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Form and Content

In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions , Thomas S. Kuhn has provided in essay form his viewson the nature of the scientific endeavor. It is a subject that Kuhn believes is little understood bythe general public , by students of science , and even by scientists themselves. In particular , hechallenges the beliefs that the development of science has been linear and cumulative and thatscience is characterized by complete objectivity. These beliefs , he says , are propagated bycontemporary textbooks and by many popular writings of scientists. In the preface , he describesthe intellectual route by which he came to his views.

The circumstances surrounding and leading to Kuhns writing of The Structure of ScientificRevolutions involved personal and institutional elements. In the late 1940s , Kuhn was agraduate student in theoretical physics at Harvard University. He has stated that during his yearsof studying physics he developed a strong interest in the philosophical aspects of science. As anadvanced graduate student , he became a teaching assistant in a group of new science courses for nonscience majors that Harvard was developing at that time.

In the years immediately following World War II , the faculty of Harvard University came to theconclusion that the postwar generation of Harvard students needed to be more broadly educatedthan their predecessors had been with regard to their cultural heritage. A new set of generaleducation courses were devised , which included science. It was thought that a historicalapproach would be appropriate for developing in all students an appreciation of what had beenaccomplished by Western (as contrasted to Eastern , or Oriental) scientists and how their accomplishments had been achieved.

In preparing himself for his new teaching duties , Kuhn made a particular study of the shift fromPtolemaic , geocentric astronomy to Copernican , heliocentric astronomya shift that is oftencalled the Copernican Revolution. Kuhn brought some new insights to this transition , eventuallywriting The Copernican Revolution: Planetary Astronomy in the Development of WesternThought , which was published in 1957 with a foreword by James B. Conant , a former presidentof Harvard University and the architect of its general education program. This early work of Kuhn can be a valuable adjunct to the reading of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions for readers with some interest in and knowledge about astronomy.

After completing his doctoral work in physics in 1949 , Kuhn turned his attention , full-time , tostudying the history of science and its philosophical implications. He remained at Harvard , associated with the history of science department and the general education program , until 1956 , when he accepted a position at the University of California at Berkeley.

Kuhns historical studies in the physical sciences focused on those periods during which radicalchanges took place in the scientific modes of investigation and explanation , that is , revolutions , as he called them. In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions , first published in1962 by the University of Chicago Press , he set forth details of the perspectives he haddeveloped on this subject. The 175-page book is divided into thirteen chapters.


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Soon after its publication , The Structure of Scientific Revolutions was widely reviewed , read , anddiscussed. It was reprinted several times. In 1972 , a new edition was issued that was not arevision of the original text but did include a thirty-seven-page postscript prepared by Kuhn in1969. In this postscript , he answered some of his critics and clarified some of his earlier statements.

By that time Kuhn was recognized internationally as a philosopher of science. (Both editionswere also issued as volume 2 , number 2 of the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science , apublication organized by an outstanding international group of philosophers of science.) By1969 , he was a professor at Princeton University , where he remained until he accepted a positionas professor of philosophy and history of science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in1979.

A nalysis

Although the title of Kuhns essay specifies revolutions , his presentation has a broader scope , namely , the nature of scientific enterprise. His perspectives developed from consideration of thesequence of steps , from ancient Greece to the present , that resulted in twentieth century physicalscience. His philosophy of science stems , primarily , from historical study. He has , however , alsoconsidered psychology and sociology and applied them to the scientific endeavor as a whole. Hisapproach is an interdisciplinary one.

In each of the thirteen short chapters , a single idea is set forth , usually drawing heavily onexamples from the history of physics , chemistry , or astronomy , as would be expected given theauthors background. Yet the examples are secondary in importance to the notions that they arebeing invoked to explicate. Although familiarity with the physical science being cited is veryhelpful to the reader , lack of such knowledge is by no means a complete barrier tocomprehension of Kuhns points.

Two features which distinguish Kuhns writing on the philosophy of science are his belief thatrevolution (not evolution) marks the development of science and his introduction of a set of terms to characterize scientific activity. Some of these terms were given new or expandedmeanings by Kuhn and became identified with a Kuhnian approach. They have been seizedupon by some readers and applied in fields widely divergent from the physical sciences.

