Book? CHAPTER ONE After these considerations, we must make another beginning and say 1145a15 that there are three forms of things pertaining to character that must be avoided: vice, lack of self-restraint, and brutishness.1 The contraries of two of these are clear: the one contrary we call virtue, the other self-restraint. But as for the contrary ofbrutishness, it would be especially fit-ting to speak of the virtue that is beyond us, a certain heroic and divine 20 virtue-just as Homer has written, when Priam says about Hector that he was exceedingly good, "and he did not seem to be a child of any mortal man, but of a god."2 As a result, if (as people assert) human beings become gods through an excess of virtue, it is clear that something of this sort would be the characteristic opposite to brutishness. For just as a brute an- 2s imal has neither vice nor virtue, so also a god does not either; rather, the characteristic belonging to a god is more honorable than virtue and that belonging to a brute animal is of some genus other than vice. And since it is rare for a man to be divine-just as the Laconians3 are accustomed to addressing someone, when they greatly admire him, as "a divine man:'4 they assert-so also the brutish person is rare among human beings, he 30 being present among barbarians especially, though some cases also arise through both diseases and defects. And such is the bad name, "brutish," we give to those human beings who exceed the rest in vice. But some men-1 Or, "savagery:' The term (theriotes) is related to the word elsewhere translated as "beast" or "brute animal" (therion). 2 Homer, Iliad 24.258. 3 That is, the Spartans. 4 Aristotle's quotation contains the Laconian variant of the word for "divine" (seios instead of theios ). Consider also Plato, Meno 99d7-9 and Laws 626c4-5 BOOK 7, CHAPTER 1 tion of this sort of disposition must be made later; what concerns vice was 35 spoken ofbefore. But as for what concerns lack of self-restraint, softness, and delicacy, this must be spoken about, as well as what concerns self-restraint and steadfastness. For it must not be assumed either that each of the two [-that is, self-restraint or lack of self-restraint, steadfastness or softness-] 1145b concerns the same characteristics as virtue and corruption respectively or that each is of a different genus. But, just as in other cases as well, after positing the phenomena5 and first raising perplexities about them, one 5 ought in this way to bring to light especially all the received opinions about these experiences6 or, failing that, the greatest number and most au-thoritative of those opinions. For if the vexing questions7 are solved and the received opinions remain standing as well, then the matter would be adequately explained. Now, self-restraint and steadfastness seem to fall among things se-rious and praiseworthy, lack of self-restraint as well as softness among 10 things base and blameworthy; the self-restrained person seems to be the same as someone who abides by his calculation, the person lacking self-restraint to be one who departs from his calculation. Moreover, the person lacking self-restraint, knowing that what he does is base, acts on account of his passion, while the self-restrained person, knowing that his desires are base, does not follow them, on account of his rea-son. And [though it is said that] the moderate person is self-restrained 15 and steadfast, some assert that a person of this latter sort is moderate in all respects, while others deny it. And some assert that the licentious person lacks self-restraint and the person lacking self-restraint is licen-tious, without discriminating between them, but others assert that they are different. And sometimes people deny that the prudent person can be without self-restraint, whereas sometimes they assert that some who are prudent and terrifically clever do lack self-restraint. Further, people 20 are said to lack self-restraint also in point of spiritedness, honor, and gain. These, then, are the statements made on the subject. 5 Literally, "the things that appear" or "come to sight" (ta phainomena). 6 Or, "the passions" ( ta pathe). "The word pathos is loosely used here of all states of soul .... Really they are hexeis [characteristics]" (Burnet). 