Working Draft

Three NPT Snapshots – and Some Lessons and

Implications for Rebuilding U.S.-Russian Cooperation

Dr. Lewis A. Dunn

November 30, 2016

Prepared for

US-Russian Dialogue on the NPT Review Process: Lessons Learned (1970-2015)

and Steps Ahead (2016-2020)

Geneva, Switzerland

December 10-11, 2016

The views herein are those of the author not necessarily those of SAIC or any of its sponsoring

organizations

1

Three NPT Snapshots – and Some Lessons and Implications for Rebuilding

U.S.-Russian Cooperation

During the Cold War, nuclear non-proliferation often stood out in the midst of the wider

confrontation as one area of engagement and cooperation between the United States and the

Soviet Union. Within that area, Washington and Moscow took the lead in negotiating the Treaty

on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, most often referred to as the Non-Proliferation

Treaty or the NPT – and later cooperated to sustain that Treaty and eventually gain its indefinite

extension. With renewed political-military confrontation between the United States and Russia,

it is timely to revisit the earlier history of cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation and

specifically the NPT. Doing so may help to identify possible lessons for rebuilding habits of

cooperation between the two countries as one part of a more comprehensive strategy for slowing

and then reversing a steady slide into a new Cold War.1

The following paper briefly explores three “snapshots” of U.S.-Russian NPT cooperation:

the initial negotiation of the NPT in the mid-1960s; the sustaining of the NPT’s credibility at the

1985 NPT Review Conference; and the Indefinite Extension of the NPT in 1995. For each

snapshot, the discussion first describes the overall geopolitical context; the incentives and

obstacles to NPT cooperation; and the most prominent specific dimensions of U.S.-

Soviet/Russian cooperation. Again focused on a specific snapshot, the paper then puts forward

some explanations of successful cooperation. By way of concluding the overall paper, some

cross-cutting lessons drawn from all three snapshots and their implications for rebuilding U.S.-

Russian habits of cooperation on NPT matters (including Article VI and nuclear disarmament)

are explored.

1 For my views on what a comprehensive U.S. strategy to avoid a new Cold War could entail see Lewis A. Dunn,

“Redefining the U.S. Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament: Analysis and Reflections,” Livermore Papers on Global

Security No. 1 Center for Global Security Research, October 2016, pp. 57-61.

https://cgsr.llnl.gov/content/assets/docs/CGSR_Document_LLNL-TR-701463_103116.pdf

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Negotiation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Throughout the process from the 1961 United Nations General Assembly resolution

calling for negotiation of a non-proliferation treaty to the opening for signature on July 1, 1968

of the NPT, the United States and the Soviet Union consulted each other and as the negotiations

advanced, cooperated closely in crafting the new Treaty. Over time, Washington and Moscow

had to work through several very difficult and critical issues on which their going-in positions

differed significantly, particularly the Article I “no transfer” obligation and the Article III

“safeguards” obligation. Their successful cooperation reflected a strong congruence of U.S. and

Soviet strategic interests.2

Geopolitical Context. Turning to some of the most important dimensions of the

geopolitical context, the negotiation of the NPT took place against the backdrop of the Cold War

military confrontation in the heart of Europe. The Group of Soviet Forces was deployed in East

Germany and seen by the United States and its NATO allies to pose a continuing military threat.

To buttress deterrence and to reassure a nervous West German government, the United States

was in the process of deploying significant numbers of tactical nuclear weapons to NATO

Europe and had initiated so-called Programs of Cooperation which entailed dual U.S. and allies’

control over nuclear weapons in the event of a European conflict. Equally important, there was

ongoing U.S. and allies’ consideration of the creation of a possible Multilateral Nuclear Force

(MLF) that would have entailed deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons on ships manned both by

2 The following discussion draws heavily on George Bunn and John B. Rhinelander, “The Nuclear Nonproliferation

Treaty Then and Now,” Arms Control Today https://armscontrol.org/act/2008_07-08/lookingback.asp#bio; George

Bunn, “Brief History of NPT Safeguards Article,” NPTNegHis.ArtIII.6Febr.06; George Bunn, “The Nuclear

Nonproliferation Treaty: History and Current Problems” https://armscontro.org/taxonomy/term/69; “The Impulse

towards a Safer World” 40th

Anniversary of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty – set of declassified documents on

the negotiating history complied by the National Security Archive, www.nsarchive.org.; See Interview of

Ambassador Roland Timerbaev, Conducted by Rich Hooper and Jenni Rissanen June 14, 2007 – Vienna, Austria,

cgs.pnnl.gov/fois/doclib/Timerbaev(transcript)2.pdf; and Roland Timerbaev, “In Memoriam: George Bunn (1925-

2013), https://www. armscontrol.org/taxonomy/term/69).

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U.S. and some NATO countries. For its part, the Soviet Union was “fighting like hell against the

multilateral force because they were afraid that the Germans might get access to a nuclear

weapon.”3

Growing concerns about nuclear proliferation also were an important part of the context

for U.S.-Russian cooperation. In part, this concern was more general: U.S. estimates at the time

were that absent effective non-proliferation, upwards of 20-30 countries could seek to acquire

nuclear weapons in the decades ahead; the Soviets shared the U.S. concern about future

proliferation but also thought that effective international action could prevent such runaway

proliferation.4 China’s test of a nuclear weapon in 1964 as well as ongoing debates about

acquiring nuclear weapons in other countries reinforced these concerns. Projections at the time

of a coming wave of widespread use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes were another factor.

But for Moscow – and somewhat less so Washington – there also was a more specific concern

that West Germany could seek to acquire nuclear weapons. Here, too, West Germany’s

expanding reliance on nuclear energy added to that concern.

For both Washington and Moscow memories of the Cuban Missile Crisis provided part

of the background. In that crisis, the two countries’ leaderships had approached the brink of a

nuclear war and come away with a recognition of the importance of finding new ways to manage

their own nuclear relationship as well as of the dangers of nuclear war from whatever source.

Six months later, the quick and successful negotiation in June 1963 of the Limited Test Ban

Treaty (LTBT) both signaled that recognition and demonstrated their will as well as ability to

cooperate.

3 See Interview of Ambassador Roland Timerbaev, Conducted by Rich Hooper and Jenni Rissanen June 14, 2007 –

Vienna, Austria, cgs.pnnl.gov/fois/doclib/Timerbaev(transcript)2.pdf, p. 6. 4 See “Interview with Roland Timerbaev” Part of “War and Peace in the Nuclear Age,”

http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/V_ED432881A740475493E7664F1DD93816

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Incentives and Obstacles to Cooperation. The most important incentive for cooperation

was a shared interest in nuclear non-proliferation. Both countries wanted to constrain any

possible West German pursuit of nuclear weapons; both countries wanted to prevent nuclear

proliferation globally. Nonetheless, the relative importance of these two concerns, as noted

above, varied.

