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Antagonism, hegemony and ideology afterheterogeneityLasse Thomassen aa University of Limerick, Department of Politics and Public AdministrationPublished online: 09 Aug 2006.

To cite this article: Lasse Thomassen (2005) Antagonism, hegemony and ideology after heterogeneity, Journal of PoliticalIdeologies, 10:3, 289-309, DOI: 10.1080/13569310500244313

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Antagonism, hegemony and ideologyafter heterogeneityLASSE THOMASSEN

Department of Politics and Public Administration, University of Limerick

ABSTRACT This article examines the implications of the introduction of thecategory of heterogeneity in Ernesto Laclaus most recent work. Laclaustheory of hegemony and discourse theoretical approach to ideology is oftenassociated with the category of antagonism. I argue that heterogeneity shouldbe the central category of hegemony and discourse analysis, and that antagonismcan be seen as a strategy of ideological closure. In addition, heterogeneityunderstood as the simultaneous condition of possibility and impossibility ofhegemonic articulationrenders the theory of hegemony closer to Derrideandeconstruction. Hegemony analysis and deconstruction are often presented asdifferent and complementary theoretical moves. I argue that this is not the case,and that they can instead be seen as dealing with the same issues of the conditionsof possibility and impossibility of the discursive constitution of ideology andidentity.

Introduction

One of the most influential approaches to the study of ideology is ErnestoLaclaus theory of hegemony and the so-called Essex School employingLaclaus work. They treat ideology as a special kind of discourse, that is, astructured, meaningful totality,1 and ideology refers to a particular kind ofdiscourse that attempts to conceal the always-already dislocated character of anymeaningful totality.2 The hegemonic approach to discourse and ideology drawsupon different strands of thought, among them Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Lacanand post-Saussurean linguistics.3 Another source of inspiration is Derrideandeconstruction which has played a central role for Laclau and those inspired byhis work.4

Corresponding Address: L. Thomassen, Department of Politics and Public Administration, University ofLimerick, Limerick, Ireland. Email: lathom@essex.ac.uk

Journal of Political Ideologies (October 2005),10(3), 289309

ISSN 1356-9317 print; ISSN 1469-9613 online/05/03028921 q 2005 Taylor & FrancisDOI: 10.1080/13569310500244313

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The appropriation of deconstruction for the theory of hegemony is seeminglyunproblematic: deconstruction and the theory of hegemony are often presented asthe two sides of the same coin, with deconstruction showing the contingency ofstructures and identities and the theory of hegemony explaining the constitution ofstructures, identities and ideology.5 Recently, Aletta Norval has put thiscomplementary relationship between deconstruction and the theory of hegemonyinto question,6 and here I wish to continue this problematisation of the relationshipbetween deconstruction and hegemony.This meta-theoretical question of the relationship between hegemony analysis

and deconstruction is linked to a more specific issue arising from Laclausconceptual apparatus. In his most recent work, Laclau has introduced the notion ofheterogeneity to refer to an excess escaping the attempt to discursively objectifythe boundaries of identities.7 One example of an heterogeneous entity is thelumpenproletariat, which, in Marxs work, is a discursive excess escaping thecreation of a conceptual frontier between bourgeoisie and proletariat. I shall returnto the notion of heterogeneity and to this and other examples in more detail below.The introduction of the notion of heterogeneity necessitates a reconsideration ofthe notion of antagonism, which has held a central place in Laclaus work. This, inturn, forces us to consider what is the end of the analysis of ideology: antagonismor heterogeneity; and whether ideology analysis comprises simply the dualstrategy of deconstruction and hegemony analysis.My claims in this article are threefold. First, with Norval, I will argue that

deconstruction is not a negative preparation for hegemony analysis. This is linkedto the notions of antagonism and heterogeneity. The central category, if there isone, of hegemony and discourse analysis is heterogeneity, I will argue, notantagonism. As a result, hegemony analysis, like deconstruction, is also concernedwith showing the contingency and precariousness of discourses and socialidentities. Here, deconstruction and hegemony are shown to be not simplydifferent and complementary discourse analytical strategies. Second, andfollowing from the previous point, my argument implies that social identitiesare not necessarily constituted around antagonistic frontiers, and that there areonly degrees of antagonism, never pure antagonisms. Third, I will argue that it ispossible to see antagonism as an ideological type of discourse because it is oneway of attempting to achieve discursive closure.Although the argument is mainly theoretical and conceptual, I shall use a

number of concrete examples. In the first section, I examine the existing literatureon the relationship between deconstruction and hegemony and discourse analysis.In subsequent sections, I examine the key parameters of Laclaus theory ofhegemonyempty signifiers, logics of equivalence and difference, and so onand show the implications of Laclaus recent reformulations of these for the notionof antagonism. I argue that the notion of antagonismmust be qualified, and this hasimplications for the use of the theory of hegemony for discourse and ideologyanalysis. This conclusion is further emphasised with the introduction of the notionof heterogeneity, the consequences of which I discuss in the last section of thearticle.

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Deconstruction, hegemony and discourse analysis

Derridean deconstruction has been part of the theory of hegemony from itsinception in Laclau and Mouffes Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. In thissection, I will first consider Laclaus appropriation of Derridas work and then theviews of several of Laclaus commentators.Since Aletta Norval has already dealt with Laclaus appropriation of Derridas

deconstruction, I will only make some brief comments on this. In Hegemony andSocialist Strategy, Laclau and Mouffe make reference to Derridas deconstructionof structuralism, showing that ultimately no structure or system can be heldtogether by a transcendental signified. This enabled Laclau andMouffe to questionthe emphasis on structure, determinism and necessity in Marxist thought.8

Deconstruction provides an argument for contingency and, hence, for thecentrality of hegemony understood as the articulation of contingently linkeddifferential elements into a more or less stable whole. In short, no hegemonywithout contingency and the deconstruction of structure.In the 1990s, Laclau reformulated this insight in terms of the Derridean notion

of undecidability. Deconstruction, he argued, shows the undecidability ofstructures and identities, and the theory of hegemony provides a theory of thedecision in an undecidable terrain.9 As Norval has shown,10 this rests on amisunderstanding of undecidability. Not only is undecidability not a generalinfrastructure, but a specific notion introduced by Derrida in specific contexts; inaddition, the decision does not dissolve undecidability. This goes against thetemporal dimension of Laclaus use of undecidability/decision: first undecid-ability, then decision. Likewise, deconstruction is not a negative and preparatorymove that one needs to make and can subsequently leave behind before embarkingon the analysis of the decision or hegemony. Deconstruction and hegemony,undecidability and decision, can neither be temporally separated, nor conceived asdifferent and complementary analytical moves. It can, of course, be argued thatLaclau merely appropriates and, in the process, rearticulates deconstruction forhis own purposes and that it is therefore wrong to accuse him of havingmisinterpreted Derrida. Yet, the problem I want to emphasise here is that hisparticular interpretation of deconstruction implies the aforementioned temporaldivision of deconstruction and hegemony. As I shall argue below, this is ofutmost importance for the way one does hegemony analysis because it meansthat it cannot simply consist in showing how a hegemonic project wassuccessful. It must also consider the limits of any hegemonic constellation,that is, incorporate the purportedly specifically deconstructive move into thehegemony analysis.Laclaus appropriation of deconstruction and undecidability as different from

and complementary to the theory of hegemony is reflected in the work of some ofhis commentators. Thus, three introductions to Laclaus work and to discourseanalysis all argue that deconstruction and the theory of hegemony are differentand/but complementary discourse analytical strategies.11 For instance, JacobTorfing writes:

