this transcript has been edited and approved by william ... · johnson space center oral history...

8 October 1997 12-1

ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT

WILLIAM A. ANDERS

INTERVIEWED BY PAUL ROLLINS

HOUSTON, TEXAS – 8 OCTOBER 1997

[This transcript has been edited and approved by William Anders.]

ROLLINS: Well, when did you make the decision to become an astronaut and what did you do

towards …

ANDERS: [Early in my Air Force career as a fighter pilot] I was trying very hard to get into

the Air Force Flight Test School. … I … talked to Chuck Yeager and the people running

[the school] and Yeager … said “We’re really looking for people with advanced degrees.”

This was in [1959]. So, I signed up for the Air Force Institute of Technology masters

[degree] program [where I] graduated with honors. [I went back] to Edwards thinking I was a

shoe-in and [was told by Yeager], “Oh, well [that] the criteria [had been changed and that

advanced degrees didn’t count as much as flying time.] … I was disappointed but I still kept

trying to get in and [applied] for the Flight Test Program [anyway]. [In the meantime,] … I

was driving my Volkswagen bus, [one Friday afternoon] going home from work [in]

Albuquerque [New Mexico] at the Air Force Special Weapons Center, where I was an

engineer and an instructor pilot [when] I heard this announcement [over the car radio] that

NASA was looking for another group of astronauts. Now one had to be a test pilot for the

first two groups [of astronauts] and it didn’t occur to me that they would change that. But

[for] this group [the radio announcer] went down the list of things [NASA required. He said

Johnson Space Center Oral History Project William A. Anders

8 October 1997 12-2

the applicants] had to be a graduate of Test Pilot School or have an advanced degree. I

remember pulling over to the side, tuning it up, and then waiting for the next fifteen minute

[news cast where the “… or advanced degree” message was repeated. By the time I got

home] … I had decided that … I was going to put in an application. … I wrote up a letter

[that weekend], … mailed it to [NASA on Sunday]. [W]hen I got to work at the Air Base

the next [Monday the pilot officers were] told that if … we were interested, [we should fill

out some] forms [and] submit them through the channels. … I went to my boss and said [that

I] already sent [NASA] a letter [of application.] … [H]e said, “Well, that’s okay, just go do it

again [through channels].” …[T]o my surprise [I] was asked to come down for the various

physicals and tests [several weeks later]. And, to my increasing surprise, [I] kept surviving

[the cuts]. [On October 17] of 1963 [(my birthday), I] was called by Deke [Donald K.]

Slayton and asked if I wanted to [fly with them, I accepted immediately]. Two days later, I

[received] a call from Chuck Yeager who said, … he was really sorry [and that] I was really a

great candidate but I didn’t make [the USAF Test Pilot School]. I made the mistake, in

retrospect, of saying, “Well, Colonel I appreciate [your call] … but I [have] a better offer

anyway.” “What was that?” [he asked surprised]. I told him I [had received] a call from

Deke Slayton [to come to NASA. Yeager] said that’s not possible because we … screened

all the applicants and since you weren’t a member of the test pilot school you didn’t go

forward. I said, “Well, sir, I put in [another application directly to NASA].” … [He was

upset about that and] actually put some energy into that trying to get me kicked out of the

[NASA] program… [Fortunately he was not successful.]

ROLLINS: By-gones are by-gones…


8 October 1997 12-3

ROLLINS: Now what are the tests like for becoming an astronaut? Are there a lot of written

tests that you have to pass, and then oral interviews and that sort of thing? For instance how

many people applied when those fourteen of you were selected?

ANDERS: I don’t remember, I mean the record is around, but I had the impression that it was

several thousand, maybe five thousand of which two thousand met the published criteria, of

which I think they invited about three hundred. They just kept doing it in waves and

chopping out about half of the group each time. I remember going down to San Antonio

[Texas] for [testing on] an aptitude machine, … like a massive pinball or video game … that

we played for a score… [A]pparently [I] did very well on that. Mainly because I figured out

how to beat it. In fact the write up was the Anders required more time in the checkout than

was normal. Because I said, “Now how to score this thing?” And I found out there [were] …

ten [games] going at once. Some of them were essentially impossible to play without total

dedication at the expense of all others. But I found out that the scoring system was based, not

only on getting the right answer or the wrong answer, but how long it took [to make your

choice]. So, you’re cumulative score was the number of wrong answers times the time [it

took]. So I thought to myself, ‘Fine, if there’s one of these games that’s very difficult, then