Initially, U.S. support for a possible MLF was the most significant obstacle to

cooperation. Indeed, not until the United States signaled its readiness to Moscow to set aside the

MLF concept did U.S.-Soviet negotiations begin on the possible elements of a non-proliferation

treaty. Even after that U.S. policy shift, difficulties persisted in working out the specific

language of the Article I “no transfer” provision, reflecting Soviet opposition to U.S. nuclear-

cooperation arrangements with its NATO allies and U.S. unwillingness to renounce all such

cooperation. Reaching agreement also proved difficult on the eventual language in Article III

on inspections and “safeguards.” Here, a Soviet emphasis that International Atomic Energy

Agency (IAEA) inspections should take place in EURATOM countries clashed with those

countries’ reluctance to accept such IAEA inspections. In both cases, the U.S. need to consult

closely on these matters with its NATO allies, including especially West Germany, was a

continuing requirement and an obstacle to Soviet-U.S. bilateral cooperation to find mutually

acceptable compromises on outstanding issues.

Dimensions of U.S.-Soviet Cooperation. Once the United States had decided internally in

1966 to set aside the MLF concept, U.S. and Soviet officials began a continuing process of

official negotiations, consultations, and sometimes informal engagement to resolve their

differences on the most critical outstanding issues. The outcome would be the development of

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identical draft treaties tabled at different points in the ongoing multilateral negotiation in the 18-

Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) in Geneva.

In particular, during 1966, a working group comprised of three Russians and three

Americans developed mutually acceptable language for the “no transfers” provision of Article I

and the “not to receive the transfer” provision of Article II.5 Two key players were George

Bunn on the American side and Roland Timerbaev on Soviet side. The key compromise

reflected an American readiness (with West German concurrence) to drop the MLF and a Soviet

readiness to live with limited U.S. Programs of Cooperation with NATO allies but stopping short

of any allied peacetime control of nuclear weapons. The initial result was the tabling of

identical draft treaties by Washington and Moscow in August 1967 – absent, however, any

safeguards-inspections provision because of continuing U.S.-Soviet differences or any nuclear

disarmament Article VI obligation given the two countries’ focus exclusively on non-

proliferation.

A somewhat comparable process of U.S.-Soviet negotiations characterized efforts to

resolve differences over safeguards issues and to come up with language that would be mutually

acceptable to Moscow and Washington as well as to U.S. European allies in EURATOM. Here,

technical discussions between small teams of U.S. and Soviet negotiators in Geneva were

critical, with both Bunn and Timerbaev again playing key roles.6 Building on professional and

personal ties that had developed in the earlier negotiation process – and in an informal process

that included discussing this issue while hiking around Geneva and sailing on Lac Leman – they

5 See Bunn and Rhinelander, “The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Then and Now,” Arms Control Today; Roland

Timerbaev, “In Memoriam: George Bunn (1925-2013), https://www. armscontrol.org/taxonomy/term/69; Interview

of Ambassador Roland Timerbaev, Hooper and Rissanen June 14, 2007. 6 See George Bunn, “Brief History of NPT Safeguards Article,” NPTNegHis.ArtIII.6Febr.06, passim; Interview of

Ambassador Roland Timerbaev, Conducted by Rich Hooper and Jenni Rissanen June 14, 2007 – Vienna, Austria;

Timerbaev, “In Memoriam: George Bunn (1925-2013);

6

eventually came up with a possible solution and conveyed that solution back to Washington and

Moscow. As reflected in Article III of the NPT, this solution provided that non-nuclear-weapon

states would conclude safeguards agreements with the IAEA “. . . either individually or together

with other States . . . .” With agreement in both capitals, the compromise language was used in

the identical U.S. and Soviet draft treaties that were tabled in the 18-Nation Disarmament

Committee on January 18, 1968.

On other Articles within the January 18th

identical drafts, there also was U.S.-Soviet

cooperation but without as difficult differences of position to be resolved. Agreement had been

reached between them on peaceful uses in Article IV as well as in response to demands from

Mexico, Sweden, and other non-nuclear-weapon states, on nuclear disarmament in Article VI.

By contrast, on the issues of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon states,

Washington and Moscow, in effect, agreed to disagree – and, thus, not to let that disagreement

impact conclusion of the Treaty. In 1966, Moscow had proposed including a clause prohibiting

use of nuclear weapons “against non-nuclear—states parties to the treaty, which have no nuclear

weapons in their territory.” The United States rejected such a clause – and the process went

forward without it.7

Following the January 18th

identical drafts, some proposals still would be made to amend

the NPT by other participants in the ENDC, including Article VI, prior to the two countries’

March 11th

joint submission of a draft Treaty to the General Assembly. Still additional proposed

amendments would be made prior to the General Assembly passage on May 31st of a Resolution

7 George Bunn and Roland M. Timerbaev, “Security Assurances to Non-Nuclear-Weapon States,” The

Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1993, pp. 12-13.

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commending the NPT to UN members.8 Washington and Moscow consulted closely and sought

a “common front” in determining how to respond to such proposed amendments, agreeing to

accept some and dismiss others.9 Close cooperation continued in lobbying countries to support

the NPT both before and after the Treaty was opened for signature on July 1, 1968. In the

ensuing internal and international deliberations on the Treaty (including over ratification),

American and Soviet officials sought to keep each other informed and coordinate responses to

requests for clarification or interpretation of the Treaty’s obligations.10

Explanations of Successful Cooperation. Shared if not completely identical U.S. and

Soviet interests in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons were an underlying and continuing

reason for successful cooperation in the negotiation of what became the NPT. By the early

1960s, growing concern about the proliferation threat had led both countries’ leaderships to a

similar conclusion, even if initially the Soviet focus may have been most on preventing West

German acquisition of nuclear weapons11

and the American focus more on a perceived “Nth”

country problem of widespread proliferation. As this process advanced, both Washington and

Moscow kept their attention focused most on their fundamental goal of a non-proliferation treaty,

whether in accommodating demands from non-nuclear states to include a disarmament article or

in agreeing to disagree on the issue of negative security assurances. “This common

8 See Mohamed Shaker, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Origin and Implementation, 1959-1979, (London:

Oceana Publications, Inc, 1980), pp. 558-559. Shaker’s definitive analysis is available on the website of the James

Martin Center for Non-Proliferation Studies. 9 See National Security Archives, “The Impulse Toward a Safer Nuclear World”, Op. Cit., “Documents 23 and b:

The Mexican Amendments, “U.S. State Department cable 161473 to U.S. Mission, United Nations, New York, 10

May 19688, U.S. State Department cable 162528 to U.S. Mission, United Nations, New York, 11 May 1968. 10

Interview of Ambassador Roland Timerbaev, Conducted by Rich Hooper and Jenni Rissanen June 14, 2007 –

Vienna, Austria, p. 10. 11

See Interview of Ambassador Roland Timerbaev, Conducted by Rich Hooper and Jenni Rissanen June 14, 2007 –

Vienna, pp. 5, 6-7 passim.