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Deconstruction in a certain sense implies a theory of hegemony and the theory of hegemonyimplies deconstruction. . . . Whereas hegemony brings us from undecidability to decidability,deconstruction shows the contingent and constitutive character of decidable hegemonicarticulations by revealing the undecidability of the decision.12

While I agree that there is a mutual implication between hegemony anddeconstruction, this should not be understood as if the two constitute twocomplementary and reciprocal movements.13 Deconstruction is not a merelypreparatory analytical move, nor is it a purely negative undertaking. As Derridahas argued, deconstruction is affirmative. Deconstruction does not merely taketexts and discourses apart, showing the contingency of structures, identities andbinary oppositions, and it does not leave us with a terrain of indeterminacy.As most forcefully argued by Rodolph Gasche, deconstruction aims toaccount for the conditions of impossibility as well as the conditions ofpossibility of identities, distinctions, and so on.14 This is the case, for instance,in relation to undecidability and decision: the former at once makes the latterpossible and impossible. There is no decision without undecidability, but,importantly, because of undecidability, no decision is ever complete or final.Hence, it is a mistake to argue that deconstruction and hegemony analysis aredifferent and, as such, complementary discourse analytical strategies.Deconstruction already involves what the theory of hegemony is thought toadd to it, namely an account of the possibility of identities, distinctions, and,more generally, the stabilisation of meaning. Conversely, as I will try to showin the following, the theory of hegemony should not be seen as exclusivelyconcerned with an account of how decisions and hegemonic totalities comeabout.

Hegemony, empty signifiers and antagonism

In a recent work, Laclau uses the following model to clarify the way hegemonicarticulation works (Figure 115).In the model, D1, D2, D3, D4, and so on, represent particular signifiers

(or demands: D), which are articulated into a chain of equivalence(D1 ; D2 ; D3 ; D4. . .). One of the signifiers (D1) has been able to emptyitself of its particular content. As a result, it can stand in for and represent the chainas a whole, thereby establishing the equivalence among the different signifiers.This creates an antagonistic frontier (F) vis-a`-vis an antagonistic force (T), inrelation to which the particular signifiers of the chain of equivalence stand in thesame relation insofar as they take part in the chain of equivalence as representedby the empty signifier. This links together the creation of a chain of equivalence,the empty signifier and antagonism.In the original model, T refers to Tsarism and the chain of equivalence is

formed by different demands united through their opposition to the Tsaristregime. A more recent example of the same kind of hegemonic construction isthe so-called War on Terror in the aftermath of the 911 attacks. The US

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government was able to put together a coalition united through their opposition toterrorism, especially the international terrorism associated with the names ofOsama bin Laden, al-Qaeda and the Taliban. There was an antagonistic frontierdividing us from them: you are either with us or you are with the terrorists.This hegemonic formation made certain things possible that had not previouslybeen possible (the coalition of hitherto mutually opposed states, for instance), butalso excluded certain possibilities from the hegemonic political space (puttinginto question the particular way the War on Terror was carried out, forinstance).

Tendentially empty signifiers and internal divisions

It is not always clear whether Laclaus theory of hegemony refers to thearticulation of identity and meaning as such or to a particular way of articulatingmeaning and identity, for instance populist discourses emphasising antagonism,equivalence and emptiness.16 This also applies to the model presented above.The question here is whether or not, and to what extent, (contingent) hegemonicarticulation is subsumed to antagonism as the necessary end of hegemony. Part ofthe aim of my analysis is to show that antagonism is not a necessary outcomeof hegemony, and that, even in the case of, for instance, populist discourses, it isnecessary to pay attention to tendential emptiness, the relativisation ofantagonism, and heterogeneity.Just as the world has turned out to be more complex than the simplistic

discourse of George W. Bush would allow, so Laclau has complexified his model.The signifiers in the chain of equivalence are equivalent and not identical, that is,they retain some of their mutual differences (hence; and not ). Like the othersignifiers, the empty signifier is split between its equivalential content and itsdifferential content, thus making it only tendentially empty. Laclau speaks

Figure 1.

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here of a differential remainder17 or a remainder of particularity.18 Thetendentially empty signifier is not a transparent medium; rather, the signifier has anineliminable materiality.19 This is of utmost importance for the model and hasimplications for the analysis of hegemony and ideology.The tendentially empty signifier simultaneously represents the whole chain and

is one part of it among others; this is why it appears twice in the model. As a result,the tendentially empty signifier is unable to represent the whole as a whole. InEmancipation(s), Laclau links the notion of the empty signifier to the subversionof the play of differences: insofar as the empty signifier does not have anyparticular differential content, it is able to represent the totality of the relations ofdifferences without being merely one more difference in an infinite field ofdifferences. Yet, insofar as it is only tendentially empty, the (tendentially) emptysignifier is not able to fulfil this role. It never ceases to be also one particularsignifier among others; that is, it is never just any signifier but always also thisrather than that signifier.Similarly, the equivalence never completely dissolves the relations of

difference: just as the logic of difference never manages to constitute a fullysutured space, neither does the logic of equivalence ever achieve this.20 SinceLaclau conceives of meaning and identity in post-Saussurean terms as constitutedthrough relations of difference, equivalence supposedly halts or subverts the playof difference. Again, insofar as the equivalence is only tendential, this subversionis only tendential, and the potential divisions within the chain cannot be dissolvedin the antagonistic frontier (for instance, in the case of the War on Terror). As aresult, the signifiers of the chain of equivalence are partly floating signifiers. Theirinteriority or exteriority to the chain cannot be clearly and unambiguouslyestablished, and they can therefore, be dis- and re-articulated. This is an essentialpart of hegemonic struggles; if there were no floating signifiers, it would be the endof any future hegemonic struggle.The hegemonic operation of a particular signifier taking up the signification of

the chain of equivalence is essentially a relation of representation. Importantly itis not the representation of something already present. What is missing isprecisely the equivalence, and this is what the relation of representation bringsinto existence. What is represented does not pre-exist the relation ofrepresentation; rather, the latter constitutes the former in a performativefashion.21 Yet, as we know from Derridas deconstruction of performativity, theperformative is never pure, but always made possible and contaminated by aconstative. The performative representation of the chain of equivalence involvesan irreducible element of citation: one of the signifiers of the (as yet not fullyconstituted) chain is partly emptied of content. We thereby have an operationinvolving both continuity and discontinuity, both citation and performativeinstitution. The relation of representation is only possible insofar as the particularsignifier is gradually emptied, yet this process of emptying is never complete.Thinking of hegemony as a relation of representation in this way means that thereis no pure (performative) origin of naming; but nor does the process ofrepresentation come to an end and establish the full identity of the chain, where

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there would be a simple relation of repetition across the different parts of thechain. This suggests that we can think of the hegemonic relation not only in termsof decision/undecidability and representation but also of the Derridean notion ofiterability.22