I’ll just always hit “A” instead of wondering whether it’s “A” or “B” and I’ll just do it

instantaneously because zero times any number is still zero.’ … I weeded out about three of

the games, and maxed out on the rest and I think my score was [probably] 150% better than

anybody else’s mainly because [the rest were] trying to do all the fancy stuff. … [A]nother

little feature that might be worthy in record. During this [test the shrinks] look at you


8 October 1997 12-4

through a one way glass to see how you take stress because they really load you up. I mean

you’re like a one arm paper hanger… Well in the middle of the test, when … we’re moving

… at double speed and I kept hearing this “RRRRR RRRRR RRRRR” over [at] the side of

the room, [which was supposed to be]. I thought, well that’s distracting. So I [gestured

toward the noise thinking that … these jerks are trying to screw me up. …[A]pparently this

behavior caused [the] shrinks to start flocking in [thinking,] “Hey, here we’ve got a live one

that’s about to go nuts.” Well towards the end I looked over where this noise was and a drill

bit came through the wall… Well it turned out that [a maintenance man had] been hanging

fire extinguishers on the outside of [the room, the shrinks] didn’t know about, they couldn’t

hear him. Anyway that was one of the tests, but there were quite a few and right up to—there

was written tests. I used the mumbling theory which I learned in college that if you have an

essay [answer] to write and you don’t know the answer just start mumbling because most of

the professors are bored and half asleep when they read it and they’ll at least give you a C or

C- [if you’ve written a lot]. … I knew the answers to a few and I wrote those up very

succinctly and [when] I didn’t know the answers to others and I mumbled. … [I]n any event,

I survived [the testing. Now,] I will tell you something … that I’ve only told one other

person [Claudette Gage the Flight Medicine Nurse] besides my wife… [W]hen I came to the

final [screening], there were a row of guys…, Al Shepard [Alan B. Shepard, Jr.], Wally

Schirra [Walter M. Schirra, Jr.], Chuck [Charles A.] Berry, who was the head flight surgeon

and some other flight surgeon, and the chief shrink, … (the big names of the day), were lined

up at [a] table. And I was asked, I guess along with others, to come in and they had [a] stack

of records. They were going through [this stack of records] and I was kind of standing there a

little bit uncomfortably… I remember Chuck Berry saying something like, “Well,” he said,


8 October 1997 12-5

“we basically are … satisfied with what we have here, you’ve done well, a strong candidate,

but we want to ask you [again] about that concussion … that you had five years ago.” … I

had never had a concussion, so I’m thinking, what’s going on here. I didn’t know Al Shepard

then but I know now and I know he’s quite capable of throwing out a fish, a Red Herring, out

there to see how you react. …[Maybe] are they testing me, are they just seeing whether I’m

going to be honest and confess that I’ve never had it, or, seeming unlikely …, did they get my

records mixed up with somebody else? Since I made it this far and since there were five

hundred others, odds are that maybe [the official] Anders [record was] rejected because he

had a twisted foot or he didn’t do well in the psychiatric exam. … I couldn’t bring myself to

lie… So I thought okay, I’ll just say, “I’ve never had a problem with a concussion.” “Fine.”

And the next thing I knew I was a member of the program. … [I’ve recently asked the Flight

Medicine Nurse to go back through the records to] see if those original physical blood type

actually match all the others [of mine]…

ROLLINS: So you’re wondering whether you’re here by mistake or not… Well, when you

finally ended up coming to Houston, was there any sort of initiation for the rookie astronauts,

hazing, good natured—

ANDERS: No, there wasn’t

ROLLINS: You weren’t immediately embraced I wouldn’t imagine?


8 October 1997 12-6

ANDERS: No, since I was not a test pilot, there were several of us who weren’t, we basically

figured out real fast that we were at that bottom of the totem pole… Also [our] group was

not immediately embraced because … the Time Life [magazine] contract was a bit of an

issue. The first group were well into that, the second group had been brought along by the

first group reluctantly and the last thing they wanted was to start dividing the pie even

further… [T]hey really didn’t know what to do with [us]. So there were some tensions that I

didn’t fully understand going on because of that. … [G]enerally we were accepted and the

lines were accepted, but if you had gone to test pilot school, whether it be Air Force or Navy,

you were more accepted than if you were an ‘egghead’, so to speak, like I and several others

were [considered].

ROLLINS: So what were those first few weeks like when you arrived?