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understanding and mutual trust . . . helped to overcome innumerable problems” during the

negotiations.12

This shared interest in preventing nuclear proliferation – and with it a growing risk of

nuclear conflict – was reinforced by an external event, the Cuban Missile Crisis. Both

Washington and Moscow agreed on assigning “highest importance” to the NPT because of the

danger of nuclear war.13

A very different external event, the growing resistance to the concept of

the MLF among U.S. NATO allies other than West Germany, also provides part of the

explanation for successful cooperation. That resistance made it far easier for the United States to

shift its position on nuclear cooperation within NATO, thereby opening the way for U.S.-Soviet

NPT cooperation (including an eventual compromise on the “no transfer” provision of Article I).

Institutions and people also help explain successful cooperation. The creation of the

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1961 established a strong advocate for the NPT as

well as a bureaucratic opponent to the MLF advocated by the Department of State. In turn, the

close working and personal relationships among key figures in the U.S. and Soviet negotiating

teams proved critical to resolving difficult issues, not least how to handle safeguards and

inspections under Article III. Key negotiators such as Bunn and Timerbaev had a shared

commitment to “the vital need to stop proliferation of nuclear weapons.”14

More broadly, habits

of consultation, coordination, and cooperation developed that continued once the new NPT was

opened for signature and ratification, thereby helping to avoid any surprises and to coordinate

efforts in support of the Treaty.

12

Timerbaev, “In Memoriam: George Bunn (1925-2013). 13

See National Security Archives, “The Impulse Toward a Safer Nuclear World”, Op. Cit., “Document 24: “There

Are Very Few People Who Truly Understand the Meaning of Nuclear War,” U.S. Department of State,

Memorandum of Conversation [between Secretary of State Rusk and Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov], 17 May

1968. 14

Timerbaev, “In Memoriam: George Bunn (1925-2013).

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Sustaining NPT Credibility – the 1985 NPT Review Conference

The 1980 NPT Review Conference had been unable to reach agreement on a consensus

Final Declaration because of differences on the issue of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

(CTBT). Five years later, sustaining the credibility of the NPT made it important to avoid back-

go-back Review Conference failures to agree on a Final Declaration. Though less prominent and

determinative than in the initial negotiation of the NPT, cooperation between the United States

and the Soviet Union made an important contribution to achieving that objective – from shaping

the structure and tone of the 1985 Review Conference to the resolution of its most difficult issue,

once again the CTBT.15

The Geopolitical Context. Particularly concerning the U.S.-Soviet relationship, the

context in the immediate run-up to and at the Third NPT Review Conference from August 27-

September 21, 1985 was one of prospective positive change. Only six months before – and a

year and one-half after the Soviet delegation had withdrawn in November 1983 from the

negotiations on Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) and in December 1983 on Strategic Nuclear

Forces (START) – the United States and the Soviet Union on March 12, 1985 had begun new

arms control negotiations on defense and space systems, strategic nuclear forces, and

intermediate-range nuclear forces. This resumption of negotiations took place one day after

Mikhail Gorbachev had become the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet

Union. In turn, the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed to a Summit Meeting of

President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev to take place in Geneva on

November 19-21, 1985.

On the non-proliferation front, Washington and Moscow had agreed to establish twice-

yearly formal, high-level bilateral non-proliferation consultations. The initiation of such a

15

The following discussion draws on the author’s role as U.S. Ambassador to the 1985 NPT Review Conference.

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formal process of bilateral non-proliferation consultations had been proposed by Soviet officials

some months after Moscow’s withdrawal from the INF and START talks in an apparent signal of

a desire to sustain this aspect of the arms control relationship. Building on earlier less formal

exchanges, the first such meeting took place in Moscow in December 1984. The U.S. team was

led by Ambassador-at-Large Richard T. Kennedy; the Soviet team was led A.M. Petrosyants,

then Chairman of the Soviet State Committee for Atomic Energy. The U.S. delegation included

the author who also was then heading U.S. preparations for the Review Conference; the Soviet

delegation included both Vladimir Petrovsky, then Head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry’s

Department of International Organizations as well as Roland Timerbaev. Very quickly both

delegation leaders and their teams developed a strong working relationship.

The resumption of bilateral arms control negotiations, the upcoming Reagan-Gorbachev

Summit (and other senior-level contacts), and the resumed non-proliferation dialogue, however,

all took place against a backdrop of continuing U.S.-Soviet political-military confrontation and

suspicion. The 1984 and 1985 U.S. report on “Soviet Compliance with Arms Control

Agreements” had alleged multiple Soviet violations of existing arms control agreements; the

United States was providing military support to the mujahedeen fighting the Soviet forces in

Afghanistan; the military confrontation persisted across the European divide; Soviet concerns

were growing about President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative; and each country’s strategic

nuclear forces remained on high alert against the other.

Globally, the nuclear non-proliferation state-of-play was troubling. Pakistan was

moving towards acquisition of nuclear weapons, putting pressure to respond on an India that had

tested a nuclear explosive device a decade earlier in 1974. Israel’s 1981 bombing of Saddam

Hussein’s Osirak research reactor had set back Iraq’s nuclear-weapon ambitions but had also

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created new fissures within the IAEA. In 1982, the IAEA General Conference’s decided not to

accept Israel’s credentials, barring Israeli partnership in the IAEA and leading to a temporary

U.S. suspension of American participation in the IAEA. Elsewhere in the Middle East and

beyond other countries figured prominently at least on American assessments of proliferation

problem countries.16

As for the NPT, specifically, there were concerns that lack of progress on

peaceful uses and nuclear disarmament could characterize the 1985 Review and undermine the

NPT’s credibility.17

Incentives and Obstacles to Cooperation. A shared U.S.-Soviet interest in the NPT as

well as in preventing nuclear proliferation provided the basic underlying incentive for

cooperation in the 1985 Review Conference process. Both countries recognized that interest. A

desire to avoid back-to-back Review Conference failures also figured in here. However, perhaps

even more important, the prospect of the soon-to-occur Reagan-Gorbachev November 1985

Summit in Geneva gave both Washington and Moscow a strong incentive to cooperate.

By contrast, continuing political-military confrontation remained an underlying obstacle

to cooperation. Somewhat differently, the desire within the Reagan administration to hold the

Soviets to account on arms control non-compliance – joined to a Soviet desire to respond often

by making counter-charges against the United States – was another obstacle to cooperation at the

Review Conference. All too easily, this combination could have led to acrimonious polemics

across the many Review Conference fora. In turn, mutual suspicions about how the other would

act at the Review Conference – pursuing shared interests or making it a forum for charge and

counter-charge were also were an obstacle to cooperation.