Kuhns thinking about the development of science may be briefly summarized. At most giventimes , scientists pursuing a mature science practice normal science and teach it to their students , initiating them and training them to carry on in the then-established tradition for their

particular discipline. For sciences which have reached a state of maturity , a paradigm hasbeen established by consensus among the practitioners. For Kuhn , the term paradigm refers toa situation in which all the currently known information in a field is accessible , suitable lines of investigation to extend that knowledge are recognized , and a collection of laws , theory , applications , and instrumentation constituting a model are accepted. In Kuhns view , before ascience has reached mature status it is most often studied or investigated in relative isolation byscientists from a number of competing schools of thought and , in retrospect , would be viewed as


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being in a preparadigm state of development. During its preparadigm period , it cannot beregarded as being truly scientific because no consensus prevails.

To be an accepted member of a scientific profession at any given time , an individual is expectedto accept and conform to the current paradigm , selecting appropriate problems to study. Kuhn

regards such activity not as paradigm testing but as puzzle solving within the currentlyaccepted paradigm.

Inevitably , such investigations reveal anomalies , that is , instances that cannot be fitted into thecurrent paradigm. (Accidental discoveries are another source of anomalies.) The presence of anomalies threatens a crisis in the paradigm. Initially , in the face of anomalies , efforts are madeto modify the current paradigm to accommodate the new information. When that cannot be doneor when that has come to involve cumbersome and far-fetched elements , the time is right for theintroduction of a new paradigm.

A scientific revolution occurs when a new paradigm gains wide acceptance. Yet a revolution

cannot occur unless a new paradigm has been made ready. It may take decades for a newparadigm to become established within the majority of a scientific community , and some older scientists may go to their graves never having accepted the new paradigm for one reason or another.

Acceptance by a scientific community of a new paradigm , that is , a scientific revolution , involves many changes that are not immediately clear. For example , a new conceptualvocabulary is required , new theories must be developed , new problems posed for solution , oldlines of inquiry abandoned as irrelevant , metaphysical ideas (often unarticulated assumptions)examined for tenability.

Kuhn considers successive paradigms to be necessarily different and irreconcilable , their respective adherents seeming to operate in different worlds which prevent any meaningfulcommunication among them. Scientists , in Kuhns view , talk only to colleagues sharing the sameparadigm and are usually insulated from other disciplines and from the public at large.

Kuhn recognizes the political connotations associated with the word revolution and does notshy away from its use , even noting some similarities between political and scientificrevolutionsa point which brought him some criticism from scientists , many of whom prefer theword breakthrough to characterize marked changes in the course of the development of ascientific discipline.

Kuhn challenges the idea of what is typically regarded as scientific progress. In particular , hedoes not believe that each successive paradigm shift brings scientists closer to the truth. Atmost , science can be said to have progressed from previous stages but not toward an ultimategoal.

Critical Context


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With the publication of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions , Thomas Kuhn came to berecognized as a provocative contemporary philosopher of science. He joined the company of previously established figures as Karl Popper , Imre Lakatos , and Paul Feyerabend. While it isnot appropriate here to compare and contrast the writings of these various philosophers of science , two comments are relevant.

In 1965 , a symposium focusing on Kuhns work was held in London under the auspices of theDivision of Logic , Methodology , and Philosophy of Science of the International Union of theHistory and Philosophy of Science. Kuhn , Popper , Lakatos , and Feyerabend were all contributorsto the resulting volume Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge , which was published byCambridge University Press in 1970. Two essays by Kuhn are included , Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research and Reflections on My Critics. In these essays , Kuhn discusses thedifferences between himself and the other three; he also tries to correct some misinterpretationsof his work.

Despite these attempts by Kuhn to clarify his writings , David Stove , an Australian philosopher of

science , published a sharply critical commentary , Popper and After: Four Modern Irrationalists , with Kuhn one of the four. In particular , Stove charges these theorists with expounding the viewthat scientific knowledge is never true or false and that even the best scientific opinion at anygiven time is an unjustified conjecture , deeply influenced by its contemporary context.

Other philosophers of science who have found themselves at odds with Kuhns views are IsraelScheffler and Dudley Shapere. Scheffler is disturbed by the subjectivity that Kuhn attributes toscientific investigation , and Shapere is critical of the notion of paradigms set forth by Kuhn.Margaret Masterson , another contributor to Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge , alsocriticizes Kuhns use of the word paradigm. Kuhn took note of and responded to some of thosecritics in the postscript to the second edition of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions . To some

extent,

it appears that misunderstanding of Kuhns words has contributed to the disquietudewhich some readers have experienced. Nevertheless , the notion of paradigms and all that theword connotes for Kuhn , the importance Kuhn places on consensus within a scientificcommunity , and Kuhns strict use of the term revolution have resulted in considerable debateabout his views , especially within the communities of scientists and historians , or philosophers , of science.