ANDERS: Just a lot of briefings and … a lot of logistics of trying to get our families located

and that kind of thing. … [W]e were treated well [but] you definitely knew there was a totem

pole, just like in any organization.

ROLLINS: And you all were given other duties—

ANDERS: … [W]e were trained in [spacecraft systems,] rendezvous and in geology which I

particularly liked. I volunteered to go on all the geology trips which probably didn’t go over

too well because you weren’t supposed to be interested in that kind of stuff. Then eventually

we were assigned various duties, somewhat related to our experience, mine mainly being in


8 October 1997 12-7

space radiation shielding … [and] I was assigned that [responsibility for] the environmental

control system…

ROLLINS: Well part of the research, they noticed that you’re experienced with that, radiation

and the Van Allen belts, you were asked about that?

ANDERS: In the interviews you mean, when?

ROLLINS: Well, no. Before the Apollo mission for the Gemini missions. For instance for 9,

they were wondering whether that was going to cause a problem.

ANDERS: Well, and there were various experiments on board the spacecraft measuring

radiation and I generally got involved in reviewing those. Pete Conrad [Charles C. Conrad,

Jr.] and I particularly on Gemini 11, which was highly elliptical orbit up through the Van

Allen belt, went up to the Naval Research Lab and we had a little, (still have) a … joke [why]

we wanted him to look good but he didn’t know anything about the [radiation] and wasn’t

going to learn anything about. [We had] signals where [one finger] meant “no” and [two

fingers] meant “yes”. So when you interview Pete Conrad you can [ask], “Does that [one

finger] means anything to you?” …

ROLLINS: Well do you think when they were choosing the crews for the various missions,

were the individuals personalities taken into account?


8 October 1997 12-8

ANDERS: The best source I have there is the book Deke because I could never figure out what

the selections were based on. Some guys got picked early that I wouldn’t fly with and others

seemed to get ignored who I thought were on the top of the pile. … I was picked as a back up

crew for Gemini and was going to fly on Gemini 13 because we rotated every other flight

with Neil Armstrong, but then the Gemini program was truncated. And then Neil Armstrong

and I trained together in the lunar landing training vehicle [and] I thought this was a very

good sign. Then we had the fire and so the various crews got shifted around and I was

crewed up with Frank Borman and Mike [Michael] Collins and I thought that was a [very]

good sign. … I was a Lunar Module pilot [and] I was particularly interested in landing on the

Moon being interested in geology, but … because of the Russian threat of a circum-lunar

flight in early ‘68, they changed Apollo 8’s mission and we didn’t have a Lunar Module…

The next thing I knew I was the Command Module… Jim Lovell [James A. Lovell, Jr.] came

kind of late onto our crew. So that sort of welded me into the Command Module seat. And,

… from Deke Slayton’s book, I read … that [Borman] and his Apollo 8 crew were offered

the lunar landing flight and that [he didn’t accept]. [Borman] left [the program], that [made

me the] Command Module pilot for Apollo 13, I was on that crew for awhile before it was

announced. Then I was [asked by the NASA administrator] to go to Washington to work on

space policy. [When I left NASA] Ken Mattingly [Thomas K. Mattingly II] took my place…

ROLLINS: And that’s what I’m curious about and of course a lot of us are curious about how

those crews were chosen and so that’s why I asked. And so far I don’t think from the people

we’ve talked to, none of you come up with a very deceitful answer, because for instance,

some astronauts got many missions and others, like you, only got one.


8 October 1997 12-9

ANDERS: But I selected out, if I’d had hung around, I’d have flown on Skylab probably but

when this opportunity [for a] presidential appointment came up [I felt I had to take it]. I’d

been complaining about [NASA not having a space policy] after the lunar landing. I thought

the American public was supporting Apollo not because they wanted science or even because

they wanted exploration, they wanted to show those “dirty commies” that America [was still

#1 technologically]. So the first time that flag went in the Moon, which is what JFK [John F.

Kennedy] and LBJ [Lyndon B. Johnson] really had [in mind]… It was put the flag in the

Moon so that America wouldn’t be embarrassed [by Sputnik or Gagarin]. Well NASA lost

track of what the real [political] reason was. They liked a more romantic reason, and I did

too for that matter, but I think that I was one of the minority who maybe realized correctly

that the American public really wasn’t for what NASA wanted to do. And they wanted their

NASA to land on the Moon [and plant the American flag] but they weren’t that interested in

lunar rocks or even going to Mars. We’ve got the same problem today. So my concern was

how do we got a space program that actually has public support. How do we start not only

exploring, but pioneering space? So I went to Washington and helped get Skylab and Viking

and … the Space Shuttle… So that’s why I didn’t get [anymore] flights…

ROLLINS: Well were you disappointed that you weren’t able to … I guess you had a choice to

make more flights.