One could think about identification along the same lines: it involves citation ofan already existing object, which is signified in a particular way. It is not a purecitation, though, because there is an element of naming and rearticulation when theobject of identification becomes the central organising principle of my identity.The latter process is never complete because there is a tension between citationand naming, with the result that we have continuous identifications rather than afully established identity.It matters which particular signifier is cited, that is, which signifier takes up the

task of representing the whole. While this is ultimately contingent, it is notarbitrary. The particular signifiers are not equally able or likely to take up thistask because it takes place in an already partly sedimented terrain permeated byrelations of power. Hence, the particular signifier taking up the task of signifyingthe totality must not only be available, but must also compete with otherparticular signifiers. This takes place, not on a level playing field, but in a terrainthat is itself the result of prior hegemonic articulation.23 Moreover, since theempty signifier is only tendentially empty, it matters which particular signifiertakes up this role. The emptying of the signifier opens up a space within whichother signifiers can be included and represented, but this opening up is onlypossible via a simultaneous closing off, because it is the relative emptying of aparticular signifier.It is one of the tasks of hegemony analysis to examine why some signifiers come

to represent the whole and why others do not. The analysis of hegemony cannotstop at the identification of a successful hegemony, but must also examine whichalternatives have been excluded for the present hegemony to be possible. Forinstance, in the case of the War on Terror, one must ask what would have beenpossible, and what would have been excluded, if it had not been a War, but apolice or law-enforcement operation. And, one might ask why freedom and notsolidarity became the organising signifier for the Bush administration. These arenot just empty terms that everybody can agree with, rendering it irrelevant whichsignifier comes to dominate; instead Bush was (also) continuing certain existingdiscourses in American society, and this had implications for what becamepossible and what did not.Glenn Bowmans study of the way in which Palestinians in exile have imagined

their lost nation provides a further example. Bowman shows how the emptysignifier (the Palestinian nation) is necessarily split between its emptiness and adifferential remainder. Since the nation is imagined through synecdoche, the lostwhole (the Palestinian nation) depends on which part of it one puts in its place, thatis, which particular signifier takes up the task of signifying the whole.24 In short,synecdoche also relies on the citation of already existing signifier. The means ofsignification at our disposal will depend on our embeddedness in a particularcontext, which is always partially sedimented and permeated by relations of

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power. Not every means of signification is equally available in every context, anda signifier will have different meanings in different contexts. As a consequence,different significations of the same empty thing (for instance, the lostPalestinian nation) may not be compatible, and some of them may eventually needto be suppressed in order for a coherent and unitary identity to emerge. Insofar asthe split in the signifier is constitutive, it is always possible to imagine thingsotherwise, for instance, for the nation to be a different nation. And therewill always be persons and groups whose points of views cannot berepresented within the space of representation opened upbut simultaneouslyclosedby the tendentially empty signifier. In the case of Palestinians inexile, Bowman shows how these different images of the nation emerge, how theydepend on their different contexts of enunciation, and how they mutuallyconflict.25

One note of caution must be raised at this point, though. Bowmansexplanation of the inherent split in the signifier is ambiguous. At times, hesuggests that this is so for the intrinsic reasons explained above. At other times,however, he explains it with reference to the de facto geographical dispersion ofPalestinians and their physical, political and social separation from their land.26

Likewise, Bowman sometimes presents the dispersion of Palestinians from oneanother and from their land as the result of some external force (namely, Israelioccupation), rather than as an inherent part of identity that cannot be overcome.27

This would imply that if only they were not geographically dispersed, and if onlythe Israelis did not occupy their land and discriminate against them, thePalestinians would regain their lost fullness. Yet, given that there are onlytendentially empty signifiers, and that there is always some internal division, thisis impossible.

Antagonism: The limit of objectivity?

If the empty signifier is only tendentially empty, and if the equivalence is unableto completely subvert the relations of difference, then the frontier vis-a`-vis theantagonistic outside will not be a clear and stable frontier (it should berepresented in Fig. 1 as a dotted line). Antagonism only exists as a discursiveeffect and only as one end of a spectrum that is never reached. If anything, thereare tendential antagonisms, that is, frontiers and identities that are constructed asmore or less antagonistic. As argued above, this means that the frontier is open todis- and rearticulation. For instance, in the War on Terror it was not difficultto create a coalition for freedom and democracy and against bin Laden and theTaliban. Once the War went on to Iraq, however, the cracks that were already tosome extent present in the coalition started to open up. With Iraq, it was no longerpossible to represent the enemy as an absolute threat (or evil). The freedomthat was supposed to hold the coalition together appeared to be the freedom of aparticular agent, and, as a result, the coalition was unable to stay intact. Beforeturning to some of the implications of the relativisation of antagonism for

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discourse analysis, it is necessary to examine Laclaus different formulations ofantagonism.In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, antagonism is introduced as the limit of

objectivity and as a threat to my identity: [I]n the case of antagonism . . . thepresence of the Other prevents me from being totally myself. The relation arisesnot from full totalities, but from the impossibility of their constitution. . . . Insofaras there is antagonism, I cannot be a full presence for myself.28 And: Antagonismas the negation of a given order is, quite simply, the limit of that order, and not themoment of a broader totality in relation to which the two poles of the antagonismwould constitute differentiali.e. objectivepartial instances.29 Antagonism isconceived as the limit of objectivity because it refers to the subversion of thediscursive constitution of meaning and objectivity. More specifically, antagonismrefers to the moment when the system of differences is constituted into a chain ofequivalence opposing an external threat. The equivalence is established through anempty signifier signifying a set of differences as a totality. Supposedly,antagonism both makes meaning possible (because it provides the condition ofpossibility for the differences to coalesce into a totality) and impossible (because itdenotes a point where the relations of difference, which are constitutive ofmeaning, are subverted by equivalence). Yet, the antagonistic relation does notactually threaten the identity established through the chain of equivalence. Instead,antagonism is the flipside of equivalence: it is constituted by and constitutesequivalence, because the equivalent signifiers are equivalent insofar as they are allopposed in the same way to the antagonistic Other. Hence, the emptiness of theempty signifier and the antagonistic relation go hand in hand: the emptiness ofthe empty signifier signifies the fullness of an identity (for instance, of a communalidentity by fixing the meaning of its differential elements in relation to thatfullness), and the antagonistic Other is supposed to threaten this fullness.30

However, although this type of antagonistic relation is indeed not a positive,differential relation, as Laclau and Mouffe rightly argue, this is not what precludesthe possibility of its representation. Antagonism precisely refers to andpresupposes a broader totality in relation to which the two poles of theantagonism would constitute, if not differential, then at least objective, partialinstances. Since antagonism presupposes the fullness of the community with aclear division between inside and outside, antagonism presupposes the space ofsignification within which both the community and its antagonistic other areconstituted. With an antagonistic frontier, you have a clear inside and a clearoutside. Hence, Laclau and Mouffe are both right and wrong when they write inHegemony and Socialist Strategy that the experience of the limit of allobjectivity [has] a form of precise discursive presence, and this is antagonism.31

Antagonism has a precise discursive presence: it is a discursive representation,but, as such, it is not the limit of objectivity or signification. Similarly, the emptysignifier may be the limit of signification insofar as the latter is constituted throughrelations of difference. Yet, the empty signifier makes the signification of a spaceof fullness with clear boundaries possible. Both pure equivalence (or the pureemptiness of the empty signifier) and pure difference would constitute a set of

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fixed relations. The limit of objectivity, I suggest, is instead reflected in the mutualcontamination of equivalence and difference.Slavoj Zizek has argued that antagonism is a way to externalise the ineliminable

split (or lack) in the subject and, in this way, to discursively master the always-already dislocated character of any identity.32 A good example is racist andxenophobic ideologies: if only we could get rid of the foreigners, then crime andunemployment would disappear . . . If the identity of the community is constitutedthrough a hegemonic articulation, and if hegemony is essentially a relation ofrepresentation, then the identity of the community will be marked by an inherentsplit (or lack), which it can only erase by projecting it onto something representedas external to and negating the identity. We do not start with a pure inside; theinside is always already dislocated, and it is only the negation ofthis dislocationits externalisationthat creates the purity of the inside. As aconsequence, Zizek argues, we should distinguish between dislocation and anydiscursive response to it, including antagonism. Since New Reflections (1990),Laclau has thought of identity and discourse in this Lacanian sense, as constitutedaround a lack and, as such, inherently dislocated, with antagonism being one wayof discursively mastering dislocation, even if this always eventually fails.33