16

See, for example, National Security Archives, Director of Central Intelligence, “Nuclear Proliferation Trends

Through 1987”, National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 4-82, Approved for Release 2012/08/06. 17

Ibid.

12

Dimensions of U.S.-Soviet Cooperation. During the Preparatory Committee phase of the

1985 Review process, the United States and the Soviet Union consulted closely on how to ensure

a successful Conference. Those consultations took place both within the now-formalized process

of bilateral consultations as well as via the near-monthly trips to Geneva in 1984-85 of the author

as U.S. NPT Ambassador.

In addition to ensuring that each country understood how the other was approaching the

Review Conference, this process of consultations also focused in part on gaining Soviet support

for a U.S. proposal to revise the Committee structure of the Review Conference.18

At the first

and second Review Conferences in 1975 and 1980 respectively, the work of the Conference had

been carried out in two so-called Main Committees, one dealing with Non-Proliferation,

Safeguards, and Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and one dealing with Nuclear Disarmament.

The U.S. proposal made at the second Preparatory Committee meeting in October 1984 was to

create a new Main Committee so that henceforth there would be three Main Committees, dealing

respectively with Non-Proliferation and Safeguards, Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, and

Nuclear Disarmament. This new breakdown was seen to reflect more accurately what came to

be called the “three pillars” of the NPT and to allow for more thorough discussion of non-

proliferation matters. (In turn, creation of an additional Main Committee also provided an

opportunity for each of the three main NPT groupings – the Western Group, the Eastern Group,

and the Non-aligned Group – to chair a Main Committee). With support from the Soviet

delegation and Eastern Group delegations as well as those of the Western Group and the Non-

Aligned countries, this change of Review Conference structure was recommended by the

Preparatory Committee and then agreed to at the start of the Review Conference.

18

The Final Report of the Preparatory Committee for the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on

the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.III/1).

13

At the same time, the U.S. representatives – including at very senior levels – also

emphasized to their Soviet counterparts – that both Washington and Moscow had an interest in

taking a positive approach to the Review Conference, while avoiding polemics and turning the

Review Conference into a spectacle of charge and counter-charge that only could hurt the NPT.

To that effect, one month before the Review Conference as they discussed the overall state of

U.S.-Soviet relations and the upcoming Reagan-Gorbachev Geneva Summit, Secretary of State

Shultz told his counter-part Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze that “[a]t the Review

Conference itself we should stay away from polemics and the U.S. will conduct itself this

way.”19

There were indications that Moscow thought that this positive approach made sense for

both countries but also questions about how it would be implemented.

Nonetheless, Moscow’s agreement to a “no polemics” approach became clear only at the

start of the Review Conference. Following the positive U.S. Plenary Statement by the Head of

the U.S. Delegation, ACDA Director Kenneth Adelman, the Head of the Soviet delegation,

Ambassador Victor Israelyan, also spoke and focused only on Soviet accomplishments in

implementing the NPT. Like Adelman, he eschewed polemics. That said, some years later after

the breakup of the Soviet Union, a former Soviet diplomat told this author that he had written

two speeches for Israelyan – one that took the positive approach and one to be used if Adelman

used the U.S. Plenary Statement to blame the Soviet Union for arms control non-compliance and

lack of progress in implementing Article VI. The decision to take a “no polemics” approach also

was said to have been made high up in the Soviet system.

On more specific issues during the Review Conference, the most difficult substantive

issue concerned the language to be used on CTBT in the Final Declaration. In the middle of the

19

See “Memorandum of Conversation”, July 31, 1985. Source: Freedom of Information Act Request to the U.S.

Department of State, National Security Archives.

14

last week, the conference faced possible deadlock over U.S. unwillingness to agree to language

regretting failure to conclude a ban on nuclear testing and calling for its urgent negotiation. One

further session involving perhaps a couple of dozen countries from across the NPT’s

membership was called to try to work out a compromise, including Mexico as the leading voice

on this issue as well as the United States and the Soviet Union (which had made clear its support

for resumed CTBT negotiations). With a deadlock still looming, the U.S. delegation proposed

one final compromise approach that was based on a suggestion by one of the delegation

members.

Specifically, the author as U.S. Ambassador to the conference suggested to the other

delegations that the Final Declaration state – to use the eventual language – that: “The

Conference, except for certain States whose views are reflected in the following subparagraph,

deeply regretted that a [CTBT] had not been concluded. . . and, therefore, called on all the

nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty to resume trilateral negotiations in 1985. . . .”20

Except

for one delegation, everyone present was prepared to support this compromise approach. The

exception was the East German delegate who pressed the United States to make clear which

countries other than the United States and the United Kingdom had opposed CTBT during the

Review Conference. Very quickly, Soviet Ambassador Israelyan looked over to the East

German representative and told him to leave the matter alone and in effect to be quiet. That

Soviet intervention sealed agreement on the CTBT compromise. Though several other tough

issues still had to be resolved, this outcome on CTBT was absolutely essential for U.S.

agreement to the eventual consensus Final Document – and avoiding damaging back-to-back

failures of the 1980 and the 1985 Review Conferences.

20

Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document,

Geneva 1985.

15

Explanations of Successful Cooperation. Without the type of commentary from Soviet

participants that exists for U.S.-Soviet cooperation in negotiation of the NPT, explanations of

successful cooperation in sustaining the NPT in 1985 are unavoidably more speculative – and

even perhaps somewhat more reflective of American thinking. That said, a number of

considerations stand out.

Particularly during the difficult period following the late 1983 withdrawal of the Soviet

Union from the arms control talks, the historic shared interest in the NPT insulated the early

Preparatory Process21

from the wider breakdown of bilateral arms control negotiations. Both

countries had a sense of responsibility for a Treaty that they had jointly played leading roles in

creating. In turn, the mid-1984 Soviet proposal for more formal, high-level bilateral non-

proliferation consultations (including on NPT) – as well as American acceptance of that offer –

reflected a recognition of the importance of continuing one area of arms control cooperation even

in the midst of the wider breakdown. For both countries, the risks of nuclear proliferation and

the challenges facing the wider non-proliferation regime (again including NPT but also the

IAEA) provided a logic for consultations. This dimension of shared interest continued as a

motive for cooperation into the Review Conference. Neither Washington nor Moscow wanted or

would have benefited from back-to-back Review Conference failures to reach agreement on a

Final Declaration as well as the all-but-inevitable perceptions that would have followed of the

“NPT on the rocks.”

As the Review Conference approached, Gorbachev’s coming to power in the Soviet

Union reinforced that motivation. Not only did the arms control process resume and accelerate

but there was new emphasis in both countries on turning the page in the relationship. Moreover,

21

The First Preparatory Committee Meeting for the 1985 Review Conference took place from April 2-6, 1984 and

the Second Preparatory Committee Meeting took place from October 1-11, 1984.