ANDERS: I did, but I could see because I had been put on the Command Module track by

default even though I trekked down the lunar training vehicle [track] and checked out in the


8 October 1997 12-10

Lunar Module… [NASA] took our Lunar Module away from us to go around the Moon real

quick. All that made sense. So I feel extremely fortunate to have been able to participate on

man’s first flight away from [our] own planet but I would have traded the last lunar landing

for the first flight away from the planet…

ROLLINS: Well were you surprised when they made the decision to send Apollo 8 to the

Moon?

ANDERS: Yes.

ROLLINS: And what were your concerns?

ANDERS: Well my concern was that I was losing my Lunar Module, because if you had your

name on the side of the Lunar Module, so to speak, then that meant, unless you screwed up,

that you were going to make a lunar landing. When that Lunar Module went away, I could

really quickly see the domino effects.

ROLLINS: You’d lost those responsibilities.

ANDERS: Right and [then] I [became] a Command Module expert and the hook there was

that the more expert I became in the Command Module, the more I became welded to the

Command Module [and] Command Module guys … don’t land. And my position on the

totem pole was such that it was going to have to be Apollo 16, 17, 18, or later when I’d be a


8 October 1997 12-11

commander. … Gene [Eugene A.] Cernan sweated it out, but Gene … also flew [in] Gemini

so he had slightly greater number of brownie points. … [I]f I’d have waited [there might

have been a chance to land on Apollo [19] or [20]… But … at the time, I didn’t expect

[NASA] to go past Apollo 15, given the [public] unrest that was developing over the cost of

the space program.

ROLLINS: And you had a better feel for that because weren’t you then in Washington?

ANDERS: I had to make that decision before I went to Washington. Once I went to

Washington, … though, I made a deal with the administrator that I could come back [if I so

chose I] even got to fly NASA airplanes for five year later, [but I had] pretty much cast my lot

of not [landing on the Moon. It was a good call].

ROLLINS: Well when I asked about concerns with Apollo 8, those were your personal

concerns but did you have personal concerns about the equipment because it was the second

time—

ANDERS: No, we were test pilots … and that was our job. In retrospect, I’ve been in a lot

more dangerous positions. Flying in the Air Force or just a couple of months ago in the Reno

Air Race is more dangerous than on Apollo 8. … [I]t was not that we were blasé about it. I

mean, we really checked. … I knew every little wire and relay in that Saturn and in the

Command Module. And, as an engineer, [I] probably was [more] able, … than a lot of the

other guys to determine whether it was safe or not. I had made that determination. I didn’t


8 October 1997 12-12

think it was risk free but I thought that the [national] reasons for doing it were important, [as

well as] the patriotic and … exploration… [This] all made me decide that … there was

[probably] one chance in three that [we] wouldn’t make it back, that there was probably two

chances in three that we wouldn’t go there either because we didn’t make it back or [we had

to abort] and one chance in three we’d have a successful mission, [that this was a risk worth

taking]. You know, [Christopher] Columbus [sailed] out with probably worst odds. This

was very much like Columbus voyage. So on the one hand I was very excited about it and on

the other hand I was disappointed about it. I wasn’t really worried about it anymore than any

other mission.

ROLLINS: Do you have any special memories or anything stands out about that mission?

ANDERS: [Several] things … stand out. We had simulated essentially everything we could

think of or anything anybody could think of on that flight, all previous flights, and in

centrifuges, in zero G airplanes, and procedure trainers and that kind of stuff. And yet the

very first seconds of the flight were a total surprise to everybody because the Saturn V which

is a big tall rocket, kind of skinny, more like a whip antenna on your automobile, [and we

were] like a bug on the end of a whip… It actually gets very massive near the bottom, with

the center of gravity near the bottom so if you rotate it, what little bit of wiggle [on the

bottom that] translates to a big wiggle up [at the top]. … [T]hese giant F-1 engines, [each]

producing a million and a half pounds of thrust, … were trying to keep [the rocket] going

straight. So, it was being thrashed at the bottom and we were getting really thrashed at the

top. I mean, violent sideways movement and massive noise that … no where near had been