As Nathan Widder has rightly argued, the turn to dislocation would be redundantif it necessarily manifests itself in antagonistic relations.34 Laclau concludes:

In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy the notion of limit is more or less synonymous withantagonistic frontier. Objectivity is only constituted through a radical exclusion. Later onI came to realize that this assimilation presented two flaws. The first, that antagonism isalready a form of discursive inscriptioni.e. of masteryof something more primarywhich, from New Reflections on the Revolution of our Time onwards, I started callingdislocation. Not all dislocation needs to be constructed in an antagonistic way. The secondflaw is that antagonism is not equivalent to radical exclusion. What it does is to dichotomizethe social space, but both sides of the antagonistic relation are necessary in order to create asingle space of representation.35

Bowmans study of Palestinian nationalism provides a good example of thispoint. He shows how the Palestinian nation is defined through its antagonisticrelationship with the state of Israel. At the same time, he argues, Palestinianidentity is internally divided and only the result of contingent articulations.36

Whatever alternative antagonisms there may be within the Palestinian communityoccur within and are subsumed to the antagonistic frontier vis-a`-vis the state ofIsrael. At present at least, these secondary antagonisms do not put the definingantagonism with Israel into question.37 However, the antagonistic frontier vis-a`-vis Israel and the resultant fullness of the lost Palestinian identity masks, not anessence, but the essential lack of an essence, that is, the inherently dislocatedcharacter of identity. It is the task of hegemony analysis to examine whether, andhow, antagonism is the response to dislocation, and how the construction of oneantagonism may rely on the suppression of alternative antagonisms (even if theanalysis cannot stop at this).38 As I shall argue in the conclusion, antagonism canbe seen as ideological insofar as it conceals the dislocatory character of identity by

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externalising the dislocation onto an external antagonistic force, thereby alsoestablishing the unity of the discourse.

Hegemony analysis and the relativisation of antagonism

The relativisation of antagonismantagonism is one possible discursive responseto dislocation among several others, and there are only tendential antagonisms39has implications for the strategy one pursues in analysing ideology. The hegemonyanalysis of ideology can neither assume antagonism to be always in existence norcan it consist only in looking for antagonisms to emerge. Hegemony analysis mustlook both behind and beyond antagonism. It must look behind antagonism inorder to see whether and why an antagonism was constructed, something onlypossible through a careful analysis of the historical context. It must also lookbeyond antagonism in order to examine how the antagonism is never fullyconstituted and may subsequently be transformed. That is, hegemony analysismust take a dynamic perspective that takes antagonism as one possible outcomeamong others and not as the teleological aim of any identity formation.Significantly, this outcome is not the end of the matter, but instead requires furtheranalysis of the possibilities of its transformation. Hegemony analysis does notnecessarily aim at the identification of antagonisms, and even if an antagonism isidentified, this cannot be the last word on the matter.A good example of the kind of hegemony analysis that takes antagonism as its

endpoint is Sebastian Barros and Gustavo Castagnolas attempt to explain theshape of Argentine politics after World War II. They argue that Peronism was notonly a particular hegemonic project, but became the imaginary horizon of otherhegemonic projects, thus setting the terms of Argentine politics long after its fallfrom power in 1955. Peronism shaped Argentina in two ways: it divided Argentinepolitics and society into two antagonistic camps, and these camps were Peronismand anti-Peronismyou were either for or against Peronism. Barros andCastagnola write that Peronist populism introduced the representational resourceswhich functioned as a negative imaginary precluding the stability of Argentinepolitics. This prevented the formation of a common imaginary sustaining a stablepolitical order. Social differences were immediately read in terms of politicalexclusion. The political frontiers, thus framed by the constitution of politicalidentities, prevented the emergence of a stable hegemonic articulation.40

The problem with this analysis is the link between antagonism and instability.If the imaginary horizonincluding the central antagonismof Argentinepolitics was the same for almost half a century, then it seems wrong to talk aboutinstability. There was stability with regard to the terms of political and socialstruggles, and there was a common imaginary shared by the whole political order,including the antagonistic forces.Barros and Castagnola write: [t]his strict split of the political space into two

fields overdetermined by an equivalential division prevented the constitutionof two conditions for a stable hegemonic practice: the presence of a plurality ofantagonistic forces and the instability of the frontiers separating them.41 This is

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the crux of the matter, however. It is correct that hegemony is only possible insofaras frontiers and identities are ultimately unstable. In this sense, dislocation andheterogeneity, not antagonism, are the conditions of possibility (and impossibility)of hegemony. Since antagonisms divide the social field into two (for instance,Peronism and anti-Peronism), to have a plurality of antagonisms would requiretheir relativisation. You cannot have both pure antagonism and instability offrontiers and identities, and the possibility of hegemony is linked to therelativisation of antagonism. Moreover, the constitution of the imaginary horizon(through the emptying of a signifier and the creation of equivalence) relies on theexclusion of those who are barred from representation within the imaginaryhorizon because the latter is not infinite but limited by the differential remainder.One must therefore, not stop at the identification of antagonistic frontiers andideology, as Barros and Castagnola do; discourse analysis must go one step furtherand identify the discursive heterogeneitythe remainders of particularityresulting from and making possible these antagonistic frontiers and identities.

Heterogeneity, antagonism and discourse analysis

In his most recent work, Laclau has introduced the notion of heterogeneity to referto a discursive excess escaping categorisation and conceptual mastery.Heterogeneity stands in an undecidable tension between internality andexternality vis-a`-vis the boundaries of the discourse.42 As examples ofheterogeneity, Laclau gives the lumpenproletariat in Marxs work, the peopleswithout history in Hegel, and the subaltern.43 The point of this section is todevelop a more systematic account of the category of heterogeneity in the contextof the hegemonic approach to ideology and discourse analysis. I will, first, discussPeter Stallybrasss analysis of Marxs notion of the lumpenproletariat in order toshow how heterogeneity relates to antagonism. I will then further develop thenotion of heterogeneity through a discussion of Georges Batailles notions ofhomogeneity and heterogeneity.The figure of the lumpenproletariat in Marxs discourse is an example of a

heterogeneous entity. The lumpenproletariat is a discursive excess escaping theconceptual categories of Marxs analysis of capitalism, in particularthe determination of the antagonistic relation between proletariat and thecapitalist class. Yet, as Peter Stallybrass has argued,44 the lumpenproletariat notonly shows the limit of the objectification of the relation between proletariat andbourgeoisie. The exclusion of the lumpenproletariat from the other categoriesitbelongs neither to the proletariat, nor to what is antagonistically opposed to theproletariat, namely the bourgeoisiemakes it possible to theorise the relationbetween proletariat and bourgeoisie as an antagonistic relation. The lumpenpro-letariat is precisely the irreducible remainder45Laclaus characterisation ofheterogeneityfrom the constitution of the identity of the proletariat, whichis constituted through the antagonistic relation vis-a`-vis the bourgeoisie.The exclusion of heterogeneity from the chain of equivalence supports the unityof the chain and of the identity in question. However, this heterogeneity is not

