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ContentsListofmapsListofabbreviationsPlacenamespellingsAcknowledgementsIntroduction

1 PriortothestartofOperationCitadel2 July4thontheSouthernSalient3 July4thontheNorthernSalient4 July5thontheSouthernSalient5 July5thontheNorthernSalient6 July6thontheSouthernSalient7 July6thontheNorthernSalient8 July7thontheSouthernSalient9 July7thontheNorthernSalient10 July8thontheSouthernSalient11 July8thontheNorthernSalient12 July9thontheSouthernSalient13 July9thontheNorthernSalient14 July10thontheSouthernSalient15 July10thontheNorthernSalient16 July11thontheSouthernSalient17 July11thontheNorthernSalient18 July12thontheSouthernSalient19 July12thontheNorthernSalient20 July13thontheSouthernSalient21 July13thontheNorthernSalient22 July14thontheSouthernSalient23 July14thontheNorthernSalient24 July15thontheSouthernSalient

25 July15thontheNorthernSalient26 July16th-July31st27 August1st-August27th28 FinalThoughts

AppendicesI GermanOrderofBattleJuly4th1943II SovietOrderofBattleJuly4th1943III GermanArmoredStrengthsIV SovietArmoredStrengthsV AFVTechnicalDataVI GroundforcesstrengthsasofJuly4th1943VII AviationStrengthsVIII Casualties

Bibliography

ListofmapsMapsincoloursection.Map1 NorthernSalient,July4th1943–midnight.Map2 NorthernSalient,July5th1943–midnight.Map3 NorthernSalient,July6th1943–midnight.Map4 NorthernSalient,July7th1943–midnight.Map5 NorthernSalient,July8th1943–midnight.Map6 NorthernSalient,July10th1943–midnight.Map7 NorthernSalient,July12th1943–midnight.Map8 SouthernSalient,topographical.Map9 SouthernSalient,July5th1943–midnight.Map10 SouthernSalient,July6th1943–midnight.Map11 SouthernSalient,July7th1943–midnight.FirstmajorSovietcounter-attack.Map12 SouthernSalient,July8th1943–midnight.SecondmajorSovietcounter-attack.Map13 SouthernSalient,July9th1943–midnight.4thPzAresumesitsattack.Map14 SouthernSalient,July10th1943–midnight.Map15 SouthernSalient,July11th1943–midnight.Map16 SouthernSalient,July12th1943–midnight.Map17 SouthernSalient,July13th1943–midnight.

Map18 SouthernSalient,BattleforProkhorovka,July11th1943–midnight.2ndSSPzC’sattempttotakeProkhorovkabefore5thGTAfullyarrived.

Map19 SouthernSalient,BattleforProkhorovka,July12th1943–midnight.Theadvanceof2ndSSPzCafterRotmistrov’sassaultfailedtoencircletheGermans.

Map20 SouthernSalient,Counter-attackof1stTA,July12th1943–midnight.Thesectorretreatof48thPzCagainst1stTA’scounter-attack.

Map21 Kempf’sOffensive,July12th1943.3rdPzC’sadvance.

Map22 OrelSalient,July11th1943–midnight.DeploymentsatthestartofOperationKutuzov.

Largermapsheetslocatedinsiderearcoverofbook.Map23 SouthernSalient,largetopographical.

Map24 SouthernSalient,PrimaryAxis,July5th1943.Openingdayfor48thPzCand2ndSSPzC.

Map25 SouthernSalient,July8th1943.Sovietarmoredcounter-attack.Map26A SouthernSalient,July9th1943.2ndSSPzCoffensive.Map26B SouthernSalient,July10th1943.2ndSSPzCoffensive.Map26C SouthernSalient,July11th1943.2ndSSPzCoffensive.Map27 SouthernSalient,July12th1943.DefenseofProkhorovka.Map28 OrelSalient,OperationKutuzov,July12th-August16th1943.Map29 Proposedalternateoffensive,SouthernSalient,July12th1943.

ListofabbreviationsAAR Anti-tankArtilleryRegimentAB ArtilleryBrigadeAD AssaultDivisionAGC ArmyGroupCentreAGS ArmyGroupSouthAR Anti-tankRegimentATR Anti-tankRegimentCP CommandPostDATR DestroyerAnti-tankRegimentDR SSDasReichDivisionGA GuardsArmyGAD GuardsAirborneDivisionGAR GuardsAirborneRegimentGCC GuardsCavalryCorpsGD GrossdeutschlandDivisionGMRB GuardsMotorizedRifleBrigadeGMC GuardsMechanizedCorpsGR GrenadierRegimentGRC GuardsRifleCorpsGRD GuardsRifleDivisionGRR GuardsRifleRegimentGTA GuardsTankArmyGTB GuardsTankBrigadeGTC GuardsTankCorpsGTDR GuardsTankDestroyerRegimentGTR GuardsTankRegimentIC InfantryorArmyCorpsID InfantryDivisionKSF KomsomoletsStateFarm

LAH SSLeibstandarteAdolfHitlerDivisionMRB MotorizedRifleBrigadeOP ObservationPostOSF OktiabrskiStateFarmPzC PanzerCorpsPzD PanzerDivisionPzGD PanzerGrenadierDivisionPzGR PanzerGrenadierRegimentPzR PanzerRegimentRD RifleDivisionRLR RocketLauncherRegimentRR RifleRegimentSD SecurityDivisionsPzAbt HeavyTankDetachmentsPzR HeavyTankRegimentSSDR SSDasReichDivisionSSTK SSTotenkopfDivisionStuGAbt AssaultGunDetachmentStPzAbt AssaultPanzerDetachmentTA TankArmyTB TankBrigadeTC TankCorpsTDB TankDestroyerBrigadeTDR TankDestroyerRegimentTK SSTotenkopfDivisionTR TankRegimentVA AirArmyVVS AirForce(Soviet)

CodeSourceListSeebibliographyforfulldetailsofeachtitle.

Code Author Titleaaa AtlasoftheSecondWorldWar(Collins)

agk PatrickAgte MichaelWittmannandtheWaffen-SSTigerCommandersoftheLeibstandarteinWWIIVolume1

asz AlbertSeaton TheRusso-GermanWar1941-45

awk AlexanderWerth RussiaatWar1941-1945cbk ChristerBergstrom Kursk:TheAirBattle,July1943cby ChrisBellamy AbsoluteWar:SovietRussiaintheSecondWorldWarcbz CorrelliBarnett Hitler’sGenerals

dga DavidM.Glantz AfterStalingrad:TheRedArmy’sWinterOffensive1942-1943

dgk DavidM.Glantz&JonathanHouse TheBattleofKursk

dgn DavidM.Glantz FromtheDontotheDnepr:SovietOffensiveOperations,December1942–August1943

dgr DavidM.Glantz TheBattleforKursk,1943:TheSovietGeneralStaffStudy

dlu DidierLodieu III.Pz.KorpsatKurskdpv DavidPorter FifthGuardsTankArmyatKursk12July,1943

eru ErhardRaus&StevenH.Newton

PanzerOperations:TheEasternFrontMemoirofGeneralRaus,1941-1945

evm ErichvonManstein LostVictories:TheWarMemoirsofHitler’sMostBrilliantGeneral

ezz EarlZiemke StalingradtoBerlin:TheGermanDefeatintheEastfkk FranzKurowski OperationZitadelle,July1943

fmz F.W.vonMellenthin PanzerBattles:AStudyoftheEmploymentofArmorintheSecondWorldWar

fwl Franz-WilhelmLochmannetal

TheCombatHistoryofGermanTigerTankBattalion503inWorldWarII

fzk FranzKurowski PanzerAcesgjz GeoffreyJukes StalingradtoKursk:TriumphoftheRedArmy

gmn GeorgeM.NipeJr DecisionintheUkraine:GermanPanzerOperationsontheEasternFront,Summer1943

gnk GeorgeM.NipeJr Blood,Steel,andMyth:TheII.SS-Panzer-KorpsandtheRoadtoProchorowka

gnv GeorgeM.NipeJrLastVictoryinRussia:TheSS-PanzerkorpsandManstein’sKharkovCounteroffensive,February-March1943

hjj Hans-JoachimJung TheHistoryofPanzerregiment“Grossdeutschland”hsz HelmuthSpaeter HistoryofthePanzerkorpsGrossdeutschlandhzs HaroldShukman Stalin’sGenerals

je JohnErickson TheRoadtoBerlin:Stalin’sWarwithGermanyVolume2

jp JanuszPiekalkiewicz OperationCitadel:KurskandOrel,theGreatestTankBattleoftheSecondWorldWar

kcz KeithCumins Cataclysm:TheWarontheEasternFront1941-45

kfz FranzKurowski Panzerkrieg:AnOverviewofGermanArmoredOperationsinWorldWar2

knz KamenNevenkin FireBrigades:ThePanzerDivisions1943-1945

kuc KarlUllrich LikeaCliffintheOcean:AHistoryofthe3rdSS-Panzer-DivisionTotenkopf

lck LloydClark Kursk:TheGreatestBattle

mck ChrisMann SS-Totenkopf:TheHistoryofthe‘Death’sHead’Division1940-45

mhz MarkHealy Zitadelle:TheGermanOffensiveAgainsttheKurskSalient4-17July1943

mjk MichaelJones TotalWar:FromStalingradtoBerlinrb RupertButler Hitler’sDeath’sHeadDivisionrck RobinCross Citadel:TheBattleofKurskrmk RobertM.Citino TheWehrmachtRetreats:FightingaLostWar,1943sgf StephenG.Fritz Ostkrieg:Hitler’sWarofExterminationintheEastsnk StevenH.Newton Kursk:TheGermanView

snz StevenH.Newton Hitler’sCommander:FieldMarshalWaltherModel-Hitler’sFavoriteGeneral

swm SamuelW.MitchamJr TheMenofBarbarossa:CommandersoftheGermanInvasionofRussia,1941

vdp DavidPorter DasReichDivisionatKursk:12July1943

vzz ValeriyZamulin DemolishingtheMyth:TheTankBattleatProkhorovka,Kursk,July1943:AnOperationalNarrative

wdk WalterS.DunnJr Kursk:Hitler’sGamble,1943wfz WillFey ArmorBattlesoftheWaffen-SSwwf WillFowler Kursk:TheVital24Hours

zds DennisShowalter Hitler’sPanzerszfk FranzKurowski PanzerAcesIIzmb MarkM.BoatnerIII TheBiographicalDictionaryofWorldWarIIzoc OttoCarius TigersintheMud

zom PeterMcCarthy&MikeSyron

Panzerkrieg:TheRiseandFallofHitler’sTankDivisions|

zow OttoWeidinger DasReichIVzra ColRichardN.Armstrong RedArmyTankCommanders:TheArmoredGuardszrl RudolfLehmann TheLeibstandarteIIIzro RichardOvery Russia’sWar:AHistoryoftheSovietEffort:1941-1945

zsm SamuelW.MitchamJr PanzerLegions:AGuidetotheGermanArmyTankDivisionsofWorldWarIIandTheirCommanders

ztc CharlesTrang Totenkopfzzk FranzKurowski InfantryAces

zzt ThomasL.JentzPanzertruppen2:TheCompleteGuidetotheCreation&CombatEmploymentofGermany’sTankForce1943-1945

zzy JohnPimlott TheAtlasofWorldWarIIzzz SimonGoodenough WarMaps

PlacenamespellingsPrimary AlternativeAlekseevka AlexejewkaBerezovka BeresowkaBerezov BeresoffBolyeMaiachki BolMajatschkiButovo ButowoBykovka BykowkaCherkasskoe TscherkasskojeDubrova DubrowaGertsovka GerzowkaGrenoe GresnojeGremuchi GremutschyIakovlevo JakowlewoIasnaiaPoliana JasnajaPoljanaIvanovka IwanowkaKalinovka KalinowkaKartashevka KartaschewkaKiselevo KisselewoKochetovka KotschetowkaKozmo-Demianovka KismaDemanowka

KrasnyiPochinok KrassnyiPotschinokLuchkiNorth LutschkiNordLuchkiSouth LutschkiSudLukhanino LuchaninoMalyeIablonovo MalJablonowoMalyeMaiachki MalMajatschkiMikhailovka MichailowskojeNepkhaevo NepchajewoNovenkoe Nowenkoje

Ozerowski OserowskijPetrovski PetrowskijPolezhaev PoleshajewPushkarnoe PuschkamojeRakovo RakowoRzhavets RshawezSmorodino SsmorodinoStorozhevoe StoroshewojeSukhoSolotino SsuchSsolotinoSyrtsev SsyrzewSyrtsevo SsyrtsewoTernovka TernowkaTeterevinoNorth TeterewinoNordTeterevinoSouth TeterewinoSudVasilevka WassiljewkaVerkhopenie WerchopenjeVesselyi WesselyiVinogradovka WinogradowkaVisloe WisslojeZavidovka SavidovkaZhimolostnoe ShilomostnojeZhuravlinyi Shurawlinyi

IAcknowledgements

wouldliketodedicatethisbooktomyfatherandfather-in-lawwhowerebothveteransandintheir ownway generated inme a deep interest and respect for themen and events of the

SecondWorldWar.IwouldalsoliketodedicatethisbooktomynephewAlex,whosadlyleftusmuchtoosoon.

Hewillbeinourheartsforalways.Iwouldlike to thankmyfriendsDuncanandPaul,whoprovidedsageadviceandassistance

when it wasmost needed. In addition, I would also like to thankmy dear wife for her help,patienceandunderstanding.

TIntroduction

hisstudy,whichfocusesontheoperationalaspectsofthisimportantcampaignanditsfar-reachingimpactonthewar, is tryingtoachievetwoobjectives.Thefirst is toprovidea

comprehensivelookatthebattleeventsfromwithineachcorpssectordrivingdowntodivisionalandwherever possible regimental level.With the action discussed chronologically from corpssector to corps sector, there are times when the discussion is hectic, multi-directional andsometimes a little perplexing. To assist the readerwith this avalanche of information, a smallamountofredundancyisintroducedintothenarrativetoreducethenumberoftimesthereaderhasto stop and go back to refresh hismemory on a related thread of thought. For example on theboundary linebetweenLAH andSSDR is a fortified hill protectedwith plenty of artillery thatcould strikebothdivisions.LAH fought and captured the hill in themorning. In late afternoon,whichcouldbepageslaterinthebook,DasReichapproachedthenearbyareathatwouldhavebeenunderenemyartilleryrangepriortotheLAHcapture.AspartofthediscussionofSSDR’sactivityinthearea,abriefmentionofLAHtakingthehillearlierinthedayandtheimpactithadonSSDR is alsomentioned. There are also times during day-long engagementswhen differentstages of the battle are mentioned, sometimes pages apart and a reminder is made of earlierevents.Thereisalsosomeoverlapwhendifferentcombatantsreviewthesameengagementfromtheirperspective.Thebattlezonesforthenorthernandsouthernsalienthavedifferentcomplexitiesandthestory

formats are laid out differently to respond to those complexities. In the north, where theengagementswerefewer,moredirectinnatureandfoughtinamoreconfinedarea,thelistingsareseparatedonlybydayandtimewithnoregardtocorpssector.Inthesouthernsalientthebattlezonewaslargerandthebattleactionwasmoreplentiful,whereactionsinonecorpssectorwouldhavegreaterimpactonanothercorpssector.Assuchitisnecessarytoseparatethebattleactionfurthertomakethenarrativeeasiertounderstand.So,inthesouththebattleactionisdividedbydayandhourforeachpanzercorpssector.Thecoveragebeginswiththe2ndSSPzCfollowedby48thPzCanditendswiththe3rdPzC.Thereisalsocoverageoftheinfantrycorpsontheextremeflankswhichisincludedinthenearestpanzercorpssector.ThenarrativeisdrivenbytheGermanadvanceandasmentionedbeforeisdivided,atleastin

the southern salient, by the 3 primary panzer corps that participated in the assault. I believeviewingtheoverallcampaignintheformatchosenhascertainadvantages,providingadifferentperspectivethanstrictlycoveringthebattlesequencedivisionbydivisionorbysectorbysectoronly.Withtheseriousstudentstudyingthisbookalongwiththeotherkeytextsinthefield,onecangrasp some of the subtle nuances of the campaign thatmight have otherwise been overlooked.Choosingthisformathighlightstheordealsthecorpscommanderswerefacingonanygivenday.

Knobelsdorff,HausserandKempfhaddifferentresponsibilitiesandfaceddifferentproblemsandthey,with their distinct experiences and resources, overcame thedifferent terrain,weather andSovietresistanceintheirownway.SovietGeneralsChistiakov,Katukov,Shumilov,Rotmistrovand Zhadov also receive a fair amount of attention but the most critical attention is given toGeneralsHoth,Vatutin,RokossovskyandModel.Thereisanothercomplexitytoconsider.Thiscampaignwasdynamic,foreverchanging,attacks

and counter-attacks occurring simultaneously within individual battles. During the day anobjectiveachievedcouldbelostduringthenightwithanenemycounter-attack.Ithappenedmanytimes that the Germans would have to recapture the same village or hill several times. TheSovietsweretenaciousaboutrecapturinglostground,attackingtheflanksandgettingbehindthefront line towreak constant havocon theGermans.By covering eachof these episodeswhichcouldbepagesapartmaybealittleconfusingbutitcouldnotbehelpedifthestorylinewastobeadheredto.If thiscomplexitywasnotenough, thereadermustalsobeawareof theblizzardoforder changes Vatutin instituted from the very beginning of the campaign. To stay true to thechronology,thesechangesarealsoincludedinthenarrative.WhiletheGermansidehastheleadingrole,theSovietsideisfarfromneglected.I’vetriedto

stay neutral, not favoring either side. The many counter-attacks ordered by Vatutin andRokossovskyaregivenamplespace.Thecoverageisalsoextendedbeyondmid-JulytoalmosttheendofAugustandincludesminor

coverageoftheeventsofOperationKutuzovinthenorthandOperationRumyantsevinthesouth.RegrettablyitwasnotpossibletogivetheseoperationsasdeepcoverageasOperationCitadel.IjustwantedtoshowthatafterOperationCitadelwascancelled,theGermans,intheirweakenedstate,stillhadmanyproblemstocontendwith.Thesecondobjectiveistocreateahandyreferenceguideforthosereaderswhodesirefurther

studyofthisimportant,revealingcampaign,enablingthemtolook-upkeyinformationonaselectbasis.ToaccomplishthisgoalanextensiveindexisprovidedandI’veaddedacodeoraseriesofcodestomostparagraphsthatwillpointthereadertoothersourcesofrelatedorsupplementalmaterial.Inmostcasesthisadditionalmaterialisharmonioustothisbookbutinafewcasestheinformationisdifferent.Forexample,onesourcequotesthenumberofpanzersacertaindivisionhasorcarriesintoaspecificbattlewhileanothersourcequotesahighernumber.Overtheyearsthenumberoftanksavailableordestroyedhasvaried.I’vechosenwhatIbelieveistheaccuratenumberbutthereadershouldbeawarethatotheraccountsexist.Thisannotationisanattempttoprovidethereaderwithaswideascopeofinformationpossible.Thecodesystemissetupinthefollowingmanner.Theprefixisthreelettersthatdesignatethe

authorandsource.Theaccompanyingnumberisthepagenumberandwherethereisa“+”therearemultiple pages to study. These references are not created equal. Some are in depthwhileothers are fleeting. Some will be very helpful while others are less so – those marked withasterisksIfoundparticularlyuseful.Ifthecodeendswithan“m”thenitreferstoamapthatcouldbestudiedalongsidethetext.I’vealsosuppliedaseriesofmapsandhopefullybetweenmymapsandtheotherprovidedmapreferences,thereader’squestionswillbeanswered.Onmymaps,theGermanfrontlinerepresentstheareawheretheGermanshadreasonablyfirm

controloftheterritory.Inmanysituationsascoutingpartyorsmalladvancedcombatgrouphad

gone beyond the represented line but did not control the countryside sufficiently for it to beconsideredGerman terrain.Conversely,within the recognizedGerman territory there could beisolatedpocketsofresistancethatcouldlastfordaysafterthefrontlinemovednorth.Asdescribedabove thispresentation revolvesaround theoperationalaspectsof thiscritical

campaignandwhiletherearesomeanecdotalexperiencesincluded,it’snottheprimarythemeofthebook.

1

PriortothestartofOperationCitadelMarch1stZeitzlerwas thinkingofways to shorten the line and redeploy the troopsmoreefficiently.TheprocesswasalreadyunderwaywhenKurskwasdiscussed.ZeitzlerknewModelwouldnothavesufficientforcestoreachKursksohedecidedtotransferforcesfromtwooutsideareastoKursk.The first sourcewas atDemyansk. Itwas decided to finally evacuate the areawith its nearly100,000men.MostofthesemenwouldheadforKursk.TheotherevacuationlocationwasattheRzhev salient. The evacuation of Demyansk began on February 7th and took ten days whileelementsoffiveSovietarmiestriedtodestroythepocket.Itwasabrilliantmaneuver.TheRzhevevacuationwascalledOperationBuffaloanditbeganonMarch1st.Thisevacuationtook16daysandthelinefellbackasmuchas90milesinsomeplaces.Rzhev,Bely,VyazmawerelefttotheSovietsbynolaterthanMarch12th.LosingthissalientreducedtheGermanfrontageby230milesandfreed21divisionsfordutyelsewhere.swm126*.mhk46.asz354.asz357.zow130+.1

March10thFieldMarshal vonMansteinofferedHitler battle plans to attack and reduce theKursk salient.WhenHitlerrejectedhis“backhandplan”, theFieldMarshalwantedtheoffensiveoperationtostartinApril.Hitlerwashavingtroublewithhisallies;heneededanoffensivethatwouldregainthe initiative, restore his image and ease the concerns for the Axis partners. Von Manstein’salternateplantoattackthesalientlookedlikeanoffensivetoachievehispoliticalobjectives.Itwas limited in scope compared to Operation Barbarossa but if it succeeded would destroyseveralSovietarmies,alotofweaponryandshortenthefrontline.BetweenthelossatStalingradandNorthAfrica,theAxishadlost500,000men,maybemore.VonManstein,aveteranofWWI,quicklyshowedhisabilityasatalentedstrategist,oneofthebestintheWehrmachtandroseinthe ranks to Field Marshal and commander of an Army Group in relatively short order. Theoriginalplanwasfor48thPzCtoleadtheassaulttowardOboyan,whichwastheshortestroutetoKursk.The2ndSSPzCwouldstronglysupportthe48thPzC’srightflankinitsdrivenorth.The3rdPzCwouldparalleltheSSCorps,providingflankprotection.The11thICwouldprotecttherightflankandrearof3rdPzC.Itsoundedlikeagoodplanbutwhen3rdPzCcouldnotkeepuptotheother corps, it damaged the integrityof thewholearmyandHothandvonManstein shouldhave reacted but did not. lck176. awk679. zmb341+. ezz128+. zro198+. zro202. shn153.hsz106+.zrl202.zrl206+.asz353+.asz355m.asz358.zow131.dgk14.

March18th

After recapturing Kharkov, the 2nd SS PzC supported by the GD moved toward Belgorod,capturingitafterseveraldaysofheavyfighting.mhk48.dgn206+.

March22ndTheBritishUltramachinedetectedacommuniquécontainingdetailsofOperationCitadelanditwasimmediatelypassedalongtoStalin.lck182.shn155.

March23rdThe Soviet Operation Star and von Manstein’s counteroffensive that retakes Kharkov andBelgorodwindsdown.Withtherainyseasonabouttostartbothsideswouldbeunabletomoveuntilmid-MayorJuneandbesidesthefightinghadbeencontinuousforninemonthsandbothsideswereexhausted.SomeGermangeneralsthoughtthatitwasthepropertimeandplacetostayonthedefensive,allowingtheenemytofightitswaytoattritionandanegotiatedpeace.Thesesamegenerals also knew their dictatorwould never stay on the defensive, believing itwas safer toattackandforcetheenemyonthedefensive.ThissuccessfulGermancounteroffensiveformedthefrontlinefromwhichOperationCitadelstartedfrom.dgn209.hsz104+.zrl201.zow97.

April6thThe7thPzDwaspulledfromthefrontandsenttoBarvenkovo,southwestofIzyum,forrefit.Justlike6thPzD,the7thPzDhadafullcomplementofmenbutunlike6thPzD’s6thPzRwillbeshorta fewpanzersandotherheavyequipment.Whilebothof thesedivisionswouldstartOperationCitadel with over 100 panzers, the 19th PzD would be down 30% from establishment. HothslowlybeganassemblinghisforcestotheKharkovarea.knz214.fzk51.shn157.

April8thMarshals Zhukov andVasilevsky submitted battle plans for the summer in theKursk sector toStalin.TheplansnotonlyincludedthedefenseoftheKursksalientbutalsothecounteroffensivescalledOperationKutuzovandOperationRumyantsev.TheformeroperationwouldtargetAGCintheOrelsectorwhilethelaterwouldtargetthesouthernhalfaimedatrecapturingBelgorodandKharkov.Zhukovhadbeenbornintoapoorfamilywithnomilitaryheritagein1896inthesmallvillage

of Strelkovka not far fromKaluga.He struggled desperately for an education andwhenWWIbrokeouthewascalledupforactiveduty.Overtheyears,heprosperedintheserviceandwouldrise to be a Marshal and number two man, behind Stalin. He had major roles at Leningrad,Moscow,Stalingrad,andlaterBerlin,aswellashelpingformthebattleplansforthedefenseofKurskandthefollow-upoffensive.wwf30.hzs343+.zro198+.

April12thStalinconvenedawarmeetinginMoscowtodeterminewhatthesummeroffensivewouldbe,toseeifhecouldconvinceZhukovandVasilevskytoagreewithhispre-emptiveoffensive.Hewasin favor of attacking theGermans first from theKursk salient. Zhukov,Vasilevsky andStavka

wanted to stay on the defensive until the newGerman offensive petered out and then strike aweakenedenemyashardaspossible.Theyfavoredthe“backhandapproach”thatvonMansteinpromotedpreviouslytoHitler.StavkaandZhukov’spresentationtoStalinwasquiteconvincingandStalinagreedwithit.I have often wondered how history would have played out if Stalin had attacked first. It’s

possible itwouldhavebenefitedGermanymore thanactualeventsdid if theSoviets,who hadalready started assemblingmen in the area, had launched inMay or Junewhen their logisticswouldnothavebeenascompleteastheyhadbeeninJulyorwouldnothavehadthebenefitoftheextensive defenses that were built. In the last three months before Operation Citadel waslaunched,500,000railwaycarsfullofsuppliesandweaponswerebroughttotheKursksalient.GermanaerialrecondetectedmanyoftheselongtrainsheadingfromMoscowtotheKurskarea.lck180.awk681.ezz128+.zro198+.shn155.

April15thFromMunich,Hitler releasedOrder#6:OperationCitadel.Deploymentsandobjectiveswereexplained in much detail. The launch date for Citadel was set for May 3rd. Hitler toldKnobelsdorffandvonMellenthinthat48thPzCwouldbethemainspearheadtocaptureOboyanandthenKursk.Ifthecampaignwassuccessfulthefrontlinewouldbedramaticallyredrawn;thelinewouldrunfromeastofOrel–Kursk-Maloarkhangelsk-Prokhorovka-Belgorod-Kharkov.TheshorterlinewouldfreeupdivisionstobesenttoItalywhentheAlliesstruck.AnofficeratthemeetinghadtheaudacitytooffertheideathatwiththesuccessofOperationCitadel,Stalinmightbewillingtositdownatthebargainingtable.Thatideawasquicklyquieted.HitlerandZeitzlerjustwantedtodestroyafewSovietarmies,straightenoutthelineandregaintheinitiative.ThetwobiggestopponentstoOperationCitadelwereGeneralsModelandGuderian.Modelwantedto rebuild his 9th Army before tackling such a large offensive and Guderian, the InspectorGeneralofArmoredTroops,didnotwant theoffensiveatall.Hewas institutingaprogram torevitalize the Panzer arm and neededmore time to complete it.He knew ifOperationCitadelwentahead,itwoulddoomhisprogramwhichhefeltwouldbetheonlywayofprolongingthewar.VonMansteinalsoremindedhisbossthatRussia’stankproductionwasabout1,500tanksamonth, so the longer the delay themore tankswould be faced in the salient. swm127. lck178.lck182. fmz212++. fmz216. vzz26. vzz33. ezz128+. kfz445+. zro198. pck89. zrl201. mhk50.asz354.dgk2.Stalinalreadyhadacopyoftheorders;itwasobtainedbytheLucyspyringanddeliveredto

Moscow.Usingtheseplans,ZhukovdevisedadefensetoneutralizetheGermanoffense.Zhukovhad the time, about tenweeks, to supply the salient (about 500,000 freight carsworth) and tobring20%of theRedArmy to theareaaswell as30%of thearmorand25%of theRedAirForce.Hewasdetermined tobreak theGerman spell ofwinning summeroffensives. swm127.lck178.lck182.fmz217.mjk94.ezz133.shn153.

May4thDuringaconferenceinMunichbetweenHitlerandhistopofficers,ColGeneralJodlonceagainasked Hitler to cancel the offensive. Jodl believed new forces would be needed in the

Mediterranean and Balkans. Col General Guderian and Albert Speer also wanted to cancelCitadel. Guderian wanted the German Army to stay defensive for all of 1943 to allow arebuilding of the entireArmy.Modelwanted to delay it further untilmore new panzerswereavailableandhis9thArmycouldberebuiltbutKeitel,KlugeandHitlerwantedtheoffensivetolaunchsoonerratherthanlater.Hitlerwasobsessedwiththenewpanzersandwasconvincedthatdelayingthelaunchwouldbeworthwhiletohavemoreofthesesuperweaponsthat“wouldeasilypenetratetheenemy’sdefenses”.EventhoughKlugewasnotadedicatedNazi,hehadahabitoffollowingHitler’slead.KlugewasbornintoanaristocraticPrussianfamilyanditwasunusualforHitler to like and admire aristocrats, but he apparently likedKluge.Klugewaspart of theinvasion force of Poland as commander of 4thArmy as hewas in the invasion of France andOperation Barbarossa. Von Manstein had an aristocratic military background as well butunderstandably Hitler did not like him. swm130. cbz396+. mjk82. ezz129. fzk169. pck89+.mhk84.asz356+.dgk20.(May4th)By now the evacuation process of civilians in the Kursk salient was under way. 100,000

volunteerswouldremaintohelpbuildthedefenses.lck207.shn155.

May6thTheairwar in theKursk salient for theSoviets started in earnest for they expectedOperationCitadel to beginwithin theweek. For the next three daysGerman airfields and important railjunctionswerebombed.TheSovietsclaimeddestroying500planeswhilelosing122planesaswellasdestroyingtrainsanddisruptingGermanlogistics.DuringthisperiodtheSoviet2ndVA,16thVAand17thVAflewjustshyof10,000sorties.nzk75.cbk12m.zro202.

May7thInretaliationfortherecentairoffensiveintheKursksalientbytheSoviets,theLuftwaffebegananassaultonthreeindustrialcomplexes:thecitiesofGorki,SaratovandYaroslavl.Anestimated1,200sortiesweremadeandsincethistypeofstrategicbombingwasunusualfortheGermans,itcameasasurprisetotheSovietsandfewplaneswerelost.Another800sortiesweremadeattherail junctions at Kostornoe, Kursk, Arkhangesk and Elets. The German escorts also claimedshootingdown163Sovietfighterswhotried to intercedeatacostofonlysevenplanes.TheseattacksbroughtfurtherescalationbytheRedAirForce.nzk75.wwf48.

May10thThePantherproductionwasexperiencingproblemsandthepanzerwouldnotbereadyintime,soHitlerhadtopostponeCitadeluntilJune12th.AlbertSpeerassuredHitlertheproductionglitchwastakencareofandthattherewouldbe300PanthersfortheJune12thlaunch.Speerwastoooptimistic; by July 1st, only 12Pantherswere comingoff the assembly line eachweek.Therewould be only 192 Panthers forOperationCitadel plus four recovery vehicles.By the end of1943,Albert Speer hadworked out the production problems and by the end of thewar 6,000Panthershadbeenbuilt.Guderianknewof theproblemsassociatedwith launchingapanzerascomplicated as thePanther and tried to convinceHitler to cancelOperationCitadel.Guderian

alsotriedtohaveaMGmountedonthenewElefantsbutfailedthereaswell.swm130.snk73.lck184.zpm184+.shn152+.vzz27.mhk135.zow131.dgk20.InadditiontothePanther,therewereseveralotherdebutsforOperationCitadel.The“Elefant”

tank destroyer was larger and heavier than the Panther, weighing in at 64 tons or more andsportingan8.8cm21footlonggun.Ithadathickhide(200mminfront)liketheTigerbutitslackofmachinegunmadeitvulnerabletoinfantry.Despitehavingtwoengines,itwasslow,havingatop speed of around 12 mph over ground. Another weakness with the Elefant was its tracks,which were not sturdy enough and were prone to mine damage. The three Elefant battalionswouldbedeployedinthenorthernsalient.Theminiaturetanklikevehicle,namedGoliathafteritsinventor,wasusedasaremotedemolitiontool.Itranontrackslikeapanzerandwasdrivenbytwostartermotorspoweredbybatteries.Itwasfivefeetlong,twofoothighandalmostthreefeetwideandmostof themwouldcarryapayloadof132poundsofTNT.Theywouldbeused toclearapathinaminefield,clearbarbwireentanglements,destroyMGnestsandlargerbunkers.wwf27.wwf19.lck189.pck40.asz364.GoingagainstHitler’sordernottobuildanextensivetrenchsystemintheOrelsalient,Model

began planning a trench system just like the one built at the Rzhev salient that successfullyrepulsed a massive Soviet offensive. Though Model had years of experience, he made hisreputationbybeingagreatdefensivetacticianandfeltmoreateasewiththatrole.Forthegeneralto have to play offensive against an elaborate defense and a comparable commander like LtGeneral Konstantin Rokossovsky might have been asking too much. Though his strategy wasdifferentthanLtGeneralHermannHoth,whoreleasedallhispanzerdivisionsonthefirstdayascomparedtoholdingoutfourdaysbeforereleasingallhisreservepanzers,Modeldiduse300panzersandassaultgunsthefirstday.snz257.mjk82.ColGeneralHeinzGuderian,stillagainstOperationCitadel,wenttoseeAdolfHitlerandonce

againtriedtohavetheoperationcanceled.Hitler,thoughnotconfidenttoitssuccess,refusedtherequest.Hitlerwasalsoconcernedabouttwoothernearbyareaswhichmadethedictatormorecautiousandunwillingtotakechancesthanusual.NorthofOrelandsouthofKharkovweretwoareasinwhichtheSovietshadconcentratedlargeforces.HitlercouldnotaffordtoneglectthesepotentialhotspotswhendealingwithKursk.Therefusaltorelease24thPzCtovonMansteinwasagoodexampleofhisconcern.AlsointimidatingthedictatorwasthefactthatAxisforcesweresurrenderinginTunisiabythethousandsandthatitwouldbeonlyamatterofdaysforthefinalcapitulationandsurrender. Inall130,000Germanssurrendered.ThenextdayHitlerpostponedOperationCitadeluntilJuly.fmz216+.ezz128+.dgk55.fkz169.kfz444++.zro202.zow134.

June5thGeneralJeschonnekofOKLreportedtoGeneralGreimandHitlerthattheLuftwaffestrengthforOperation Citadel would be insufficient to guarantee control of the skies or to give adequategroundprotectionforallsectorsallofthetime.Hitlerdismissedthisinformation.Othergeneralstriedtotalkhimoutofthisoperationbutheignoredallattempts.Hehadmadeuphismindontheoffensiveandnothingwouldchangeit.fzk169.

June12th

TodaywassupposedtobethenewstartdateforOperationCitadelbutitwaspostponedagain.Hitlersetanewdate;thistimethestartdatewouldbebetweenJuly3rdandJuly6th.Thedictatorwantedanother36Panthersatthefront.WhenFMvonMansteinheardofanotherpostponement,hestronglyprotested,claimingtheSovietshadtoomuchtimetoprepareandthatnomatterhowmanynewpanzerswereavailable,theSovietsalientcouldnotbetaken.EventheOKWchimedin,whichwas unusual asHitler deliberately kept them away from the business of theEasternFront.AgainstHitler’sprotests, theOKWalsowanted tosee theoperationcanceled.swm132.lck182+.lck212.ezz131.zro202.shn152+.

June15thDuring a meeting in Berlin, German intelligence briefed Hitler and his OKH staff on SovietstrengthintheKursksalient.Thebriefingwasdismallyinaccurate.Forexample,itwasestimatedthattheSovietshadonly1,500tanksinsteadoftheapproximately5,000tankstheyactuallyhad.TheyalsoanticipatedRedforcesinthesectortobeaboutonemillionasopposedtothenearlytwomillionactuallypresent.(TheabovenumbersincludeSteppeFrontandotherattachmentstoVoronezhFront.)lck211.Hoth received aerial photos of theKursk salient. It showed the 10th TC had arrived in the

Oboyan region and other large columnsmovingwest fromVoronezh. Further concentrations offorceswereseenattheOskolRiveraswell.TheonlyconclusionHothcouldmakewasthattheSoviets knew ofOperationCitadel, and based on this knowledge, he adjusted his attack plan.HothlikedtheOboyanroutethebestbutdidacknowledgesomedisadvantagestoit.TheterrainleadingtothePselRiverwasruggedinspots;theriveritselfhadswampybanksinmanyareasandtherewereonlyafewgoodcrossingpoints.Thegroundtothenorthoftheriverwashigherthanthesouthernside,givingtheSovietsabigadvantage.Aslongasthe2ndSSCorpswassouthoftheTeterevino-Gresnoeline,theProkhorovkacorridorwasanidealexitpointforSoviettankstoattackthe48thPzC’seasternflankas it triedtocross thePsel.Hewouldneedaformidablepanzerforcetostoptheflankattackandthatwaswhyhechosethe2ndSSPzCforcenterduty.WiththeSSCorpsheadingtothenortheast,itwouldbecloserto3rdPzCandthetwocorpscouldmutuallyassisteachotherinattackingProkhorovka.Thebiggestchangeintheplanwasafter48thPzCcapturedCherkasskoe,thecorpswouldalsoshiftslightlytothenortheasttoparalleltheSSinordertokeepaunifiedfront.Theconceptofaunifiedfrontwaslogicalbutinmyopinionitwasnotexecutedverywell.AtrueshiftwouldmeantostayeastofthetroublesomePenaRivervalley and this clearly was not the case. In the Pena bend, the 3rd PzD and the 52nd IC gotthemselves into trouble and theGD divisionwas called on to save them. This detour byGDkilledtheirmomentumtothePselRiverandcreatedagapbetweenthetwopanzercorps.OnceProkhorovkaand/orOboyanwere captured,Hothhadno formalplans to reachKursk.

Thechoicesmadewoulddependoncircumstances.Hethoughtthetoughestpartofthecampaignwould be fighting through the first defensive belts, the first 15 to 18 miles. Once past theNovenkoe-TeterevinoNorthlinethegoingshouldbeeasier.Intheoryitwaspracticalbutthe3rdPzCwastoofarbehindtheSStogainmuchbenefitfrommutualsupport.TheGeneralwasclearlywrongonthisexpectationthoughhewasrighttobeconcernedthat4thPzAdidnothavesufficientpanzersormentoreachKursk,especiallyaftersuchalongdelay.Thereceiptof192Panthersdid

provide somecomfort; themachinehadpotentialbutwas feared for its rumored shortcomings.snk72++.snk76.hjj112+.zrl202+.Afterstudyingtheaerialphotosofeveryfootofthesouthernsalient,Hothandhisstaffworked

out a carefully laid plan of coordinated fire between the artillery batteries of the differentdivisions.Airraidswerealsoincludedintheplan.Hothknewthatcarefullyplacedshellingandaerialbombingwouldbeessential ifvictorywas tobe theirs.Hehadnofalsebeliefs that thiscampaignwouldbeeasy.Arigidtimetableforpreparationsbeforethelaunchwasalsofollowed.There was much to do before the attack and Hoth tried to be as efficient and organized aspossible.TheallottedbatteriesfortheSScorpsalonewereover24,000shellsandover9,000rocketsforthefirsthouroftheoperationfor7/5,withexplicit targetinstructions.Targetswerechosen from aerial photos and information obtained from prisoner interrogations and Sovietdeserters.fmz219.vzz32.zow135+.Over the weeks the aerial photos kept arriving, showing how the Soviet defenses kept

developingandgreaterforcewasbuildingtothewestoftheattackzone(40thArmysector).VonMansteinandHothconsideredmoving theaxisof attack further eastwhichmeant further southalso to avoid thewell organizeddefenses.They contemplateddriving as far east as theOskolRiverbutthenrejectedtheidea,stayingwiththeoriginalplan.Thisnewplanwouldentailgreaterdistances to travel and going deeper into enemy territory which meant greater risks ofencirclementanddestruction.AfterpleadinghiscasetovonManstein,HothreceivedGDandthenewPantherBrigade for 48th PzC to aid in combating the expected resistance on thewesternflankoftheoriginalattackaxis.HothanticipatedthatthisextraarmorwoulddowellincapturingandholdingOboyan,creatingawesternbridgeheadnorthof thePselRiverwhichwouldallowthe Panthers to strike eastward to assist the SS Corps whenmoving through the Prokhorovkacorridor.Neartheendofthemonth,HothsentneworderstohiscorpscommandersthatincludedtheprobableshifttowardProkhorovka.vzz32.zrl201+.

June20thHitlersetthenewlaunchdateofOperationCitadeltoJuly5th.AtaboutthissametimeMarshalZhukov,GeneralVoronov,GeneralSokolovskyandLtGeneralM.M.PopovcompletedthefinalpreparationsforOperationKutuzov.Thegeneralshadbeenplanning thisoffensivesinceApril.swm132.snk71.zrl209.dgk229+.

June23rdAn officer from 2nd TC picked up a German deserter, Heinz Schroeter, who had a completeOrderofBattleforboththeKurskandOrelsalients.ThoughtheSovietsalreadyhadknowledgeofthecampaign,thisnewconfirmationwasappreciated.zow132.

June27thOver the previous week, Soviet agents had been caught behind the line west of Belgorod,especiallyinthepanzerbivouactryingtopickupintel.snk74.

June29thAt night from the Kharkov-Akhtyrka area, the 4th PzA, 3rd PzC andGD began their journeynorthwardtotheirfinalstagingareasbeforeCitadelbegan.TheGDwouldsettleneartheVorsklaRivernorthwestofTomarovka.ForGD, the reconphotos showed theirattackzone tobehilly,wooded terrain, cut bymany streams and the lowlands extremelymarshy; not exactly optimalpanzerterrain.Andnorthofthisimmediategroundwasalongridgethatcouldnotbeseenpastuntilcaptured.Onthesouthsideoftheridgeitcouldbeseenthatthelandwasdottedwithtanktrapsandheavilyfortifiedbunkers.ThisgroundhadbeenreconnoitereduptothisfirstridgelineandHothbelievedhisforcescouldovercomeanyobstacles.Thereweretwodefensivetrencheswithinthefirstdefensivebelt.OnetrenchranthroughCherkasskoeandanothertothenorththatran throughDubrova.Hoernlein’sGDwould be the spearhead for the 48thPzC andwouldgostraightforthehighgroundtoobserveforartillery.Itssectorwouldbelessthantwomileswide.The11thPzDwouldbeontherightand3rdPzDontheleft.The3rdPzDwasassemblingnearZybino. The rest of 48th PzC was stationed in the Bogodukhov-Akhtyrka area to the west ofKharkov.Takingadifferentroutetoavoidcongestionitalsostartedmovingnorth.Thefrontlinewas not the problem, it was the terrain near theVorskla River and especially the PenaRiverwheretheterrainbecamereallydifficult.Theareahadreceivedalotofrainthatsummerandthatmadethoserivervalleysevenworse.IftheseobstaclescouldbeovercomethenthePselRivertothe north would have its own set of problems to be addressed. mhz192. fkk257+. kcz167.hsz108+.hsz112++.snk70.fmz218+.zrl203+.zow135.

June30thThe GD had been stationed near Moschchenoye, southwest of Tomarovka, and was nowpreparingtomovetotheirjump-offpoints.hjj113+.hsz112.Whiletherehadbeenapauseinthegroundwarthelastthreemonthsduetotherainyseason,

plusthefactthatbothsideswerepreparingforOperationCitadel,theairwarcontinuedunabated.OntheGermanside,theLuftwaffemadeadeterminedefforttoslowthebuildingofdefensesinthe salientaswell as thebuildupofmen,weaponsandsupplies thatwerebeingsent toKursksector.OntheSovietside,theRedAirForcewasactiveinmanysectorsoftheline,especiallyintheKubanareawherethe17thArmywaswastingawayandtheLuftwaffehadtotrytoneutralizethe threat. In the last threemonthperiod, theLuftwaffe reported losing616planes: 60%werebombersandtherestfighters.ForGermany,thiswasalargeloss;someofthoselostpilotsandplanes were destined for Kursk and would be sorely missed during the campaign. nzk74.snk151++.mjk80.IthadbeenaproductivemonthforSovietpartisansworkingbehindthelinesofAGCsector.In

anattempttoslowtheGermansfromresupplyingforOperationCitadel,theyconductedover800attacks thatdestroyednearly300 locomotives,over1200 railwaycars andover40bridges. Itactually made a major contribution to the cause for it slowed the German logistics, thoughGeneralModelwasstillabletofindwaystofillhisbunkers.snk160.

July1st

Stalinbecamethebenefactorofanever increasingflowofLendLeasesupplies.Fourthousandtanksweredeliveredin1942aswellas120,000trucksandjeepsand2,400planes.Forallof1942,2.7milliontonsofsuppliesandnaturalresourcesweredeliveredtoRussiafromtheUnitedStates. In the lastfivemonthsof1943another158,500vehicleswouldbereceived.Duringthefirsthalfof1943,1.5millionnewsoldierswereaddedtotherosterandanevengreaternumberofwoundedreturnedtoactiveduty.wdk32+.pck94.ByJuly1st,theGermanArmyhad243activedivisionsand,despiteinitiatingavigorousdraft

program,onaverageeachdivisionwasshort2,500men.AtStalingrad,Hitlerlost19divisionsandthelossinNorthAfricaearlierthatyearwasnotmuchbetter.TheWehrmachtwouldneverrecoverfromsuchlosses.TheselosseswereanepiphanyofsortsforHitler.HedidtrytoboosthisdraftinandoutsideofGermany.Germanassemblylinesnowworkeddayandnight;womennowworkedaswell.Sovietvolunteerswereencouragedandarmedtohelpfightpartisanactions.Manynon-GermanswerenowdeployedaroundGermany,manningAAgunstoassistinwardingoffAlliedbombing.It rainedhardduringpredawnhours,making itmoredifficult for the trailing forces to reach

theirassemblyareasouthofTomarovka.wdk35++.zzk371.zow135.Hitler invited his key commanders of Citadel to his Wolf’s Lair for a final briefing and

motivation session.He informedhisgenerals thatOperationCitadelwould launchon July5th.Somewere pleased and some displeased. Luckily for all the generals their forces were wellpreparedandreadytogo.ThegeneralsthatweredispleasedwerehopingHitlerwouldcallofftheoperation.HealsoconfidedthataerialphotosshowednonewformationsinthesalientsincemidJunebuttherehadbeenaredeploymentofforces.Thebiggestchangewasanincreaseofmenin the Pena River valley, especially northeast of Rakitnoye. Improvements in the defensescontinued,whichsetmostoftheGermangeneralswithconcern.VonMansteinhadtopostponehistriptoBucharestRumaniatoseeGeneralAntonescutomakethismeeting.BythenextdayStalinhadbeeninformedofthefinaldatefromtheSovietspyonHitler’sinnercouncil.snk74+.pck20+.asz357.zow134+.HausserissuedOrder#17toPriessofSSTK.Onthedayofthelaunchthedivision,deployed

totheimmediatesoutheastofDasReich,wastoadvanceandcaptureHill216.5whileDasReichwastakingBerezovnextdoor.Zhuravlinyi,northofHill216.5,wouldbethenextobjective.FromtherethedivisionwastoturnsoutheastandsecuretheBelgorod-KurskHighwayintheShopino-Gonki-Eriksector.ItwasthentocontinueeastandclearresistancebetweenthekeyhighwayandtheLipovyiDonetsRiver,extendingitscontrol toSmorodino.Toassist thedivisionagainst themany gun emplacements in the area, a Werfer battalion was attached to give SSTK morefirepower.TheLuftwaffewouldflyinfrontoftheadvance,hittingthemanygunsandprovidingair cap against the Red Air Force. The attached Tigers would lead the ground assault. AfterregroupingitwouldattackHill227.4andHill218.AtthestartofthecampaignSSTKwasonly65%offullstrength.kuz192.vzz6m+.dgk95m.ztc268.zow135.

July2ndIn mid afternoon, theGD division arrived at their pre Citadel assembly points northwest ofTomarovka. The HQwould be set up atMoshenoye, south of Tomarovka, while the division

wouldwait in thewoods to thewest of thevillage.Attached toGDwas 10thPzBwhich hadapproximately192newPanthersthatwereworkingwhenthetrainpulledintothenearbystation.In total, GD had at least 350 and as many as 370 panzers on the eve of the launching ofOperationalCitadel.Therearenumeroussources thatdiffer innumbers for thePantherbrigadefrom192 as the low figure and asmany as 200Panthers as the high figure. It seems that 192Pantherswereinworkingorderandwereabletostarton7/5.hsz112.hjj114.knz662+.pck27.zow136.After thewar conferencewithHitler atWolfsschanze, vonManstein flew to Bucharest and

presentedtheGoldCrimeaShieldtoGeneralAntonescuforhisloyalsupportinthewar.pck25.vzz88.Vatutin andKhrushchev arrived atKatukov’sHQ and informed the general that theGerman

offensivewouldbeginwithinthenextthreedays.pck26+.

Saturday,July3rdontheSouthernSalientTheKursksalientwaslocatedonanuplandbetweentheOkaandDonRiverstotheeastandtheDonetsandDneprRiversonthewest.AlsoofvitalimportancewouldbethePselRiverandthePenaRiver.OtherriversthatfellwithinthebattlezonewereLipovyiDonets,Koren,RazumnaiaandKorochawhichflowedsouthwards.OtherriverstocontendwithbuttoalesserdegreewouldbeDesna,Svapa,Seim,VorsklaandVorsokoletswhichflowedmostlysouthortothesouthwest.The48thPzCwouldhavethetoughestterraintomaneuveraround,fortheVorskla,PenaaswellasthePselwouldhavetobecrossed.Theseriversalsohadtributariesandmarshybankstofightaswell.The2ndSSPzCfor themostpartwouldadvancebetweenrivers, thoughSSTKwouldhave tocross thePsel.The line theSovietswereholding in thesalientwasover250miles inlengthandattheshouldersthedistancewasabout70milesapart.Thedistancefromtheshouldertothetipwasalmost125miles.Theactualassaultwouldfallwithina50milerangeofthat125miledistance.DrivingsouthfromnearOrel,AGCwouldfightitswaytoKurskandmeetupwithAGSwhichwas fighting its way north fromBelgorod. Once linked, both army groups wouldbegin to liquidate theseveralSovietarmies thatwouldbe trappedwithin thesalient.dgk79*+.swm125.wdk112.lck176.hjj123m.zpm189.ztc268.zro198.hsz105+.vzz35.To avoid the death and destruction of the linear trench warfare of WWI and to avoid the

massivedeathsof thecurrentGermanblitzkrieg, theSovietsbuiltdefensivebelts inthesalient.Thesebelts,whichran theentireGermanattackzone,usuallyconsistedof three trenchsystemswitheachtrenchspread100to400yardsapart.Inthiswayinfantrywouldbespreadovergreaterdistances, making artillery barrages by the enemy less effective. These belts also had theadvantage that if the front trenchwasbreached, themencould fallback to thenext trench.Thesecondandthirdtrencheswereconstructedinsuchawayastocreatekillzonesifandwhenthefirsttrenchlinewasbreached.TherewouldbemultiplelayersofPakfrontsanddug-intankstostop the Tigers and Panthers breaking through. For example, in the south, 6th GA had fourdivisions in thefirst trenchand three in thesecond.The7thGAhad threedivisions in thefirsttrench and two divisions in the second. In the southern salient, the second defensive beltwasaboutfivemilesbehindthefirstandthethirddefensivebeltabouttentotwelvemilesbehindthesecond. In thenorth, due to thedifferent terrain features, the threedefensivebeltswere closer

together.Thesecomplexconfigurationsweredesignedtomutuallysupportstrongpointsmadeupof infantry,armorandartillery.Oftentimesdug-in tanksweredeployedto theflanks inorder tostriketheTigersontheirvulnerablesidearmor.Rokossovskydug3,000milesoftrencheswhileVatutinhad2,500milesoftrenches.Strongpointswouldusuallybebuiltevery500to800yardsthathadthecapacitytotakedowntanksastheyapproached.Theheaviestdefenseswerebuiltinfrontof48thPzCandthe3rdPzCsincethesewerethetwobestwaystoreachKursk.wdk104++.dgr34m.mjk80+.ezz133+.fzk170.vzz37+.asz360+.zow133+.dgk67.TheSovietshadalltheadvantagesandit’salittlesurprisingthat4thPzAdidaswellasitdid.

TheGermanshadacombinedtotalof900,000men,asmanyas2,700panzersandassaultguns,10,000gunsandaround2,000planes,half thenumberoffieldgunsandmanytimeslessrocketlaunchers.TheSoviets had 1.3millionmen, approximately 3,300 tanks, 19,000 assorted guns,2,600 assorted aircraft in the immediate area, more if needed, and 1,000 rocket launchers.RokossovskyhadtheadvantageoverVatutininmenandtanks.CentralFronthad700,000menand1,800tankswhileVoronezhhad600,000menand1,500tanks.IfyouincludethenumbersfromSteppeFront then thenumbers increase to5,100 tanks,31,400gunsandmortars,3,500aircraftand1.9millionmen.IfyouextendtherangealittlefurtherwhencountingavailableplanesthentheSovietshadalmost6,000planes.TheSovietsalsohadthehugeadvantageofhavingmonthstoprepareasophisticateddefenseagainstthecomingassault.TheUS,during1943,suppliedRussiawith35,000 radio stations, 380,000 fieldphones, and956,000milesofphone cable.TheRedArmyneverhadcommunicationsonthislevelbeforeKursk.Inthefirsttwoyearsofthewar,poorcommunicationswas one of the RedArmy’smajorweaknesses and one reason for their poorresults. The improvements in communications between the front line andHQswould have anincredible positive impact on how the Soviet forces responded to the German assault.wwf28+++. lck193+. swm131+*. lck185++. hjj112. mjk81. jp115. pck24+. rkz166*. sgf343.cbk12m.fzk170.kfz450.zpm191+.zro193+.zro201.vzz34.zow134.The5thGAwasoriginallythe66thArmythatfoughtbravelyatthetractorfactoryinStalingrad.

Stalinawarded itwith thenew“Guards”designation for itsvalor.On7/6/1943, thearmywastransferredfromKonevtoVatutin.wwf92++.vzz54.asz360.(July3rd)The5thGTAwascreatedusingthe3rdTCasitscore.The29thTCand5thGMCwerethen

addedtoit.InFebruaryof1943itreceivedafullcomplementoftanksandbecamethe5thGuardsTankArmy. InMarch itwasassembled in theOstrogozhskareaeastofProkhorovkaaspartofKonev’sSteppeFrontwhereitwasreorganized,resuppliedandtrained.On7/6/1943,thearmywastransferredfromKonevtoVatutin.wwf92++.vzz54.(July3rd)Theterrainfeaturesinthesouthernsalientvaried.Inthe48thPzCsectortherewerethePena

andVorsklarivers,whichhaddifficultterrainaswellasmarshybasinsthatmadetankmovementdifficult.Inthecenter, theSSCorpshadthebestterrainandroadstotravel,withroaminghillsand few ravines to contend with. The SSTK would eventually encounter the Psel River, thecrossingofwhichwouldbemoderatelydifficultduetotheaboveaveragerains.Thelocationandcontourof the river rightnext to themaincorridor toKursk favored theSovietdefenders.TheLAHwouldhavetocrosstheSolotinka,butthatwasarelativelysmallriver.The3rdPzCtotheeast hadmore favourable terrain than the48thPzCbut it didhave to contendwith a seriesofravinesandanumberofriversincludingtheDonets,althoughtherewereclearaccessroutesto

reachthemightyrivernearRzhavets.wwf97.gnk312m+.fmz219.hjj112.hsz112.StavkastudiedandanalyzedGermanassaultsandtheywereconfidentthatHothwouldhavehis

panzersleadtheattack.ToneutralizethisthreatitwasdecidedtocreatePakfronts.APakfrontwasanassemblyofatleasttenguns,typicallymore,thatwereusuallydug-inandwaitingforapanzerformationtoapproachakeyroute.Tigershadgreaterfiringdistanceonmanyofthesegunsand would have the advantage. That was why at least ten field guns would be deployed; theTigerswouldhitsomeofthesegunsbuttheothergunswouldcontinuefiringhopingtogetluckyorperhapshitanMkthatwouldbetrailingtheTigers.Usuallymassiveminefieldsanddeepanti-tankditcheswouldbeplacedinfrontofthePakfrontstoslowthepanzersevenfurther.Tomakethese Pak fronts even more formidable, a series of mutually positioned Pak fronts would beplacedinordertooverwhelmtheGermanattackers.Itwasacleverconceptanditwasadeptlyapplied with excellent camouflage before the campaign was launched. This invention clearlymadecertainaspectsofblitzkrieglesseffective.ItalsomadeMkIIIsandtosomeextentMkIVsobsolete.TheGermansfoundthebestwaytodefeatPakfrontswerethecarefulmodifieduseofPanzerkeilcalledPanzerglocke, or a special useofwedge formationswithTigers in the leadwithcoordinateduseofairpower.TherewouldbeaLuftwaffeobserverwiththesePanzerglockeandwhenaPakfrontwasdiscoveredaquickcallwouldbemadetotheairfieldforassistance.AfterthewareventheTigercrewshatedthethoughtofgoingupagainstthelargePakfrontswitheithermanygunsorlargeguns.wwf77.wwf116.fmz230+.Not counting assault guns, Hoth had over 1,200 assorted panzers that included, in round

numbers,100Tigers,200Panthers,500MkIVs,400IIIsand50MkIIs.ItwasdecidedthatthebestwaytopenetratetheelaboratedefenseswouldbetouseawedgeformationwithTigersorPanthersintheleadandthelighterpanzerstrailingbehind,providingflankscreening.The6thGAand7thGAhad20anti-tankgunspermileaswellas1,700VoronezhFronttanksintheimmediatearea to stop the panzers.TheLuftwaffe had 1,100 planes in the immediate sector to assist allground forces.Extending the rangea totalof anestimated1,830planes that includedbombers,fightersandreconnaissanceaircraftwereavailable to theLuftwaffe in theKursksalient.Theseairfields ranged fromSmolensk in the north toKirovograd in the south. That 1850 figurewasabout 75% of Luftwaffe’s resources on the Eastern Front. dgr239. gjz185. rkz166**. vzz29.wwf163m.snk73++.lck193.zpm191.asz358+.Inthelasttendays,thenumberofdailymissionsflownbytheLuftwaffewasbetween100to

150sorties,downfromadailyaverageof400sortiesforthefirstthreeweeksofJune.ThiswasanattemptbyOKHtohidethefactthattheoffensivewasabouttostart.TheGermanshad1,830assortedaircraftspreadoutnorthandsouthofKurskbutmostoftheplaneswerestationedatthefollowingfields:Bryansk,Smolensk,OrshaandOreltothenorthandBelgorod,Kharkov,Stalino,ZaporozheandKirovogradinthesouth.Thisrepresented75%oftheairstrengthoftheLuftwaffeon theEasternFront.Nearlyacombined totalof500anti-aircraftgunsandmachinegunswerealsobroughtintothesalienttoprotecttheirgroundforcesfromSovietplanes.dgr238+.TheSovietsoldiershadbeentoldtheGermanoffensivecouldstartatanytimeandwerenow

onhighalert.Alltrenchesweremannedaswellastheartillery.ReportswerecominginfromtheLucyspyringinBerlin.pck28.HothplacedOtt’s52ndIConhisextremewesternflanktoprotectthe48thPzC’swesternflank

fromattackinordertoconcentrateontheirdrivenorth.The48thPzChad535panzersincluding192newPanthersfrom10thPzBplus66assaultguns.The2ndSSPzC,totheeastof48thPzC,hadacombinedstrengthof494panzers including42Tigersand104assaultguns.ThefareastflankprotectionwasprovidedbyGroupKempf,whichhad344panzersincluding45Tigersfromthe attached sPzAbt 503 and 25 assault guns. Overall von Manstein had 22 divisions whichincludedsixpanzerandfivePzGDand1,514panzersandassaultguns.HothwasalreadyawareofthelargetankconcentrationeastoftheOskolRiverandwasthinkingofmeetingthemheadonatProkhorovka,18milessoutheastofOboyan,insteadofhavingtheSoviettankshithisflankashiscorpsheadeduptheOboyanroad.SomedisagreewiththeclaimthatHothwasfullyawareofthesizeoftheSovietconcentrationtotheeastforifhehadbeenawarehewouldhavedonethingsdifferentlyleadingtothemorningofJuly12th.Hoth,whotookoverthe4thPzAinMay1942,had223,900menin4thPzAandanother126,000meninKempf’sGroup.HothwouldbesackedbyHitler in November 1943 when Kiev fell quickly. dgk53**. pck52+. vzz28. vzz159. zsm259.zow132.zzt86+.A statistic that is sometimes overlooked concerns medical care the soldiers received.

Expectinglargenumbersofwounded,VatutinandRokossovskyhadbuiltorupdated450hospitalsor fieldstations.Their insightwaswarranted;all these facilitieswouldbeused.TheGermanswerenotnearlyasprepared.lck198.Asmentionedabove, the3rdPzChad299panzers:6thPzD106;19thPzD81;7thPzD112.

sPzAbt503had45Tigerswhichweresplitintothreecompaniesandeachpanzerdivisionof3rdPzCreceivedaTigercompany.TherewerealsosomeStuGs.Thegrandtotaloffightingvehicleswas375.By7/12eachoftheseunitswouldbedownto50%orbelowinstrength.Itisestimatedthat these threedivisionshad less than120panzersalong theDonets in theRyndinkasectorby7/12.Onereasonforsuchahighlossofpanzerswasdueto lackof infantryprotection.Kempfstartedthecampaignwithonlyoneinfantrydivision,the168thID,foroffensivepurposes.Afewdayslaterthe198thIDarrivedbutwasusedmostlyonthedefense.Whenyoucombinealackofair support, it quickly becomes clear that Kempf and Breith were working at a severedisadvantageandtheyhadtostartfurthersouththanthetwoothercorpsandcrosstheDonetsaswell.vzz411+.dgk287+.zzt92.Intheevening,Hothreceivedanaerialreportthatshowedaconcentrationof200tankssouthof

thePselRiver,straddlingtheBelgorod-Oboyanroad.IfHothhadanydoubtsastowhetherVatutincould be surprised by the attack axis, theywere gone now.ClearlyVatutinwas expecting thismainhighwaytobethemainaxisofattackfortheGermans.zrl202.

Saturday,July3rdontheNorthernSalientDuringtheprecedingmonth,Modelhadmadesurehis9thArmywaslogisticallyprepared.TheArmyconsistedof335,000menand for a campaign lasting tendays, largequantitiesofgoodswereassembled,including5,320tonsoffood,12,300tonsofammunition,6,000tonsoffodderforhis50,000horsesand11,200cubicyardsoffuel.wwf47.lck198.Stavka was making last minutes changes to Operation Kutuzov. It had been planned and

approved by Stavka in May. It was scheduled to launch no earlier than 7/12/1943. It was acounteroffensive toencircle the2ndPzAand9thArmy in theOrel salient.TheWesternFront

wouldattacksouthwardon thenorthernsectionwhileCentralFrontwouldattacknorthwardonthe southern arm of the salient. At the same time, the Bryansk Front would attack the easternperimetertokeepallGermansbusy.cbk83.dgk231m.snk433m++.After receiving a few new replacements, the 9th PzD was short only 238 men and was

consideredatfullstrength.Italsohad25MkIIIs,34MkIVsaswellas275armoredvehiclesand46guns.Thepanzersweremadeupofamixtureofshortand longgunswith50mmand75mmbores. The 9th PzD along with the 2nd PzD, 20th PzD and 6th ID made up the 47th PzC(Lemelsen)whichwasdeployedinthecenterofthelineandwastaskedwithbreakingthroughtheboundarylineofthe13thand70thArmiesandreachingOlkhovatkaandnearbyHill274.The6thID and 20th PzDwould launch the following daywhile 9th PzD and 2nd PzDwould stay inreserveandwait forapenetrationbeforeattacking.Thatwastheplanbutwhenthepenetrationdidnotoccuronthefirstday,Modelwouldstarthistwopanzerdivisionsearlierthanscheduledtoassistinthepenetration.ThecorpswasstraddlingthemainroadandrailroadthatleddirectlytoKursk.mkz116.wwf52.snk18.snk105+.lck116m.LtGeneralRokossovskymadeanameforhimselfduringtheBattleofSmolenskinAugust1941

whenhecommanded16thArmyandtwoyearslaterhewascommandingCentralFront.ItwasnotalwaysgoodtimesfortheGeneral.In1937,duringthepurges,Rokossovskywasimprisonedandtorturedforthreeyears.BeingasonofaPolishfatherandRussianmotherhealsohadtoworktoprovehimself.Bytheendofthewar,hisstarwasalmostasbrightasZhukovorKonev.lck192.zro200.JustlikeRokossovsky,GeneralKonevmadeanameforhimselfduringtheSmolenskCampaign

asleaderof19thArmyandrosetobecometheCommanderofSteppeFrontinJune1943.LikeZhukovandRokossovsky,KonevwassmartandruthlessandwoulddomostanythingtodefeattheWehrmacht.KonevwasalsooneofStalin’sfewfavorites.lck194.zro201.