8 October 1997 12-13

[simulated] properly in [our] simulations. …[F]or about the first ten, seemed like forty, but

probably the first ten seconds we could not communicate [with each other]. Had there been a

need to abort detected on my instruments I could not have relayed that to Borman. So we

were all out of it, [on our effectively] unmanned vehicle for the first ten or twenty seconds…

The next most impressive thing was that as we burned out on the first stage… [W]e were

hitting about six or eight G’s … and [we] were back in [our] seats. You could hardly lift

your arms, you have trouble breathing, [but] you’re not blacked out because the way your

blood was flowing from your legs … down into your torso. But, … try to reach up, it’s like

you had a twenty pound weight in your hand… [A]ll the fluid in your ears is … being pushed

[back] into the seat along with your body. … [T]hen the engines cut off, and just as they cut

off some retro rockets fire to try to move that big first stage away from the second and third

stage but slightly before it separates. So, you go from a plus 6 G to a minus one-tenth, and

the fluid in your ears just [goes wild]. … I felt like I was [being] catapulted right through that

instrument panel. … [Instinctively] I put my hand up [in front of my face] and just about the

time I got my hand up …, the second stage cut in. …[W]hack-o, right onto the face plate

with the wrist ring which left [a] gash. … I thought, ‘Oh, damn,’ … here I am, the rookie of

the flight, and sure enough here’s this big rookie mark. [When] we got into orbit and I got

out of my seat and we [took] off our suits and each guy handed me their helmet [to stow] and,

sure enough, each one of them had a gash in it from the same thing. But, the most impressive

aspect of the flight was [when] we were in lunar orbit. We’d been going backwards and

upside down, didn’t really see the Earth or the Sun, and when we rolled around and came

around and saw the first Earth rise. [T]hat certainly was, by far, the most impressive thing.


8 October 1997 12-14

To see this very delicate, colorful orb which to me looked like a Christmas tree ornament

coming up over this very stark, ugly lunar landscape really contrasted…

ROLLINS: This is the famous photograph.

ANDERS: …[T]hat one [view] is sunk in my head. Then there’s another one I like maybe

[and this is] of the first full Earth picture which made it again look very colorful. … [T]o me

the significance of this [is that the Moon is] about the size of your fist held at arm’s length …

you can imagine … [that at a hundred arms’ lengths the Earth is] down to [the size of] a dust

mode. [A]nd, a hundred lunar distances in space are really nothing. You haven’t gone

anywhere not even to the next planet. So here was this orb looking like a Christmas tree

ornament, very fragile, not [an infinite] expanse [of] granite … [and seemingly of] a physical

insignificance and yet it was our home…

ROLLINS: Well, was there anything on that flight that you wish could have been

accomplished that you, maybe, ran out of time?

ANDERS: In retrospect I wish I would have taken more pictures, but Frank was concerned

about whether we were rested or not so he forced Lovell and I to go to sleep which probably

made sense. One screw up I did was I used some film that had been designed as ASA 2000,

very high speed film, to photograph the Earth’s side of the Moon which was in Earth shine on

that flight. … I got them mixed up and … used the Earth shine film on the intense lunar back

side and vice versa. But fortunately I confessed to Dick Underwood who was the [NASA


8 October 1997 12-15

photo] guru and they were able to change the chemistry of the development and at least

salvage some of [the photos]. But no, we made it up and back and that was our job and so I

don’t have any regrets other than what I’ve already articulated about not making a landing…

ROLLINS: Mr. Collins was here, of course before, and he said that he felt that it was more

significant that your mission had left the Earth than their mission where they had actually

landed on another.

ANDERS: I’ve heard that from him and others.

ROLLINS: And so I’d like to hear your…

ANDERS: Well I’ve thought about that and I try to be objective. I certainly think it was very

significant. I think landing on the Moon was very significant… [W]e were the first to leave

our home planet, they were the first to go to … another planet. So even though maybe the

lunar landing which was the objective got a lot … more hoopla, I certainly would put them

both on the same level. To say that Apollo 8 is more significant, I’m not ready to say that.

They were both significant.

ROLLINS: What do you feel is your most significant contribution to the space program?

ANDERS: … [W]ell that’s difficult because so many things we did were just a culmination of

all the activity and the fact that we happened to be the ones who were there. Maybe taking


8 October 1997 12-16

that picture which had a lot of ecological and philosophical impact at the time. Probably just

making sure that the Apollo 8 Command Module and service module worked, not only

during the flight but was rung out thoroughly during the tests, which I really had dedicated a

tremendous amount of energy to which probably just doing my part in one link in the chain of

success of Apollo 8 [in particular and the Apollo program in general].

