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Thoughts on Space Acquisition

Major General (ret). Thomas TaverneyAFCEA Luncheon

16 July 2015

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The Worldwide Landscape of Space Has Changed

Missions Need to be Adapted to Current/Future Landscape

High Commercial Bus Availability and desire for

rideshares

Rapid Technology

Improvements

Faster Commercial Production Cycles

Cyber threats and necessary protections

Declining Budgets

Changing landscape in

Launch

New,In-Space Threats

• Technology obsolescence for systems conceived in the 80-90’s– Expensive, specialized buses - Rapid technology evolution– High costs mean no spares - Slower technology adoption– Maximum capability per launch/cost - Ill adapted for today's threats

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Overview“We currently have a significant asymmetric advantage in space”

• Our asymmetric advantage is at risk because:– PHYSICAL CHALLENGES- Space is a congested, contested and competitive environment,

posing both intentional and unintentional, reversable and non-reversable threats– FISCAL CONSTRAINTS- Cost of space systems makes large constellations unaffordable.

Current process for WHAT we buy and HOW we buy it also leads to long schedules building complex space systems.

– EVOLVING SPACE TECHNOLOGY- Technology is turning over rapidly, and our adversaries are taking advantage

– TYRANNY OF THE PoR- During acquisition problems of the 90’s and 20000’s we properly put “Laser Focus” on execution. We stopped thinking about and beginning development of systems for the future. We need to now move out to assure we have a strong future

• Evolution vs. implementing new technology– Should we evolve the currently being deployed systems, or should we move to new

technology????? No formulaic answer, must be answered mission by mission» EVOLUTION- Ability of the current or evolved technology to handle evolving threats.

Additionally, technology obsolescence a real challenge. » NEW DEVELOPMENT- The new technology may be relatively mature by the time we begin

development, where it is not we should drive down risks with on orbit demonstrations

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A new direction for Space

General Hyten clearly set the new direction for Space Systems acquisition • “We must Win Today’s Fight and to Prepare for Tomorrow’s Fight",

putting equal weight on preparing for the systems of the future as we have on executing current programs.

• "We also have a sacred responsibility to deliver space effects to Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and Airmen wherever they are, all the time" emphasizing that these new systems must be resilient to be available all of the time.

• "Over the past several years what has changed is the fiscal environment, budgets are tighter and we have had to learn to work within that constraint" putting emphasis on the affordability of future systems. For this future we need to have newer technology to continue to dominate the space regime, and we have to do this more rapidly, and at lower cost than we have done in the past.

“To do this, we have to be smart and adjust the policies that prepared us to field our recent generation of space systems. Not just how we buy systems, but likely requires a fundamental change in what we buy.”

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PATH TO GET THERE

Mission Requirements

Mission Threats

Affordability

Mission Capabilities

Availability

AnalysisOf Alternatives

Demonstrations

Current Systems

• Evolved vs. New Technology

• Development Plans

• Transition Plans

Roadmaps

Future Architectures and Systems

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CAPABILITIES---THE BASICS

• What Mission capabilities do you need? What are critical characteristics?

• Who needs or can use the data? Do we need to share?

• Where does the data need to go---how quickly (sensor to shooter)?

• What are the threats to success? How do we design to handle these? Are these evolving with technology advancement?

• Do we need to evolve current systems or develop new systems

• Rapid “Technology Insertion-tech refresh”

• Demonstrations to reduce Operational and Developmental risk- Technical Demonstrations to drive down technical risk

- Operational demonstrations (when necessary) to drive down unique operational risks

- Exploit residual capabilities of these systems once technology is proven

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Getting capabilities to users- The Box We Are In

• In the previous generation of systems, aggregated mission requirements drove us to large, complex, high tech, expensive systems