1Seepage15foranexplanationofthesereferences,andpagesviii-xforakey.

T2

July4thontheSouthernSalienthe Sunday morning was hot and muggy as the German soldiers moved to their launchpoints.Theirmoralewashighandthoughtheyknewthecampaignwouldbedifficult,they

wereconfidentofreachingKursk.fmz219.Inthesouth,Vatutinhadtwoarmiesmanningthefrontdefensivebelt:the6thGAand7thGA.

BehindI.M.Chistiakov’s6thGAandShumilov’s7thGAwas1stTA,69thArmy,35thGRC,2ndGTCand5thGTCinsecondandthirdechelon.Onthefrontlinefromwesttoeastwouldbe71stGRD,67thGRD,52ndGRDand375thRDclosesttotheDonetsRiver.The6thGAhadalmost2,500gunsandmortarsofvaryingsizesand155tanksandassaultguns.The6thGAalsohadthe96thTBwith61tanksandthe230thTRwith39tanksattachedtoitaswell.VatutinhadanotheradvantageoverHoth.Even though theGermanswent through this area in1941-42,VatutinhadlivedmuchofhislifeinavillagenearBelgorodandknewthelandscapebetterthantheGermans;thiswouldplayan important role in thepreparations.After thebitter fightingatStalingrad, the21stArmywasrenamedthe6thGAnzk34.wdk116+.lck193.asz361.The starting line for the 48th PzC and 2nd PzC would be just north of the Borisovka-

TomarovkatojustwestofBelgorod.The3rdPzCwouldstartatBelgorodandalongtheDonetsRiver toas far southasMaslovoPristanandZiborovka.The6thPzDalongwith the168th IDwouldbeinthenorthatBelgorod.The19thPzDwouldbetotheimmediatesouthfollowedby7thPzD which was stationed in the Dorogobuzhino -Solomino sector. Further south, Corps RauswouldcovertheToplinka-Ivanovka-Ziborovkasector.Toplinka,locatedonthewesternbankoftheDonetsRiver,wasaboutmidwaybetweenSolominoandIvanovka.Totheeastof6thGAwas7thGAanditwascommandedbyM.S.Shumilov.Hisarmywas

deployedona35mile line that started to the eastof theDonetsRiver and swung south to theNeshegolRiver.Twodivisionsfrom24thGRCandtwodivisionsofthe25thGRCcoveredthefrontline.Thesedivisionswerethe36thGRD,72ndGRD,78thGRDandthe81stGRD.Anothertwo divisionswere in second echelon. The independent 213thRDwas third echelon.Vatutin,expectingtheGermanstousethissectorasamainaxisofadvance,fortifiedShumilovwithmanyadditionalartillerybatteries. Inaddition to theextraguns,ShumilovcreatedhugeminefieldsatthelikelycrossingpointsontheDonets.Thearmyhadover1,600gunsofassortedsizes,mortarsandrocket launchers. Italsohadalmost250working tanksandassaultguns. Inaddition to thishardware,threetankregimentswerebroughtintosupporttheinfantry.The262ndTRsupportedthe81stGRD,the73rdGRDhadthe167thTRandthe148thTRwaswiththe15thGRD(24thGRC)whichwasinreservethefirstdaysoftheoffensivebutwouldbebroughtupseveraldayslater.nzk35+.GeneralSeppDieterich,thecommanderofLAH,releasedhiscommandofLAHtoactivatethe

1stPzC.InhisplaceGeneralTheodorWischwouldtakecommandofthedivision.zow138.Startingat theextreme leftof the48thPzC’sattackzone, the firstdefensivebelt for6thGA

started just south of Dmitrievka-Korovino-Cherkasskoe-Trirechnoe across the Vorskla River-Berezov-ErikturningsouthuntilitreachestheDonetsRiver.The7thGAtakesupthechallengefrom here and parallels the Donets River just east of the river. The second defensive beltbeginning in thewest follows the bend of the Pena River and thenmoved east to Lakhanino-Syrtsev-southofPokrovka-Solonets-Nekhaevka-across theLipovyiDonetsRiver toTeterevinoSouth.ThebiggestcomponentofthethirddefensivebeltwasthePsellRiver.ItthenwindsalittlesouthandincludesHill252.2,KomsomoletsStateFarm-Storozhevoe-acrosstheDonetsRiver-Rzhavets-Aleksandrovka-northofKazache.While6thGAand7thGAwereonthefrontline,the1stTAwestoftheDonetsand69thArmy

eastoftheDonetswouldbedefendingthesecondandthirddefensivebelts.The1stTAwasrunbyM.E.Katukov,had1,000tanksandincluded3rdMC,6thTCand31stTCandtemporarilyhad2ndGTCand5thGTC.nzk36+.Fromwesttoeast,theGermanoffensivewouldincludethe332ndID,3rdPzD,GD,11thPzD,

167thID,LAH,DasReichandSSTKclosesttothewesternbankoftheDonetsRiver.Continuingthelineupontheeasternbankoftheriverwouldbe6thPzD,168thID,19thPzD,7thPzD,106thIDand320thID.sPzAbt503had45Tigersandeachcompanyof thebattalionwasattachedtoeachpanzerdivisionof3rdPzC.nzk59.NotonlyweretheGermansatagreatdisadvantagewithtanksbutalsowithairplanes.Planes

availablewithinflyingdistanceofKurskwere1,830forGermanyandamassive5,965aircraftfortheSoviets.Modelwouldhave730planesfromDessloch’sLuftflotte6andHothwouldhave1,100planesfromGreim’sLuftflotte4tosupportthegroundcampaign.TheSovietshada3to1advantage in tanks and a 4 to 1 advantage in planes. BeforeOperationCitadel started,HitlerorderedFMRichthofenandpartofLuftflotte4toItalyasadefensivemeasurewhentheAlliesattackedNorthAfrica. lck190++. sgf343. cbk12m. zzk371. zow132+.The loss of these planeswouldbegreatlymissedfor3rdPzCwouldreceivelittleairsupportduringthecampaignandisamajorfactorfortheirfailuretokeepup.AfterbeingreadthemotivationalletterfromHitler,acommandopartyledbyColKarckand

accompaniedbyengineerswithflamethrowersfromLAHwouldlaunchitsassault,afterhoursofpreparation,at2300hrs.ItsobjectivewastosilentlysecuretheOPonthehillwestofIakhontoffand tohold theoutpost until relievedwhen themain attackbegana fewhours later.Without amoonthenightwasdarkbuttheOPwassecured.OncerelievedthecommandogroupwastobereinforcedandwouldmovealongthenearbywoodsandcaptureHill228.6whilescreeningtherightflankofLAHasitadvanced.Atthesametime,the315GRof167thIDalsomovedtowardStreletskoe and secured the outpost in the village. After Iakhontoff was secured, early nextmorning the leadingunitswere to fight theirway to Iakovlevo.Hill228.6was important for itwastobethestagingareafortheTigerstobegintheirassault.TheSovietswantedthehillalsoand countered with forces in the area but the attack was repulsed. zrl204+. zrl209. vzz6m.zow136+.Preliminaries to theKursk offensive started the same day, around 1500 hrs. TheLuftwaffe,

flying800planes,beganbombingSovietpositionsinandaroundtheKursksalient.Besidesthe

airattackseveraladvance teamswere testing theSoviet line.Thebiggest incursionwas in thesouthwhenHoth’s4thPzAadvancedon the6thGA.AbadstartwhenHoth’sPanthersdidnotshowupduetothethickmudfromtherecentrains.HermannHoth,whowasbornin1885notfarfromBerlin,hadbeenincommandofthe4thPzAsinceJune1st,1942,afterHoepner’sdismissal.swm137.zmb240+.zzk371.OnSundaymorningat1030hrs,whenHoth’s4thPzAweremovingintotheirstartingpositions,

theSoviet6thGAandtoalesserextentthe7thGA,deliveredacrushingbarragethatdisorientedthe Germans. The Germans regrouped and delivered an even heavier bombardment on Sovietpositionsintheafternoon.Inthecenterof48thPzCsectorwastheGDDivisionanditadvancedtowardtheSyrtsevandLukhaninoareawhilethe3rdPzDand11thPzDattackedontheleftandright flanks. A few panzers moved forward during the shelling, trailing the infantry. bt81+*.hjj121m.wwf65.At1500hrs,75bombersbegantheGermanoffensivebystrikingtheforwardpositionsofthe

52ndGRDand67thGRDatGertsovkaeastwardtoButovo.WhilethefighterscircledoverheadtheStukasdivedandwailedastheywereaimingattheirtargets.Sovietfighterssortiedbuttheywere stopped by German fighters and all bombers returned to base. Five squadrons dropped2,500bombsonanareatwomileslongandonly500yardsdeep.GermanartillerybeganshellingGertsovka, Butovo, Dragunskoe and Iakhontov which were defended by the 52nd GRD, 67thGRDandthe71stGRD.Underthescreenoftheshelling,panzersbegantorolltowardthefirstdefensebelt.TheSSTK reachedButovowhichwasdefendedby199thGRRof67thGRDandfoughttheirwayintothevillagebutwerehaltedwhensomeoftheirleadpanzersweredamaged.NomatterhowhardtheLuftwaffetried,Sovietshellingremainedheavy,causingalotofGermancasualties.Theplanwas todefeat thevery front linepositionswith infantry and thenhave thepanzers move up at night to lead the attack on the first main day of the assault, but a heavyrainstorm hit the area at night turning the already soft ground into muddy fields, delaying thepanzersfromreachingtheirstartpoints.Incertainsectors,theinfantrywouldhavetostartwithoutarmor support next morning. fkk74+. pck30. hsz115. wwf44. fmz220. fmz221m+. gjz180+.fzk170.kfz450.pck50.zow139.dgk81.Afterthebombings,preliminariesintensifiedwithamassiveshellingbytheGermansandthe

Soviets quickly reciprocated. In the late afternoon, battalion-sized raiding parties went out todefendingOPsand front linebunkers.AtnightGermanengineerscrossed the front linedeeperinto noman’s land to clear pathways through theminefields for the advance coming up in themorning. Often thousands of mines would be cleared each night. The Soviets had plantedhundredsofthousandsofminesandwhiletheGermanengineersdidtheirbesttoneutralizethem,theymissedmany of them and the leading panzers, especially the new Panthers, paid for thatshortcoming.Evenifapanzercouldberecoveredfromtrackdamageorshelldamageoncestuckinaminefield,itwouldoftentakedaystogetthepanzerbackonthebattlefieldandwhilethesepanzerswereintherepairshop,theywouldbegreatlymissed.lck233+.pck28.WiththeGermansadvancingintheafternoonandwiththeLuftwaffeflyinglargermissionsthan

hadyet occurred in theprevious threeweeks,Vatutin andStavka believed theGerman assaultwouldbeginforrealnextmorning.Theywouldputintoeffectaplanthathadbeeninitiatedtwomonths earlier for a preemptive strike on German airfields at daybreak that would cripple

Germanairsupport.dgr249.wwf163m.TheGerman aerial arsenalwould include the FW190,Hs 129, Ju 87,Bf 109G for ground

attackwhiletheHe111andJu88wouldbeusedforthemoreseriousbombingruns.SomeoftheHs129sandJu87sweremountedwitheithera30mmor37mmcannonforhuntingtanks.Thesecannoncouldpenetratetherearenginecompartment,ruiningtheengineandusuallyengulfingthemachine in a firestormwhen the fuel lines and fuel tanks ruptured. The Soviets had for theirlineup theLa-5,Yak-1b,Yab-7b,Yak-9,P39,Pe-2and thenewfavored Il-2 forgroundattack.MostoftheIl-2satKurskwerethenewmodelhavingabackseatforareargunner.TheSovietaircraft industrywasmore robust than theGermans’and the industrial scaleofbuildingplanesdwarfedthem..TheseplaneswereamixtureofsingleengineanddualenginetypesandmostweresingleseatwiththeexceptionoftheIl-2m3whichhadasecondseat.nzk79+.BydarktheLAHhadmovedintotheirdeparturepositions.Thedivisionhad11workingTigers,

72Mk IVs, 16Mk IIIs and 31 assault guns. At 2300 hrs a commando team from 2nd PzGRlauncheditsattackafterseveralhoursofpreparation,takingoutOPsintheirsectorthatincludedHill 228.6 and the hillswest of Iakhontov, preparing the terrain for a quick departure for thepanzerswhichwouldlaunchinafewhours.agk89.agk91m.agk94m.wwf59+.At2230hrs,SovietgunsbeganshellingGermanpositionsalongthefrontlineonaprearranged

scheduletodisrupttheGermans’preparations.je98.At 2300 hrs, a commando team from Das Reich left the line and, deliberately avoiding

outposts, traveled to the edge of the fortifications surrounding Iakhontov. During the rest ofdarkness, engineers cleared mines in front of the town in preparation of the assault of thisstrongpoint nextmorning.Once theGermanswere spotted, they had to clearmines under fire.GermanartillerywascalleduptoanswertheSovietfire.By0130hrson7/5,Hill228.6,apartof theSoviet strongpoint at Iakhontov,was captured byLAH.At 0245 hrs and notwaiting forreinforcementstheBissingerGroupofDasReichcapturedIakhontov.zow140.The Red Air Force had a superiority of planes over the Luftwaffe. The 2nd VA had 881

aircraft, the16thVA1,052and the17thVA735planes.These threeairarmieshadover2,600planesat theirdisposal.Whenyouadd in the1stVAand5thVA2,800planes theSovietshadaccesstonearly6,000planesifitwasneeded.OntheGermansideonlythe1stFliegerDivisionandthe8thFliegerCorpswouldparticipate in thecampaign.TheSovietswouldhavenearlyathreetooneadvantageinnumbers.OneadvantagetheLuftwaffehadwasexperiencedaircrewsandpilots.nzk76.kfz449.Lateatnightadelugeofrainturnedthesoilintomud,hinderingthemovementoftheGerman

attackinthemorning.bt82.gjz81.snk77.InBerlin,ReinhardGehlenofFremdeHeereOst(Germanintelligence)reportedtoOKHthat

afterlookingatreconphotos,therewasnochanceofvictoryatKurskandthatOperationCitadelshouldbecanceled.Theadvicewasignored.MajGeneralvonMellenthinof48thPzChadbeenthinking the same thing forweeks .Hehadseen theaerialphotosof the salientandKurskhadbeen transformed into a fortress. Hitler was going to use a weapon of maneuverability as abattering ram and by mid June von Manstein, Guderian, von Mellenthin and a few othersdisagreedwiththeirdictator.HitlerhadmadeamistakeatStalingradandhewasmakingthesamemistakeatKursk.FriedrichvonMellenthinwasbornintoamilitaryfamily;hisfatherhadbecome

ageneral,promptinghis three sons to followhim into theofficercorps.TheMellenthinswerearistocratslivinginBreslau;Friedrichwastheyoungest.wwf65+.fmz217.zmb355.With Citadel starting the following day FM von Manstein and his staff moved from their

headquartersatZaporozhebyrailtonearthefrontlines.ThedistancebetweenHothandModelwas125milesandvonMansteinwasstillconcernedthedistancewastoogreat.pck25.pck33.HothstartedOperationCitadelwith1,269workingpanzers:102Tigers,192Panthers,563Mk

IVs,416MkIIIsamongotherassortedpanzersandassaultguns. It’sbeenclaimedthat the tankbattlesofProkhorovkaon7/12was the largest inhistory. Itmayhavebeen themost importanttank battle but by numbers alone, this was not true. In 1941, AGS fought a tank battle withKirponosthathadacombinednumberof3,800tanks.gjz185+*+*.fmz216.Alongtheapproximately50milefrontof6thGAand69thArmy,therewerealimitednumber

ofroutestheGermanscouldtaketoreachOboyanorProkhorovka.Therewereonlyfourroutesthathadpavedroads.Onlyhalfofthis45or50milefrontcouldbeusedbytrucksandevenfewermilesthatthepanzercoulduse.GoingthroughIakovlevo,whichwasakeyroadjunction,gavetheGermanstheoptionofgoingeitherdirection:towardOboyanorProkhorovka.Hothchosethetwokeyroadnetworksasmuchaspossible,avoidingwheneverpossibleoffroadtravel.Theywerethe Belgorod-Prokhorovka Highway and the Belgorod-Oboyan Highway. The Soviets had theadvantageof knowing the terrain andVatutin had sufficient time to erect sturdydefenses alongtheseaxisroutes.vzz89.dgk109.dgk114.By theendof thedayon the left flankof6thGA,Vakhrameev’s23rdGRCwasprepared to

facethe2ndSSPzCwhentheyattackedinthenextdayortwo.ItconsistedofNekrasov’s52ndGRDandGovorunenko’s375thRD.The52ndGRDwasdefendingoneof thekeypavedroadsleadingnorth,theTomarovkatoIakovkevoroadtotheOboyanroad.ThelineincludedBerezovandGremuchi.The375thRDdefendedtheline:PetropavlovkatonorthwestofChernaiaPoliana.Furthereast, the81stGRDof7thGAandelementsof the92ndGRDweredeployedalong theStaryiGorod-BlizhniaiaIgumenka-Postnikov-ShliakhovoStation-IarOrlovline.Russkikh’s94thGRDheldthelinefromIarOrlovalongtheRazumnaiaRivertoMiasoedovotothewoodsamileeastofMiasoedovo.vzz92.vzz247.dgr155m.dgr173m.dgr181m.dgr39m.pck59.vzz5m.Inadditionto theVoronezhFront,Vatutinalsohadtheresourcesof the2ndAirArmyand, if

needed,accesstothe17thVAofSouthwesternFront.dgr238.The large distance, about 12miles, between the Soviet second defensive belt and the third

defensivebeltwasdue to thenatural terrainfeaturesof thePselRiver; itsswampyriverbasinanditssteepnorthernriverbank.WiththedefensesbehindtheriveritwouldmakeitharderfortheGermanstocrossagainsttheswampygroundtothesouthandthehighbanksonthenorthsideof theriver.Eachbeltconsistedofusuallyat least three trenchlinesaswellascommunicationtrenches that led to therear.All thedefensebeltswerebuiltaroundterrainfeatures thatwouldgivetheSovietsadecidedadvantage;itwouldincludeariverline,aridgelineandaseriesofvillages that could be fortified. Wherever possible, personnel trenches and anti-tank ditches,bunkers,MGnestswithcorrespondingminefieldsandbarbwireentanglementswereplaced insuchamannerastoprovidethegreatestsafetyandresults.TheSovietsweremastersatthisandhadseveralmonthstobuildtheseimpressivedefensesandyettheGermanswouldfindawaytobreachthem.TherealquestionwouldbehowexpensivewouldtheSovietsmakethetask.vzz106.

wwf31++.ezz133.In the months before Operation Citadel launched the Soviets built three defensive belts

betweenBelgorodandProkhorovkaandthePsel‘River.Eachdefensivebeltwouldhaveasmanyasfourtrenches,usuallytwotothreehundredyardsapart.RokossovskyalsohadthreedefensivebeltspositionednorthofOlkhovatka.Betweenthetwosalients,therewerealmost2,500milesoftrenches,bothpersonnelandarmor,alongwith3,900pillboxes,9,300artillerybunkers,26,000,mortarpositionsandthousandsofundergroundshelters.Therewere675,000mineslaidaswellasmilesofwireentanglements.VatutinthoughtthemainaxisofattackwouldbebetweenShopinoandVorsklaforthefirstdefenseline.TheseconddefenselinewasbetweenLuchkiandPokrovka.dgr277.dgr280m.swm132.nzk33.fzk170.ztc268.UnlikeModel, Hoth believed the application of localized concentration of armorwould be

whatwas needed to reachKursk; the reasonwhy hewould launchwith all his panzers at thebeginning.TheSovietssuspectedthatpremiseandplacedasmanyarmoredunitsdirectlybehindChistiakov’s6thGA.Modelwouldstarthisbattleusingmostlyinfantrytopenetrateagapinthelineandthenlethispanzersdrivethrough.ModelalsodividedtheFerdinandBattalionsamonghis panzer divisions.Keeping these heavyBattalions togetherwould have provided a strongerpunchthroughenemylines.pck52+.pck33.swm137.fzk171.In theBelgorod area, just northof the city, theNorthernDonetsRiver ran in a southwest to

northeastdirectionandwouldplayamajorpartintheKurskbattle.From3/28/43thousandsofSovietengineersbuiltnearly2,000milesofnewroadstobringall

themen,weapons,suppliesandequipmenttothebattlefront.Inaddition,newrailroadtrackwaslaidtoservethenewlocomotivesgiventoRussiathroughtheLend-LeaseProgramtohelpcarrythemenandsuppliestothesector.dgr291.ThesouthernbendofthePenaRiverwas15mileswideandpresentedanaturalobstaclethat

theSovietsusedto theiradvantage;ahardship to theGermansfor thebendwaspractically theentiresectorofthe48thPzC.Atitssouthernpoint,itwas15milesfromOboyanasthecrowfliesandanother35milestoKursk.The90thGRD,22ndTB,27thATRandthe3rdMCwereduginon the far sideof the river.Tomake thingsharder for theGermans, therewas a smallmarshytributarywithanimpassableriver-bedthatflowedeastthroughLukhanino.gnk148.gnk162m.The2ndPzGRofLAHmovedonHill228.6northwestofIakhontovtopreparethejump-offof

themain force thenextday.Unexpectedly theSovietsputup stiff resistance includinghand-to-handcombatnearthehill.Thehillwastheanchorofthe52ndGRD’ssectorwhichranforonlyfour miles to Hill 218.0. Defending a key highway to Oboyan as well as the important roadjunctionofIakovlevo,Vatutinknewthe52ndGRD’ssectorwouldbehotanddeliberatelygavethedivisionarelativelynarrowfronttodefend.By0200hrsHill228.6hadbeencapturedandLAH was moving on the tank trench to the north as well as the village of Streleskoe. vzz92.wwf65.dgk109.dgk112.zrl209+The 48th PzC of 4th PzA took the heights of Iakhontov-Streletskoe-Butovo-Gertsovka line

northwestofBelgorod.Fromthere the52ndICmovednorthfollowingthepanzers,pushing theSoviet 6th GA back. By midday, heavy rains and increased Soviet artillery had slowed theGermanadvance.Itwouldtake3rdPzDuntilnightfalltotakeGertsovkaandthesurroundinghighground.Itwouldbeafter0200hrson7/5whenthe3rdPzDandGDmet,stabilizingtheline.The

bombardmentwasjustanhourawaytoinitiateOperationCitadel.pck28.pck32.dgr251.Germanreconpatrolshadspottedweaknesses in theSoviet line in48thPzCsectorover the

preceding couple of days. It was decided to start a limited assault a day early and head forGertsovka,theraillinesouthoftownandHill229.8,northeastofGertsovka.AstheleadGermanunitslaunched,theynoticedaquickstiffeningoftheline.The“easy”advancehadcost3rdPzDandGD more than what was expected. The 11th PzD made the best gains with the fewestcasualties.Hothdecidedthat4thPzAneededbetterartilleryOPsbeforebeginningthemainattackthe followingday sohe sent limited forcesout to capture thesekeyhighground targets. It hadbeenarguedbysomeintheWehrmachtthat4thPzAdidnothavesufficientforcestoreachKursk.HothknewthisandwantedtotakeadvantageofeverypossibilityandgainingtheseOPswouldbeabigplus.Hisartillerybatterieswouldprovidemuchbettersupportfromthesekeyhills.TheSSspearhead would start between Tomarovka and Belgorod. The 48th PzC would be west ofTomarovkadrivingnorth, straddling theCherkasskoe-Butovo axis. In 48thPzC sector, the firstimportantheighttocapturewasatZybino,southwestofButovowhereaheavyconcentrationofartillerywaspositioned.FromontopofZybinoanobservationpostwouldbesetuptoassistintaking Gertsovka Station and Gertsovka to the immediate northeast. gnk65. snk19. snk75+.pck30+.dgk81.BeforereachingButovo,asmallcreekwithanimpassablemuddybottomdelayedbothGDand

11thPzDfromadvancing.Aftergettinganumberofpanzersstuckandbarelyable topull themout, both divisions had to go around the creek which cost valuable time. After bypassing thecreek,around1500hrs,whilestillrainingGDlaunchedagainafterwithstandingahorrificaerialand ground bombardment andwas able to quickly capture the hillwest ofButovowhichwasdefendedbythe199thGRR.ItwasabletorepulseSovietcounter-attacks,includingattacksfromtheair.SoonafterwardstheGermansplacedtheirownOPsthere.Eveninthisbriefengagement,panzerswerehittingminesandincurringtrackdamage.ThePanthershadnotarrivedyetbuttheywouldhave their turn the followingday.At the same time thehighgroundeastofButovowascapturedbythemenof11thPzD.TheGD,afterButovowascaptured,didnotstoptheiradvanceafterdarkbutkeptmovingandduringthepre-dawnhoursof7/5capturedthehillssoutheastofGertsovka. (GertsovkaandZavidovkawouldbeattackedby3rdPzD.)ThedaywassuccessfulforGD but it was also costly in men and panzers - taking Alekseevka and Lukhanino wasexpected to be fairly quick. Also at 1500 hrs other elements of the GD moved off for apreliminary attack against the Belgorod-Gotnya railroad and in the general direction ofGertsovka.The3rdPanzerBattalionofGDwasbackatthestartingline,waitingforitspanzerstoarriveattherailhead.Thenew29foot,45tonPanther,hada75mmlongbarrelgun,armorupto110mmandcouldtravelasfastas34mphonagoodsurfacebuthadnotarrivedyeteithersotheinfantryhadtorelyonitself.pck31+.pck53+.fkk259+.dgr249.wwf65.snk77.gnk68m.fmz220.zpm184++.hsz114+.Acombatgroup fromGDwithelementsof3rdPzDguarding theirwestern flank, advanced,

headingnorthtosecurethehighgroundwestofButovobeforemovingonthevillage.GDpushedthe67thGRDand71stGRD(supportedbythe27thTDB)deployedinfrontofButovobackthreemiles towardCherkasskoe, allowingGD to continueheading for thehillwhich theywanted totake first. With GD in control of the hill immediately to the west of Butovo and 11th PzD

controlling the hill to the east, the village soon succumbed to German artillery. At 1645 hrsButovofallstothe11thPzD;theGDhadalreadylefttheareaheadingnorthtowardCherkasskoe.DespiteaSovietcounter-attack,bytheendoftheeveningGDtraveledthreemoremilesandwassubsequently fighting forCherkasskoe. Trailing behind the panzer group the grenadiers ofDasReichcapturedthevillageofBerezov,abouttwomilesnorthofthestartpoint,drivingelementsof the 71st GRD back to Krasnyi Pochinok. wdk109. wdk118. dgr172m. hjj121m. pck31+.hsz114+.wwf44+.snk78.lck213.The 3rd PzD’s 394th PzGR and 332nd ID were not so productive for they ran into heavy

shelling coming fromZybinohills.Thedivisions thenhad to endure attacks from the hills thatlastedpastdark.The11thPzDandtheGDlaunchedanattackagainstthestrongpointsdefendedbyelementsof

Nekrasov’s52ndGRDbetweenStreletskoeandBerezov.Anevenlargerbattle tookplacenearGertsovka.AtGertsovka,the213thRDputupfierceresistance,inflictingheavycasualtiesbutby2100hrstheGermanattackhadtakenthetown.Therestof52ndGRDwouldbeinfrontofLAH’sadvance.Behindthe52ndGRD,Vatutindeployed230thTRand96thTBwhichtogetherhad110tanks.Tothewestof230thTRwas245thTRwhichwasfacingGD.dgk81.gnk109.The52ndIC,tothewestof48thPzC,beganitsfeintattack,hopingtodrawforcesawayfrom

48thPzCbuttheattackfailed,sufferingheavycasualties.The52ndICwasledbyGeneralOttandconsistedofthe57thID,167thID,255thIDand332ndID.snk70.snk77.The48thPzCalsohadadditionalpanzersthatwerenotcountedfortheywereunderlongterm

repairandwouldnotbereadyforthecampaign.GDhad51panzersneedingrepairsand11thPzDhad29underrepairs.wdk57+*.wdk112.snk73++.ItwasnotanauspiciousbeginningforthenewPantherBrigade.Sixofthenew45tonpanzers

caughtfirenearMoschchenoyeafterleavingtherailstation.gnk191.hsz113.The 394th IR of the 3rd PzD was held up by defensive fire of the Soviet 71st GRD at

GertsovkaHillsanddidnotreachtheirobjectiveuntildark.GertsovkaontheBelgorod-Gotnyarailwaylinedidfalllaterthatnight.dgk98.pck57.kfz451.The48thPzCconsistedof167thID,11thPzD,GDand3rdPzD.Aregimentof167thIDwould

movewithLAHandprotectitsflank.The11thPzDwoulddrivetowardButovoandthenheadforthe eastern side of Cherkasskoe. The GD would drive straight toward the fortified town ofCherkasskoe while 3rd PzD, west ofGD, would head for Gertsovka, Korovino and KrasnyiPochinok.Theoverallmainobjectiveof thecorpswas tocross thePselanddriveonOboyan,just30milesaway.fkk247.gnk68m.Before thecampaignstarted, the48thPzChad61,700men.Thiscorpswould includenearly

190Panthersof10thPzBattachedtoGDwiththespecificintentionofdefeatingthe1stTAwhichwas in the samesector.The167th IDwhichwas taskedwithprotecting thepanzers’ flankhad17,800men.The2ndSSPzCmustered73,400men.vzz91+*.dgk53+.Hitler,againsthisgenerals’advice,hadpostponedtheoffensiveforamonthinordertohave

the latestbatchofTigersandPanthers in thebattle,whichsubsequentlygave theSovietsmuchmoretimetoprepare.ThePantherswerehavingmechanicaltroubles;theGermanshadtoreplaceaxlesonthetrainsastheydroveeasttoKursk.The1stTAconsistsofthe6thTCunderGetman,31stTCand3rdMCwhichweredeployedin

theBelaia,KurasovkaandBykonovregion.The5thGTC,afrontreserve,wasdeployedto therearintheMarinoregion.Thetotalnumberoftankswas930.The1stTAwassubordinatedto6thGA.Whilewaiting forvonManstein toattack, the3rdMCbuiltadefensealong theStudenok,StalinskoeStateFarm,VladimirovkaandOrlovkalinewhilethe6thTCbuiltadefensealongthenorthernbankofthePselRiver.1stTA’scombatzoneincludedtheboundary:theOboyan,IvniaandTrefilovkaonthewestandtheBelgorod-KurskrailroadlineontheeastandthePselRiveronthenorth.Thecoveragefromeasttowestwas27milesandthenorthsouthdistancewas31miles.dgr208++.dgr172m.dgr209m.kcz166+.dgk404.A few Panthers died from mechanical failure before ever reaching their launch point. 46

Panthers died from mechanical troubles within the first two days of the battle but they werealreadyintherepairshopandthemechanicswereworkingasfastaspossibletogetthembackonthebattlefield.ThoughthefrontarmorofaPantherwas less thanaTiger, itstillhadanalmostequalprotectionfactorduetoitsangledplating.The75mmL70KwK42gunhadhighvelocitythatmadeitalmost theequalof theTiger’s88.ThePanther,whichwascheaperandquickertobuild than a Tiger, once the bugs were worked out, would be an excellent tank but for thiscampaignitgavetheGDdivisionalotoftrouble.Vatutinhad105KV-1sandafewSU-152stocombattheTigerandPanthers.dgk18.snk73++.snk77.wdk53*.fkk258.zro193.Theoffensivepowerof48thPzCwasGDdivisionlocatedinthecenterof48thPzC.Thenew

Panthers attached to this division were under the command of Major von Lauchert. On thismorningthesetwobattalionsalongwithPzR139werejoinedtoformPzB10(brigade).Deckerwassupposedtobe theCOof thebrigadebutdidnotarriveuntil7/11.InsteadvonStrachwitzcommandedPzB10.InadditiontothesePanthers,thedivisionalsohad15Tigersandsome300Mksthataddedtoatotalcountof535panzersplus66assaultguns.The3rdPzDand11thPzDweredeployedoneithersideofGDandsported90panzersand113panzersrespectively.The11thPzDalsohadStuGAbt911attachedandithad31machines.VonKnobelsdorffof48thPzChadathisdisposalover700assortedfightingvehicles.HothwassoconfidentthathescheduledhisforcestobeatthePselRiver,halfwaytoKursk,bytheendofdaytwo;apassageofbetween20to30miles.AccordingtotheGermantimetableforOperationCitadel,theSovietswouldhavetobedefeatedinfivedaysbeforeadditionalreinforcementscouldarrive.Frommystudyofthecampaign,itappearsHothwastooconfidentindefeatingVatutinandit

madehimalittletoolaxinchoosinghisattackroutefor48thPzCaswellasallowingthe2ndSSPzC to shift to the northeast towardProkhorovkawhilemaintaining the attack towardOboyan.This shift indirectionexpanded thegapbetween the twocorps, lengthenedand thinnedout theline.Thegeneral thencompounded theseerrorsbynotclosing rankson thewest flankwhen itwasdiscoveredSoviet resistancewasstronger thananticipated.Abandoningeither theOboyanrouteor theProkhorovka routeseems logical.Whenyoualsoconsider the troublesof3rdPzCandthedifficultiesofDasReichandthefactthatSSTKwasstuckalongtheDonetsforacoupleofdays,mychoicewouldhavebeentoabandonOboyanandfullyconcentrateontheProkhorovkacorridor.wdk121.mhz201+.snk73.fmz218.hjj114.asz358.Bytheendoftheday,thereconforcesof48thPzChadpushedbackthe6thGAhavingreached

the lineGertsovka,Butovo,Hill 230.8 but the strongpoints atDragunskoe and Iakhontovwerestill inSoviethands.Artilleryandmenweremovedup tosecure these importantOPareas.At

dawn the next day, the 48th PzC resumed its attack on Dragunskoe, Iakhontov and nearbyZagotskot.dgr74.lck214.lck164m.sPzAbt503arrivedattheirassemblyareanortheastofBelgorod,rightnexttotheDonetsRiver.

ItwassoondiscoveredKempfhaddecidedtobreakupthebattalionintocompanies,givingonecompanytoeachpanzerdivisions.TheofficersofsPzAbt503thoughtthatwasamistake.Theythoughtstrengthinnumberswouldbethebesttactic;thatthe45Tigersworkingtogetherdrivingdown themainaxiscouldplow through theenemybetterandquicker thanseparatecompanies.TheirpleaswereignoredbyKempf.fwl110.fwl116.The recaptureof sectionsof theDonetsaswellasBelgorodduringvonManstein’scounter-

attackinearly1943allowedtheGermansthechancetoconsiderOperationCitadel.OnApril1st,Kempfsubmittedaplanwhichwouldstartwithin30daystoretaketheKursksalient.TheshortdelaywouldallowtheAGC/AGStoregroup,beresuppliedandwaitouttherainyseason.WhenrepeateddelaysmadeitlookliketheoffensivewouldbegininJuneorevenJuly,Kempfturnedsourontheoffensive.erz210.fwl109.At 2230 hrs, the Soviets delivered a series of disrupting barrages against 3rd PzC, east of

Belgorod,especiallyontheonlybridgeheadontheeasternbanksoftheDonetsatMikhailovka.wdk121.dgk95m.The3rdPzChad thedifficult responsibilityofprovidingscreenprotectionfor theadvancing

4thPzAwhileatthesametimeadvancingalongwiththe4thPzAasitheadedforthePselRiver,OboyanandProkhorovkaline.Theresponsibilitywasevenmoredauntingwhenyouconsiderthe3rdPzChadtostartsouthofBelgorodasfarsouthastheNezhegolRiverandthenheadeastasfarastheKorochaRiverbeforeheadingnorth.Ontheextremeeastflankwas11thICorCorpsRauswithhisweakened106thIDand320thID.Backinthefirstmonthsof1943, the320thIDnowcommandedbyMajGeneralPostelgotcaughtbehindthefastmovingSovietlineandhadtofightitswaytotheKharkovlinetoescapedestruction.Insodoing,itlostmostofitsheavyguns,panzersandothersupplies.ItstillhadnotfullyrecoveredbyJuly.ToassistGeneralRauswithovercomingtheseweaknesses,hereceivedthreeflakregimentsandfivegunbattalions.Thethreeflak regiments totaled7288mmandnearly900smaller flakgunswhichwouldbeusedfornotonlyaerialdefensebutalsoforgroundsupport.erz199++.erz186m.hjj123m.hsz107+.On the west bank of the Donets, Beaulieu’s 168th ID made its final preparations for the

following day’s assault in support of 6th PzD. During the night of the 4th, Kempf’s artilleryexpendedmost of it ammo in softening up the enemy. The Soviet 7th GA returned fire in thepredrawnhourswhichdelayedthe6thPzD,7thPzDand19thPzDcrossingtheDonetsRivernextmorning.TheTigersofthesPzAbt503whichweretoleadtheotherdivisionsalsotookcasualtiesfromthebarrage.dlu10.The 6th PzD entered this campaign with 16,200 men plus a few Soviet volunteers. It was

commanded by Maj General Walther Hunersdorff who was a Knight’s Cross recipient as of12/22/1942.FromreconphotositwasknownthathisdivisionhadthetoughestdefensivebarriertocrackintheStaryiGorodsector.fkk277.fkk324m+.hjj112+.The19thPzD,whichhadfoughttwomonthsearlierfortherecaptureofKharkovandhadbeen

regroupingeversince,stillwasnotuptofullstrengthineithermenorpanzers.TheCOwasLtGeneralSchmidt,anexperiencedofficerandrecipientoftheKnight’sCrosswithOakLeaves.It

wouldattacktotherightof6thPzDthenextmorning.Thedivisionwouldstartthecampaignwith70panzersand13,780men.fkk286.vzz46.gnk86.dlu80.dlu115.

I

3

July4thontheNorthernSalientSeeMap1

nthenorth,Rokossovsky’sCentralFronthadthreearmiesprotectingthefrontline.Itincluded70thonthewesternflank,13thinthecenterand48thontheeasternflank.Allof13thArmy

wouldseeactionanditwouldbefierce,whilethetwoflankswouldseefightingonpartoftheirsectors.Pukhov’s13thhadapproximately150,000mendefendingalinenearly20mileswidebynearly the same distance in depth, along three defensive belts. Fromwest to east the 8thRD,148thRD,81stRDand15thRDwouldmanthefronttrenches.Inthesecondbelt,the74thRD,307thRDand6thGRDweredeployed.Thethirdbeltwouldhavefivedivisions:2ndGRD,3rdGRD,4thGADof18thGRCand70thGRDand75thGRDof17thGRC.Inadditiontherewouldbeeithersixtankregimentsorbrigadestosupporttheinfantry.AssoonastheGermansshowedtheir intended lines of attacks, Rokossovsky would redeploy these tanks to the appropriatelocations. Behind the third belt would be many artillery batteries and additional reserves ifneeded.The13thArmydeployedover3,000gunsofassortedsizes,rocketsandmortars.Italsohad 200 operational tanks.Central Front had just over 1,100 tanks and then therewasStavkaReservewhichmeantmoretanks.Thelargestunitwouldbe2ndTAwhichhadtwocorps,the3rdTCand16thTC,andonebrigade.CentralFrontalsohadthe9thTCand19thGTCinreserve.The2ndTAhad37,000menandabout450tanks.Rokossovskyalsohad4thand65thArmiesinthesector.The13thArmywouldbefacingsPzAbt505’s45Tigers,whichwouldleadtheassaultsfortheGermansinasimilarmannerastheElefants.Thepanzersthatwerefollowingthesegiantswouldthenexploitthegapscreated.nzk32++.nzk85.dgk87m.lck192+.kfz449.zzt74+.Rokossovskysetuphisdefensivebeltsinthefollowingmanner.Thefirstbeltfromwesttoeast

consisted of Shepelevo-Izmanova-Verjh Tagino-Iasnaia Poliana-Ozerki-Maslovo-KrasnaiaSlobodka. The second defensive belt was Malakhova Sloboda-Buzova-Probuzhdenie-Gnilets-Bobrik-Podolian-Butyrki-Aleksandrovka-Protasovo-Grinevka-Verkhne Gnilusha. Further souththe third defensive belt started at Vetrenka- Berezovka-Krasavka-Samodurovka- Saburovka-Snovo-Ponyri-Maloarkhangelsk.Therewasonemajordifferencebetweenthedefensivesystemsof thenorthernandsouthernsalients; in thenorth, thedefensivebeltswerecloser together.Forexample,thekeytownofOlkhovatka,whichsatbehindthethirddefensivebelt,waslessthan15milesfromthefrontline.Inthesouth,Prokhorovkawasalmosttwicethatdistancefromthefrontline.Anotherdifferencebetweenthetwosalientswasthatevenwithadefensewithlessdepth,Rokossovskyhadbuilt500moremilesoftrenches.(July4th)Model’s9thArmy,aforceof335,000men(includingnoncombatandreserve),consistedof21

Germandivisionsbrokendownby14infantry,6panzerandonePzGD.The9thArmyalsohad

590tanks,mostlyMkIIIsandMkIVs,and424assaultguns.ItincludedthesPzAbt505,sPzAbt653, sPzAbt 654 (Ferdinands) and the 150mm self propelled guns of StPzAbt 216. The 9thdeployed its five corps in the followingmanner: 20th ICwas on thewestern flank of the linewhilethe23rdICwasontheeasternflank.Thethreepanzercorpsfrominnerwesttoinnereastwere:46thPzC,47thPzCand41stPzC.The47thPzCwasintheexactcenterofthelineandhadthe primary responsibility of breaking through toOlkhovatka.Model also had a reserve forcemadeupofthe4thPzD,12thPzDand10thPzGDwhichhadacombinetotalof184panzers.Theyweredeployedbehind47thPzCinsecondechelon.Ithasbeenarguedthatiftheabovementionedheavy battalions had not been broken into the different divisions, these unitswould have beenmoreeffectiveasbatteringramsinbreakingthroughthefrontlines.CaptKageneckofthesPzAbt503inthesouthcomplainedaboutsamethingwhenhisbattalionwasbrokenupbetweenthe6thPzD,7thPzDand19thPzD.IntheOrelsalientnortheastofModel,thebulkof2ndPzAwasmadeupofthe55thIC,53rdIC

and the 35th IC. These three corps totaled 160,000men in 14 divisions. It also had the 25thPzGD,the5thPzDand8thPzDinreserveplustwosecuritydivisions.Tothewestonthenoseofthe Kursk salient was Weiss’s 2nd Army with 96,000 men and they were waiting to attackeastwardonceHothlinkedupwithModelatKursk.GeneralModel’sriseincommandwascertainlydramatic.HestartedBarbarossaasCOof3rd

PzDthenmoveduptoCOof41stPzCandnowtwoyearslaterwasthecommandingofficerof9thArmy, 2ndPzAand a favorite ofHitler. zpm189. dgk51++. lck116m. sgf343. fzk171+. kfz455.pck33.asz354.asz355m.zzt74+.AGerman engineering team from6th IDwas clearingmines south ofTagino before the big

assault that would begin just a few hours later, when a Soviet recon team apprehended oneengineerandtheninterrogatedtheprisoner.CorporalFermellotoldhiscaptorsalltheyneededtoknow.At0110hrson7/5,Rokossovskyopenedhisownbarrageaheadof theGermans.pck33.dgk87m.lck116m.zro203.(July4th)The airmen of the 1stFlieger Division assembled in operation rooms at Bryansk andOrel

airfieldstolearntheirtargetsfortheopeningrounds.Mostpilotsthoughtitwouldbeairfieldsbuttheywerewrong.MajGeneralDeichmannwouldavoidthemanyairbasesGeneralRudenkohadset up in the Kursk area. The Soviet planes were spread out and the airfields were heavilydefended.InMayandJunetheLuftwaffeattemptedtoattackthesefieldssufferingheavylossesandmeagergains.Insteadthepilotsweredirectedtostrikeartillerybatteriesintheattackzonesin the northern salient. TheDivision had 730 assorted aircraft but due to the shortage of fuel,missionswere carefully scheduledwheneverpossible. In the south, the8thAirCorpshad justover1,100planes.AnotherimportantshortagetheairgroupingshadwasofAAguns,particularlythe88.ForModeltodefendhis9thArmyagainsttheexpectedheavyraid,quiteafew88swerepulled from nearby airfields and given to Model. This would reduce the air coverage at theairfieldsbutat least9thArmywouldhavejustover100precious88sfortheirdefense.cbk37.dgk54.cbk12m.In addition to theCentral Front,Rokossovsky also had the resources of the 16thAirArmy.

dgr238.TheGermanairfieldsinandaroundOrelhadbeenestablishedandimprovedsince1941and

included steel mesh on the runways. Some of the airfields west of Kharkov also hadimprovements.Thefieldswerealsoprotectedwithasmanyflakbrigadesthatcouldbespared.cbk51.cbk12m.pck64.

D

4

July5thontheSouthernSalientSeeMaps9,24

uringthepredawnhours,asmanyas200,000partisanslaunchedtheirownattack,hittingconvoys, rail lines, bridges andnon-combat rear area soldiers.Railroad engineers and

securitydivisionsworkeddayandnight to stop theattacksand repair thedamage.Theattackswereverysuccessfuland thesupplies to thefront felldramatically.The timingof theseattackswasanotherindicationthattheSovietswerewellawareoftheGermanplans.swm138.kcz169+.ThebattleofKurskformallybegan.Afterseveraldelays, theGermansummeroffensivewas

launchedagainsttheSoviet-heldsalientcenteredonKursk.Tothenorthofthesalient,theGerman9thArmy(Model)attackssouthwardagainst theSovietCentralFront(Rokossovsky)onafrontthatwould eventually expand to25miles.To the south, 4thPzA (Hoth) andArmyDetachmentKempfstrikenorthwardagainsttheSovietVoronezhFront(Vatutin)onanearly40milefront.TheSoviet Steppe Front (Konev) was held in reserve. Zhukov and Vasilevsky were Stavkarepresentatives for the battles in the north and south, respectively. The Germans hoped toeliminate theKursk salient andwith it aSoviet capability to launchanoffensive in1943.TheSoviets had prepared extensive defenses and anticipated the German offensive. A disruptivebombardment was carried out shortly before the German forces were scheduled to beginattacking.When the offensive did get underway, progresswas relatively slow and casualtieswere relatively high on both sides. After arriving at Kursk, Zhukov argued with Vatutin andVasilevsky that the dug-in tanks should be unearthed and used in the offensive. The other twogeneralsarguedthedefensiverolewasrightforthemoment.StalinagreedwithVatutin.gjz184.hjj129.vzz26.vzz33.asz362+.TheGerman9thArmyattackedfromsouthofOrelonthenorthernlegofthesalientwhilethe

4thPzAandKempfArmyattackedfromBelgorodnorthwardintothesouthernlegofthesalient.HothandKempfwereusingthe traditionalBlitzkreigwithpanzers infrontcontrary toModel’sapproachofleadingwithinfantry.vzz26+..dgk87m.Thefirstdaysawpenetrationsof11milesonthesouthernsalientand6milesonthenorthern

salient.Luftwaffe estimated 432 Soviet planeswere destroyed to theGermans’ 26.A total of1,450 German planes took part in the operation. Though the Red Air Force suffered greatercasualtiestheabovenumberforSovietlossesishigh.TheGermanarmiesinvolvedwereGroupKempf,4thPzAinthesouthand9thArmyand2nd

PzAinthenorth.Therewere7IDs,11PzDsand3assaultbrigades.Inthesouththemaineffortwas ledby48thPzCand2ndSSPzCwitha totalof700panzers.TheSoviet6thGAtook thebruntofthisforcealongtheroadtoOboyan.Despitetheunfavorableweather,theLuftwaffegave

strongsupportthroughoutthecampaign.TheSSPzCwasabletotravel11miles,penetratingthe52ndRDline.VatutinbegansendingreinforcementstoplugtheholesformingaroundCherkasskoeandthePenaRiver.dgk94+.AtKursktheGermansdidgaingroundbutnotenoughtoguaranteepocketinglargenumbersof

POWs. Therewere six defense belts in the south and four in the north of the salient and vonManstein figured he had five days to secure them if victorywas going to happen. Theywerealreadybehindschedule.Theplancalledforgaining18milesaday.wdk124*.DuringthedayandnightsPzAbt505destroyed111SoviettankswhilelosingonlythreeTigers.

Bytheendofthewar,only1,354Tigershadbeenbuilt.dgk18.Even though Hitler thought this offensive would surprise the Soviets, the Soviets knew for

monthsthattheKurskareawouldbetheGermansspearheadandplannedaccordingly.Thefrontlinewas 35miles deep. By the end of the first day,Hitler andOKWknew the Sovietswereexpectingthem.ThefieldgeneralsformonthstriedtotellHitlerthisbuthewouldnotlisten.FrominterrogatingaGermansoldierat0110hrs,Zhukovdiscoveredthefull invasionwould

begin at 0330 hrs. He immediately ordered all of his batteries to open fire on the Germanpositions. 2,460 guns opened fire, causing heavy casualties on German assault positions. TheSovietsclaimedafterthecampaigntheGermanshadtodelaytheinvasionforuptothreehourstoregroupbuttherewasonlyaminorpausefromtheirscheduledlaunchtime.gjz180+.Twelvemiles east ofGertsovka at 0115 hrs,Hausser’s 2nd SS PzC advanced under fierce

fighting tocapture forwardpositionsat Iakhontovandon the southernslopesof theErikRivervalley.The2ndSSPzCreceivedhalfofthe167thIDandthe48thPzCreceivedtheotherhalftohelpsupportthepanzers.Hausser,aveteranofWWI,retiredfromservicein1932butjoinedtheSS when Hitler came to power in 1933. He is considered one of the best if not the bestcommandersoftheWaffenSS.In1941whilewithDasReichhelostaneyeandworeablackeyepatch. In 1944, he would be transferred to Normandy as CO of 7th Army. In August he wasseriously wounded near Falaise and was replaced by Heinrich Eberbach. dgk84. snk75++.dgr280m.Startingearly,2ndSSPzClaunchedfromthelinethat includedtheStepnoi,SukhoiVerkand

the nearby Hill 227.4 and Hill 218.0. The attack axis included Iakhontov, Hill 228.6 andStreletskoe but themain axis forLAH andDas Reich was straddling the Tomarovka-Bykovkaroadinordertoreachtheirprimaryobjective,thekeyjunctionatIakovlevoTheheavieststrikebyLAHandDasReichonthe52ndGRDwasinafourmilesectionbetweenHill228.6andHill218.0.JusttotheeastofthissectorwastheimportantvillageofIakhontovthattheflankofDasReichwasheadingforaswell.SincetheSovietsexpectedtheGermanswouldtraveldownthepavedroadtoIakhontov,itwasheavilycoveredwithmanyanti-tankguns.The52ndGRDwasequipped with a special flamethrower battalion and had erected defenses on all sides of thevillage.Eventually,afteragrislyfightby1000hrstheSovietswereforcedfrombehindtheanti-tankditch southof Iakhontovandhad to fallback toHill246.3.Engineerswerebroughtup toclearminefieldsbeforemoremenorpanzers couldmove in thedirectionof Iakovlevo.Heavyfighting would soon erupt for Hill 220.5 and Hill 217.1 near the farming village of Berezovwhich was also defended by 52nd GRD with 51st GRD in second echelon. gnk13. gnk56.vzz92++.vzz6m.vzz2m.cbk32.cbk12m.vzz39.zrk204+.zow135.zow139.

In order forLAH to reach Iakovlevo as quickly as possible, theLuftwaffe was taskedwithclearing the resistance positioned in and aroundBerezov aswell as both sides of nearbyHill220.5(1stPzGR).During thispreemptivebombingandshortlyafter0130hrs the2ndPzGRofLAHcapturedHill228.6situatedalongtheTomarovka-Bykovkaroad.OnehourlaterittookthehighgroundnearIakhontov.DasReich,with2ndPzGRofLAHonitsleftflankandheadingforKamennyiLogandSadelnoe,tookthevillageofIakhontovat0245hrsbutby0510hrswasstillboggeddownbytankditchesnorthofthevillageandcounter-attacksby52ndGRDwhichweretryingtoretakethetownandhill.Theattackswererepulsed.Atthesametimeotherelementsofthe 2ndPzGRwere fighting theirway intoStreletskoe to thewest of Iakhontov.Once the lineStreleskoe-Iakhontovwasachieved,thetrailingunitsofLAHwouldadvance.Duringthisinitialperiod,artillerybatterieswerenearlyfiringconstantlyonprebattleobjectivesoruponreceivingnewinteloftroublesomePakfrontsorartilleryconcentrations,shiftingtothosenewcoordinates.Occasionallysmokescreenswouldbeorderedtohelpoutaregimentindistress.agk93.gnk75.vzz92.vzz6m.vzz2m.zrl204+.zrl207.zow140.At0220hrsintheKursksalientonthisMondaymorning,theSovietsbeganshellingGerman

positionstodisrupttheirassaultpreparations.Tanksremainedsilenttohidetheirpositions.The6thGAand7thGAbroughtup76mmguns to the firstandseconddefensebelts in thesouth toslowtheexpectedpanzerattacks.ThesegunsweredeliveredbyUStrucksandcausedthe167thIDsome600casualtiesbythetimethebarragestopped.The167thIDhadresponsibilitytoguardtheleftflankofLAHasittravelednorthalongtheeastbankoftheVorsklaRiverandhadtofighthardtocatchupwithLAH.Furthereast,the19thPzDdefendingtheMikhailovkabridgeheadwasalso hit hard. In the north Model’s front was especially hit hard, causing destruction in 90batteriesand60OPs.Alsoatthistime,180Germanbombersattackedinfrontoftheadvancing4thPzA.je98.dgk85+.rkz166.fkk75.agk87.agk91m.At 0230 hrs, the 3rd PzR of SSTK captured Hill 218, southeast of Berezov, then repulsed

several counter-attacks before moving on. By 1230 hrs, in fierce hand-to-hand combat, thegrenadierscapturedthenearbytanktrenchaswell.kuz194.ztc268.Beforedaybreak,Germanradarspottedapproximately400planesheadingtowardLuftlotte4

air bases.German fighters quickly scrambled to intercept theSoviet force. In the dogfight thatpursued, many Soviet planes, about 120 in the north and as many as 432 in the south, wereclaimedtohavebeenshotdown.EventhoughaerialconflictonthisdaywasoneoftheworstinthewarontheEasternFront,thetotalsthatexcludethisairfielddisasterfortheVVSwerecloserto70planesinthenorthand150planesinthesouthfortheRedAirForce.TheLuftwaffelostjusta fraction of these numbers,which gave thema temporary advantage in the air.TheLuftwaffeclaimed only 26 of their planes were downed. Many of the Soviet planes flew out of theShumakovoairfieldsoutheastofKursk.TheirmaintargetwastheMikayanovkaairfield,34milessouthwest of Belgorod but Pomerki, Sololniki, Ostnova and Rogan were also targeted. Otherairfields used by the Sovietswere atGlinev,NovyiOskol,Dubki andPokrovskoye and somewere as far as 60miles east ofKursk.TheSovietmission failedprimarilynot by early radarnoticealonebutacombinationofradarandthecoincidentalpreparationoftheGermanaircrewsfortheirownassault.Withtheirplanesallreadytofly,ittooktheGermanpilotsonlyminutestogetintotheair.Besidestechnique,SovietradioequipmentwasinferiortotheGermanequipment.

dgk85.lck222+.cbk26*+.cbk34.cbk30.dgr249+.swm140.sgf344.wwf163m.cbk12m.pck63+.In the predawn hours before Citadel began, the remainder of the 800 German airplanes of

Luftflotte 4 were checked, fueled and loaded. These air fields were located at Barvenkovo,Pomerki,Osnova,Rogan,Sokomki,KramotorskayaandMikayanovka.Justbefore0300hrs,theseplanes started to take off for their intended targets. mhz199+ mhz216. fkk51. fkk79. dgr249.cbk12m.hsz108.AftertakingHill228.6andrepulsingacounter-attackaround0230hrs,theTigersofLAHalong

withthe2ndPzGRheadedforHill220.5neartheTomorovka-Bykovkaroadwhichwasdefendedby the 151st GRR of 52nd GRD. At 0315 hrs, the eleven Tigers of Company 13 of LAHapproachedHill220.5.Hill220.5washeavilydefendedandwouldbemuchtoughertocapture.In front of the hill was an anti-tank ditch that was heavily covered with mines and wire.Flamethrowers,anti-tankgunsanddug-inassaultgunswerewaitingfor theGermans toattemptcrossingtheditch.agk93+.agk94m.vzz92.zrl211.Hausser’s2ndSSPzClauncheditsattackandmetfierceresistancebutstillmanaged,withthe

help of the Luftwaffe, to advance 11 miles by dusk against 6th GA. The SSTK succeeded inattackingthe69thHQatIakhontovo,inflictingheavycasualties.Berezov,Gremuchi,BykovoandVosnesenskiall also fell to theGermans.The6thGAwas at a breakingpoint.By1200hrs allthree divisions of 2nd SS PzC had penetrated the first defense belt. Katukov, Popiel andChistiakovcouldnotbelievethespeedofthepenetration.Theday’scasualtieswouldturnouttobetheheaviestfor2ndSSPzCofthecampaign.ItprovedtoHausser,whowasobservingmuchof the fighting that the initial shelling and bombing had little effect. It also told him that therewouldbenoquickracetothePselasHothexpected.bt83.mhz210+.mhz216.vzz93.lck241.WhentheTigersandfollowinginfantrybrokethroughthefirstline,Sovietanti-tankgunshiding

in wait opened fired. The Soviet guns could not penetrate the Tigers so the big cats calmlystoppedandstartedmethodicallypickingofftheSovietguns.Tanksfromthe230thTRmovedupto challenge the Tigers.Wittmannn saw them first and immediately startedmoving toward theT34s.Otherpanzersmovedtowardtheimportanthillandwerestoppedbyaminefieldandatankditch.Whiletryingtofreethemselves,theSovietsshelledthemheavily.IttooktheLAHuntil1200hrs to reach the top of Hill 217.1 and began securing the immediate area. Once the hill wassecuredotherelementsoftheLAHmoveduptotheline.gnk66+.gnk74+.mjk88.vzz97+.At0315hrs,SSTKartilleryopenedupandby0400hrs,atleast100bombersandStukasflew

directlyover themen in the trencheswhowerewaiting for theword togo.When thebombersweredone,thedivisionjumpedoffwithTigersinthelead.AsthemenheadedforandthroughthewoodsinfrontofHill216.5,manydogfightscouldbeseeninthesky.Shortlyafter0900hrs,theregiment reached theapproach to thehill.Bynoon themenhadfought through thebarbedwireand reached the first trench in front of the hill. Hand-to-hand combat erupted. Soviet artilleryopenedupwhen theassaultgunswere in range.TheTigersweresafeagainst thesesmall fieldgunsbuttheassaultgunswerenotsoluckyandweretakingcasualties.Duringthisengagement,theTigersmetupwiththefirstSU-152.ItwasahybridT34witha15cmhowitzerbuiltaboard.While theheavygunswere firingat eachother,Germanengineers struggled to closedown thetrench in order for the panzers tomake it across.Making thingsworse for theGermans, fourTigersfoundaminefieldandlosttracks.Therepairshopwouldhavetomakeemergencyrepairs

toget thesemachinesmovingagain.TheSSTK started thecampaignwith115assortedpanzersand 39 assault guns that were in fighting condition. Excluding seven command panzers, 97 ofthosepanzerswereeitherMkIIIsorMkIVs.TherewereonlyelevenTigers.gnk80+.kuz192+.ztc268.ReconpatrolsfrommostGermandivisionsmovedoutwhilestilldark,infiltratedtheveryfront

trenchesandeliminatedanumberofOPsights.TheSovietswouldbetemporarilyblindinafewsectors,givingtheGermansafewminutesofadvantage.wwf73.DasReichwasunpreparedforthelaunch.Manyoftheirpanzershadnotarrivedwhichmeant

Hausserwouldhavetowatchhisgrenadiersjumpoffwithoutpanzersupport.Notagoodstart.Theirartillerydidbeginontime.At0330hrs,itstartedfiringonthelowhillsinfrontofBerezovwhichwasdefendedbythe155thGRRand156thGRR.At0400hrs,Stukasshoweduptosoftenthefrontlineaswell.WhentheSovietssawtheGermansadvance,agroupoftankswentouttomeetthemwithinfantryontheirdecks.TheGermansputupawallofsmall-armsfirethattargetedthemounted infantry.The firewas sobad that theSoviets had to jump from the tanks.After aviciousfight,DasReichreachedthefirstditchinfrontofBerezov.Withoutpanzers,DeutschlandRegiment had to destroy one bunker at a time. Itwas slow going. Soviet artillery stationed atZhuravlinyiWoods,northofBerezov,increasedtheirmortarfireonthestrugglingGermans.Withmonthstoprepare,theSovietswereabletosetupartillerypositionsthatwouldcovertheirlines.The Germans were able to bring up their mortars to combat the Soviets but it still cost theGermansheavily.With theirmenstuckat theditch, thebigGermangunsshifted theiraimfromBerezov to ZhuralivniWoodswhere the biggest danger lurked.Without an OP, their aimwasineffectivesoStukaswerecalledintoquiettheWoods.gnk77+.vzz92.gnk69m.zow141.At 0600 hrs, sappers led the advance of the 2nd SS PzC toward Berezov butDas Reich,

travelingalongtheeasternbankoftheVorsklaRiver,followingthesapperswerehaltedbyheavyshellingfromthewestsideof theriver.Aerialbombingandadditionalshellingwasrequested.Theirmissionwas tocollapse the tank trenchandclear themanymines in frontof the town toallowthepanzersquickpassage.By1000hrs,thegrenadiersofDeutschlandpenetratedthefrontlinetrenchfromthenorthofthe52ndGRDandwerefightinghand-to-handagainstthe151stGRRand155thGRR.ItwascriticalfortheSStogaincontroloftheTomarovka-BykovkaroadandtheBelgorod-IakovlevoroadinordertobypassmuchofterribleterrainalongtheVorsklaRiverthatwouldgreatlyslowtheadvanceandmake thecolumnsvulnerable toattack.By1100hrsEickeRegiment of SSTK but temporarily attached to Das Reich entered the fight for Berezov bycrossingthetrenchontheeastsideandfightinghand-to-handwiththedefendersby1230hrs.TheSSCorpsalsohadtheresponsibilityofscreening48thPzC’seasternflank.Partofthattaskwasgivento167thID.HoweverHothplacedGDwithits350panzersdirectlyinfrontofthisterribleterrainandthefirstcoupledaysfightingwouldhaveadisastrouseffectonthesepanzers,causingthe48thPzCtofallbehindtheSSCorps.Tomakethesituationworsefortheattackers,someoftheSovietguns,likethe122mm,wereusingfragmentationbombsthatwoulddestroyallinfantryorengineerina320sqyardarea.vzz89+.vzz94+.vzz221.vzz2m.gnk68m.gjz184.zow141.DasReichcontinuedtofightforBerezovandeventuallyaholeeruptedinthe52ndGRD’sline

andby1400hrsBerezovwasbeingsecured.The156thGRRof52ndGRDwashitthehardestandwasforcedtofallbacktoHill246.3.Thiswasanotherexampleofalongandcostlybattle

forasmallstrongpoint.Thiswouldbeapatternthatwouldrepeatitselfoverandoverasthedayswent by. Leaving Berezov, a trailing battalion of theDeutschland Regiment headed for Hill233.3, almost twomilesnorthof thevillage to join the restof the regiment thatwas locked inbattle.AstheleadGermansapproachedtheHill,T34scamerollingdowntomeet theirenemy.Though destroying a few of the leading tanks, the Germans had to halt their advance; OttoWeidingerwaswoundedandhad tobecarried tosafety.He later recovered to leadhis troopsagain.Panzershad still not arrivedand infantry assaultwas indangerofbeing stopped.OtherelementsofDasReicharrivedandadded theirweight to theoffensive.TheGermangunswerenowhoningtheiraimonHill233.3andStukaswouldsoonarrivetohelpout.Atthefootofthehill,theGermansstruckaminefieldbutby1600hrstheywereontopofHill233.3andmoppingupthelastresistance.MajorWislicenyof3rdBattalionofDeutschlandRegimentledthechargeon the hill.Hewas awarded theKnight’sCross for his bravery and leadership that afternoon.CaptainSchreiberandMasterSergeantWeberwerealso recipientsof theKnight’sCross.DasReichstartedthecampaignwith98assortedpanzersincluding12Tigers,18capturedT34splus43assaultguns.gnk78+.wwf149.gnk69m.hjj112.ztc268.vzz93.zow141+.Inthefirsthoursofthecampaign,theLuftwaffestruckthe52ndGRDextremelyhard,inflicting

manycasualties.The52ndGRDhadthemisfortuneofbeingdeployedinfrontoftheroute2ndSSPzCwastaking.The67thGRDtotheimmediatewestof52ndGRDintheOlkhovka,Dmitrievkaareaandinfrontof11thPzDandGDwasalsohithard.Thecorpsreceivedhighpriorityinaerialand artillery support.This extremebombing also haddisadvantages aswell for therewere somany shell holes that the new Panthers of the GD had trouble conquering the terrain. TheLuftwaffealsohadsquadronsoffightersflyingoverSovietrearareastryingtoshootdownandpreventSovietplanesfromenteringthebattlezonewhentheyfirststartedappearingintheskiesafter0700hrs.Ontheotherhand,totheeastwhenKempf’sforcesattackedthe81stGRDattheMikhailovka bridgehead not far from Belgorod, there was no Luftwaffe support. Without airsupport,thefirstcoupledaysforKempfwereslowandtortuous.Itisinterestingtoconsiderwhat3rdPzC’sadvancewouldhavebeenlikeifairsupportwasprovided.Would6thPzDhavebeenabletopush81stGRDbackthatfirstdaywithairsupport, insteadofhavingtoredeploytothesoutheast thenextday?Thefirstdaywasacostlywastefor3rdPzCingeneraland6thPzDinparticular.WouldthepanzerdivisionshavebeenabletoreachnearPravorotby7/11or7/12toassistLAH andDas Reich if the first two days had gone better forKempf? cbk30+. dgk70m.dgr250.Ontheeastflankof48thPzCwas2ndSSPzC.Hausserplannedanarrowfrontfromwhichhis