On the other hand , writing in 1980 , Gary Gutting stated that The Structure of ScientificRevolutions has had a wider academic influence than any other single book of the last twentyyears. Gutting was particularly struck by the number of different disciplines that have found aKuhnian approach useful. As the editor of Paradigms and Revolutions: Appraisals and Applications of Thomas Kuhns Philosophy of Science , Gutting assembled a collection of fourteen essays responding to Kuhns views from the areas of philosophy , the social sciences , thehumanities , and the history of science. Also , he has provided a bibliography of about 250 items(including sources in English , French , and German) whose publication was stimulated by their authors consideration of Kuhns writings. In addition to studies by scholars in the fields listedabove , there are entries specifically related to theology and religion , to art and literature , and toeducation. Social scientist Barry Barnes is also very appreciative of the value of Kuhns ideas for his discipline. Writing in 1982 , when his book T.S. Kuhn and Social Science was published ,


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Barnes stated that research into the sociology of knowledge had already benefited from Kuhnswork and would continue to do so in the future.

The extension of Kuhns ideas to fields beyond the physical sciences had already begun beforethe second edition of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions was published. In his postscript ,

Kuhn seems somewhat surprised by the enthusiastic responses to his ideas coming from widelydifferent disciplines , and he makes some cautionary comments.

Kuhn continued to expand upon his original writings and published a number of articles in linewith the main themes set forth in The Structure of Scientific Revolution . Fourteen of thosearticles were republished in 1977 by the University of Chicago Press under the title The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change . In one of the essays in this volume , he discusses the essential tension that he believes exists between tradition and innovation inscientific research. Regardless of the degree of agreement (or disagreement) with Kuhns ideasthat each reader experiences , it is impossible not to recognize how provocative they have been , and continue to be , stimulating scholars from diverse disciplines to examine and reexamine their

methods and beliefs.

A dditional Reading

Giere , Ronald N. Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach . Chicago: University of ChicagoPress , 1988. This book surveys the philosophical theories of science and includes an extensivereview of Kuhns philosophy. Many of the discussions are largely developed from Kuhnsconcept of revolutions in science.

Horgan , John. Reluctant Revolutionary. Scientific American 264 , no. 5 (May , 1991): 40-9. Inan interview , Kuhn reveals his frustration with those who misused or misinterpreted his ideasabout scientific revolutions. He discusses modifications he made to his theory , particularly in thedefinitions of paradigm and incommensurability. Horgan depicts both Kuhns personalityand ideas with clarity.

Horwich , Paul , ed. World Changes: Thomas Kuhn and the Nature of Science . Cambridge , Mass.:MIT Press , 1993. An introduction by the editor and essays by nine scholars discuss how Kuhnsideas differ from those of previous philosophers. The essays take historical or philosophicalapproaches in their arguments. In Afterwords , Kuhn comments on the essays , refining hisviews about incommensurability and defending himself against charges of relativism andantirealism.

Hoyningen-Huene , Paul. Reconstructing Scientific Revolutions: Thomas S. Kuhns Philosophy of Science . Chicago: University of Chicago Press , 1993. The author reconstructs Kuhns theoryof scientific development as articulated in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions . His purpose isto clarify the fundamentals of the theory and end the confusion produced by the diverseinterpretations of Kuhns vaguely defined terms. This volume is most helpful for readers familiar with the controversies produced by Kuhns book.


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Margolis , Howard. Paradigms and Barriers: How Habits of Mind Govern Scientific Beliefs .Chicago: University of Chicago Press , 1993. Margolis applies his own analysis of cognition toKuhns concept of the paradigm shift. Specifically , Margolis finds that habits of mind , pervasiveand normally beneficial , sometime pose barriers in the face of novel phenomena or theories. Aparadigm shift occurs when the barrier is overcome and new habits of mind replace old. His

argument , he insists , reveals that relativism has a limited role in the methods of science.

OHear , Anthony. Introduction to the Philosophy of Science . Oxford , England: Clarendon Press , 1989. OHear discusses Kuhns paradigm-centered theory at length and somewhatunsympathetically. He specifically compares Kuhns ideas with those of Karl Popper andexamines the historical evidence upon which Kuhn relied. The book , which summarizes thephilosophy of science as a whole , is readable and well-suited to readers new to the subject ingeneral and Kuhn in particular.

Thagard , Paul. Conceptual Revolutions . Princeton , N.J.: Princeton University Press , 1992.Thagard bases his own theory of scientific revolutions on Kuhns ideas. He seeks to add a

psychological and computational approach for analyzing conceptual transformations , hierarchies , combinations , structures , sources , and explanatory coherence. In so doing , he summarizesKuhns work and shows its wide influence.

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