• These large, complex, high tech, expensive systems drove us to:– High reliability components that drove cost and schedule They better be

reliable since we can’t afford as many of them– Long, expensive and robust testing to assure quality of the launched

system further– Long development times and desired cost efficiencies reinforce the trend

of building complex, multi-use systems– Long lifetimes keeps older technologies on orbit driving vendors to

support these older technologies and resolve technology obsolescence– We have spent the past 15-20 years driving cost efficiencies into

contractors processes and in OH reduction—there is not much meat left on that bone

– The costs of systems and lack of spares drove us to highly reliable, ANDexpensive launch vehicles, and launch assurance campaigns

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Evolving Space Threats- Driving Technology Insertion

• When we discuss evolving current systems vs. developing new systems---we must take future threats into consideration

• The U.S. military is now completely focused on fighting smaller regional wars in the Middle East and elsewhere. As a result, modernizing our systems has been virtually ignored.

• On the other hand, the Russian and Chinese militaries are in the midst of significant modernization programs, and they are currently developing some incredibly impressive offensive and defensive next-generation weapons that are designed to be used in a future war with the United States.

– The Russians are building and deploying 21st century weapons such as the Sarmat (ICBM), the Borey Class Nuclear Submarine, the Bulava Submarine-Launched Nuclear Missile , and the Barguzin Strategic Missile Train.

– The Chinese already have a threat to the US fleet in the DF 21 that is simply scary. China has also tested its hypersonic strike vehicle Wu-14 at least four times since January 2014, seriously alarming the Pentagon, as the device may reportedly neutralize the US anti-missile shield.

– The Russians announced the Krasuha-4, a ground based weapon that can jam selected frequencies and damage electronics

• The rest of the world is also rapidly advancing- no longer a game for superpowers only

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ASSURED AVAILABILITY

“We also have a sacred responsibility to deliver space effects to Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and Airmen wherever they are, all the time” General John Hyten

Assured availability requires a mix of techniques to provide continued capability being provided by the systems on orbit. We can build in survivability features, provide architectures that are resilient, and have the capability to rapidly recover of both survivability and resilience fail. We need a combination of all three to assure availability to our critical users.• Survivability

- Hardening- Cyber/IA defense- Protection (OCS/DCS underpinned by SSA)

• Resiliency- Distribution- Proliferation- Disaggregation- Maneuver- Stealth/Ambiguity

• Replenishment/reconstitution- On-orbit spares- Ground spares- low cost access to space

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Assured Availability Continuum

ASSURED AVAILABILITY GOALS“Capability Recovery Integral: Measure performance through attack and recovery”

•Unintentional: Debris collision, radiation, sun activity

• Intentional/reversable: Jamming, dazzling

• Intentional/irreverable: Impact, laser damage, disable power systems and/or electronics

ASSURED AVAILABILITY THREATS

Complicate Adversary’s Decision Calculus

(redundancy, proliferation, maneuver,Stealth, ambiguity, deception)

Delay Service-Lossfrom Attack

(Spares, reconstitution, multi functional systems)

Operate Through Attack(Redundancy, survivability, proliferation)

Increasing Cost

Availability can be Analyzed and MeasuredUse Survivability, Resilience, and ability to Reconstitute/Recover

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Affordability Problem“Despite technical, cost, and schedule challenges….the last generation

of systems we built were terrific. However, continuing on the path we are on is simply unaffordable. How can improved acquisition of space systems contribute to maintaining our asymmetric advantage in space, in a more complex threat environment, but at a lower cost”

• What are the issues that we face with space acquisition today? – Due to long development times requirements evolve and are therefore are unstable and frequently unaffordable– Space acquisition budgets have been significantly reduced (about 40 %).– Current systems can take more than 10 years to build before getting on-orbit. This provides workforce stability

BUT also has technology obsolescence challenges.– Industrial base faces significant challenges associated with producing large expensive systems in low volumes.

