoners and whatever. The youth should create their own vision to the
solution, especially in Palestine. There should be such a movement that joins the left, the PFLP, Hamas,
Fatah and other Islamic people, ideologist. So, what should happen in the beginning, we need to create a
vision of ours. As long as we belong to just this blind leaders, we will then be just as useless as our leaders.
Q: Does that mean that in your opinion the youth parties are the same as their formal parties? That there
is no difference?
A: Of course, yes. Definitely yes, 100% yes. In the universities, everywhere. Whenever there is a youth
party you should understand that they belong to the leadership they do not represent themselves. I would
say that more for Fatah than Hamas. In my university, we have the student unions elections where the
students of An-Najah University vote for 81 student council members. So, in 2013, we had 40 something
as Fatah, Hamas had 30 something and the left parties had less. So, what happens is that the 81 go into a
room they would elected 13 including the president who represent the 81 who represent the 22,000. (So,
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kind of like a cabinet). Hamas did not join this meeting. What happened is, by the law of the student union,
2/3 of the votes go the winning party.
Q: So, then Fatah goes from 40 to about 60 seats.
A: Of course, and Fatah has nominated 13 members including the president. I was one of the people
against that list. That list was just nominated by the leadership and I didn’t believe in those people.
Therefore, I am saying there are also people in Fatah against Fatah policies. This also exists in Hamas. So,
we can achieve something. We can’t just be eye blind and follow our leaders where they want to go.
Q: Do you have a problem with religion being a part of a political system?
A: Not really. Of course I am a secular. I am a secular, because I am part of Fatah. I think that the Islamic
people that want to be in politics want to involve religion, but they have the right. I am a secular, so
personally I have a problem with this, but other people do not and they have the right to be represented
in the political system by their own views, so that means religion as well.
Q: To what degree, because this is the image that is put out there a lot. The Jews versus the Muslims. To
what degree do you feel the Palestinians are the Muslim people?
A: To zero degree. This is not a religious conflict. It has never been and it will never be. The Israelis are
trying to drag it into that zone. I always to talk to Christian people, Muslim people, Jewish people,
Samaritans and also Israelis to convince them that this is not a religious conflict. It should never be
religious. Palestinians have a lot of ethnicities and never had a problem with these different perceptions
of religion. But for the Jews it’s a claim from go that they are the chosen people and promised this land.
What drives me crazy is when you talk to the Jewish people they would say that Jews are not a religious
community. They are an ethnicity. They would compare that you are Arabs and we are Jews. What
Palestinians perceive is that Jews are a religious community. This is a problem I think some Palestinians
believe it is a religious conflict. It shouldn’t be and will never be. I don’t agree with the thing that Jews and
Muslims are the base for this conflict.
Q: Ok. An-Najah University hasn’t had elections in two years, right? (yes) and you voted Fatah, but was
against the list? (Yes). When you say that you explained your view on the solution, the fact that the Israelis
should be invited over to see that you are human. Why do you think that hasn’t happened yet? Why hasn’t
there been a resolution yet? Why haven’t the Palestinians come together as you have also said that they
need to?
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A: Ok, so I’ll go from the point of explaining that if I was in charge, it’s not the thing is invite the Israelis. I
want the Israelis to see the Palestinians, who they are, where they live, what they teach, how are they
educated, what is their normal life like. You ask why, it’s because 2 years ago from now I had not met any
Israeli and never believed that I should. Until I met them and its personally good for me, because I always
want to know how they lived, because if you know your enemy then you can educate yourself for the
conflict. What changed me is when I saw how they reacted, how their attitude changed when they saw
me, how I looked how I react about the situation that happened. Something changed in me. I wondered
what would happen if more Israelis so Palestinians, if they would have another mentality with different
perspectives. It didn’t happen so far, because they are afraid of meeting Palestinian’s and coming to
Palestine and the Israelis are hopeless of meeting Israelis. This is because of the leaders of both countries.
I blame for Israel, because I think that Mahmoud Abbas is the best peaceful leader that Israel has ever
had to make peace with. I blame Netanyahu and his government. I think he is misleading his government
so eventually if the Palestinian public opinion and the Israeli public opinion had somehow met in a point
we would be more close to the solution, but as long as we have this leadership they will not meet, because
I told you Israelis are afraid and the Palestinians are hopeless of this cause.
Q: Do you think that the public opinion between the Israelis and the Palestinians is closer together than
the political?
A: What do you mean?
Q: I have heard this described as a higher political conflict and not a people’s conflict. Do you think that
the people themselves have a much more similar mentality towards the conflict than the political leaders
do?
A: Yes. Of course. They have because the leadership is more expired in terms of legitimacy and the people
you know in Fatah, Hamas and other parties they have come to the point that they want to end this
conflict. But as I told you before the people are still represented in parties by their leadership, so they
meet at, the Palestinian public opinion meets at the point that they want to change their leaders. The
Israeli public opinion the meet at the point at the point that they also want to change their leaders and
this is where I think the two should meet with new leadership for both nations.
Q: So, you don’t think that either side is represented by their leadership.
A: Yes of course.
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Q: Ok, enough formal questions. Thank you, now let’s have a beer and relax for a bit.