ROLLINS: When you were doing that, you got to go to the factory a lot and talk to all the

engineers.

ANDERS: To inspect the tests. Yea.

ROLLINS: Do you have any memories of that? Were there any particular things that you

recommended or suggested that were put into place, did engineers redesign anything?

ANDERS: Well it was just a continuous dialogue back and forth between me personally or the

astronauts as a group or non-astronauts. There was a very good working relationship. The

contractor clearly was more interested in doing it right than making a lot of money, although I

suppose they did all right. But I don’t remember any issues where things weren’t resolved to

my satisfaction whether I thought about them initially or not, so it was a very good. And

there wasn’t, particularly prior to the fire and even after the fire there wasn’t, the kind of who

shot John aspect that you see in the Shuttle today or who forgot to pull the plug out of the Mir

or whatever they did. People now seem to be, maybe it’s the age of the yuppie or something,

looking for blame, who can be blamed for this or who can be blamed for that, as opposed to,


8 October 1997 12-17

“Oh, the Mir’s probably pretty good.” Certainly better than nothing. And yet the press focus

is on what’s the leak of the day. And we put people in much greater risks, we the United

States, down in Antarctica or in airplanes everyday than the astronauts are put at risk in Mir,

in my view, and yet the press hasn’t jumped on that. Why did I tell you this, you didn’t ask

me about Mir?

ROLLINS: No, no, but that’s good, that’s a good point. Because that was going to be one of

my later questions was, what do you think NASA’s future is and …

ANDERS: Is that the question now or later?

ROLLINS: Well we can do it now since you’re on the subject.

ANDERS: Well I think NASA got off the track a bit and is still off the track a bit and I don’t

mean this as a big negative comment about NASA. I think what happened was very human.

But I think NASA started believing their own press releases about mid Apollo and they

forgot, this point I made earlier, that the real reason for Apollo was a [battle in the] cold war,

as Frank Borman is fond of saying, “Another battle in the cold war.” It was not an

exploration program, even though I thought of myself more of an explorer than a fighter

pilot, and it was not a way to generate technology. Contrary to what NASA would like to

have you think, it’s a lot cheaper to develop Teflon without going to the Moon than the other

way around. [Yes,] there were some interesting spin-offs, [and] the lunar rocks, to me

anyway, [are] an interesting spin off. NASA, particularly the hierarchy, both in, and this is


8 October 1997 12-18

one of the things that I was reacting negatively to at the time and the reason I went to

Washington, was that somehow that the six billion dollars per year that NASA was getting

early on [should be continued regardless of the banes of NASA]… Well the real question

[was], “Where have the Russians embarrassed us last?” Did they embarrass us on Mars? No.

In Earth orbit? Well, not yet. And so the idea that the American public was behind Apollo

for these more accepted politically correct reasons so to speak; exploration and the benefit of

mankind [was not correct]. [Yet] we said so much that I think we started to believe it. It just

wasn’t there with the taxpayers in Iowa. Sure they were interested [in space exploration],

they’re interested in the Martian program but they are not going to double their taxes to get a

man on Mars in any near future in my view. Also the NASA system required a “big deal”

[project] in order to survive—in order to keep all the centers. I find it interesting … that we

still have the same centers that we needed to go to the Moon [yet] now we’re just kind of

nibbling [at space]. …[H]ow come? Well they’ve got the political constituencies… I use

that figuratively. Everybody in Houston wants to keep their jobs so we’ve got to have a

Shuttle, we’ve got to have a Space Station because the Marshall people want to have a job,

and everybody at the Cape wants to launch something so they keep their jobs. And so terrific

amount of political support … an incorrect idea. That is that the American people really

wanted another Apollo like thing. They wanted it if it was free but were they willing to pay

for it when it wasn’t … there to beat the “dirty Commies.” We spent like, what three trillion,

some say thirty trillion dollars to fight the cold war of which NASA is a part. But now the

cold war’s over, are we putting any money to help the Russians become democrats, hardly

any, it’s amazing. And the same phenomena then with Apollo, you land on the Moon, do the

people really want to go with for a big Shuttle. I don’t think so but NASA wanted it, NASA


8 October 1997 12-19

needed it… I was in the position [in Washington] where I could see the political forces at

work. And the reason the Shuttle is as it is today is not because it’s a great idea, maybe it is.