7 The word (dyschere) can also mean disagreeable or offensive things. BOOK 7 CHAPTER 2 [ 137 CHAPTER TWO But someone might be perplexed as to how a person, though he forms a correct conviction,8 lacks self-restraint. Some, then, deny that a per-son who has scientific knowledge can lack self-restraint; for it would be a terrible thing, when science is present (as Socrates used to suppose), for something else to overpower it and drag it around as if it were a slave.9 For Socrates used to battle against this argument in its entirety, on the 25 grounds that no such thing as lack of self-restraint exists: nobody acts contrary to what is best while supposing that he is so acting; he acts in-stead through ignorance. This argument, then, is in contention with the phenomena that come plainly to sight, and one must investigate, if in fact this experience occurs through ignorance, what the character of the ignorance is. For it is manifest 30 that before he is in the grip of passion, a person who lacks self-restraint does not think, at least, [that he ought to act as he then proceeds to act]. And there are some people who concede this in certain respects but not in oth-ers: they agree, on the one hand, that there is nothing superior to science, but they disagree, on the other, that nobody acts contrary to the opinion held of what is better; and it is for this reason they assert that the person lacking self-restraint is overpowered by pleasures because he possesses not 35 science but opinion. But if in fact it is opinion and not science at issue, and a person's conviction that resists is not a strong but a mild one, as in the case 1146a of people given to hesitation, there is sympathy for someone who does not stick by those convictions in the face of strong pleasures. Yet for corruption there is no sympathy, nor is there for anything else blameworthy. Is it, therefore, prudence that resists [pleasures]? For prudence is a very 5 strong thing. This contention, however, is strange. For the same person will be simultaneously prudent and lacking self-restraint, and not one person would assert that it belongs to a prudent human being to do vol-untarily the basest things. In addition to these points, it has been shown before that the prudent person is skilled in action, at least-for he is someone concerned with ultimate particular things-and possesses the other virtues. Further, if a person is self-restrained in having strong and base desires, 10 8 Or, "supposition" (hypolambanon). 9 Consider Plato, Protagoras 352a8-c7. 138] BOOK 7, CHAPTER 2 the moderate person will not be self-restrained or the self-restrained moderate. For it does not belong to a moderate person to have either ex-cessive or base desires. And yet the self-restrained person must have such desires, for if his desires are worthy, 10 the characteristic that prevents him from following them will be base, with the result that not all self-restraint 15 will be of serious worth. But ifhis desires are weak and not base, it is noth-ing august to resist them, and if they are base and weak, it is nothing great to do so. Further, if self-restraint renders a person apt to abide by every opinion, it is base-for example, if it prompts someone to abide by even a false opinion. And iflack of self-restraint renders a person apt to depart from every opinion, some lack of self-restraint will be of serious worth, as in the 20 example ofNeoptolemus in Sophocles's Philoctetes. For he is praisewor-thy because he does not abide by what he was persuaded of by Odysseus, on account of his being pained at telling a lie.11 Further, Sophistic argument prompts perplexity. For on account of the Sophists' wish to refute their opponents by way of paradox, so that they may be terrifically clever when they succeed, the very syllogism that 25 results becomes a perplexity. For one's thinking is tied up in knots when-ever, on account of its being dissatisfied with the conclusion reached, it does not wish to stay put but at the same time is unable to proceed be-cause it is unable to refute the argument. So it results from a certain ar-gument that foolishness, when accompanied by lack of self-restraint, is a virtue. For in that case a person, on account of his lack of self-restraint, does things contrary to what he supposes; and he supposes that things 30 actually good are bad and that he therefore ought not to do them-with the result that he will do what is actually good and not bad. Further, he who, because he has been so persuaded, does and pur-sues pleasant things, and chooses accordingly, might be held to be bet-ter than someone who acts, not from calculation, but through lack of self-restraint. For the former person is easier to cure, because he might be persuaded otherwise; while the person lacking self-restraint is subject to 35 the proverb in which we assert, "when the water chokes, what should you 1146b drink?"12 For if he had been persuaded to act as he does, then upon be-ing subsequently persuaded to stop, he would have done so. But as it is, 10 Or, perhaps, "good" (chrestai). 11 See Sophocles, Philoctetes, especially 54-122 and 895-916. 