16

at the Conference itself, the prospect of the November 1985 Reagan-Gorbachev Summit almost

certainly was a powerful reason for both countries to adopt a “no polemics” approach to the

Review Conference as well as to cooperate to make it a success. As with MLF and the

negotiation of the NPT, a development external to the NPT made an important difference – but

in this case providing a strong motivation for cooperation to ensure a successful Review

Conference.

Once again, institutions and people also are part of the explanation for U.S.-Soviet

cooperation at the 1985 NPT Review Conference. On the American side, ACDA was able to

dedicate significant staff and senior-level resources to preparations for the Review Conference.

Sustaining the NPT was one of the top Agency priorities. One result was repeated consultations

over the two years before the Conference between the author and Soviet counterparts in Geneva

(and within the wider bilateral non-proliferation process) on the issues likely to arise, the benefits

to both countries of taking a positive approach, and the importance of U.S.-Soviet cooperation to

serve both countries’ interests in a successful Review. At the same time, though Ambassador-at-

Large for Non-Proliferation Kennedy was not directly involved in implementing U.S. NPT

diplomacy, his credibility with his Soviet counter-parts as well as their strong working

relationships developed in the wider non-proliferation bilateral process both reinforced the

arguments for cooperation.

On the Soviet side, Roland Timerbaev was heavily involved in all aspects of Soviet

preparations for the 1985 Review Conference, including consultations with the author. He was

committed to the NPT and to ensuring a Review Conference outcome that strengthened and did

not weaken the Treaty – as noted above, a Treaty that Timerbaev had already played a critical

role in helping to bring into being. Timerbaev also made clear his intention to work back in

17

Moscow for Soviet-U.S. cooperation that protected the NPT. Institutionally, U.S.-Soviet

consultations for the 1985 NPT Review Conference also reflected a recognition of the leading

roles that Washington and Moscow had played in the creation of the NPT. This was so although

there also were continuing consultations with the United Kingdom as one of the three NPT

Depositaries and the then-three NWS Parties. (France and China were not yet Parties). Thus, if

more speculatively, the institutional structure of the NPT at this point in time may also have

contributed to successful cooperation in sustaining the NPT’s credibility at the 1985 NPT

Review Conference.22

Indefinite Extension of the NPT in 1995

Long habits of NPT cooperation between Washington and Moscow also contributed to

the Indefinite Extension of the NPT by consensus at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension

Conference from April 17-May 12, 1995. Cooperation was nested in a broader network of

successful nuclear engagement between Russia (after the collapse of the Soviet Union) and the

United States. At this juncture, moreover, the future geopolitical and domestic events that were

to begin the slow slide toward today’s U.S.-Russia political-military confrontation mostly were

still only on the horizon. At the same time, U.S.-Russia cooperation was no longer at the core of

Indefinite Extension efforts as it once had been in the NPT’s negotiation and creation 25 years

earlier. Nonetheless, Moscow’s readiness to agree to an 11th

hour, end game American request

that Russia as one of the three NPT Depositaries join with the United States and the United

22

Once France and China joined the NPT in the early 1990s, this unique NPT-derived institutional U.S.-Soviet

dimension and dynamic first faded and then eventually ceased to exist. It has been suggested by one very

experienced “NPT hand” that this change made it more complicated and ultimately harder to cooperate closely with

Moscow in the new configuration of five NPT NWS, of which two of them were close U.S. allies.

18

Kingdom in sponsoring the so-called Middle East resolution was absolutely essential to

achievement of Indefinite Extension by consensus.23

The Geopolitical Context. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 –

accompanied by the emergence of Russia and 11 other independent Republics and the transfer of

power from Mikhail Gorbachev to Boris Yeltsin – was the most dramatic feature of the period

leading up to the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. Over the months that followed, the

United States recognized each of the newly independent Republics. At much the same time, the

nuclear risks of deteriorating economic and political conditions in a collapsing Soviet Union had

led to Congressional passage and President Bush’s signature on December 14, 1991 of the Nunn-

Lugar Act – or the “Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991. As one result, by the time of

the 1995 Conference, very extensive and innovative framework of U.S.-Russian nuclear threat

reduction cooperation had been established. From a more specific NPT focus, Moscow and

Washington cooperated during this period to ensure that former Soviet nuclear weapons would

be withdrawn from Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine and that these three countries would

accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states. (Belarus and Kazakhstan did so in 1993;

Ukraine in 1994).

Decisions in 1992 by France and China to join the NPT also provide part of the context

of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. All five of the nuclear-weapon-states recognized

by the NPT finally were Parties. The three Depositaries, however, remained responsible for

convening the process called for by the NPT to address twenty-five years after EIF “. . . whether

23

The following draws heavily on Thomas Graham, Jr., Disarmament Sketches (Seattle: University of Washington

Press, 2002) as well as on conversations with U.S. participants. For an overall discussion by two outside experts of

the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, see Tariq Rauf and Rebecca Johnson, “After the NPT’s Indefinite

Extension: The Future of the Global Nonproliferation Regime” The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1995.

19

the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period

or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.”24

Not to be overlooked as part of the context, some of the most important underlying

external drivers of the steady deterioration of the overall political-military relationship between

Washington and Moscow had yet to occur. The economic free-fall and chaos of the early 1990s –

measured in terms of decline in GDP, hyperinflation, and decline in overall Russian quality of

life – would not reach its peak until the financial crisis of August 1998.25

Similarly, though

debate among officials and experts on possible NATO enlargement had begun by 1993-94, a

formal NATO study was not completed until September 1995 – and the first three countries from

the Warsaw Pact were not invited to begin accession talks to join NATO until July 1997 and did

not become NATO members until March 1999.26

Similarly, NATO’s bombing campaign against

Serbia to end ethnic cleansing and force acceptance of a settlement during the Kosovo conflict –

an intervention often cited as critical in shaping the views of President Putin and Russian

officials-military toward the United States and NATO – did not take place until March 1999.27

Far from least important, U.S. withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty did not

occur until June 2002.

Incentives and Obstacles to Cooperation. For both countries, not only their traditional

support for the NPT as a bulwark against nuclear proliferation but also their recognition that

24

Article IX, paragraph 5 states: “The Depositary Governments [identified in Article IX, paragraph 2 as the United

Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the United States] shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the

date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into

force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.” Article X,

paragraph 2 states: “Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to

decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or

periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.” 25

President Yeltsin resigns and Vladimir Putin takes over as Acting President at the end of 1999. 26

On the process and the overall timeline, see North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Enlargement,” last updated 03

December 2015. 27

For example, see Mathew Dal Santo “The Shortsightedness of NATO's War with Serbia Over Kosovo Haunts

Ukraine”, The National Interest, September 2, 2014.