There were strong recommendations for a continuation of Skylab which the Mir did, and a

smaller … test Shuttle… [F]rankly, I thought [it] was a better idea to … go at [it] step-wise.

[but I attended] a meeting in the White House and Mr. Halderman in the presence of the

President said, “Well which one [shuttle] would get the most votes in California?” Well, the

bigger the Shuttle, the more the votes; therefore the big Shuttle—which [has] no where near

… lived up to it’s economic advertisement in the beginning of cutting the cost of orbit down

by a factor of ten. In that regard, it’s been a big joke. The massive tragedy, even though it’s

a fine vehicle [and] we are learning some things, but if we had not done that and gone to a

smaller Shuttle as a test vehicle and continued Skylab, we may be in better shape today then

we are with a Shuttle that people don’t know what to do with other than put together a space

station that people don’t know what to do with. So that’s the long answer to your question…

[R]ight now, we’re being distracted in my view about from what makes sense. We’re being

distracted [with] a manned Mars program which is going to be fraught with difficulty,

radiation and otherwise, … not to mention expense when there’s so much that could be done

by getting back to the Moon putting [in] bases like Antarctica, McMurdo up there. Finding

out what you could use the Moon for. If for nothing else than a jumping off spot to Mars but

probably [it will make a] great solar or space observatories, [platforms and] radio

observatories [on] the back [side]…

ROLLINS: Well the United Space Alliance I think is trying to privatize the Shuttle.


8 October 1997 12-20

ANDERS: What is that?

ROLLINS: Well the United Space Alliance.

ANDERS: I got so tired of NASA politics I retired to my island and I fly my P-51 and fish for

salmon and I don’t pay much attention anymore.

ROLLINS: There’s a new organization that’s been made up of consortium of aerospace

companies as the United Space Alliance and they are responsible for the Shuttle. And I think

the goal is to privatize the Shuttle. Do you think that’s a good idea or workable?

Anders: It basically is a massively uneconomical venture. If you privatize it, it will have to

be subsidized in some way. So I can’t imagine that it can be successful in the [truly] private

[unclear]. [W]here [is] their money? … Are they willing to buy the thing? [If note, why

should the taxpayer?]

ROLLINS: Well, that’s the talk.

ANDERS: Yeah, well, I mean, are they going to pay for the non-reoccurring costs? If you

give me a Cadillac, I can probably afford the gas… So if this alliance is given a massively

subsidized, by the taxpayers, capital situation for free, well maybe they can make a success

out of it. But I wouldn’t call that a real private activity. If they want to take over the job of

the civil servants, who, with all due respect, may be are not as easy to manage as people are


8 October 1997 12-21

in the private sector, … that’s just trading one, sort of, frozen-in bureaucracy versus a

somewhat more flexible bureaucracy. Maybe that would work better but that doesn’t mean

that it makes sense. I wouldn’t buy stock in it myself. I’ve been asked to be the

administrator of NASA three times and I’ve turned it down because I figured they couldn’t

stand hearing this so I’m telling you this, more or less, in private. Okay. But that’s what I’d

be saying on the hill.

ROLLINS: Well then why didn’t you take the job and go ahead.

ANDERS: Because in [Gerald R.] Ford’s day and in George Bush’s day it was clear that

[NASA and some politicians] were still mesmerized by the big-deal… I [would have] had to

get rid of a lot of people to have it make sense and that’s always a very painful exercise and

… maybe I’m too lazy…

ROLLINS: How did you end up in Washington state”?

ANDERS: My father had been a naval officer and was stationed in Bremerton [WA] when I

was four. And so I never remembered [it] raining, I remember nothing but all the

blackberries you could eat and all the garter snakes a four year old could catch. … I went to

check that out forty years later and found that it really wasn’t that great but my wife and I

went up to the San Juan Islands and found that it really was nice. So we bought property and

fantasized … about it for years and eventually bought a home up there and that’s where we

live…


8 October 1997 12-22

ROLLINS: Well, what way did your fame as an astronaut affect you and your family? … Did

you feel effects?

Anders: I felt the effects but and certainly there was this sort of knee-jerk adulation. I used

to be a little cynical with the thought that if you’d been to the Moon you could answer any

question. I mean people are dumb enough to ask you, ‘What do you think about the events in

Tanzeekestan, or Birth Control or DNA or something?’ It’s amazing how many [astronauts]

will answer [those] question[s] and think they really do know the answer[s]. … [A]lso it was

clear that [many] of the guys were getting sucked into [being] what I’d call door-openers.