400 fighting vehicles including 42 Tigerswould smash through the Soviet lines on itsway toOboyan.ElementsofLAHlaunchedshortlyafterfirstlightandquicklyranintotheSoviets’firstdefense

belt that included tank and wire obstacles and a string of heavily armored bunkers. The leadpanzersmadelittleprogressagainstthiswall.Somembersofthe2ndPzGR,leadbyKarckandusingdemolitioncharges,sneakedinanddestroyedonebunkerafteranother.Thepanzersrolledon.The2ndSSPzChadaneasiertimethanthe48thPzCforitreceivedmoresupportfromtheLuftwaffe.TheHs-129twinengineheavilyarmoredfighterswiththe37mmcannonwereinthissector. Theywere also using the new fragmentation SD-1 bombs thatwere simply horrific on

infantry. The 151st GRR and 155th GRR were practically annihilated, leaving the Belgorod-Kurskhighwayopen.pck60+.pck65++.lck232.The 52nd GRDwas deployed across the critical Tomarovka-Iakovlevo road on a line that

includedTrirechnoe-Gremuchi-Nepkhaevo-Berezov.Thewidthoftheirsectorwasfourmiles.By1000hrs, the2ndSSPzCbroke through the first trench line.The1008thDATR,dug in on thesecondlineatHill217.1,onemilenorthwestofBerezov,waswaitingfortheGermanstoarrive.ViciousfightingbetweentheSovietartilleryonthehillandtheapproachingpanzerssoonbrokeout.SeeMap9.vzz92.vzz96.vzz2m.vzz3m.gnk66+.NorthofTomarovka in the11thPzDsectorwhere the67thGRDwasdefending,severalFw

190swere shotdown. Ingeneralon the firstdayof theoffensive, theSoviet air responsewasslowandinconsistentbutinthisareatheLuftwaffewasnotheavilypatrollingandtheSovietAFhadbetter results.TheGermanplanes for themostparthadcontrolof the skiesand lostmanyfewerplanes than theRedAirForce this firstday.Soviet fighter escortswouldalso flyat thesamespeedandaltitudeofthebombersandtheGermanBf109sflyingatamuchgreaterspeedandheighthadtheadvantageanddestroyedmoreSovietplanesthantheywouldlosetoday.Sovietobserverswere poorly trained and observation procedures and practiceswere delinquent andawkward,makingforanextremelyslowresponse.Thisfailingwasquicklyrecognizedandwasimproved in thedays ahead.On theotherhand,Germanprocedureswerewell formulated andfollowedwell.WhenSovietartillerythreatenedaGermanoperation,thelocationwascalledinandtheappropriateairresponsewasmade.ThisGermanroutineworkedwellforthefirstdaysbutasattritionworedowntheLuftwaffe, theirresponsewasslowedandnotasubiquitous.cbk29+.cbk31+.Thebattle forHill 220.5, the strongpointof theBerezov sector,whichwasdefendedby the

151stGRRof52ndGRD,startedat0315hrswitharocketbarragebythe55thWerferRegiment.At0405hrs,theStukas,whileLAHcontinuedtoadvance,cameintobombtheHillaswell.At0430 the armored vehicles of LAH moved out while the shelling continued on the Butovo-Gertsovkaline.Nearby,thefortifiedtownofBerezovanditssurroundingareawasattackedagainbyDas Reich. The infantry ofLAH moved on Hill 220.5 around 0700 hrs. It would take theGermansintotheafternoontotakebothoftheseobjectives.Hill220.5straddledtheTomarovka-BykovkaroadandwasduewestofBerezovbytwomiles.Hill217.1,amilenorthofHill220.5alsoranalongthekeyTomarovka-BerezovroadandwouldalsohavetobetakenbeforereachingBykovka,furthernorth.TothewestnexttotheVorsklaRiver,the2ndPzGRofLAHsupportedbythe 315GRof 167th IDwas advancing against resistance at Sadelnoe andKamenyiLog.TheattackrouteforLAHwassituatedbetweentheVorsklaRiveronthewestflankandBerezovontheeast.vzz92.gnk66.gnv75.agk90.vzz2m.gnk69m.zrl214.At0720,VatutinorderedKravchenko’s5thGTCtopreparetomoveforward.TheCOwasthen

ordered to move to and defend the Lunino, Teterevino, Petrovka line by next morning. WithGremuchifallen,Burdeiny’s2ndGTCwasordereduptothelinetofillthegapbehind5thGTC.Theyneededtobeinplaceby2400hrsthatnight.BurdeinyhadtentativeorderstoattackontheTeterevino,Bykovo,RakovoaxisiftheGermansshowedanyweakness.vzz93.vzz105.dgk101.During the day and especially during the morning hours, the Soviet AF concentrated their

groundattacksintheZybino,Moschchenoye,TomarovkaandStreletskoeareasinthewestandin

theSolomino,BezliudovkaareaseastoftheDonetsagainstlargepanzerformations.dgr251.At0900hrs,Il-2sattackedDasReich.GermanBf109sgreatlyoutnumberedtheseveralgroups

ofeightSovietfightersandwereabletoshootsomedownandchasetheothersaway.cbk31.ThegrenadiersattackingBerezovweretakingheavycasualtiesandweremakingslowprogress

duetothehiddenartilleryinZhuravlinyiwoodswhichwasdirectingaccuratefireonDasReichin front of Berezov and nearby LAH. The 55thWerfer and 1stWerfer Regiments turned theirrocket launchers on the woods and started firing. The 55th Werfer Regiment was originallyassignedtosupport2ndPzGRofLAHandinparticularlytoscreentheregimentfromflankattacksemanatingfromthewestbankoftheVorsklaRiver.Itwasalsopositionedtosupporttheassaulton Bykovka, further north. Bykovka, situated near important roadways and the future site forLAH’sHQ,wasalsodeemedtobeamajoraidstation.AhospitalhadalreadybeenpreparedinTomarovka, west of Belgorod. The HQ for General Kruger of Das Reich was located atRedilovka but would relocate to just north of Kasazkaia after the operation launched. vzz93.dgk231m.snk433m++.dgk99.zrl208#.zow.134+.zow138.At0915hrs, elementsofSSTK approachedHill 216.5. In frontof thehillwas a trenchand

runningbehind the trencha seriesofbunkers theGermanshad to takebefore reaching the top.With artillery firing ahead of the infantry, the Germans throwing grenades reached the trench.Withoutstopping,thetrenchwasleapedandthemenwereheadingforthebunkers.Thedefenderscameoutfrombehindtheirdefensestomeettheattackersandavicioushand-to-handfightensued.By1600hrs theSSTK hadcapturedHill216.5with theSoviet survivors fallingback.WithoutwaitingfortherestofSSTKtocatchup,HausslerorderedhismentoheadfortheOboyanroad.BylateafternoonHaussler,hismenandsixTigersreachedHill225.9whichhadacommandingviewoftheimportantroadtoProkhorovka.Abriefbutcostlybattlewiththe155thRRof52ndGRDsplittheSovietregimentfromtherestofthedivision.Thiscausedtheregimenttofallback,leavingthedivisionflankexposedandshowingagapwiththe375thRDwhichwassituatedtothesouth.Ontheothersideof375thRDwas81stGRDof7thGAwhichwascurrentlyfighting6thPzDof3rdPzCandwasunabletolendahand.TheEickeRegimentwentontocapturenearbyErik,GonkiandHill198.3.gnk81+.zow145.Lebedev’s 96th TBwas quickly ordered to Hill 225.9 when it was discovered SSTK was

makinggoodprogress.TheSovietsmadeittothehillbeforetheGermanscoulddefeat52ndGRDand though notwell prepared, still put up stiff resistance.With night quickly approaching andwithout his full complement of panzers, Haussler chose to withdraw from the hill. He wouldattackitearlynextmorning.ThiswasacriticalbreakfortheSoviets.Ifithadbeenearlierinthedayandwith all ofhispanzers supporting,SSTKmight have taken the hill and struck the 81stGRDintherearatthesametime6thPzDhadbeenattackingfromtheotherdirection.If6thPzDhadbeenabletobreakthe81stGRDlinethefirstday,the3rdPzCcouldhavebeenadayaheadofscheduleandpotentiallybeenabletolinkupwithDasReichby7/12foracoordinatedattacktowardPravorotandProkhorovka.Maybe?gnk83.At1435hrs,EickeRegimentofSSTKcommandedbyKnochleinattackedelementsofthe52nd

GRDdefendingthewoodswestofHill225.9.TheassaultwasmadedifficultfortheSovietshaddugatankditchinfrontoftheforestaswellasplantingthousandsofmines.Germanengineerswerecalleduptoclearthefield;manypioneerslosttheirlivesthatafternoontoheavysmallarms

fire.Oncepasttheminefield,thegrenadierswereabletoquicklyoverpowerthedefenders.TheGermanscouldnotfinishclearingthewoodsbeforedarkandstoppedtheiradvanceinthewoods.Theywould resume in themorningandhopefully reachErik to thewestbynoon the followingday.With lessenemyfire, theengineers finallyovercame the tankditchand thepanzersstartedrollingagain,tryingtocatchuptotheinfantry.OnceagaintheSovietdefenses,accurateartilleryfire and an active air force had slowed theGermans’ advance.SSTK flak guns downedmanyplanes that day. SSTK had the lightest casualties of the SS Corps and still had 121 workingpanzers.gnk84.The 1008th DATR and 538th TDR defending the road to Bykovka quickly destroyed six

panzers, including threeTigers ofDasReich before being forced to retreat northward throughtown. Before the fighting was broken off, Kotenko claimed to have destroyed 33 panzersincluding17Tigers.SomeofthosedestroyedbyusingKatyusharocketspointedpointblankatthepanzers.Helost21ofhis24tanksand45guns.TheLAHjoinedintohelpDasReichsubduetheSovietswhichfellbacktoHill217.1.LAHthencontinuednorthhopingtocrosstheVorsklaandtotry to breach the second defense belt near Iakovlevo. It failed its objective butwould resumeearlynextmorning.dgk99+.rkz167.vzz95+.TheopeningdriveforthebulkofLAHwasinthedirectionofStreletzkoye-Berezovwhichwas

defendedbythe52ndGRD.Berezov,whichwasontheborderlinebetweenLAHandDasReich,wascapturedby1100hrs.By this time theLuftwaffe, for themostpart,hadclearedorgreatlyreducedtheskiesofSovietcompetition.cbk32.agk91m.lck164m.zow135.TothenortheastofIakovlevotheterrainwasopenandflatuptotheKomsomoletsStateFarm.

With2ndSSPzCfightingforIakovlevo,justsouthofPokrovka,Vatutinbroughtupthe31stTCtodiginandblocktheGermans’way.Thisareawaspartoftheterrainbetweentheseconddefenseandthirddefensebeltandtherehadbeennotrenchesbuiltinthearea.The1stTAwasorderedtomove up along a 19 mile sector betweenMelovoe and Iakovlevo and fortify the line. Theseredeploymentsofover1,000 tankswerecritical for thisareawasabout tobeattackedby twodivisionsof48thPzCandonedivisionoftheSSwhichwouldhaveblownrightpasttheoriginalformationsof6thGA.SeeMap9.vzz106+.lck241.vzz8m.lck164m.InorderforthepanzersofSSTKtomovepasttheswampwestofErik,theirengineers,taking

pointunderfirefromtheRedAirForceandartillerycomingfromtheZhuravlinyi(Shurawlivny)Forest,werebridgingtheunsuitableterrain.gnk110.gnk69m.vzz3m.The Pz Abt 2 attacked Nekhaevka, on the western bank of the Lipovyi Donets River and

southwest of Teterevino, and the surrounding high ground, forcing the defenders to fall back.fkk134.vzz3m.The67thGRD,justtothewestof52ndGRD,washardhitbythe48thPzC’s11PzD;Vatutin

orderedthe6thTCandthe3rdMCuptothelinetosupportthe67thGRD.Eventuallythe67thwouldfallbacktosecondechelon.kcz167.dgk95m.JoachimPeiper andhis fellow tankers that hewas supporting contributed to the advanceby

breaking through the line east of Bykovka and opened the way to Iakovlovka and the futurebridgeheadacrossthePsel.fkk153.nzk85.Hausser called in theLuftwaffe to hit the Zhuravlinyiwoods inwhich Soviet artillerywas

hittingBerezovandGremuchihard.Hausseralsocalledupthe55thWerferRegimentwhichhad

beendeployedwithLAHandthe1stWerferRegimenttoshellthefronttrencheshardbeforetheinfantry stormed the line.Hausser also had the support of 400 planes from the 8thAirCorps.vzz93.vzz6m.Oncepastthefrontlinetrenches,DasReichcapturedIakhontovby1100hrsandBerezovby

1330hrs.Vzz92++.dgk99.The167thID,deployedbetweenLAHand11thPzD,wastaskedwithgivingLAH’s left flank

protectionbutwerelockedinfiercecombatjustoffLAH’sflankandcouldnotmove.The167thIDhadattachedtoitthe55thWerferRegimenttogiveitgreaterpunch.TheinfantrywentafterthetownsofSadelnyeandKamennyiwhichwasdefendedbyartilleryofKotenko’s1008thDATRthatcouldhitLAHasitmovednorthtowardHill220.5.Kotenko’sregimentwasonereasonwhyHill220.5wassodifficulttocapture.mhz216.gnk65.At1200hrs, theLAHwith thesupportofmore than30panzers launchedanattackalong the

roadtoBykovkawithleadelementsreachingHill217.1,onemilenorthwestofBerezov.HalfofthegroupsplitoffandenteredBerezovwhileafewpanzersenteredGremuchi.Hill217.1was500yardsnortheastofHill220.5andby1400hrsDasReichhadfinishedsecuringBerezov.AtthesametimeSSTKwasfightingforGremuchiwhichhadescalatedfromwhenthefirstpanzersenteredthevillage.TheSSTKwastryingtopenetratethelinetoreachtheBelgorod-KurskroadbyfightingthroughthewoodssouthofErikcreek.At1430hrs,DasReichmovedoutofBerezovforZhuravlinyiandthenGremuchi.By1600hrs,DasReichhadclearedtheZhuravlinyiwoods.vzz96+.gnk66.zow141.A German recon force of over 2,000 men with support of 20 panzers from 11th PzD was

advancingtowardButovofromthesoutheast.Whilethe11thPzDslowlypushedforwardtowardButovo;theirrightflank,SSPzC,tookthehighgroundnearIakhontov,forcingtheelementsofthe6thGAbackfromtheiroutposts.At1645hrs,fromthisnewlycapturedhighground,the48thPzCand SS started shelling the depth of the first defensive belt.During the shelling the 48th PzC,supported by assault guns, rolled over Soviet defenses and reachedCherkasskoe southwest ofAlekseevkabyeveningwhereaterriblebattleerupted.VatutinorderedKatukovtobringreservesup to the line that includedMelovoe,Rakovo,Shepelevkafrom6thTCwhile the3rdMCwasordereduptotheAlekseevka,Syrtsevo,Iakovlevolineandthe31stTCwassupposedtomoveinto the line thatcoveredStudenok,StalinskoeStateFarm,Vladimirovka,Orlovka. Inaddition,the2ndGTCweretomoveuptoSazhnoe,westofKrivtsevo,ontheeasternbankoftheLipovyiDonets River and the 5th GTC were to move to the Teterevino South-Malinovka area. Theywouldbeinplacebythefollowingday.Around300sortieswereflownonthisafternoontoassist48thPzCintheiropeningmoveswhichwasabighelpconsideringmostofthepanzershadnotarrivedyet.Anestimated100Soviet fightersweresent tostop theGermanformationsbut theywere ineffective in stopping the attacks though tenGermanplaneswere shotdown.Malinovkawas a small village east of Teterevino South andwest of Shakhovo. bt81+*. dgk81. hjj117m.dgr249.vzz105+.vzz5m+.vzz12m.AftercapturingBerezovby1300hrs,theDeutschlandRegimentmovednorthbutnotfarfrom

Bykovka engaged a group from 52ndGRDwith a fewAmericanM3 tanks.After awhile theSovietswereencircledandwereputtingupstiff resistance thatwasslowingDasReich down.But theywere runningout of ammoand their survivalwould be lost unless help could arrive.

Nekrasov planned a suicide tank attack as a diversion in order for his men to fall back toBykovka.At1400hrsthetanksmetfourmilesnorthofBerezovonHill233.3.Asecondgroupoftanks attacked LAH one mile south of Bykovka. Seven Soviet tanks were knocked out in thesouthernengagementbutthe52ndGRDintheareacontinuedtoresist.At1500hrs,theLuftwaffemade another run onHill 233.3,Hill 215.4,Bykovka,KamennyiLog andKozmo-Demianovkawhere the 52nd GRD HQ was located. Elements of two regiments of 52nd GRD that wereencirclednorthofBerezovdidnotmakeBykovkaandweredestroyed.By1800hrs,thegarrisonatKozmolostitscommunicationswith6thGAHQ.vzz97++.gnk77+.gnk69m.vzz6m.zow141.AfterthecaptureofHill233.3,bothLAHandDasReichwereorderedtofightpastdarkand

wereinformedtheirpanzersweremovingup.By1800hrsDasReichfollowingaravinenorthofBerezovmarchedintoaminefield.Afterextracting themselves theregimenthad tobackupandmovethroughtheZhuravlinyWoodstoheadtowardBykovkasector.zow142.Followingorders, theThuleRegimentofSSTK turned southeast after reaching theGremuchi

Valleyaround1200hrsheadingfortheShopinoareatosecuretheBelgorod-KurskHighwayaswellasthenearbybridgeovertheLipvoyiDonets.kuz194.At 1220hrs, a scouting party fromDerFührerRegiment ofDasReich was headed toward

Luchki South and by 1800 hrs was approaching its outskirts, having penetrated the gap inChistiakov’s 6thGA’s line. To the southeast, alongwith theLAH, a crossingwasmade but abridgeheadcouldnotbeestablishedovertheLipovyiDonetsRiver.DuringthecrossingattemptIL-2groundattackaircraftattackedtheGermans.Eightplaneswereshotdown.LeadelementsofDasReichwerenowalmost10milesfromtheirstartlineandnotfarbehindLAH.BetweenLAHandDasReich,the52ndGRDhadbeenhithardandwerefallingback.fkk135.lck66m.pck66.By1200 hrs after nearly five hours of vicious fighting,Hill 220.5 fell to theGermans.The

Tigercrewsallmentionwhenthebattlewasoverthattheyhadneverexperiencedawallofsteelcoming at them like thatmorning. Itwas an experience thatwould be carried throughout theirentirelives.OneoftheSovietunitstheLAHwouldbefacinginthisareawasDragunski’s1stMBwhichwas supplied with the new panzer-killer, the 57mm gun. Flamethrowers andMG nestswerepositionednearminefieldsalongsidewireentanglements tohelpstop infantry.TherewasalsoatankditchinfrontofthehillandastheGermansappersclearedminesandtookcareoftheditchthepanzersandinfantryofLAHwaitedtopasstookheavyfire,sufferingheavycasualties.AfterHill220.5felltoLAH,the315GRquicklymoveduptothelineandpreparedtocrosstheVorsklaRiverandestablishabridgeheadonthewestside.WhileHill220.5wasbeingcontested,otherelementsof2ndPzGRadvancedonnearbyHill217.1,abouthalfamilenortheastofHill220.5.AfterHill217.1,thegrenadiersmovedontowardHill215.4situatedalittleoveramilesouthofBykovka.agk87+.agk95+.agk94m.vzz92+.zrl214#.AftersecuringHill220.5,apartofthefirstdefensebeltandtearingaholeinthe52ndGRD

line, the lead units of LAH with almost 100 panzers moved up the road toward Bykovka.Iakovlevo,afortifiedvillagefourmilesfurthernorthofBykovkaandontheedgeoftheseconddefense belt would be next. It was expected of LAH to capture Iakovlevo fromMaj GeneralTavartkiladze’s 51stGRDbefore dark.The 51stGRDwas deployed directly behind the 52ndGRD.Eventually the230thTRwhichwasharassingLAH northwardgaveup their attacks andmoved northward toward the second defense belt to dig in. TheGerman column just reached

Iakovlevoatduskandwasimmediatelyfireduponbythe28thATB.Withnoartillerysupportandrunninglowonammo,theLAHdecidedtoattackthevillageinthemorning.TheLAHhadmadethebestprogressof4thPzAonthisdaybytravelingelevenmilesandreachingtheouteredgesoftheseconddefensebelt.gnk75+.dgk101.Trailingitspanzers,the5thPzGRofSSTKcrossedoverthetankditchsoutheastofBerezovat

1230hrs,whilethe6thPzGRclearedthewoodssouthwestofErik.TheregimentsofSSTKlinkedupandattackedandsubsequentlycapturedHill216.5northeastofBerezovwithinthehour.ThedivisionthenadvancedandcapturedthevillagesofKolchoseSmeloandKolchoseTrudusituatedneartheBelgorod-Kurskhighwayby1500hrs.Eagertomoveon,acombatgroupfrom6thPzGRsplit from the division andmoved on the villages situated in theHammerWoods after a briefshelling.DiscoveringaSovietconcentrationinnearbyDragonWoods,theEickeGroupmovedonit as well. During the last two hours, the SSTK Flak Abt shot down three planes using acombinationof37mmand88mmguns.kuz194.Duringtheday,SSTKmoveduptofillthecriticaleastflankof4thPzA;itsmainjobtoprotect

the4thfrombeingblindsidedasitadvancednorthward.SSTK’sadvancecrashedintothedug-inpositionsofthe52ndGRD.Bytheendoftheday,theGermanshadeventuallybrokenthroughandwerecontinuingtoadvancebutSSTKfailedtoreachthelineheldbythe375thRD.ItdidcaptureIakhontovobynightfall,forcingthe52ndGRDback.ThatwastheCPfortheSoviet69thArmywhichevacuatedveryquickly.wwf77.lck241.dgk106m.At1240hrs,Kraas’s2ndPzGRofLAH,withthesupportof50panzers,finallybrokethrough

thelinethatincludedHill217.1andmovedontowardHill215.4,alittlemorethanamilesouthofBykovka.When theGermanswere approachingBykovka andKosmo-Demianovka, the 51stGRDwasorderedtomoveuptothelinetosupport52ndGRD.Bymidafternoonanddespitethe28thAARand1008thDATRmovinguptohelp52ndGRDdefendthesurroundingcountryside,thetownofBykovkafelltoLAHwhichbythistimehadseenbothLAHgrenadierregimentsjoinforces.AftertakingHill215.4,LAHmovednorthbutwasmetwithhorrendousfire,forcingtheGermans to fallback to the reverse slopeofHill215.4 toawait reinforcements thatwere stillcominguptothelinefromclearingHill220.5.fkk78+.wwf115.vzz6m.agk96.wwf112+.Betweenthefirstandseconddefensebelt,MichaelWittmannwenttotheaidofafellowTiger.

BytheendoftheengagementWittmannhaddestroyedeightT34sandsevenanti-tankgunsdespitelosing his mobility. Over the next eight days, Wittmann added another 20 tanks to his total.mhz215.By1400hrsDasReich,aftergettingofftoagoodstart,wasstoppedbyanextensiveminefield

whichhad tobe clearedbeforemovingon.Amile to thewestLAH continued to advance andstormedthevillageofBykovka.TherollinggrasslandsbetweenthefirstdefensebeltandseconddefensebeltwerepunctuatedbycopseswhichhadbeenconvertedtoPaknests.TheTigerswiththeir88stooktheseinstrideastheycontinuenorthward.The52ndGRDwasstillholdingthelineinthePokrovka,Hill254.2areaaboutsixmilesnorth

ofBykovkabuttheywouldnotbeabletoholditformuchlongeragainsttheconstantpressureofLAHandDasReich.dgk101+.vzz99.vzz2m.gnk113m.Intheafternoon,theSSTKwasbattlingthe375thRDwhichwasputtingupstiffresistance.The

SSTK had so far failed to cross theLipovyiDonets and establish a bridgehead on the eastern

banksandtheoddsthattheriverwouldbecrossedtodaylookedpoor.vzz102.gnk82.WiththeLAHsplitting52ndGRDinhalf,tworegimentsfellbackalongthewesternbankofthe

VorsklaRiverintheVoznesenskiandVorsklaareasandthethirdregimentfoundsolacealongtheKamenski-Gonkilinewhichwasbeingdefendedbythestillhealthy51stGRD.AsmallfractionmadeitnorthtoPokrovkaandBolshieMaiachkiwhichwasdefendedbythe49thTBandthe1stGTB. Once this action was discovered, Vatutin ordered the 51st GRD, which was deployedbehindtheseconddefensebelt, tomoveupto theSolonets-Nekhaevkaline tosupport the52ndGRD.ThisquickresponseatSolonets,justamilesouthofIakovlevo,slowedtheGermansfromreaching Iakovlevo.There aremanyexamples throughout the campaignwhere a small fortifiedvillage like Solonets delayed theGerman advance and collectively these delays tremendouslyhelpedVatutinmovereservestothesehotsectors.dgr75.gnk114.vzz6m+.The2ndSSPzGD,DasReich, smashed through thedefensesatBerezovandbynightfall its

leadunitshadcutthekeyOboyan-Belgorodroad,cuttingofftheSoviet155thGRRfromits52ndGRD.SouthoftheDasReich,theSSTKseizedGremuchiat1430hrs thenwheeled to therightanddrovethedefending155thGRRintotherightflankofthe375thRD.The155thfellbackalongtheBelgorod-Oboyanroadandwiththehelpof96thTBwasfinallyabletoholdthelineandsavetherightflankofthe375thRDfrombeingencircled.dgk100+.vzz105.zrl215.InreachingtheOboyan-Belgorodroad,theLAHhadmadeaspectacularadvancethisfirstday

andwasnowapproachingtheseconddefensebeltbutthePselRiverwasstillatleast20milesaway.Insodoing,ittoreapartthe52ndGRDwhiledestroying15tanks.Theday’scosttoLAHhad been high: 97 dead, 522wounded, 17missing and about 30 panzers. The divisionwouldnevermakeitpastProkhorovkaiftheselossescontinued.dgk100.TheLAHheadednorth,throughtheSoviets’seconddefensebelteastofIakovlevo,towardthe

PselRiver to establish abridgehead.Theorder to shift direction towardProkhorovkahadnotbeengivensothedivisionalcommanderswerestillplanningonadvancingtowardOboyan.Oncepast Iakovlevo the 1st PzRwas ambushed nearHill 234.8 by the 28thAnti-tankBrigade.TheGermans fell back to regroup andwould resume their advance in themorning.TheSSTK alsomadegainsclearingtheZhuravlinyiwoods.dgk100+.fkk133.zrl215.East of the 52nd GRD sector, the 375th RD held a ten mile front leading southwest from

Gremuchi andBerezov south toBelomestniaiwhichwason theBelgorod-Kursk rail line.The2ndSSPzCwith its threepanzerdivisionsand the167th IDstruck the375thRDatTernovka,quicklyforcingtheSovietstofallbacktothenorthtothewestbankoftheLipovyiDonetsRiverwith theSSTK closely following.Not taking the time to destroy the 375th, theLAH continuednorth trying tomaintain theirschedule.By1630hrs, theLAH, fightingalongside11thPzD,hadadvancedandwasattackingBykovkaontheVorsklaRiver.The51stGRDandthe230thTRwerebroughtuptostopLAHbutalsofailed.Thistownwassixmilesinfromtheirstartline.TheotherSSdivisionshadalsoreachedthefirstdefensebelt.wdk119.dgk111.dgk222m.dlu63m.mhz207.agk91m.LAHwasdrivinguptheroadthatranthroughBykovkaflankedontheleftbythe167thID.Das

Reich and SSTK were on the right, heading for the strongpoints of Berezov and Gremuchi.Hausserwas losingTigers tobreakdownsaswell frombattle actionandminefields.TheLAHsmashed through the 151st GRR’s defenses and continued on toward Bykovka against stiff

artillery firewhichdestroyed sixpanzers, including threeTigers.DasReich continued towardBerezov.At1630hrs,theLAHreceivedorderstoheadtowardthePselRiverbutat2000hrsasitreachedHill234.8overlookingIakovlevoitwashitbyasevereartillerybarragethatstoppeditsadvance,forcingittoregroupforthenight.TheLAHhadshatteredNekrasov’s52ndGRDinitsadvancebutitlost30panzersdoingitandthislosswasalreadyaffectingtherateoftheadvanceaswellasthemoraleofitsmen.dgk99+.mhz207.With the52ndGRD in troublebetweenBerezovandBykovka to thenorth,Kosachev’s28th

Anti-tankBrigadewasorderedfromPokrovkatoBykovka,sixmilestothesouth.Hisarrivalwastoolatefor1stPzGRofLAHhadenteredBykovkaandtakenHill224.2,alittletothesouth,by1630hrsandmanymenofthe52ndGRDhadbeentrappedandkilled.KosachevwasdelayedforhereceivedhisorderslateplushewasattackedbyLuftwaffenearthelineOlkvatka-Hill234.8onthewayto theencirclement.While1stPzGRfinishedsecuringBykovka, the2ndPzRdrovethroughonitswaytoKozmo-Demianovka,lessthanamilenorthofBykovkaandamileeastofVorskla.WithDasReich,withthehelpofairsupport,keepingpacewithLAH, itsDeutschlandRegimentcapturedHill233.3ataboutthesametime.TheLAHgrenadierswerethenorderedtoadvanceeastofIakovlevotowardthePselRiverbutthepanzerregiment,beinglowonfuel,wasorderedtostopearlyforthenightandwouldresumenextmorningatfirstlight.vzz99+.lck240.zrl214+.vzz6m.By1600hrs,DasReich overran thedefensesonHill 233.3, northofBerezov, andby1630

LAH’s2ndPzGRhadenteredBykovkaandwasfightingstreetbystreetforitscontrol.WithHill233.3 inGermanhands theBykovka areawas untenable andby1700hrs the remains of 52ndGRD retreated to the Vorskla-Gonki area. By 1900 hrs, the SS troops captured the fortifiedKozmo-Demianovka.Hausserorderedhisdivisionstocontinuethroughthenightinordertoeitherreachorsecureapenetrationoftheseconddefensebelt,haveLAHlinkupwithDasReichintheZhuravlinyiwoodsanddisrupttheSovietsfromorganizingastrongerdefenseusingtheretreatingsoldiers.LAH reached the second defense belt at 1840 hrs and by 1900 hrs was heading forIakovlevo.AftertakingKozmo-Demianovkaat1900hrs,DasReichcontinuedtofightafterdark,tryingtoreachHill214.5ontheouteredgeoftheseconddefensivebelt.WhenLAHstoppedforthenightithadreachedHill234.8,justnorthofKozmo-Demianovka.Elementsof167thIDtothewestofLAHwereheadingtopassnearHill254.4,westofDubrovadgk100.vzz100+gnk77+.gnk69m.ztc268.By1800hrs,anelementoftheLAHapproachedtheseconddefensebeltandwasfightingits

wayin.ItwasorderedtoassistincapturingHill214.5beforepausingforthenight.AtthispointtheLAH had started fightingwithMajGeneralTavartkiladze’s51stGRDwhichwasdeployedbehindthe52ndGRDnearHill218.3,notfarfromKozmo-Demianovka.TheGermanscontinuedtopushtheSovietsbackandwereabletocapturethevillageofVorskla,situatedonthewestbankoftheriver,beforemovingonthevillageofSolonets,alittlefurthernorthonthewestbankoftheriverand justsouthof Iakovlevo.The96thTBmovedupandattackedLAH, slowing itbutnotstoppingit.Thestragglersofthe52ndGRD,151stGRR,153rdGRR,whichcouldnotreachtheseconddefensebeltwerecrossingtotheothersideoftheVorsklaRiverorintheotherdirectionto375thRD sector, but theywouldnot find any safety there for theGermansweremovingupthereaswell.ThetworegimentsthatreachedthewestbanksduginonalinethatincludedHill

233.6,Hill238.4,andtheravineonemilewestofSolonets.The155thGRR,movingeast,joinedthe375thRD’s1243rdRR’sdefensesintheNepkhaevoarea.ThetwootherSSdivisionshadnotkeptupandwerealongthelinethatincludedZhuravlinyiwoodsbuttheywouldcontinuetodrivepastdarkaswell.vzz101+.agk95+.agk91m.vzz6m+.zrl215.AftercapturingthefourmilelinebetweenHill228.6andHill218.0,theSSdivisionsquickly

movedon.TheLAHwith theattached315GRof167thIDprotecting its left flankattacked theright flankof52ndGRDwhile theDasReich andSSTK struck the center and left flankof the52ndGRD.WiththefullweightoftheSSCorpsonthe52ndGRD,theSovietshadtofallbackbutfightingthewholeway.vzz92.dgk100.ztc268.By late afternoon,Das Reich, inflicting heavy casualties on 52nd GRD, had penetrated the

seconddefensebeltatIakhontovobuttheirspeedhadcostfiveTigers,disabledtomines.Theywouldberecoveredandrepairedbutthesepanzerswouldbemissedinthemeantime.WithTigersitwould takeat least twoandsometimes threerecovery trucksdependingon terrain tobring itbacktotherepairshop.mhz216.nzk60.ByearlyeveningHausser’sSStroopssupportedbytheLuftwaffe,hadsplitthe52ndGRDin

half and penetrated almost 12 miles to the minefields and obstacles in front of the 6th GA’sseconddefensivebelt.Thoughthe52ndGRDhadsufferedheavycasualties,itdoggedlyresistedthe panzers at this second line. Chistiakov ordered reinforcements to the line to arrive beforemorning.The67thRDhad toevacuateCherkasskoeandfallback toKrasnyiPochinok.Vatutinordereda counter-attack fordaybreakon theSS thatwasdeployeda little southof the seconddefensivebelt.ColChernov’s90thGRDof22ndGRCmoveduptosupportthe52ndGRDfromAleksandrovkawestwardalongthenorthbankofPenaRiverthroughSyrtsevo.The51stGRDofthe 23rd GRC held the line from Syrtsevo to Nepkhaevo on the Lipovyi Donets River withspecific orders to block the Belgorod-Oboyan road, preventing the Germans from reachingPokrovka.The151stGRRand153rdGRRwereholdingtheeverextendingwesternflankalongtheVorsklaRiver.Aheavyrainbegantofallduringthenightmakingtraveldifficultintheearlymorning.hjj121m.dgk222m.dlu63m.dgr209m.hsz120.lck240.vzz3m.dgk98.dgk101.Afterpausingtoregroupintheafternoon,Sovietplanesataround1800hrsflewtothebattle

zoneinanattempttoslowtheSSadvance.TheyweremetbyBf109swhichhadbeenflyingcapoverthegroundforcesprettymuchfor15hours.TheGermansonceagainhadtheirwaywiththeSoviets,shootingdownmanymoreplanesthantheylost.SomeoftheGermanpilotshad8to10victorieswhilemany had three, four or five victories.The favored techniquewas to come upfrombehindatahigheraltitudeandstrikewithMGsblasting.Forthenexthourwaveafterwaveofnewplanesfrombothsideswouldescalatetheairbattle.ItisestimatedthekillratioforthatdaywasclosetoseventooneintheGermans’advantage.cbk32++.By1840hrs,LAHhadfoughtitswaytowithin500yardsoftheseconddefensivebeltbetween

Iakovlevoand theDonetsRiveron theeast.Elementsof51stGRDalongwith230thTRweremovedtothepenetrationgaptocloseitbuttheattemptfailed.Theroadcongestioncausedbythepanzers moving up and trying to bypass other vehicles was bad and Hausser was forced topostponetheorderforthepanzerstomoveupuntillaterintheevening.LuckilyforthegrenadiersofDasReich littleSovietarmorhadbeenseen thisday,but theywereapproaching theseconddefensivebeltwhereGeneralVatutinhadorderedseveralbrigadesfrom1stTAtomoveuptoand

supportthe52ndGRDand51stGRDwhichwerehavingtroublestopping2ndSSPzC.wdk119.zow142.After dark, when the battle died down for the day, there was still much to do. Damage to

defenses had to be repaired, ammo had to be retrieved, machines had to be maintained andrefueled, thewoundedhad tobe takencareof and thedeadhad tobeburied.Damagedphonelines had to be repaired alongside burying new mines and replacing destroyed wireentanglements.Planningfor thefollowingday’sbattleactionalsohadtobeworkedoutandthemenhadtobenotified.Ifaunitwasbeingredeployedtheywouldhavetotraveltothenewarea.mjk87+.WhiletheLAHwasstrugglingtogetthroughtheseconddefensivebelt,the315GRof167thID

onLAH’sflankattackedthe153rdGRRof52ndGRDonthewestbankoftheVorsklitsaRiverintheregionofStreletskoe,ZadelnoeandKamennyiLoginordertostoptheshellingthatwashittingLAH.TheLAHwashavingtroublesubduingseveralbunkersthatresistedairattacksandshelling.Commandoscame inusingdemochargesandflamethrowers tosilence thedefenders.TheLAHwasalsobattlingthe51stGRDintheseconddefensebeltintheIakovlevo-LuchkiSouthsector.At the same time, SSTK on 2nd SS PzC’s right flank was still stuck against the 375th RD’sdefenses.Thissituationwasmadeworsewhen3rdPzCwasstrugglingalsoandcouldnotkeepupwithSSTK.vzz111.dgk100+.zow144.Vatutin’s forces were hit hard, suffering heavy casualties. His report to Stalin that night

distortedreality,showingamorepositiveslant.Hestatedthat12,000Germanswerekilled,500panzersdestroyedandthattheGermanswerebeingpushedawayfromtheDonets.gjz184.Afterstudyingtheday’sresults,Vatutinchangedhisdeploymentforthefollowingday’sbattle.

Tikhomitov’s 93rdGRDwas ordered tomove to Prokhorovka by 0300 hrs and dig in behindKositisyn’s183rdRD.The92ndGRDandthe94thGRDweresenttobolsterShumilov’s7thGAfacing3rdPzCintheKorochaarea.vzz108.hjj123m.dgk104.BytheendofthedayHoth,notcountingthosemachinesrepairable,hadlost51panzerstotally

destroyed,leaving953panzersandSPsstillfighting.ThepenetrationintotheseconddefensebeltoccurredonlyinLAHsector;theforcesoneithersidewerebehindexposingLAH’sflanks.Thiscausedthedivisiontodivertforcestotheflanksforprotectionandawayfromthefront.Hoth’stimetablewasalreadybehindscheduleandatacostfaraboveexpectation.Histwoflankswerefalling dramatically behind, causing major tactical problems for the entire Army and yet hehesitatedtomakeanymajorchangestorectifythesituationandtherewerenoreservesavailabletoplugthegaps.Vatutinontheotherhandhadtoreleasealmostallofhisreservestothelinebythestartofthesecondday.48thPzCandthePantherBrigadeinparticularweredeployedinthewrongsectorandtheharshresultsexperiencedby48thPzConthisdayshouldhavebeenawakeupcall,butitseemsGeneralHothsleptthroughthealarm.mhz216.vzz111+.At2230hrsVatutininitiatedacounterbombardmentin6thGAsectoragainsttheGermanguns

that had been brought up to the new front and were now visible between Tomarovka andBelgorod.Bytheendoftheday,DasReichhad traveledalmostfivemiles into theSoviet firstdefense

belt but itwas still another fivemiles from the second. The division still had to captureHill246.3beforereachingtheseconddefensebelt.Hopefullytheirlatearrivingpanzerswouldcatch

up. Hausser for much of the day was not aware that many panzers still had not arrived andconsideredDasReichpoorshowingcomparedwithLAHdue to thepoor roadsconditionsandtrafficcontrol.Sovietartilleryhadprovenaccurateandtheirairforcemoreactivethanexpectedandwerealsocausingslowdowns.TheSSFlakAbt2ofDasReichclaimshootingdownsevenaircraftonthisday.TheDeutschlandRegimenthadtakenpointalldaywithDerFührerRegimentto the southeast in reserve.By nextmorning theDer Führer would be brought up to the line.Panzerswerearrivinglatein48thPzCsectoraswell.gnk80.pck53.zow143.Bytheendoftheday,the2ndSSPzChad334workingpanzersandatleast44assaultguns.

The2ndSSPzCreported toHothdestroying7 tanks,27anti-tankguns,300antitankriflesandcapturing500POWs.Thisbootywasfarbelowexpectations.fkk133.vzz120*.Fightingthroughoutthenightandintotheearlymorninghoursofthe6th,DasReichwasbeing

heldupuntil infantrywasabletocatchupandprotectthepanzers.Whenitdidarriveprogresswasmade.SSTK,moving up theBelgorod-Oboyan road against the 375thRDmade even lessprogress.TheLAHwasmakingthebestprogressbutDasReichwasfightingthroughoutthenightandby0400hrson7/6wasapproachingtheseconddefensivebelt.wdk119.Katukov’s3rdMCof1stTAhadbattledwiththeleadingSSTigersthedaybeforeandsuffered

heavycasualties.Katukovknewhisforcescouldnothandle thepanzerattacksat thisstageandarguedagainstamajorcounteroffensivethatVatutinwantedon7/6.Tocomplicatethings,his2ndGTCand5thGTCwerenotinplaceordug-inandwouldnotbereadytoattackforhours.Vatutinwasnotdefensive innatureandhisorders toattack thisearly in thecampaignwereamistake;perhapsKatukovwiththehelpofStalininfluencedhisdecisionnottoattackonascaleoriginallyintended.vzz114+.cbk57.wwf82.Stavka approved the transfer of Lt General Trofimenko’s 27th Army from Steppe Front to

Vatutin. It would take several days for the Army to get involvedwith the fighting in the Pselregion.The27thArmyconsistedof71stGRD,147thRD,155thRD,163rdRD,166thRD,241stRDandthe93rdTBamongotherattachments.kcz167.dgk324.lck263.Bytheendoftheday,elementsofLAHapproachedIakovlevoandhadjustbegunfighting51st

GRDfortheimportantjunction.Theterraininfrontof51stGRDwasrelativelyflat,providinganeasyaccessroutetothenorthforGermanpanzers,forcingVatutintogivethe51stanarrowsectorofaboutfivemilestodefend.Thedivisionhadgonefourmilesfurtherthan11thPzDandhaditswestflankexposed.TheDasReichontheeastflankofLAHwastwomilesbehindleavingtheeastflankofLAHexposedaswell.LAHhadtotakeassetsmeantforthefrontandredeploythemtocovertheirflanksuntilthoseotherdivisionscaughtup.The167thIDwasmeanttocoverthegapbetween11thPzDandLAHbutitwashavingtroubleandwasbehindschedule.ThiswouldbeachronicconditionthatwouldplaguetheSSfortheentirecampaign.With11thPzDalreadyfivemilesbehindLAHand3rdPzCevenfurtherbehind,theresistanceontheflankswouldbleedtheSSdry.gnk111.vzz115.vzz119.LateatnightStavka,enrouteviaVasilevsky,orderedthe2ndTCand10thTCtomoveupto

Prokhorovka.The10thTCof5thGAwassenttoIadovanortheastofProkhorovkaandthe2ndTCfromtheSouthwestFrontwassenttoKamishevkaontheOskolRiver,eastofProkhorovka.Eachofthesetankcorpswaslargerthanapanzerdivision.The5thGTAwhichwasstationedover200milesawaywasorderedclosertoKurskandbythenexteveningwaspullingintoStarylOskolto

thesoutheastofKursk.The2ndGTCatKorocha,38milesnortheastofBelgorod,wasorderedwest toProkhorovkatofaceDasReichaswell. ItarrivedatGostishchevo thenextmorning tosupport the 375th RD against SSTK. The 5th GTCwith 200 tanks arrived at Luchki South atmidnight to support the 52nd GRD against LAH. That day another tank corps was sent toProkorovski,19milessoutheastofOboyan.wdk127*.wdk132.fkk83.lck273.dgr82++.gnk245.kcz168.wwf121.dgr83m.hjj123m.The2ndVVSflew1,322 sortieswhile17thVVS few569sorties.The1,891 totalmissions

wereallforthesupportofthe6thGA.wdk123.BothvonMansteinandHothweredisappointedwiththeday’sresults.Theirforceshadmade

somegainsbutnotenoughor fastenough toencircle largegroupsof theenemy, likewhatwasexperienced in1941.Hothhad scheduled the4thPzA tohavepenetrated the seconddefensivebelton thisdayandonlyLAHhad just reached thesecondbelt,notgone through it.EspeciallytroublingwastheslowprogressofSSTKwestoftheriversand3rdPzContheeastsideoftherivers.Somethinghad tobedonebut therewereno reserves tosend to thesector tospeed theadvance.LookingatthebigpicturevonMansteinwantedHothandModeltomeetatKurskinfourorfivedaysbutitwouldneverhappenifperformancewasnotgreatlyimproved.wdk124.ThroughoutthedayHoth’sradiooperatorslistenedtotheairwaves,listeningforpleasofhelp

fromthefrontlineSoviets,buttherewerenotanysuchpleaswhichsurprisedtheGermangeneral.ItwasanindicationthattheSovietsoldierswereexpectingtheassaultandwereprepared.pck57.Bymidnight,withthehelpofthe315GRof167thID,LAHforcedacrossingovertheVorskla

RiverinthesectorZadelnoe-Vorskla,anareaoftwomilesdeepwhichwasoriginallydefendedbythe52ndGRD.After17hoursoffightingtheSSbrokethroughthefirstdefensebeltintheareaof theBelgorod-Kursk road andwasnowpoundingon the seconddefensebelt on a front fourmileswidedefendedbyMajGeneralTavarikiladze’s51stGRDwhichmoveduptothefrontandtheremainsofMajGeneralNekrasov’s52ndGRD.Thoughlaggingbehind,the167thIDplayedakeyrole todayandthroughout thecampaignbycloselysupportingthepanzerdivisions.vzz102.wdk119.dgk111.Kravchenko’s 5th GTC assembled behind the 51st GRD on a seven mile front between

Iakovlevo and the Lipovyi Donets River to the east. It was straddling two important roads:Butovo-DubrovoroadandtheBelgorod-Kurskhighwayandtheseunitswouldseefiercefightingover thenext couple days.The3rdMCmoved to the seconddefensivebelt, right behind90thGRD.vzz107.dgk69.ThetriangularshapeoftheSovietsalientencompassedOrelastheNEcorner,Belgorodasthe

SEcornerandKurskastheWesterncorner.GermanstrategywastooutflanktheEasterncornersand encircle the Soviets. However the Soviets had planned carefully, were well dug in withmultiple lines of defense andwere determined to stop the assault, as the Germanswere nowfindingout. In thecaseofBelgorodthedefensivebeltswere36milesdeepandincludedmanytanksthatweredugin.Evenwithall thepreparationsbytheendoftheday, theGermansmadepenetrationsinthefirstdefensebelt.fmz225.zzz101m.TheLuftwaffeflew1,958sortiesintheKursksalientbutitwoulddroptobelow1,000thenext

day.TheSovietAFwasbusyaswellfortheyclaimeddestroying100Germanaircraftinthefirsttwodays.TheRedAirForcewasbusy supporting the6thGA.The2ndAirArmy flew1,322

missions while the 17th VA flew 569missions. The Red Air Force flew 1,274 sorties aloneagainst48thPzC.wdk123.rkz167.dgk104.dgr74.Inthesouth,the8thAirCorpsflew2387sorties.Thisnumberishigherthanmostothersources

report. I think the difference considers theLuftwaffe’s defense of its own airfields outside theKursk salientwhen theSoviets attemptedamassiveattackbeforedawn todestroyGermanaircapacity.nzk77.AtKursk,theLuftwaffewereusingthe37mmcannontostopT34s.Theflyingaceandthemost

decoratedGermanofficerofthewar,CaptRudel,stopped519tanksbywar’send.Onthisday,CaptRudelsawacompanyofTigers(Kling,Wittmannn)beingfireduponbyaPakfrontthatwasdug in and in front of Berezov. One of the Tigers had track damage and was immobile andvulnerable.RudelandhisfellowStukasdivedontheSovietguns,destroyingsomeofthemwhilethe Tigers advanced to better firing positions to finish off the rest.mhz215. lck273+. agk100.fzk306+.pck66.Bytheendoftheday,itwascalculatedthatModelhadlost150panzersthoughmanywouldbe

repairedwhileHothlost51panzers.lck227.Bytheendoftheday,Hausserclaimedhisdivisionsshotdown17Sovietplanesbytheirflak

guns.Manymorewereshotdownfromtheair.wdk119.During thenight and into thepredawnhoursof7/6, elementsof51stGRDdeployedeastof

IakovlevomovedsouthtoHill243.2tofortifyanalreadystrongpositionandtoblockLAHwhenitarrivedthenextmorning.HothexpectedLAHtosecureIakovlevotodaysoitwasimperativetocaptureitandthescreeninghillasearlyaspossiblethenextday.agk99.gnk69m.ItwasatoughdayfortheSSCorps;groundwasgainedbutatahighcost.TheLAHmadethe

greatestgainsanditsleadunitswerenorthofBykovkaintheOlkhovka-Solonetsarea.OlkhovkasitsonthebanksoftheVorsklaRiverandSolonetswasabouttwomilesnortheastofOlkhovka.LeadingthechargeforLAH,MichaelWittmanndestroyedeighttanksandninegunstoday.Hehadtoleavethefightingtogobackandreloadthreetimestoday.Eachtime40shellswerestuffedintohisTigerandthatdidnotincludethereloadofmoreshells,MGbelts,fuel,oilandwaterattheend of the day before turning in. LAH suffered 97 dead, 522 wounded and 17 missing. LAHreporteddestroying15 tanks,3planesandcapturedadisappointing99POWs.agk96. agk101.zrl215#..At0115hrs,Hausser,theCOof2ndSSPzC,sentoutareconforceaheadofthemainforcein

6thGA’ssector.By0300hrs,theyhadcapturedIakhontovandmovedontothesouthernslopesoftheErikRiverValley.Theopenfieldsinfrontof2ndSSPzCweremuchmoreaccommodatingforthepanzersthantheterrainin48thPzCsectorandaprinciplereasonfortheSS’sbetterprogress.OnehastospeculatehowtheGermanadvancewouldhaveplayedoutifthePantherBrigadehadbeendeployedwiththeSSorevenwiththe3rdPzCinsteadofasectorunsuitedforarmor.Theengineersworking throughout thepreviousnighthadbetter success inclearingmines, allowingtheSStomoveoutquicker.Alittle latercloser todaybreak,aviolent thunderstormhit the4thPzA’sarea,disruptingtroopassembly.dgk84.mhz209+.dgr280m.The4thPzAreconforcedestroyedhalfoftheoutpostsinfrontof6thGAsectorandforcedthe

otheroutpoststobeabandoned.Attackelementsofthe167thID,11thPzDandGDreachedtheirmainobjectivesby1800hrs.However the3rdPzDand the332nd ID tookheavy flanking fire

fromZybinoHeightsandfailedtotaketheirobjectives.TheyalsohadtodefendagainstSovietcountersthroughoutmostofthenight.dgk84.snk75++.sgf346.nzk68+.dgr280m.IntheearlyhoursofpredawnGDsappersmovedoutintotheopenfieldsclearingpathsthrough

heavilyencrustedminefields inorder tospeedupthepanzersadvance;aharrowingexperiencetryingtodefuseamineinthedarkwhilealsotryingtoavoidtheroamingbandsoftheenemyorasniper.Theengineersofthe48thPzCwereinthefieldsasearlyastheSSengineersbutduetotheruggedterrainandrainyweatherwerelesssuccessfulinfindinganddisarmingmines;thisfailurewouldcausemanypanzerstobedestroyedandtroopstobekilledorwounded.wwf66.At 0245 hrs, the Luftwaffe carpet bombed an area two miles long near Butovo, an early

objective for the 3rd PzR of 11th PzD andGD divisions. The air raid had the defenders in aconfusedstateandthepanzersmadeaneasypenetration.By0445hrs,theGermanshadcontrolofthehighgroundandcouldseetheSovietdefenses.Artillerywouldbequicklymovedforwardtotakeadvantageofthebettervision.WestofButovonearGertsovka,Sovietresistance,71stGRD,slowedtheGermanadvanceandZybinoHeights,southofKorovino,wasnotcaptureduntilafterdark.wwf71.Asmallgroupofshocktroopsfrom394thPzGR(3rdPzD)supportedby30panzersfrom6th

PzRattackedthe71stGRDandelementsofthe27thTDBatKorovino,theHQforthe71st.The67thGRDstartedtomoveuptothefrontlinehelpingtoslowtheGermanadvance.ElementsofGD and11thPzD shifteddirection tohelp secureCherkasskoe to the east ofKorovino.WhilemaneuveringforCherkasskoe,GDdroveintoaminefieldanddamagedmanypanzers.Thebattleescalatedfurtherwiththeairforceofbothsidescomingintoduel.Anestimated32Redaircraftand13Germanaircraftwereshotdown.By1300hrsGermanpanzershadreachedasolidlinebetweenGeresovka-Cherkasskoeandby1500hrshadbypassedCherkasskoeonbothsidesandweremoving northwithTigers in the lead.By late nightfall the soldiers ofGD following thepanzers had the town but it had cost them dearly. The fight for Cherkasskoe was one of thetoughestinthecampaignandisjustoneofmanyexampleswhy48thPzC’sattackroutewastoofarwest.fkk77+.fkk261+.nzk85.pck56.pck58+.Duringthepredawnhours,14engineersfromGDclearedover2,500minesinfrontofthehills

of Butovowithout losing a person. It was also arranged thatGD’s artillery would provide aheavy rollingbarrage tohelpclear thepath forGD.Speedwouldbeessential. fkk259.pck28.hsz113.At 0400 hrs another wave of German bombers struck the front lines in the Korovino-

CherkasskoeareaandtheStreletskoe-Erikarea.Hothhadbegunhisoffensivewithatwoprongattack.Thewesternprongwouldconsistofthe332ndID,11thPzDandGDandattacktheNovaiaGorianka-Butovosector.The3rdPzDwouldbeinreserve.TheeasternprongwouldconsistofLAHandSSTK.Theflankguardwouldbe167thIDandDasReichforthemostpartwouldbeinreserve. They would attack the Streletskoe-Erik sector. The repeated attacks in this area toldVatutinwhataxistheGermanswouldtakeandhemadelastminutechangestothedeploymentsofthe52ndGRD,67thGRDand71stGRDdefendingtheseareas.NovaiaGoriankawassituatedonthesoutheastcornerofBubny.SeeMap24.fkk76.lck232.vzz116.gnk111.gnk69m.InfrontoftheGDattackzonelaidadeepravinethatranfromGertsovkainthewestalltheway

tothe11thPzDboundaryline.Itwassoddenfromrecentheavyrains.Infrontofitlayatankditch

andtogetherthesetwoobstacleswouldcost3rdPzDandGDanditspanzersmanycasualtiesontheopeningday.TheSovietshadplacedmanygunsbehindtheravine,waitingforthepanzerstoget stuck.The situation for theGermanswouldbemadeworsewhen theyoungpanzer leadersrushedblindlyintothetrap,gettingmanypanzersstuckinthedeepmud.Decker’sPantherswerenotthecauseofthispanzerpileupfortheyhadnotarrivedonthebattlefieldyet.ItwasStrachwitzintheleadatthistime.ThePanthershadbeendelayedthepreviousdaybyablownbridgenearBeresovyi.Atmidnight,leadingintothefifth,thePanthershadjustarrivedatMoschchenoye,fourmilessouthoftheBeresovyiravineandstayeduntil0800hrson7/5.TheywerestillbehindtheleadunitsoftheGDthatwerestuckinthemudandtakingcasualties.TheGDhadanarrowfrontthatstretchedfromGerzovkaonthewesttoButovoontheeast.gnk92+.hsz119.hjj114.pck53+.At0400hrs,theLuftwaffebombed6thGAsector,hittingthe67thGRDthehardestthoughthe

71stGRDand52ndGRDwerealsohit.Behindthe52ndGRDand67thGRDwasthe3rdMCwith Krivoshein positioned in front of Iakovlevo. At 0500 hrs five battalions and 30 panzersstruckthe71stGRDatGertsovka.Duringthefirsthourofbattle,theLuftwaffeflew400sortiesinthisareaalone.Elementsofthe332ndIDand30panzersstruckwestofButovogaining2milesagainstthe67thGRDandcapturingthehighgroundwestofBerezovandpushingthe71stGRDbacknorthofKrasnyiPochinok.Acounter-attackwas initiatedon332ndID’swest flankbut itwas repulsed. General Ott’s 52nd IC made progress and would complete capturing Bubny,southwestofGertsovka,earlynextmorning.The255thIDquicklymoveduptothelinetodefendBubny on itswestern flank.TheGermanswere trying to soften the linewhere 4th PzAwouldstrike inamajorway thenextmorning. Iakovlevowas12milesnortheastofButovo,where theGermanswere shelling ahead of their soon advancing panzers (3rdPzD).wdk117+. dgr172m.pck49.vzz116.dgr250.pck57.Atdawn,anotherwaveofhundredsofbombersstruckSovietforcesintheSyrtsevo,Gertsovka

and Ternovka areas. A small corridor leading to Butovo and Dragunskoe was also hit. TheGermansflewover2,000sortiesonthisday.For15hoursthe52ndGRDwashitfromtheairfordefendingtheplannedattackrouteoftheleftflankofLAH.Thisheavybombingwasanimportantreasonwhysomepanzersmadefivemiles.TheSovietfighterswereslowtorespondbutby0600hrs,theRedAirForcebegantotaketotheskytodeflecttheGermans.TheyalreadyhadhundredsofplanesflyingagainstGermanairfieldsinaseparateaction.Bytheendofthedayacombinedtotal for both sides for both salients lost over 320 planes to heavy damage or completedestruction.AlittlefurthertothenorthandeastintheSSTKsector,theLuftwaffealsoattacked,but on a smaller scale, the line between the towns ofGremuchi andGostishchevowhichwasdefended by the 51st GRD. Dogfights erupted when Soviet fighters tried to intercept; theLuftwaffe lost several planes, more than the Soviets in this situation. This dogfight was soencouraging, Vatutin decided to initiate a bomb run into the rear of theGerman held territoryaroundTomarovka.dgr250+.cbk26+++.vzz2m+.cbk31.cbk41.vzz5m.cbk12m.asz362.The52ndIC’s255thIDwasdetachedandsentto48thPzContheVorsklitsaRiverandjoined

the332ndID inprotecting thepanzer’s flank.The48thPzCand the2ndSSPzC jumpedoffat0600hrs after theplanned twohourpreparation.TheLuftwaffewas amajor help in subduingSovietartillery.MajGeneralFretter-Pico’s57thIDremainedwith52ndICinadefensivepostureonthewesternflank.snk76+.

AfteranhourofpreparationwhichincludedNebelwerferrockets,Hothstartedhisadvanceatdaybreak with 48th PzC leading the way toward Zavidovka, Alekseevka and Lukhanino.Zavidovka,onthesouthernbanksofthePena,wasreachedfirstbut3rdPzD’sinitialattempttotakethevillagefailed.TigerswouldleadwithIVsfollowinginanexpandingwedgehelpedtakethetown.Someofthedivisionalartilleryhadnotarrivedfor3rdPzDandGD,thecorpslentthemsomeoftheirguns.Itwasnotasmoothbeginning.Muchofthecorpsartillerywassupportingthe11thPzDandthe167thIDtotheeastofGD.EvenbeforetheGermanshellingstarted,Vatutinhadstartedhisowndisruptivebarrage,hopingtoruincommunicationsandroadsetc.Theassaultgunswouldfollow.SomeofthesenewgunswerebuiltwithoutMGssotheyweredefenselesswhenenemy infantry attacked them. That night it rained hard. jp106. jp110. hjj121m. fkk80. gnk91.vzz2m.hsz121.dgk107.At 0700hrs a squadronof IL-2s came in lowand attackedGD panzerswhichwere stalled

fromthickmudandheavyfire.AlittlelateranewwaveofIl-2scameinlow,targetingthe11thPzD and 167th ID. All three German divisions immediately called for air support.Messerschmidtswerealreadyresponding toGD’s requestandwithinminutescameflying in tointercepttheSovietfighters.NearBerezovafewSovietbombersstrucktheGDHQ,killingthreeofficers.cbk31+.The3rdPzD,withthe394thPzRinthelead,hadtostartwithoutitsartilleryorpanzersforthe

machineswerebeingslowedbythemuddyroadsandhadnotarrivedyet.Resumingtheirattackfrom thepreviousafternoon, thegrenadiers launchedat0420hrs towardGertsovka.The210thGRR of 71st GRD was defending the line between Gertsovka and Beresovyi. The Germaninfantrymadegoodearlygains; thepanzers startedcatchingup to themenby0600hrs togivesupportinfinishingthetownoff.By0800hrstheGermanshadpenetratedtheSovietdefensesandwereheadingpastthetown.gnk97.gnk51.At0810,the196thGRRcounteredatCherkasskoeandstartedtooregainground.Morepanzers

of the GD came up and with the support of the west flank of 11th PzD attacking east ofCherkasskoe,capturedthetownafteralongdifficultstrugglethatlastedallday.ThistownwasthreemilesfromtheGDstartline.Inthesectoreastof67thGRD,otherunitsofGDhitthe52ndGRDinthecenteroftheirsectoratIakontov.The11thPzDand167thIDattackedtheeastflankof52ndGRDatBerezovwithover100panzersandairsupport.The52ndGRDwithsupportofthe1008thDATRand 538thTDRclaim to have destroyed 18 panzers including tenTigers but by1600hrshad to fallback fourmiles toBykovkaon theVorsklaRiverwhere it joined the51stGRD. They held Bykovka overnight but had to continue to fall back next day. Korovino,Cherkasskoe, Zadelnoe and Gremuchi were the main spearhead sector for the 48th PzC. TheLuftwaffegavestrongsupporttotheadvance.wdk118+.dgr74.dgr172m.pck56.zrl215.dgk69+.LeavingMoscschenoyethe160Panthers,ofthenearly190thatleftGermany,reachedtherail

linesouthofGertsovkaby0815hrsbuttheystillhadtocatchuptotheinfantrythathadalreadylaunched.gnk93.hjj115.At0900hrs,athirdwaveofIlL-2scameafterGDforces, tryingtoliquidatethelargesttank

concentrationthathadbeendiscovered.cbk31.At 0900 hrs, the 11th PzD adjacent toGD reached Hill 237.7, west of Cherkasskoe then

proceededtowardHill210.3,northofCherkasskoe.InearlyafternoonasmallsquadronofT34s

coming fromKorovino attacked, slowing the advance. The T34s were liquidated by accurateshellfireandtheadvancecontinued.NearbyintheGertsovkaValley,panzersofGDwerestalledin aminefield andwere takingheavy fire.The crews returned fire anddesperatelywaited forsappers tocomeupandclear themines.Thatmorning theHQwasbeingoverloadedbyphonecallsreportingminedamageorrequestinghelptoclearmines.Therewerenotenoughsapperstohandletherequestsinatimelymanner.At1955hrs,Cherkasskoewasreachedandtheescalatingassaultbeganwithapinceraction.11thPzD,usingflamethrowers,speadheadedtheassaultandeventually entered the northern outskirts of town. A little later, members of theGD divisionnearedthesouthwesterncorneroftown.ToholdCherkasskoe,Chistiakovmovedtworegimentsof anti-tank guns toward the village next to the 67thGRD.When Tigerswere brought up, thevillage fell and the Soviets had to fall back heading northeast for the relative safety of 90thGRD’slinealongthePenaRiver.wwf76.je100.dgk97.hsz115.hsz119.wwf74+.Inthe48thPzCsector,theGDdivisionwasassemblingforitsassaultnearAlekseevkawhen

Soviet artillery opened up on them causing death and destruction. Not wanting to wait whileunderattack,thePanthersmovedoutandrandirectlyintoaminefieldinfrontoftheSovietfirstlineofdefense.Thepanzersstoppedintheopenfieldamidartilleryandairpatrolstoallowtheengineers to clear the mines. Some of the panzers were equipped with flamethrowers whichhelpedsuppressSovietfire.lck233.At0900hrsadirecthitontheGDHQkilledfiveofficers.GeneralHoernleinwasuninjured.

hsz119.AftercapturingGertsovka,theleadunitsof3rdPzDcontinuednorthandcapturedhighground

southofKorovinoduringthenight.Korovinowasafortifiedtownthatwasthewesternanchortothe first defense belt, but it too fell that evening by the hard hitting 394th PzR of 3rd PzD.KnowingthattherestofthedivisionwasquicklymovinguptoKorovino,ColPapeof394thPzRfollowedtheretreatingenemyandcapturedthevillageofKrasnyiPochinokandreachedthePenaRiver.Totheleftof3rdPzD,the255thIDandtheSilesian332ndIDcontinuedtofightintothenightinordertostaywiththepanzersandtoscreentheirleftflank.ThePenaRivermarkedpartof the second defense belt and was about seven miles behind the first defense belt. Beforereaching the Pena, theVorskla andVorsklitsa Rivers and accompanying swampland had to benegotiated.pck58+.vzz89++.Westhoven’s3rdPzDontheleftflankofGDwasinitiallyunabletobreakintoZavidovka,not

far from Lukhanino, (protected by minefields and the 71nd GRD) despite repeated attacks.EventuallythevillagefellandoncepastZavidovka,the3rdPzDquickeneditspaceandquicklycapturedKrasnyiPochinok.Leadelementsof3rdPzD,40panzers,attackedtheonlybridgeoverthePenainthesectorbutwererepulsedthefirsttimebythe71stGRD.Afterbringingupmoreinfantry,thesecondattemptpenetratedthefrontlineandtheGermanswereonly150yardsfromthebridgewhenitwasblown.TheLuftwaffehadalsoraidedthearea.Thebridgewasdamagedbut itwas fixed alongwith another bridge erectedbynextmorning.AnumberofUSM3 lighttanksweredestroyedintheengagement.The332ndIDon3rdPzD’sleftcaughtuptothepanzersbynightfall.mhz210.fkk248.gnk148.The 48th PzC had temporarily pocketed a large Soviet force southwest of Iakovlevo but

withoutsufficientsupportinginfantrymostoftheSovietsescapedtoheadnorth.dgk99+.rkz167.