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excluded in an antagonistic fashion as opposed to the identity. Heterogeneity isexcessive and undecidable; in the case of Marxs lumpenproletariat, it escapes theattempt to conceptualise social relations in antagonistic terms. Yet, the exclusionof the heterogeneous from the antagonism also makes the antagonism possible.In Laclauian terms, the condition of possibility of antagonism is the exclusionof the heterogeneous differential remainder. The heterogeneous is not excludedfrom the discoursefor instance, from Marxs texts. It is not something externalto the discourse, which would presuppose a closed discourse with clearlydemarcated limits. That is why we can refer to it as discursive heterogeneity, andwhy it also undermines the antagonism.The heterogeneous does not simply disappear from the discourse. The existence

of these heterogeneous elements shows the ultimate contingency of theconstitution of an identity or a discourse, including antagonistic identities anddiscourses. Heterogeneity therefore, provides a privileged point of entry forideology analysis. One must locate the heterogeneous elements in a discourse,examine what this heterogeneity is the trace of, and how it is dealt with in thediscourse. Stallybrasss analysis of Marxs texts is exemplary in this regard.The lumpenproletariat provides a point of entry for the analysis of Marxs textstracing the former as an effect of Marxs discursive decisions and examining howMarx deals with the resulting heterogeneous excess.We should not be led to think that, normatively, there is anything inherently

progressive about heterogeneity. For instance, although Marx finds somerevolutionary potential in the spontaneity of the lumpenproletariat, he alsoidentifies the lumpenproletariat as a regressive force and as the foundation forthe conservative discourse of Bonapartism. Georges Batailles analysis ofThe Psychological Structure of Fascism is also telling in this regard.Bataille refers to homogeneity as the commensurability of elements and

the awareness of this commensurability. Production, according to Bataille,is the basis of social homogeneity,46 and money is the equivalent through whicheach person exists:

As agents of production, the workers fall within the framework of the social organization, butthe homogeneous reduction as a rule only affects their wage-earning activity; they areintegrated into the psychological homogeneity in terms of their behaviour on the job, but notgenerally as men [sic]. Outside of the factory, and even beyond its technical operations, alabourer is, with regard to a homogeneous person (boss, bureaucrat, etc.), a stranger, a man[sic] of another nature, of a non-reduced, non-subjugated nature.47

Science can only take homogeneity as its object of knowledge, thus excludingthe possibility of a science of heterogeneity. Therefore, it is necessary to posit thelimits of sciences inherent tendencies, and to constitute a knowledge of the non-explainable difference, which supposes the immediate access of the intellect to abody of material, prior to any intellectual reduction. Tentatively, it is enough topresent the facts according to their nature.48 Heterogeneity does not lend itselfto any intellectual reduction within a coherent and closed scientific system. Thissuggests that the study of the heterogeneous can only proceed through categories

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and examplesincluding the category of heterogeneity and the example ofthe lumpenproletariatthat gesture towards, but never appropriate, theheterogeneous.[W]ith a view to defining the term heterogeneous,49 Bataille, echoing

Marxs description of the lumpenproletariat, gives the following examples ofheterogeneous waste and unproductive expenditure: the numerous elements orsocial forms that homogeneous society is powerless to assimilate: mobs, thewarrior, aristocratic and impoverished classes, different types of violent individualor at least those who refuse the rule (madmen, leaders, poets, etc.).50 Pointingto these things makes Bataille able to talk about the heterogeneous as apositive experience without falling back upon the homogeneous to understandthe heterogeneous and without viewing heterogeneity merely as the failure ornegation of homogeneity.51 Here one must avoid two opposite pitfalls. On the onehand, as pointed out by Bataille, heterogeneity is not simply the negation ofhomogeneity, and one should avoid thinking of heterogeneity and homogeneityin a dualistic fashion. Heterogeneity is, rather, the simultaneous condition ofpossibility and impossibility of homogeneity. On the other hand, one must alsoavoid Batailles more or less implicit references to an immediate and vitalisticaccess to the world of heterogeneity. Instead, heterogeneity is inherently linked torepresentation.A related question concerns the relationship between the category of

heterogeneity and the examples of it. One must avoid the temptation to reduceheterogeneity to Stallybrasss, Batailles or Laclaus examples or to any otherexample. Likewise, we must not think that these examples express an underlyingessence. The notion of heterogeneity, as I have used it here, is what Derrida calls anon-synonymous substitute52 to name different discursive aporia, which couldalso be referred to in Laclauian terms as, for instance, the differential remainder orthe tension between equivalence and difference. Heterogeneity, then, is neither apure concept nor simply a name. It is rearticulated each time it is applied inconcrete analyses. The explanatory force of the category of heterogeneity can, ofcourse, only be shown through its use in concrete analyses; however, it can atleast be used to pose a set of questions about the ideological nature of particulardiscourses.53

Social homogeneity, according to Bataille, may become dislocated by economiccontradictions, causing elements to split off from the homogeneous sectors ofsociety. These elements may then be articulated with already heterogeneouselements and form a new social formation. This is how Bataille accounts for theemergence of Fascism in the 1920 s and 1930 s.54 Despite Batailles tendency toreduce things to the economy in the last instance, from the perspective ofhegemony, it is interesting to note that the existence of heterogeneity is thecondition of possibility of hegemonic (re)articulation. What orthodox Marxismcannot explain, namely the emergence of the non-class ideology of Fascism, canbe accounted for in this way. Fascism thrives upon the heterogeneity that cannotbe accommodated within the relation between worker and capitalist. Likewise, inthe case of Louis Bonapartes successful articulation of the lumpenproletariat,

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the phenomenon of Louis Bonaparte is not reducible to the relation between theproletariat and the capitalist class.55 In both cases, the heterogeneous elements arearticulated into an anti-system antagonism, even if that articulation is nevercompletely successful. Significantly, the heterogeneous is not something whollyother as the example of the lumpenproletariat in Marxs discourse might suggest.It is discursive heterogeneity, part of the discourse, which can, then, berearticulated.To sum up, I suggest that the notion of heterogeneity is a non-synonymous

substitute for different discursive aporia and for different ways in which we canrefer to the limit of discursive objectivity. It stands in for other terms, yet it doesnot refer to some underlying principle or essence, which the other terms merelyreflect. One can use heterogeneity to refer to the differential remainder, to theinherent split in the signifier and to the undecidable relationship betweenequivalence and difference.56 Similarly, we can say that there is somethingheterogeneous in the relationship between performative and citation. In thesecases, we are dealing with the limit of objectivity. Yet, what is thus the limit tohegemonic articulation is simultaneously the condition of possibility ofhegemonic articulation. Without the unstable relationship between equivalenceand difference, for instance, no hegemonic articulation would be possible.In the terms of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, heterogeneity not only appears

in the undecidable relationship between equivalence and difference, but also in thefact that [t]he transition from the elements [i.e. any difference that is notdiscursively articulated] to the moments [i.e. differential positions . . .articulated within a discourse] is never entirely fulfilled.57 We are dealing herewith something that is both the condition of possibility and limit of hegemonicarticulation. Laclau and Mouffe use the term field of discursivity to refer to theinherent inability of any discourse to close itself as a totality:

a [discursive] system only exists as a partial limitation of a surplus of meaning whichsubverts it. Being inherent in any discursive formation, this surplus is the necessary terrainfor the constitution of every social practice. We will call it the field of discursivity . . . itdetermines at the same time the necessarily discursive character of any object, and theimpossibility of any given discourse to implement a final suture.58