20

decision on NPT extension was “truly consequential”28

provided strong incentives for

cooperation. Both countries also still had a political incentive to make common cause on

Indefinite Extension at this point in time. The responsibilities of Washington and Moscow

(along with the United Kingdom) as NPT Depositaries – as well as leaders in the NPT’s creation

– further reinforced these incentives to cooperate.

Overall, in the run-up to 1995, there were no obstacles to cooperation comparable to

those that were present earlier – whether the overall Cold War confrontation and its specific

manifestations or those highly salient differences on specific issues that had to be overcome.

START I reductions were being implemented; START II had been signed in January 1993

(though not yet ratified by either Washington or Moscow at the time of the Review and

Extension Conference); and both countries had ceased testing nuclear weapons, thereby

eliminating what had been a continuing source contention between them. Nonetheless, U.S.

opposition to sometimes alleged and sometimes confirmed Russian nuclear and dual-use exports

to countries of proliferation concern was becoming a greater source of contention between the

two countries. In turn, during the mid-1990s after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, there

apparently also was an “informal but heated debate” among Russian political-military decision-

makers as to whether to revise Russia’s traditional support for non-proliferation. Ultimately, the

answer was not to do so.29

Within the NPT structure, the accession of China but especially France to the NPT in

1992 created not so much an obstacle to cooperation as much as a new complication for the

earlier pattern of very direct consultations between Washington and Moscow as equal leaders on

NPT matters. With the other two NWS now Parties to the Treaty, a new pattern of consultations

28

Conversation with author with U.S. participant. 29

Vladimir Orlov, “Russia’s Policy on Nonproliferation Under Putin,” PONARS Policy Memo 131, Center for

Policy Studies in Russia (PIR Center), April 2000, pp. 2-3.

21

increasingly emerged in which the United States engaged first with the United Kingdom, next

with France and the United Kingdom, then the three Depositaries, and followed eventually by all

of the P5 NPT states.30

At least for the 1995 Conference, however, this de facto change of

Moscow’s place in the order of U.S. consultations does not appear to have impeded

cooperation.31

Dimensions of U.S.-Russian Cooperation. Beginning as early as 1991, there were close

consultations among the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom as the three NPT

depositaries to develop strategy for the upcoming 1995 extension decision at the Review and

Extension Conference.32

Early on, Washington and Moscow – as well as the United Kingdom

and other likeminded countries – all agreed that the goal should be Indefinite Extension as the

“optimum outcome”. Continuing consultations among the three depositaries were characterized

by “real conversations among equal states joined in this responsibility to do Indefinite NPT

Extension.33

Over time, genuine trust, confidence, and strong professional and personal

relationships built up, including via coordination and cooperation in the Preparatory Process for

the 1995 Conference. At times, some persons in the U.S. and Russian governments – as well as

others involved in this consultative process – questioned whether the Indefinite Extension goal

could be achieved. But the initial agreement on that goal was not reconsidered.

As the Review and Extension Conference approached, the United States, Russia, and

others including France, Canada, Japan, and Australia coordinated to use their diplomatic

influence to encourage support for Indefinite Extension. Unlike at the time of negotiation of the

30

This point is based on the author’s conversations with two senior U.S. participants in the 1995 Indefinite

Extension process. 31

Later, this change in Moscow’s NPT relationship with the United States – along with the reduced role of the

Depositaries after Indefinite Extension – may have made cooperation more difficult. Point made to the author by a

senior U.S. participant in later Review Conferences. 32

The following draws heavily on Graham, Disarmament Sketches, passim as well as on conversations with

directly-involved U.S. participants. 33

Conversation by author with one of the U.S. participants.

22

NPT, however, Moscow had fewer “special relationships” with other countries than the United

States or some other supporters of Indefinite Extension that it could use to influence those

countries’ positions – but it put its diplomatic weight behind the goal.

U.S.-Russian consultations and coordination continued into the Conference. Russia was

part of a very small group of countries that led by Ambassador Graham met daily to discuss the

state of play and refine strategy for Indefinite Extension. In parallel with this group, the two

countries also shared information on the evolving positions of other countries.34

Of particular importance, on the eve of the Conference, Russian Ambassador Grigori

Berdennikov had proposed in a March, 1995 Western Group meeting in Geneva that supporters

of Indefinite Extension come up with a way to demonstrate that support for Indefinite

Extension.35

At the Conference, Canada took the lead in gaining co-sponsors for a resolution

stating the Conference’s decision that “. . . the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely.” By

May 4th

just before the deadline to present such resolutions, 90 countries had signed it (that being

a minimum legal majority of the 178 States Parties as of that date); as of May 11th

, when the

Conference took the consensus decision to extend the NPT without a vote, 111 countries had

done so.36

The support for the Canadian resolution demonstrated that the votes were there for

Indefinite Extension – if a consensus decision without a vote could not be reached.

When it occurred, Indefinite Extension was part of a package of three proposals put

forward on May 11th

by Conference President Jayantha Dhanapala and agreed by the Parties –

the others were agreement on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and

Disarmament” and “Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty”. Along with decisions on

these three proposals, the Parties also approved what would become known as the Middle East

34

Conversation by author with one of the U.S. participants. 35

Rauf and Johnson, After the NPT’s Indefinite Extension, p. 33. 36

Rauf and Johnson, After the NPT’s Indefinite Extension, p. 33.

23

Resolution. 37

In the closing negotiations over this Resolution, U.S.-Russian cooperation was

critical – and proved absolutely essential to achieving consensus Indefinite Extension without a

vote.

Specifically, by the very last days of the Conference, agreement had been reached on

what would become the decisions on “Principles and Objectives” and on “Strengthened

Review”, thereby solidifying support for Indefinite Extension among most Parties. 38

However,

the key to gaining acquiescence of Egypt and other Arab states in Indefinite Extension without a

vote was finding a compromise on the final part of the package, that is, what would become the

Resolution on the Middle East. There were many difficult points of contention to be resolved,

with the United States and Egypt as the key protagonists. As negotiations among a small group

of countries continued deep in the basement of the United Nations on night of May 10th

, the final

stumbling block to agreement was U.S. rejection of Egypt’s formulation that the Middle East

resolution specifically name the non-Parties to the NPT in the Middle East, including but not

limited only to Israel. With this disagreement continuing, representatives from Djibouti, Oman,

and the United Arab Emirates (then also non-NPT Parties in the Middle East) entered the room

and made clear that they did not want to be explicitly identified in the resolution and urged to

join the NPT. In response to their intervention in the negotiations, the language was changed to

call only on “all States of the Middle East that have not yet done so” to join the NPT.