12 The proverb is otherwise unknown. BOOK], CHAPTER 3 [ 139 though he has been persuaded of one thing, he does other things none-theless. Further, if self-restraint and its lack pertain to all things, who is the person lacking self-restraint in an unqualified sense? For nobody has all forms of the lack of self-restraint, but we do assert that some people are lacking self-restraint in an unqualified sense. Such, then, are some of the perplexities that result; and of these, one ought to do away with some but leave others remaining. For the resolu-tion of a perplexity is a discovery. CHAPTER THREE First, then, is to examine whether those who act without self-restraint do so knowingly or not, and how they might do so knowingly. Next one must set down the sorts of things that the persons lacking self-restraint 10 and the self-restrained are concerned with-! mean whether they are concerned with every pleasure and pain or with certain particular ones, and, as regards the self-restrained and the steadfast, whether they are the same person or different, and similarly for all other points belonging to h. d 13 t IS stu y. A starting point of the examination is whether the self-restrained per- 1s son and the person lacking self-restraint are distinguishable by what they are concerned with or by the way in which they are so concerned. I mean this: whether it is solely by being concerned with these or those things that the person is lacking in self-restraint; or, if that is not the case, then instead because of the way in which he is so concerned; or, if not that, then instead as a result of both considerations. Second, one must exam-ine whether lack of self-restraint and self-restraint pertain to all things or not. For the person lacking self-restraint in an unqualified sense is not concerned with all things but rather with those with which the licen- 20 tious person is concerned. Nor is he lacking self-restraint simply by be-ing concerned with these-in that case, lack of self-restraint would be the same thing as licentiousness-but by being concerned with them in a certain way. For the licentious person is led on by what he chooses, hold-ing that he ought always to pursue the present pleasure, whereas the per-son lacking self-restraint does not think that, but pursues the pleasure anyway. 13 Or, "contemplation" (theoria). BOOK 7, CHAPTER 3 As for its being true opinion but not science [or knowledge] against 25 which those who lack self-restraint act, it makes no difference to the ar-gument. For some people, when they opine about something, are without hesitation but think they know things precisely. If, then, those who opine will act contrary to their conviction more than do those who possess sci-ence, solely on account of their having a weak conviction, 14 then [as a matter of fact] science will not differ from 15 opinion; for some are no less 30 convinced of what they opine about than are other people of what they know16 -and Heraclitus makes this clear.17 But since we say "to know" in two senses-both the person who has the science but is not using it and he who uses it are said to know-it will make a difference whether some-one who does what he ought not to do has the relevant knowledge but is not actively contemplating it, or whether he is actively contemplating it. 35 For this latter does seem to be a terrible thing, but not so if he is not ac-tively contemplating [the science he nonetheless has]. Further, since there are two kinds of premises, [namely, the univer-1147a sal and the particular,] nothing prevents someone who holds both from acting contrary to the science he possesses because he makes use of the universal premise but not the particular one, matters of action being of course particulars. There is also a relevant difference pertaining to the universal premise, for there is the universal relating to the person himself and the one relating to the matter of concern at hand: for example, that dry foods are advantageous for every human being and that he himself is a human being, or that this sort of thing here is dry. As to whether this particular food here is of a particular character, however, the person lack-ing self-restraint either does not have that knowledge or is not exercising it. And so, given these different ways ofknowing, a massive difference will arise, such that for the person lacking self-restraint to know in the one way, [that is, to know in principle the relevant universal but not to know or to be activating his knowledge of a given particular,] seems to be noth-14 Not the word usually translated as "conviction" ( hypolambanein and related terms), but pisteuein, as also in the next clause of this sentence ("convinced of"), which can also mean simply "trust" or "have faith in:' 15 Or, "will not be superior to:' 16 Epistasthai, "to know scientifically," here and in the next two instances of"to know: 17 The famous pre-Socratic philosopher of Ephesus. The precise reference is uncer-tain; some commentators suggest that Aristotle may here allude to Heraclitus's oracu-lar style of arguing, itself a response to the impossibility of certain knowledge of the world, which is fundamentally in "flux:' BOOK 7 CHAPTER 3 ing strange, but in the other way, [that is, knowing and having active in him both kinds of premises,] it would indeed be a cause for wonder.18 Further, another way of having science, different from those just now 10 mentioned, is