The field of discursivity refers to the discursive constitution of objects, and tothe ultimate unfixity of moments within a discourse. Like heterogeneity, the fieldof discursivity is not something external to discourse in the sense of a region lyingbeyond the borders of the discourse. If the subversive character of the field ofdiscursivity was due to its location in a region beyond the limits of the discourse, itwould presuppose what it was supposed to subvert, namely the discourse as aninside with an outside. Rather, the field of discursivity is an inherent characteristicof any discourse, an internal limit to discourse. The field of discursivity is closelylinked with what Laclau and Mouffe refers to as the discursive exterior which isconstituted by other discourses.59 The field of discursivity refers to the ultimateunfixity of the moments within the discourse, whereas the discursive exteriorrefers to the competing discourses potentially able to rearticulate the discursive

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moments. The field of discursivity and the discursive exterior are, thus, two sidesof the same coin: without one, the other would hardly matter. In both cases we aredealing with a heterogeneity that cannot be discursively masteredit is theheterogeneity that, in Batailles analysis, makes the fascist articulation of theworkers possible (but also ultimately limits it). Indeed, we are dealing here withsomething undermining the very possibility of establishing a discursive insidewith clearly demarcated boundaries. Hegemony analysis then involves not onlythe identification of emerging and persisting discourses, but alsoas a way ofexamining the historical character of these discoursesthe identification of thefield of discursivity and the discursive outside. As with the lumpenproletariat inMarxs texts, heterogeneity does not disappear from a more or less stable andhegemonic discourse.If there is no discourse or hegemony without heterogeneity, there is no

hegemony analysis without attention to heterogeneity, that is, withoutconsideration of what is simultaneously the condition of possibility andimpossibility of hegemony. The identification of contingency and conditions ofimpossibility cannot simply be referred to as a specifically deconstructive move;rather, it is an inherent part of hegemony analysis. As a result, deconstruction andhegemony analysis cannot be distinguished in a dualistic fashion. Both areconcerned with the conditions of possibility and impossibility of texts ordiscourses, and the conditions of possibility cannot be clearly distinguished fromthe conditions of impossibility. Similarly, whatever heterogeneity there may be ina discourse, it is not simply a heterogeneity preceding its supersession with theestablishment of a hegemonic discourse and, for instance, an antagonistic frontier.Heterogeneity persists.

Conclusion: Deconstruction and hegemony, heterogeneity and antagonismand ideology

The introduction of the category of heterogeneity into the hegemonic approach toideology and discourse analysis has implications for the relationship betweenhegemony analysis and deconstruction, for the category of antagonism, and forideology analysis.Heterogeneity refers to the simultaneous condition of possibility and

impossibility of hegemonic articulations, including antagonism. Accordingly,hegemony analysis and deconstruction cannot be distinguished according todualisms of possibility/impossibility, closure/contingency, or decision/undecid-ability. Both hegemony analysis and deconstruction address both sides of thesedualisms, and they are not opposed and complementary discourse analyticalstrategies. The supposedly deconstructive move is an inherent part of hegemonyanalysis (and vice versa). It is at least possible to conceive of hegemony analysis inthis way, something that is more likely with the introduction of the categoryof heterogeneity, even if the theoretical toolsfor instance the fieldof discursivitywere already there in previous formulations of the theory ofhegemony. Indeed it could be argued that much of the argument made here about

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heterogeneity could also have been made starting from the formulation of thetheory of hegemony in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, albeit with somerearticulation of it. Although I do not think it necessary to go outside the theory ofhegemony in order to make the argument of this article, a similar, but not identical,argument may have been made starting from alternative theoretical sources. Onepossible source is Wittgensteins later philosophy;60 another source are theories ofabundance inspired by Nietzsche and Deleuze, for instance the work of WilliamConnolly.61

As for heterogeneity and antagonism, the conclusion is that, just as there areonly tendentially empty signifiers, so there are only tendentially antagonisticfrontiers. Pure antagonism is impossible, and we should rather speak of differentdegrees of antagonism. As a consequence, hegemony analysis can neither takeantagonism as the necessary outcome of ideology and identity formation, nor,should it be the case, as the end of the process. Hegemony analysis must examineif and how discursive heterogeneity is articulated into antagonism, but also theheterogeneity created through the articulation of antagonism. This suggests thathegemony is not necessarily linked to antagonism, even in its tendential forms.Not only is Fig. 1 in need of qualification, it may not be the whole story either. Itmay well be the case that (relative) antagonism is restricted to particularideologies, such as populism, which, in Laclaus work, is associated withequivalence, empty signifiers and antagonism.62 However, the theory ofhegemony may be able to cover non-antagonistic cases by also focusing onrelations of difference as a way of constructing hegemonic discourses.63

The implications for the analysis of ideology have already been hinted at above.If discursive closure is ultimately impossible, if there is always somethingheterogeneous, then the misrecognition of this and the attempt to conceal it can besaid to be ideological. Here, in the words of Laclau, [t]he ideological would notconsist of the misrecognition of a positive essence, but exactly the opposite: itwould consist of the non-recognition . . . of the impossibility of ultimate closure.64

In this context, heterogeneity provides a point of entry for the analysis of theideological character of particular discourses. If ideology is identified as theattempt to conceal or exclude the heterogeneous, then ideology analysis taking thisperspective should seek to identify the heterogeneous elements that resist attemptsat closure as well as the various ways which agents deal with these elements. Forinstance, one might ask what are the strategies pursued by agents in the UnitedStates today in order to externalise and suppress what is termed unpatriotic andun-American.Here the notion of antagonism is central, although in a different way than

originally conceived by Laclau and Mouffe. Antagonism can be seen as one wayof suppressing and externalising heterogeneity. It can be seen as a way ofestablishing coherence and closure.65 As such, antagonism is ideological: it is astrategy to achieve closure and to suppress its ultimate impossibility. One couldargue that this is the case in the case of the War on Terror and in the discoursesanalysed by Barros and Castagnola (Peronism) and Bowman (Palestiniannationalism). This is especially so when the antagonism is naturalised, and the

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antagonistic frontier and the opposing camps are endowed with allegedly non-contingent characteristics. Here antagonism is part of a naturalisation of what areproperly speaking contingent phenomena, a naturalisation that makes thesephenomena appear to be beyond politics and hegemonic dis- and rearticulation.What we are dealing with here is what Michael Freeden, coming from a differentperspective, has called decontestation: the identities of the antagonistic camps aswell as the antagonistic frontier itself are decontested and, thereby, depoliticised.66

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Jason Glynos, Leonard Williams, Aletta Norval,Lars Tnder, Ernesto Laclau, Michael Freeden and two reviewers for the Journalof Political Ideologies for their comments on earlier versions of the argument.

Notes and references

1. E. Laclau and C. Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, 2ndedition (London: Verso, 2002), p. 105.

2. E. Laclau, New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time (London: Verso, 1990), p. 92; and E. Laclau, Thedeath and resurrection of the theory of ideology, Journal of Political Ideologies, 1 (1996), pp. 201220.