The3rdPzDontheleftandelementsofGDcontinuedtostriketheboundarylinebetweenColBaksov’s67thGRDandColSibakov’s71stGRD,tryingtobypasstwofortifiedstrongpointsintheir forward zone, the villages of Cherkasskoe and Korovino to the west. The Germans didsucceedincreatingalodgmentbutthenboggeddownunderincreasingfireandhugeminefieldsfortherestoftheday.Onlyatmidnightdidthetwomaincombatgroupsenterthesetwovillageswherehouse tohousefightingwasnecessary tosecure thesevillages.The48thPzCwhichhadonlyadvancedabout fouror fivemiles,wasstill fighting itsway through the firstdefensebeltdefendedbyGeneralIbiansky’s22ndGRCandwasfarbehindthe2ndSSPzC.TheGermanplanof using Tigers and Panthers as a spear was not working very well in this area due to theswamplandandhugeminefieldsthatwerecoveredbymanyanti-tankguns.IthasbeenarguedthatHoth’schoiceofconcentratingallthePanthersinthissmallareawasamistake.SomanypanzersinsuchasmallfrontgavetheSoviet2ndAFarealtargetofopportunity.ItwasdiscoveredbytheendofthefirstdaythatthePantherhadaweakpointthatwouldcausethepanzertobesetablazeeven with a superficial hit. Its fuel and oil lines were unprotected. Once this problem wasalleviated,thePantherbecamesaferbuttherewereotherissuesthatneededtobefixedaswell.ItwasalsoquicklydiscoveredthatthePanthercrewshadnotbeentrainedproperlyandthatwouldhavetoberectifiedaswell.vzz103+.wwf71.fmz228+.hjj112.Toreiterate,northwestofBelgorodattheboundarybetweenthe22ndGRCand23rdGRC,the

67thGRDthe52ndGRDofChistiakov’s6thGAwasdefendingagainstthe48thPzCand2ndSSPzC.The48thPzC’s550panzersandassaultgunsstrucktheSoviet linewithits3rdPzD,GD,and11thPzD.Defendingthepanzerswere332ndIDand167thIDontheflanks.TheGDattackedina2milefrontacrosstheBerezovstreamfromButovotothefortifiedvillageofCherkasskoe,the anchor point of the 67thGRD’s defenses.The followingPanthers ran into aminefield andwerestopped.dgk94.dgk95m.wdk118.Sovietplaneshadbeenhitting48thPzCandespeciallyGDhardaroundBerezov.Startingat

0730hrsandforthenextthreehours,Sovietbombersandfighterswouldattackpanzersandmen.Germanpilotsclaimedshootingdown18planesinthistimeperiod.TheVVSclaimedhaving32planesdownin48thPzCsectorby1200hrs.Totherightof48thPzC,Germanplanesstruckthepositionsofthe52ndGRDwhichwasblockingthemainaxisofLAH.Duringtheday,thedivisionsuffered2,400casualties,manyduetotheairattacks.cbk32.TheleadingelementsofLAHmovedonitsobjective,thevillageofBykovka,situatedalongthe

VorsklaRiver.AfterwardstheLAHapproachedIakovlevo,alsoontheVorsklaRiver.Thevillagewasanimportantstrongpointintheseconddefensebeltandwassurroundedbymineswhichhadtobeclearedbeforemovingonthevillage.Takingthisvillagewouldprovideflankingprotectionforthe48thPzCmovingnorth.mhz215.mhz20m.gnk69m.lck164m.To the west of GD, the 3rd PzD resumed its attack northward from Gertsovka toward

Korovino.TheGD infantry,whichwould be supported by 350 panzers that had not shown yet, had to

advanceontheirowndetermination.Theleadpanzergroupsthathadfreedthemselvesfromthemudwerecatchingup.Theyadvancednorthwardinasectoronlytwomileswide,betweentheBerezov stream and the dirt track of Butovo toward the fortified village of Cherkasskoe, theanchorpointofthe67thGRD’sdefenses.Thepanzers,rushingtocatchuptotheinfantry,raninto

aminefield andwaiting Soviet anti-tank guns. They got stuck andwere being shelled heavily.While theengineerswereclearing theirbackfield inorder for thepanzerscouldfallback, theSovietswere firing.Germansusedsmoke todistract theenemyandartillerywerecalledup toslowtheSovietattack.Aftertwodaysoffighting,twothirdsofGD’spanzerswouldbesidelinedwith battle damage, mechanical failure or were destroyed. This was a terrible debut for thePantheranditwouldnotgetmuchbetterforthePantherandGDthatwasdependingsoheavilyonitthroughoutthecampaign.You have to wonder howGD would have performed if the panzers launched on time and

avoideditscarelessmovementsandifthePantherhadperformedtoitsexpectations.Perhaps48thPzCcouldhavecrossedthePselanddrivenontoOboyan.If48thPzCcouldhavekeptupwithHausserandsupportedtheSSthenthe2ndSSPzCmighthavetakenProkhorovka.dgk94.gnk92.dgr172m.gjz184.pck53.EvenafterhavingtorelaunchduetothemiredPanthers,theGDand11thPzDwerefightingfor

thehighgroundthatGertsovkawaslocatedon.TheBerezovyistream,swollenfromrecentrains,andthesoggygroundsurroundingGertsovkaslowedtheGermanattack.Manypanzersgotstuckand had to be pulled free by special recovery panzers and large halftracks. As the Germansgainedgroundon6thGA,Chistiakovsenttwoanti-tankregimentstosupportthe67thGRD.Withthe help of flame throwing panzers, the 11thPzD still broke through the line east of the town.mhz205+.pck56.ThetwopincersofGDlaunchedfromeithersideofthevillageofButovowhileMickl’s11th

PzD was on their right and 3rd PzD on the left.GD was heading for the fortified town ofCherkasskoewhichwastheSovietlynchpinofthefirstdefensebeltandjustthreemilesfromtheGermanstartline.Thedefensebeltwasmoreofabeltthanalinewithadepthofamileormore.BesidesthemassiveminefieldinfrontofCherkasskoe,LtGeneralChistiakov’selite67thGRDwasdefendingthetownandsector.EvenbeforereachingthispointthePanthersstartedbreakingdownandbetweenmechanicalfailure, theminesandswampland,36Pantherswerelostbeforethefightingbegan.Mostofthese36damagedPantherswererecoveredandeventuallyrepaired.At2,000yardsthePanthersopenedfireandquicklydestroyedanumberofM3Leesbutbeforelongthepanzerswererecalledtothestartlinewheretheyshifteddirectioncloserto11thPzDandbeganagain.mhz202++.mhz207.lck226.wwf71.wdk118+.pck55.WiththePantherBrigadelateforthelaunch,theleftflankofGDwasstalledbuttherightflank

was making progress. General Hoernlein transferred resources to the right flank to keep themomentum.TheFusilierRegimentshiftedtowardthenortheast.pck55At1300hrs, the10thPzBofGD freed itself ofmarshyground andminefields and attacked

Cherkasskoe, slowly gaining control of the northwest corner of the town.At 1350 hrs, Soviettankers driving east from Korovino toward Cherkasskoe to stop the invaders were theythemselves attacked by theGD. Seven tankswere quickly disabled as a tank battle ensued. ItwouldtakeuntilthenextmorningtocaptureCherkasskoeandthesurroundingarea.ThiswasanextremelycostlybattlefortheGermans.Manyofficersandsoldiersdiedaswellaspanzersbeingdestroyedordamaged.CountSaurmaofaPantherbattaliondiedinthisstruggle,justoneoftheearlyvictimsofthiscampaign.The11thPzDcominginfromtheeastmadeabigcontributionintakingCherkasskoe.fkk263.pck54++.gnk68m.hsz112.

Furious fighting escalated near Cherkasskoewhen the 11th PzD, onGD’s right attacked theartillerysupporting the town thatwasemplacedonhighgroundeastof town.With theartilleryunderattack,itlostitsfocusonprotectingCherkasskoe,makingiteasiertocapture.The11thPzDgained5milestodayonitswaytoOboyan.OnGD’sleft,3rdPzDdrivingtowardKorovinoandtheimportanthighgroundofHill220.5,southofKorovinomadefewergains.The6thPzRdroveontoKrasnyiPochinok, thelastmajorSovietdefensivepositionbeforethePenaRiver.Duringthenightthe255thIDand332ndIDjoinedthe3rdPzDforthenextday’sassaulttoresecureHill220.5.dgk98.hsz120.dgr74.wwf71.pck58.InlateafternoonelementsofGDmovedonDubrovaontheLukhaninoRiver,eastofLukhanino.

QuicklybreakingthroughthefirsttrenchlinetheywerethenstoppedbyarowofduginT34sinthesecondtrench.InfantrywascalledupandtogetherclearedapathpastthetrenchesandthroughDubrova,allowingthePantherstoreachnortheastofHill247.2wheretheyduginforthenight.TheswampyterrainwasnowslowingtherestofGDasitapproachedAlekseevkaandLukhaninoatnight.TheGDPanzerRegimentandattachedPantherbrigadehadmanynewcrewmembers,and though thebattalion commanders,Decker andLauchert,were experiencednobodyhad anyexperience in fightingwith the Panther. Six Pantherswere total losseswithin the first hour ofbattleduetoenginefailurewhichcausedmassivefires,killingmostofthecrews.SeeMap23.dgk107.dgk154m.hjj114+.hjj121m.dgr209m.hsz122.gnk92+.wwf45.The German engineers had been working fanatically constructing a bridge over Beresovyi

ravine but by 1100 hrs only a dozen panzers had crossed. This meant that the attack onCherkasskoehadbeeninitiatedbyinfantrywithoutarmorsupport.By1600hrs,45panzershadcrossedtheravineandwereheadingnorthtojointheaction.TheleadPantherswerestillsouthofHill 229.0 at 0945 hrswhenCherkasskoewas first attacked.The bottleneck at the ravine thatincluded panzers and other vehicles was a golden opportunity for the Red Air Force whichinflictedheavycasualties.Knobelsdorffconsideredchanging the route into11thPzD’s territorybutdecidedagainstit.gnk94+.wwf76.Inlatemorning,leadelementsofGDwereinbitterfightingwiththe196thGRRatthecemetery

justoutsideofCherkasskoe. Itwasa stalemateuntil a fewofLauchert’sPanthers arrivedand,despiteattacksfromtheair,gavetheGermanstheadvantage,drivingthedefendersbackintothenorthwestcorneroftown.The611thATRdefendingthesectorwiththeir4.5cmgunscouldnotstopthenewpanzersandhadtofallback.Oncepast theperimeter, theGDGrenadiersquicklymovedthroughthenorthernpartoftown.Afterreachingtheeasternedgeoftown,GDcameunderheavyfirefromanearbyhillwhichwasdefendedbythe245thTRand1837thATR.The1837thhad8.5cmgunswhichcouldpenetratethePanthersandtheywereforcedtomoveback.WhilethefightingforCherkasskoecontinued,asmallcontingentofGDmovedontothenorthernsuburbofIarki.BydarktheGermansweresecuringtheareaandwouldstopforthenightinit.Theywerestill fightingwithin the first defensive belt and at least threemiles from the front edge of thesecond defense belt, andwere therefore behind schedule and behind the SSCorps. It was anextremely expensiveday forGD for the division lost 150 panzers. That totalwasmade up ofdestroyed,damagedorsimplystuckinthemud.Therecoveryteamswouldbeabletoputmostofthosepanzersbackon thebattlefieldbut itwould take timeand in themeantimeGDwouldbeshorthanded.gnk95.gnk68m.

After an aerial bombardment theGD grenadiers, using flamethrowers and grenades, beganclearingBerezovstreetbystreet.WhentheGermansenteredthetownSovietmortarcrewsmovedupandbeganshellingit.Bylatemorning,VatutinorderedKatukov’s1stTA,theseparate2ndGTCcommandedbyMaj

GeneralBurdeinynearGostishchevoandthe5thGTCunderMajGeneralKravchenkoforwardtosupportChistiakov’s6thGA’sseconddefensivebeltwhichwasalreadyintrouble.The6thTCof1st TA, with 169 tanks, moved up along the Pena River behind the 90th GRD. The 3rdMC,equipped with 250 tanks would deploy eastward in positions extending from the Pena Rivervalley to Syrtsevo, backing up 90thGRD’s left flank. Kravchenko’s 200-tank strong 5thGTCmovedupbehindthe51stGRDintheIakovleoarea.The2ndTCwith200tanksmovedintotheGostishchevoareaeastoftheLipovyiDonetsRiver,ontherightflankoftheadvancing2ndSSPzC.Chernienko’s31stTCwith196tanksremainedbehindthe6thTC.The2ndGTCusing60tanksweretodrivewestandcuttheBelgorod--OboyanroadandtheGermans’supplyline.Alltold,1,000tanksweremovedupforthefollowingday’sfightagainst4thPzA,topushitbackandtorestoretheline.Vatutinwouldcancelthecounter-attackandswitchtoadefensiveposturewhentheGermansadvancedtoofartothenorthduringthenightfortheSovietstankstoassemblefortheirattack.Chistiakovwouldmisusethesenewforcesandbeseverelyreprimanded.dgk101+.gjz183.dgk222m.dlu63m.dgr209m.fkk248.vzz104++.vzz3m.vzz5m.zra58.pck75.The1stTAwastodeployalongandeastofPenaRiverinadefensivemodeuntiltheGerman

advance petered out; then they could go on the offensive.During the night, theGermanswereadvancing tooquickly forVatutin toputhis counter-attackmeasures inaction andhad to settlewiththeabovedefensivepositionsfornow.TheGermanshadreachedtheVerkhopenieareaandits important bridge across the Pena tonight, taking away Soviet assembly areas for theircounterattack.GeneralVatutinwasdeterminedtolaunchacounter-attackbut itwouldtakeuntilthe 8th for it tomaterialize. The 48th PzC claimed 85 panzerswere damaged or destroyed intoday’sheavyfighting.Thecorpshadonly250workingpanzersforresumptionoftheadvanceinthemorning.dgk101+.hjj121m.dgr209m.To the eastof90thGRD, the51stGRDdug in along thehighgroundbetweenSyrtsevoand

NepkhaevoontheLipovyiDonetsRiver,atributaryoftheNorthernDonets,withorderstoblocktheGermans from reaching Pokrovka along themainBelgorod-Oboyan highway. Behind thesetwo divisions, the 93rd GRD was deployed along the Pokrovka-Prokhorovka road. dgk101.dgk95m.hjj121m.dgk222m.dlu63m.dgr209m.lck247.ElementsoftheGDweredrivingtowardHill232.0northeastofCherkasskoebutwerestopped

before reaching it by Lt Col Okhrimenko’s 20th GTB and the 6th GMRB. The hill was astrongpoint that covered Cherkasskoe, taking the hill first wouldmake taking the town easier.hjj115.vzz121.In the afternoon, the 151st RR and 155th RR of 52nd GRD near Sadelnoye, two miles

southwest of Bykovka were encircled. At night the Soviets tried to escape suffering heavycasualtiesbutsomeweresuccessful.With the52ndGRDfallingback, thevillagesofBykovkaandKosmo-DemyanovkafelltotheGermans.With52ndGRDfallingback,the375thRDwithitsnowexposedflankhadtofallbackaswell.The51stGRDof6thGAwascalleduptothenewdefensebelttoslowtheGermans.fkk79.vzz5m.

In late afternoon the6thPzR raced forward at the junctionof71stGRDand67thGRDandseizedthevillageofKrasnyiPochinok, threemilesbehindthefront line.AstheGermansweretakingKrasnyi,the71stfellbacktotheeastandstartedbuildingnewdefenses.Totheeastof67thGRD,the52ndGRDdefendingIakontovwereattackedbyGDaftera30minutebarrage.The11thPzDwith its 100panzers and167th IDattacked the52ndon its east flank atBerezov.Thoughlosingsomepanzers,the11thPzDwasabletoforcethe52ndGRDbackthreemilestoBykovkaontheVorsklaRiver.dgk97+.dgk95m.wdk119.dgr172m.Thelastactionofthedayfor394thPzGRof3rdPzDwasdrivingduenorthaboutthreemiles

fromGertsovka and storming Korovino which was defended by 210th GRR of 67th GRD byevening.Throughout theday the few tanksatKorovinowould launchcounterattacksagainst theGermans thatwould eventually fizzle outwhen they proved ineffective.By 1430 hrs, the leadpanzers reached theanti-tankditch in frontofKorovino.While thepanzerswere stalledat theditch, several battalions were creeping their way through a ravine to the east of the village,hopingtosurprisetheirflankingscreen.ItwasanimportanttownthatanchoredthewestendofthefirstdefensebeltandtheGermansfeltitwasimportanttocontrolforflankprotection.Intheafternoon,the6thPzRracedforwardatthejunctionofthe71stGRDand67thGRDandcapturedthevillageofKrasnyiPochinok,threemilesfromthestartline.ThisforcedSivakovtopullbackhis71stGRDandtoshiftforcestoplugthegaponhisleftflank.dgk98+*.dgk72.wwf76.pck57.Asorderedduringthenight, the1stTAwouldmoveintothefollowingpositions:inthewest

theywouldoccupytheMelovoe,Syrtsevo,Iakovlevoareajustbehindthe6thGA’sforces.The5thGTCwere tomove in along the Iakovlevo,Nekhaevka, Teterevino line and the 2ndGTCwould head for theRozhdestvenka toDruzhnyi area.WithKorovino and Krasnyi Pochinok inGermanhands and the3rdPzD reaching thePenaRiver, the security of thewestern flankwasgreatlysecured.Duringthenight, the255thIDmoveduptothelinebetween332ndIDand3rdPzDtothenorthtostrengthenit,butwiththeredeploymentsVatutinhadjustinitiated,theGermanadvancewouldstillbedifficult.dgr78.dgr76m+.wwf82.ThevillageofNovaiaGoriankawhichwasdefendedbythe210thGRR(71stGRD)putupstiff

resistance,butwaseventuallyoverpoweredbyelementsofGDand3rdPzDandthevillagewascapturedbeforetheGermansmovedontothefortifiedvillageofDmitriievkaintheDragunskoesector.fkk79.vzz115.gnk69m.dgk81.dgk98.AfterdarkasCherkasskoewasfallingtotheGermans,thedefendersofDimitriievkawerestill

holdingon.ItwouldtaketheGermans17hoursbefore67thGRDand71stGRDcrumbledtotheGerman attack.With theGermans assaultingDimitriievka and securingCherkasskoe, they nowhadagapinthefirstdefensebeltsixmileswidebyalmostthreemilesdeep.ThefortifiedvillageDragunskoe would be troublesome also. Hoth was hoping for more before the day ended; heexpectedthePanthersofGDtoblowaholeintheSovietdefensethatwouldallowthemtoreachthe Psel River by the following day. He underestimated the defenses, the terrain and themenguardingthem.ThiscampaignwouldnotbelikeBarbarossa.fkk78+.hsz119.gnk69m.ThedefendersofCherkasskoehadtofallbacktotherelativesafetyofthedefensivepositionof

Chernov’s90thGRDof22ndGRCalongthePenaRiverafterGD,11thPzDexpelledthemfromtown.ThePenawasaboutsixmilesfromtheoriginalSovietfrontline.Duringthenight,the27thAnti-tankBrigadeamongothertankfragments,werebroughtuptohelpthefaltering67thGRDin

stoppingGD,11thPzDandthenearby3rdPzDfromadvancing.dgk98.Providing additional details on Vatutin’s redeployments for the next day: in the afternoon,

Vatutin,theCOofVoronezhFront,orderedKatukov’s1stTAwithits31stTC,3rdMCand6thTCtomoveuptotheseconddefensebeltandtoattackthe48thPzCwhichwastravelingnorthontheOboyanroad.The6TCmovedbehindthe90thGRDontheeast,the3rdMCbehindthe67thGRD in the center and31stTCwas behind the 67thGRDand52ndGRDon thewest end asreserve.The6thGAalso received the 29thTDB, 1244thTDR, 869thTDRand the 309thRDfrom40thArmy.Tosupportthe309thRD,the59thTR,60thTR,203rdTR,86thTB,theheavy1461stSURegiment,12thTDRandthe1689thTDR.The180thTBfromLtGeneralChibisov’s38thArmywasbroughtuptoSemenovkaasanotherreserveunitforthewestflankof6thGA.The161stRDwasinsertedintothewestendofthelineaswell.The6thTCconsistedof200thTB,22ndTB,112thTBandthe6thMRB.IthasbeenarguedovertheyearsthatVatutinhadmadeseveralmistakesthatallowedHothto

gain asmuch ground as he did.One of those arguments concerns the placement of LtGeneralMoskalenko’s40thArmyinthesalient.The40thArmywasoneofthestrongestintheVoronezhFront;theSovietsknewwheretheattackzonewouldbesowhywasnot40thArmydeployedinablockingposition?wdk126.dgr212.kcz167+.dgr76m.gjz182.dgk411+.vzz107.With the heavy rains the leading elements of 48th PzC, traveling near the stream between

ZavidovkaandSyrtsev,werehavingtroublewiththemud,theincomingshellingfrom6thGAandthedeterminationofthe27thTDB.Furthersouth,aftermanyhoursofferociousfighting,theforcesofthe11thPzDandGDfinallysecuredCherkasskoeandwouldnowhaveachancetocatchupwith the rest of their divisions and fill in the gaps in the line. Its infantry and armor sufferedcripplingcasualtiesintheminefieldsaswellasfromtheshelling.Cherkasskoewastheboundarylinebetween67thGRDand71stGRD.rc159.bt82.fkk76.gnk68m.By1930hrs,theLAHhadfoughtitswaytowithin500yardsofthesouthernedgeofIakovlevo.

The villagewas a strongpoint on the second defense belt. Itwould have been nice to captureIakovlevothatnightandbeenabletoadvancefromthereinthemorning,butitwasdecideditwastoolateandtheattackwouldbeginthefollowingmorning.Bytheendoftheday,48thPzChadalsobreachedtheouterdefensesofthefirstSovietdefensivebeltbutitwasslowgoingthroughit.HothandvonMansteinagreedtochangedirectionawayfromOboyantowardProkhorovkaforitmightbeeasier.HothalsoorderedGDand11thPzDtoquicklycaptureOlkhovkaandDubrova,catchupwithLAHandlinkupwith167thIDtostabilizetheline.Dubrovahadbeenfortifiedandwouldnotfalleasily.wwf80.vzz115.Thetrailingunitsof11thPzD,GDand3rdPzDwereadvancingonCherkasskoe,attackingthe

right flank of Col Sibakov’s 71st GRD and frontally on the 67th GRD when the 67th GRDshatteredandstartedretreating.Outsideoftown,thetwoSovietdivisionsregroupedandfortifiedthe new defenses outside of town, blocking theGermans from leavingCherkasskoe during thenight.dgk97+.Afterdark,VatutinorderedKatukov’s1stTA toattackatdawn the followingdaybuthad to

rescindtheorderwhentheGermansgainedtoomuchgroundduringthepredawnhours,forcingthe1stTAtostaydefensive.The5thGTCintheareaeastofLuchkiSouthandthe2ndGTCnearGostischtschevoalongasixmilesectorbehindtheLipovyiDonetsweregivenalertorders,but

thecoordinatedattackwasnotrealizedeitherduetotheiruntimelyarrivalatthelaunchpointorpoorpreparation.ItwouldbeshownthatVatutinhadahabitofrushinghiscounter-attacksbeforehisbrigadeswerereadyandthoughtheseattacksslowedtheGermanadvance,thecasualtiesweremuchhigher than theyneeded tobe. fkk81.vzz107.vzz114.gnk152.gjz183.kcz168.dgk106m.nzk85.Atnight,withthebattlefieldsituationchanging,Vatutinalteredhisbattleorderforthenextday

by communicating 1stTA the following deployment: the 6thTCwouldmove up to the seconddefensebeltalongtheMelovoe,RakovoandShepelevkalinebeforedawnthefollowingday.The3rdMCwoulddeploy along theAlekseevka to Iakovlevo line and the31stTCwas todeployalongtheStudenok,StalinskStateFarm,VladimirovkaandOrlovkalinefordefensivepurposes.Thesepositionswereachievedbyearlymorningon7/6.The1stTAHQwaslocatedatZorinskieDvoryarea.The6thTCconsistedof200thTB,22ndTB,112thTBandthe6thMRB.The31stTCcomprised237thTB,242ndTBand86thTB.The3rdMCincluded1stMB,3rdMB,10thTB,1stGTBand49thTB.The5thGTCwastomovetotheTeterevinoareawhilethe2ndGTCpositioned themselves in the Gostishchevo area and prepared to launch an offensive towardRakovoandBelgorodatdawnon7/6.dgr211+.dgr209m.vzz3m.vzz5m.At2200hrs,Vatutintransfered160thTB,situatedalongtheOboyanroad,tothecontrolof1st

TA.ThemanyreinforcementsthatwerebroughtuptothefrontorwereredeployedtoanotherpartofthefrontsavedVatutinwhentheGermansresumedtheiradvanceinthemorning.dgr212.Favoringoffense,Vatutingavesecondaryordersto1stTA,5thGTCand2ndGTCinaddition

totheirredeploymentorders.VatutingavepermissiontothesethreeunitstoattacktheGermansifand when their advance stalled. The 1st TAwas to drive toward Tomarovka while 5th GTCdrovetowardBykovkaand2ndGTC,whichwasdeployedintheGostishchevoarea,wouldheadforGremuchi.Katukovof1stTAtriedtopersuadeVatutintodelaythecounter-attackorderforitwas clearly too early to attack; the 4th PzAwas still too strong andwould repulse the attackwhileinflictingheavycasualties.Theorderwouldbemodifiednextmorning.dgr78+.dgr76m+.Bytheendoftheday,VatutinsuspectedtheassaulttowardKorochawasafeintwhiletheattack

towardOboyanwasthemainassaultandmovedhisforcesaccordingly.FeelingmoreconfidentthattheOboyanroadwastheprimaryaxis,at1640hrsVatutinorderedthe6thTCand3rdMCovertotheOboyansectoraspartofthemajorredispositionofforces.Tothesoutheastofthere,closertoBelgorod,Vatutinbroughtupthreedivisionsof35thGRCtoreinforce7thGA,tocovertheKorochaaxisandeliminatethesmallGermanforcethatcrossedtheDonetsRiver.Throughoutthedayalongthewholesalient1,000tanksandpanzerswerebeingbroughtintotheactionsettingup,indaystocome,thelegendarytankbattle.je100+.nzk85.hjj123m.DeckeraccusedStrachwitzofpoorhandlingofhispanzerswhichcausedthetrafficjambplus

thehighcasualtiesintheminefields.Strachwitzsenthispanzersintooearlybeforetheinfantrycouldclearapaththroughthemine-fieldsorbeforeagapwasmadeintheline.ThisearlyfrictioncreatedanatmosphereofdistrustbetweenthePantherbrigadeandStrachwitz.Strachwitz,thoughanexperiencedofficer,didhaveatendencytosendhispanzersintothefraytooearlyandmanyofthemreceivedtrackandwheeldamageastheyranintotheminefields.StrachwitzwasseniortoDeckerandhadmoreexperienced..StrachwitzhadreceivedhisKnight’sCrossinAugust1941,hisOakLeavesinNovember1942andhisSwordsinMarch1943.Deckerwouldbepromotedto

general in 1944 and command the 39th PzC but would never see the end of the war for hecommitted suicide inApril 1945when trapped in theRuhrPocket.With thehigh casualties ofPanthersthisfirstdayandthenextfewdaystocometherewassomebasisforthiscondemnationofColStrachwitzbutthecoloneldidnotchangehistacticsafterlosingsomanyintheearlydaysof the campaign. Indefenseof the colonel, infantry and engineerswere sparse at times andheprobablyhad tousepanzersas thebreakthroughdevice.gnk96.hjj114.hjj131.zoc100.zsm69.zsm364.Throughoutthenightandintothesmallhoursofnextmorning,whileGDwasstillsecuringthe

last resistance in andaroundCherkasskoe,Hill 237.8 to the southeastof townwas still firmlyheldbytheSovietsandwouldhavetobetackledinthemorning.Atnight,Knobelsdorffdecided11thPzDshouldfinishCherkasskoeandHill237.8sothatGDcouldcontinuetomovenorth.GDhadsuchcostlyproblemsattheravineandinfrontofCherkasskoeduetothepoorplanningandpreparations of General Hoernlein, who underestimated the Soviet defenses and the terrain,meaningthatitwouldbefightingbelowparfortherestofthecampaign..WhilethefightingforCherkasskoe raged throughout the night, the sappers were busy clearingmines for the trailingforceswhowouldbeheadingforthefront.AfterleavingCherkasskoe,GDwouldheadnortheasttowardHill237.8andDubrova.gnk96.hsz120+.Bytheendoftheday,the48thPzChadpenetratedthefirstdefensivebeltbuthadnotgonefar

intoit,reachingalinefromDragunskoe,ButovotoapointeastofCherkasskoeandthentoapointsouthwest of Korovino. The 394th PzGR had just captured Korovino and were securing thevillageagainstpossiblecounter-attacksduringthenight.TheSovietresistancewashardbuttheharshterrainalsowasaproblem.Aclaimed40ofthe190Panthersassignedto48thPzCwereoutofaction.The3rdPzDand52ndIChadtroublegettingpastZybino.The48thPzCreceivedsporadicallygoodairsupportbutnothingmatching2ndSSPzCtoday.ForthedaytheGermanscapturedfewPOWsandlittlematerialanditwasbelievedtheSovietswerenolongerstandingandfightingtotheendbutwerefallingbacktothenextdefensebelt.Infactthe71stGRD,whichhaddefendednearCherkasskoe,hadbeenpushedbackandbytheendofthedaywasdefendingthe Bubny-Krasnyi Pochinok line. The 67th GRD had fallen back to the Krasnyi Pochinok-TrirechnoelineinthehopeofstoppingtheGermansfromexpandingtheirwesternflank.The52ndGRD,whichwashit the hardest along theKozmo-Demianovka axis,was split in two andhadfallen back in disarray. Dragunskoewas twomiles east of Kazatskoe and twomiles north ofStreletskoe.TrirechnoewaslessthanamilesouthofNovoCherkasskoeandsixmileseastandalittle south ofKrasnyi Pochinok. snk77+.wdk118+. vzz115. dgr172m. dgr75.wwf82. gnk68m.dgk95m.vzz2m.Bytheendofthedaythe48thPzCwiththePantherBrigadeattached,thestrongestofthethree

panzercorpsin4thPzA,wasscheduledtobeapproachingthePselRiver,thethirddefensivebeltbut thedivisionswerestill trying topenetrateandbreak through theseconddefensebelt, some12-15 miles further south. Even still the advance the Germans did make the first day causedVatutintocallupalmostallofhisreservesincludingthe35thGRCtothefrontbythenextday.When these forces arrived to the line, it stillwould not be enough andVatutinwould have toborrowfromStavkaandotherFrontstomeetthechallenge.Hothwantedthe48thPzCoverthePselandenteringOboyanbytheseconddayatthelatest.Theplanwascompletelyunreasonable.

Hothhadmadeamajormistakeintheroutethe48thPzCwouldtake;itslowedthemdownfromtheverystartandthecorpswouldnevermeettheschedule.It’spossibletherouteplannedwasmadebecauseoftheunderestimationoftheRedArmybutthatexcuseholdsnowaterforHothandvonMansteinhadphotosofeveryfootofthesalientandshouldhaveknownbetterthantochoosea route with such a poor terrain for panzers that also had extensive defenses with manystrongpointsthatwouldhavetobecaptured.The48thPzChadreachedalinethatjustincludedCherkasskoe.ThelinethatKnobelsdorffreachedwasmorethanfivemilesbehindHausser.Withtheunevenadvanceofallthreecorps,flankswouldbeexposedandthefrontlinewouldbelongerthan it had to be, thinning the forces of an army that started the campaign with dramaticallyinsufficient forces. The performance of the Panther and 48th PzC would be one of the majorsetbacksfor4thPzAduringthecampaign.vzz109+.Bytheendoftheday,2ndSSPzChadbrokenthrough6thGA’sdefenseandtravelednearlyten

milesuptheVorsklaRiveronitswaytoOboyan.ThesouthernGermanassaultlostfewerpanzersthanthenorth,losingaround50panzerswhichwereunrecoverable.Eventhough2ndSSPzCand48thPzCbothpenetratedthefirstdefensivebelt theybothfellshortoftheirobjectivesandthatworriedvonManstein.TheGermanswerealsoquestioning theirpracticeofhavingTigersandPanthersleadthecharge.Theywereslow-movingtargetsthattheSovietshadfoundalimitedwaytoneutralizebytheuseofcamouflagedPakfronts.T34s,beingmuchquickerandrunninginpackswould out-maneuver the bigger tanks if not properly defended and disable them at theirweakspots such as the tracks or engine compartment. ThoughHoth intended all panzers to advancetoday,due to the latearrivalsonlyabout800eventuallysawfrontlineaction.Vatutinhadmorethanthatin1stTAandaccesstoanother1,000inreserve.rc180+.dgk94.fkk79.TheSovietsquicklydiscoveredtheirtankswerenomatchfortheheavilyarmoredTigersand

rapidlyusedaircraft andbig fieldguns toneutralize them.But thenewGermanPantherswerehavingmechanicaltroubleswithenginesstartingfiresandhavingtobesidelined.Itcameattheworstpossibletime.Throughoutthepredawnhours,Germansappersofallpanzerdivisionssearchedforminesto

clear inorder to speed theway for thepanzersat first light.Someof theminesweremadeofwoodandthesappershadtousebayonetstofindthem.dlu25++.At0225hrs,reconunitsandengineersof3rdPzCcrossedovertheDonetssouthofBelgorod

andambushedthenearbyrailroadjunction,butthegainshadcostdearlyinmenforthedefendersreactedquickly.rc177.shn157+.In7thGAsector,the3rdPzCpreparedtoattackwithalmost300panzersthatwouldspreadout

overa35milefront.ItwasoriginallytaskedthatonceasecurebridgeheadwasestablishedontheeastsideoftheDonets,thepanzerswoulddrivetothenortheastandcaptureKorochaontheeasternborderof the intendedaxis.Thisobjectivewouldbechanged toa lessambitious trackoncevonMansteinsawthelevelofresistancehisforceswereupagainst.VonManstein’schangesweretooslow,comingdayslater.hjj123m.The 19th PzD was tasked with breaking through the first defense belt and heading for

Uroshazah, near Kreida. The division had a bad start and did not fully achieve this modestobjective.dlu25.Duringthenight,engineerscompletedabridgeatPushkarnoye,whichwouldallowthepanzers

of19thPzD tocross the riveronce thegrenadiersestablishedabridgeheadacross theDonets.Raus’s11thIContheextremeeasternflankwouldcrossoveraswellfortheirresponsibilitywastoscreenthepanzers’rightflank.wdk121+.hjj121m.fkk79.dgr155m.dgr173m.dgr39m.nzk85.By0225hrs3rdPzCandGroupRaushadsettledintotheirassaultassemblyareasalongthe

Donets River from Belgorod to Maslova Pristani. It was still dark and the soldiers had tomaintainsilence.Itgaveasoldiertimetothink,thinkabouthisfamilyandwhetherhe’deverseethemagain.Hewouldwonderabouthisownmortality,whether thatdaywouldbe theday thatbulletcaughtup tohim.Shortlyafterwards,his introspectionwouldbeshatteredas the7thGAcounteredwithartilleryandairattacks.Thepanzerdivisionsof3rdPzCmovedto theDonetsat0225hrs,undersupportofartillery

fire,inpreparationforthecrossing.Theengineersandscoutingpartieswerealreadyacrosstheriverclearingminesandcheckingforthebestroutestotake.Theplanwasfor7thPzDtoattacktowardSolomino,the19thPzDinthecenterofthefronttoattacksouthofBelgorodandthe168thIDontheleftofBelgorodwhereasmallbridgeheadalreadyexistedwouldaimforStaryiGorod.The 6th PzD with its heavy weapons supported the 168th ID and once the bridgehead wasenlargedwassupposedtodrivetowardStGorodishche.The7thPzDquicklycrossedtheriverandestablishedabridgehead.The19thPzDgainedlessgroundandlostmorepanzers.The168thIDdidnotgaingroundandpreventedthe6thPzDfromadvancing.The2ndVAflewmanysortiesthatdayalongtheDonets,southofBelgorod,dramaticallyslowingtheprogressofthepanzersof3rdPzC.TheLuftwaffehadlittlepresenceinthearea,givingSovietpilotsnoresistanceatall.The 48th PzC and the 2nd SS PzC received all of their attention. The first day showed theLuftwaffedidnothaveenoughaircrafttoadequatelycoverallthreecorpsandthesituationonlyworsenedas thecampaignworeon.Thiswasanextremelypoorstart forKempandhis forceswouldnotbeabletocatchupastheSSCorpsbattleditswaytowardProkhorovka.Bytheendoftheday,thegainsweresosmallandtheresistancesogreatthatitcouldbeseenthatifthatlackofprogresscontinued, thewholecampaignwouldbe in jeopardy.YetHothandvonMansteindidnothing to improve the circumstances for 3rd PzC. shn157+. snk46. snk49. dgr198m. gnk86.dgr251.kcz167.erz201.dgk95m.AtMikhailovkabridgehead,theheavyweaponsofthe6thPzDwouldsupportthe168thIDand

once the bridgeheadwas enlarged and the line penetrated the panzerswere supposed to drivetoward St Gorodishche and Staryi Gorod. The main force of 168th ID and 6th PzD wereimmediatelystoppedatbreakingoutbyfierceresistanceofthe81stGRDandsupportingartillerybutanothersmallerbattlegroupofthe6thPzDtookChernaiaPoliana, threemilesnorthwestofBelgorod.Soviet reinforcementswerebrought up and the entire 168th ID / 6thPzD’s advancewasstopped.Withnopenetration, the6thPzDhadtocrossontheirownatadifferent locationfurther south, followingbehind the7thPzDwhichhadmade thebiggestgainsof thecorpsandendedthedaynearKrutoiLog.The168thIDalsoshiftedtheirdirectionalittletowardthe19thPzDinorder toavoid the impassable resistanceof the81stRDoppositeBelgorodand tohelpsupportthe19thPzD.SeeMap9.vzz5m.dgr76m.wdk22.fzk51.shn158.pck73.dgk136.GroupRaus began their assault south of 7thPzDwith its line centered onMaslovaPristan.

Shortlyafterwards,the7thGAcounteredwithartilleryandairattacks.TheGermanscrossedtheDonetsineightplaces.The6thPzDand168thIDattackedtowardStaryiGorod,forcingthesouth

flankof81stGRDtoretreat totheeastbuttherestofthe81stGRDremainedfirmanddidnotallow any gains to be made toward Staryi Gorod. Another battle group of the 6th PzD tookChernaiaPoliana, threemilesnorthwest ofBelgorod.Reinforcementswerebroughtup and6thPzD’s advance was stopped. The 19th PzD, attacking from their bridgehead at MikhailovkasoutheastofBelgorod,madesmallgainsontheirbridgeheadeastof theriver.Duringthenight,engineerscompletedabridgeatPushkarnoyewhichallowedthe19thPzDtobringtheirpanzerstotheline.Raus’s11thICfacedthe24thGRCasitadvancedontheextremeeasternperimeterand would try to defend the panzers from attack from the east. wdk121+. hjj121m. fkk79.fkk324m.dgr155m.dgr173m.dgr39m.nzk85.vzz5m.At0225hrswhiletheartillerypreparationcontinued,the7thPzDheadedforthewestbankof

theDonetsinthedirectionofDorogobuzhino,sevenmilessoutheastofBelgorod.AfterclearingamajortrafficjamduetoaminefieldonthewestbankoftheDonets,thelightpanzersof7thPzDcrossed the Donets on a bridge northwest of Dorogobuzhino and marched on the village.DorogobuzhinowasquicklytakenbutthevillageofRazumnoe,amiletotheeast,waspreparedandwouldbemoredifficult tocapture.Inthefirsthour,whenPzRRothenburgwasleadingtheadvance,the7thPzDdestroyed34tanks.Theengineershadtoclearmanyminesbeforethetroopscould safely advance. They were working around the clock clearing the tens of thousands ofmines thatwereplantedover theprevious fewmonths.Theyalsobuiltanotherbridgeover theDonets.Thefirstattemptwasdestroyedfromarocketattackbutthesecondattemptsucceededinlarge part to the grenadiers who were pushing back the enemy, enlarging the bridgehead andmakingithardertoreachtheriverbyrocket.Inonerespectitwasabaddayfor7thPzDforfiveof their key officers died in these early hour skirmishes as well as having some Tigers fromsPzAbt 503 damaged by mines when they strayed from the cleared paths. fkk290. gnk88++.dgr155m.kfz451.zzt87+.Inthepredawnhours,Germanengineersfeverishlyworkedbuildinga24tonbridgeoverthe

Donets,notfarfromBelgorod.Atdawnitwas80%completed.TheSovietAFbombedit,puttingtheGermanadvanceinastateofconfusion,especiallyOppelin-Bronikowski’sgroupof6thPzD.The19thPzDwasalreadyacrosswhen thebridgewasdestroyedbut itdidnotgo farwithoutinfantryagainstheavyresistancefrom7thGA.Thirteenofthe14TigersofsPzAbt503attachedtothe19thPzDweredamaged;mostbymineswhichwereundetectedbytheengineers.WithouttheLuftwaffe’ssupport, theRedAirForcecausedmuchdamagetotheGermanstryingtocrosstheDonets.Therewasaheavydownpourintheearlymorningwhichalsoslowedthebuildingofthebridgesmhz217.gnk86.gnk88++.gjz182+.At0230hrswhileGeneralKempfwashavingaquietmomentnear theriver,Shumilov’s7th

GAbeganasignificantbombardmentof3rdPzC,especiallyatMikhailovkawheretheGermanshadtheironlybridgeheadontheeastsideoftheDonets.Tothenorthataboutthesametimeoralittle earlier, Rokossovsky began his own disruptive barrage.mhz199+mhz216. fkk51. fkk79.dgr249.At 0330 hrs, after a 30minute preparation, five divisions of Kempf’s Group launched and

eventually forcedcrossings at differentpoints along theNorthernDonets and from theGermanMikhailovka bridgehead, which was situated across the river from Belgorod, southward toMaslovaPristan.Kempf’s168thIDwasimmediatelystoppedatbreakingoutofthebridgeheadat

Mikhailovkabythe81stGRD.Thesites thatwerecrossedwere locatedatPushkarnoe,DalniePeski,Dorogobuzhino, Solomino, Puliaevka,MaslovaPristan, Priiutovka andBezliudovka.By1300hrs,screensweresetupontheeastbanksoftheDonetsbythe6thPzGRand7thPzGRandbridges were constructed at Maslova Pristan and Karnoukhovka to allow panzers and heavyequipment over the river. By the afternoon the Germans had consolidated their gains into abridgeheadsevenmileswideandabouttwomilesdeep.Bytheendoftheday,the78thGRDwaspushedbackandwasdefendingHill126.3–KrutoiLogand the72ndGRDand213thRD theoutskirts of Krutoi Log,Maslov Pristan and Priiutovka. Three of these sites were abandonedwhen the other crossings looked more promising. The 17th VA was called in to destroy thepontoonbridgesacrosstheDonetsinordertoisolatethe7thPzDthathadmadeitacrosstoallow78thGRDtocounteranddestroytheremains.dgk103.dgr75.cbk33.erz203.dgr76m+.In 19th PzD sector, the sappers had worked all the previous night to clear a path for the

panzers.Earlyinthemorningpanzersofthe2ndCompanyofsPzAbt503beganmovingoutbutdid not go far before three Tigerswere damaged frommines that had beenmissed during theclearing.Inall13Tigersweredamagedbutrepairabletominedamagethefirstday.Twomoreweredamagedbyshellfire.TheTigerswerebeingusedasthespearheadbecauseoftheirtoughskinandlonggunandtheywereinjeopardytoallthethousandsofminesthathadbeenplanted.Fourotherpanzerswerelosttothe19th.FiveTigerswererepairedbytheendofnextdaybuttheothereightwouldtakefromtwotofourdaystorepair.WithouttheseTigers,the19thPzDwouldnotreachHill139.9wherethefrontobserversweregaugingtheartillerydistance.WithouttheseTigers, the 3rd PzC had little chance of reaching Prokhorovka on time. With the bridge justdestroyedotherpanzerscouldnotcrosseitherandtheinfantrywaslefttofendforthemselvesandit was going badly. The division did not have any more 60 ton pontoons left either. dlu28+.gnk88++.Elementsofthe19thPzD,attackingfromthesouthernborderofthebridgeheadatMikhailovka

southeast of Belgorod, made small gains on their bridgehead east of the river. The 19th PzDeventuallypenetrated the linenearRazumnoeagainstSkvortsov’s78thGRDand the81stGRDandapproachedthetownbynightfall,losingmanypanzersintheprocess,mosttominedamage.The7thPzDescapedmostoftheshellingfortheSovietsweretargetingthe6thPzDand19thPzDsectorswheremostofthebridgeconstructionwastakingplace.SeeMap9.fzk51.dlu40.shn158.After crossing theDonets andpenetrating the first defensebelt,whichwasheldby the25th

GRC’s81stGRDandsupportedbythe262ndTR,KempfwastoheadnortheasttowardKazacheandthenKorochatoblock7thGAfromattacking2ndSSPzC.gnk85.dgr155m.dgr77m.dgr87m.snk76.hjj123m.LtGeneralShumilov’s7thGA’s24thGRCand25thGRCcontained76,000men.Itwasalso

reinforcedwiththe27thGTB,201stTBandanumberofothertankregimentsandmortarunits.Italsohad1,500gunsandatotalof245tanksattached.The3rdPzChadalmost300panzersandadditional45TigersfromsPzAbt503.InsteadofusingsPzAbt503asasinglemassivebatteringram, the battalionwas broken up and split between the three panzer divisions. This has beenheavilycriticizedthroughouttheyears.gnk85.SoutheastofBelgorodontheeastsideoftheDonets,theleadunitsof7thPzDfailedtotakeout

Soviet OPs as they moved forward. This allowed the Soviets to have eyes on their shelling,

makingforlethalaccuracyontheGermanscrossingtheriver.gnk89.WhiletheTigersattachedto7thPzDwaitedfortheheavybridgetobecompletedacrossthe

Donets, the grenadiers crossed over and headed for the rail linewhichwas defended byMajGeneralSkvortsov’s78thGRD.Therail lineand itsprotectiveembankment ranparallel to theriver,abouttwomileseastofit.Bytheafternoon,theinfantryhadtornasmallgapinthelineandproceededtoheadinland.AtthispointLtGeneralFunckunleashedhispanzerstoexpandthegapand extend the bridgehead. Their objective was now Razumnoe. Skvortsov of the 78th GRDorderedelementsofthe81stGABtoplugthegap.gnk88+.dgr173m.AfterbeingpushedoutofDorogobuzhino, the78thGRDregroupedand initially stopped the

GermansfromadvancingpasttheraillinerunningthroughDorogobuzhino.The73rdGRDjoinedin thedefensebut bothdivisions eventually failed tohold thevillage andwerepushedback amiletoRazumnoe.Aftersecuringthevillagethe7thPzDresumeditsmarchgaininganotherthreemilesandbynightfallreachedahilloverlookingKrutoiLog.Whilethe81stGRDwasdeployednearest the Donets, the 78th GRD was deployed to the southeast, closer to Krutog Log. TheGermanswereusingtheirTigersintheleadwiththeMkIVsfollowing.ThisformationlosttheadvantageofthelonggunoftheTigersplusputtingtheirhighlyprizedpanzerinmorejeopardy.wwf82.dgk94.dgr39m.wdk122.dgr172m.dgr39m.gnk87+.dgr155m.wwf110.In7thPzDsector the leadTigersofsPzAbt503expanded itsbridgehead then traveledeight

milesandwasapproachingKrutoiLog,situatedonaplateautotheleftofthepanzercolumn.Itwasdecidedtoattackinthemorningandthe7thPzDcampedforthenightontheplateau.Ithadpenetratedthefirsttwodefensebelts.Itwasarelativelygooddayforthedivision,ithadtraveledabouttenmilesandcasualtieswerelowat10killedand86woundedbuttheotherdivisionsofGroupKempfdidnotdoverywellandhadincurredgreatercasualties.Withtheirflanksexposedthe7thPzDwasinavulnerableposition.dlu24.dlu63m.FromtheBelgorodarea, the6thPzDunderHunersdorffandwith168thIDin the leadattack

northwards towardStaryiGorod.Elements reachedChernaiaPolianabynightfall but failed toreach theirmainobjectiveofGorod.Two important road junctionsofSabyninoandKrivtsovowouldbeattackedbeforereachingStaryiGorod.The6thPzDtriedtoreachStaryiGorodbuttheminefieldsandheavyMGfirekepttheGermans,includingtheTigers,fromenteringthetown.The6thPzDhadtowithdrawtoChernaiaPoliana.vzz179.gnk85+.vzz5m.Once across theDonets River, theKempfGroup, led by 7th PzD, attacked the 7thGA and

penetrateditslinequicklyinafewspots,droveonandreachedtheKorenRiver,establishingabridgeheadalongwith19thPzDofsevenmileswideandfourmilesdeep.Thegainswerelessthanexpectedand3rdPzCwasstillbehindthe2ndSSPzC.IthadcostKempfseveralthousandcasualtiestoestablishthisbridgehead.Itturnedouttobehiscostliestdayofthecampaign.The7th GA had to fall back in this sector to its second line of defense to escape envelopment.dgk103+.dlu6m.gjz183.dgr78.dgk222m.dlu63m.gjz185.Lateinthedayitwasdecidedtomovethe6thPzDsouthwardduringthenightandcrossthe

Donets in 7th PzD sector at dawn.MajGeneralHunersdorffwould then join the 7th PzD andtogetherwouldexploittheirstrengthagainsttheriverlinedefenses.The7thPzDand11thPzRof6th PzD, with a total of around 200 panzers and assault guns, planned on attacking SovietpositionsontheRazumnaiaRiverlinenextmorning.MeanwhilethenearbyvillageofKrutoiLog,

defendedby7thGA,repeatedlyhalted7thPzD’sattacks,theselastinglateintothenight.The11thPzRwasattachedto7thPzDwiththespecifictaskoftakingIastrebovo,twomilessoutheastofBlizhniaiaIgumenkaandleadingthe7thPzDtoMelikhovo,25milesnortheastofBelgorod.TheBelgorod-Melikhovohighwaywascriticalforitwouldeasetheadvancementofthedivisionstothefront,speedupresupplyandprevent7thGAfromusingit.FivemilessouthofBelgorod,therewerestillpanzersof7thPzDandtherestof3rdPzCstill

waitingtocrosstheDonetsonanewbridgethatwasbeingrebuilt,buttheTigersofsPzAbt503attemptedtofordtherivernearthevillageofSolomino.Whentheleading#321gotstuckonthefarside,therestoftheTigershalteduntilasuitablebridgewasavailable.Whena60tonbridgewasassembled,itwasquicklydestroyedbytheRedAirForce.ThebridgewasrepairedandtheTigersquicklycrossedbutsoonranintoabunkersystemthatstoppedtheirprogress.EvenwiththeveryslowstartwithsomeofhisforcesstillonthewestsideoftheDonets,Kempf’sTigershaddestroyed30T34s.wwf78++.mhz218.fkk278.dgr173m.kfz454.shn158+.Whilethe6thPzGRand7thPzGRof7thPzD(Funck)hadpenetratedthefrontlineof7thGA

andthe25thPzRwasracingeasttotakethehighgroundwestofKrutoiLog,LtGeneralSchmidt’s19thPzD,tothenorthinthewooded,swampyPushkarnoyeareanearMilkailovka,wasmeetingstiffresistance.Theinfantryfinallymadeprogressinenlargingthebridgeheadandthe71panzersofthe27thPzRplustheattachedTigersofsPzAbt503launchedfromthe60tonbridgethatwasjust finished.Only a few panzersmade it across before Soviet artillery and planes hit it. TheTigershadtowaittohavethebridgerepairedasthelighterbridgewhichtheotherpanzerscouldcrosswould not hold up to the Tigers’weight. The light panzerswere heading for BlizhniaiaIgumenka which was captured by nightfall. snk49+. dlu24. dgk103. gnk89. erz203. dgr155m.wdk122.kfz451.HavingfinallycrossedtheDonets,sPzAbt503wasstoppedattheDelnazhayaIgumenkabridge

waitingforsapperstofortifyittohandletheweightoftheTigers.Thelightertankscrossedover.While the Tigers were waiting for the bridge to be strengthened, the grenadiers crossed andestablishedabridgehead.Afterfivehours,theTigerscrossedandheadedforRazumnoeStationandthenDalniePeskiandthewoodstotheeast.AtRazumnoe,theTigerswereattackedbyT34s.ThefirstSoviettanksweredestroyedat1,200yardsbeforetheywerewithinlethalfiringrangeandtherestscattered.Therewere45TigersinsPzAbt503anditwouldbebrokenupintothirdswithonecompanygoingtoeachpanzerdivision.Onlythefirst14TigersmadeitoverthebridgebeforetheSovietsshelledanddestroyedthefortifiedbridge.TheremainderoftheTigershadtowait again while the bridge was repaired. Most of the bridges in 3rd PzC sector had beendamaged or destroyed at least once today, andwith theRedAF in action, some had been hitseveraltimes,delayingthecrossingdramatically.dlu10++.dlu28.dgr155m.dgr173m.InfrontoftheGermanbridgeheadatMikhailovka,the15thGRDand81stGRDof25thGRC

had created a hugeminefield and erected formidable defenses. Add the heavy shelling in thepredawnhoursand19thPzDand168thIDpaidahighpriceleavingthebridgeheadandbeforereachingtheSovietline.AtMikhailovkaandalongtheGermanlinefor15miles,the72ndGRDand36thGRDattacked,attemptingtoeradicatethebridgeheadsthathadjustbeendeveloped.ThebridgeheadsatBesliyodovoandPriytovkawereeliminatedbuttheotherswithstoodtheattacks.GermanengineerswereabletocompleteabridgeatMaslovaby1100hrsandatPristanby1300

hrs.WhiletheMkIIIsandIVsrolledacrosstheDonets,theTigershadtowaituntiltheheavierbridgewascompleted.The262ndTRwasattachedtothe81stGRDtohelpequalizethebalanceagainstthepanzers.The73rdGRDand213thRDweremanningtheseconddefensebelt.fkk80.gnk85.TheinitialchargeacrosstheDonetsby320thIDof11thICwassuccessfulbutsoonafterwards

agroupof150menwerepocketedbyacounter-attackby7thGA.AtKempf’sHQ,itwasheardovertheairwavesthatthemenwereallexecutedafterkeyinterrogations.ThosemurderswouldsetthebarforGermanreprisalsforSovietPOWs.erz203.snk49.By1100hrs,Kempf’s19thPzD,havingdeployedbetweenthe6thPzDand7thPzD,achieveda

smallpenetrationacross theriveropposite theSovietfortifiedvillageofRazumnoe.Exploitingtheopportunity,LtGeneralSchmidt’s73rdPzGRmovedforwardoveramileat thejunctionofthe78thGRDand81stGRD.Bynightfallthe19thPzD’s27thPzRjoinedthebridgeheadontheDonet’seastbankandcompletedroutingthe228thGRRwhofellbacknearRazumnoe.The19thPzD was heading for Korocha but first it had to capture the heights overlooking BlizhniaiaIgumenka.dgk103.dlu6m.dlu25*.dgr155m.dgr173m.dgr39m.dlu63m.hjj123m.Withthe3rdPzCmakinggains,evenmodestgains,Vatutinbroughtupthe213thRDand27th

GTB toprotect the threatenedMaslovaPristan area.Both formations attacked from themarch.TheGermansdidsucceed,encirclingthedefending72ndGRDbeforereinforcementsarrivedandit took another 48 hours before the garrison was able to break out with the help of thereinforcementsandheadnorth.VatutinthoughtthattheonlywayHothcouldreachKurskwaswiththe linking of 3rd PzCwith 2nd SS PzC and the subsequent destruction of 69thArmy and hewoulddoeverythingpossibletopreventthatfromhappening.The69thArmystartedthecampaignwithnearly61,000men,538gunsand1,028mortars.WhydidHothnotseethisscenario?fkk80.vzz180.Southof3rdPzC,GroupRauswiththe106thIDand320thIDmadeevenlessprogress.The

106thIDdidcrosstheriverandreachedtherailwayatToblinkaafewmileseastoftheriverbuttheiradvancewasstoppedwhenattackedbythe72ndGRDandelementsofthe213thRD.The320thIDalsocrossedandreachedtheBelgorodtoMaslovarailroadline,afewmilessouthofBelgorodbutthetwoGermandivisionshadnotmutuallysecuredtheirflanksyet.wdk123.The 7th PzD’s 25th PzR crossed theDonets justwest ofDorogobuzhino and as the infantry

fought tosecuretheeasternside, theengineersbuilta lightbridgetoget thepanzersandtrucksacross.Thegrenadiersmadeslowprogresstowardthevillageagainstthestiffresistanceofthe78thGRDand73rdGRD.EventuallybothdivisionshadtopullbacktoRazumnoeallowingthe7thPzDtotakeoverthevillage.wdk122.fzk170.VatutingaveShumilovcontrolof69thArmy’s111thRDand270thRDwhichwereinsecond

echelon.VatutinwantedShumilov’s7thGAtoattackinthemorningtoeliminatethebridgeheadsthathadbeenestablishedthatday.ThetwodivisionswouldprotectthelineincasetheGermansgotpastShumilov’sattack.vzz108*.dgr78.Lookingbackovertheday’saction,thefightingaroundBelgorodwasintenseandlosseswere

highonbothsides.Thepanzerswerehaltednotfarfromthekeycity.Atnightthe168thIDwasorderedtoadvancewiththe19thPzDagainstpositionsonthehighgroundnortheastofBelgorodtopenetratethefirstdefensebelt.Comparingtheresultsof48thPzCand2ndSSPzC,the3rdPzC

wasclearlylaggingfortheothertwocorpsbrokethroughthefirstdefensebeltandorreachedtheseconddefensebeltdespitetheruggedterrain.The35thGRCwasorderedtosendits93rdRDforwardtoProkhorovkaforfuturedeployment

behindKostitsyn’s183rdRDwhileColTrunin’s92ndGRDandRusskikh’s94thGRDwassenttotheKorodiaareawhereitlookedliketheGermanswereheading.The7thGAunderShumilovwasorderedtoattackontwoaxestowardtheKrutoiLogareawherethe19thPzDand7thPzDweremakinggains.Thisordertoattackwasrescindedaswellinfavorofadefensiveposturethatwouldweardowntheattackers.fkk81.vzz107.vzz114.gnk152.gjz183.kcz168.dgk106m.nzk85.Duringthenight,6thPzDmovedsoutheastwardawayfromtheLipovyiDonetsRivertofollow

7thPzDoverthebridgesatDorogobuzhinoandSolomino.Themaneuverweakenedthevacatedsector,allowingtheSovietstocontinuetoapplyharshpressureonSSTKand168thID.The6thPzDwasoriginallytaskedwithtakingStaryiGorodandChernaiaPolianabuttheresistancewastoostrongand thedivisiondecided itwasbetter to findadifferent route.The168th IDon thewest bankof theDonetswas guarding the 6thPzD’s flankduring the redeployment aswell asshelling theSoviet positions on the east side.At the same timeGeneralMattenklott’s 42nd ICattacked across the Donets, south of the 320th, as a feint but it was unsuccessful. After darkKempf andBreith conferred, trying to decidewhich lineof attack6thPzD should take after itcrossedtheDonets.Initiallybothgeneralsthoughtthe6thPzDshouldpairupwithoneoftheotherpanzerdivisionstoconcentrate theirstrengthbut itwasfinallydecidedtohave19thPzDmovemoretothewestandhave6theventuallymoveinbetweentheothertwodivisions.wdk122++.dlu10.hjj121m.gnk141.dgk222m.dlu63m.fkk278.dgr155m.dgr173m.dgr39m.shn158+.snk47.vzz5m.fzk51.Duringthenight,Vatutinbroughtupthe111thRDand270thRDof69thArmytobolsterthe7th

GA’slineattheseconddefensebelt,eastoftheKorenRiverandtotherearof24thGRC.Healsosentthe93rdRDof35thGRCtotheLipovyiDonets,westofProkhorovkatopreventthe2ndSSPzCfromlinkingupwithKempf.KempfwasatadisadvantagehavingtostarthisassaultsouthofBelgorodandtohavetocrosstheDonetsfromastandstill.In3rdPzCsector,engineershadbuilttwopontoonbridgesacrosstheDonetsinthissectorwhichallowed100panzerstocrossbeforetheSovietAFdestroyedthebridges.Thebridgeswerefinallycompletedandtherestofthe3rdPzCstuckonthewestbankwasabletocrossoverandracetocatchupwiththeircomrades.ThedisastersattheriverinthemorningwerecostlytoKempf,slowinghisadvanceandhewasneverabletocatchup.TheSovietsplayeditwell:extensiveminefields,heavyartillerycoverageandair support had a tremendous affect on 3rd PzC. dgk103+. dlu6m. gjz183. dgr78. dgk222m.dlu63m.gjz185.Bytheendoftheday7thPzD’sPzR25hadtraveledthreemilesandforthemostpartwasstill

withinthefirstdefensebelt.TheywerenotclosetoreachingKorocha,theirfirstdayobjective.gnk89.snk76.hjj123m.The106thIDof11thICmadeitacrosstheDonetsagainstheavyresistance,advancedslowly

andby theendof theday reached the railway lineatToblinka, severalmiles eastof the riverwhentheywereattackedbythe72ndGRD.The320thID,travelingsouthof106thIDmadeittotherailwaylineafterdarkandthenstoppedforthenight.wdk123.NearbyBlizhniaiaIgumenkabytheendoftheday,Funck’s7thPzDtentativelycapturedKrutoi

Log.KrutoiLogwasan important strongpointon the seconddefensebelt.Krieda,not far fromMikhailovka,hadbeendestroyedwhen7thPzDdrove throughitbut resistanceremained in thearea.PzGR74alsowentthroughKriedaclearingresidualresistanceasitdrovetothenortheast.Between the accurate shelling and bombing, the 3rd PzC got off to a slow, costly start. Theaccompanying11thIClostheavily today, tryingtoprotect7thPzD’srightflank.snk49+.dlu24.dgk103.gnk89.erz203.Failing to reach its objective of Blizhniaia Igumenka against aerial attacks and stiff ground

resistance by the end of the day, the 19th PzD suffered casualties of nearly 500, including 62dead.dlu25.Bytheendoftheday,abridgeheadofsevenmileswideanduptofivemilesdeep(although

averagingonlytwo)wasestablishedbutnotallofhispanzersormenhadcrossedover.Kempf’sobjectivewasKorocha but could only reachKoren.KnowingKorochawould be next,Vatutinbroughtup35thRC to support the7thGA for thenextmorningattackby thepanzers. Itwasacostly,hecticdayfor3rdPzC;Kempf’sdivisionswerepoorlydeployedand6thPzDhadtocatchup to bolster the front line and participate equally in the offense while guarding against theunexpectedhighresistanceoffrequentlocalcounter-attacks..rc177.Itwasabaddayfor3rdPzC.ExceptforDorogobuzhino,sevenmilessouthofBelgorod,which

wastakenby7thPzD,theSovietfirstlineofdefensehadnotbeenpenetratedveryseverely.The19thPzDwasclosetobreakingthroughsoutheastofMikhailovkabut6thPzDandtheinfantryof168thIDhadbeenstoppedbythe81stGRDandthe375thRDtothenorth.Duringthenight,the6thPzDwasmovedfromclosetotherivereastwardtofollowbehindtherelativelysuccessful7th PzD,whichwas nearKrutoiLog, but its advancewas quickly brought to a stop by heavyartillery fire.Kempfwas going to try to pocket the Soviets near StaryiGorod by sending thepanzersbehindtheSovietsinsteadofdrivingthroughthem.The3rdPzChadfallenbehindwhichexposed the eastern flankofSSTK, forcingSSTK to concentrate on its flank insteadofmovingforward.The167thIDwasmovinguptoassistandtheneventuallyreplaceSSTKontheflankbutSSTKwouldstill leavepanzersbehind tosupport the167thID.The42ndIC,Kempf’s infantrycorpscrossedtheriverbutwasimmediatelystoppedbyaminefield.ThiswasakeydevelopmentforVatutin;withthestiffresistanceofthe81stand375thdivisions,itforcedSSTKtoconcentratemoreontheirflankthanadvancingtothenorth.ItprobablydelayedSSTKtwodaystoreachthePsel River which was a cruial development. wdk122. wdk130. dgr172m+. hjj121m. fkk80.dgr155m.dgr39m.fkk320m.fkk324m.vzz5m.Bytheendoftheday,GenRauscountedhiscasualtiesof11thICandittotaled2,000men.His

corps, screening the7thPzDfromflankattacks,washeavilyhitnorthwestofShevekinowhichwas a favorite jumping-off spot for the divisions of 7thGA to enter battle.GeneralRauswashopinghisdivisionswouldmakeitoutofthefirstdefensivebeltbythefollowingdaywheretheresistancewouldlessenuntilhereachedtheseconddefensivebelt.erz204.ItwasonlythefirstwholedayofthecampaignandyetGeneralVatutinwashavingtoalterhis

battleplansandtroopdispositionsmanytimesandwoulddosoforeverydayofthecampaign.Itwas a dizzying array of new orders andmuch creditmust be given to the front line forces inkeeping up with the changes. To proponents of the general, it could be said that they werewatching a Grand Master move his pieces skillfully across the chessboard while detractors

wouldsaythegeneralwasoutofhisdepthandwasalreadyfloundering.Thetruthwasprobablysomewhereinthemiddle.