P.R. guys, quick buck, but [short timers]. … I thought, ‘… I’m not that famous, and I’m

certainly not glib, so maybe I’d really ought to [get real] work for a living.’ And … I did that

both in the government and in private industry. … [S]ure, the fact that I had been to the

Moon might have gotten the door open a crack but you really couldn’t get [it in and keep it

in] for the long term. … [T]he shareholders at General Dynamics couldn’t have cared less

whether I had been at the Moon or not. So it helped me some but not all that much. And if

you look at the other participants, depending how you measure it, if you measure [success] in

economic terms, it didn’t help all that much, most of them were expecting [too much from

the exposure].

ROLLINS: But at the time you were bugged a lot? Were you recognized?


8 October 1997 12-23

ANDERS: Still am, still get requests for autographs and every now and then somebody will

actually recognize me, some nerd somewhere. They’ll say, “Ah, I follow that space program,

aren’t you Bill Anderson?” … [I]t’s still kind of surprising… [W]e went down to this

Astronaut Hall of Fame [event] over the weekend and Disney or MGM or somebody wanted

to have a motorcade. … [S]o here all these geriatric cases sitting on the top of the Corvettes

going by and people applauding, most of whom weren’t even born. These little kids were …

looking and their mothers would say, “Applaud.” So, … maybe it’s part of the human

instinct, to try to perpetuate heroes, which in my view is getting overworked. Get some of

the new heroes instead of the old ones… [P]eople still get turned on to that and want you to

autograph a Kleenex. It still goes on.

ROLLINS: Are you bothered by that?

ANDERS: A little bit. Yeah.

ROLLINS: It gets on your nerves after all these years.

ANDERS: No, I’m particularly bothered when somebody gets an autograph and tries to sell it.

I got a real hard nose policy because even one of our lunar landing colleagues sold some stuff

that our crew gave him and that really burned me up. I tried to buy it back on the open

market. It was a flag that had been to the Moon or around the Moon and autographed by the

Apollo 8 crew. Next thing I know, it was for sale. And it even had, I won’t say the name,

you might guess who it was, ‘To so and so, thanks for all your help, Frank, Jim and Bill.’ …


8 October 1997 12-24

[T]here’s amazing amount of autograph sellers out there, who use every excuse you can think

of to get an autograph. Like, “I’m dying of Cerebral Palsy,” or “I’ve been hit by a train and

my last wish is that you give me your [autograph].” My secretary used to keep a record of the

addresses versus the stories and there [were] about 100 people who had applied ten times

under ten difference aliases with ten different diseases or whatever to try to get the autograph.

ROLLINS: We had heard that Ken Mattingly does that too. That he has some database that he

checks against all these.

ANDERS: Yeah. I quit doing that, I just quit signing them [at] all unless it’s somebody that I

really know [and that it’s] for their own use. But it’s amazing how many of these, ‘Oh, I

swear I’ll never sell it,’ type stories end up … in the autograph catalog… One of our

colleagues said “Well, okay, if they want to buy them, I’ll sell them.” So he gives them all

his canceled checks for fifty cents or something. That has more honor than the other as far as

I’m concerned.

ROLLINS: Speaking of geriatrics, John Glenn wants to have another mission. Do you think

that’s a good idea? Do you?

ANDERS: I think they ought to send me instead of him, because I’m a lot smarter and in

better shape. [No, I’m joking of course. I think it’s great John is going. He’s earned it and

we might actually learn something. But I’m next.]


8 October 1997 12-25

ROLLINS: That was my next question. If you were offered would you like to go?

ANDERS: Sure. I actually thought that by this time, you could actually buy you a seat on

something. Unfortunately the Shuttle and the Challenger … have now blocked that

[possibility] in my lifetime. But sooner or later people will be able to buy a ride into space.

And if John can go, great. But they’d better be prepared to take me, because I’m going to

write to my Senator. That would be an interesting experience. Why not, they took Jake

Garn, he’s not a bad guy but there was less of a reason [for Jake] than [for] John Glenn…

And, since I’ve only been once, I ought to go too. You know, the older guy and the

somewhat middle aged guy. Tell … and I’ll retract everything [bad] I’ve said about NASA if

you pass that message on.

ROLLINS: Okay, we’ll do that. Well, can you think of anything?

[End of Interview]

this transcript has been edited and approved by william ... · johnson space center oral history...

Documents