3. For Laclaus work, see Laclau andMouffe, op. cit., Ref. 1; Laclau,New Reflections, op. cit., Ref. 2; E. Laclau,Emancipation(s) (London: Verso, 1996); and J. Butler, E. Laclau and S. Zizek, Contingency, Hegemony,Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left (London: Verso, 2000). On the intellectual influences ofLaclau and the Essex School, see J. Townshend, Laclau and Mouffes hegemonic project: The story sofar, Political Studies, 52 (2004), pp. 269288; A. Norval, Theorising hegemony: between deconstructionand psychoanalysis, in L. Tnder and L. Thomassen (eds), Radical Democracy: Politics betweenAbundance and Lack (Manchester: Manchester University Press, forthcoming 2005); and Y. Stavrakakis,Lacan and the Political (London: Routledge, 1999). For discourse analytical studies using Laclaus theory ofhegemony, see the contributions in E. Laclau (ed.), The Making of Political Identities (London: Verso,1994); D. Howarth, A. J. Norval and Y. Stavrakakis (eds), Discourse Theory and Political Analysis:Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000); D. Howarthand J. Torfing (eds), Discourse Theory in European Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004); and F. Panizza(ed.), Populism and the Mirror of Democracy (London: Verso, 2005).

4. For instance, A. Norval, Deconstructing Apartheid Discourse (London: Verso, 1996); and D. Howarth,Complexities of identity/difference: Black consciousness ideology in South Africa, Journal of PoliticalIdeologies, 2 (1987), pp. 5178.

5. For this view, see E. Laclau, Deconstruction, Pragmatism, Hegemony, in C. Mouffe, Deconstruction andPragmatism (London: Verso, 1996), pp. 4760; E. Laclau, Discourse, in R. E. Goodin and P. Pettit (eds), ACompanion to Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), p. 435; Laclau,Emancipation(s), op. cit., Ref. 3, pp. 78f, 90; Laclau and Mouffe, op. cit., Ref. 1, p. xi; J. Torfing, NewTheories of Discourse: Laclau, Mouffe and Zizek (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), pp. 102f; N.AkerstrmAndersen, Discursive Analytical Strategies: Understanding Foucault, Koselleck, Laclau, Luhmann (Bristol:The Policy Press, 2003), pp. 5662; N.Akerstrm Andersen, Political Administration, in Howarth andTorfing, op. cit., Ref. 3, pp. 142145; and L. Phillips and M. Winther Jrgensen, Discourse Analysis asTheory and Method (London: Sage, 2002), pp. 48f. For a good use of a combination of deconstruction andLaclauian discourse theory, see Vicki Squire, Integration with diversity in modern Britain: New Labouron nationality, immigration and asylum, Journal of Political Ideologies, 10 (2005), pp. 5174.

6. A. Norval, Hegemony after deconstruction: the consequences of undecidability, Journal of PoliticalIdeologies, 9 (2004), pp. 139157.

7. E. Laclau, Paul de Man and the politics of rhetoric, Pretexts 7:2 (1998), pp. 154 and 156; E. Laclau,Democracy between autonomy and heteronomy, in O. Enwezor et al. (eds), Democracy Unrealized:Documenta11_Platform1 (Ostfieldern-Ruit: Hatje Cantz, 2002), p. 381; C. Pessoa et al., Theory,democracy, and the Left: an interview with Ernesto Laclau, Umbr@, (2001), pp. 9f; and E. Laclau,

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On Populist Reason (London: Verso, 2005), Chapter 5. Heterogeneity is used in a similar fashion inJ. Derrida, Positions, 2nd edition (London: Continuum, 2002).

8. Laclau and Mouffe, op. cit., Ref. 1, pp. 111f. In New Reflections (Laclau, op. cit., Ref. 2, pp. 17f, 172f),Laclau introduced the deconstructive notion of constitutive outside from H. Staten, Wittgenstein andDerrida (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1984), pp. 1618, 24. On Statens and Laclaus uses ofthis notion, see L. Thomassen, In/exclusions: towards a radical democratic approach to exclusion, inTnder and Thomassen, op. cit., Ref. 3.

9. Laclau, Deconstruction, Pragmatism, Hegemony, op. cit., Ref. 5, pp. 4760; Laclau, Emancipation(s),op. cit., Ref. 3, pp. 78f, 90; and Laclau and Mouffe, op. cit., Ref. 1, p. xi. Yet, Laclau also rightlyacknowledges that Derrida himself theorises the decision, cf. Laclau, Deconstruction, Pragmatism,Hegemony, op. cit., Ref. 5, p. 48.

10. A. J. Norval, Hegemony after deconstruction: the consequences of undecidability, Journal of PoliticalIdeologies, 9 (2004), pp. 139157.

11. Torfing, op. cit., Ref. 5, pp. 102f, 300;Akerstrm Andersen, Discursive Analytical Strategies, op. cit., Ref. 5,pp. 5662; and Phillips and Jrgensen, op. cit., Ref. 5, pp. 48f. When distinguishing deconstruction fromhegemony analysis, they all make reference to Laclaus distinctions between deconstruction and hegemonyand between undecidability and the decision. For a similar view of the complementarity of deconstructionand hegemony in relation to politics, see S. Critchley, On Derridas Specters of Marx, Philosophy & SocialCriticism, 21:3 (1995), p. 21.

12. Torfing, op. cit., Ref. 5, p. 103.13. Ibid. Here I am assuming that the distinction between hegemony and deconstruction is conceptual and not

just methodological or heuristic.14. R. Gasche, The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection (Cambridge, MA Harvard

University Press, 1986).15. E. Laclau, Constructing Universality, in Butler, Laclau and Zizek, op. cit., Ref. 3, p. 303. In Laclaus

original model, the equivalence is represented by , but it is clear from the text that it should be; , that isequivalence and not identity.

16. For a good example of the use of Laclaus theory for the analysis of populist ideology and a discussion of thispoint, see Y. Stavrakakis, Antinomies of formalism: Laclaus theory of populism and the lessons fromreligious populism in Greece, Journal of Political Ideologies, 9 (2004), pp. 253267.

17. E. Laclau, On the names of God, in S. Golding (ed.), The Eight Technologies of Otherness (London:Routledge, 1997), p. 262.

18. Laclau, op. cit., Ref. 15, p. 305. See also E. Laclau, Glimpsing the future, in S. Critchley and O. Marchart(eds), Laclau: A Critical Reader (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 281; and Laclau, The death and resurrectionof the theory of ideology, op. cit., Ref. 2, p. 219. In the model, this is represented by the division (split) of theelements in the chain.

19. E. Laclau, Identity and Hegemony: The Role of Universality in the Constitution of Political Logics, inButler, Laclau and Zizek, op. cit., Ref. 3, p. 70.

20. Laclau and Mouffe, op. cit., Ref. 1, p. 129.21. Laclau refers to the empty signifier as a name as opposed to a concept or description, cf. E. Laclau, The uses

of equality, in Critchley and Marchart, op. cit., Ref. 18, pp. 342344.22. J. Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, trans. A. Bass (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1982), pp. 307330.23. Laclau, Emancipation(s), op. cit., Ref. 3, pp. 4143; and E. Laclau, Structure, History and the Political,

in Butler, Laclau and Zizek, op. cit., Ref. 3, p. 208.24. G. Bowman, A Country of Words: Conceiving the Palestinian Nation from the Position of Exile,

in Laclau, The Making of Political Identities, op. cit., Ref. 3, p. 142.25. For good examples of similar analyses, see A. J. Norval, Social Ambiguity and the Crisis of Apartheid,

in Laclau, The Making of Political Identities, op. cit., Ref. 3, Chapter 5; D. Howarth, The difficultemergence of a democratic imaginary: Black Consciousness and non-racial democracy in South Africa, inHowarth, Norval and Stavrakakis, op. cit., Ref. 3, pp. 175177; and N. B. Celik, The constitution anddissolution of the Kemalist imaginary, in Howarth, Norval and Stavrakakis, op. cit., Ref. 3, pp. 200f.