A

5

July5thontheNorthernSalientSeeMap2

t0110hrs,Rokossovskybeganatwo-hourpreparationalongtheentirelinetodisrupttheplannedGermanassault.Italsokilledfrontlinesoldiersandcutcommunicationlines.It

waseffectiveandtheGermanlaunchgotofftoaslowerstartthanexpectedbutifRokossovskyhadstartedhisbarragea little later, itwouldhavebeenevenmoreeffective.Thisbarragewasexpected by Model for he learned through interrogations that Rokosovsky had learned of theinvasion timeandwas trying todisrupt thestart.wdk113.dgk87m.gjz179+.dgk92m.snz225+.zow140.At0230hrs,the13thArmybegantheirownbarragethatincludedalmost600gunsandlasted

30minutes,inanattempttocausehavocandconfusionalongtheGermanline.dgr107.dgk87m.gjz179+.dgk92m.TheGermaninitialobjectiveswereHill253.5atButyrkiheights,Hill274atOlkhovatkaand

Hill 272 at Teploe and the key panzer corps were specifically aligned to accomplish theseobjectives,oncetheinfantrypenetratedthefrontline.rc172.wf71.dgr198m.dgk87m.dgk92m.At 0330 hrs over 200 planes,which included 60 escorts fromLuftlotte 6, took off in three

wavestoattackSovietpositionsatandnearMaloarchangelsk,thelargestcityinthebattlearea.ThefirsttoattackwereaformationofHe111s,thenJu88sandfinallyJu87s.Whileintheair,Soviet fightersattacked theGermanformationsbuthad littlesuccessagainst theescorts.At thesame time, Model unleashed an 80 minute barrage against the same targets. These attackshampered Soviet artillery preparation against Model’s 9th Army opening assault on the city.TherewouldbeaconstantrotationofplanesattackingtoslowtheSovietresponse.At0530hrs,the 9thArmymovedoutwith 23rd ICon its east flank attacking the junction of 13th and 48thArmiesmakingasmallgapbutataheavycost.Menandvehiclesranintothousandsofminesthathadbeenlaid.Inthenorth,theLuftwaffeflew2,088combatsortiestotheSovietnearly1,200.Ofthose 1,200 sorties, 817 were fighters. An hour earlier some of these German planes had toscrambleunexpectedlyfromtheirairfieldwhentheirradarpickedupalargeformationofSovietfighterscomingintodestroythembeforethelaunchhadevenstarted.Thepilotswerereadyfortakeoff so their responsewasquickand theywereable todefend themselvesand theairfields.The Soviets were unsuccessful, losing many planes. The repeated bombing runs in theMaloarkhangelskareatriedtodestroytheheavydefensesthereanddisruptrailtransportrunningthroughthecity.Therecentlydevelopedsmallcaliberfragmentationbombs,theSD-1andSD-2,were very accurate and many targets were destroyed during the first pass. snk163. dgk92m.rc170.je99.rkz167.lck222+.dgk87m.dgr250.cbk26++.gjz181.cbk55.nzk77.cbk12m.pck66.

ThesPzAbt656wasunderthecommandofMajorSteinwachsandwasattachedto292ndID.The sPzAbt 654 under Major Noak was attached to 78th AD. The sPzAbt 654 made a bigdifferenceinhelpingtakeHill239.8thefirstdayofbattle.ThisFerdinandregimentwascreditedwithdestroyingover500tanksinthemonthofJuly.Inadditiontothe90FerdinandsofsPzAbt656,ModelalsohadStPzAbt216underthecommandofLtvonJungenfeldt.TheseStuGswouldsupportandprotecttheFerdinands.kfz460+.WhiletheGermanbarragewashittingtheSovietfrontlineaswellastherearareas,German

engineerswereclearingpathwaysthroughtheminefields.snz225+.At0430hrswhileModelinitiatedhisown80minutepreparationonjusttheSovietfrontline,

the23rdIClaunchedaprobingattacktowardMaloarkhangelskontheeastendofthebattlezonetohuntforweaknesses.The13thArmycontinuedtoshelltheGermansduringtheGermanbarragein an attempt to disrupt their imminent attack. It was partially successful. The 23rd IC thenlaunchedafeintattacktodisrupttheSovietswhiletherestoffirstechelon9thArmymadetherealattack. The 23rd IC attacked the boundary between 13th and 48th Armies in the direction ofMaloarkhangelskwhichhadanimportantroadjunctiontoalldirectionsinthearea.Thisareawasdefendedby8thRDand148thRDof15thRC.WiththehelpofStukas,thethreedivisions(78thAD,216thID,36thID)madeamileintothefirstdefensesectorbutwerethenhaltedbyaSovietcounter-attack.dgk86.dgk87m.nzk84.dgk92m.lck116m.The currentGerman artillery barrage thatwould last 80minuteswas directed to a depth of

abouttwomilestotherearoftheSovietfrontline.Itwasanattempttocutcommunicationsandtodestroy entanglements, trenches and soldiers. During the shelling, about 100 German planesbombedthefronttowithinafourmiledistance.The13thArmyreceivedthemostofthisabuse.Rokossovskydecided further shellingwasneeded and another barragebegan at just past 0430hrs,thistimealmostathousandgunsandmortarstakingpart.WhenModellaunchedhismen,onespearhead attacked the 13th-70thArmy boundary behindKrasnaia Slobodka and Izmailovo.Asecondary demonstration occurred against General Romanenko’s 48th Army in theMaloarkhangelsk-Panskaiasectorwhichwasdefendedbythe8thRD,148thRDand16thRD.Inall the 48thArmy had 84,000men, nearly 1,500 guns and almost 200 tanks and assault guns.General Galinin’s 70th Army had 96,000 men, almost 1,700 guns and 125 tanks. dgr107+.dgk59+.dgk87m.dgk92m.dgr108m.At0510hrstheLuftwaffelaunchedanotherattackonpositionsheldbythe13thArmyalonga

30milefrontbetweenTrosnaandMaloarkhangelsk,followed20minuteslaterbytendivisions.UnlikevonMansteinandHoth,Modelwasspearheadinghisattackwithinfantryfollowedbythepanzersafteragapopened.Theinfantrywasstoppedandwithdrew.Anhourlongbombardmentensued,thentheinfantrytrieditagainbutwithsomeTigersthistime.By0930hrs,MajGeneralKessel’s20thPzDfoughtitswaytoBobrik.Bobrikwasdefendedbythe321stRRof15thRDandwhenBobrikfell,the15thRDhadtofallbackinthesector.Onitsleftwas6thIDwhichhadcrossedtheOkarivertosiegethevillageofNoviChutorandtoclearapathintheminefieldsforthepanzerstopass.Atthispoint,afewmorepanzerswerebroughtupfronttoparticipate.ModelwasusingthisnarrowfronttoplowmenandtankstooverloadtheSovietdefenseandhewouldcontinue to pour more resources to keep the Soviets busy. je99. dgr198m. fkk50. dgk87m.swm138.wwf48.dgk92m.lck116m.kfz454+.zsm155+.

AfterreceivingapreemptivebarragebyRokossovkyandaplannedartilleryandaerialbarrageby 9th Army, the German main assault began at 0530 hrs against the 13th Army in theMaloarkhangelskarea.TheleadcorpswereLtGeneralFriessner’s23rdICandHarpe’s41stPzCto thewest. The 41st PzC had a narrow front; itwas hoped that their concentration of forceswouldpenetrate thefront linequickly.The78thADof41stPzCusedmanyGoliaths toclearapath throughthemine-fields toreducethe timetoreachthefront line.At0630hrs,Zorn’s46thPzCandLemelsen’s47thPzClaunched.TheSovietsusedmassiveshellingandairraidstoslowtheGerman advance. Initially, the Germansmet little resistance from ground troops but whenapproaching thefirst trenchawallofsmallarmsfirehit themhard. In frontof the trenches theremote controlled Goliaths cleared paths through the minefields. wdk172. dgk86. dgk87m.swm136.dgk92m.kfz455.On theeastern flankat0530hrs, the292nd IDof41stPzCandMajGeneralHoffimeister’s

383rdIDof23rdICattackedthe16thRDof48thArmyintheareanorthofMaloarckhangelsk.Afterasixhourbattle,theGermansmadelittleprogressandgaveuptheattack.Aregimentofthe383rdpositionedatPanskaiaonthenorthflankwascounterattackedbythe16thRD.ThefightingwassofiercetheregimentalCOwaskilled.wdk174.dgk87m.dgk92m.At 0530hrs as the barragewas ending,Model left hisHQandheaded forLemelsen’s 47th

PzC’sHQ.Hewantedapersonalupdateonhow20thPzDand6thID’sassaultbegan.The292ndIDof41stPzClaunchedwith themandwasscreeningtheireasternflank.TheirmainobjectivewastoreachKasharabytheendoftheday.Togivethe6thIDalittlemoremuscle,afewElefants(sPzAbt656)ledtheadvance.ThemaindefenderfacingGrossmann’s6thIDwasthe47thRRofColDzhandzhgava’s15thRDandMajGeneralBarinov’s81stRD.Atthesametime,the18thGRhadcrossedtheOkaRiverandcapturedIasnaiaPoliana.The47thwasputtingupstiffresistancebutwerenowslowlybeingpushedback.snz228.dgk92m.dgk88.Atdaybreakaround0530hrsthe6thID,onthetherightof20thPzD,attackedalongthevalley

oftheOka.TheTigersofsPzAbt505attachedtothe6thIDdestroyedadefensivescreenofT34sbeforehittingtheopenflankofthe676thRR,andallowingtheGermaninfantrytoadvancebehindit.Fightingmuchofthemorning,thevillageofNovoChutorwasfinallycaptured.By1200hrs,the Tigers had advanced and captured Butyrki, northeast of Bobrik, and were threatening tounhinge the 81st RD next door. The 81st RD (13thArmy)was already being threatened by afrontal attack by the 292nd ID ofHarpe’s 41st PzC. sPzAbt 653, which had Ferdinands, wassupporting the 292nd ID, had penetrated the line defended by 410th RR andwere headed forAleksandrovka. During this battle, Soviet sappers moved up and planted thousands of minesacross theexpectedrouteof theGermans.Notexpecting themines, theFerdinandsandpanzersdrove right into theminefield, disablingmanyvehicles.TheGermans’other axis of attack thatmorningwasonthePanskaia-Maloarkhangelskaxistotheeastwhichwasalsotheboundarylinebetween13thArmyand48thArmy.The8thRD,148thRDand16thRDwerehitthehardestbuttheywereabletorepulsethefirstattack.Inthe16thRD(Latvian)sector,theGermanswereabletopenetratethelineandlungeamiledeepintotherearbeforetheSovietscounteredandpushedthe Germans back. dgr110. pck42+. dgk87m. wwf48+. wwf50m. dgk92m. dgr199m. dgk88.lck116m.vzz12m.At0615hrs, thepanzersofvonKessel’s20thPzDdroveintoamassiveminefieldandwere

stuckthereuntilthepioneerswereabletoclearthemines.Theminefieldwaspartofamassivetank trap. A Pak frontwaswaiting for the trap to be sprung and started firing on the trappedpanzers.Ithappenedatabadtimeforthe6thIDwasbeginningtogettractionandwasmovingtheSovietlineback.The6thIDhadalsocrossedtheOkaRiver,advancedamileandcapturedNoviChutor. With the panzers stalled next to them, the 6th ID’s momentum had soured. snz228+.kfz456.At 0630 hrs after leaving Lemelsen, Model arrived at Harpe’s 41st PzC HQ. The Army

Commanderwastoldthe508thGRof292ndIDhadgainedsomegroundbutwasnowstuckinaminefield,haltingtheiradvance.TheywerenowtakingheavySAandmortarfirefromBarinov’s81stRD(13thArmy).BeforeModelarrived,Harpehadalreadyorderedthe101thPzRof18thPzDuptothelinetohelpthedrivereachthekeyobjectiveofOzerki.LtGeneralJosefHarpewaspromotedtothatpositionandbecametheCOof41stPzCin1942.Hewouldrisetocommandthe9thArmyandthenthe4thPzA.snz229.zsm110.pck40.About an hour after 23rd IC attacked toward Maloarkhangelsk, Lemelsen’s 47th PzC and

Harpe’s 41st PzC with support from the air attacked the defenses of 29th RC’s 15th RD(Dzhandzhgava) and Barinov’s 81st RD northwest of Ponyri. The 120 panzers of 20th PzDbreached the 15th RD’s forward defenses by 0900 hrs. To the east, Friessner’s 23rd IC wasmakingademonstrationattackbetweentheboundarylineof13thand48thArmiesinthedirectionofMaloarkhangelsk, an important traffic junction, but failed tomakemuch progress. The 47thPzC,consistingof2ndPzD,9thPzD,20thPzDand6thID,quicklymadeashallowpenetrationbetweenPodolianandButyrkiallowing the20thPzDand6th ID toheadsouth towardBobrik,StepandSaburovkaontheSevana.WhiletheJu87sandHe111shitgroundtargets,theFw190seffectivelykepttheRedAirForceoutofthesector.LtGeneralRudenkowashesitantinsendingmassivesquadronstocountertheLuftwaffeandhisairforcepaidtheprice.Realizinghismistakethat night, he called for a stronger response the nextmorning. dgk86. snk105. lck249. lck252.dgk87m.dgr199m.cbk38+.dgk92m.lck116m.At0800hrsandwith9thArmy’sexpanding,gainingmomentum,PzAbt21launchedfromnorth

ofLebedichaheading forPodolianbywayofTagino to joinupwith20thPzD.Upon reachingHill218.2,theformationofassaultgunswereattackedfromtheair;stiffanti-aircraftfiredownedseveral fighters and chased the rest away. ApproachingGnilets, a small band of Soviet tanksattacked the formationbutweredrivenback.Afterdark theAbt21was fighting for controlofSaborovka.Thefightingwentonwaypastdarkandafterwardsthesupplytrucksaswellasthemedicsarrivedtotakebackthewoundedandtoreplenishfuelandammo.SaborovkawasaboutamilesouthofBobrik.zzt75+.dgk87m.BetweenBobrikandGnilets,20thPzDmadeinitialgainsby0900hrs.Toextendthesegains

furtherreinforcementswerebroughtuptoaddweighttothecharge.The47thRDwasbadlyhitandwasforcedtowithdraw.The6thIDnextto20thPzDwashelpedbytheirsuccessandalsomadegains, continuing togivecover to thepanzers.TheLuftwaffe also attackedboth sidesofIasnaiaPoliana.pc38+.dgr198m.dgk87m.dgr199m.dgk92m.lck116m.zzt75+.On the left flank of 46th PzC, themen charging through the rye fields quickly discovered a

minefield.It tookthemhours toclearapathfor themenandpanzers togetpastnoman’s land.Tigersapproached theedgeof theryefieldandfiredshellaftershellat theenemyline togive

cover to the sappers clearing themines. This delay affected the entire 46th PzC’smomentum.pc36.dgk87m.dgk92m.The41stPzC struck the81stRDhardandwereunable tomake initial gains, but eventually

wereabletopushtheSovietsback.The70tonFerdinandswerebroughtuptoblastapath.ThesemachineshadnointernalMGsotheoccupantswouldfiretheirMGsthroughthe88mmgunbarrelfor self-defense. In Berlin, Guderian had failed the Ferdinand road test butwas overruled byHitler who demanded these weapons be at Kursk. Guderian knew of the vulnerability of nothavingaMGsoamake-shiftsledwasattachedtothebackoftheElefant(alsocalledFerdinand)withatowchainandinfantrywouldridealongandkeeptheenemyawayfromthevehicle.pc40+.dgk87m.wwf48.AfterfailingtopenetratetheMaloarkhangelskfrontline,theGermanspulledbackat0730hrs

andregroupedbeforeattackingagain.AnewassaultalongtheSoglasnyi-Arkhangelskoe-IasnaiaPolianasectorwas launched thatwouldeventually lead themtoOlkhovatka.TheveryheaviestconcentrationwasintheVerkhneTagino-Arkhangelskoeareaduringthissecondassault.Afterahalfhouroffighting,theleadingGermanunitsreachedthefrontlineofthe81stRDand15thRDandafterashorttimetheSovietsslowlyfellback.AtthesametimetheLuftwaffewaspoundingthelinenextdoorwhichwasguardedbythe132ndRDand280thRDof70thArmy.With15thRDfallingback,therightflankof70thArmybecameexposed.The712thRRof132ndRDshifteddirection east ofGnilets to face the gap. The 712thRRwas not strong enough and theywerepushedbackintoGniletsbutresistancestiffenedandtheGermanswerenotabletoenterthetown.TheGermansexpandedtheirattackareaandhittherestof132ndRDand280thRDaswellandbegan topush themback.During this retreat in thissector,Sovietartillerypoureddownon theGermans,tryingtoslowtheirpursuit.ThefirstaxisofattacktowardMaloarkhangelskwasstillactivebuttheadvancewasslowingdown.By1030hrs,thedivisionsof41stPzChadcapturedNikolskaia1,OzerkiandIasnaiaPolianabuttheresistanceofthe81stRDand15thRDstiffenedandtheGermanadvancewashalted.Panzerswerebroughtupandextendedthegapbeforemorereinforcements arrived. The panzers headed for Ponyri. Rokossovsky ordered the air force toattacktheareaofpenetrationtoslowtheGermansandby1300hrsreinforcementscameintotheareaandstoppedtheattack.dgr110++.dgk87m.dgk92m.dgr199m.At0800hrs, the18thGRof6thIDstormedtheChurchWoods,securingit thentheTigersof

sPzAbt505drovepasttheinfantrytowardPodolianandthehillstothesouthandsoutheastwiththe6thIDfollowing.Beforegoingveryfar,theTigerswereattackedbyT34sthatwerehiddeninnearbycornfields.Sovietinfantrywasalsohiddeninthosefieldsandthe6thIDhadtogoinandclearitandatgreatcostinlifeandtime.TheTigershadmadeanimportantbreakthroughandifthe2ndPzDor9thPzDhadbeenactivatedandtrailingclosebehindtheTigers,acriticalfollow-through could have beenmade.As itwas those two panzer divisions did not arrive until nextmorningand itwas too lateasRokossovskyhadplugged thegap.The left flankof6th IDwasstruggling and falling behind but it didmanage to reachHill 245 andHeartWoods.However,withthelineonitsleftatOzerkievenfurtherbehind,itputextrapressureonthe6thID.fkk52.lck251.fkk102m.dgk87m.dgr199m.dgk92m.lck116m.kfz456+.The292ndIDof41stPzCwithsupportofsixFerdinandsmoveduptoAleksandrovka,three

miles deep into enemy territory and half way to Ponyri. pc41. dgk222m. dlu63m. dgr111.

lck116m.dgk87m.dgr199m.dgk92m.dgr199m.At0830hrs,Rokossovsky,continuinghisredeployments,orderedthe74thRDupclosetothe

front lineatProtasovo, justwestofMaloarkhangelsk, toprotect the town’swest flank.dgr111.dgr108m.dgk87m.dgk92m.dgr199m.While 46th PzC and 47th PzC were making their coordinating attacks, the 23rd IC under

Friessnerandconsistingofthe78thAD,216thIDand383rdID,continuedtheirattacktowardtheheavily fortified strongpoint ofMaloarkhangelsk. Plenty of engineers werewith the assault tohelpwiththeminefields.The23rdICwastojoinupwith41stPzCeastofPonyri.The20thICunderRoman,consistingofthe45thID,72ndID,137thIDand251stID,stayedbehindthefrontlinetoprotectagainsttheSovietsgettingbehindandrollingupthefrontforces,primarilythe46thPzC.snk106.dgk87m.dgr199m.nzk84.dgk92m.lck116m.zzk372.On thewest flank, the258th ID,31st ID,and7th IDof46thPzCattacked the280thRDand

132nd RD of 70thArmy at 0930 hrs in the Tureika area. The 7th ID soon occupied Tureika,drivingthe175thRDbackabout2.5miles.Inthewest,the258thIDtookObydenkiIsmailovo,amile from its start line but was halted by the 280th RD as the Soviets shifted forces to thesouthwest tomeet the threat.At0900hrs,LtGeneralHossbach’s31st ID took thehighgroundnorth of Gnilets, southeast of Tureika, driving the 132nd RD south about four miles. Anotherimportant duty for 46th PzC was to protect the right flank of 47th PzC which had the mainresponsibilityofbreakingthroughanddrivingtoKursk.Thegeneralplanofattackfor46thPzCwasontheaxis:Smitrovsk-Orlovski-ChernCreek-Tysnokoye-Fatezh.The20thICon46thPzC’srightflankwoulddrivedowntheSvapaCreekline.wdk172+.fkk55.fkk102m.dgk87m.snk18.snk106.dgk92m.pck39m.It was a little after 0900 hrs when Maj General von Kessel’s 20th PzD was approaching

Bobrik.ThecommanderorderedhisartilleryberedirectedtowardBobriktosoftenthevillage.pck38.pck39m.At0930hrs,afterfourhoursoffiercefighting,theGermanspenetratedtheSovietlineintwo

places:ArkhangelskoeandVerkhneTaginosectors.Thatmorning,Rokossovskyorderedthe2ndTAtomoveuptothecenterofthelinetoplugthesegaps.Bynoonthetankerswereontheroadandmovingtowardtheirnewpositions,reachingthemafterdark.Besidespluggingthegap, the2ndTAalongwiththe16thTCand11thGTBwastaskedwithdestroyinganypanzersthatwerenowsouthofthatlineandheadingforKashara-Olkhovatka.The19thTCwassubordinatedbackto2ndTAandwas alsomovingup to join2ndTA, arriving at around1900hrs.The16thTCwould attack next morning toward Step and Butyriki from the Ponyri II, Kutyriki area. MajGeneralSinenko’s3rdTCwouldattackfromthePoselka-GorodishchelinealongwithLtGeneralBondarev’s17thGRC.The17thGRCwasinsecondechelonanditwouldtakethemtimetoreachtheirlaunchpoint.TheywouldbedelayedlongerthanexpectedfortheLuftwaffehaddiscoveredtheir long convoy in the rear areas andwere hitting it as hard as possible to prevent it fromreaching the front. The 19th TCwould attack toward Saburovka and Podolian but it was latestartingasitranintoaminefieldthathadtobecleared.The17thGRCconsistedof6thGRD,70thGRDand75thGRD.dgr201++.cbk42.nzk87.dgk92m.dgk91.At0930hrsthe15thRD,beingpressuredbyboth47thPzCand41stPzCindefendingthethree

villagesofIasnaiaPoliana,OzerkiandNikolskaia(notfarfromArkhangelskoe)andnothaving

any air support, was forced to fall back about amile to save itself. Concerned for the quickbreakthrough, Rokossovsky ordered amassive aerial counter-attack. At 1000 hrs an air battletook place over Ponyri. The Germans still had the advantage but by noon the Soviets werebringing more planes into the sector and doing a better job in defending themselves and thegroundassets.TheGermanswouldstillhavetheadvantagebytheendofthedaybutatleasttheSoviets were realizing the magnitude of the Luftwaffe response and trying to meet it. cbk39.dgk87m.dgk92m.AlongasixmilefrontinthevicinityofVekhTaginoandrunningtotheOrel-Kurskrailway,the

20thPzDbegan tomakeprogress toward their importantobjectivesofTeploeandOlkhovatka.Model decided to use this as themain axis and directed the 6th ID, 86th ID and 292nd ID tocapture those towns which were defended by 15th RD of 13th Army. Lt General Grossmanncalled sPzAbt505 tocomeup to the line tohelp the infantry reachTeploe.mhz226.dgr198m.fkk102m.zzz101m.dgk87m.dgk92m.lck116m.Eastofthe81stRDsector,alongtheraillineleadingtoPonyri,the86thIDof41stPzCwith

supportfromMajGeneralSchlieben’s18thPzDandafewElefantsadvancedsouthwardtowardthetown.The29thRCandthe129thTBstoppedtheGermanadvanceinfrontofthetownfourtimes but the fifth time, the Germans broke through. The 148th RD, deployed northwest ofMaloarkhangelskhad topullbackwhen the81stRDand the29thRC fellback tohelpdefendeachother’sflankstoavoidanyflankexposure.ThebreakinthelinewasnearTosna,northwestofMaloarchangelsk.WhenRokossovskyheardofthebreakthrough,hesent350planestostoptheGermansaswellasorderingupseveraltankbrigadesfromreservetothearea.dgk89.dgk87m.dgr199m.wwf50.dgk92m.dgr111.dgk92m.lck116m.pck41+.The23rdICwithLtGeneralTraut’s78thADandMajGeneralSchack’s216thIDsupportedby

Major Karl Noak’s sPzAbt 654 (Elefant Battalion) attacked the east flank of the 13th Armydefendedbythe8thRDand148thRD.MajorNoakwasarespectedcommanderandarecipientof theKnight’sCrosswithOakLeaves.Assistedbygoodair support, the78thADpierced thefirst defense belt, advancing six miles to the road from Protasovo to Maloarkhangelsk andcontinuedsouthof the road,driving the148thRDback.The216th ID,despite receivingheavyartillery andmortar fire, advanced due east to Ielisaveto, over sixmiles from their start line,drivingbackthe8thRD.TheareabetweenTrosnaandProtasovoontheMaloarkhangelskroadbetween the spearheads of the 78th AD and 216th ID was still held by the Soviets. Thisseparation of German divisions could prove deadly if they’re not careful. At night, a tank-supported counter-attack in the Trosna area surprised the Germans. Trosna, northwest ofMaloarkhangelsk,wasnorthofthemainaxisof23rdIC’sattack,sotheattackhitthevulnerableleftflank.ModelwouldspendthenextcoupledaystakingTrosnaandeliminatingtheflankthreat.wdk174.wdk177+.dgk87m.dgk92m.dgr110.dgr108m.dgr199m.lck116m.zzk372+.pck42.In the23rd ICsector, theFerdinandsof sPzAbt654woulddrawnear the front linebut stop

outside theminefieldandstart firingon thefront line.While this firingwas takingplace,manyGoliathswerebroughtuptoclearpathsintheminefieldtoallowtheElefantsandinfantrymoveontheline.These“miniremotecontroltanks”didnotalwaysworkbutwhentheydid,theresultswere usually impressive. It was important for 23rd IC to capture Maloarkhangelsk by thefollowingdaytohelpscreentheSovietreservesthatwerealreadymovingforwardfromreaching

andimpeding47thPzC’sassault.zzk372+.pck43.By1030hrs, thegoodbeginningwasalreadyslowingdownalong theentire lineof the47th

PzCand41stPzCsectors.In6thIDsector,the332ndRRhadmoveduptothelineandcounteredtheGermans,completelystoppingtheiradvance.WhilestillatHarpe’sHQ,Modelcalledupfirecontrolandredirectedtheentirebatterygroupof23rdICtosupportthe47thPzC.Modelwouldredirectfiretoothersectorsthroughoutthecampaign.Fornow,the47thPzChadthepriorityover23rdICsodespitethehardshipplacedon23rdID,theredirectiontookplacewithoutamoment’shesitationbyModel.He also called additional engineers to freeup the stuckpanzers andmenfromtheminefields.snz229+.Frominformationgainedthroughprisonerinterrogations,Modellearnedthathisinitialbarrage

inflicted heavy casualties on 15th RD and 81st RD. To exploit this weaknessModel orderedadditionalshellingonthislinebeforesendinginthe6thIDalongwithsomeTigers.TheTigerswere to cross the shallowOkaRiver andhead forPodolian andButyrki and into the exposedflankof676thRR.Aftercrossing theOkabutbefore reachingIasnayaPoliana theTigerswereambushedbya largenumberofT34s inadesperateattempt todestroy them.For thenext threehours the two sides fought bitterly but the Tigers, though outnumbered,were getting the upperhand.Whenthe6thIDarrivedtheGermansforcedtheirwaythroughthelineandthenstormedthevillageofButyrki shortlyafternoon.The15thRDhad toevacuatealongwith theT34sbut42T34sweredestroyedinthefighting.MkIIIsandMkIVsfollowedinthewakeoftheTigersandwere able to capture the village of Podolian. mhz227. fkk52+. fkk102m. dgk87m. dgr199m.dgk92m.lck116m.zro203.With the flanking exposure of the 132nd RD on 70th Army’s eastern flank, the Germans

concentratedtheLuftwaffeandartilleryofthe46thPzConthisareatomakeabreakthrough.Theinfantry of the 46thPzC attackedbutweremet by stiff small arm fire and a deadlyminefield,sufferingheavycasualtiesandwereforcedtofallback.Asthebattleragedontheground,ahugeairbattletookplacenearMaloarkhanglskthatincludedGermanbombersandtheirescortsandtheSoviet fighters. The German escorts won the battle forcing the Soviets from the area aftershooting down 100Red planes. The 46th PzC badly needed this air support andwhile it didreceive some, greater support in the west could have added the extra boost needed to breakthrough.Justlikeinthesouth,theLuftwaffedidnothavesufficientassetsinthesectortocovertheentireline.dgk90.dgk87m.dgk92m.OnModel’sleftflank,23rdICunderFriessneralsomademodestgains.UsingFerdinandsand

Goliaths, a two-foothigh remotecontrolledvehiclecarryingover100poundsof explosives, apaththroughtheminefieldwascleared,allowingthespearhead, the78thAD,toadvance.TheyadvancedthroughheavyfiretotheroadjunctionleadingtoMaloarkhangelsk.AlsoalongsidetheGoliathswere theB-IVswhichweremoreuseful.Thesewere largerversions thatcouldcarry1,000poundsofexplosivesandcouldclearalargerpathofminefieldordestroyalargerbunker.OutsideofMaloarckhangelsk8 largerB-IVscleared the400yardsonmines to thecity limits.pck42.dgk87m.dgk92m.Despite the lethal support of theElefants, the78thADand216th ID facedheavy resistance

frombehindwell-constructeddefenses,supportedbymassiveartillerydeployedtotherear.TheassaultgrenadiersreachedtheirsecondaryobjectiveofHill249.7butfailedtocapturetheirmain

objective of Hill 255.6. This hillmade an excellent OP, allowing for views formiles in anydirection.Modelwantedthathillandhisordersweretotakeitnextmorning.TheflankattackscomingfromTrosnapersisted throughout thedayand thecommanderwanted thatclearedupaswell.zzk372+.TheFerdinandanti-tankgunsescortedtheTigerstoprotectthembutwithoutInfantrytoprotect

theFerdinands,Sovietinfantryweredestroyingbothweaponswithsatchelcharges.InadditiontotheFerdinand,Modelalsohad45Hornetscarrying88mmassaultguns.TheseHornetswereusedbythePzAbt655.Inthesouth,KempfwasgiventhePzAbt560whichalsosported45Hornets.Thismachinedid a splendid job atKursk and received little attention for its efforts.wdk87+.pck36.By1100hrs, theGermanshadpenetrated the lineandwerenowapproachingPodolian.The

15thRDwastakingheavycasualtiesandwasintrouble.Onthe15th’srightflankthe132ndRDlentthemthe712thRRtohelpprotecteastofGnilets.The712thRRsoonfounditselfintroubleandhad to retreat insidePodolianwhere theywereable to repulse theGermanattack.By thistimetheothertworegimentsof132ndRDwereintroubleandwerebackingupintotheothersideofGnilets.Nearby the280thRDwasbeingpushedbackaswell.TheLuftwaffe had switchedsectorsfrom13thArmyto70thArmyandtheirassistancehadmadeabigdifferenceinthegainsnowbeingmade.Bytheafternoon,the81stRDand15thRDwerenowformingdefensesalongtheSemenovka-Shirokoe-Boloto-Saburovkalinewhilethe132ndRDand280thRDwereformingupalongthesouthernoutskirtsofBobrik,Gnilets,Probuzhdenie,andIzmailovo.The74thRDhadmoved up and plug the gap between the boundary between 148th RD and 81st RD. dgr111+.dgk87m.dgr199m.dgk92m.dgr199m.In47thPzC sector, theTigers of sPzAbt 505werebrought in to attack IasnaiaPoliana, just

south ofTula, after the air strike andquickly penetrated theSoviet line defendedby15thRD.pc39.dgk87m.dgk92m.TigersofsPzAbt505,supportingthe6thID,hadcrossedtheOkaRiverattackingtheopenflank

of676thRRof15thRDatdawn.Theinfantrywasfollowing.AftercapturingNovoChutor thedivisionheadedforButyrkibutthe6thIDhadtoshiftitsleftflanktowardthereartoprotectitselffromanattackcomingfromOzerkiforest.Despite thiscounter the infantry,6thID,wasable tocaptureIasnaiaPolianaandreachedHoopoewoods.ThisSovietattackwasadelayingattempttoallow Soviet reserves to come up and block the panzers and Elefants from reaching Butyrki.Modelstillheldbackthe2ndPzD,4thPzD,9thPzDand18thPzDandwithouttheirsupporttheGermanadvance started slowingdownas theSoviet reserves reached the front.Elefantswerenewmobile assault gunswith thick hides but had no self-defense,which greatly reduced theirusefulness; with the withholding of four experienced panzer divisions, the combination wasalready causing theGerman advance to start slowing down.AtAleksandrovka,manyElefantswere damaged by Soviet infantry. bt82. dgk222m. dlu63m. fkk51+. dgk88. dgk87m. dgk92m.lck116m.kfz456+.pck39.Atnoontwoadditionalpanzerdivisions, the2ndPzDand9thPzD,werecalledupandlater

that afternoon struck thewest flankof the 15thRD, driving theSoviets further south.The eastflankofthe15thRDintheMaloarkhangelskareawashitbyanother60panzers,supportedbythe292ndIDof41stPzC.The292ndIDhadpenetratedthefirstdefensebelt,reachingOzerki,about

threemiles from their start line.Nowwith the help of the panzers, one regiment of 292nd IDcontinuedonandby2200hrstraveledanotherthreemilesreachingButyrki,whichhadbeentakenby theTigers earlier.The line in this 15thRD sectorwas being threatened butModel did notrespondquicklyenoughwithhispanzerdivisionsandRokossovskybroughtupreservesfirstandpluggedtheforminggap.Tothewest,LtGeneralWeidling’s86thIDencounteredminefieldsandheavyshellingfromthe5thArtilleryDivisionthatstoppedtheiradvance.Bytheendoftheday,the86thIDhadreachedOtschkiontheroadtoMaloarkhangelsk,sixmilesfromtheirstartlinebutthewholedivisionwasnowstalled.The41stPzConthisfirstdaypenetratedthefirstdefensivebeltbutwereonlyhalfwaytothesecondlinethatincludedtheimportanttownofPonyri.wdk173.dgk87m.dgr199m.snk19.pck39.lck116m.After repeatedassaults, the15thRDand81stRDof13thArmy’s eastern flankcontinued to

giveground;15TigerswereattheOkaRiverfiringastheymovedalongwiththelighterMkIVstobreakthroughtheSovietlineofinfantry.BynoonRokossovskycouldtellthemainassaultwaschanging from the Ponyri axis to further west at Olkhovatka, though the Ponyri axis remainedimportant.Hemovedup2ndTAand17thGRCintopositiontocountertheGermans’mainassaultareaatOlkhovatkaandtheweakerPonyriaxisaswell.Modelwasnowattackingalonga25milefrontagainstRokossovsky’sCentralFront.Aspartof2ndTA,19thTCand9thTCwerebroughtuptothelineaswell.ThreehundredplaneswerecurrentlysupportingtheGermanattackthoughModelwouldhave liked twice that number.TheGerman front in thenorthwouldbe about 31mileswidebytheendofthecampaign.Iftheopportunityarosethefollowingday,Rokossovskyhad given permission to 2nd TA and 17thGRC to attack in the area betweenOlkhovatka andPonyriII.The19thTCwouldattackSaburovkaandPodolianonly.Laterintheday,Rokossovskychangedhis assault to limitonlypartof2ndTA togoon theoffensive.The3rdTC,deployedalongthePolselaGoriannova-Gorodishcheline,wouldstaydefensive. je100.gjz181.fkk102m.dgr107.dgr112+*.dgk87m.dgr199m.kcz167.dgk92m.dgr199m.dgk88.pck39.To the east of 47th IC, the 6th ID supported by sPzAbt 505 under the command ofMajor

SauvantsmashedthroughadefensivescreenofT34sandpenetrated15thRD’srightflankheldby676th RR. By noon, the Germans captured the villages of Butyrki and Aleksandrovka andthreatened the neighboring 81stRDwith encirclement on its left flank.On the 81stRD’s rightflanknorthwestofPonyri,the41stPzCwithsupportofElefantswasdecimatingthatlineaswell.TheLuftwaffewasalsosupportingthe47thPzCinitsadvance.TheGermanswereusingB-IVstoclearminefields.Thesewere remotecontrolvehicles thatusuallycarried500poundbombsorsometimes 1,000 pound bombs and would drop them and move on before the device wasdetonated. A series of detonations would clear a lane for panzers and infantry to pass fairlyquickly.dgk89.snk107.lck251++lck255.dgk87m.dgr199m.dgk92m.lck116m.kfz457.The 15th RD and 81st RD were being pushed back at the Semenovka-Shirokoe-Boloto-

Saburovka line but then joined forceswith 132ndRDand 280thRDwhowere atBobrik andGnilets and together stopped theGerman attack. The 74thRDmoved up to Protasovo to helpclose thegapbetween the148thRDand81stRD.ThesesixSovietdivisionshadbeenpushedback but were now stiffening their resolve and were slowing the German advance. dgr112.dgr103m.dgr199m.NearBobrikthe20thPzD,withthehelpofengineersclearingmines,pushedforwardmaking

penetrations intoRokossovsky’s17thGRCnearOlkhovatka.Rokossovskyhadplacedhismainforce nearPonyri but theGermans swerved direction, heading towardOlkhovatka.TheSoviet16thTCand19thTChadtoquicklyredeploytomeetthenewthreat.Otherredeploymentsinthenorth involved moving more of the 17th GRC and 18th GRC eastward near Maloarkangelskwherethe23rdICwasmakingslowprogress.Onlylaterinthedaywhen41stPzCalsoengagedPonyri did theGermansmake progress;Rokossovsky had to contendwith that aswell. rc164.dgr198m.fkk102m.dgk87m.dgr199m.dgk92m.The46thPzCunderZornlaunchedasupportingattacktotherightofthemainstruggleledby

47th PzC along the Smitrovsk-Fatezh line. The 7th ID and 31st ID slowly advanced towardGnilets against132ndRDbut failed to reach it today.Elementsofbothdivisionsafter runningintoacloverfieldfounditwaslitteredwithmines.ClearingtheminestooktimeanddestroyedthemomentumtheGermanshad.ThemainobjectiveforthecorpswasreachingtheSvapaCreekline.Oncetheattackhadmadesomegainsthe12thPzDwouldcomeupbetweenthetwocorpstohelpsecuretheSvapaCreekareanearFatezh.Thecorpsalsohadthe102ndIDand258thID.Atthesametime,the41stPzCunderHarpeandconsistingofthe18thPzD,86thID,292ndIDwouldadvancealongbothsidesoftheOrel-Kurskhighway.TheSvapagenerallyraneast-westjustnorthof Samodurovka. dgk89. snk106. fkk104m. zzz101m. dgk87m. dgr199m. dgk92m. lck116m.pck36.At1400hrs,ModelescortedbyZornof46thPzCmoveduptothelinetoseehow7thIDand

31stIDonthewestflankof20thPzDweredoing.The46thPzCnotonlyhadtheresponsibilityofkeepingupwith47thPzC’s advance to the south, it also alwayshad toblock70thArmy fromattackingtheflankof47thPzC.ModelleftshortlyaftergivingZornalittlepeptalk.HisnextstopwouldbetheHQofFriessner’s23rdIConthefareasternflank.Arriving,Modelquicklylearnedthe78thADand216thIDdivisionshadalsostalledagainststiffresistance.snz230.The86thIDand292ndIDalongwiththe45FerdinandsofsPzAbt654breachedtheminefields

ofthefirstdefensebeltandtogetherwereabletomakesomeprogresssouthwards.Venturingtoofarfromtheinfantry,someoftheFerdinandsweredestroyedbyMolotovcocktailsanddemolitioncharges.TheSovietinfantrywouldhideintheirtrenchesuntiltheFerdinandshadpassedandthenwouldattackthemfromtherearwheretheyweremostvulnerable.Thesepanzerswouldoftenusetheirvaluable88shellstoshootdownroamingteamsofthesehumantankkillers.Insidethetankto save their shells, they would use their MGs shooting out the barrel to stop the attackers.mhz227+.dgk87m.wdk85.dgk92m.lck116m.WhenthedriveonMaloarchangelskslowed,ModelsentsPzAbt653withits45Ferdinandsto

the78thADinthehopesthatagapcouldopenup.Evenwiththeextrafirepowerthe18thGRC’sthree divisions held the line against theGerman onslaught.TheGermanswere able to capturesome of the fortified villages in front of the critical city. The Ferdinands left the village ofGlasunovkabutweresloweddramaticallybythemanyminefieldsthatledtoHill257whichwastheSovietlynchpinofthefirstdefensebelt.Rokossovskyhadpredictedthetwoimportantaxesofattack for the Germans would be through Olkhorvatka and Ponyri and built his defensesaccordingly.Tocombattheseelaboratedefenses,the78thADusingadozenSdKfz301remotecontrolexplosivecarrierstriedtoclearapathfortheFerdinandstomakeittothetopofHill257.By the end of the day only 12 of those 45 leading Ferdinands were still fighting. mhz221+.

dgk87m.dgr199m.wdk85.dgk92m.Where the remotecontrolexplosivecarrierswereclearingapath for theFerdinands,oneof

themwashitbyashellandexplodedcausingachainreaction,destroyingtwoothercarriersandaStuGIIIaswell.mhz225.dgk87m.dgk92m.At1630hrsModelarrivedbacktoseeHarpetofindoutiftheextrapanzersof101stPzR(18th

PzD)weremakingadifferenceinreachingOzerki.The508thGRstartedmovingagainbutstillwouldnotreachOzerkibynightfall.BeforeModelleft,Harpesuggestedthatthe51stPzGRand101stPzGRof18thPzDshouldbebroughtupduringthenightandbereadyatfirstlighttohelpthe6thIDand292ndID.The18thPzDhadveryfewtransporttrucksleftandtheinfantryattachedtothedivisionreallywerenotmobileandwouldbebettersuitedtosupportotherinfantry.Modelknewalreadythatextrasupportwouldbeneededinthissectoriftheseconddefensivebeltweretobepenetrated,butheheldoffgivingHarpeadecisionuntillaterthatnight.snz230.Bylateafternoon,theGerman86thIDhadreachedtheoutskirtsofPonyri.The86thwas then

joinedby the216thIDand78thADsand launchedanattackagainst theheavilydefendedroadleadingtoMaloarkhangelskfromPonyri.TheGermansmadeinitialgainsbuttheSoviet129thTBwasbroughtupandstoppedtheattack.Bytheendofday,47thPzCand41stPzChadpenetrated4–6milesintotheSovietdefensivebeltbutatgreatcost.The292ndIDcapturedOzerkiand86thID,bothfrom41stPzC,capturedOchki.dgk87m.dgr199m.nzk84.dgk92m.lck116m.Probablythelargestdogfightinthenorthernsalientoccurredintheearlyevening.Afteranhour

offiercefightingtorepulseGermanattacks,areported42SovietplaneswereshotdownwhileonlyacoupleGermanescortsweredestroyed.cbk40.dgk92m.Bylateintheafternoon,Modelstillhadthebulkoffivepanzerdivisionswaitingtoenterthe

battlefield.Itwasadecisionthatwouldbecontested.mhz229.dgk87m.dgk92m.At 1700 hrs, Model arrived at 47th PzC’s HQ to adjust Lemelsen’s attack orders for the

followingday.Modelcouldseetheresistancewasgreater thanexpectedandhewouldhavetoacceleratetheplan.HetoldLemelsentheentire9thPzDand2ndPzDwouldenterbattleinthemorning.snz231.WhileattachedtoGrossmann’s6thID,sPzAbt505capturedthetownofButyrkilateintheday

andwas threatening to unhinge the left flank of the 81stRDof 13thArmywhichwas alreadyunderpressurefromthe292ndIDofthe41stPzC.TheTigersandElefantsdrovethroughthe81stRD reachingAleksandrovka. During the battle, Soviet sappers plantedmoremines with greatsuccess,putting100vehiclesoutofaction.wwf50.dgk87m.dgk92m.lck116m.In the 47th PzC sector, the 20th PzD and 6th ID attacked with strong panzer support that

includedTigers and air support. TheGermans quickly penetrated the first defense belt and bynoonwasfightingfor theseconddefensebelt.By1900hrs, the132ndRDand280thRDweredefending the second defense belt southwest ofBobrik, sevenmiles south of theGerman startline.OneGermanregimentreachedSaburovka,eightmilessouthofthestartline.By2000hrstheSoviet rifledivisionsweresupportedby the167thGLARand206thGLARfromthe1stGAD.The 70th Army also released several tank regiments to the area. wdk173. dgr198m. dgk87m.dgr199m.dgk92m.lck116m.After being on the road all day,Model arrived at his ownHQ at 1900 hrs to discusswith

Elverfeldt,hisChiefofStaff,plansforthefollowingday.Modelactuallyhadmoreconfidencein

Harpe than Lemelsen but the master plan had the 47th PzC, the strongest in 9th Army, withprimary responsibilityof reachingOlkhovatka.WalterModeldecided to redirect allLuftwaffesupportdestinedfor41stPzCto47thPzCfor thenextday.Abreakthroughhadtohappensoonandthiswasthebestwaytoachieveit.ModelnevertoldFMGuntherKlugeofAGCofthemanychangesheinstitutedforthefollowingdaysoitwasnotsurprisingKlugecalleduplaterthatnightcomplaining that he learned about the changes from a corps commander. Model had beendiscouragedaboutthechancesforavictoryatKurskaftertheseveralpostponements,buthewasstilldeterminedtoreachKursk.Only the6thIDandthe292ndIDhadmadeit throughthefirstdefensive belt and were fighting toward the second belt by the end of the day but at last herealizeditwouldtakemorethanhisinfantrytoreachOlkhovatka.Itcouldalsobeseenbytheendofthefirstdaythat9thArmydidnothaveenoughtroopsorartillerytodefeattheSovietdefenses.Late in thedayModel did introduce segmentsof the20thPzDand the101stPzRof18thPzDalongwithsPzAbt656amongseveralotherGunBattalionsthatcontributedtotheapproximately500panzersandassaultgunsthathadbeenreleasedontothebattlefield,althoughonlyabout300panzers opened the assault. It could be argued that without better air support to speed theadvance,puttinganymorepanzers into theattackwouldhavecausedevengreater traffic jams,presenting theSovietAFwitheasy targets.Howeverwith judiciousplanningandallocationofarmor and anti-aircraft batteries that heightened risk should have been reduced to the arrivingarmor.ItisalsoarguedthatkeepingtheTigerandElefantbattalionstogetherinsteadofsplittingthemamong thedivisionsmighthaveprovidedamoreconcentratedattackalong the threemainaxes of Maloarkhangelisk, Ponyri and Olkhovatka and thus have delivered better results.snz231++.By theendof theday,manyfieldofficersbelievedModelwasmistaken touse just the20th

PzD, sPzAbt 505 and the Elefants for the initial attack. Kessel’s 20th PzD, fighting throughminefields,barbwireandtrencheshadmadeaboutfourorfivemilesbuttheadvancewasnarrowandnotveryconvincing.Thefrontwasnotheavilydefendedatfirstbutbythestartofthesecondday,Rokossovskyhad reinforced it. If theGermans hadmade it pass the first line on awiderfront,itwasbelievedOlkhovatkasectorcouldhavebeencapturedresultinginabetterchancetoreachKursk.fkk52.fkk102m.dgk87m.dgk92m.ItwasalmostdarkintheseconddefensezonenearPodsoborovka,whenthe27thGTRcounter-

attackedbutdidnotgetanywhere.While the27thGTRpaused torefitbeforeattacking,Modelhad sent panzers to the area in preparation for their next assault. The 27th GTR wasoverwhelmed.wdk173.fkk102m.dgk87m.dgk92m.dgk120.The17thGRCwasdelayedmovinguptothelinefor theoffensiveplannedfornextmorning

whentheLuftwaffestruckseveraltimesatthemovingformation.ItwasinpositioninthePonyriII, Kutyrki area and the Snovo, Samodurovka area by 2030 hrs despite the attacks. dgr113.dgk87m.dgr108m.dgr199m.dgk92m.AttheendofthedayRokossovskyknewhisforceshadsufferedheavycasualties.Afterdarkhe

traveledalongthe linegivingpraiseandencouragement tohismen.At thesametimethecorpscommandersof9thArmywerestayingup late, studyingmapsandendofday reports, trying tofigureoutawaytospeedtheiradvance.Model,knowingRokossaovsky’sabilities,plannedhisassault inacautiousmanner,notwanting to riskallhispanzersuntilhis infantryhadcreateda

gap.Bytheendoftheday,theGermancorpscommanderswerequestioningthatlogic,believingbrute forcewas theway to go andGeneralModelwas beginning to change hismind aswell.ModelcalledLemelsenandtoldhimtobringupthecomplete2ndPzD,9thPzDand18thPzDandinsert them in the Butyrki-Bobrik sector where the Soviets showed the greatest weakness.Rokossovskyhadbuiltanamazingdefensivesystemthatincludedtrenches,minefields,bunkers,MGnestsandwireentanglementsandevenwiththesethreepanzerdivisions,itwouldstillbeadifficulttasktoreachKursk.mjk85.pck43+.Bytheendoftheday,41stPzCwiththeaidoftheLuftwaffehadreachedthenorthernoutskirts

of Ponyri. Aerial reconnaissance also discoveredmajor formations of armormoving up fromLivnyareatoMaloarkhangelsk,PonyriandOlkhovatka.The120panzersof20thPzDof47thPzCbreached the front line of 29th RC by 0900, pushing the Soviets back and then capturing thevillage of Bobrik. It was stopped shortly afterwards, after arriving at the trench line of 17thGRC’s6thGRDwhichwasinsecondechelonandsupporting29thRC.Theskywasblackandvisionwaspoorfromthemanybombs,shellsandminesthatwereexplodingonbothsidesoftheline.pc41++.dgk86**+.dgr198m.fkk102m.dgk87m.dgr199m.dgk92m.InthenorthModel’s9thArmyadvancedsixmilesonanalmost25milefront.Startingwestof

Maloarchangelskin23rdICsector,theinfantrybreachedtheSoviet’sfirstlineofdefenseagainstthe15thGRDand81stRD.AfewotherdivisionstothewesthadreachedandwerefightingforpenetrationoftheseconddefensebutduringtheafternoonandthroughoutthenightSovietreservesweremovinguptobolsterthislineandstalltheattack.SeeMap1.gjz181.dgk92m.Ontheextremeleftflankofthesector,LtGeneralHocker’s258thIDandLtGeneralRappard’s

7thIDofGeneralZorn’s46thPzCadvancedtowardtheKursk-Orelhighway,theirfirstobjective,butwerestoppedafternearlytwodaysoftryingbythe280thRD.The7thIDonitsflankalsometstiffresistanceandwasstopped.Infrontofthisadvance,9thArmyartillerypoundedthe13thand70thArmiesandyettheSovietsheldtheline.Modelregroupedhisinfantryandsentthe20thPzDtoattackonanarrowerfrontagainstthe13thArmy’s15thRDwhichfinallyhadtofallbacktotheridge linewestofPonyri.With the15thRD fallingback, the right flankof70thArmybecameexposed.Themain thrustwouldnowbeon theTeploe-Olkhovatkaaxis.The23rd ICwasstilltasked with taking Maloarchangelsk but without a panzer division for support, it would beimpossible.bt82.dgk89.mhz220+.dgr198m.fkk102m.zzz101m.dgk87m.lck116m.dgk92m.Rokossovskyhadspentalotoftimeonthisdayplanningacounter-attackfornextmorningto

push theGermansoutof thepenetrationzone.Thiscounter-attackwasprematureanddisruptedtheirdefensesmore thanhelped.TheFrontcommandercorrectlydeduced that theattackonhiseasternflankwassecondaryandtheattackinthePonyri-Olkhovatkaareawastheprimaryactionandtookthepropercountermeasures.Ponyriwas30milesnortheastofKurskwhileOlkhovatkawas about 25 miles north of Kursk. dgk91. dgr112+. dgr108m. dgk87m. dgk92m. dgr199m.mjk84+.In the evening, Rokossovsky sent the 3rd TC of 2nd TA to defend the PolselaGoriannova-

Gorodishcheline.NextmorningfromthePonyriIIarea,itwastoattackalongwiththe16thTC,the11thTBincooperationwith17thGRCinthedirectionofStepandButryki,inordertoplugthebreachontheleftflankof13thArmy.Oncethosetwovillageswerecaptured,thisformationwouldjointhe19thTCandattackwestwardtowardSaburovkaandPodolian.Inadditiontothe

upcomingattack,the148thRD,74thRDand81stRDwerebroughtbacktothelinewiththerestof13thArmy.Rokossovskywasmakingsurethathislinewasstrongincasetheoffensivefailed.The19thTCwouldtakesomuchtimetopreparefortheattackthatitwouldbelatetolaunchnextmorningand,withoutconsulting,Rokossovskyabandonedtheattack.StepwaseastofBobrikandsouthofButyrki.SeeMap2.dgr113+.dgk116m.dgk87m.dgr199m.dgk92m.Luftflotte6wouldfly2,088sortiestodayinsupportof9thArmy’sassault.UnlikeHoth,Model

plannedonusingthebulkofhispanzerson7/6afterhisinfantrymadegapsinthelineandhewascounting on the Luftwaffe for another full day of coverage when more of his panzers weredeployed. The sPzAbt 505 and Elefant battalions were also on the line. The Soviet 16th AFstartedout slowbut by the afternoon it competedwith theLuftwaffe almost on an even basis.Tomorrowwouldbenodifferent.mhz220.dgk87m.dgk92m.By the end of the day the 23rd IC, though it advanced about five miles into the east flank

betweenthe13thand48thArmies,failedtorollupthesector.ModelwantedtotakethissectorfortheKurskrailroadranthroughitandalsotodisablethisflankandpreventitfromattacking47thPzConitsflankwhenitdrovesouththroughOlkhovatkaorPonyri.ThetheorywaslogicalbutModel, just likeHoth in thesouth,didnothaveenoughmentoaccomplishbothobjectives.dgr112.dgr108m.dgr198m.dgk87m.By theendof theday,Model’s forceshadbroken into the firstdefensivebeltat the junction

between70th and 13thArmies, creating a lodgment ninemileswide and fivemiles deep, justwestofPonyri.Modelhadlostmanypanzers,somesay200whichseemshigh,butmanyofthemwereretrievedatnightandrepaired.The46thPzC,47thPzCand41stPzCallcontributedtothecount.DuringthenightRokossovskysentreinforcementstothelineintheOlkhovatka-Ponyriareawhere it was obvious Model was using as his main spearhead sector and by next morningresistance had increased. This iswhereModelwentwrong.His first day’s assault forcewasinadequateanditcouldnotbreakthroughwhichgaveRokossovskytimetoreinforcethelineovernight.Bynextmorningthe line in thePonyri-Olkhovatkasectorwasstronger thanitwasonthefirstday.dgk91.snk107.dgr113.dgk87m.dgr199m.dgk92m.The47thPzCmadefivemilesthefirstdaybutitsflankswerebeingattackedanditwasbeing

seriouslythreatened.The23rdIConthe47th’seastflankwasfightingreservescomingupaswellas350planesattackingtheadvance.dgk87m.dgk92m.The9thArmygainedaboutsixmilesthatday.Itwouldturnoutthatitwasthebestdailygainin

the operation forModel and half of the total ground gained.One has towonderwhat kind ofprogress 9th Army could have made that day if more of the panzer divisions led the charge.Personally,myhunchisthatitwouldhavemadeabigdifferenceinreachingandcontrollingtheOlkhovatkaheightsbuttheSovietshadtoomanyreservesandwouldhavebeenabletostoptheGermans fromreachingKursk regardless. If theSovietshadhad to retakeOlkhovatka itwouldhave been horrifically expensive and probably would have impacted their planned counteroffensiveonthe12th.ModelallowedRokossovskytimetobringupheavyreinforcementsduringthenighttodegradethemomentumModelwastryingtogenerate.wdk174.dgk87m.dgk92m.By theendof theday,Modelhadoneof theworstdaysofhis career.Hismenandpanzers

were ravaged, with approximately 7,200 casualties and 60 panzers either destroyed or soseverely damaged itwould take a long time to repair them.Another 100 panzerswere lightly

damagedandwouldbequicklybackinthefield.OnereasonforsuchhighpanzerdamagecanbeattributedtothenewSovietPTABbomb.ThePTABwassortofahighvelocityclusterbombthatcouldcovera3,000squareyardareawithonebombloadfromanIL-2.Itisunimaginablewhattheseclusterbombscoulddototheinfantry.Modelcouldthankthe1stFliegerDivisionformuchof9thArmy’sgains.Thedivisonflewalmost2,100sortiesthatincludednearly650fromStukas,600frombombers,520fromfightersandtheremainderbymostlyreconandtransportplanes.TheRed Air Force flew just over 800 sorties. The 7,200 casualty figure represented 20% of thecombatstrengthof9thArmy.cbk40+.nzk77.dgk92m.snz242+.hsz106.Bytheendoftheday,the47thPzCand41stPzC,positionedinthemiddleofthelineadvanced

betweenfourtosixmilesbutwerestillfightingwithinthefirstdefensivebelt.wwf51.dgk92m.