[It’s not just a matter of “old technology”].– Expensive systems drive longer life times Assuring that we are flying current systems for a longer time. – Cost becomes astronomical and systems are unaffordable in any kind of quantity, so we cannot afford spares.– The resulting cost reality constraints on architectures may cause single point failures – too many eggs in too few

baskets.– Cost of launch is a significant cost driver Large expensive satellites demand large, HIGHLY reliable (and

expensive) launch vehicles! – Contractors have been in a constant cost reduction push for almost 20 years, and have driven significant cost

savings. Not likely a lot more meat on the bone for efficiencies.– So, it is more about changing what we buy, than how we buy it.

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It Is Not A Space Acquisition Problem ~It Is Just Current Acquisition

Average number of years in development (from technology-development request for proposal until delivery of the first production aircraft)

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Some potential approaches to AFFORDABILITY

I. What we buy• Architectural choices

- Eliminate technology obsolescence- Shorter life for more rapid technology insertion- Shorter development times

• Leverage Commercial– Commercial buses off commercial production lines– Commercial rideshares– Open/commercial ground systems

II. How we buy it• Acquisition practices

– Commercial like processes/oversight– Build in technology insertion– Class B/C/D acquisitions– Shorter life/lower cost payloads– Single purpose payloads – ORS like processes and waivers

• Risk reduction– Technical demos to eliminate technical risks– Operational demos to eliminate data throughput issues– Commercial/open ground systems

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We Have Done it Before

1960’s 1970’s 1980’sProgram ATP to Launch Program ATP to Launch Program ATP to Launch

1st DMSP 10 months DSP 5R 105 months DSP SV14 88 months

1st DSP 42 months DMSP SD1 48 months NATO IIID 46 months

1st 110 42 months DSCS 3A 65 months FLTSATCOM SV6

48 months

1st 467 36 months NATO III 38 months GPS II SV1B 90 months

DSCS II 30 months FLTSATCOM 1

62 months GPS IIA SV23 78 months

GPS B1 42 months MILSTAR 124 months

Dev

elop

men

t Tim

e(m

onth

s)

1960’s 1970’s 1980’s

Development Times Have Gone Up Steadily Over Time

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We did it before—Can we do it again????

• Failure was tolerated!• Lower launch reliability was accepted, because we had

lower reliability launch systems.• Schedule was the primary KPP---Requirements and

costs were softly defined (schedule & mission were drivers).

• Getting some capability on-orbit was more important that getting full-up capability on-orbit.

• Program Managers had authority to make decisions (i.e. drop requirements and make design trades to meet cost and schedule) without extensive review.

DMSP, CORONA, DSP, 110, 467, etc.

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We Can Do It Today--using less stringent practices

17.0

25.6

29.0

35.2

35.9

37.644.7

51.6

11.9

16.4

28.1

32.0

34.9

35.4

37.6

38.3

39.3

39.6

47.9

51.552.7

53.4

83.0

92.1

92.1

93.4

100.0

0.0 20.0 40.0 60.0 80.0 100.0 120.0

RADCAL

STEP 2

Stacksat POGS

APEX

MSTI 1

MSTI 3

Step 0

Lewis

STEP-4

TSX-5

FORTE

TRMM

ARGOS

EOS Terra

Months

Non Optical Payloads

Optical Payloads4 Years

Experimental Vehicles have been Developed within 4 Years.Source: Aerospace Historical Space Vehicle Development Timelines Report. 4 Mar 2003

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Changing our Risk Profile we can develop systems in 2-4 Years

• DARPA, ORS, AFRL, and in some cases SMC have each successfully pulled off short schedule, cost effective developments of R&D capability

• We should reexamine our space architectures in the context of overall mission architectures. We should pursue architectures that maximize mission accomplishment per dollar within the scenarios that the systems are required to operate (i.e., consider issues of survivability) Consider the following:

– Look at satellite life in a different way – If we can keep cost down» Look at a mix of shorter lived satellites with longer lived satellites-Increasing constellation sizes, limits

vulnerability, and increases robustness. Provides both resiliency and the ability to accomplish technology insertion.

» For shorter lived satellites with 1-3 year lives, have new technologies inserted into replacement systems when ready and utilize existing buses and existing ground systems----payload centric development.