26. See, for instance, Bowman, op. cit., Ref. 24, p. 139. For an analogous problem in an analysis of post-warItalian anti-Fascism, see J. Martin, Ideology and antagonism in modern Italy: poststructuralist reflections,Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 8:2 (2005), p. 154.

27. See, for instance, Bowman, op. cit., Ref. 24, p. 164.28. Laclau and Mouffe, op. cit., Ref. 1, p. 125.29. Laclau and Mouffe, Ibid, p. 126.30. My account of Laclaus theory of hegemony enjoys the comfort of hindsight as the notion of antagonism

is already present in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (1985), whereas the notion of the empty signifier is

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introduced in Emancipation(s) (1996). This is not to suggest that one can understand Laclaus work as theteleological unfolding of his present position. As is evident, Laclaus texts are themselves heterogeneous.On this, see L. Thomassen, Reading radical democracy: a reply to Clive Barnett, Political Geography,24 (2005), pp. 631639.

31. Laclau and Mouffe, op. cit., Ref. 1, p. 122 (also p. 146).32. S. Zizek, Beyond Discourse-Analysis, in Laclau, New Reflections, op. cit., Ref. 2, pp. 251254.33. Laclau, New Reflections, op. cit., Ref. 2, pp. 3941, 44f, 65; Laclau, The death and resurrection of the theory

of ideology, op. cit., Ref. 2, pp. 203ff; Laclau in L. Worsham and G. A. Olson, Hegemony and the Future ofDemocracy: Ernesto Laclaus Political Philosophy, in L. Worsham and G. Olson (eds), Race, Rhetoric andthe Postcolonial (Albany: SUNY Press, 1998), p. 137; and Pessoa et al., op. cit., Ref. 7, p. 15. At times,Laclau and his commentators continue to treat antagonism as the limit of objectivity, for instance, Laclau,op. cit., Ref. 19, pp. 72 and 77. Dislocation may also be said to be a discursive construction because itdepends on the discursive construction of what is dislocated and of what dislocates, cf. Laclau, op. cit.,Ref. 18, p. 319; and T. B. Dyrberg, The Circular Structure of Power: Politics, Identity, Community (London:Verso, 1997), pp. 146148.

34. N. Widder, Whats lacking in the lack: a comment on the virtual, Angelaki, 5 (3) (2000), p. 133 (note 23).For the argument that we need to distinguish dislocation and antagonism and understand the latter as merelyone way among others to construct identities, see also A. J. Norval, Frontiers in question, Filozofski vestnik,18:2 (1997), pp. 5175; and U. Staheli, Competing figures of the limit: dispersion, transgression,antagonism, and indifference, in Critchley and Marchart, op. cit., Ref. 18, pp. 234239.

35. Laclau, op. cit., Ref. 18, pp. 318f.36. Bowman, op. cit., Ref. 24, p. 156.37. Bowman, Ibid, pp. 143, 155.38. In Social Ambiguity and the Crisis of Apartheid (Norval, op. cit., Ref. 25, pp. 121f, 127, 131f), Aletta

Norval does to the South African apartheid regime what Bowman does to the imagined Palestinian nation.Norval shows how, despite a seemingly clear antagonistic frontier dividing South African society into twocamps, there are, in fact, criss-crossing frontiers. These competing frontiers not only undermine the stabilityand clarity of any particular frontier. When suppressed, they return as discursive heterogeneity or, inNorvals terms, ambiguity and indeterminate elements. Similarly, in the context of post-war Italy, JamesMartin (op. cit., Ref. 26, pp. 154, 156158) shows how the antagonism between fascism and anti-Fascismcannot suppress all potential divisions within the anti-Fascist camp because the meanings of fascism andanti-Fascism cannot be completely fixed.

39. See Martin, op. cit., Ref. 26, for a similar position.40. S. Barros and G. Castagnola, The political frontiers of the social: Argentine politics after Peronist populism

(19551973), in Howarth, Norval, and Stavrakakis, op. cit., Ref. 3, p. 35.41. Barros and Castagnola, Ibid. For Laclau and Mouffes formulation of the same, see Laclau and Mouffe,

op. cit., Ref. 1, p. 136.42. Laclau, Paul de Man and the politics of rhetoric, op. cit., Ref. 7, p. 156 (also p. 154); E. Laclau, Politics,

polemics and academics: an interview by Paul Bowman, Parallax, 5:2 (1999), p. 103; and E. Laclau,Can immanence explain social struggles?, Diacritics, 31:4 (2001), p. 5. For an ambiguous characterisationof heterogeneity, see Laclau, Democracy between autonomy and heteronomy, op. cit., Ref. 7, p. 382.

43. Pessoa et al., op. cit., Ref. 7, pp. 9f; Laclau, Democracy between autonomy and heteronomy, op. cit., Ref. 7,pp. 381f; and Laclau, On Populist Reason, op. cit., Ref. 7, Chapter 5.

44. P. Stallybrass, Marx and heterogeneity: thinking the Lumpenproletariat, Representations, 31 (1991),pp. 6995.

45. Laclau, Democracy between Autonomy and Heteronomy, op. cit., Ref. 7, p. 381.46. G. Bataille, The Psychological Structure of Fascism, trans. F. Botting and S. Wilson, in F. Botting and

S. Wilson (eds), The Bataille Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), p. 122. It is tendential homogeneity,though. For Laclaus use of Bataille, see Laclau, On Populist Reason, op. cit., Ref. 7, Chapter 5.

47. Bataille, op. cit., Ref. 46, p. 123.48. Bataille, Ibid, p. 126 (also pp. 125 and 146 [note 3]).49. Bataille, Ibid, p. 126.50. Bataille, Ibid, p. 127. In addition to these things, Bataille refers to the unconscious, the sacred, and affect

(pp. 126128).51. Bataille, Ibid., pp. 126f.52. Derrida, op. cit., Ref. 22, pp. 12, 25f.53. On the difficulties of a post-structuralist approach to explanation, see the forthcoming work of Jason Glynos

and David Howarth.54. Bataille, Ibid., pp. 125, 140, 142.

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55. Stallybrass, op. cit., Ref. 44, pp. 79ff.56. Heterogeneity can also express the irreducible gap between what is represented (the absent fullness of the

community, an absent universality) and the means of representation (a particular signifier). It referssimultaneously to a lack (the particular signifier is never quite up to the task) and an excess (the emptysignifier is only tendentially empty because it contains too much difference).

57. Laclau and Mouffe, op. cit., Ref. 1, pp. 105, 110.58. Laclau and Mouffe, Ibid, p. 111.59. Laclau and Mouffe, Ibid, pp. 111 and 146 (note 20).60. M. Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

1996), pp. 6091; and Norval, op. cit., Ref. 34.61. W. E. Connolly, Review essay: twilight of the idols, Philosophy and Social Criticism, 21:3 (1995),

pp. 130136; Widder, op. cit., Ref. 34.62. See Stavrakakis, op. cit., Ref. 16.63. Norval, op. cit., Ref. 34.64. Laclau, New Reflections, op. cit., Ref. 2, p. 92. See also Laclau, The death and resurrection of the theory of

ideology, op. cit., Ref. 2, pp. 203207.65. Cf. also Martin, op. cit., Ref. 26, pp. 152 and 154.66. Freeden, op. cit., Ref. 60, p. 76. This is why I have suggested that a radical democratic approach to inclusion

and exclusion needs to go beyond the notion of antagonism, cf. Thomassen, op. cit., Ref. 8.

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