D

6

July6thontheSouthernSalientSeeMap10

uring thepredawnhours the2ndVAbombed theGermanammodepotatTomarovkaaswellas reservesstationed there.Other targets includedBorisovkaandPushkarnogo.At

dawnanothersquadronbombedtheSSTKpositionsnorthwestofBelgorod.WithoutthepresenceofGermanplanes,theSovietshadaneasytimewiththemission.Afterahorrendousdaythedaybeforeandwiththenewdaystartingoutcloudy,MajorGeneralSeidemannallowedhispilotsanextrahourof rest.At0900hrswhenmostof4thPzA launched for theday, theLuftwaffe wasready to support. About 200 sorties targeted the 52ndGRD and 67thGRD again. The Sovietdivisionssufferedheavycasualties thepreviousdaybutwerestillgivingLAH and11thPzDatoughtime.Justwestof67thGRD,the6thTCwasgettinghithardfromasecondwaveofGermanplanes.ForthedaytheLuftwaffeflew1686sorties.cbk56.AspartofVatutin’sdeploymentadjustments,the35thGRCat0300hrsstartedmovingits93rd

GRD forward from behind Prokhorovka to the Petrovka-Oktiabrski-Pravorot line behind 69thArmy’s183rdRD.Theywereinplacebeforetheendoftheday.Theothertwodivisionsofthe35thGRC,the92ndGRDand94thGRDweresentto7thGAintheKorocharegiontostop3rdPzC.dgr78.hjj123m.dlu44+.At0300hrsintheIakovlevoareatheSoviet1stTA’s3rdMCand5thGTCaswellasthe51st

GRDwere locked in battlewith theLAH. TheGermans launched repeated attacks against theSovietswithmorethana100panzerswhenthe31stTCwith160tanksunderartilleryfirecameuptosupport.Inspiteofthereinforcements,by1100hrstheGermanshadfoughttheirwaypast,trying to cross the small Pena River. At which point additional tanks and additional artilleryjoinedthebattle.By1500hrstheSovietshadtowithdrawtotheirseconddefensebelt,allowingtheLAHfightingalongtheCherkasskoe-PokrovkaaxistocapturetheAlekseevkaandLukhaninoareas in which the second defense belt was situated. Even though it was afternoon, so muchsmoke,fireanddirtwasintheair it lookedlikedusk.Later thatafternoon, the1stGTBof3rdMCmovedupandengagedtheLAH,slowingitsadvance.Abattalionfromthe49thTB,whichwascurrentlyinreserve,wasalsobroughtuptohelp.The31stTCconsistedof237thTB,242ndTBand86thTB.jp149.dgr212+.dgr209m.lck265.vzz114.Germanpanzersofthe2ndSSPzCattackedtherightflankofVoronezhFront’s2ndGTCwest

oftheLipovyDonetsslowlyforcingthembackduringanalldaybattle.ThroughoutthedaySovietfighterswouldfly in todisrupt thepanzersbut theLuftwaffewasquick to respond,bringing intheirown fighters and theSoviet aerial assaultwasmutedeach time.Thebiggest aerial battleoverthe2ndGTCoccurredtowarddusk.Bf-109sshotdownmanyIL-2sbutanaccuratecountis

not forthcoming from theGerman side. Soviet records show59 planeswere shot down in thesectorthatday.At2300hrs,the5thGTCwasbroughtuptoassistthe2ndGTCfromfallingbackanyfurther.WhiletheextratanksslowedtheGermans,itdidnotstoptheiradvance.cbk57.In4thPzAsectortherecentlyarrivedforcesofthe6thGAinclude51stGRD,89thGRDand

90thGRDweremovedupclosertothefrontline.The89thGRDwouldbedeployedbehind90thGRD.vzz108.dgk108.The6thPzGRofSSTK launched near daybreak, around 0400 hrs, towardHill 225.9which

overlookedtheBelgorod,Iakovlevo,Oboyanhighway.TheGermansintendedtotakethehillandthen cut off the escape route going east from Erik. Launching from the hill, SSTK was alsoplanningtoattack375thRDwhichwasguardingtheLipovyiDonetspassageto3rdPzC.ThehillandtheimportantroadwereheavilydefendedfromthewoodsnearbyinthedirectionofGonkiwhichwasattackedat thesame timeby5thPzGR.Tomake thingsworse for theGermans, theLuftwaffewasnotavailabletolendahanduntillater.Itwouldnotbeaneasyengagement.Hill225.9,nearbyHill198.3,thewoods,GonkiandErikallfellthatafternoonwhichlimitedaccesstotheriverfortheSovietswhowerepullingback.Atthissametime,GeneralHausserorderedPriess to senda recongroupnorth towardLuchkiSouth to linkupwithDasReichwhichwascurrently engagedwith 2ndTCwhich had crossed theLipovyi to join battle. gnk130. kuz194.ztc269.As dawn broke in LAH sector, the 1st PzGR was fighting for control of the hills south of

Iakovlevo.The2ndPzGRwasdefendingagainstacounter-attackforcontrolofOlkhovka,westofKozmo-Demianovka,andthe315GRof167thID,whichwasstillattachedtoLAH,wasfightingin the ravinesouthofBykovka. In theafternoon the315GRwould return to the167th ID.TheSovietsweretryingtoreclaimgroundlostthepreviousday.zrl216.The Tigers attached to SSTK led the charge for Hill 225.9. The panzers ran over wire

entanglements as theywere shooting atMGnests and larger bunkers in front of thehill.Otherpanzersandthengrenadierswerefollowing.EventuallytheStukasshowedandbombedthetopofthehill,causingmuchdestructiontothedefensesandthedug-intanks.By0630hrsthehillwasinGerman hands. After taking the hill the Tigers moved south in the direction of Shopino andTernovkawhichweretheprimarysiteswheretheSovietswerecrossingtheLipovyiDonets.The96thTBandthe496thARwereprotectingthecrossingsandstartedfiringontheTigerswiththeirPakswhenthetankswereinrange.By1700hrsafterahardstruggle,theSSTKwasfightingonthe edge of Shopino limits. Soviets in the sector came to help the Shopino garrison but theGermanartillerywastoostrongandtheirattemptsfailed.Additional tankswerecomingacrossthe river and the SSTK was being threatened near Smorodino until the German artillery wasredirected,stoppingtheSovietadvance.gnk130.gnk140+.gnk69m.ztc269.On the southern flank ofSSTK, theEicke Regimentwas advancing toward Erikwhichwas

southwestofHill 225.9.Knowing thatSSTKwas closing inon the sector, thegarrison atErikevacuatedsoutheasttowardShopino.Erikwascapturedfairlyquicklydespitetheinterventionofelements of 2ndGTCwhichwere arriving in sector andEicke Regiment started to secure thesurroundingarea.gnk140.TheSSTK resumed its advance against 375thRDwhichwasdefendingVisloe,Shopino and

ErikwhichwereonthewestbankoftheLipovyiDonets.TheGermansweretryingtosqueezethe

375thRDbetweenthe2ndSSPzCandthe3rdPzC.The275thRD’sleftflankhadtofallbackalittlebeforeitshattered.vzz115+.dgr80+.dgr155m.dgr173m.dgr280m.Other elements of SSTK pushed Govorunrnko’s 375th RD back as it headed east toward

Shopino,TernovkaandtheLipovyiRivertolinkupwithKempf.The375thRD,alongwithMajGeneralLebedev’s96thTB,wasable torepulse theattack.Thisdefeatontheperimeterof thebattlefieldwouldweighheavilyagainst theGermansin thedays tocome;without linkingup, itwouldslowKempf’sprogressaswell.dgk111.wdk129.dgk222m.dlu63m.dgr155m.dgr173m.By 0400 hrs, the 2nd SS PzCmarched due north against the 6thGA’s 52ndGRDwith 250

panzers and assault guns, while elements of the LAH’s left flank advanced up the main roadtowardBykovka.The167thID’s315GRwasonitsleftflankandDasReichontherightheadedforBerezovandGremuchi.TheLAHsmashedthroughthelineofthe151stGRRandheadedforBykovka.TheLAHfoughtitswayintothetownbutlost33panzers,includingsomeTigers,doingso.TheGermans lostsomanypanzersbecause the5thGuardsMortarRegimenthaddepressedtheirrocketsallthewaytofireontheincomingpanzersbutthepanzershaddestroyed21ofthe24launchersandhalfoftheregiment.At1610hoursBykovkafelltothe2ndSSPzGRwhichthensentareconpatroltocrossthePselRiverbynightfall.By1800hrsthe2ndSSPzGRcapturedKozma-Demitankovkaandwaswithin strikingdistanceof thekeyobjectivePokrovka.dgk99+.dgk109*.dgk106m.The2ndSSPzCbeganshiftingitsaxisfromOboyantowardProkhorovkaleavingitsintended

routefromIakovlevotoSyrtsevotheresponsibilityofthe48thPzCandtothecaptureofOboyanall on its own. The 2nd SS PzC had already engaged the 51st GRD just south of Iakovlevo,quicklyforcingittofallbacksufferingheavycasualties.Meanwhile,the11thPzDandGDwerestraddlingtheButovo-IakovlevoroadintheregionofOlkhovkaandDubrovainordertolinkupwith the 167th ID’s 315GR thatwas guarding 2ndSSPzC’s left flank. If thismove could beaccomplished quickly, therewas a good chance of encircling the 67thGRD and 52ndGRD’s153rd RR in the Novo Cherkasskoe-Trirechnoe-Dragunskoe-Veselyi region. The 2nd SS PzCwouldbekeepingthe51stGRDtoobusytocometotheaidofthesedivisionswhiletheSSTK,tryingtoforceColGovorunenko’s375thRDacrosstheLipovyiDonetsintheregionofVisloe,ShopinoandErik,wouldbeblockingtheirwayfromhelpingtheencircled.DubrovawaseastofLukhanino on the southern banks of the Lukhanino River. vzz115. vzz118. vzz2m. dgk101+.dgr155m.dgr173m.dgr280m.nzk87.By earlymorning the 5thGTChad arrived in its assigned area:Teterevino,Ozerovski, two

milesnortheast ofLuchkiSouth, to support the6thGMRBagainst the advancingSSdivisions.The21stGTBandthe48thTRalsodeployedintheOzerovskiareatotheleftoftheeastflankof3rd MC. The 2nd GTC was on the other side closest to the Lipovyi Donets River. vzz125.vzz121+.dgk109.Kravchenko’s 5thGTC,which justmoved up, counter-attacked the advancingDas Reich in

supportof51stGRDsouthofIakovlevobutwereforcedtowithdrawwithheavylosses.The51stGRDalsowithdrewwiththetanks.Nexttothe51st,the3rdMC’s1stGTBclungtothefortifiedtownsofPokrovkaandBolshieMaiachkiagainsttheSSPzC’sleftflank.dgk109.Krivoshein’s 3rdMCwas defending the critical Butovo-Dubrova road, theBelgorod-Kursk

road and the fortified villages in the Lukhanino, Dubrova and Iakovlevo area, as well as

indirectlydefendingSyrtsevoas theGermanswouldbecoming thatway.German troopsof the2ndSSPzCthatweremovingupwouldpassthroughtheIakovlevosectoralso,sothe3rdMChadlargeresponsibilities.vzz117+.dgr212.lck265.Atdaybreakelementsof theSSTK launchedanattack toward thevillagesofNepkhaevoand

Sashenkovo,tryingonceagaintoforceacrossingoftheLipovyiDonetsandtoscreentherestof2ndSSPzC’seastside.At0900hrsafterabitterfight,theSSTKcapturedthetwovillagesfromthe155thGRRof52ndGRD.Burdeiny’s2ndGTCwasmoving into theareaandwould try totakethevillagesback.vzz127.dgk100+.dgk111.TheSovietlinehaddecidedlystiffenedfromtheredeploymentofKatukov’s1stTAduringthe

pre dawn hours to forward positions along the line running from the villages of Melovoe,eastwardthroughSyrtrsevoandontoIakovlevo.Thislinewasalreadydefendedbythe6thGAbutVatutinwanted it stronger to stop theGermanshere at the seconddefensebelt.VatutinhadevensentKravchenko’s190tanksof5thGTCtothislinetobeaddedwithKatukov’s525T34sand109T70s.Burdeiny’s2ndGTCwassentforwardtooccupypositionsnearGostishchevotothe east of theLipovyiDonetsRiver.The right flankof 2ndSSPzCwould be heading in thisdirectionandBurdeinyjustbeatthemtothisareaonlybyhours.ThiswasanextremelyluckyturnfortheSovietsbecausethechancesofSSTKcrossingtheriverwithouttheblockingpresenceof2ndGTCwas high and if theSSTK crossed the river, itwould have hadmajor impact on thedefensesof69thArmyandacorrespondingbeneficialeffecton3rdPzC.Vatutinhadoriginallyplanned a counter-attack for today but the German drive the previous day was so strong herescinded the attack for these defensive actions. Vatutin, though wanting a major counteroffensive,approvedtheselocalattacksinordertoslowtheGermanadvanceandallowhisforcestopreparebetterdefenses.mhz230.vzz3m.cbk56.vzz5m.HothhadbegunhisassaultwithTigersand/orPanthersintheleadandwiththeIIIsandIVsin

therearandhewouldcontinuethispracticethroughoutthecampaign.Thismaneuvernullifiedtheadvantage of theTiger’s longer range gun and put these valuableweapons at themercy of thestrong anti-tank defenses of the Soviets. The 48th PzC and 2nd SS PzC were moving alongconvergingroadsthroughPokrovkaandleadingtoOboyan.Chistiakov’s6thGAwouldtakethebruntof thesetwocorps.Thepanzersweretocross thePselandestablishabridgeheadbytheendofthedaybutgrosslyfailedtoachievethisobjective.dgk94*.dgk106m.Although losing some 15 panzers the previous day, the 2nd SS PzCwas fielding a greater

numberofpanzersonthebattlefieldonthisdayduetotherepairshopsreturningpanzerstothefield.AdvancingalonganarrowfrontageofsixmilesthatlaybetweentheriversVorsklaandtheLipovyiDonets,theLAHandDasReichbithardintotheSovietdefenses.Thekeyobjectivesforthedayweretosecureanumberofkeyheights.LAHassaultedHill243.2heldby1stGTBand51stGRDtotheeastofIakovlevo,akeyroadjunction,inabidtooutflanktheheavilyfortifiedvillage.Withthesupportofartillery,theLAHadvancedtowardthehillinfourcolumnsmarchingacrosstheChapaev-ShepelovkaareawhereKatukov’sartillerybeganshellingthem.Evenagainsttheheavyshelling,1stPzGRofLAHcapturedHill243.2by1130hrs.The2ndPzGRwasthencalleduptoassembleonnearbyHill232.0beforemovingout.TheDerFührerRegimenthadthelead to take this hill but got hit by heavy shelling which slowed their advance making itimpossiblefortheregimenttoreachthehill.TheywereredirectedtowardLuchkiSouth.Thishill

andHill246.3weresurroundedbyopengroundandwereanidealattackrouteforthepanzers.TothewestandeastofthisareayouhadtheswampsoftheVorsklaorLipovyiDonetsRivers.Atthispointit isestimatedthatthe2ndSSPzC,withtheattachedTigers,had334panzersand44assaultguns.Of these, theLAH had99andDasReichhad121whileSSTK had just over 100panzers.Shepelovkawaslocatedontheeasternbankof thePenaRiveraboutmidwaybetweenZavidovkaandLukhaninoandwasamilenorthofthetwinvillagesofKrasnoeandAlekseevka.mhz232.dgr209m.vzz120+.zrl216.zow143.Maj General Tavartkiladze’s 51st GRD was defending the sector that included Solonets,

Iakovlevo, Luchki South, Teterevino South,Malinovka aswell asHill 229.4,Hill 226.0,Hill243.2,Hill246.3andNekhaevka.Thesectorhadafrontoftenmiles,longerthannormal,butitdidhavethe52ndGRDsupportingitandrightbehindthesetwodivisionswereanumberoftankbrigadesthathadmoveduptotheseconddefensivebeltduringthepredawnhours.WithinthistenmilerangetherewereonlyanumberofareasthatcouldsupportpanzertravelandTavarkliadze,gambling,deployedmostofhistroopsintheselikelyspots.The51stGRDstartedthecampaignwithnearly11,000butithadquicklyfallentounder9,000men.Asexpected,LAHandDasReichwereassemblingover100panzersfortheassaultonthe51stGRDonafourmilefrontwheretheterrain was relatively flat. That optimal sector that would take the SS through Iakovlevo andSolonetswasdefendedbyLtColSushkov’s154thGRRandwhentheGermansplowedthroughthissector,the154thGRRwouldsufferheavycasualties.TheWerferRegiment,usingtheirrocketlaunchers,hitHill243.2andHill246.3beforeLAH launched theirattack.DasReichwas latearrivingandcouldonlylaunchasmallportionofthedivisionagainsttherightflankofHill246.3.DasReichwasreallyneededforthisdifficultoperationand,withthebulkoftheattackfallingonLAH,itcostthemheavily.TheGermansmadethreeunsuccessfulattacksbeforepullingbackandlettingtheirartillerysoftenuptheSovietline.Then150Stukascameinanddroppedtheirloadsontheposition.Aroundnoonthe2ndSSPzClaunchedanotherattackfromKozmo-Demianovkatoward the hills which failed also. An hour later the Germans shifted direction a little andattackedLuchkiSouth.By1500hrs,LuchkiSouth andNekhaevkawere inGermanhands.The51stGRDhadtowithdrawtothenorthwest.Hill210.7,closertoTeterevino,wasstilldefendedbythe158thGRR.vzz118+.vzz6m+.Thepreviousday,the51stGRDhadmovedsouthfromtheseconddefensebeltinordertoslow

the2ndSSPzCafterpenetratingthefirstline.Earlyonthisday,whilestillpreparingdefenses,theLAHandDasReichresumeditsattackthroughtheseconddefensivebelt.wdk129.OntheeastbankoftheLipovyiDonets,thewesttributaryoftheDonets,the155thRRof52nd

GRD and elements of the 2ndGTCwere holding a defensive position againstDas Reich andSSTK.Tothesouthalongthe(Novi)LipovyiDonets,the375thRD,496thTDRandthe96thTBwere defending Shopino and Ternovka against the south flank of the SSTK, straddling theBelgorod-Kursk road. After dark, the Soviets countered with infantry riding on T34s but theattackfailedandtheSovietssufferedheavydamage.wdk129+.dgk222m.dlu63m.fkk135.At0730hrsthe1stPzGRofLAH,supportedbythe55thWerferRegiment,attackedtowardHill

243.2(westofHill246.3andLuchkiSouthbuteastofIaklovlevo)butwererepulsedbyheavyartilleryfire.HeavyGermanartillerycounteredtheSovietsandbynightfallDasReichmoveduptoassistincapturingHill243.2andclearingtheroadtoLuchkiSouth.Panzersmovedthroughand

started driving toward Prokhorovka. From Pokrovka to Bolshie Maiachki, the 3rd MC withsupportfromthe51stGRDcountered,tryingtoblocktheGermans.ToslowtheGermans,SovietaircraftandartilleryfiredontheGermancolumntogivetimefor the6thGAand69thArmytoreachProkhorovka.TheSoviet attempts slowedbut did not stop theGerman advance. rkz167.dgr209m.vzz2m.vzz3m.lck266.gnk114.gnk112m+.zrl216.Though busy in the western sector, Siedemann diverted part of the 8th Flieger Corps of

Luftflotte4totheeastwhenKempfsignaledadesperaterequestforairsupport.Withnotenoughplanesorfuel,theLuftwaffecouldnothandletheneedsofallthegroundforcesatthesametime.When the planes went east, the support in the west declined, especially in 48th PzC sector,allowingSovietfighterstotemporarilytakecontroloftheskiesinthewestandknockingdowntenaircraftinashortperiodoftime.cbk56.Afteranartillerypreparation,theLAHattackedandquicklytoreatwomilegapinthelinein

the 51stGRD sector thatwould eventually lead toward Prokhorovka. By 0945 hrs,LAH wasorderedtoHill243.2toassistDasReichwhichwashavingtroubleinreachingitfromtheeast.Nearby,the2ndGTCsentatankcompanytothelineHill243.2–Hill246.3totrytoplugthegapand another tank company to the line Petrovski-Nekhaevka. With the threat of the 2nd GTCmoving in from the river,Das Reich leftHill 243.2 toLAH,moved east and focused onHill246.3,LuchkiSouthand the6thGMRBof5thGTCand thesupporting2ndGTCdefending thearea.Thedefendersputupstiffresistancebutwereoverwhelmedandhadtoscatter.DasReichdidnotstop toclear thevillageandmovedon towardKalininwhereKravchenko’s5thGTC’sHQwaslocated.ThestaffhadtoquicklyretreattoIasnaiaPolianawhenGermanpanzerswereseensuddenlyapproachingthetown.TheGermanpressurewastoomuchandthegarrisonsoonfollowed.WhenVatutinheardofthisbreakthrough,heorderedthe1stTA,2ndGTCand5thGTCtocounter-attackimmediatelybuteventsdidnotturnoutthewayVatutinplanned,fortheGermansweremovingtooquickandtheSovietshadtostaydefensive.Hill243.2waseastofIakovlevowhileHill246.3wasjustsoutheastofthefortifiedtownofLuchkiSouth.SeeMap23.vzz121*+.vzz125.vzz7m.gnk114+.agk99+.kcz168.dgk106m.dgr209m.TheleadingcombatgroupofLAHresumeditsadvancenorthwardfromTeterevinoSouthand

by 0900 hrs had reached the anti-tank ditches in front of Hill 258.2 and along the road toProkhorovka, southwest of the Komsomolets State Farm, when they were ambushed by manyT34sof5thGTC.DasReich,totherightofLAHandlittlebehindit,wasalsolaterattackedby2ndGTC.Theattackswererepulsedandby1000hrs,LAHhadcapturedLuchkiNorthandonitswesternflankwasnowapproachingthevillageofPokrovkawhileDasReichcontinuedtotrytoliquidateanumberoftanksfrom5thGTCthatwerepocketed.Despitebothdivisionsadvancingtheywere constantlydefending their flankswhichdid slow themdown.By the endof theday,LAH reported to Hausser that 75 tanks were destroyed and 123 POWs captured. LAH alsoreported84dead,384woundedand19missing.The285thRRof183rdRDwasdefendingHill258.2.SeeMap10.fkk136.vzz3m.vzz8m.vzz130.nzk87.zrl217.The 2nd PzGR ofLAH was ordered tomarch to Luchki North and secure it. The regiment

wouldthenscreentherestofthedivisionasitmovedfurthernorthaswell.wwf85.Withalltherecentrains,theroadswerestillverybadandDasReichwasbehindschedulein

starting itsattackat thescheduled0730hrs.At0930hrsDasReich resumed itsattackonHill

246.3whichwas situatedon the outer edgeof the seconddefense belt.The assault of the hillwouldbeledbySchulze’sDerFührerRegiment.AsDerFührerwasadvancingtowardthehill,artillerypounded theground to thenorthof it, softening the resistance.Onceapenetrationwasmade, additional forceswould come in to add support.The first attackwas repulsedbut afterStukas bombed the front line, a second attack was successful. At this point Kruger orderedReitzenstein’s panzers to move out and exploit the gap at Hill 246.3. Once over the hill, thepanzersshifteddirectionandheadedforLuchkiSouth.By1400hrs,theleadpanzershadreachedHill232.0andwerelessthanamilefromtheirobjective.Whilethepanzersweretravelingthelongwayaround the town, theGrenadiers took thedirect route.DespitebeingattackedatHill232.0,theybothattackedthetownontimeandby1500hrs,LuchkiSouthwasinGermanhands.ThereissomeconfusionabouttheHilldesignation.Onesourcecallsit232.0andanothersourcecallsit232.6.gnk124.vzz3m.As theLAHwas advancingnorthward,Tigers from13thCompanywere approachingLuchki

Southwhentheywerefiredonbyabatteryof15cmguns.Takingevasivemeasures,WittmannandhisfourfellowTigersmovedinonthebiggunsandwereabletosilencethemwithoutlosingaman. Once past the destroyed guns, the Tigers entered Luchki andwere ambushed bywaitingtanks.Kleber’s leadTigerwashitandcouldnotmove;WittmannandWarmbrunnmovedup toprotectKleberwhileherepairedhistrack,andtofireontheenemytanks.Fourassaultgunsweredestroyed.Withoutpausing,thefiveTigersmovedontowardLuchkiNorth,acouplemilesaway.Thistimethecompanywasnotsolucky.ApproachingLuchkiNorth,theTigerswereambushedbyhiddenKV1s.TheleadTigerwashithard,eruptingintoflames.Thecrewjumpedoutandwererunningforcoverbutwerekilledbymachinegunfire.The remainingfourTigerswereable tomoveinandtakeoutthetwoheavytanks.fzk307+.Ithadrainedduringthenightandbysunrise theroadswerestillmuddybutby1030hrs, the

Sovietsweremoving.Supportedby30tanks,theyattackedLAHnearNasianaPolianabutwererepulsed.LAHwasalsoattackednorthwestofTeterevino.DasReichsentabattalionofpanzersuptoassistLAHinrepulsingtheattack.fkk134.VatutinhadalreadyformulatedGermanintentions.TheOboyanroutewouldbeprimaryandit

wouldbeattackedinatwopincerformationusing48thPzCtakingthewesternrouteandthe2ndSSPzCtakingtheeasternroute.TheGermans,ontheirwaytoOboyan,wouldtrytoencircleasmuchof1stTAand6thGAanddestroy.Inordertopreventthisfromhappening,Vatutinbroughtup tank reserves.The1stTAwouldnowdefend theMelovoe-Syrtsevo-Iakovlevosectorwhilethe5thGTCwouldhave the Iakovlevo-Nekhaevka-Teterevinoarea.The2ndGTCwouldhavetheRozhdestvenka-Druzhnyi line.Rifledivisions from6thGAand69thArmywerealsobeingmoved up. Druzhnyi, on the eastern bank of the Lipovyi Donets River, was south ofRozhdestvenka,notfarfromGostishchevo.dgr78+.dgr76m+.AftertakingHill243.2,the2ndPzGRofLAHmovedalongtheeastbankoftheVorsklaRiver

trying to recon the area. The 1st PzGR spotted the Soviets falling back toward theOlkhovka-Dragunskoe area as they headed north. The next fewmiles the Germans wouldmove quicklyagainstlightresistance.Panzers,whichincludedafewTigersintheleadandmotorizedinfantry,were immediatelyordered to fill thevacuumof the retreatingSoviets.Before long theGermanconvoysaw tanks,about40, fromMajorGeneralKravchenko’s5thGTCmoving toward them.

Tigersopenedupanddestroyedtheleadingtanksbuttheystillkeptcoming,allthewhileSovietguns kept firing on the panzers from a nearby hill. TheTigers kept firing and theT34s had toreversecourseandheadeastornortheast toavoidbeingdestroyed.TherangeadvantageoftheTigerswashardtoovercome.gnk115+.gnk112m+.vzz6m.On the way to Luchki, Wittmann and his fellow Tigers were accidently strafed by the

Luftwaffe.Wittmann,thinkingfast,openedhishatchandbroughtouthisNaziflag,placingitontopoftheenginecompartmenttostopanyfurthercollateraldamage.agk102.At1130hrs,theLAHandDasReichresumedtheirattackalongtheIakovlevolineandfound

little resistance in 51st GRDwhichwas already falling back intoDubrova, a key part of theseconddefensebelt.Thegap thatwascreatedbetween51stGRDand52ndGRDwasquicklyfilledinbyelementsof31stTCandthe1stTBofthe3rdMC,northofIakovlevo.DasReichwasalsoattackedbythe230thTReastofIaklovlevobutbothattackswereuncoordinatedandwererepulsed.TheSovietsattemptedacounterbutitwasrepulsed.The100thTBof31stTCmoveduptoBolshieMaiachkibehindthe52ndGRD.By1400hrs,DasReichwasstillstalledatLuchkiSouthby5thGTCusingChurchilltanks.DasReichfellback,regroupedandattackedagaininlateafternoon.Atthesametimethe2ndGTC,supportedbythe48thGTReastofLuchki,alsoattackedDasReich ‘ssouthernflankand thenorthflankofSSTK,and together theSovietsstoppedDasReich’sadvanceonthewestbankofLipovyiDonetsRiver.AfterdarkDasReich’sleftflankwasabletomoveanothermilenorthofIakovlevoagainst5thGTC.AtmidnightDasReich stoppedforthedayandwentdefensive.Laterthatday,northofIakovlevo,DasReicheventuallymetupwiththe122ndGARof5thGTC.AbattleensuedbutKrugerdidnotwanttofightsolateandhadhis forcesmovebackfor thenight.Theenemywouldstillbe there in themorningandhismenwouldbemorerestedfor thefight.Hewouldalsohavetimetomoveartilleryupcloser to thelinetoassistwhenthebattlewasrenewed.wdk129.dgr212.dgk222m.dlu63m.After failing in taking Iakovlevo, LAH regrouped and after a 90 minute barrage launched

another attack by 1130 hrs on the village. Repeated attempts failed but by nextmorningLAHfinallyforcedthedefendersoutoftown.Iakovlevowastheboundarylinebetween3rdMCand5thGTC.The1stGTBof3rdMCwashitthehardestbutstillheldthelinewhileotherelementsfellback,allowingthetowntobeentered.The49thTBwouldbesentafterdarktobolsterthelinewith 1stGTB.At 1430 hrs theGermans advancing along theCherkasskoe-Pokrovka axissucceededincapturingAlekseevkaandLukhaninowhichwerealsodefendedbythe3rdMC.The10thMBhadputupfierceresistanceandtheGermanshadtocallintheLuftwaffeforassistancebeforetheSovietsstartedpullingback.FromtheOlkhovkaarea,theGermansrepeatedlyattackedthe1stMBbutfailedeachtime.OlkhovkawassouthwestofIakovlevoandnorthwestofVorsklasituatedontheeastbankofatributaryoftheVorsklaRiver.dgr80.dgr212+.vzz2m.dgk108.TheonlyforceofVatutin’s thatwasable toattackasoriginallyplannedwasBurdeiny’s2nd

GTC.The2ndGTC’s200tanksmovedintotheGostishchevoarea,eastoftheLipovyiRiverandprepared to attack 2nd SS PzC when it arrived. The other units who were to attack foundthemselvesindefensiveroles.dgk102+.vzz3m.vzz5m.DasReichwasnotonlybusyattackingnorthward;itseasternflankwasstrugglingtoholdits

lineagainstrepeatedattacksfromthe155thGRRof52ndGRDandelementsof2ndGTCalongtheLipovyiDonetsRiver.Southof52ndGRD,the375thRD,496thTDRandthe96thTBwere

tryingtoblockSSTKfromenteringShopinoandTernovka,alittlefurthersouth.wdk130.dgr76m.dgr86m.dgr93m.TheLAH thenattacked10thMBof3rdMCbut the tankersabsorbedfourattacksfrommany

panzers aswell as air attacks. At the same time the 1stMB held back eight attacks from theGermansadvancingtowardOlkhovka.TheGermans,havinglostmanypanzers,eventuallypulledbacktoregroup.Leavingasmallscreenthere,theLAHshifteddirectionandattacked5thGTConits flank and by 1800 hrs captured Luchki South, driving the tankers back to the north andnortheast.Beforestoppingfor thenight, theLAHalsocapturedKalininandOzerovskiandwasthreatening to split the boundary line between 1st TA and 5thGTC.After hearing Luchki hadfallen, Vatutin ordered at 2050 hrs the 31st TC to deploy into the Krasnaia Poliana area. Tostrengthen the 31st TC, the 29th Anti-tank Brigade was attached. dgr213 dgr209m. vzz116.dgk108.The 2nd SS PzC was ordered to complete capturing the second defense belt. As the LAH

headednorthitwasslowedbyintensefirenearIakovlevoontheOboyanhighwaybythe3rdMCof1stTA.Aftertenhoursoffightingwithouttakingthevillage,elementsoftheLAHandGDoneithersideofthevillagewentaroundandheadedinthedirectionofLuchkiSouthandTeterevinoSo. A little later Iakovlevo also fell. Katukov quickly responded by sending ColMorgunov’s200thTBof6thTC,29thAnti-tankBrigadeandpartof31stTCtoblocktheGermansnortheastofIakovlevo, while all of 5th GTC prepared to attack at Teterevino. Before the 5th GTC couldattack,LAHwasabletopushthe200thTBand31stTCbacktothenorthofthetowninsomeoftheworst trenchwarfareof thecampaign, finallysecuringTeterevinobynightfall,around1700hrs.Theinfantryofthe183rdRDweredefendingthelinebetweenTeterevinoandIasnaiaPolianabeforebeingevacuatedfromtheirtrenches.Ithadbeenrainingandthetrencheshaddeepwaterinthem.Nearby, theDas Reich was assaulting the railroad embankment at Belenikhino. Despitesuffering heavy casualties, Commander Kruger captured the railroad section. fkk82+. fkk133.lck274.wwf85.gnk113m.dgk129.By1200hrs,Vatutin sentorders to1stTAand6thGA toattacknextmorning.TheGermans

advanced too far in the afternoon and Vatutin had to cancel the offensive with orders to staydefensive.Bytheendoftheday,allreservesofVoronezhFronthadbeencommittedtotheseconddefensebelt.dgr82.On two hills near Iakovlevo, about 1,100 yards apart, 1st TA andLAH were firing at each

other.After an hour of shelling, twelveT34swere in flames; they could not competewith thethickskinsandlonggunsoftheTigers.Withacrisisbuildingthe5thGTCwasmovedfromthenortheastintoanareajusteastoftheDonetsRiverintheProkhorovkaarea.wwf83++.WhileLAHandDasReichweredrivingnorth,alargecontingencyofSSTKwerefightingoff

repeatedattackson the flanksby2ndGTCand96thTB.LeadingelementsofSSTK initiated asmallbreakintheSovietlineandpenetratedtoIakhontovo.TheGermanengineers,whileunderfire,werebusyclearingminesfortheTigerstoproceed.BynightfalltheSSTKhadcrossed theimportantKursk-Belgorodrailline.TheSSTKwasnowonlytwelvemilesfromthesouthernbendofthePselRiverbutitwasconcerningHausserthatsomanyforcesoftheSSTKwerebeingusedontheflanksandnotforthedrivenorth.Bytheendoftheday,the167thIDwasstilltieddownhelping 11th PzD from its predicament and unable to take over flank protection as it was

originallytasked.mhz233.cbk57.gnk113m.TheLAHandDasReichweregainingground in themiddleof theirsector.By1200hrs, the

DerFührerRegimentofDasReichhadcapturedLuchkiSouth,drivingthe6thGAback.TheLAHwasevenfurthernorththanDasReichandhadtraveled20milessincethepreviousday,butnowthesedivisionswereengagingwithtanksofthe1stTAandtheiradvancewouldslow.LAH’sfirstencounterwith1stTAwasnearIakovlevobetweentwohilltops.wwf83.TheDasReichof2ndSSPzChadenteredthevillageofLuchkiSouthby1200hrs,12milesin

fromtheirfirstdefensebeltinthe6thGAsector.The5thGTCmadeseveralcounter-attacksbutwererepulsedeachtime.Otherdeploymentswerebeingmadeaswell.The49thTBwasmovingtoPokrovkawhile31stTCwasonitswaytoBolshieMaiachki.The2ndGTCandthe96thTBweremovingalongtheLipovyiDonetscontinuingtoattack2ndSSPzC’seastflankinorder todiluteitsnorthwardlunge.NextdoorinLAHsector,thePzcommander,MichaelWittmann,inhisTiger knocked out 8 tanks and 7 antitank guns this day alone against the 6th TC. Teterevino,southwestofProkhorovka,wasenteredandintheprocessofbeingsecuredasdarknessfell.Atthe end of the day,Vatutin ordered 6thTC back to form a new defense line south ofOboyan.rc176.dgk94.dgk109.dgr209m.lck267.The 2nd SS PzC’s LAH punctured the second defensive belt of 6th GA and were heading

northeasttowardTeterevinoNorthbut,withinfantrytrailing,thepanzerswerepoorlyprotected.Aerial reconnaissancespotted twoenemycolumnsmoving toward this sector.The firstcolumnwasheadingsouthtowardTeterevinoNorthandtheothercolumnhadcrossedtheLipovyiDonetsRivernearNepkhaevoandwasheadingwest.ThissecondcolumnifnotstoppedcouldmaneuverbehindLAHandbetween the twoforces trapanddestroy theGermanforce.HausserorderedareinforcedbattalionthatwascurrentlyatLuchkiSouthtoimmediatelyheadnorthandslowifnotstopthesecondenemycolumn.ThepanzersnearTeterevinoNorthwouldhavetohandlethefirstcolumn on their own. Before reaching the town the panzers hit aminefield, knocking out fourpanzersandablockingdefensethatwastoostrongtotake.ItwasjustaboutdarksotheGermanspulledbackandsetupadefenseforthenight;the1stPzRwouldtryagaininthemorningwhenmoreof thedivisionarrived.Evenwith littleprogress, the2ndPzCclaimedtohavedestroyed173tanksandcaptured1609POWsonthisday.dgk109+.dgk124m.zrl217.At1300hrsafterdrivingtheSovietsoutofLuchkiSouth,DasReichwascloselyfollowingthe

retreating51stGRDand5thGTC.Breakingintotwocombatgroups, thefirstgroupheadedforOzerovskiandthesecondgroupinthedirectionofSobachevskiandKalinin.WithLAHandDasReichinthearea,itwasclearHausserwastryingtoencirclethe5thGTC.Theisolatedattackby22ndTBfrom theKozinkawoods in thedirectionofHill232.0and fromLuchkiSouth failed.Kravchenkosentthe21stTBandthe48thGTRtohelpthe22ndTBbutwithoutartillerysupportevenworkingtogethercouldnotstopthe2ndSSPzC.TheGermanscrushedthe22ndTBnearthevillagesofOzerovskiandKalininwhiletheothertwounitshadbeenencircledneartheKozinkawoods.Afterwards, the2ndSSPzCattackedtowardBelenikhinoStationandStorozhevoe.The5thGTClost110tanksinengagementsthatafternoon.TheLuftwaffewasbusyhereandacrosstheentireline,havingflownabout1500sorties.vzz123+.vzz7m.The2ndPzGRofLAHwerestrugglingtomovenorth.Soviet tanksfromthe49thTBcoming

fromPokrovkacontinuedtoharasstheinfantryateveryturn.Nearbythe315GRof167thIDwas

stillmired in fighting to clear theVorskla River bank in the Streletskoe area. Resistancewasfinally lesseningas theSovietdefenders started to fallback towardPokrovka. In theafternoonwiththeLAHmakingprogress,KatukovorderedChernienko’sthreetankbrigadesof31stTCtoattacktheleadunitsofLAH.Bylateafternoonfivetankbrigades(100thTB,49thTB,1stGTB,242ndTBand237thTB)wereattackingLAH’swestflank.WischhadnoreservestosendLtFreyand ordered him to take care of the situation on his own. Frey stopped his advance andwentdefensive.ThefightingcontinuedintothenightbuttheSovietswerenotunabletoroll theflankup.OneTigerwasdestroyedbyadirecthitfromaKV1at600yards;thewholecrewwaskilled.The other Tigers continued to fire at the flashes; Wittmann fired at the tank that killed hiscomrades anddestroyed it.TheTigers destroyed all the dug-in tanks andmanyof themobilesbeforetherestbuggedout.TheflakgunsthatwerepartoftheconvoycontinuedtofireatSovietfighters while the tank battle ensued. Toward evening, Chistiakov pulled his men along theVorskla River from all towns south of Pokrovka, enabling the 315 GR tomove up. gnk118+.zrl216.AftertakingHill243.2,acombatgroupfromLAHshiftedtothenorthwestandheadedforHill

230.5, northof Iakovlevo.DasReichwas still tied downon the right side ofHill 243.2 nearLuchkiSouthunderterrificfireby52ndGRDand67thGRD.Stallinginthissectordelayedthewholedivision.TheGermansbroughtupadditionalartilleryandassaultgunsandwiththehelpoftheLuftwaffepoundedtheSovietpositionsfor90minutesbeforetryinganotherattack.WhentheattackbegantheSovietscouldnotholdandstartedtofallbacktopositionscurrentlyheldby1stTA.Bymidday,LuchkiSouth(DR)andIakovlevo(LAH)hadbeentaken.Initiallythe51stGRDwasabletostopLAHseveraltimesbuteventuallythe51stGRDfellbacktojustsouthofSukhoSolotinoandMalyeMaiachki.Hill230.5 to thenorthof Iakovlevostillhad tobe takenbeforeLAHcouldmovefurthernorth.AgarrisonfromLAHremainedatIakovlevotokeepitfromfallingback into enemy hands, for there were still raiding parties in the area looking for easy prey.mhz232+.dgr209m.vzz120+.vzz7m.zow144.Four Tigers attached to LAH that were approaching Luchki North landed in a minefield.

WittmannintheleadTigerwasstruckbyaminewhichcausedtrackdamagetohisrightsideandlossofmobility.WaitingT34sstartedfiringonthedamagedTiger.Therewasnodamagetothepanzerbut themencouldnot evacuate it to fix the trackdue to theheavy fire.A secondTigermoved up behindWittmannn and itsmen jumped outwhile still under fire and hooked chainsbetween the twoTigers.WithWittmannnbeingpulled, the twoTigersstartedmovingback toaplace of safety. The three working Tigers resumed their advance toward Luchki North whileWittmann’screwrepairedthetrack.AsmalldefensivebatterypositioninfrontofLuchkiNorthstartedfiringon theTigers.TheTigersstarted toreturnfireandby1400hrshaddestroyed theSovietbatteryandforceditsmenbackintotown.TheTigersenteredthetownandanewlineoftanks, including KV1s from Kravencho’s 203rd TR, started firing on them. The TigerssystematicallydestroyedeverySoviet tankbeforemovingnorthof town.While thisactionwasoccurring,SovietfighterswereattackingGermanfighterswhoweretryingtosoftenthedefensesthatthegroundforceswereheadingfor.gnk117+.agk100.Theleftflankof6thGA(51stGRD,52ndGRDand67thGRD)hadsufferedheavycasualties

and was in disarray.When Katukov was ordered to counter-attack toward Iakovlevo, Luchki

SouthandTeterevino tostopLAHandDasReich,whichhadpenetrated the line, itwasnotaneasytask.The2ndSSPzCwasheadingforGresnoe,BolshieMaiachkiandKochetovkawhereKatukovwasstationed.Katukovstillhadtodefendhisothersectorsbuthedidthebesthecould.By1330hrs,Krivoshein’s3rdMCwasorderedtoracethe49thTBtotheaidof1stGTB(ColGorelov) in the areanorthof Iakovlevo to plug thegap.The31stTCwasordered to send its100thTBtothenorthofIakovlevoatthecollectivefarmatMikhailovkawhereitwastoattack1stPzGR.LAHwasmovingtoofast;theywerealreadyatLuchkiNorthandthe100thTBhadtointercepttheGermansintheareaofUlianov,BolshieMaiachkiandIablochki.The1stPzGRofLAHhadnotdonequiteaswellbutitdidcapturethedifficultHill230.5,2.5milesnortheastofIakovlevowhereotherelementsofLAHwerestillclearingthelastoftheresistanceinhousetohousefighting.The1stPzRofLAHhadreachedtheLuchkiSouth-TeterevinoSouthlineby1300hrsandwereadvancingforTeterevinoNorth.TeterevinoNorth,ashortdistancesouthofKSF,was 11miles north of Teterevino South. At thismoment,Das Reich was in the Luchki SouthsectorapproachingTeterevinoSouthwhileLAHwasfightingtowardTeterevinoNorth.vzz123.vzz127+.lck269.zrl216.zow144.At 1315 hrs, elements of the 51st GRD and supported by 38 tanks, driving southeast from

Iakovlevo, counter-attacked the 1st PzGRofLAH nearHill 243.2. TheGermanswere able torepulsetheattackwhiledestroyingeighttanks.agk100.vzz2m.LAHwasorderedtomovetoLuchkiNorthtogivesupporttoDasReich,whichhadjusttaken

thetownbutwasstillmeetingstiffresistance.TheGermanshadopenedagapinthe6thGAlineandwerewellontheirwaytogainingtenmilestoday.bt84.dgr209m.VatutinhadtobringupmostofhisreservestoplugthegapsouthofOboyanaswellasshiftthe

38thArmyto40thArmysectorwheretheywereneeded.Tomorrow,Vatutinwouldhavetotapthereservesof those twoarmies aswell.Later thatnight,Stalin agreed to release the5thGTA toVatutinbutitwouldtakedaystoarrive.Withreinforcementsarrivingtothefront,Vatutinorderedthe 52nd GRD to the rear. Katukov of 1st TA ordered the 31st TC to seal off 2nd SS PzC’sadvancefromthewest.Tohelpwiththisassignment,ColN.M.Ivanov’s100thTBwasbroughtuptothelineatBolshieMaiachki.Oncethe100thwasdeployed,thebattered52ndGRDwouldfallbacktoregroup.dgk113.dgk111.dgr209m.vzz159.gjz183+.cbk56+.zro206+.After taking Luchki South and the surrounding area, elements ofDas Reich (2nd SS PzC)

advanced on Belenikhino Station, where the makeshift tiny garrison put up stiff resistance,repulsing the larger attacker which fell back to Kalinin to regroup. Tanks from Lt ColOkhrimenko’s 20th GTB and the remains of Col Occharenko’s 21st GTB of 5th GTC startedarrivingaround2000hrs,turningthestationintoastrongpoint.vzz126.vzz7m.TheLAHandDasReichweremakingdecentgainsthatdayandby1400hrshadbothreached

the Prokhorovka road axis, at great cost to the Soviets. Lead elements ofDas Reich with thesupportofLAHhadcapturedHill230.5,nearlythreemilesnortheastofIakovlevowhichwasstillbeingsecuredbythebulkofLAH.SeveralSovietdivisionswerehithard;forexamplethe51stGRDlost2000menand5thGTClostmanytanks.Chistiakovwasseverelyreprimandedforhisdeployinghistankbrigadespiecemealandlosingsomanytanks.DasReichhadpushedthe51stGRDoutofLuchkiSouthandwerecurrentlypursuingtherearguard,asthebulkofthe51stGRDwas heading for Ozerovski and Kalinin to the northeast. The 22nd TBwas ordered to attack

toward Hill 232.0 to slowDas Reich in chasing the 51st GRD but the assault was quicklyrepulsed.VatutinalsoorderedBurdeiny’s2ndGTCwhichhadrecentlyarrivedinsectortocrossthe Lipovyi Donets River and get behind the SS and cut the Belgorod-Prokhorovka road.vzz127+.zrl216.The1stPzRhad to slow itsadvancedue to running lowonammunition,butat1430hrs the

supplytrucksarrivedandthepanzerswererefueledandreloaded.Thepanzersweretolinkupwith1stPzGRandtogetherwouldheadnorth.zrl216.The2ndGTC launchedanother counter across theLipovyiDonetsRiver against the2ndSS

PzC’s right flank in the Rozhdestvenka-Kriukovo-Novye Lozy area. A reserve battalion wascalleduptodeployatLuchkineartheLipovyiDonets,tohelpcoverthepanzers’flank,whenitwasdiscoveredadditionalSoviettanks(5thGTC)werecominguptothelinefromthewestonVatutin’sorders.Evenmoretanksfromthe31stTCwerebroughtuptocoverthelineatBolshieMaiachki.dgk110+.dgk222m.dlu63m.dgr209m.dgr80.It was after 1530 hrs when the Soviets, probably the isolated companies of 52nd GRD,

attackedthegarrisonthatwasleftatKozmo-DemianovkabuttheassaultwasrepulsedwithheavylossestotheSoviets.zrl216.At 1630 hrs, the right flank of 1st PzRwas north ofLuchki and heading towardTeterevino

North.BeforereachingTeterevino,thepanzershitaminefieldthatwascoveredbyartilleryanddug-in tanks hiddenbehind a tankditch.The air support officer ridingwith the panzer columncalledforairsupporttocoverthepanzersastheytriedtobackoutoftheminefield.Thepanzerswereabletofallbackwiththeaidfromtheair,andafterdarktheSoviettanksattackedbutwerebeatenback.The1stPzRwasluckythatafternoon,escapingwithonlyminorlosses.zrl217.At0600hrs,with theoriginaldefenders fallingback to IasnaiaPolianaafter losingKalinin,

elements of the 5th GTC were ordered to Kalinin to defend the area. Having arrived in theKalininareaby1700, theywereattackedby theLuftwaffe.Though receivingheavycasualties,fiveGermanplaneswereshotdown.At1800hrspanzersattacked;theSovietAAgunswerethenusedtostopthepanzers.At2000hrs,Sovietdefenderswerestilltrappedbutcontinuedtofightuntildarkwhentheymadeabreak.Theonesthatescapedheadednorth.vzz125+.dgk134+.At 1700 hrsKravchenko (5thGTC) orderedOkhrimenko’s 20thGTB,whichwas stationed

nearTeterevino,totheencirclementnearHill246.3andHill243.2(northeastofIakovlevo)andthewoodstothenortheast,inthehopesoffreeingtheencircled21stGTB,22ndGTB(5thGTC)and 48th GTR and stopping 2nd SS PzC from getting any closer to Belenikhino Station orProkhorovka.AttackingfromthewoodsnorthofSobachevski,the20thGTBstruckthegrenadierswithinsightofthestation.At2300hrsthefewremainingtanksinthepocketlaunchedanattacktobreakoutoftheirtrap,whichsucceededbynextmorning,anddroveeastofBelenikhinoStation,stoppingin thewoodsonthewaytoregroup.Duringthebreakoutonlyadozentankssurvived;mostofthelightT70sweredestroyed.vzz124++.At1700hrs,aerialreconnaissancediscoveredacolumnof30tankscrossingtheDonetsnear

Soshenkov.The3rdPzRofSSTKwasorderedtointerceptanddestroy.The3rdPzRattackedthecolumnofBritishChurchill tanks andquickly destroyed15.At 1900hrs, theSoviet survivorsturnedandheadedfortheriver.Itwaslearnedfromprisonerinterrogationsthatthecolumnwasfromthe48thGTR.The3rdPzRwouldmeetthe48thGTRnextmorningwhentheytriedtoattack

thepanzersagain.kuz194.vzz7m.zow145.Germanplanescomingback fromreconpatrol reportedseeingaSovietconvoyofover150

vehicles approaching the east bank of theDonetsRiver. It turned out the convoywas the 26thGTBof2ndGTC.Therestoftheconvoywasnotfarbehind.BynextmorningVatutinwouldhaveanother200tanksand50moregunstostoptheGermans.ThiswasalarmingnewsforDasReich.Itwasthought that theSovietswouldtrytoencircleLAHbygoing throughDasReich.Hausserdecided to keepDas Reich panzers near the Luchki South-Kalinin-Ozerovski area instead ofmovingfurthereastuntiltheSovietintentionswereknown.gnk125.In general Hoth’s 4th PzAmade three penetrations into the Soviet line today, gaining about

sevenmiles.HaussermademoreprogressbutthentheSovietsstiffenedtheirdefenseandstoppedHoth’soveralladvance.1stTAwithitsoriginal640tankswasdug-inbehind6thGAwhichtheGermanswere passing by, but the 1st TAwas determined to repel all attacks.wwf82. dgk94.dgr39m.dgk106m.With6thGAintrouble,theresponsibilityofstopping2ndSSPzCfellonKatukovandhis1st

TA.Heplanned to crush 2ndSSPzCby attacking from thewest and pushing themagainst thedefensesalongtheLipovyiDonets.The3rdMC,31stTCandthe237thTBwoulddrivefromthenorthandnortheast.The1stGTB,the49thTB,the100thTBandthe242ndTBwoulddriveeastfromwestofPokrovkaagainstthenarrowsalienttheSShadformed.Atthesametime,elementsof the2ndGTC,5thGTC,375thRD,89thGRDand93rdGRDwould stay inplacealong theLipovyiRivertomakesuretheGermanswouldbetrapped.Thefrontlinedefenseswereabletokeep thebulkofLAH’s infantry southof theBelgorod-Oboyan road for the restof thedayandnight.Thisarmorattackwouldbegininthemorning.Theattackingunitshadacombinedstrengthof383 tanks and that didnot include the tankswaiting in the east.TheLAHwould alsomoveforcesuptothelineduringthenightanditwasagoodthingtheydid;theywouldbeneededtowithstandthecomingassault.vzz133+.dgr80.dgk106m.SSTKslowlyadvanceduptheBelgorod-Kurskroadonthisday,capturingErikandtheadjacent

Hill198.3.Resistanceincreasedasnightfell;thepanzerregimentstoppedatthebridgesitewestofShopinotodefenditwhilethegrenadierswerebeddingdownamilenortheastnearTernovka.ShopinowaseastofIakhontov,notfarfromthewestbankoftheLipovyiDonetsRiver.Afterabriefrest,areconpatrolwhichincludedpanzersweretomoveouttowardLuchkitocheckouttheenemyandtoseeifDasReichcouldbefound.fkk135.dgk106m.dgk222m.kuz194.Despite being all alone in the front and being pressured by the heavy resistance, Hausser

pushed the LAH toward Teterevino North which was almost eight miles from Prokhorovka.gnk119+.gnk113m.dgk106m.At1830hrsVatutin,talkingtoStalin,deliveredasitrepandthenaskedformorearmor,infantry

andairsupport.Vasilevskysecondedtherequest.Itwasquicklyagreedhewouldget it.Stalin,againstKonev’sprotests,releasedRotmistrov’s5thGTAand5thGAfromSteppeFrontreservetoVatutin’sVoronezhFront.ItwascurrentlydeployedinthedenseforestaroundOstrogozhskandtheadjacentKuzmenkovandKamenkasectors.Ithadorderstobeontheroadbydaylightofthe7thandtoarrive in theProkhorovkasectorasquickaspossible.The5thGTAconsistedof the29thTC, the5thGMCand thenewlyattached18thTC.Theonlypossible reserveHothmighthave,the24thPzC,wasnoteveninsector.The23rdPzDand17thPzDwereapartof1stPzA

and preparing for a battle to capture Lischansk in the south. The 5th SS PzD, Viking, was inreserveandnotpreparedtofight. Itwasadiscouragingthought toGeneralHoththathehadnorealistic reserves left and that he would have to complete the campaign with his existingexhaustedforces.gnk151.mhz239.lck272.dgr220.vzz268++.pck74.vzz161.OncepastTeterevinoNorth,LAHwas approachingHill 258.2when the183rdGRD,which

wasdefendingit,openedfireontheleadingpanzersandthetransportvehiclescarryinginfantry.Thepanzerscontinuedtoadvanceandranintoanotherminefield.TheGermanshadalreadylostmany panzers tomines and yet they continued to be reckless about approaching defenses.Hill258.2wassituatedontheouterlimitsoftheSovietthirddefensebelt.gnk119.vzz129.gnk113m.Besides talking to Stalin, Vatutin also wired Stavka with a situation report and asked for

additionaltanksandplanes,despitehisglowingreportofdestroyingmanypanzersandstoppingtheGermanadvance.Vasilevskyrecommended the request.By1900hrs thenextday,Burkov’s10thTCwith165tanksplusassaultguns(SteppeFront),MajGeneralPopov’s2ndTCwith168tanks (SouthwesternFront) and the 17thVAwere arriving in sector.Both tank corps had beenreinforcedwithanti-tankgunswith85mmbarrelsandtwomotorizedrifleregiments.StalinalsoorderedKonevtorelease5thGTAtoVatutinaswell.The5thGAwasalsobeingsentwiththe33rdRCleadingtheconvoy.Withthe5thGTCand2ndGTCalreadyinsectorandfightingalongtheDonets Rivers,Das Reich andSSTK were being forced to spendmuch of their resourcesfighting flankbattles andnot fighting to thenorth to support theLAH. In the first two days theGermanshadlostmanypanzers;the48thPzCwasalreadyfallingbehindandnotsupportingLAHasorderedandbesides,theGermansjustdidnothaveenoughmenorpanzerstoreachKurskanditwasalreadyshowing.TheadditionalSoviettankcorpswouldnotbefullyassembledinsectorfor 24 hours but when ready for battle would present a noticeable increase in resistance andgreater threat to the German advance. vzz159. gnk152+. gnk245. gjz184+. nzk88. wwf91.wdk132+.Around 1900 hrs, the SSTK was fighting along the Belgorod-Kursk road when the Soviets

counterattacked.TheGermanswereabletorepulsethesurpriseattack,destroying15tanksintheprocess;12tankswereAmericanmadelightweights.wdk130.AtnighttheSS,probablyDasReich,headedfortheKilovyDonets.Elementsofthe2ndGTC

crossedtheriverinordertostoptheenemyfromreachingtheLipovyiDonetsRiverintheLuchkiSouth area.At 2000 hrs a battle erupted that forced theSSTK to halt their offensive and sendpanzersnorthwardtoassistDasReich.EventuallytheGermansgainedtheadvantageandthe2ndGTChadtoretreatbackacrosstheriver.Kempf’s responsibilitywas to protectHoth’s right flank on his northerly advance but since

Kempfwaswaybehind,theSSTKhadtoactasflankguardagainst2ndGTCand5thGTC.Thiscaused the SS, and especially Kempf, to fall behind schedule. TheLuftwaffe was practicallyabsent east of the Donets on the previous day, allowing the Soviets to control the skies. TheSovietplanesfrequentlyattackedtheGermanbridgeheadsandtheforcesthathadmadeitacrosstheriver.Withoutconsistentairsupportthe3rdPzCwouldcontinuetofallbehindagainsttheseaerialattacksaswellasagainstartillerystrikes.Kempf’sfrequentrequestsforairsupportfinallypaidoffastheLuftwaffearrivedandthegroundforcesmadebetterprogress.Bytheendoftheday,3rdPzC’sleadforceswerenoweightmilesfromBelgorodatMiasoedovoandtherearunits

were able to cross the river.Evenwith theLuftwaffe support the Soviet defenses in this areaweregoingtobetoughtobreak.Kempfwouldneedevengreaterairsupportifhewastocatchup- but hewould not get it. The lion’s share of air supportwould go to the SSCorpswith theremainder going to 48th PzC. The Luftwaffe did not have sufficient resources to maintainadequatecover toall thepanzercorpsand thiswouldbeacontributing factor fornot reachingKursk.ItcannotbeoverstatedhowmuchthisfailureofKempftokeepupwiththeSSimpactedtheoverallcampaigninthesouthandhowithighlightstheflawedstrategicplanbyvonMansteinandtheexecutionofthatplanbyHoth.dgk113.cbk57.DuringthedaytheSovietAFbegansendinglargernumbersofescortsalongwiththeirbombers

togivegreaterprotection.Ithelpedbutitwasdecidedtosendevenlargernumbersofescortstogivegreaterprotectionfortherestofthecampaign.HothandhiscorpscommanderswerealreadyawarethattheylackedsufficientmenandpanzerstodefeattheSovietdefensesandwerealreadyusingtheLuftwaffeasfirebrigades.cbk58+.SSTK,on2ndSSPzC’srightflank,brokethroughSovietdefensesandgained12milestothe

north.Bydusk,SSTKhadcrossedandcuttheBelgorod-Oboyanhighway,stoppingfor thenightastridetheBelgorod-Kurskrailway.TheirobjectivehadbeentocrossthePselRiverwithatleastabattalionandestablishabridgeheadonthenorthbankbytheendofthenight,buttheyfailedtodoit.dgk94.WiththeLAHgettingtoofaraheadofeitherflankandwiththeincreasedSovietresistanceat

Hill 258.2,HausserofficiallyorderedLAH to fall back toLuchkiNorth for thenight to avoidbecomingisolated.Kravchenko’s5thGTCwasonthenortheastcornerofLAHwhilethe31stTCwas on the northwest corner and the 1stGTB and 49th TBwas in themiddle. Itwas awisedecisionbyHaussertopullbackhispremierdivision.TomakeitmoredifficultfortheGermans,the2ndGTChadbeenorderedtothePselsectorandwouldarrivenextmorning.gnk121.German pilots, flying the newHs 129Fs,were now using the new 1000ABBombs. These

bombs contained hundreds of bomblets that could destroymany soldierswhen detonated. Theareacoveredcouldbeaslargeas30yardsby60yards.cbk57.At 2300 hrs,General Rotmistrov receivedwritten orders tomove out as soon as possible,

assembleattheOskolRiverandawaitfurtherordersthatwouldincludefightingatProkhorovka.Thatwasadistanceofatleast150milesfromtheiroriginalassemblyarea.Partsofthe5thGTAwereontheroadby0130hrson7/7whileotherswouldbeahalfdaybehind.Originallythe5thGTAconsistedofthe29thTCandthe5thGMC,butwiththisnewdeploymentorderthe18thTCwasattachedtoRotmistrov.The5thGTAstartedarrivingattheriveronthemorningof7/8aftertraveling 125 miles in 24 hours. At 0100 hrs on 7/9, Rotmistrov was ordered to reach theBobryshevo, Bolahaia Psinka, Prelestnoe, Aleksandrovski and Bolshie Seti region, north ofProkhorovka, and be prepared to repel attackers. This new deploymentwas another 60milesaway.The5thGTAhadunderitscommandapproximately800tanks:501T34s,261T70sand31Churchills plus assault guns. dgr220++. fkk167. cbk77. bt84. kcz170. wwf121. vzz162++.vzz166+.vzz180.dgr86m.Atnight,DasReich attacked the rail embankment atBelenikhinobut the first attempt failed.

Regrouping,thesecondattemptwasabletoscatterthedefenders.fkk134.AfterreceivingareconreportthatacolumnoftankswerecrossingtheDonetsatSoshenkov,

SSTKmovedforcestowardthevillagetointercepttheSoviettanks.SSTKfoundandengagedtheSovietsandwasabletoknockout15tanksbeforetheremaindercrossedbacktotheeastbankoftheriver.ItwasdiscoveredfromPOWinterrogationsthatitwasagainthe48thGTRandmostofits tanks were Churchill tanks. By the end of the day the SSTK reached the Shopino-west ofTernovka-southeastofSmorodinoline.ThatwasacommonpracticefortheSoviets–assembleeastoftheLipovyiRiverthencrossjustbeforelaunchtime.fkk135.dgk106m.vzz7m.By the endof the day, the 2ndSSPzChadbroken through the seconddefense belt between

LuchkiNorthandIakovlevo.LAHhadnoticedearlierinthedaythefirsttankreservesshowingupinsectorbetweenIakovlevo-TeterevinoNorth;the5thGTC.ThisnewsdisturbedHothforhewashoping reserveswould not arrive for severalmore days. It was also noticed in the 48th PzCsectorthatKatukov’s1stTAhadbroughttankreservessouthaswell.The31stTC,northwestofLAH,waspreparingdefensesand,alongwiththe3rdMC,preparedforafightatPokrovka.The2ndGTConthewestbankoftheDonetswasnowfullyengagedwithDasReichandSSTK.The90thGRDand67thGRD,withsupportofthe3rdMC,haddoneagoodjobofslowingthe48thPzC’sadvance.gnk151.By the end of the day, the 2ndSS PzChad gained on average fivemiles andmore in some

placesaswellaspenetratedfurtherintotheseconddefensivebeltatIakovlevoandLuchkiSobutthe4thPzAwasfallingfurtherbehindschedule.wdk130.During the night,Kling’s Tigerswere called to duty. It had been recently discovered that a

columnofenemytanksweremovingsouthtowardTeterevino.Hs129swiththeir30mmcannonandtheTigersweretostoptheadvancingenemy.Thestrafingdamagedordestroyedanumberoftanksfrom5thGTCandbeforetheTigersarrived,asquadronofFw190sflewinandsupportedthe first squad of aircraft. The fragmentation bombs that were dropped scattered the closinginfantry.ThefourTigersfinallyjoinedthebattle,firingonthehiddentanksthat theaircrafthadmissed.Aftertwohoursoffiercebattle,thetanksweredestroyedandtheriflemenpulledbacktothenorth.AllfourTigershadbeendisabledandwouldneedtobetowedbackforrepairs.TherecoveryteamspreparedtheTigersforrecoverywhileunderfirefromSovietsnipersstillinthearea.ThesetankswerebelievedtobepartofthecolumnheadingforTeterevinoNorthearlierinthedaythat1stPzRhadfallenbackonwhenstoppedatthefortifiedtankditch.fzk309+.zrl217.BytheendfthedayLAHhadonlyfourworkingTigersandDasReichhadten.gnk152.At the end of the day, the three divisions of the SS collectively reported to Hausser of

destroying173tanksandcapturing1,600POWs.ThecaptureoftensofthousandsofPOWs,asin1941, was not being repeated. The Soviets finally got wise to their mistake of standing andfighting to the death and besides, the defensive fortifications that had been built allowed theinfantrytofallbacktothenexttrenchveryeasily.wdk130.Inthesouth,theLuftwaffeflewonly899sortiesdownfromalmost2,000missionstheprevious

day. The reported sorties the Soviet AF flew are uncertain. One source claims 1,958 sorties,whileanotherclaims1,278.wdk130.dgr81.Bytheendoftheday,theGermanshadgainedonlyfromsixtoninemileswhichwashalfora

littlemoreofwhatwasplanned.Hothwasstill67milesfromKursk.Sovietreinforcementswerealreadymovingtothethirdlineandinsomecasesthesecondline.Itwasabadsignthatthisearlyin theoperation theGermanswerealreadybehindscheduleandwouldbe facingan increasing

numberofreinforcements.wdk132.The first two days of fighting had been costly;Hoth estimated that hundreds of panzers had

been destroyed, damaged or weremalfunctioning. TheGD had been hit the hardest with 270panzersofitsoriginal350beingremovedfromthebattlefieldduemostlytomechanicaltroublesorminedamage.The2ndSSPzChad110panzersdownand48thPzClost134panzersinthisday’s fighting alone.A large number of these casualtieswould be repaired butwhile somanypanzerswereintherepairshop,theGermanadvancewouldclearlysuffer.lck272.cbk57.Afterfightingalldaythe375thRDhadtofallbackbutwasstillonthewesternbanksofthe

LipovyiRiverdefendingbetweenVisloeandShopino.dgr80.Whilethe3rdPzCwasslowlypushing7thGAback,theLAH,DasReichandSSTKdivisions

hadpenetrated20miles,andcrossed theBelgorod-Oboyanhighway. Ithalted thatnightastridetheBelgorod-Kurskrailwaytoreqroup,butbeforedawn(7th)theywouldbeonthemove.Whilestilldark,thenearly400panzersattackedthe1stTA.TheSovietswereoverwhelmedbuttheairforcewascalledin.Despitetheairraidthatdestroyedsomeofthepanzers,theGermansbrokethroughthecenterofthelineshatteringthe51stGRDandanumberoftanks.The1stTA’stankswithdrew and came around and attacked the flank of the panzer formation in the Syrtsevo-Iakovlevosector.wwf85.je104.hjj121m.dgr209m.InthesouththeLuftwaffe reportedhavingelevenplanesdamagedbutrepairableandanother

elevencompletelydestroyed.The2ndVAreported45destroyedaircraftand17thVAlostanother37planes.OnaverageGermanpilotshadfarmoreexperiencethantheirSovietcounterpartsandinmostinstancesoftheairwaritshowedintheearlydaysofthecampaignbutbyAugustmanySovietpilotswouldbetheequalofhisenemy.cbk58.BytheendofthedaytheseconddefensivebelthadbeenpenetratedintheSSsectorbutwith

the reinforcements that Vatutin brought up on this and the previous day, the German advancewouldbemoredifficult from thispoint.Themini-salient thatLAH started thedaybeforegrewevenlarger,exposingmoreoftheirflanksandforcingMajGeneralWischtoinvestevenmoreofhisforcesontheflanksandawayfromthespearhead.Thenorthernfrontof thesalienthadjustreached the Prokhorovka road, north of Luchki and Bolshie Maiachki, and on the verge ofcapturingMalyeMaiachki,Teterevinoand IsaniaPoliana.Thesalient thatLAHandDas ReichwerecarvingoutextendedfromtheVorsklaRiverinthewesttoalmosttheLipovyiRiverintheeast. The towns captured on the northern perimeter included Petrovski, Pokrovka, Kalinin,TeterevinoSouthandLuchkiNorth.IwonderwhatprogresscouldhavebeenmadethefirstdaysifDasReich hadbeen fightingon the northern front insteadof protectingLAH’s eastern flank.NowthatVatutinhadbroughtupmanyreservesandwouldcallupevenmorethefollowingdayfromotherarmies,theGermanpacewasabouttodramaticallyslow.GeneralHothunderstoodtheimpact the Soviet positions deployed along theDonetsRiverswere having in breaking up thesolidarityoftheeasternflankandyethedidlittletoovercomeit.Hewasobsessedwithmakingsurethe48thPzCwouldfulfilltheirmissiontoreachOboyan.The48thgotofftoarelativelybadstartandnevercameclosetofulfillingitsresponsibilities.Insteadofscalingbackthesectorandmodifyingthebattleplan,thegeneralthrewmoreresourcesonalosingsector.The48thPzCwasthemostpowerfulcorpsin4thPzAbutthe2ndSSPzCoutperformedit.zrl217.VatutinreportedtoStalinthatanestimated332panzersand80planeshadbeendestroyedthat

day,andover100planesintheprevioustwodays.Theseestimateswerehigh.TherewasenoughlightduringthenightfortheLuftwaffetosendoutbomberstosoftenupthe

expectedrouteLAHwouldtakeinthemorning.TheprimarytargetsoftheJu-87sandJu-88swerethe 51st GRD and 52nd GRD between Teterevino and Prokhorovka. Other key targets wereBelenikhino,IasnaiaPoliana,IvanovskiVyselokandStalinskoeStateFarm.wwf85.vzz3m.In theearlydaysof thecampaign thefamousGermanStukasdidmuchof thework.Thefirst

twodaysofaerialfightingsaw1,864sortiesfromJu-87Stukasdivebombers.Onthisdayalone1,023sortieswereflowninthenorth,whileinthesouth1,686sortieswereflownagainstSovietpositions.cbk59.TheSovietAirForcereported1,632sorties.nzk77.wwf85.vzz3m.The4thPzA,overthelast twodayshadgainedfromsixtoasmanyastwentymiles(butthe

averagewasabouthalfthatamount)butstillhadnotattainedfreedomofmovementorasecurereararea.Thequestionwaswhether thesituationwouldgetbetterorworseas thesalient theywerebuildinggrewdeeper.Timewouldtell.dgr81+.After securingTeterevino, a groupof ten panzers fromLAH drove north to reconwhatwas

aheadfornextmorning.Afterbreakingthroughthequicklyprepareddefensesofthe285thRRof183rdRD,thepanzersheadedforKomsomolets.wwf85.Inanattempttocatchupto2ndSSPzCthe48thPzC,whichwasstillstrugglingtogetpastthe

first defense belt along theKorovino-Cherkasskoe-Hill 246.0 linewhichwas defended by the67thGRDand71stGRD, launchedat0300hrsagainstChistiakov’sdivisions(6thGA). IthadrainedallnightandthegroundwasmuddyastheGDand11thPzDdrovenorthalongtheButovo-Iakovlevo road in theOlkhovka-Dubrovasector, inorder tomeetupwith167th IDwhichwasguarding2ndSSPzC’sleftflank.TheGermanscouldnotaffordtohaveanyexposureintheirlinethattheSovietscouldexploit.vzz115.dgk84.snk75.hsz120.In1stTAsector(rightbehind6thGA),Vatutinorderedacounter-attacktoslow48thPzC.He

hadorderedmanyreinforcementsintothearea;manyhadarrivedduringthenightandmorewouldbearrivinglatertoday.The2ndGTCand5thGTCwouldleadtheassaultbuttheassaultwouldbeuncoordinatedandwouldgarnerpoorresults.wdk128++.dgr212.cbk57.KnobelsdorffwantedanearlystartforhiscorpsinordertoreachthemainOboyanroadwhich

wouldleadnorthforthePselRiver.TherewasasmalleryetimportantroadthatleftCherkasskoe,skirtedthePenaRiverandwentthroughLukhaninoandSyrtsevobeforeintersectingtheOboyanroad.The48thPzChad to take theseveral strongpointsalong this route thatday to reach theirprimaryobjectiveandatthesametimekeeptheSovietsfromcrossingthePenaandattackingthe48th’s flank. GD and 11th PzD would have the northern front while 3rd PzD and 52nd ICmaintainedthewesternflank.Therewasadelayforthebulkofthe48thPzCtoadvancebeyondLukhanino. The 11th PzDwas stillmopping up resistance at Cherkasskoe.Also, a littlewaysnorthoftown,thefortifiedHill246.0wasblockingtheroutenorthand11thPzDwastaskedtotake it aswell. In the fight forSyrtsevo,Hoth lostoneofhiskey regimentcommanders,HeinzKlostermeyer.HewaswiththeGrenadierRegimentofGDandwouldbemissedbyallhismen.gnk150.wwf43+.WhilesecuringCherkasskoe, therestof48thPzCwouldprepare tomovetowardZavidovka

andAlekseevkaaswellasOlkhovka,DmitrievkaandSyrtsevotothenortheast.Aftertwohoursof bitter fighting with almost 300 panzers, the 71st GRD had to evacuate Krasnyi Pochinok,

falling back to a new line. The 3rd PzD, moving north was able to capture Rakovo andZavidovka,whichstraddledthePenaRiver,butwerenotabletogofurther.TheGermanstriedfromChapaev toShepelevka to thenorth toestablishabridgeheadon thewesternbanksof thePenabutfailedagainstthestiffresistanceofthe6thTCand90thGRD.ItwasinthePenaareathattheSovietsusedsuicidedogstodestroypanzers.Inthe169thGRRof67thGRDareanotfarfromBerezov,16dogswereabletostop12panzers.vzz116+.vzz2m.dgr213.The11thPzDandGDhadtheleadinpenetratingtheseconddefensebeltinthewesternsector.