available to human beings. For in the case ofhaving but not using science, we see that the "having"19 is different, such that a person both has it in a way and does not have it-for example, someone who is asleep, mad, or drunk. But surely those in the grip of the passions are dis-posed in this way; for outbursts of spiritedness, the sexual desires, and cer- 15 tain other such things clearly bring about a change in the body too, and in some people they even cause madness. It is clear, then, that those lacking self-restraint must be said to be in a state similar to such people. But stat-ing the arguments that proceed from science is not a sign of anything, for even people in the grip of these passions state demonstrations and verses 20 ofEmpedocles,20 and those who are first learning will put together argu-ments but not yet understand them. For one must grow naturally into the knowledge, and that requires time. As a result, it must be supposed that those who lack self-restraint speak just as actors do. Further, someone might also look at the cause of the lack of self-restraint in terms of nature, as follows. For the universal premise is an 2s opinion; the other premise concerns particulars, over which perception is authoritative from the start. And whenever one conclusion arises from the universal and particular premises, the soul must necessarily assert it, but in the case of a conclusion bound up with making [or doing] things, the soul must immediately act. For example, if one ought to taste every-thing sweet, and this thing here is sweet (it being some one particular 30 thing), someone who is so capable and not prevented from doing so must 18 As Aquinas here says: "it is possible that a man knows, both habitually and actively, the universal considered in itself but either he does not grasp the universal considered in this particular object, i.e., the universal is not known in an habitual way, or he does not bestir himself, i.e., the universal is not actually known. Therefore ... it does not seem unreasonable for a man, who acts incontinently [i.e., without self-restraint], to have one kind of knowledge, viz., universal alone or even particular-if it is habitual and not actual. But it would seem unreasonable for the man who acts continently [i.e., with self-restraint] to have another kind of knowledge, i.e., actual, concerned with this particular:' 19 The term translated as "the having" (hexis) is elsewhere translated as "characteris-tic." Aristotle here makes use of the fact that the noun is derived from the verb mean-ing (among other things) "to have" (echein): see also the glossary. 20 Empedocles of Sicily (ca. 493-433) was a famous pre-Socratic philosopher, two of whose poems, On Nature and Purifications, survive in fragmentary form. 142] BOOK 7, CHAPTER 4 at the same time necessarily also carry out this action. Whenever, then, the universal premise is present that forbids us from tasting sweet things, and another universal is also present, to the effect that every sweet thing is pleasant, and this thing here is sweet (and this premise is active), and by chance the relevant desire is present in us, the one premise says to avoid 35 this; but the desire for it leads the way, for it is able to set in motion each of the parts [of the body]. It turns out, as a result, that someone can come 1147b to be without self-restraint by a reasoned account [logos], in a way, and by opinion, an opinion that is not in itself but incidentally contrary to correct reason-for the desire involved, not the opinion, is contrary to correct reason. As a result, on this account as well, brute animals do not lack self-restraint, because they do not possess a universal conviction but rather an image and memory of particular things. But as to how the ignorance involved is undone, and the person lack-ing self-restraint becomes again a knower, the same argument pertains also to the case of someone drunk or asleep and is not peculiar to this experience-an argument one must hear from those who study nature. Now, since the final premise is both an opinion pertaining to an object of 10 perception and authoritative over our actions, someone in the grip of the relevant passion either does not have this final premise or has it in such a way that his having it does not amount to his knowing it;21 instead he merely speaks, as a drunk man states the sayings ofEmpedodes. And be-cause the ultimate term22 is not universal and seems not to be knowable 1s as the universal is knowable, it seems also that what Socrates was seeking turns out to be the case. For it is not when science in the authoritative sense seems to be present that the experience of the lack of self-restraint occurs, nor is it this science that is dragged around on account of passion, but rather that [knowledge] which is bound up with perception. So about the knower and non-knower, and how a knower can lack self-restraint, let this much be said.