» Assure flexibility with on board programming ability.» Examine constellations of extremely capable satellites and massive downlinks, and consider moving all the

processing to ground stations where continuous improvement can be implemented [this was a recommendation made to NRO SIGINT by an advisory board].

– To the maximum extent feasible, use commercial buses…purchased commercially.– Look at hosting payloads on commercial satellites at a lower cost than building a

dedicated satellite (and taking launch costs off the table).– For the smaller, less reliable special purpose satellites, accept lower reliability launch – To

have a larger more survivable/affordable constellation, we need these smaller, single purpose payloads.

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Affordability- How do we get there?• Deploy disaggregated solutions with

constellation mixes determined on a mission-by-mission basis

• Assess whether to evolve existing technology, or develop new technology

• Allow shorter lifetimes:

– more rapid technology insertion

– increases resilience by increased numbers

– shorter production cycles, higher production rates

– next payload available sooner

– Predictable/consistent production for industrial base

health

– technology developments as risk reducers for future

development

• Manage risk differently - Fly on commercial buses, rideshares, and develop Class

B, C, D systemsEn

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Shor

ter L

ifetim

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ViciousCircle of

Space Acquisition

Commercial satellites Hosted

payloads Class B, C, D

developments

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Thoughts for moving forward

Need for significant “business model” changeWE MUST:• Continue to provide leading edge space capabilities to our warfighters.

• Provide these capabilities in financially challenged environments.

• Keep our aerospace industry and its critical vendors healthy and able to respond to vital space needs.

HOWEVER:

• Merely trying to find efficiencies with existing acquisition processes is probably inadequate to achieve

the savings we will need to find.

• In the process of looking at solutions, can we find ways to be more responsive to warfighter needs.

• We should have approaches that allow us to insert cutting edge technology into replacement systems

when ready (we do not want a “fair fight” for our kids).

• Develop strategies to not only lower cost of systems while increasing responsiveness, but also assure

availability of critical capabilities in a congested, contested, and competitive battlespace.

• Cost and schedule as KPP’s becoming essential.

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Summary and Conclusions

We must retain our asymmetric advantage in space while combating the challenges of:

• Physical threats - incorporation of new technical approaches- Adversaries are increasing in number as space technology continues to become more affordable

and accessible.- To retain our advantage we must stay ahead of the technology curve—and get technology to orbit

faster than we do today.

• Fiscal threats of budget reductions- Trends toward unaffordable cost with shrinking budgets- Supplier base for highly capable, long lived major systems is difficult/expensive to sustain.- Change Culture and Processes to enable Low Cost Small Sats and Rideshare/Hosted Payloads

Leverage the commercial space business—both capability augmentation and rideshares. - Procure and develop low cost portion of the constellation with new acquisition paradigms- A mixed constellation approach can create a market for lower cost / lower reliability launch systems

to supplement the current high reliability / high cost launch systems. - Air platforms seem to hold a pretty level funding plateau because we sequentially field new fighters,

bombers, tankers, cargo a/c. Seems like all of our space systems are coming due for renewal at the same time. This approach could fix this issue with a notional fielding sequence for comm/PNT/wx/Imint/MW/SIGINT/etc., with a steady planned flow, with cost and schedule fixed.

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Summary and Conclusions (cont’d)

• Availability through Resiliency, Survivability, and Rapid Reconstitution

- Trends towards ever increasing time to get fielded systems.- Robustness in the face of major external threats and environmental factors (e.g.,

arms control, deterrence, global growth in space technologies and systems, economic dependencies etc.).

- Small constellations are inherently more vulnerable to attack and natural threats/phenomena.

- Pick Selected Missions Where Rideshare/Hosted P/L’s Make Sense- Develop Flexible Ground Station & Ground Station Processing to Optimize

Flexibility on the Ground.

• Tyranny of the PoR/evolution vs. revolution- Examine the ability to evolve vs the need to develop on a mission by mission

basis.- We MUST invest in the future.- Assure future architectures meet future threats.