Duringthenightof7/5,thedivisionswerestillfinishingthesecuringoftheCherkasskoeareaandthe bulk of these forces could not move north until the strongpoint was fully secured. Neardaybreak, with the help of flame throwing panzers, the forces finally did leave the town andheaded northeast along the eastern edge of the Pena River. GD’s objective was eventuallyDubrova,butfirstLukhaninoontheouteredgeoftheseconddefensebelthadtobecaptured.Itwasdefendedbythe67thGRD.The3rdPzDwastoclearresistancefromthePenaRiveranditwould have the support of the 52nd IC to protect its flank.After leavingCherkasskoe, itwasnearly noon whenGD began its advance toward Lukhanino by attacking Hill 210.7. gnk146.gnk112m.hsz120.Atfirstlighttheengineersof11thPzDhadstartedclearingminesontheCherkasskoetoButovo

road;itwouldbeheavilyusedandtheGermanscouldnotaffordthetimeorvehiclesinfindingtheminesthehardway.gnk146.Following a rain-soaked night, elements of GD began to clear the area southwest of

Cherkasskoe.Whilethisclearingtookplace,SovietartilleryshelledtheCherkasskoeareabeingheldbytheGermans.Atthesametime,othermembersofGDheadedtowardDubrovawhichalsocontainedheavySovietresistance.BeforereachingDubrova,GDhadtoclearHill237.7andthenHill241.1.AnothergroupofGDheadedthroughtherivervalleywestofYarkityforthevillagesofKalashnoyeandLukhaninowhichlaynortheastoftheirlineofdeparture.Duringthenight,theboundarywith the11thPzDwhichwas attackingon the righthadbeenestablishedon thenewline:Butovovillage-Dubrovaroad.The3rdPzD,whichwasalittlebehindGDonitsleftflank,wasattackingthevillageofZavidovkawhichwasimportantforithadastandingbridgeoverthePenatributarywhichthe48thPzCneeded.hsz120+.gnk312m.Twobattalionsof the11thPzDleftCherkasskoebeforedaybreakandattackedHill246.0by

0330hrs.By0630theGermanswereontopofthehillandthedefenderswerefallingback.WiththeSovietartilleryonthehillquieted,Knobelsdorffsentadditionalforcesofthe11thPzDtowardLukhanino. A mile north of Hill 246.0 an additional Soviet battery fired on the recon forcesmovingnorth.Afterabriefskirmish, theGermanscontinuednorth.By0830hrs thebulkof the11thPzDwasonthemoveandheadingforSyrtsevo.gnk150.The trailingunits of 11thPzDof 48thPzCpushednorthward along theButovo-Cherkasskoe

road, eastofButovo, against stiff resistance reaching theoutskirtsofCherkasskoe.Despite thefactthattheGermanswerefinishingsecuringCherkasskoe,thecountrysidewasstillteemingwiththeenemyandthemarchinggrenadiersstillhadtobeonhighalert.Theirmainobjectivewastheheights atZybino.With the3rdPzDattacking71stGRD from its flank and11thPzDattackingfrontallyboththe71stGRDandthe67thGRD,theSovietshadtostartfallingbackintothe52ndGRD’srear.Nearby,the196thGRRsupportedbythe611thAnti-tankRegimentweredefending

neartheruinedvillageofCherkasskoebuthadtofallbacktothenorthwestafterdarktothesafetyof the 90th GRD defending the Pena River. By night, the 3rd PzD reached the Pena River atRakovo.Theswampylandprevented thepanzersfromcrossinguntilnextmorning.Zybinowasdue south of Novaia Gorianka and due west of Loknia. dgk97+. dgk105. snk75+. dgr172m.hjj121m.WiththefusiliersofGDcapturingLukhanino,Knobelsdorffordered3rdPzDnorthtooccupy

thetown,capturenearbyZavidovkaandthenestablishanewbridgeheadacrossthetributaryofthe Pena River. He then got the temporary assistance of the Deutschland Regiment to headnorthwesttocaptureSyrtsevoontheeastsideofthePena.Atthesametime,elementsof11thPzDcontinuedtoshrinkthepocketaroundDubrova.LukhaninostraddledatributaryofthePenaRiverandwasnotfar(east)fromZavidovka,whichhadastandingbridgeoverthePenathe48thPzCcoulduse.DirectlyacrossZavidovkaonthePena’snorthshorewasRakovo.gnk147+.gnk162m.vzz2m.nzk88.TheGDresumeditsattacktowardHill241.1,southwestofDubrova,butbeforereachingthis

objective had to overcome an anti-tank trench and a minefield. By 1400 hrs, Hill 241.1 wascaptured.BetweenthishillandHill247.2,northwestofDubrova,theGDmetupagainstabout90tanks, half of themdug-in.During the engagement in a friendly fire incident aPantherwashit,killing its entire crew. By the end of the day,GD had lost 37 Panthers to battle action andmechanicalfailure.Duringtheday’sadvance,GDbecameseparatedfrom11thPzDbutroamingpatrolsfrombothdivisionslinkedup.Thedistancebetweenthetwodivisionswasnotgreatbutitgave the Soviets a chance to exploit the gap if it was discovered. hjj116. hjj117m. mhz235.hsz122.gnk312m.At0830hrs,Westhoven’s3rdPzDassaultedZavidovkaonthesouthernbankofthePena.As

thepanzersnearedthevillageSovietartilleryopenedfire.Withthe3rdPzDtakingground,therewas a chance the only bridge over the Pena in the sector could fall inGerman hands; Sovietengineersblewthebridge.ZavidovkaandtheothervillagesalongthePenahadbeenfortifiedandwouldbecostlytocapture.The52ndIC’s332ndIDwasmovinguptotake3rdPzD’spreviouspositionandtherearunitsof3rdPzDwerenowmovinguptotheLakhaninoarea.OriginallyLtGeneralWesthovenhadtheresponsibilityofcrossingthePenaRiverinthissectorbutwithsuchstiff resistance, Knobelsdorff decided to shift 3rd PzD eastward and head for Lakhanino.gnk148+.gnk162m.Onthewestside,52ndIC’s255thIDand57thIDstartedthedayattackingnorthwardwestof

Bubnytoprotect48thPzC’swesternflankwhileitwasonthemarch.At0830hrsthe48thPzCresumeditsassaultandpushedbackthe71stGRD,67thRDand52ndGRDtotheseconddefensebeltinflictingheavylossesontheSoviets.At1400hrsthe332ndIDonthewestflankof48thPzCattacked the71stGRDatKrasnyiPochinok,whichwas fivemiles from theGerman start line.Followingthe71stGRD,the332ndIDpushedthemoutofKorovinoandbacktothePenaRivernearRakovowhichwaspartoftheseconddefensebelt.The90thGRDmovedupandfilledthegapbetweenthe71stGRDand67thRDwhilenextdoorthe6thTCand3rdMCwereslowingtheadvanceofGDatandtotheeastofLukhanino,astheGDwasmovingnortheasttowardDubrova;bothsidessufferedheavycasualties.WhilesomeoftheGermanplanesthatwereoriginallymeanttosupport48thPzCweresenttohelpKempf,alargeportionoftheremainingaircraftwassentin

toattack6thTC.Despitehavingseveralraidsonthetankers,theGermanplaneswereunabletocause heavy damage and the 6th TC held their ground. Fewer German planes striking Sovietartilleryinthe48thPzCsectorallowedtheSovietartillerytotakeamoreactivepartagainsttheGerman ground forces. Also, the Soviet tankers were helped by repeated waves of fightersinterferingwiththeGermansorties.wdk128.cbk56+.dgr172m.Withthe332ndIDand225thIDmovinguptotheKrasnyiPochinok-Cherkasskoearea,theGD,

11thPzDand3rdPzDdrovenorthattemptingtoclearresistancewestoftheVorsklaRiver.Atthesame time the LAH andDas Reich pushed forward along the Belgorod-Kursk rail line whileSSTK provided flankprotection in the east.The 167th IDprovided flankprotection forSSTK.Thesetwopincers,oneoneachsideoftheVorsklaRiver,succeededinencirclinganddestroyingsomeSovietforcesbutnottothedegreethatwasexpected.VonMansteinexpectedhistwomaincorpstobreakintotheseconddefensebeltalongtheLuchkiSouth-Iakovlevo-Dubrova-LukhaninolineatsuchapacethatmanySovietdefenderswouldbeencircledanddestroyed.Whilethe2ndSSwas advancing fast enough, the lagging48thPzCprevented any such encirclement. fkk81+.gnk111.gnk112m+.Aftera90minutebarrage,elementsofGDsupportedbysomepanzersaswellasairsupport

headtowardPokrovka,butbumpedintothe71stGRDnearKrasnyiPochinokat1130hrs.Afterabitter fight the village and the nearby villages of Novo-Ivanovka andMikhailovka fell to theGermans.WiththeGermansgainingthisline,the40thArmysentthe309thRD’s294thRRtotheKobylevka-Razdolline.Theyarrivedlateatnighttohelpblockthe52ndICfromexpandingtothewestornorthwest.dgr79.dgr39m.wwf44.Adisruptivebarragecausedpartsofthe4thPzAtogetalatestartbutby1000hrstheentire

armywas on the move. Charging from Cherkasskoe, the 48th PzC in general would head forPokrovkawhilethe2ndSSPzCand167thIDwouldleavefromtheKozmo-DemianovkaareaandheadforBykovkawiththeaimofsurroundingthe67thGRDand52ndGRD.Someofthepanzersof48thdidsplitofftoheadnorthwesttowardKrasnyiPochinokwhichwasdefendedbythe71stGRD. Not only did Krasnyi Pochinok fall but also Novo-Ivanovka and Mikhailovka soonthereafter.With thesevillages falling,40thArmysent309thRD’s294thRR to theKobylevka-RazdollinetoblocktheGermans.dgr79.dgk106m.dgr76m+.AttackingfromnearCherkasskoe,the48thPzCwouldtakeAlekseevka,Lukhanino,Podimovka

andZavidovkabymidafternoon.The11thPzDassistedGD intakingZavidovkalocatedonthesouthern bank of the Pena. Podimovka was south of the Pena River bend, just northwest ofZavidovka.The3rdPzDreachedRakovo.dgr213dgr209m.vzz116.dgk106m.TheinitialattackfromtheKrasnyiPochinok-Cherkasskoeareawasrepulsedbythe71stGRD,

the67thGRDandthe27thTDB.TheGermanspulledbackandtriedagainat1300hrs.ThistimetheassaultpenetratedthelineintheSetnoye-Sartytoie-Zavidovkaarea.JustastheGermanswereapproachingtheRakovoarea,the6thTCof1stTAarrivedandstoppedtheiradvancebyknockingoutseveralTigersandPanthers.Undeterred, theGermansshifteddirectionandheadedeast forOlkhovka and reached the Vorskla River north of Kosmo-Demianovka where they werethreateningtoencirclethefrontlineunitsthatweretryingtoregroup.fkk82.Inthelatemorning,the1stPzGRadvancednorthtowardDubrovaontheLukhaninoRiverbut

wasunable to initiallyreachthevillagebecauseof themanytankditchesandtheSovietarmor

thatwasbroughtup toprotect them.Despite the fierce fighting, bynightfall theGermanswereable to advance pastDubrova and arrived atHill 247.2where they dug in for the night. ThisGermanpenetrationwasnotwidespreadandwiththissmallsalient,the1stPzGRofLAHwasinaprecariousposition.dgk107.dgk106m.By1100hrsafterclearingCherkasskoe, thebulkofGDmoved towardsHill237.7andHill

241.1.ThesehillswerealsohardtocapturebutfinallyweretakenbeforemovingonHill247.2dueeastofDubrova.ThishillwouldbenecessaryifthefortifiedtownofDubrovawasgoingtobe taken.AssaultingHill247.2wouldbedifficult; the taskof taking itwouldbegiven toMajRemerofGroupRemerbutthehillhadtobetakenbeforemovingonDubrova.WithSovietgunsonHill247.2,Dubrovawouldbedifficultandcostly tocapturebutwithGermanson thathill,their artillery could target Soviet defenses insideDubrova. The taking of the hill plusmovinggunsonthathillwasexpectedtotakehours.TheattackonDubrovawasthereforescheduledtostartnextmorning,whichwouldallowa lengthypreparationon the townbefore theattackwaslaunched.Thegunswouldcontinuetofireonthetownwhiletheattackprogressed.Atthesametime, the 11th PzDwas attackingHill 237.8 east of Cherkasskoe.After taking it, the divisionmovedalittlenorthandattackedHill246.0whichwasdueeastofCherkasskoe.fkk264.gnk96.gnk68m.gnk312m.hsz121+.At 1130 hrs as most of the 11th PzD was advancing from Cherkasskoe sector toward

Lukhanino,Dubrova andOlkhovka, a combat group soon split off from this group and headedsouthforTrirechnoe.dgr80.dgr76m.Bymidday, the29thAnti-tankBrigade,being transferredfrom40thArmy,deployedbetween

1stTAand5thGTC.dgr84.Knobelsdorff’s 48th PzC shifted direction for better tank terrain between Alekseevka,

LukhaninoandSyrtsevoalong theTomarovka-Oboyan road. In late afternoon the11thPzDand3rd PzD, trying to split the Soviet forces that were blocking the way to Oboyan, engagedChernov’s90thGRDandKrivoshein’s3rdMCalong theLukhaninoRiver.TheGermanswereunsuccessful. At night, Vatutin brought up the 35th MC to help 90th in stopping the Germanadvance.dgk105.hjj121m.dgr209m.WestofGD,the3rdPzD’s394thPzGRattackedduenorthfromGertsovkatowardKorovino,

strikingColSibakov’s71stGRD’s210thGRRwhichwasdefendingthissectorand67thGRD’sleft flank. Breaking through the right flank of 67th GRD by afternoon, the 394th PzGR hadcapturedthehighgroundoverlookingKorovinoandbyeveninghadexpelledthe210thGRRfromthetownandtheimmediatearea.The70panzersof6thPzRof3rdPzDracedpasttheboundaryof71stGRDand67thGRDandresecuredthevillageofKrasnyiPochinok,threemilestotherearof the original Soviet front line.To prevent encirclement, the 71stGRDhad to fall back.Theattackwassuccessfulandthe3rdPzD,GDand11thPzDbreachedthelineandenteredthegapheading northeast toward the Pena River and the 2nd defense belt. The 48th PzC underKnobelsdorff had torn a big hole in the line and the Sovietswere unable to close it. dgk98+.dgr172m.dgk106m.gnk112m.Withthetroublethe48thPzCwashavingwithnavigatingthePenaRiverValley,Knobelsdorff

ordered this corps to the east of Alekseevka through Lukhanino and Syrtsevo. The corpswasslowedagainasitapproachedLukhaninowithitshugeminefieldtothesouthoftown.lck270+.

Schimmelmann’spanzergroupof11thPzDwasheadingforSyrtsevobutby1230hrsastheyapproachedHill241.1thepanzerswerestoppedbyatankditchandfiringfromthehill.Underthecoverof smoke, thepanzers backedoff and called for engineers to take careof theditch.Notwantingtowaitforthepanzers,twobattalionsbypassedthehilldespiteseveralambushesandby1800hrswereontheirwaynorthagain.Bythistimetheditchhadbeenfilledinandthepanzerswere fighting for the hill. Other engineers were busy clearingmines on the road to Dubrova.gnk150.WhiletheGDand11thPzDcontinuedtheirnorthboundroutetoOboyan,the3rdPzDscreened

GD’sleftflankwhilethe332ndIDcontinuedtoscreen48thPzC’sfarleftflanksouthofthePenaRiver.Soon,allpanzerdivisionswouldmeetupwith10thTCthatwerespreadoutacrosstheirpath.By thispointboth11thPzDandGDwereoverextendedandexposedandneeded time toregroup,buttheordersweretocontinue.The11thPzDnearDubrovaattackedthe67thGRDand1stMB/3rdMC,with70ormorepanzersandbynighttimehadpushedtheSovietsfromthefrontlineintoDubrovawhichwasontheroadtoOboyan.ThiscausedHothtoorderthe3rdPzDevenclosertoGD intheSyrtsevoarea.Inadditiontothe3rdMCdefendingSyrtsevo,therewastheinfantryofthe67thGRDand90thGRDtodealwith.snk79.wdk129.hjj121m.mhz235.dgr209m.The11thPzDandGDmetfierceresistancefromColBaksov’s67thGRDandColNekrasov’s

52ndGRDastheyfoughttheirwaynorthward.By1700hrs,thesetwoGermandivisionscapturedthe fortifiedvillagesofNovo-Cherkasskoe,Alekseevka,Tiriechnoe,DmitrievkaandOlkhovka.WiththeGermansgainingcontrolofthesevillages,thetwoSovietdivisionsfellback,fightingarearguardactionbacktotheSyrtsevo-Dubrovkalineattherearoftheseconddefensebelt.The11thPzD,GD andLAHwere quick enough to catch and destroymany of these soldiers in theVorsklaandVorsklitsaRivervalleyswhilethesurvivorswereabletoslippasttheGermanlineduring nighttime hours. Moving forward, the 48th PzC headed for the fortified villages ofZavidovka, Syrtsevo and Lukhanino further east but still within the Pena River basin. Thesevillagesweredefendedbythe90thGRD,6thTCand3rdMCwhichputupstiffresistance.The3rdPzDwasslowedbyfightinginthePodimovka-Alekseevkaareaandhadfurthertroublewhenattacking Zavidovka. Initially the resistance was too much and the 3rd PzD pulled back toregroup.The67thGRDwassituatedinthemiddlebetween52ndGRDontheireasternflankandthe71stGRDonthewesternflankanddefendedaninemile linecrossingtheVorskoletsRiverValley to thewesternbankof theVorsklaRiver.The52ndGRDwason theeasternsideof theriverandhandledafourmilestretchwhilethe71stGRDdefendedanequalamounttothewest.vzz117.dgr80.dgk72+.dgk106m.dgr76m.Theleadingedgeof48thPzCmovednorthintotheseconddefensivebeltthatcontainedmany

dug-inT34s andartillery.The10thPzBhadmanyPanther failures todaycausedmostlyby therough terrainand themuddyground thatslowedGD’sadvance.The11thPzDcapturedseveralvillagesand reached thePenaRiver linenorthofCherkasskoe.By theendof theday, the48thPzC had penetrated through the first defensive belt, advancing along the general line to thesouthern banks of the Pena River eastward to Lakhanino. Knobelsdorff regrouped the corpsduring the night, with the exception of elements of the GD and 11th PzD, which were sentnorthwardalongbothsidesoftheroadtoOboyan.The167thIDwastheonlyunitinthesectorthat made any progress today without suffering heavy casualties. It secured Dmitrievka by

afternoonwhereitwasattachedto2ndSSPzC.snk77.snk79.dgr172m.dgk124m.gnk112m.By1500hrs,whentheissueofwhocontrolledHill247.2wassettled,theright-handregiment

ofGDwasapproachingDubrovawhentheycameuponastrongpointinfrontoftownamongthecornfieldsandrollinghills.ItwaspartoftheouteredgesofVatutin’sseconddefensivebeltandcontained a maze of trenches, bunkers,MG nests and buried Pak guns. German artillery wasdirectedon thesite,ashockgroupwithflamethrowerswasbroughtupandeachbunker, trenchandfoxholehadtobevanquishedoneatatime.Itwasacostlyordealbutitwasaccomplished.hsz121.IntheLukhanino-Syrtsevo-Hill247.2sector,theGermansrepeatedlytried,withthehelpofup

to200panzers,tobreakthroughthedefensesofthe90thGRD,1stTA’s6thTCand3rdMCbutfailed.Thiswaspartoftheseconddefensivebelt;thedefenseswerewellpreparedandVatutinwasbringingup1stTAtosupportthe6thGA.48thPzCwasbeginningtoshiftnortheastwardly,puttinggreaterpressureon3rdMCandlesson6thTC.The3rdPzDreachedthefortifiedvillageofLukhaninodespiteheavyresistancefrom6thTC.ItwasdecidedafterseeingaerialphotosofLukhaninothatitwouldbebettertoshellitfirstbeforeattacking.Oncetheattackbegan,itwouldbenecessarytoclearonefortifiedhouseatOlkhovkatimeuntilalltheunitsmadeittothestream,north of the village.TheSoviets began shellingLukhaninowhile friendlieswere still fighting.The shelling plus the discovery of a newminefield causedLtGeneralWesthoven to order hisforcesinthetowntopullbackuntiltheshellingstopped.TravelingalongtheLukhaninostream,the3rdPzDwasabletoreachtheeastbankofthePenaRiverbyevening.Inthesamesectorthe1stMBsuccessfullydefendedOlkhovkaagainstmanyattacksbyGDthatlastedallday.SeeMap23.dgk108.dgr209m.fkk248.vzz7m.gnk442.In late afternoon, theGD pivoted east between Lukhanino and Alekseevka before shifting

toward the river and after a brief but fierce fight created a small bridgehead across the PenaRiver.Furtherwest,the3rdPzDwastakingheavyfireandhadtopullbacktoCherkasskoewhichsecured the left flank of GD between Cherkasskoe and Iaoki. Later and still against heavyresistance,the3rdPzDalsocrossedthePenaRiver.TotherightofGD,the11thPzDstruckthe67th GRD at 1130 hrs and by 1500 hrs had pushed the Soviets back through Trirechnoe andDmitrievkatoOikova,oversixmilesfromthestartlinebutatleastamilefromthesecondline.The11thPzDalsopushedthe52ndGRDbacktotheseconddefensebeltatDubrova.Americanbuilt M3 tanks were being used by the Soviets; six were destroyed in this engagement. ThepanzersofGDwerebeinghamperedbyexcessivemuddyfieldsandonlysomeofthemtookpartin the assault on the fortified villages ofLukhanino andKalesnoie.GD had just capturedHill237.0andhadgoneontoattackthemoreimportantHill241.1whichoverlookedDubrova.Thedefendersweredeterminedtokeepthehillanditwastakingmorefromthegrenadierstoreachthetop.Asmoreofthedivisionreachedthesector,itwassentintoassist.Thissectorwaspartofthe seconddefensivebelt and as such thereweremany strongpoints the48thPzChad to clearbeforemoving on.While themain roads and strongpointswere cleared, the surrounding areaswerestillinfestedwiththeenemy.TheGermanswouldneverhaveamoment’srestfrompartisanattacksintherearareas.LyingsouthofDubrovaandtothenorthofCherkasskoe,thesehillslaydirectlyalongthelineofadvancetothekeyvillageofSyrtsevowhichwasdefendedbythe250tanksofKrivoshein’s3rdMC.wdk128+.dgr172m.hjj115.hjj121m.mhz234.dgr209m.gnk312m.

dgk106m.dgk95m.The48thPzCmovednorthtowardthePselRiverbendwhichwasanimportantobjectivefor

theday.The11thPzDwasadvancingwell and its commander,Mickl, thoughthis reconpatrolmightreachtheriverbytonightormostlikelythenextday.Nearby,LAHandDasReichmovedontoGresnoe.NortheastofCherkasskoeafterfightingfiercelyallday,11thPzDwasabletoreachandcapturethevillageofOlkhovkawiththesupportofthe167thID.Bytheendofthedayonthewest side ofGD, the 3rd PzD had reached the Pena River but had failed to cross it in anysignificantway.mhz236.dgk94.dgk106m.Duringthepredawnhours,Vatutinreleasedthe72gun27thATBandotherunitstomoveinto

67thGRDand90thGRDsectorsalongthePenaRiver tobolster the lineagainst the48thPzC.dgk98.Strachwitz’spanzergroupwasonlythreemilesnorthofCherkasskoewhenitwasattackedby

tanksofthe245thTR.ThePantherBrigadewhichwastostayincommunicationwithStrachwitz,whowas nowhere to be found. Deckerwas still angrywith Strachwitz for his blunder at theravine the previous day and did not want his machines to fall under a commander that haddifferent views of fighting a battle. Strachwitz had been slowed down in front of a tank ditchlocated in frontofHill241.1,westofDubrova.Knobelsdorffwasgettingangrywith the slowprogress and was trying to motivate his officers. He also had to contend with the increasingfriction caused by the arguing Strachwitz and Decker. Decker had made some accurateaccusations thatKnobelsdorff shouldhave actedonbut didnot and it caused the lossofmanyPanthersoverthenextweek.By2100hrs,theGrenadiersofGDreachedtheedgeofDubrovaandwerefightingtoenterthe

town.AtthesametimetheFusiliersofGDcapturedHill210.7northofCherkasskoeandby2100hrshadcapturedLukhaninoandcreatedasmall,tenuousbridgeheadontheothersideofthePenaRiver.gnk146+.(July6)Atnight,FMvonMansteinorderedthe2ndSSPzCtogain12milesthenextdayandreachthe

thirddefensebeltwhichstretchedfromjustsouthofOboyantoProkhorovka.Thepanzercorpswouldhavetodrivetothenortheast,crossthePselRiveraswellascontinueontheroadthatledtoProkhorovka.ThePselRiverranabout25milessoutheastfromOboyanbeforeturningtothenortheast,passingthreemilesnorthwestofProkhorovka.TheriverprovidedanexcellentnaturaldefensefortheSoviets.The48thPzConthewestflankwasalsoorderedtoreachthePselRiverbetweenSchipyandOlkhovskithencrosstheriverandheadforOboyan.wdk133.The3rdPzD,11thPzDandtheGDdivisionsmovednorthand,withthehelpoftheLuftwaffe,

pushedthe67thGRDbackintothe52ndGRD’sdefensebeltwhichwasfightingtheSSpanzerstothe east of 48th PzC’s sector.By evening both the 67th and the 52ndRDs had to fall back tobeyond the second defense belt leaving just the 90th GRD and 3rdMC defending the sector.Reachingthesecondbeltthe48thPzCmaderepeatedattemptsthroughoutthenight,gainingsomegroundbutfailingtobreakallthewaythrough.dgk105.ItwasonlyatLukhaninobytheendofthedaythatGDwasabletopenetratetheseconddefense

belt.The3rdPzDwasstillat thePenaRiverandthe11thPzDwaswestofBykovka.mhz236.lck271.As it started to get dark, Group Remer ofGD bypassed the heavily fortified Dubrova and

capturedHill247.2wheretheyduginforthenight.TheywouldattackDubrovainthemorning.hsz121.The 11th PzD alongwith elements of 167th ID stopped for the night justwest of Bykovka.

lck271.By the end of the day, the 48th PzC had linked up with 2nd SS PzC near Iakovlevo. This

GermansalientwastentativelyheadingstraightforOboyan.The48thPzChadreachedalinethattouchedthePenaRiverandreachedSyrtsevintheeast.SyrtsevwasduewestofSolonetswhichtheLAHhadreachedthepreviousnight.Inotherwords,the48thPzCwasafulldaybehindtheSS. Solonetswas just onemile south of Iakovlevo. In the preceeding two days, the 48th PzCclaimedtohavelost300AFVs.Thoughmanyofthesevehicleswouldberepaired,thetimeoffthebattlefieldwouldbeconsiderableandwouldhaveadefiniteimpactontheGermanadvance.TheLuftwaffehadlost100planesintheprevioustwodays.dgk111+.dgr172m.Inthe48thPzCsector,theSovietswerenowstrikingtheflanksaswell.Vatutinwantedamajor

counter-attackandKatukov,whichhadmovedhis1stTAuptotheseconddefensivebeltduringthepredawnhours,triedtopersuadehiscommandertodelaytheattackastheGermanswerestilltoostrong.Vatutinwouldnotchangehismind, soKatukov talked toStalin.Stalin thenorderedVatutin to delay the attack for at least another day. Vatutin, though downsizing the attack, stillorderedafewlocalattackstolaunchnextmorning.The1stTAhadbeenassembledinreserve,northofthePselRivernotfarfromOboyan.Itwasa20miletripthatKatukov’shundredsoftanksmade in a half of a day. The 6th TC and 3dMC led the tripwith the newly formed 31st TCfollowing.The112thTBof6thTCbroughtuptherearandwasconsideredthereserve.Katukovsentaspeedyreconpatrolaheadtoreconnoiterthesecondlineandreportbacktohim;hedidnotwantanysurpriseswhenhisarmyarrived.Itwasnotlongafter6thTCand3rdMCarrivedatthelinethattheGermansarrivedandattacked,quicklypenetratingbothcorps,especiallythe3rdMCsector.Katukovhasbeencriticizedforhaving3rdMCinfirstecheloninsteadof31stTC.zra59+.zow145.The 4th PzA had reported a net loss of 263 panzers to AGS for the first two days of the

campaign. The figure had been higher but the repair shopswereworking around the clock torepairandgetthepanzersbacktothebattlefield.mhz238.With Knobelsdorff aware of the bickering between Strachwitz and Decker, the corps

commandertookstepstorectifytheissuebyremovingDeckerfromcommandofhisbrigadeandgivingtheentirePantherbrigadetoColonelStrachwitz.Theresolutionwascontroversialforthefirsttwodays;GDlosttwo-thirdsoftheir300panzers.gnk148.Bytheendofthesecondday,DasReichhadtraveled13miles,penetratedtwodefensebelts

and was heading toward the third. LAH’s move was comparable, maybe a little better. Theadvancewasgoodbutitwasonlyonatenmilefrontwhichmeantitwasfragile.HothhadcalledKnobelsdorffwithexplicitorderstomakesure11thPzD’srightflankcaughtupandlinkedwiththeleftflankofLAH.OntheSovietside, the6thGA’sdefenseshadbeenpenetrated inseveralplaces, had heavy losses ofmen and itsHQhad lost control of its divisions. vzz131. vzz133.dgk100++.dgk109+.Vatutin,inordertosafeguardthewesternapproachestoOboyan,ordered40thArmytomove

itsforcesalongtheProletarski-VengerovkalinetoblockanypossibleexpansionontheKorovino-

Rakitnoeaxis.dgr78.dgr76m+.Bytheendoftheday,thethreedivisionsof48thPzChadfailedtoreachtheirobjectiveofthe

PselRiver.TherepeatedattacksbytheSovietsonKnobelsdorff’sflankcausedmoreresourcestobe diverted from the front to the side. As the ground battle heated up, the demands on theLuftwaffe increased and it was becoming increasingly difficult to get air support in a timelymanner.Themobileflankformationswerealsobeingusedforgroundattackwhereahugeamountofammowasbeingexpended.Despitetheincreasingresistance,Hoth’s4thPzAwasabletogainsixmilesinmanyplaces.dgk108.mhz233+.dgr214.At 0300 hrs, the panzers of 3rd PzC resumed moving to the northeast from Belgorod area

towardKorocha,theirprimaryobjective.hjj123m.Duringthepredawnhours,the6thPzDcrossedtheRazumnaiaRiveratMiasoedovo,11miles

eastofBelgorod,andredeployedbehindthe7thPzDbeforeshiftingdirectiontowardMelikhovotofillthegapbetween19thPzDand7thPzD.Whilethe19thPzDand7thPzDhadcrossedtheDonets in strength early that morning, it would not be 6th PzD’s turn until midday. The linefollowedtheBelgorod-Korocharoad13milesnortheastofBelgorod.Thethreepanzerdivisionsthenattackedand,despitehaving300panzers,progresswasslowagainstheavyartillery.Southof7th PzD, Group Raus and the 42nd IC broke into the Soviet first defense belt despite stiffresistance,especiallyfromthe78thRD,betweentheDonetsandKorenRivers.Alittlelaterinthedaythe106thIDwasattachedto7thPzDatKrutoriLog,10milessoutheastofBelgorodandadvanceddueeastdrivingbackthe73rdGRDto theseconddefensivebelt thatrannorth-southabout 11miles east of theDonets.By noon the 106th reached the second line at Poliana, fivemilessouthwestofKrutoiLog.The106thIDandthe320thIDnextdoorcouldnotadvanceanyfurther that day against 24th GRC. wdk131+. dgr172m. mhz240. dgr155m. dgr173m. erz204.hjj123m.In 7th GA sector, further reinforcements were brought up. Col Trunin’s 92nd GRD, Maj

GeneralTikhomirov’s93rdGRDandColRusskikh’s94thGRDofMajGeneralGoriachev’s35thGRCmovedupandwereinplaceby0300hrson7/6.The111thRD,183rdRDand270thRDof69thArmymovedintotheProkhorovkaarea,northoftown.OthertankbrigadesmovedcloseraswellstoppingintheBatratskaiaDachaarea,10mileseastoftheDonetsRivertoblockthepathof19thPzD.OtherunitsstoppedatGremuchiandthePolianaStateFarmnearKrutoiLogtoblock7thPzD.ElementsofMajGeneralVasilev’s24thGRC(213thRDandthe27thTB)stoppedatMaslovaPristanitoblock320thIDandanothergroup,whilethe15thGRDand111thRDmovedintoNekliudovo-ChuraevoareaontheeasternsideoftheKorenRiver.Onthesoutheasternflankagainst11thICand7thPzD,Vatutinsentthe25thGRCsupportedby31stTDB,the167thTRandthe1438thSURegimenttotheBatratskaiaDachasector,rightbehindtheseconddefensivebelt.Asecond reinforcement groupwas sent to block 19thPzD, further northeast of the first group. Itincluded the 1529th SU Regiment, the 1669th TDR and this formation would assemble nearGremiachi to block 19th PzD. Gremiachi is roughly eight miles south of Batratskaia Dacha.dgr77mwdk130+.vzz108.lck247.Following orders before daybreak Shumilov, using his 7th GA’s second echelon forces,

attackedthenewbridgeheadthatKempfestablishedthepreviousdaynearBelgorodontheeastbanksoftheDonets.AdvancingfromnearGremuchiandthePolianaStateFarmtheSovietsdrove

towardKrutoiLogwherethe7thPzDbivouacforthenight.vzz108.gnk141.The 6th PzD, following orders, reached the Razumnaia River at Solomino aiming to attack

Generalovka before moving on to reach within a mile south of the strongpoint village ofIastrebovo,whichwasdefendedbyelementsofthe92ndGRDand94thGRD.ThedivisionmaderelativelygoodtimeandwasabletocrosstheSolominobridgeby1430hrs.Generalovkawasavillageon thesouthernbankof theRazumnaiaRiver,duesouthof the larger townofBlizhhaiaIgumenka.Iastrebovowasalittleeastforthosetwositesandverticallyinthemiddleofthetwo.dlu34.dgr155m.dgr173m.dgr39m.dlu30.dgk136.nzk88.zzt88+.During the predawn hours, the 7th PzD was frequently attacked by Soviet fighters which

slowedtheGermanpreparationsbutcausedlittledeath.At0615thedivisionlaunchedwiththesupportoftheTigersofsPzAbt503.Afterabriefbutfiercebattle,the7thPzDbrokethroughthefrontlineandheadedforKrutoiLogalonganarrowaxis,clearinganyresistanceleftoverfromyesterday.gnk141.AdvancingalongtheRazumnaia,alargeslowmovingriver,theleadelementsofthe7thPzD

climbed the ridge and attacked and captured Krutoi Log to the southwest. The advance wasresumedalongtheriver.AtBatratskaiaDacha,thedivisionwasstoppedbystrongartillery.Thesubsequent counter-attack along the wood line south of the village was repulsed. The leadelements of 7th PzDwould have towait until the next daywhenmore of the division arrivedbeforepushingontowardthefortifiedvillageofMiasoedovo.fkk293+.dgr39m.dgr155m.After the capture of Krutoi Log, the 7th PzD tried advancing northward, to clear the area

aroundHill216.1tothewestofBatratskaiaDachaKolkhoz.Theadvancewasstoppedbyheavyshellingfrominfrontofthehill.TheLuftwaffewascalledintoassist.Theadvancewasabletocontinueafter theStukashadbeencalled in.Thisareawaswoodedand theSovietshadsetupnumerousambusheswhichslowedtheadvancethoughtheleadunitsofthedivisionstillmadeitsixmilesnorthofthecapturedtownofKrutoiLogbylateafternoon.dlu35+.dgr39m.Duringthenightandpredawnhours,the6thPzDmovedtoitsnewlaunchpointfurthersouthof

Belgorod.Theydidnotgetpermissiontostartuntillaterinthemorningbutby1200hrsthebulkofthedivisionwasontheeastsideoftheDonetsandheadingthroughthecorridorthat7thPzDhadclearedforKrutoiLog.Withinminutesofthecrossing,the6thPzDwasattackedfromtheairaswell as shelled.By1800hrs, the6thPzD joined7thPzDand together attackedHill216.1.ElementsoftheinfantrymovedoutandheadedforHill207.9,amilenorthofBatratskaiaDachabutitwouldtakeuntilmidnighttosecurethetwohillsandthevillage.Thetwodivisionsstoppedtheiradvanceforthenightandwouldresumeatdaybreak.gnk143.snk20.dlu30.dlu31m.zzt88.TheGermanattackeastofBelgorod,especiallyaroundtheenemystrongholdofKreida,was

verydifficultandmadenoprogress.TheSovietscounteredthroughthewoodswestofKorenwithseveralRDsandatankbrigadedrivingtotheShevekino-Belgorodroadagainstthe106thIDbutwere stopped with the help of 11th IC’s assault guns which inflicted heavy losses. ThemainSovietattackwasbetweenPolianaandShcholokovoandwhiledetermined,itwasuncoordinated.Duringthebattlethe198thIDwasbroughtuptohelpandinthedaystocomeplayedapivotalroleindefending3rdPzC’sflank.Raus’s11thICwasmakingthesmallestgains.Thefailureof3rd PzC to quickly capture theKreida-StaryiGorod strongholdwould have immense negativeimpactfortheGermancampaigninthedaystocome.wwf83.snk51*+.nzk88.

Trailingelementsofthe7thPzDalsoadvancedleavingthe106thIDand320thIDof11thICtoguard its flank. Heavy fighting erupted as the Soviet Volchansk Group attacked 11th IC. TheBezlydovka bridgehead along the Donets was abandoned in order to narrow the front andconcentratetheforcesof11thIC.bt84.erz204.StillonthewestbankoftheDonets,the106thIDremainedonthedefensive.The6thPzDhad

redeployed from Staryi Gorod to the southeast behind the 7th PzD, which was the only unitmakingprogressin3rdPzCsector.ThepanzerdivisionswereabletofinallybreakthroughtheSovietlinetogainthehighgroundatMiasoedovoandthentowardMelikhovo.Coordinatingitsattack with 7th PzD, 11th IC captured the high ground between Koren and the Donets beforeturning northeast, waiting for the expected counterattack. snk50. dgr172m. dgr155m. dgr39m.vzz5m.dlu37+.The6thPzD,afterbeingredeployedbehind7thPzD,shifteddirectionalittleandheadedfor

MelikhovobywayofIastrebovo.shn159.dgr155m.dgr155m.dgr173m.zzt88+.Advancing betweenRazumnoe,which had been captured in costly fighting by 19thPzD and

KrutoiLog,the7thPzDpushedasidethe233rdRRof78thGRD,trappingforcesnorthofKrutoiLogbeforebeingambushedbythe73rdGRD.Duringthisdayandthefollowingday,the7thPzDrepeatedlyattackedthedefensesofColKozak’s73rdGRDbutwererepulsedeachtimeuntilthe6thPzDarrivedtothelinebetween7thand19thPzDsandrolleduptherightflankoftheSoviets,forcingthe73rdGRDbacktothelowridgerunningfromGremuchithroughBatratskaia.Thoughthe74thPzGRwasmakingsomeprogress,the442ndPzGRof168thIDwasassignedto19thPzDtospeeditsadvancethroughthisdifficultsection.dgk111+.dgr172m.dgr39m.dlu43+.TheKempfGroup,with7thPzDand19thPzDleadingtheway,crossedtheNorthernDonets

thepreviousdayandattacked7thGA.The6thPzDjoinedthecolumnthisearlyafternoonafterredeploying. The 19th PzDwheeled northwestward against the left flank and rear of the 81stGRD.Despiteheavyresistancebythe81stGRDandsupportingtanks,theGermanssucceededinseizingKreidaStationandtothenorthofGeneralovkathekeytownofBelovskoe.Afterwardsasplintergroupbrokeawayfrom19thPzDandheadedforBelovskaiaandthenearbyStateFarm.WhilethisgroupadvancedontheFarm,Sovietaircraftmaderepeatedattacksonthecolumn.TheGermans continued to advance but hit aminefield that quickly damaged14panzers.While theGermans were trying to escape this trap, Soviet artillery from the 114th Guards ArtilleryRegimentdamaged another four panzers.By1500hrs, thepanzers andmenof 73rdPzGR thatcould free themselvesshifteddirection tobypass thisstrongpoint.The74thPzGRmovedup tocontinuethefightfortheStateFarm,fortheGermanscouldnotallowtheSovietstostaybehind.While thefightingcontinued,Germanengineersclearedpathways through theminefield.Seeingthe19thPzDmakingprogress,Vatutinshiftedthe78thGRDandColKozak’s73rdGRDtoblockthepanzers’path.dgk111+.gnk142.Eastof theDonetswheredenseforest lay, the7thPzD,19thPzDand then the6thPzDwere

beingbombardedbyeitherartilleryhiding in the treesorbyminefields. ItwasrelativelyslowgoingfortheGermans.Inoneexampleoftheday,theleadTigersofthesPzAbt503werecaughtinaminefieldbuttheMkIIIsandMkIVstotheflankshadmissedtheminefieldandattackedtoreduce the shelling on the Tigers. As it turned out both the Tigers and theMks were heavilyshelled.mhz240.

Elementsofthe198thIDweredeployedonthewesternflankof3rdPzCneartheDonetsRiver.Fortheprevioustwodaysandforthenextfewdaystocome,whilefiercefightingwasoccurringin this section, additional units of 198th IDwould be arriving fromChuguyev. The additionaltroopshelpedbutthefrontlinestillcouldnotbesignificantlypenetratedagainstfierceresistance.erz206.dgr97.sPzAbt 503 attached to 6thPzDdestroyed 21 various tanks and several guns today.By late

afternoonafterfightingallday,the6thPzDwasabletoturntheleftflankof73rdGRD,forcingittopullbackfromtheridgenorthofGermuchitothefortifiedvillageofBatratskaiaDacha.Atthispointthe6thPzDcouldgonofurther.The11thPzRof6thPzDbeddeddownforthenightnearHill209.9andwasambushedtwicebutwasable torepulsebothattacks.Nextmorningthe6thPzDwasheadingforGeneralovkatosupport the19thPzDinitsattackofBlizhniaiaIgumenka.The 6th’s recon team was already at Kolonozh-Dubovzh. dlu34. dgr155m. dgr173m. dgr39m.lck269.Workingnotfarfrom7thPzD’sinfluence,the11thIC’s106thIDwithsomedifficultycaptured

thehighgroundwestofKorek.ThewholesectorcenteringonKreidawasaSoviet strongholdanddifficulttoclear.Evenwhenasectionwascleared,theSovietswouldfanaticallytrytotakeitback.Nothingwasgoingeasyfor106thIDorthe11thIC.RaushadtaughthisinfantryatechniquetoseparatetheSoviettanksfromtheprotectionofitsinfantryanditseemedtobeworkingquitewellontheSovietcounterattacks.TheGermaninfantrywouldallowtheSoviettankstopenetratethe front line without resistance and then once past would mow down the Soviet infantryfollowinginitswake.The88batteriesinsecondechelonwoulddestroytheT34sastheyneared.Manytanksweredestroyedinthismanner.erz204+.The168thID,nowunderHunersdorff,caughtupwiththe6thPzDandweretakingsomeofthe

pressure off the panzers. The 6th PzD was trying to cross the Razumnaia River at SolominobeforetheSovietsdestroyedthebridge.Onceacross, thepanzersheadedforGeneralovkawiththeultimategoalofreachingIastrebovobynight.With tenTigers in the lead,Generalovkawaseventuallyattacked.TheSovietsrespondedwithheavyartilleryandfighterscomingintosupport.Neither action stopped the Tigers and after a while, the panzers were overrunning the Sovietposition.17Soviettanksandmanygunsweredestroyedintheengagement.SomepanzersbrokeoffanddrovetonearbySolovzhevKolkhoztosecurethataswell.Theyhitanotherminefieldontheway andneededhelp from the sappers to clear the field.Some sapperswere killed in theprocess,fortheminefieldwasbeingcoveredbyartillery.dlu30+.dgr39m.During the predawn hours, Vatutin brought up Kozak’s 73rd GRD plus attachments to the

BatratskaiaDachasector,whichincludedtwoimportanthills,toblockthepathof7thPzD.ThehillswereHill216.1andHill207.9andweredefendedbythe31stAnti-tankBattalion.Duringthe day and into the early evening, the 7th PzD fought for this sector but failed each time.EventuallyHill207.9fell,soonfollowedbytheotherhill,andthenby2200hrsthevillagefell.gnk142.dgr77m.dlu33.Afterdark,7thPzDreachedIastrebovo.With7thPzDintheleadandthe6thPzDtrailing,they

werebeinghitthehardestontheirflanksfromSovietambush.Theareawaswooded,encouragingSovietambushandhinderingthepanzers’speed.Thepanzerdivisionswerehitbythenewassaultgunsthatsporteda122mmgun,theSU-122.ItmadequiteanimpressionontheGermantankers.

shn159.dgr155m.Atnight,thenewlyarrived111thRDreplaced15thGRDonthefrontlinebetweenShebekino

andVolchanskinorderforthe15thGRDtodeploybetweenNekliudovoandChuraevoalongtheeasternbankoftheKorenRiver.The270thRDwhichmovedupwiththe111thRDthepreviousnightwassenttodefendtheShebekinoareatonight.dgr78++.dgr100m.The 3rd PzC fought its way slowly northeast of Belgorod. Its 6th PzD and 168th ID were

embroiledinbitterfightingalongbothbanksoftheDonetsRiver,abattlethatragedforthenextthree days.The168th ID finally broke through the first defense belt southeast ofMikhailovka,BelgorodandwasabletoheadtowardStaryiGorodthreemilesnortheastofBelgorod.Therightflankof168th,followingbehind19thPzDandclearingtheresidual,wasmakingbetterprogress.The two divisions were trying to expand the Milhailovka bridgehead but were having littlesuccess.The6thPzDmovedtoDorogobuzhhinoandlaunchedanattacktothenortheast.The19thPzD,deployedbetweenthe168thIDand6thPzDtotheeast,wasabletopushthe78thGRDbackto Blizhniaia Igumenka, over six miles northeast of Belgorod. bt84. dgr81. dgr39m. dgr77m.vzz5m.dlu44.The 3rd PzC’smain assault, the 7th PzDwith the 6th PzD close by, advanced fromNizhni

OlshanetstowardKrutoiLog.Bytheendoftheday,ithadcapturedandsecuredtheKrutoiLogareaandalsoRazumnoe,GeneralovkaandBelinska.Theday’sfightingfor3rdPzCwouldbeoneofthehardestdaysofthecampaign,foreachofthesevillageshadbeenturnedintoastrongpointwithplentyofsupportingartillery.The81stGRDhadfallenbacktotheDenUrozhaiCollectiveFarm;the78thGRDandthe73rdGRDfellbacktotheline:Belovskaia,BatratskaiaDachaStateFarmandtheKorenskaiaDacha.The213thRDand72ndGRDoccupiedthelinefromGremuchitoPriutovka.wdk131.hjj121m.dgr155m.dgr173m.dgr39m.wwf89.bt84.dgr81.dlu33.TheKempfGroup,despitelackofairsupport,wasabletoslowlyadvancetothehighground

between theDonets andKorenRivers but the 3rd PzCwas unable to secure the east bank ofKorochaRiverandwhileleavingresistanceontheirflankhadtostrikenorthtosecuretheeastflankofHoth’s4thPzA.Kempfwasfallingtoofarbehindthe2ndSSPzCbyextendingitseastflanksovonMansteinchangedtheattackboundariestoavoidgoingtoofareast.Evenatthisearlystage,itcouldbeseentheeastflankwouldhaveitstroublesandnotcontributetothedegreethatithadtoforthecampaigntobeasuccess.FMvonMansteinshouldhavebeenmoreproactiveinadjustingthebattleplanandinsupervisingGeneralHoth.hjj123m.More Soviet planes flew in theKursk battlefield on this day, having a greater affect on the

attackingGermans.TheRedAirForceclaimed theydowned100planeswhile reporting1,632sortiesflowninthesouth.dgk93.rkz167.

T

7

July6thontheNorthernSalientSeeMap3

he4thPzDwascalledupfromreservesaheadofscheduleandwouldtravelfromTaginotoNovotroitzki to theOkaRiver arriving at their assemblypoint by0100hrs on7/7 to

awaitfurtherorders.fkk56.dgk87m.dgk92m.lck116m.Onthepreviousday,Modelreleasedonlyonefullpanzerdivision(plusassaultgunsandother

attachments),the20thPzD,whichgaveRokossovskytimetodeterminemorefullywhichaxesofattacktodefendagainst.Duringthepredawnhoursmanyreinforcementswerebroughtuptotheline,makingModel’sjobsomuchharder.Modelshouldhaveattackedharderinaconcentratedeffort along his primary axis to reachOlkhovatka by the end of the first day. lck256. dgk87m.dgk92m.At0200hrs,Grigoryev’s16thTCbegananassaulton20thPzDandtheaccompanyingPzAbt

21attheirbridgeheadatSaburovka.At0350hrs, theinfantryof17thGRCjoinedtheattackasdidtheplanesofRudenko’s16thAF.By0600hrsafullyfledgedbattlewasoccurringbetweenSaburovkaintheeastandSamodorovkainthewestwiththeGermanslosingground,butby0900hrstheGermanshadstoppedtheattackandstabilizedtheline.PanzercompaniesweresentoutinanindependentactiontoscoutoutweaknessesintheSovietlinenearHill230.4whichwasnearthesouthernedgeofSaburovka.Thecompanyofassaultgunscameuponthebattlethat20thPzDwasinandwithoutordersjoinedthemeleewithitsthreeStuGIIIs.ModelsawachancetoreachOlkhovatkaandsentthetwopanzerdivisionsstillinreserve,the2ndPzDand9thPzD,toexploitthisweakness.Theskieswereclearandthetemperaturewasinthehigh80sbyafternoonandtheair forces of both sides were out looking for targets of opportunity. The 16th TC brought upreservesandexertedgreaterpressureonthemenofthe20thPzD.SomuchpressurethatoncetheGermansreachedthekeyroadsouthofHill230.4theyhaltedandstarteddiggingin.ThebattleragedforhoursandsomeofthepanzershadtogobacktoSaborovkatoberesupplied.The2ndPzDdeployedalmost100panzersand,withsPzAbt505’s24Tigers,wereaddedtothemixforatotalof300panzersnowfightinginanareaofsevenmileswideandtwodeepthathadexpandedbetween Saburovka and Ponyri. Tanks from both sides, but more Soviet, were littering thecountrysidebynowbutby1800hrsanewwaveof50T34scameracingontothebattlefield.Thiswas theearlyhotspotof thecampaignandGeneralRokossovskywas trying toblunt theattackbeforeitgotoutofhand.Thenewtankswereattackingthewesternflank,tryingtoturntheline,and eventually the flank was threatened. GeneralModel sent reserves to Bobrik to block theattack.mhz242.fkk55.fkk102m.lck290.wwf51+.dgk87m.dgr199m.dgk92m.lck116m.kfz457.dgk93.zzt75+.

At0230hrsonthatrainyTuesdaymorning,theLuftwaffeattackedSovietpositionsinfrontoftheadvancingpanzers.Theirtargetsweretankcolumnscominguptothefrontline.Thesesameplanesmaderaidsthepreviousnightonthesamepositions.AtthattimetheGermanshadtofightoffmanySovietfighters.TheGermansclaimknockingdown162Sovietplaneswhilelosingonlyseven.fkk54.dgk87m.dgk92m.AfterRokossovskybroughtupreinforcementsduringthepredawnhourstobolsterthesecond

defensebelt,theGermanshadamuchhardertime.The16thTCwenttoOlkhovatkatoface47thPzC,the19thTCtoMolotyschiagainst20thPzD,the17thGRCtoKasharanorthofOlkhovatkaagainst6thID,the18thGRCtoMaloarkhangelskagainst78thADandthe9thTCtoadvanceintotheCentralFrontreserve.The60thand65thArmiesonthewestfaceoftheKurskbulgesentthe11thGTB to the2ndTAand twoother regiments.The48thArmy sent the2ndAB to the13thArmy.Theattemptedcounteroffensiveby2ndTAandthewesternelementsofthe13thArmywaspremature,uncoordinatedandwasrepulsedwiththehelpoftheinfusionofthe2ndPzDand9thPzDduringthepredawnhoursintothelinewestofPonyri.Afterthe2ndTAlaunched,the104thTBand164thTBmovedclosertotheline.Iftheywereneeded,itwouldtakethemonlyminutestoreact.Thetwobrigadesdidenterbattlebutwerequicklyshatteredandhadtopullback.SeeMap3.wdk174.kcz168.dgr198m.dgk87m.wwf51+.dgk92m.lck116m.kfz458.Duringthepredawnhours,RokossovskyorderedRodin’s2ndTAtodeploytojustnorthofthe

Teploe-Olkhovatka-Ponyriline.Itwastheseconddefensebelt.Thearmywithitsattachmentshadnearly600tanksand50,000men.The17thGRCwassenttothePonyrisectorand18thGRCwassenttotheMaloarkhangelsksector.The19thTCwasmovedclosertoOlkhovatkasector.lck227.dgk87m.dgr199m.wwf51.dgk92m.Inthe47thPzC’ssector,theSovietshadbroughtreinforcementsuptothelinetoplugthegapas

wellas200tanks.Amajortankbattleensuedthatlastedfordays.TheGermansinflictedheavycasualtiesandpushed theSovietsback to theNikolskoe-Olkhovatka-Ponyri linewhereanotherseriesofstrongpointshadbeenbuilt.snk107.fkk102m.dgk87m.dgr199m.dgk92m.Model penetrated the first defensive belt the previous daywith his infantry.On this day the

second defensive belt that included Ponyri, Olkhovatka and Samodurovka would be his nextobjective and he would use his panzers to exploit that gap near Gnilets. During the predawnhours,Rokossovskyreinforcedthislineanditwouldbetwiceashardtocrackthanthepreviousday.The2ndTAand16thTCweredeployedbetweenPonyriandOlkhovatkawhilethe17thGRCduginbetweenSaburovkaandSamodurovka.Otherunitswerealsobroughtup.TheSovietAFreceivedadditionalplanesanditwouldnotbelongbeforetheLuftwaffewouldlosecontroloftheskiesinthenorthernsalient.GniletswaswestofPonyriandnorthofTeploe/Samodurovka.Itwasalsoontheboundarylinebetween41PzCand47thPzC.BytheendofthedayModelhadsuffered 25,000 casualties and 200 panzerswere either damaged or destroyed. Itwas a largepricetopayforsuchsmallreturns.lck289+.dgk87m.swm138.lck116m.dgk92m.zro204.WorkingthroughoutthepredawnhoursLtGeneralRodin’s2ndTAcompleteditsredeployment

to the Teploe and Olkhovatka area. His 19th TC, recently attached and commanded by MajGeneralVasilev,wasonthewestwhileMajGeneralSinenko’s3rdTCwasontheeast,closertoPonyri.BetweenthesetwocorpswasMajGeneralGrigoyev’s16thTCwhichwasfinishinguprefueling and preparing for the expected battle at daybreak. One distinctive feature of

Rokossovsky’s defense at his three critical points ofOlkhovatka, Ponyri andMaloarchangelskwasthatwitheachpassingday,shellingincreasedagainsteachGermanassaultonthevillagesoftheseconddefensebelt.RokossovskyspentalmosttwiceasmanyshellsasVatutin.Survivorsofthe Ponyri battles would liken it to a small scale Stalingrad. mhz242+. mhz246. mhz19m.dgr198m.fkk102m.dgk87m.dgr199m.wwf51.dgk91.dgk92m.Rokossoskybeganhisopeningbarragebeforehiscounter-attackwaslaunched.Modelduring

thenighthadassembledthe2ndPzDand9thPzDalongwithsPzAbt505intonewpositionsforhisplannedattackinthecenterofthelinebutwerestruckhardbytheSovietbarrage.Withbothsidesreinforcingtheirline,theupcomingescalatedtankbattlewouldlastforfourdaysalongtheemptyridgeswestofPonyriStationandwouldbethesecondlargesttankbattleofthecampaign.BetweenPonyriandSaburovka,overathousandtanksofbothsides,accompaniedbyinfantryandartillery firing over open sights, determinedly fought for possession of the key villages ofOlkhovatka,SamodurovkaandnearbyHill274.dgk91+.dgr198m.fkk102m.dgk87m.dgr199m.mkz118.dgk92m.lck116m.At0330hrs, the47thPzC resumed its attack, striving for adecentpenetrationof theSoviet

line.On the left flank,Grossmann’s 6th ID alongwith the grenadiers of the 18th PzD and thepanzersof9thPzDattemptedtobypassthefortifiedvillageofSaburovkaandheadforHill274and Olkhovatka. At this point, Model was confident that the villages of Ponyri, Olkhovatka,KasharaandTeploewouldbecaptured thatdaywith the increasedpresenceof the twopanzerdivisions.On47thPzC’sleftflank,the292ndIDand86thIDcontinuedtodrivetowardPonyri.LtGeneral Luebbe’s 2nd PzD with its 140 panzers plus assault guns would secure Gnilets andBobrik on theirway toHill 272 andTeploe.VonKessel’s 20thPzD and 31st IDof 46thPzCwould advance southwards along 2nd PzD’s west flank. It turned out that 20th PzD reachedGnilets first and by 0830 hrswas fighting inside the village.By 0900 hrs,Gniletswas underGerman control. The secondary attacks by 46th PzD in thewest and 23rd IC in the eastwerescaled back in order to use their artillery in the center.mkz117. dgk92m. lck116m. snz233++.snz239.At0350hrs,Rokossovskybeganaheavypreparationalongmuchoftheattacklinetosoftenup

theGermansbeforehis landassaultbegan.At0400hrs,Soviet fighterspassedover17thGRCand 16th TC sector looking for opportunities when the Luftwaffe showed. A major dogfightensuedbutdespitecasualtiesonbothsidesneither sidegained theadvantage.At0500hrs, the17th GRC finally started to get an advantage over the enemy, forcing them to fall back. TheSovietswere able to reach theDruzhovetski-Step-Saburovka line (northeast of Samodurovka).On the right of 17th GRC, the 148th RD and 74th RD was fighting, making modest progresstowardTrosnaandSemenovka.OncepastDruzhovetski,LtColTeliakov’s107thTBof16thTCheadedforButyrkibutbeforereachingthevillageitwasambushedbypanzerswhichwereableto destroy 46 tanks before the 164th TB could come up to support. They also incurred heavycasualtiesandtogetherthetwoSovietbrigadesof16thTCpulledbackbetweenOlkhovatkaandPonyri.With16thTCseverelydamaged,13thArmysentupothermobileforcestostrengthentheline.Afterrepulsingthetanks,theGermansadvancedtowardOlkhovatkaagainst17thGRC.By1300hrs, the17thGRCandtheremainingsupportingtanksmadeafightingwithdrawalbacktothe second defense belt near Olkhovatka where they were able to stop the German advance.

dgr114.dgr108m.lck116m.dgk87m.dgr199m.cbk42.nzk87.nzk86m.dgk92m.dgk93.At 0350 hrs Rokossovsky launched his counterattackwhichwas supported by fighters. The

Soviet forces pushed out of the Olkhovatka area to the north and with the 19th TC fromSamodurovkatothenorthwest.Thisactionwasmeanttorestoretheleftwingof13thArmyandtherightflankof70thArmy.AftertheSovietcounterwashalted,the9thPzDand2ndPzD,withthesupportofsPzAbt505,resumedtheiradvancebetweenPonyriStationandSaburovkafortheirmain target of Olkhovatka but were stopped once again. During the night, RokossovskyinterpretedGermanactionsandredeployedhisforces.The18thRDwassenttoMaloarkhangelskand the 3rd TC was sent to Ponyri but was released to battle in increments. The 17th GRCreinforcedthe13thArmyandthe19thTCwaspositionedwestof16thTCtocoveranythruststowardOlkhovatka, though the19thTChadnotcompleted its redeployment.wwf51.dgk91++.dgr198m.fkk102m.dgk87m.dgr199m.dgk92m.lck116m.pck45.EastofOlkhovatka,theSoviet148thRD,81stRDand74thRDattackedthe292ndIDand86th

ID at Ponyri at 0350 hrs after an artillery preparation. A fierce battle developed around thelargest of the three Ponyri villages as both sides added reinforcements, including 9th Army’sreserves:the12thPzDand10thPzGD.The307thRDwasattackedbyelementsofthe292ndID,86thIDand78thADsupportedby170panzers.sPzAbt656withFerdinandssupportedthe86thSDeastofPonyri.Nearbythe107thTBfoughtahardbattlewithaTigerbattalion;203rdRRof70thGRDstoppedaTigerwithanti-tankgrenades.The205thRRof70thGRDwasattackedby60panzersanddestroyedthreeMkIVswithanti-tankgrenadesatcloserange.The84thGTDBof75thGRDwasattackedbypanzers,includingTigers,andmanagedtodestroyfiveMkIVswith45mmanti-tankguns.Abatteryof the729thTDBclaimed fivepanzers atPonyri.TheGerman41stICclaimed28tanks,mostofthemT34s.wdk175.dgk87m.dgr199m.dgk92m.lck116m.The13thArmyandthe2ndTAlaunchedamassivecounterattackalongtheentirefrontof13th

Army.The Soviets had a 2 to 1 superiority inmen and brought over 750 tanks to the assault.wdk174.dgk87m.dgk92m.The tankbattle escalated in the20thPzD’s sector betweenSaburovka andSamodorovka.Lt

GeneralRodin threw in elements of 3rdTC to support 16thTC that had started the fight.ThebattleragedintothenextdayandwhenitwasovertheenlargedGermancounterattackhadbeenstopped and 18 of the 24 Tigers had been stopped aswell. TheGermans had failed to reachKasharawhichwaspartof the seconddefensebelt.Abig factor in stopping theGermanswas19thTC’sattackintotheflankof20thPzDnearBobrik.Withouttheuseofthe27thArmywhichwassentsouthtoVatutin,RokossovskypulleddivisionsfromLtGeneralCherniakhovsky’s60thArmyandLtGeneralBatov’s65thArmieswhichweredeployedinquietsections.ThepiecemealfashionthatModelsenthispanzerdivisionsintobattlewasprobablythebiggestreasonwhy9thArmygainedso littlegroundcompared to4thPzAin thesouth.mhz242++.dgr198m.fkk102m.lck290.dgk87m.gjz185.kcz167.dgk92m.lck116m.lck263.dgk59.At dawn, the Soviets expanded the counter-attack against the advancing German line,

spearheadedby2ndPzDand9thPzD,nearOlkhovatka.The3rdTC,16thTC,19thTCadvancedtoward theGermansand ran intoaminefield theGermans laid thepreviousnight, stopping theadvanceand forcing them togodefensive.Tigersof sPzAbt505cameat them,aiming forHill274buttheyreachedonlySaburovkabynightfall.ModelthoughtifhecouldtakeHill274thenhe

couldreachKursk.Rokossovskyorderedtherestof2ndTAtomoveupanddiginandwaitforthenextassault.Healsobroughtinfantryandsuppliesfrom60thand65thArmysector,fromthequietsectoronthefrontofthesalient,tohelpout.Itwasatoughdayforthe2ndPzD,9thPzDandsPzAbt 505 which led the assault against the stiff Soviet resistance which inflicted heavycasualtiesontheGermans.je101+.fkk102m.dgk87m.wwf53.dgk92m.lck116m.In furtheringdevelopments in thecenterof the front, elementsof the17thGRC’s70thGRD,

75thGRD, supported by the 16thTC and 9thTC, attacked the 2nd PzD of 47th PzC betweenBobrikandSaburovka,sixmilesfromtheirstart line.Inshortorder,elementsof the17thGRCpushed 2nd PzD back to the Druzhovestsky-Step-Saburovka line but were then stopped by acounterattacknowbeingsupportedbyasquadronofFw190sthatpushedthembacktotheirstartline.The17thGRCentered thebattlebetweenTeploeandOlkhovatka,attacking the47thPzC.The1stGADprovided strongartillery support to the17thGRC.All of the17thGRChadnotreachedthefrontlinesotheunitsthatdidreachithadtosetoffbythemselves.Beforethegroundforceslaunched,theRedAirForceinitiatedaheavybombingrun.ThisscaleofaerialattackwasunusualfortheSovietswhichalertedtheLuftwaffeamajorattackwasimminent.TheLuftwaffeattheOrel-WestscrambledinthehopesofcatchingSovietbombersintheairandhelpingtheirownground forces against the attack.TheSovietAFgot lucky on one of their raids, timing itperfectly.TheLuftwaffethathadbeenthere,lefttheareatorefuelandreloadbeforeanewwaveofplanesarrived;theSovietplanesbeingunmolestedattackedthe47thPzCwithdeadlyaffect,inflictingheavycasualties.Alittlelatertheroleswerereversedandthe17thGRCgothithard.Bothsidescontinuedtoescalatethroughoutthemorning,bringingmoreplanesintotheareauntiltherewasamassiveairwartakingplaceoverthemassivegroundwar.Foroneraid,the15thVAsent planes from airfields east ofOrel to assist the 16thVA.Both sides had heavy casualtiesthough theGermans stillhad theadvantage.TheSovietshadcontrolof skies in thisareaearlymorning but by late afternoon, the Germans had recovered and were at least on par with theSoviets.wdk175.dgr198m.dgk87m.cbk43++.nzk87.dgk92m.lck116m.cbk12m.Not liking the failed attempt to control the skies plus having Stalin criticize him during the

previous night’s report, Rokossovsky ordered a much heavier presence of the 16th VA.Rokossovskyhadplannedanearlyfront-widecounteroffensivefortodayandorderedRudenkotoheavilybombtheGermanpositionsaheadofthelaunch,especiallyinthecenter,northofPonyri.SergeiRudenko,aUkrainian,escapedStalin’spurgesofthelate30sandwasoneoftheleadingarchitectsofrevitalizingtheSovietAirForceafterhorrendouslossesduringthefirstweeksofthewar.HewouldretireaMarshalofAviation.cbk42+.dgk92m.hzs199++.At0500hrs,GeneralHarpecalledModelaskingformorearmortosupport20thPzDwhich

sufferedheavycasualtiesthepreviousday.ModelsenttwocompaniesofsPzAbt505from23rdICsectortothe41stPzC.snz236.Atdaybreak,theassaultforceofthe292ndIDand86thIDandthenlater18thPzDresumedits

fightforPonyri.IthadenteredPonyriStationthepreviousnightbutwasstoppedtodaybythe29thRC without making any appreciable gains. Later at night another attempt was made but thecombined efforts of 292nd ID, 86th ID and 18th PzD ground to a halt again due to the stiffresistance of the 29th RC’s 307th RD commanded byMaj General Enshin which was dug inaroundPonyriStation.ThethreeGermandivisionsweretryingtosplittheboundarylinebetween

the13thand48thArmies,butwithoutproperairsupportwerenotmakingmuchprogress.AtthesametimejusttotheeastofPonyri,the86thIDad78thADadvancedtowardHill253.5andthevillageofPrilepywhichwassoutheastofPonyri.The4thPzDwasthelastpanzerreserveModelhadandhewouldbeforcedtobringthatupaswell.dgk93.lck293.lck116m.dgk87m.dgk115.dgr199m.cbk47.kcz168.dgk92m.At daybreak, the 78th AD resumed its attack toward Hill 255.6, having to clear trench by

trench,dugoutbydugout,foxholebyfoxholebutby1100hrs,the14thARof78thADwasontopofthathill.Modelnowhadeyesonthishillandcouldseesouthandeastastotheapproachbytheenemy.TheSovietswouldattackthishillrepeatedlyfordaystogetitback.Withthecaptureofthishill,theTrosnavalleybecameuntenableandthedefenderswouldhavetofallbacktotheeasttoavoidencirclement.Some1,300POWswerecapturedintheTrosnaareaonthisday.The23rdIChadpenetratedthefirstlinebuttheseconddefensivelinewouldbeevenharder.zzk273+.Harpe’sOPsdiscoveredalargeconcentrationofenemysoldiersof13thArmyassemblingfor

anattack.Modelwascalledandaskedforartilleryassistance.Ifthisshockgroupgotpast292ndID,itcouldeasilyattacktheflankandrearof47thPzC.Modelimmediatelyturnedmoregunsonthe coordinates; having 47th PzC attacked from the rear was the worst possible scenarioimaginableandhadtobeprevented.snz237.At 0540 hrs,GeneralKluge calledModel for an update.GeneralModel predicted the high

ground around Teploe, Kashara, Olkhovatka and Ponyri would be captured. If these keyobjectives could be taken that day then reachingKurskwould be easy. Thesewere ambitiousgoalsandIwonderifModelactuallyfeltthatconfidentofhispredictions.Hedidnotlikesendingthe twopanzerdivisionsof2ndPzDand9thPzDup to the line to create thegap forheknewcasualtieswouldbehighandwasconcernedtheremainingpanzerdivisionswouldnotbeenoughtoexploitthegapandreachKursk.The4thPzD,12thPzDand10thPzGDwerestillinreservebehind47thPzC.Asearlyas thisday,Modelconsidered formingashockgroupfromall threedivisionsunderthecontrolofGeneralEsebeck.Klugewasnotinfavorofthisshockgroup.Hewanted a panzer division to remain in reserve in case 2nd PzA needed help. The 2nd PzAconsistedofmostly infantrydivisions; the5thPzDwhichwas inreservewas theonlydivisionwithpanzers – 93panzers that 2ndPzAhad.The8thPzDhad alreadybeenorderedup to thesalient but would not arrive until 7/12. Model was aware of the risks of using the reservedivisions on 7/7 but that would be the only possible way of capturing those key heights. FMKluge informedModel that he was arriving at the Front that morning for an appraisal of thebattlefieldbeforegivinghisconsenttouseallthreereservedivisions.snz237+.Atfirstlight,artilleryandStukasbombedthePonyrivillagesandtherailroadstationbeforethe

292nd IDand78thADbegan their assault.The fightingwas extremelyvicious.Abalka andastreamranthroughthevillagesandwereaterrainfeaturetheGermanshadtoovercome.Fromthenorth,behindtheinfantry,thepanzersof9thPzDdrovetowardtherailroadstation.Therewere60MkIIIsandMkIVs,allwiththelongbarrel75mmguns.TheremainingFerdinandsofsPzAbt654were there also.To the eastofPonyri the townsofGoreloie andPrilepy, locatedonhighground, were also heavily fortified and would also be a tough target for sPzAbt 653. Beforetakingthesevillages,theGermanshadtocaptureHill253.5totheirnorth.BytheendofthedayHill253.5wascapturedbuttheGermanscouldgonofurtheragainstincreasingSovietresistance.