A new obstacle to Indefinite Extension by consensus suddenly then arose. Following that

change of language, Egypt and the other Arab NPT Parties present in the room refused to co-

37

As ultimately agreed, the key clauses in the Middle East Resolution called for universal adherence to the NPT and

for “all States of the Middle East that have not yet done so, without exception, to accede to the Treaty as soon as

possible”; for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass

destruction; and for all NPT Parties to “extend their cooperation and to exert their utmost efforts” to achieve that

zone’s establishment. 38

The following account draws heavily on Graham, Disarmament Sketches, pp.271-272, and on the author’s

conversations with U.S. participants present during the very end game.

24

sponsor the resolution on the Middle East. They did indicate, however, that they would accept

the resolution if someone else sponsored it. Conference President Jayantha Dhanapala made

clear that he could not be the sponsor; instead, he suggested that perhaps the resolution could be

sponsored by the three NPT depositaries. Ambassador Graham stated U.S. readiness to co-

sponsor – and that he would consult with the UK and Russian delegation leaders, neither of

whom was present. Quickly the UK agreed while the Russian delegation leader, Sergei Kislyak,

said that he thought that Russia would be able to co-sponsor but that he would need to check

overnight with Moscow. The next morning, he confirmed that Moscow had agreed to do so.39

A few hours later on May 11th

Dhanapala, gaveled through agreement to the package of

three decisions and then to the Middle East Resolution. With cooperation between the United

States and Russia – and among many other like-minded countries – Indefinite Extension by

consensus without a vote had been successfully achieved.40

Without Kislyak’s concurrence for

Moscow, the alternative would have been a vote on Indefinite Extension.41

Almost certainly, the

co-sponsors of the Canadian resolution joined by other countries would have held firm and voted

for Indefinite Extension along with the “Principles and Objectives” and the “Strengthened

Review” decisions. But most definitely, the legitimacy of Indefinite Extension was greatly

strengthened by its having been a decision taken by consensus without a vote – and by Egypt and

other Arab NPT Parties being part of that decision.

Explanations of Successful Cooperation. Once again, both the United States and Russia

had a strong common interest in the NPT and its Indefinite Extension. That interest was

39

On the morning of May 11th

, Iran and Syria raised last minute concerns that led to a delay in adoption of the

package of decisions but which were resolved. Rebecca Johnson, “NPT extended indefinitely without a vote,” NPT

Update # 20, May 12, 1995. 40

For the May 11th

events, see Rauf and Johnson, After the NPT’s Indefinite Extension. 41

A complete breakdown of the process can be ruled out given that the Treaty itself required that a decision be

taken.

25

reinforced by responsibility as Depositaries (along with the United Kingdom) for the extension

decision – and for the initial creation of the NPT. There also were no specific tough NPT-related

issues that divided Washington and Moscow that needed to be resolved.

In turn, at least at this juncture in the broader U.S.-Russia political-military relationship,

as already noted, the issues that soon would increasingly divide the two countries and steadily

worsen that relationship were still to come. From NATO enlargement to U.S. withdrawal from

the ABM Treaty, key events were in the future. Similarly, a strong and widespread Russian

sentiment had not yet solidified that Russia, at best, had been badly served by the relationship

with the United States after the Cold War and, at worst, had been betrayed. The shift from

President Yeltsin to President Putin also had yet to take place.

Regarding institutions and people, despite some apparent rethinking, institutional support

for non-proliferation and the NPT remained strong in Moscow. Perhaps even more important,

within the United States, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency still existed.42

From the

start of U.S. planning and preparations for NPT extension, ACDA provided a strong institutional

base on NPT matters existed – separate from the State Department and Defense Department

bureaucracies, able to deal directly with the White House, and able to take the lead at home and

diplomatically abroad. Within ACDA, Ambassador Graham – supported by Susan Burk and

ACDA staff – became the leading voice for Indefinite Extension within the United States but

also in consultations with Russia and many other NPT Parties.43

Finally, during the course of the preparations for the 1995 Review and Extension

Conference robust professional and personal relationships had developed between key U.S. and

Russian players, not least, Thomas Graham and Sergei Kislyak. Trust and confidence had

42

ACDA would not be abolished until 1999 as part of a deal to gain U.S. Senate support for ratification of the

Chemical Weapons Convention. 43

Conversation with a U.S. participant.

26

developed. These relationships almost certainly paid off during the Conference and most

importantly at the very end when Graham approached Kislyak to seek Russian co-sponsorship of

the Middle East Resolution. Not to be overlooked regarding the role of people, Grigori

Berdennikov had been the Victor Israelyan’s deputy at the Conference on Disarmament ten years

earlier at the 1985 NPT Review Conference.

Some Possible Lessons – and their Implications for Future U.S.-Russian NPT Cooperation

Running throughout each of these snapshots, shared interests in non-proliferation and the

NPT repeatedly provided the underlying foundation for U.S.-Russian cooperation. So viewed, a

first lesson for future U.S.-Russian cooperation is the need to “go back to basic”, that is, for a full

and frank official dialogue on both countries’ NPT-related interests. Though both countries

share opposition to what almost certainly will be negotiation of a Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty

as well as common rhetoric that such negotiation will undermine the NPT, what is their shared

stake in an effective and legitimate NPT? How might such legitimacy and effectiveness erode in

the years ahead, perhaps accelerated by the long-avoided back-to-back failure of Review

Conferences if the 2020 Conference repeats the pattern of the 2015 one. Most important, what

are the two countries – together and with others – prepared to do to protect shared interests in the

NPT as the key-stone of the global non-proliferation structure – and what are the most important

obstacles to any such cooperation?

During the Cold War, NPT cooperation between Washington and Moscow took place

within a broader process of bilateral non-proliferation engagement. This dimension was

especially evident immediately before and after the 1985 NPT Review Conference and suggests

a second lesson. Once again, there is a strong argument to reestablish a high-level, sustained

27

process of bilateral non-proliferation consultations, including on NPT.44

Substantively, those

consultations would provide a venue within which to “go back to basics.” Restored high-level

consultations also could help create bureaucratic and institutional centers-of-gravity committed

to rebuilding habits of cooperation in each country. Equally important, reestablishing the earlier

pattern of bilateral non-proliferation consultations once again would signal both countries’

readiness to rebuild habits of cooperation, including eventually on the wider set of strategic

issues now dividing them. Renewed high-level U.S.-Russia bilateral consultations would not

replace the existing interactions within the P-5 process but also would need to be harmonized

with those consultations as well as other bilateral U.S. consultations on non-proliferation-NPT

matters.

As one way forward, a new Trump Administration should seriously consider putting

forward such a proposal. That step likely would require a U.S. readiness to lift some of the

restraints on military-to-military and defense contacts put in place after the Russian annexation

of Crimea. There is a clear precedent: Moscow’s 1984 proposal for high-level U.S.-Soviet non-

proliferation bilateral consultations. Or a jointly-agreed initiative to renew high-level NPT and

non-proliferation engagement would be consistent with post-U.S. election indications that both

President-elect Trump and President Putin may be prepared to explore ways to “normalize” the

overall relationship and to rebuild cooperation on a range of issues yet to be determined.45

44

A similar proposal also has been made by Robert Einhorn “Prospects for U.S.-Russian nonproliferation

cooperation,” Brookings, February 26, 2016; also, see Dunn, “Redefining the U.S. Agenda for Nuclear

Disarmament”, pp.60-61. 45

See Ilya Khrennikov, “Putin, Trump Discussed Ways to Normalize U.S.-Russia Relations”, November 14, 2016,

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-11-14/putin-trump-discussed-ways-to-normalize-u-s-russia-

relations; for one set of U.S. experts’ views post-election on the possibility for change, see “Survey: What Will a

Trump Presidency Mean for US-Russia Relations?”, November 17, 2016

https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/survey-what-will-trump-presidency-mean-us-russia-relations.

28

From the professional and personal relationships between Bunn and Timerbaev (NPT

negotiations) through Kennedy/Dunn and Petrovsky/Israelyan (sustaining NPT) to those between

Graham and Kislyak (NPT Indefinite Extension), a further lesson is that strong working ties

repeatedly contributed to the success of Moscow and Washington in resolving the tough NPT-

related issues dividing them and carrying forward their shared objectives. Both Washington and

Moscow should explore initiatives to reestablish such professional and personal relationships in

support of non-proliferation and NPT cooperation.

Specifically, over time, a rebuilt process of formal high-level bilateral consultations could

well help to do so. In parallel, however, other approaches should be explored – both for building

ties and for their substantive payoffs. Joint analyses could be undertaken by officials-experts of

pressing NPT-related issues, e.g., revisiting the lessons learned from earlier U.S.-Russian

technical analysis of nuclear-warhead verification; reducing risk of use of nuclear weapons in a

proliferation-related crisis; and actions that the United States and Russia could take to reduce to

an absolute minimum any risk of accidental or unintentional detonation of a nuclear weapon. Or

joint U.S.-Russian non-proliferation-NPT gaming by officials-experts from both countries could

be undertaken, e.g., on the evolution and consequences of North Korea’s deployment of nuclear

weapons, how the upcoming Nuclear Weapon Ban negotiations are likely to play out, or further

down the road on the 2020 Review Conference.

The importance of external developments at home and abroad in repeatedly reinforcing

the prospects for successful U.S.-Russian NPT-related cooperation is a further lesson. At least

three such developments are on the horizon – one immediate, the other nearer-term, and the

timing uncertain of the third one. Each comprises a critical wild card with implications for

rebuilding cooperation between Washington and Moscow on NPT-related issues (including on

29

the broader strategic nuclear relationship and further actions to meet both countries’ Article VI

nuclear disarmament obligation).

The most obvious and immediate of these developments is the inauguration of Donald

Trump as U.S. President on January 20, 2017 and a new Trump administration. As already

suggested, the result is likely to be renewed efforts by both Washington and Moscow to improve

their relationship. It remains to be seen what issues will be put on the table, in what ways, and

how far it will be possible to reverse today’s political-military confrontation. That said,

leadership change stands out again as important if uncertain external opportunity, including for

NPT and wider non-proliferation cooperation.

Very differently, it is almost certain that by the 2020 NPT Review Conference (if not

sooner), non-nuclear-weapon State activists and others – supported and prodded by advocacy

NGOs – will successfully negotiate and open for signature a Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty. How

many non-nuclear-weapon states will adhere is a matter of speculation. But if the vote of 123

countries in favor of the UN First Committee Resolution establishing these negotiations is a

guide, the number is very likely to be more rather than fewer adherents. Carrying forward the

themes of the Humanitarian Movement but now adding action, successful ban negotiations will

further change the global nuclear disarmament debate and the overall global nuclear landscape –

even though it will not eliminate a single nuclear weapon. More important, concerns expressed

by the United States, Russia, and other Ban skeptics about the corrosive impact on the legitimacy

and effectiveness of the NPT may prove not simply “good talking points” but accurate

projections.

In response to this changed landscape, it is becoming ever more important for the United

States and Russia – along with the other NPT nuclear-weapon states – to identify and pursue

30

cooperatively new approaches to regain the nuclear disarmament initiative. One priority area

would be cooperation to reduce to an absolute minimum the risk of use of a nuclear weapon.

This step would greatly help to counter arguments from within the Humanitarian Movement that

nuclear risk is significant and increasing – and in so doing, lessen the momentum behind

negotiation of a nuclear-weapon ban.46

The coming deployment by North Korea of a nuclear-armed missile capable of

destroying an American city is the third external development wild card. Suffice it here only to

set out three propositions, each germane to this closing discussion of implications for rebuilding

U.S.-Russian NPT-related cooperation.47

First, though the exact timing of this North Korean

nuclear missile threat to the American homeland is uncertain, it would be no surprise were it to

occur sooner rather than later in a Trump administration. Second, this external development will

trigger an intense domestic U.S. official and public debate about military requirements –

offenses, defenses, and cyber, in the theater, across the Pacific, at home, and in space – to protect

the American public from an unstable North Korean leader armed with nuclear weapons. Third,

as this debate unfolds, both Washington and Moscow will face a fundamental choice: Whether to

craft a mutually-agreed pathway back to engagement and cooperation on the full-spectrum of

strategic issues now dividing them in order to manage and minimize the unavoidable spillovers

of U.S. responses to a North Korean nuclear missile threat to the American homeland for the

U.S.-Russian strategic relationship – or each to act unilaterally, the United States to protect itself

regardless of any spillovers and Russia to react to those spillovers.

A Concluding Thought

46

As an aside, part of doing so needs to be actions by the five NPT nuclear-weapon states – either bilaterally as with

the United States and Russia or as a grouping – to address the concerns raised by the Humanitarian Movement about

the risk of use of nuclear weapons. See Dunn, “Redefining the U.S. Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament”, pp. 71-72. 47

For elaboration of these propositions, see Dunn, “Redefining the U.S. Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament”, pp. 67-

68.

31

Looking back at successful NPT cooperation between Washington and Moscow from the

NPT’s negotiation to its Indefinite Extension offers important lessons about the incentives,

obstacles, and reasons for successful cooperation. Looking ahead, there also are valuable lessons

and important implications to be drawn from that past experience. In that regard, just as in the

mid-1980s, today, the revitalization of high-level bilateral consultations and related direct

engagement on NPT issues may again be the first step toward a process of reengagement on the

fuller set of strategic issues now dividing the two countries. That outcome would serve both

countries’ continuing interests not only in the NPT but also in a more cooperative and stable

U.S.-Russian strategic relationship.