Evenwith the help of nearby 86th ID, little progresswas beingmade in this sector.mhz246.zzz101m.dgk87m.dgr199m.dgk92m.lck116m.kfz459.Rokossovskyenhancedhisattackplanofthepreviousnight.Elementsof13thArmywouldhold

itsdefensesnearMaloarckhangelsk;therestofthearmyalongwith48thand70thArmiesandtherecentlyarrived2ndTAwouldattack.The13thArmywouldattackwestwardtowardPonyriandSaburovkawhilethe17thGRCandthe16thGRCwithsupportofthe2ndTAwouldattackfromOrlinka, Prilepy, Bitiug andKashara eastward toward Ponyri, Ladyrevo andKoshelevo in anattempttoencircleanddestroytheGermansattackingsouthwardtowardPonyri.Atthesametimethe 48thArmywas advancing toward Panskaia, Shamshin and Zmievka. The 70thArmy’s leftflankadvancedtowardKromythroughProbuzhdenieandGorchakovo.The19thTCand9thTC,apart of 2ndTA,weremoving into theArsenevski, Trubitsyn andSergeevskoe area andwouldmovetowardVerkhneSmorodnoe,PonyriII,StanovoeandSamodurovkauponorders.The19thTCwasrunningbehindscheduleandcouldnotbeginwhenthe17thGRCattacked,whichgreatlydilutedtheeffectivenessof17thGRC.Onlyelementsof19thTClaunchedaboutnoon,whiletherestofcorpshadtosupportthe70thGRDand75thGRD.dgr112+.dgr108m.lck116m.dgk87m.dgr199m.dgk92m.dgr199m.UnlikeHoth,Modelwassendinghispanzerdivisionsintobattleinapiecemealfashion.The

2nd PzD, 9th PzD, 20th PzD and 18 PzD had been brought into battle little by little over theprevious twodays.This left the4thPzD,12thPzDand10thPzGDin reserve, though theyhadbeenmovedclosertotheline.The4thPzDwouldbecalledupandenterbattlethefollowingdayintheSamodurovkaarea.dgk87m.dgk92m.lck116m.The9thPzD,18thPzD,86thIDand292ndIDcontinuedtopushsouthtowardsPonyri.Sofar

Model’s units had advanced nomore than sixmiles but suffered over 10,000 casualties. bt84.dgk87m.dgr199m.dgk92m.lck116m.On the right of 6th ID after an hour of fighting, the 112th PzGR of 20th PzD penetrated the

woodsnorthofPodolian,allowingthepanzerstoreachthesouthernedgeofKrasniyeUgolokby0830hrs.Atthesametime,afterthemineswerecleared,theTigersofsPzAbt505wererollingthroughthehillssoutheastofPodolianwithelementsofthe20thPzDfollowing.fkk53.fkk102m.dgk87m.dgr199m.dgk92m.lck116m.The 41st PzC reached the outskirts of Ponyri with the help of Elefants. Fierceman toman

combatensued.The2ndPzD,9thPzD,18thPzDwerebeingdeployedbetweenSaburovkaandPonyritosupporttheadvanceandhelptakePonyri.ThehighgroundofPonyriwastheobjective;takingitwouldgivetheGermansanedge.Hill272,southwestofTeploe,Hill274northeastofOlkhovatkaandHill253.5eastofPonyriwerethekeytargets.Thebattlefortheheightswouldlastfourdaysandbefierce.rc184.dgr198m.fkk102m.dgk87m.dgr199m.dgk92m.lck116m.Shortlyafter0900hrs,46thPzCdiscoveredthat16thTCand19thTChadmoveduptotheline

anditwasassumedwouldbeattackingshortly.Modelwasnotnotifiedofthisdevelopmentforhewasontheroadvisitinghiscorpscommanders.By1000hrs,ModelreachedLuebbe’s2ndPzD’sHQ.Stillnotknowingthat2ndTAhadmoveduptotheline,ModelconsideredLuebbe’splansforthedayexcessivelycautiousbutdidnotcommentonitatthetime.At1030hrs,ModelreachedGrossmann’sHQ(6thID) toattendameetingwithFMKlugeandGeneralLemelsen.Thiswaswhere he discovered 2nd TAwas on the line. This development forcedModel, with Kluge’s

approval, to release10thPzGDand12thPzDfromreserve.ThreemilesawayatvonKessel’sHQ(20thPzD),ModelwasinformedthatBobrik,notfarfromGnilets,wasabouttobecaptured.Gnilets had to be captured quickly because 150 Soviet tanks were moving into sector. MajGeneral von Kessel was promised Ferdinands from sPzAbt 505 but they were very late inarriving.Afterlearningthatmanyof2ndTA’stankswereinthewesternquadrantfacing20thPzD,Modelbelievedtherewouldnotbetankreservesmovingagainst2ndPzD,givingitachancetobreakthrough.HeadingtowardLtGeneralLuebbe,Modelintendedtogivethecommandersomemoral backing.He stayed there until 1900hrswhenhe returned to hisHQ.The 2ndPzDwasorderedtotakeOlkhovatkathatdaybutfailed.ItgainedonlyamileandcapturedSnovoagainststiffresistancebutcouldnotgoanyfurther.The47thPzChadadismaldayas9thPzD,20thPzDand6thIDalsohadonlymodestgains.ModelhadbeencriticizedforbeingoutoftouchwithhisHQstaffforsixhours,claimingtheneedsof9thArmywasmoreimportantthanonlyLtGeneralLuebbe’s2ndPzD.Forexample,afterMajGeneralvonKessel’s20thPzDcapturedGnilets,thedivisionmovedonandcapturedBobrikat1530hrsbeforeheadingtowardPodolian.IthasbeensuggestedthatifModelwasatHQat1530hrs,hecouldhaveorderedthe2ndPzDand9thPzDtoshifttheiraxistothesouthwesttoparallel20thPzDinsteadofadvancingduesouth,providingalldivisionsgreatergainsthanactuallywereachievedthatafternoon.WhenModelfoundoutabout20thPzDat1630hrs,herealized itwas too late toshift2ndPzDand9thPzD,sohe tried the“nextbestthing”byshiftingtheartilleryof9thPzDtothesouthwesttosupport20thArmy.Inthetime that that artillery was shifted away from 9th PzD, they suffered heavy casualties. Thisscenario was a good example of the fog of war; taking one direction could lead to totallyunexpectedconsequences.snz239++.snz244.The Germans made initial progress against Maloarkhangelsk on the first day but Soviet

counter-attacks had pushed the Germans back which caused a split between forces atMaloarkhangelskandPonyri.ThissplitcouldgivetheSovietsanopportunity todriveawedgebetween the twogroups.Modelknew fromaerial recon that theSovietsweremovingmassivereserves into the area. Even this early into the campaignModel’s forceswere spread out anddisorganized.ModelcalledintheLuftwaffetohelpeventhescore.dgk87m.dgr199m.dgk92m.Sovietreinforcementsbroughtupduringthepredawnhourswereabletostopthe23rdICof9th

Army atMaloarchanglek. The 23rd ICmade such a poor showing,Rokossovsky, emboldened,transferredforcesfrominfrontof23rdIDtothePonyrisector.The47thPzCwasabletoreachTeploe-Olkhovatkaareabeforebeingstopped.The41stPzCjoinedupandtogetherwereabletomoveforwardagain.aaa125m.dgr198m.fkk102m.lck256.dgk87m.dgr199m.dgk92m.Ontherightsideof20thPzD,the31stIDwasfallingfartherbehindduetostiffresistanceand

wasstillnorthofKrasnaiaSariawhichwastheirfirstmajorobjective.Finallyby0930hrsthevillagewas taken.Atabout thesametime, the112thPzGRof20thPzDcaptured thevillageofPodolianbeforemovingontothehillssouthofthevillage.DuringthiswholetimetheRedAirForce launchedmany sorties against the attackers.At 1830 hrs, the 31st IDwas able to pushthroughGnilets,whichwasasectorobjectiveoftheday.At1905hrs,the20thPzDwasabletopenetrate as far as Saburovka where another five T34s were destroyed and developed abridgeheadovertheSvapa.About18T34sweredestoyedintheengagement.fkk53++.fkk102m.fkk102m.dgk87m.dgr199m.dgk92m.

The20thPzDbattled itsway through the70thArmy line and reachedGnilets, theboundarybetween 15th RD and 132nd RD, and established a gap in the Soviet defense. Once Modellearnedofthegap,heorderedthethreepanzerdivisionsintheareatoexploitit.The2ndPzDand20thPzDwouldbe in the immediateattackzonewhile the9thwouldbeon theireasternflank.Rokossovsky anticipatedModel’s tactics and had ordered the 2nd TA to come up to the lineduring the predawn hours. The tanks were waiting for the Germans when they launched atdaybreak.dgk87m.dgr199m.swm138.dgk92m.lck116m.AspartofacoordinatedefforttoreachthecriticalheightssurroundingHill274,the2ndPzD

launchedanattackonthismorningfromNizhneeTaginotothesouthtowardstheOlkhovatkaarea.Forthenextsevendays,italongwiththeotherpanzerdivisioninvolvedmadelimitedgainsandon7/12,theassaultwasstopped.knz98.dgk87m.dgk92m.lck116m.Afterheavyfighting,the23rdICwasheldupbeforereachingMaloarchangelskby13thArmy.

Rokossovskyhadbroughtupnewartillerybatteriesinthisareaduringthepredawnhoursandthisnewstrengthwashavingadetrimentalaffecton theGermans.Manynewmineswerealso laidduringthenight.Theseactionsplusthestiffresistanceofthe294thRDand254thRDpreventedthe 23rd IC from going beyond Protasovo. With the ever increasing demands placed on theLuftwaffeforsupportinthePonyri-Olkhovatkaaxismeant23rdICtotheeastwerenotreceivingmuchhelpfromtheair.The23rdwasevenhavingtroubleprotectingtheboundarylineonitswestsharedby41stPzC.ThenumberofGerman sorties flown forboth salient boundariesdroppedfrom4,298thepreviousdayto2,100onthisday.Nothavingsufficientplanes,theLuftwaffewaslimitedtotacticalsituationsofthehighestpriority.Strategicbombingsofrailandroadleadingtothebattlefieldwerenotpossibleanylonger.bt83.mhz248.fkk102m.dgk87m.dgr199m.swm138.dgk92m.The9thArmynorthofOlkhovatka,regroupedandadvancedagaintowardthecitybutGeneral

Rokossovsky brought up the 65th Army to fill in the gap between 13th and 17th Army in theattempttostoptheGermanadvance.Henowhad3,000guns,5,000MGsandover1,000tanksdefendingthisline.TheoddswouldbeslimforamajorGermanbreakthrough.RokossovskyfiredmorethantwiceasmanyshellsattheenemyasdidVatutinandRokossovskyalwaysclaimedthatwas Vatutin’s error in execution and why Hoth gained more than twice as much territory asModel.fkk102m.dgk87m.dgk92m.zro206.As the Germans were approaching Olkhovatka, Rokossovsky ordered the 16th TC and the

newlyarrived19thTCofRodin’s2ndTAtotheareatosupportthe70thGRDand75thGRD.IfModel controlled the high ground itwould be a disaster forRokossovsky.TheSoviet generalwould do anything to prevent that from happening.At 1730 hrs the 19th TC entered battle byattacking west of Olkhovatka but it had the misfortune of attacking at the exact time a largesquadron of German planes flew over and attacked. The tankers were hit hard and had toimmediatelyfallbacktotheTeploe,Knasavkaline.The75thGRDwasatoughdivisionhavingasitscoreveteransofStalingrad.dgk117.fkk102m.dgk87m.cbk48.wwf51.dgk92m.mjk85.Nextto16thTC,the19thTCwouldalsoattackthe47thPzCwhentheystartedtomakesome

progressinthemorning.Thetwotankcorpshad150tanksbetweenthemandtheirweightslowedthe German advance and inflicted heavy casualties. In the early evening and with the help ofsPzAbt505,Lubbe’s2ndPzDcaptured additional groundwhich includedHill 230.0.The2nd

PzD put all its effort into taking Kashara, due north of Olkhovatka and a part of the seconddefensebelt,butwasunabletotakethefortifiedtownbyitself.VollrathLubbehadbeenpromotedtoMajor General in October 1942. He had been with panzers for years but in 1944 he wastransferred to infantry, which he considered a demotion. fkk55. fkk102m. lck292. dgk87m.kcz168.dgk116m.dgk117+.lck116m.zsm49.As thefightingdeveloped the2ndPzDrepelleda fiercecounterattackby6thTC.Amassive

artilleryduelalsoeruptedbetween13thArmyandModel’s9thArmy in thesamesector.bt83.dgk92m.lck116m.Ontherightoftheadvancing17thGRC,the18thGRCsupportedbythe3rdTCattacked9th

PzDand6thID.Thefightingwasdifficultbutthe9thPzDwasabletodrivebackthe81stRDtoBerezovLogalong therail line toPonyri.The2ndPzDand9thPzDsupportedby infantryandartillerypenetrated the line and tookhighgroundonboth sidesofOlkhovatka against the17thGRC.wdk175.dgr198m.dgk87m.cbk43.mkz119.nzk87.nzk86m.dgk92m.lck116m.OnthefareasternflanktheGermansassaultedtheboundarylinebetween48thArmyand13th

Armywhichwasdefendedbythe81stRD.TheGermansstartedtogainsomegroundbutelementsofthe307thRDshifteddirectionandthe103rdTBof3rdTCwasbroughtupandwereabletoplug theforminggap.To theweston theboundary linebetween13thArmyand70thArmy, theGermans were able to penetrate the second defense belt, striving to reach the heights ofOlkhovatka.ThoughModeldidgainalittleinthecenter,the2ndTAand17thGRCdidagoodjobof preventing a rout. The tenacious fighting by both sides is difficult to imagine but it washorrible.dgr115.dgr108m.dgk87m.dgk92m.In the afternoon, a reserveunit of 9thPzDwasbrought on line to attackPonyri,whichwas

defendedbyJenshin’s307thRD,andlaterjoinedbyotherelementsofLtGeneralPukhov’s13thArmytostoptheadvance.ReserveSoviettanksof3rdTAcontinuedmovingtothefrontlinetobattlethepanzers.jp151.bt83.dgk87m.dgr199m.mkz118.dgk92m.lck116m.At 1500 hrs, the 112th PzGR (20th PzD) finally captured Bobrik before moving into the

Gnilets,Podolianarea.By1630hrs,Modelconcentratedhisartilleryinthe47thPzCsectorfortheexpandedassaultthere.Hestillwantedthemainpenetrationtobewiththe47thPzC.fkk53.fkk102m.fkk102m.dgk87m.dgr199m.dgk92m.ThoughtakingGnilets,westofPodolian,the31stIDwasnowstuckinfrontofHill236.7and

Hill234.1.The12thGRand17thGRwereabletotakethehillswestofKrassnyandSaria.At1500 hrs it asked for help. After taking Bobrik at 1530 hrs, the 20th PzD attacked from nearBobrik towardHill 231.7 (in the direction ofGnilets andPodolian) in the attempt to help thestalled31stID.TwentyT34scameoverHill231.7andcounteredthe20thPzDandtheGermansfailedtotakethehill.Ifthe2ndPzDand9thPzDhadbeenorderedtochangetheirdirectionfromsouthtowest,therewouldhavebeenarealopportunityofencircling16thTCbut47thPzCwasnotawareandagoldenopportunitywaslost.Modelbecameawareofthesituationaround1700hrsanditwastoolatetoshifthisdivisionsbutheorderedhisartillerytoshiftandfireinfrontofvonKessel’scombatgrouptoattempttospeedhisadvance.Withtheshiftinartillery,the6thIDand9thPzDlosttheirsupportandwerethenatthemercyoftheattackingSoviets.Theysufferedheavycasualties.fkk55.fkk104m.dgk87m.dgr199m.mkz118.dgk92m.lck116m.AttackingtowardButyrkiatthedeepestGermanpenetrationoftheday,LtColTeliakov’s107th

TBofthe16thTCfellintoanambushbyTigersofsPzAbt505,losing46oftheir50tankswithinminutes.The 164thTB, pulling up on the 16thTC’s left to assist,was alsomauled, losing 23tanks.As theSoviet tanks retreated, the panzers of 47thPzC followed and reached theSovietseconddefensivebelt,defendedbythe13thArmy.Thepanzerswerestoppedatthispointby17thGRC’s70thGRDand75thGRDguardingtheirwellprepareddefenses.At1800hrsthe150tanksofthe19thTCmovedpassedthe2nddefensebeltandenteredthefraywiththepanzersofthe2ndPzDand20thPzDintheBobrik-Samodurovkasector,justnorthofTeploe.Bynightthe2ndTAwhichstartedthecampaignwith465tankswasnowinashamblesandtheremnantshadtofallback.Sinenko’s3rdTCwasbroughtuptothelinetoreplace2ndTAbutitwasalsobroughtupinpiecemealfashionandwasnotaseffectiveasitcouldhavebeenandsufferedheavycasualties.TeploewaswestandalittlenorthofOlkhovatka.ButyrkiwaswestofPonyri.(sPzAbt505andStuGAbt 909were part of the 21st PzB). dgk93.mhz19m. dgr198m. fkk53. fkk102m. dgk87m.cbk43.dgk92m.lck116m.At1630hrsModelmadeadecisionthatwouldhavedreadfuleffectsonLtGeneralScheller’s

9thPzD.Heordered9thPzD’sartillerytoshifttheirfirefromcoveringtheirdivisionovertovonKessel’s20thPzDwhichwasdeployedfurtherwestintheBobrik-Pololianarea.Whilethe9th’sartillerybattalionsweresupporting20thPzD,9thPzDwhowereattacking towardPonyri,wasseverely damaged by amauling from 307th RD’s artillery and supporting tanks. The 9th PzDstartedthecampaignwithafullcomplementofpanzersbutovertheproceedingfewdayswouldloseallbutahandfulofthem.mkz118+.dgk92m.lck116m.At1700hrs,ModelorderedLemelsen’s47thPzCtoredirectthe2ndPzD,whichoriginallyhad

140panzersand50SPGs,and9thPzD,toassist20thPzD,whichhadbeenfightingsincethefirstday to exploit the boundary line it had just discovered to be poorly defended. In the primaryattackzone,the20thPzDwasontherightflank,6thIDand2ndPzDinthecenterand9thPzDontheleftnearPonyri.The31stIDwasonthefarrightwithorderstotakethehighgroundsouthofGnilets and to push forward to the Nikolskoe-Samodurovka line. On the left of this mainspearheadwassPzAbt505whichwasnowmoving into theeasternpartofSaburovkabutalsohadtostopfortherestofthelinetocatchup.The47thPzCclaimeddestroying157tanksonthisday.fkk54+.fkk102m.pck45.dgk87m.dgr199m.dgk92m.lck116m.TheGermanswerebringingupthelastofthereservestofeedthelineforthefollowingday’s

assault.Itincluded4thPzD,12thPzD,10thMDand36thMD.je102.dgk87m.dgk92m.lck116m.TothenorthwestofMaloarckhangelsk, the15thRC,withtanksupport,attackedthe216thID

fromtheareaaroundTrosna.Justnorthofthe216thID,the383rdIDdefendedagainstrepeatedcounter-attacksfrom48thArmy.TheGerman20thIConthewestflankhadaquietday.wdk176.dgk87m.dgk92m.lck116m.At 1830 hrs General Model, in an OP near the front, studied the 9th PzD’s progress and

decided that 4th PzD would not advance the following day behind the 9th PzD as originallyplanned,butwouldattacktothewestofitand2ndPzD.At2130hrs,thearmygeneralreturnedtohis HQ where his staff tried to persuade him that the 4th PzD should move behind 9th PzDbecauseofthemanycasualtiesof9thPzD,butModelrefusedtochangehismind.InsteadModelcombinedthe18thPzDwiththe9thPzDtohelpthe9thPzDgetpastPonyribyattackingSnovo,whichwasdefendedby16thTC.After takingSnovo the9thPzDand18thPzDwouldstop its

advanceandgodefensivewhilethe4thPzDand2ndPzDattackedTeploe,westandalittlenorthofOlkhovatka.The86thIDand296thIDwouldthenattackPonyri.mkz119.dgk92m.lck116m.At1830hrsonthewestendofthefront,19thTCattackedthroughthe132ndRDand175thRD

towardPodolianhittingthe46thPzC’s7thIDand31stIDthehardest.TheGermanswereabletorepulse the attack and counter-attacked, reaching a line less than a mile south of Gnilets andalmostfivemilesfromtheirstartline.HeavyartilleryandairattackscosttheGermansdearlyfortheirprogress.AfterregroupingtheGermanslaunchedanotherattackat1900hrsandwereabletocreateabridgeheadacrosstheSvapaRiver,sevenmilesfromtheirstartline.TheSvaparaneast-west,northofSamodurovka.The19thTCwastoattackagaininthemorningwiththeotherforcesbutwasdelayedmostly through ineptnesswhichdidnotplease theFrontcommander.dgr114+.dgk87m.dgr199m.dgk92m.wdk175.fkk102m.dgk87m.Modelleft2ndPzDat1900hrsandinsteadofgoingstraighttohisHQandwithoutinforming

hisChiefofStaff,stoppedofftoseeLtGeneralBuffaof12thFlakDivisiontodiscussprovidinggreaterprotectionto47thPzC.ModelfinallyshowedupathisHQat2130hrs.IthasalsobeensaidthatModelneededtodelegatemore.Hisstafftriedagaintoconvincehimtoplace4thPzDinthePonyrisectoraswasoriginallyplannedbuthecontinuedtoconsidertheissue.HewantedthedivisionintheOlkhovatkasectorandwouldnotbudgefromthatdecision.The2ndPzD,18thPzDand9thPzDcouldhaveused4thPzDinthePonyri-PonyriIIsectorandwiththesupportof4thPzD probably could have broken through, but Model considered Olkhovatka to be the primesector and 4th PzDwould stay close to 20th PzD in that quest.With 4th PzD relatively fresh,ModelbelievedOlkhovatkawouldbetheirsbytheendoftheday.EventhoughOlkhovatkawastheprimary target,Ponyriand the importantnearbyHill253.5andHill239.8couldnotbe leftbehindand therefore theattack in thePonyri sectorwasalsonecessary.Hespent far toomuchtimeawayfromhisHQreceivingvaluableinformationtoolatetorespondtoit.Withtheheavyfightinginthefirstquarteroftheyear,4thPzDwasdown2,500men.ThedivisionwasalsolowontransporttruckssoAGCgaveit2,500horsestoassistcarryingtheirsupplies.BymidMarchitalsohadonly36panzersworking,thoughatthestartofOperationCitadelthatnumberhadrisento about 100 panzers. Lt General von Saucken also had 13,166 men on the roster. snz245.snz248+.AtnightintheSaburovkaarea,elementsofthe46thPzC,supportedbyTigers,stormedthecity

onthenortherndefensebelt.MoreandmoreSoviettankswerebroughtupuntil1,000tankswereinvolvedastheGermanstriedtomoveonthecrucialhillsofOlkhovatkawithHill274itscentralpoint.FortheGermanstotakeKursktheyhadtocontrolthishighcountryandtheSovietsknewitaswell.Thatiswhysomanytanksandanti-tankgunswereinvolved.TheLuftwaffewascalledinbutduetofuelshortagestheirraidswerenotexpansiveoreffective.TheSovietinfantrywasusingtheiranti-tankrifletodeadlysuccess.fkk102m.dgk87m.dgk92m.At the end of the day, Model’s forces would find themselves just beginning to encounter

Rokossovsky’s strongest forces defending between Saburovka and the Olkhovatka heights.Rokossovsky originally believed the axis toward Ponyriwould be themain attack zonewhileOlkhovatkawouldbe secondary.While these twoaxesweremost important forModel, itwasOlkhovatka that was the primary. Rokossovsky had both axes defended sufficiently and whenpanzersdidnotattackinearnestuntil7/6,theSovietshadtimetomobilizetheirforces.IfModel

hadusedallhispanzers thefirstdaywhileRokossovskykepthismassivereserves to therear,Modelwould have had a better chance of taking Ponyri andOlkhovatka. The slow piecemealintroductionofhispanzersgavetheFrontCommandertimetomovehisreservestokeyaxesofattack,sealingModel’sfate.mhz229.fkk102m.dgk87m.dgr199m.dgk92m.Thecombinedeffortsof292ndID,86thIDand18thPzD(41stPzC)failedtocapturePonyri

afteranalldayfight.Thevillagewasbeingdefendedbythetenacious307thRD.dgk93.dgk92m.lck116m.Thedivisionsof47thPzCmadenopenetrationsandbarelybudgedtheSoviet line.Over the

followingcoupleofdays,the2ndPzDand9thPzDsufferedheavycasualtiesandwouldnotbeabletocontributemuchfortherestofthecampaign.Modeldidhavethe4thPzD,10thPzGDandthe 12th PzD still in reserve but he would call them upmuch sooner than expected. mkz117.dgk92m.lck116m.snz235+.By theendof theday in the41stPzC’ssector,despiteheavy fighting in thePonyriarea, the

Germanswereunabletobreakthroughtheseconddefensebelt.Ontheeastflank,the78thADof23rdICfoughthardtosecureProtasovoontheroadtoMaloarkhangelsksixmilesfromtheirstartline.Intheevening,the78thADrepulsedastrongcounter-attackatProtasovo.Fightingformuchof the night theGermans, after fighting house to house, cleared the town thenmarched anotherthreemilestowardMaloarckhangelsk.wdk176.dgk87m.dgr199m.cbk53.dgk92m.ThatmorningModelhadbeenconfidentthatabreakthroughwouldoccurbutwhenitdidnot,he

becameconcerned.Afterdark,GeneralModelcalledFMKlugeofAGCtorequestthe4thPzDbereleasedforduty.Klugewashesitantforhewantedtosave4thPzDforwhentheOrelSalientcame under attack. After a lengthy argument the 4th PzD was released toModel’s command.fzk172.kfz457.Modelordered9thPzDand18thPzDtoassembleintheSnovoareatoblock19thTCwhich

washeadinginthatdirection.WiththesetwodivisionsatSnovowithadefensiveposture,itleftonly 2nd PzD and 4th PzD to attack toward Teploewhile the 292nd ID and 86th ID attackedtowardPonyri.Thiswaspotentiallyariskymaneuver.Ifeitherorbothsidesgainedgroundwhile9thPzDand18thPzDstayedstationary, thenflankscouldbeexposed.ModelcameupwithanunusualmodifiedattackplanthatincludedtheLuftwaffeasanimportantingredient.TheLuftwaffewouldattack in the20thPzD/4thPzDsector for twohours then shift to the east to support the292ndIDand86thIDthenrotatebacktothewest.Intheafternoon,airsupportwouldbegivento23rdIDintheirattempttotakeMaloarkhangelsk.The9thArmyjustdidnothavetheforcetopushthe enemy back or the planes to support all the sectors at one time. Rokossovsky had alwaysprided himself that he outmaneuveredModel but the true fact of thematterwas that less than70,000combattroopstogoupagainstCentralFrontwasjustnotadequate.snz245+.TheheavyairbattlesinthenorthernsalientwerecausingtheLuftwaffetouseitspreciousfuel

tooquickly. Itcouldnotkeepup thepace.One importantair raid that theLuftwaffe performedafterdarkwasaraidof35bombersontherailjunctionatYelets,northeastofKursk.Allthroughthenightand into thepredawnhoursof7/7 theRedAirForce,nothaving fuelproblems, flewmissions.OverthelasttwodaysGeneralRudenkowasdesperatelyworkingoncommunicationsandprocedures forOPs reportingvital information that theRedAirForceneededon a timelybasis. Also of concern to General Rudenko was improving escort protection of his bombers.

cbk49.aaa63m.aaa106m.dgk92m.In the north, the Red Air Force flew 779 fighter sorties down from 817 the previous day.

cbk55.dgk92m.IncludedintheSovietairarsenalwasasquadronofDouglasDB7Bostonsthatwerepartof

theAmericanLend-Leaseprogram.TheBostonwasatwoengineattackbomberthatperformedwell for theSoviets.During themorning attackon2ndPzD, it inflictedheavy casualtiesbut acouple of them were shot down. Overall the Soviet AF did well that morning against theLuftwaffe,while the17thGRCattacked the47thPzC in thecenterof the line. cbk43.dgk92m.lck116m.Bytheendoftheday,Model’sforcesmadefurthermodestgainsinthecenterofthelineand

had penetrated the second defensive belt. The 78thADon the right flank of 23rd IC capturedProtasovo.Modelwasstillfrustratedbecausehis9thArmywasstillbehindschedule;he’dhopetohavebeeninOlkhovatkabytheendoftoday.9thArmyhadcasualtiesof3,000men,halfofthepreviousdaybutstillfairlyhighwhenyouconsiderthefewgainsmade.The292ndIDand86thIDin41stPzCsectormadethebestgainsonthisday,despitethatthesedivisionshadlittlearmorsupport. TheCOof 292nd ID suggested the rugged terrain and the extensive defensesworkedagainst thearmorwhile infantry,havinggreaterflexibility,couldmaneuver inways thepanzerscouldnot.The20thPzDwardiary for this day complainedofnot having sufficient infantry toprotectitspanzers.EventhoughModelwantedtoconservehisarmorforthebigbreakthrough,heknew9thArmydidnot have sufficient infantry to easilydefeatCentralFront.Even though9thArmy had a ration strength of over 200,000, combat strength was only 69,000. That was thebiggestreasonModeltriedtotalkHitlerindelayingthisoffensive,inordertobuildupandtrainreplacements.Model’sstaffestimatedthatduringthefirsttwodaysoffighting,Rokossovskylostfourtanksto

everypanzerthatwasdestroyedorseverelydamaged.RedarmorwasabletosloworstoptheGermanadvancebuthadbeenunablesofartopushtheGermansback.snz242+.TheGerman9thArmyhadadvancedabout6milesintothefirstSovietdefensivebelt,pushing

backthe2ndRD,67thRDand71stGRD,butthepanzerswereapproachingSoviettankambushsiteswheremanyPakgunsandtanksweredug-in.Inthesouth,theforcesofAGShadpenetratedat least tenmilesintotheSovietdefenses.Therewasheavyrainfallonthesouthernbattlefield.dgk87m.dgk92m.DuringthenightadditionalreinforcementswerebroughtuptothelineinthePonyrisector.The

11thMortarBrigade,46thArtilleryBrigade,2ndAnti-tankBrigade’s12thArtilleryRegimentareexamples. The 43rd TR and 58th TR were moved to the Maloarkhangelsk area. This KurskdefensivegivessomeindicationonhowfartheRedArmyhadimprovedtheirarmorandheavydivisions over the past year. Thewealth of artillery andmortar units in both the southern andnorthern salients had aprofound impact in stopping theGermans.Theprepareddefenseswereexcellent and for the most part, infantry was trained and prepared to take on this Germanjuggernaut.dgr115.dgr108m.dgr119.

A

8

July7thontheSouthernSalientSeeMap11

fterthreedaysoffightingintheKursksalient,itwascalculatedbySovietestimatesthatGermanlosseswere1,500panzersand600planes.20,000Germanswerekilled.These

figures were overstated. You will find that statistics coming from the Soviet government,especiallyduringand right after thewar,wereoverstatedwhen referring toGermancasualtiesand understatedwhen referring to Soviet casualties.OKHestimated that 460Soviet tanks hadbeendestroyedbytheendofthisday.TopLuftwaffeace,LtHartmann,shotdownsevenSovietfightersoverKursksalient.Itbrought

hiskilltotalto352planes.TheRedAirForceslowlybegan togainequality in theair, increasingLuftwaffe casualties.

dgk118.Itwaspastmidnight leading into7/7andelementsof theLAHwere still in combatnear the

hamletofTeterevino.TheseveralTigersthatarrivedquicklydestroyedthreeT34sandchasedtheremaining tanks away.For thenext twohours, theLAHmet upwithharassing fire butwhen itstartedraining,makingitdifficulttoidentifyfriendfromfoe,theactiondieddown.Theheaviestfighting of the day (7/6) occurred when it was light and LAH launched an attack from thePokrovkaarea towardBolshieMaiachki,MalyeMaiachki andGresnoe in the attempt to reachtheir objective of the bend in the Psel River at Krasnyi Oktiabr. As part of 1st TA’s majorcounter-offensivetoisolatetheSS,the31stTCdrivingsouthcrashedintoLAH.Forfivehoursabitter battle ragedwith the largest engagement occurring at BolshieMaiachki. By evening the100th TB of 31st TC had to fall back from the village. TheLAH entered the village butwasunable to advance further from the still heavy resistance in the area.While this fighting wasoccurring, other elements of LAH captured Gresnoe. The 2nd SS PzC also advanced towardKrasnyiOktiabr,southofthePselRiver,butfailedtoreachit.VatutinexpectedthismajorarmorattackwouldpushLAHandDasReichintotheLipvoyiRiverbutinsteadtheSSdivisionswerestillabletorepulsetheattacksandgaingroundatthesametime.mhz251.vzz134+.zrl217.DuringthepredawnhourstheSovietsmaderepeatedattacksonthesmallgarrisonleftbyDer

FühreronthesmalltownofPetrovski.ThepressurebecamesogreatthattheGermanshadtofallbacktothesouthtoavoiddestruction.zow145.JoachimPeiperspentallofthepreviousafternoonandeveningmovinghispanzersandtrucks

towardTeterevinoNorthafteradvancingthroughthevillageofLuchkiNorth.At0130hrson7/7,Peiperandhisbattalionwereinahedgehogdefenseforthenightwhen16tanksattacked.AsthebattleragedandmoreT34sarrived,Peiperreactedquickly,gothispanzersstarted,engagingthe

T34s and destroying five tanks, but he was eventually surrounded and needed help. fkk153.gnk163m.zrl217.At 0130 hrs, Rotmistrov’s 5th GTA was driving west but was still 150 miles away from

Prokhorovka.The18thTCand29thTCweredrivingdownparallelroadsintheleadwhile5thGMCwastrailinginsecondechelon.Eachconvoywas15mileslong.InMoscow,Stavkagavethe green light to General Rodion Malinovsky and General Tolbukhin, the commanders ofSouthwesternFront andSouthernFront, tomake final preparations for their offensive south ofBelgorodtopindownGermandivisionsandpreventredeploymenttotheKurskarea.ThiswouldbepartofOperationRumyantsev.Forthisoperation,theSovietswouldhave71rifledivisionsor1.2millionmenand2,800tanks.mhz260.dgr82+.dgr83m.zra346.Beforedawn,163SovietheavybombersattackedGerman rearareasnorthwestofBelgorod

forthesecondstraightnight.Alittlelateranother269sortiesoflightbombersattackedthesamearea.TheGermanswerealsoactiveduringthenight,sendingout50planesintwogroupslookingfortargetsofopportunity.cbk58.HothorderedHausser topresshisattacktowardProkhorovkaandtakecontrolof theheights

alongtheProkhorovka-Kartashevkaroadtothenorthwestoftherailjunction.KnobelsdorffwasorderedtostayeastofthePenaRiverandcloseuponLAH.TheGermansmustmaintainaunifiedline if they were to have any chance of defeating Vatutin. To free up SSTK from flank duty,HausserorderedLtGeneralTrierenberg’s167thIDtobreakitscurrentengagementandtakeoverSSTK’spositionalongtheLipovyiDonets.Onceaccomplished,SSTKwouldredeploytothewestofLAHandhavetheresponsibilityofcrossingthePselandestablishingabridgeheadnorthoftheriver.TheSSTKhadtoreachtheProkhorovka-KartashevkaroadandalsotoprotectLAH’sflankasitmadearunforProkhorovka.Hausserremindedhisdivisioncommandersthatfrontalattacksshouldbeavoidedandtouseencirclingtacticsonly.TheGermangeneralsknewoftheirpanzerweaknessandtriedtoconservewherepossible.ThereliefofSSTKfromtheLipovyiDonetslinewould take two days. In themeantime,SSTKwould continue to clear the ground to the north,along withDas Reich. This shift toward Prokhorovka was not a surprise for Hausser. Hothinformedhimofthatpossibilityon5/31.gnk159.agk102.wdk137.vzz30+.The lead panzers ofLAH reached TeterevinoNorth for the nightwhere defense procedures

wereinitiated.Theywerewellaheadofthedivisionandwereleeryaboutambushes.Apanzeronsentrydutydiscoveredthreeenemytanksdrivingintotownandwasabletodestroyeachofthem.Atdaybreakwhenthosethreetanksdidnotreturn,30tanksattackedthetown.Bythenabattalionof2ndPzGRarrivedandwiththehelpof thepanzerswereable torepulse theattack.WiththecaptureofTeterevinoNorth,LAHhadtraveledabout18milesfromitsstartpoint.agk101.nzk90.gnk163m.zrl217+.By0400hrs,GeneralKrugercompleted the relocationofhisHQ to thewoods just southof

Hill246.3.Hill246.3wasnorthofIakhontov.zow145.At0400hrs,the10thTCleftitsreserveareaintheStaryiOskolregion,eastofProkhorovka,

andby1900hrshadreachedtheProkhorovkaarea.dgr84.dgr83m.nzk90.During late night a column of Soviet tanks had crossed the Lipovyi Donets River at

RozhdestvenkaandhadinfiltratedtheNekhaevka-Smorodinoarea.At0430hrs,afterdiscoveringtheincursion,MajGeneralPriesssentthe3rdPzRtotheareatosecureit.zow146.

The leading elements of 2nd PzGR ofLAH moved north past Luchki South to intercept therovingtankcolumnasorderedthepreviousnight.At0500hrs,theyengagedtheSoviettanksandfor thewholedayhadtodefendthemselvesagainstrepeatedattacks.Withoutsupportingarmor,fiveSoviet tanksweredestroyedand theirpathhadbeenblockedfromwreckinghavoc furtherwest but the battalion size German force suffered heavy casualties in the blocking maneuver.zrl218.Justbeforedaybreak,the52ndGRDandasmuchofthe23rdGRCthatcouldmanagewereto

redeployalongthelineKliuchi-Hill226.6-Polezhaev(northofthePselRiver)andpreventHothfromsecuringabridgeheadnorthofthePselRiver.wwf85+.vzz1m.Thedaybefore,theLAHhadreachedtheLuchkiNorth-TeterevinoNorthlinebutstoppedfor

theeveningasthesurroundingcountrysidehadnotbeencleared.Duringtheveryearlyhoursofthe7th,SovietambushteamswentlookingforeasypreybehindtheGermanline.Theywereluckyinsomeinstancesbutunluckyatothertimeswhentheywentupagainstsuperiornumbers.Afterdaybreak,the3rdMC,1stGTBand31stTCcontinuedtohitLAHalongthisfrontsector.Duringthepredawnhours,Pakgunswerebroughtup to the line tosupportLAH against attacksand togivesupportwhentheadvancegotstarted.Frey’s1stPzGRwasabletopushthe1stGTBoutofPokrovkalastnight.Katukovorderedthe49thTBwithsupportfromthe100thTBtoadvanceandretake the town. The Soviet tankswere approaching the battle zonewhen a squad of roamingGermanplaneslookingfortargetsofopportunitysawthetanksandimmediatelydivedforthem.TheGermansatPokrovkahadnopanzer support for itwasatTeterevino fightingoffanattackthere,buttheunexpectedplanescausingconfusionanddestructionamongtheSoviettankshadnodoubt reduced thecasualtiesamong thewaiting infantry.The tanksgotwithinMG42 rangeandmanyof theSoviet soldiers ridingon the tankswerekilled.With theLAH north ofTeterevinoNorth,GermanartillerywasbeingmovedtoTeterevinoNorthtoprovidecoverfortheadvanceonthePselRiverandProkhorovka.gnk159.gnk164.gnk163m.pck67.pck67m.zrl217.WhiletheLAHfoughttosecurethePokrovka-TeterevinoNorthlineandthe48thPzCadvanced

alongtheshallowLukhaninoRiverbetweenAlekseevkaandPokrovka(exclusive),the167thIDtriedhardtorepairthegapbetweenthetwocorps.LtGeneralTrierenbergknewofthedivisionredeploymentandwantedthefrontlinetobestablebeforeheleftfortheriver.Tohelp3rdMC,the 40th Army released the 309th RD to Katukov’s 1st TA. They would arrive next morning.Krivoshein’s49thTBwasmovingup to theriver tosupport thedefenses in frontofPokrovka.The1stGTBwas already inmortal combatwith2ndSSPzCatPokrovka.To thewest of thevillage, elements of 2ndSSPzCwas still clearing the area since 0600hrswhile 6thTCwasdefendingthePenaRiverandtheroadleadingtoOboyan.The86thTBwassentto1stTAandthe9thAnti-aircraftDivisionto6thGAtohelpdefendthePenaRivervalley.The48thPzCresumedits advance on the east side of the Pena River and along this road and struck the 6th TC.dgk126++.dgr85.dgr209m.dgr176m.nzk90.wdk135.While the49thTBattackedPokrovka, the1stGTBdefendedPogorelovkaandMikhailovka,

southofPokrovkabut100Germanplanesarrivedandstartedtoattackthevillagesbutfailedtopush the Soviets from their defenses. Pogorelovka was just northeast of Iakovlevo. gnk165.vzz7m.dgr111.LAHpanzersrepulsedrepeatedattacksfrom5thGTCalongtheline that includedTeterevino

North.WhiletheSovietsattacked,LAHwasunabletoresumetheiradvancetowardProkhorovka.DasReichalsowasbusyfightingoffattacksfrom2ndGTCanddidnotgainanygroundduringtheattacks.gnk165.Elements of Der Führer had entered Iasnaia Poliana, not far from Luchki North or the

Prokhorovka railroad to the east the previous night. By 0540 hrs the Soviets had organized acounter-attack to retake the town.Severalarmored trains rolledupandstartedfiring theirgunswhile a small contingent ofmen and tanks attacked the town under the cover of fire.A smallhuntingpartyofStukasflewbyattackingthetrains,destroyingoneofthem.zow145.At0545hrs,theLAHandleadelementsofSSTK,movingfromnorthofLuchkiNorth,headed

acrossfieldsofhaytowardthevillageofGresnoe,southofthePselBend.Totheeast,DasReichheadedeastfromLuchkiSouthtowardTeterevinoSouth,thelastsignificantfortifiedsettlementinthe second defensive belt in this sector. Teterevino, roughly eight miles southwest ofProkhorovka, was the gateway on the land bridge between the Rivers Psel and theDonets toreachProkhorovkafromthesouth.The1stTArepeatedlyattackedLAHsoonafterleavingLuchkiNorth and its fellow LAH column around Teterevino and Bolshie Maiachki. SSTK was alsoinvolved in these battles and between the SS divisions claimedmany tanks destroyed. Stukaswerecalledinandclaimedanumberoftanksalso.RedplanesfinallyshowedupandattackedthepanzersmovingonTeterevino.By theendof theday,Hothclaimedonly threeTigershadbeendestroyed among others being damaged but repairable. Hoth was surprised by the increasedpresenceofarmorreservesattackinghis4thPzA.HeexpecteditwouldtakeVatutinafewmoredays tobringhis reserves to sector,givinghimmore time to reach thePsel,whichwas takingmuchtoolongtoreach.TheLAHclaimeddestroying75tanks,12planesand23gunsthatdayaswell as capturing 244 POWs. SSTK claimed destroying 50 tanks of 2nd GTC. A number ofworkingT34swerealsocaptured.mhz257+.dgr209m.gnk163m.zrl220.zow147.Hoth concentrated hundreds of panzers along the northern front in order to reach and then

penetrate the thirddefensebelt.At 0600hrs, the trailing elements ofLAH on the left andDasReichontherightmovedoutfromtheseconddefensebeltatIakovlevoandPokrovka,eastoftheOboyan road,with strong support from theLuffwaffe’s 8thFlieger Corps. The two divisions,drivinginopencountry,werepushingtheweary51stGRDtothenorth.Nearingnoon,elementsof5thGTC,withlessthan60tanks,fromnorthwestofIakovlevostruckLAH.AtMikailovkanorthof Iakovlevo on the Oboyan road, the 1st GTB was attacked by 100 German planes then 30panzersandabattalionofinfantry.AfewmilesnorthofMikhailovkaatPokrovka, the49thTBdelayed theLAH but theLAH did push on and captured Pokrovka.As part ofVatutin’s armorcounter-attack,othertankbrigadesalsotriedtostoptheLAHatUlianovjusteastofPokrovkabutwere driven north over six miles to Gresnoe. Ulianov has been called Ulianovka by some.wdk133+.hjj121m.The two western panzer corps incurred greater losses the day before when the Luftwaffe

diverted planes to 3rdPzC.On this day, the 48thPzC and2ndSSPzCwould receive highestpriority.IntheearlymorningtheLuftwaffeattackedtheDubrova,LukhaninoandGremuchiareaswhere thegroundforceswere trying tocompletelybreak through theseconddefensivebelt.Ofspecialinteresttothepilotsweredug-intanksandartillery.cbk59.pck69.At thestartof theday,DasReichwaspositioned fromOzerovski in thenorth toTeterevino

Southinthesouth.ThepanzersofDasReichwere todrivenorth,secureTeterevinoNorthandthen continue to drive further north in order to screen LAH’s east flank while it drove onProkhorovka. The panzersmoved out at 0600 hrs and initiallymet little resistance but it wasdiscovered that a large group of tanks from 5th GTC was assembling near Iasnaia Poliana,southeast of Teterevino North. At 1030 hrs, 40 tanks from Col Zhilin’s 22nd GTB attackedReitzenstein’spanzers.Aftertwohoursoffightingandsufferingheavycasualties,theSoviettanksfell back to Iasnaia Poliana. TheLuftwaffe swept in and destroyedmore tanks; the remainingtanks escaped further north allowing Das Reich to reach Teterevino North. In two days offighting, the5thGTChad lostalmosthalfof its200 tanks.While thepanzerswerebusy to thenorth,theDerFührerandDeutschlandRegimentswerefightingamostlydefensivebattlealldayand did not gainmuch.Der Führer did capture Kalinin and then extended their gains a milefurthereasttotheBelgorod-Prokhorovkaraillinebutthegainsweremuchlessthanexpectedofthe division.At the end of the day,Das Reich panzers numbered 88 andwere deployed nearTeterevinoNorth.gnk166++.gnk163m.zow145.The panzers of SSTK were stationed near Gonki, north of Belgorod. The division was

supposedtohandoverthissectorto167thIDthenextmorning.Throughoutthepredawnhoursthe26th,GTBharassed the division.Soviet resistance along the riverwas strong and the infantrymoving inwouldhave theirhands full.Tomake it aseasyaspossibleon the167th ID,PriessorderedapreemptiveattackontheSoviettankstoculltheirnumbers.TheGermanslaunchedbutSovietartilleryandplanesslowedtheGermanadvance.AtthesametimeGermanartilleryfiredonShopinoandNepkhaevoinpreparationofaninfantryattackonthosetwovillages.SSTKdidreachShopino,settingupdefenses,butsoonSovietartillerystartedhittingthevillage.At2200hrs, a series of small recon raidsweremade in theGonki area; the Sovietswere looking forweakness.gnk171.gnk175.Itwas 0700 hrs on theTeterevino-Prokhorovka road andPeiper had been in battle for five

hourstryingtobreakoutfrombeingsurrounded.HehadradioedforreliefbutbeforeitarrivedtwoTigerscametorelievethetrappedmen.WhenRibbentrop’spanzersarrivedheengagedthesuperiorforceanddestroyedsixmoretanks.Peiperhadminorwoundsandwastakentoanaidstationbeforegoingbacktohisoutfitwhichwasalreadyontheroad.fkk153.zrl219+.The twopreviousdays theweatherhadbeenhotandclearbut later thatday the temperature

hadcooleddramaticallywithaheavyovercast.Forthenextweekthetemperaturewouldremaincoolandtherewouldbeintermittentdownpours.mhz251.The3rdPzRofSSTKmovedoutfromtheirnightlydefensequartersnearShopinoandraninto

the48thGTR.Afterafivehourbattle,theremainsof48thGTRonceagainretreatedtotheeastbankof theLipovyiDonets.During theday,MajGeneralPriessmovedhisHQtoZhuravlinyi,northofGonkiandnotfarfromtheline.kuz194.vzz6m.zow147.TotherightofLAH,DasReichreachedKalininfromSouthLuchkiby0730hrsandhadnow

coveredfivemilesfromitsmorningstartpoint.At0920hrstheSovietinfantry,supportedby35T34s,attackedDasReich fromthenorthwestbutwererepulsedby1030hrsaswere theothertank battles initiated by 2nd TC between Kalinin (DR) and Teterevino (LAH) throughout themorning. The Das Reich advanced over six miles that day and reached Teterevino on theProkhorovka roadbut itwas still sixmiles short of the third defense belt.WhileDas Reich’s

panzersattackednorthward,theDerFührerRegimenthadtosetupdefensivepositionseastofthepanzerstoprotectthemfromflankattacks.TheLuftwaffehelpedDasReichnearIasnaiaPoliananortheastofTeterevino.The2ndSSPzCbytheendofthedaywereatleastsixmilesaheadofeitherflank.wdk134.dgk124m.dgr221m.WithhavingstoppedtheLAHduringthenightandhavingtakenheavycasualties,the5thGTC

allowedreservestopassthroughandthenfellbackbehindthePokrovka-TeterevinoNorthline.dgr80.At0815hrs,asmallGermanforcefromLAHwasholdingLuchkiNorth,threemilesnortheast

ofPokrovka.The firstSoviet assault failedbut the second attemptwith30 tanks succeeded inbreakingthelineandreachingLuchkiNorth.AdditionalLAHtroops,comingfromnearIakovlevo,drove throughPokrovkaand then recapturedLuchkiNorth.With the slowprogressModelwasmakingandthedifficultieshewashavinginthenorth,Hoth,whowasalreadyconcernedwithhisadvance, began to have doubts about the success of this operation. The Soviet resistance anddepth of defense was far greater than expected. dgk125. dgk124m. dgk95m. snk81. dgr209m.gnk163m.zrl218.HeadingfornearbyPokrovkafromMakhailovka,acombatgroupfromLAH’s1stPzGRwas

attackedbythe49thTBbutby1000hrs,the49thTBhadtobreakofftheattackandfleetothenorth.ItwasabusymorningforLAHforithadjustrepulsedanearlierattackagainst1stGTB,northofIakovlevoasitwasheadingforMikhailovka.Afterdefeatingthe49thTBandcapturingPokrovka,LAHcontinued its trek towardLuchkiNorth toresecure itbeforemoving toward thethird defensive belt as ordered. Just minutes past Pokrovka as it headed for nearby Ulianov,elementsof31stTC, supportedby the29thTDBand1244thTDR,attackedwith80 tanksandassaultgunstopreventtheGermansfromdrivingthroughUlianov.Theattackfailedandthe31stTChad tofallbackpastGresnoe to thenorthsideof theBelgorod-Oboyanroad.By1500hrs,LAHwasabletoreachLuchkiNorth,threemileseastofUlianov.TheLAHhadbeenspreadouttodayandwouldbeforthenextseveraldays.TheirlinecoveredfromIakovlevointhesouthwesttoPokrovka-Bolshie-Maiachki(1stPzGR)toLuchkiNorthtoTeterevinoNorth(1stPzRand2ndPzGR)andjustwestofIvanovskiVyselokandIasnaiaPoliana(1stPzR)inthenortheast.wdk134.zrl218+.By1000hrsthe1stPzGRhadoccupiedtheimportantIakovlevoandalittlelaterthevillageof

Pokrovkatothenorthwest.agk101.gnk163m.gnk69m.Withtheadvancesoftheprevioustwodays,theLAHandDasReichcreatedaninemilegap

betweenthetwodivisions.DasReichwasmovingeasttowardtheLipovyiDonetsbeforemovingnorthwhileLAHwasmovingmorenorthonanaxisthatincludedIakovlevo,MalyeMaiachkiandGresnoe. Hausser ordered the two divisions to stabilize the line and close the gap beforeresuming their advances. Thiswas another example of 4th PzA not having sufficient forces tofollowtheplanofmovingtowardOboyanandProkhorovkaandconsideringthetroublesof3rdPzCfallingeven furtherbehindandcreatinganevengreatergapwith4thPzA, itwas time forGeneralHothtoreconsiderhisalternativesandmakesomeimportantchangesbuthedidnot.Hothfurthererroredbyorderingthe48thPzC,whichwasalreadymilesbehindtheSS,toexpandhissector to thewest of Berezovka, which thinnedGeneral Knobeldorff’s forces and slowed hisnorthernadvanceevenmore.vzz132+.

Starting at 1030 hrs and lasting most of the day, the 2nd PzR (DR) defending the IasnaiaPoliana-TeterevinoNorthsectorwasrepeatedlyattackedbymultiplegroupsof30tanksbutwhilethe regiment took casualties, it did repulse each attack. At the same time to the northwest ofTeterevinoNorth, elements of 1st PzR (LAH)with the support of theLuftwaffe was repulsingsimilarattacks.Theoppressiveheatofthedayplusthefumesmadefightinginsidethosetanksarealtorture.zow147.WhileLAHwasfightingalosingbattletotakeKrasnyiOktiabrnearthePselRiver,DasReich

wasalsofailingtoreachBelenikhinoStationandtheKomsomoletsStateFarmwhichwasbeingdefendedby the20thTBand the6thGMRBof5thGTC.Whenthe2ndSSPzCcouldnot taketheirobjectivesagainstthemajoroffensivethatVatutininstituted,theyhaltedtheirattemptsintheafternoon after gaining some of their objectives, and respectively pulled back to Kalinin andOzerovski, going defensive in order to regroup and hopefully let the Soviet tankers exhaustthemselves.Ifthe2ndSSPzChadachievedabreakthroughatakeysitelikeGresnoeorIablochkijustnorthofBolshieMaiachki,theiroffensivewouldhaveprobablycontinuedthroughoutthedayandevening.DespiteholdingtheGermansback,Vatutinwantedtofortifythelinefurther.Gettingthe 29th DAB and 309th RD from 38th and 40th Armies, they were in their new defensivepositionsshortlyafterdark,supporting5thGTC.VatutinwasalsoreceivingMajGeneralPopov’s2ndTCfromSouthwesternFrontand itwouldbeatPokrovkaby theafternoonof7/8.GermanaerialreconpatrolsspottedPopov’stanksandtruckstravelingnorthduringthepredawnhoursofthe8thbutthecolumnwasneverattackedbytheLuftwaffe.vzz136+.dgk109.On the east flankofSSTK, aerial reconnaissance discovered twonew tank corpsmoving to

supporttheexisting2ndGTContheirwesternflankthatstretchedtotheOboyanroad.TheSovietAirForcewasincreasingtheirassaultsaswell.Nowthat4thPzAwaspasttheseconddefensebelt andmoving toward the third line,Vatutinwas increasing thepressurebybringing inmorereinforcements.The2ndSSPzCclaimed tohavedestroyed121 tanksandcaptured499POWsthatday.wdk136+.The lead units of LAH crossed the Luchki North-Teterevino road and headed for Gresnoe,

southwest of Prokhorovka and the gateway to the land bridge between the Psel and DonetsRivers.pck67+.Elementsof theLAHandDasReich further south, driving up the road towardProkhorovka,

pushKravchenko’s5thGTCthroughandpastTeterevinoNorth.TheadvancewashaltedwhentheSoviettankbrigadesattackedtheflanksandtheGermanshadtoshiftforcesfromthefronttothesides. To make contact with the 48th PzC, the attack zone was narrowed once reaching theNovoselovka-Luchki-Bolshie Maiachki area. In the Pogorelovka and Mikhailovka region, theGermans,supportedby100panzers,resumedtheirattackonthe1stGTBbutthelineheld.Theadvanceofthe2ndSSPzCwasslowingdownduetotheincreasingresistanceofthe31stTCandother brigades along their growing flanks, whichmeant forces from the front line had to shifttoward the side.ThoughTeterevinoNorthandGresnoewerecapturedon thisday,partsof the2nd SS PzC were still fighting within the second defense belt. dgk124m. dgk125*+. lck275.zzz101m.vzz7m.The31stTChadjustdisengagedasorderedandweremovingeasttotheirnewpositionsbut

were stopped at 1400 hrs when the tanks were ambushed by both SSTK and LAH, west of

KrasnaiaPoliana.Afterabriefbattle,the31stTChadtofallbacktotheMalyeMaiachkiline.Bytheendof theday,4thPzAgainedabout threemiles.The5thGTCand2ndGTCcontinued toresist 48th PzC’s attempt to reachOboyan but the 3rdMC had suffered greatly and had littlestrengthleft.The6thTC,despiteitsmanybattles,wasstillstrong;its180thTBhadjustmovedoutof reserveand into theUrochishcheStanovoearea, closer to the front.Reserves from40thArmywerebeginningtoarriveonthewesternflank,makingHoth’sjobevenharderbyhavingtodevotemoreresourcestotheflank.dgr215.With the breakthrough of the 51st GRD’s line and the subsequent 5th GTC’s partial

encirclementnearKalinin,therightflankof2ndGTCwasexposedsoVatutinorderedBurdeinytotheeasternsideoftheLipovyiDonets.Beforeretreating,the2ndGTCwith165tanksattackedDasReich inanattempttorelieve5thGTCbutwasunsuccessfulinpushingtheGermansback.However 5th GTC, fighting throughout the night, was able to escape though it suffered heavycasualties in the process. This action alsomeant the second defense belt had been completelybreachedandthe2ndSSPzCwasapproachingthethirddefensebeltinthesector.ThisincludedtheKomsomolets State Farm andTeterevinoNorth,whichwere defended by the 285thRR of183rdRD.DasReichhadmanagedtoreachtheTeterevinoNorthtoIvanovskiVyselokroad.Ithadalsosent10panzerstothewoodssouthoftheStateFarmtocheckconditions.AtthispointthesepanzerswerewithinrangeofSovietguns.Severalpanzerswerehitandtheremainderfellback to Hill 258.2 which was just captured. The Germans were now only six miles fromProkhorovka but nowwere up against the third defensive beltwhichwould be a tough nut tocrack.Tothenorthwest,LAH’srightflankwasalsoattackedinthisengagement.OtherelementsofLAHdeployednearLuchkiNorthwereattackedbytanksof31stTCcomingfromthenorthwestwhich causedheavy casualties but the attacks,with thehelpof theLuftwaffe, were eventuallyrepulsed.OthergrenadiersfromLAH,deployedfurtherwest,capturedPokrovkabymidmorning.After the battle for the village, tanks from31stTCdriving south attacked the village trying toretakeitbutfailed.PokrovkawasfivemileswestofLuchkiSouthandabout15milessouthwestofProkhorovkaStation.vzz129.vzz8m.gnk119.gnk113m.zow147.Some of the riflemenmanning the front line would report back to their commanders of the

craziestcircumstancestheyeverwitnessed.TheywouldseeTigersdeliberatelydriveintoanti-tankditchesand,attackingthefarwallatanangle,wouldclawtheirwayusingtheirweightandwidetrackstogrindupthefarwall,eventuallyclimbingupandoutoftheditch.mjk87.After forcing the 48thGTR to cross to the east side of theDonets the previous day, SSTK

shifted to the west and fought its way to the Iasnaia Poliana line where the 168th ID wasstationed.Bytheendoftheday,SSTKhadknockedoutanother41tanksandSPGs.fkk136.The29thAnti-tankBrigadeheavilyengagedthe2ndSSPzCbut,despitethedeterminedeffort,

by late afternoon the panzers had takenTeterevinoNorth and theSoviet brigadewas virtuallywipedout.bt85.TheLuftwaffemaderepeatedrunsintheLAHsectorthatdayastheSSdivisiondrovetoward

Prokhorovka.TheLAHadmittedthatwithoutairsupportnogainswouldhavebeenmade.cbk61.Bytheafternoon,leadingelementsoftheLAHhadreachedTeterevinoNorthwhileDasReich

onitsrighthadreachedapositionbetweenPetrovski inthesouthandKalinininthenorth.TheSSTK and 168th ID were still providing security on the east flank along the Lipovyi Donets.

KalininwasalmostduenorthofTeterevinoSouthonthewestsideoftheLipovyiDonetsRiver.Itwas also just west of the Belgorod-Prokhorovka railroad. wdk138*+. dgr209m. hjj121m.dgk222m.dlu63m.dgr221m.vzz7m.Evennow,sosoonintothecampaign,itwasgoingasGeneralHothhadenvisioned,atleastin

regardtotheadvanceof2ndSSPzCinthedirectionofProkhorovka.OriginallytheOboyanroutewasprimarybutthegeneralthoughttheProkhorovkacorridorroutethoughlongertoKurskcouldturn out to be advantageous. On the road from Pokrovka, southwest of Luchki North, toProkhorovka,Hausser’s2ndSSPzCweremakingmodestgainsagainst theseconddefensebeltheld byChistiakov’s 6thGAandKatukov’s 1stTA,whichwere strongly entrenched along thePenaandLukhaninoRiversandinfrontofProkhorovka.Thismoveby2ndSSPzCwasmovingawayfromthemainobjectiveofOboyan.The48thPzCcontinuedtomovetowardOboyanwhiletryingtoprotect2ndSSPzC’sleftflank.SSTK,on2ndSSPzC’srightflank,waspushingSovietforces back toward the Lipovyi Donets River and still had not been able to contribute to thenorthernattack.As thecorpsneared thePsel line, the168th IDwouldbe forced todefend theflankonitsowntoallowSSTKtomoveupalongsideLAHforthefinalpushacrossthePsel.BynightfalltheSoviet49thTBof3rdMCand100thTBof31stTCslowlygavegroundaroundthekeyPokrovkaandBolshieMaiachkisites,withdrawingtowardthePselRiver.Thissituationwasbroughtaboutbythefailureof3rdPzCtocleartheDonetsRiversinthefirstfewdays,allowingelements of 69th Army and certain tank corps to continue to harass 2nd SS Corps. dgk123+.dgk95m.dgk222m.dlu63m.dgr80.TheSSTKand168thIDwereguardingtheeastflankintheShopinoareaontheLipovyiDonets

River.Defendingthewestbankoftheriverwas375thRDand2ndGTC.At1900hrs,theSSTKreached the highway west of Shopino and drove the Soviets across the river. The Sovietscounteredaround2300hrswithairattacksandheavyartillery,stoppingSSTKonthehighridgeonemilewest of the riverwhere they ended their dayof advancement.Before retiring for thenight, the division spent couple hours building a defense against possible ambushes. wdk134.dgk222m.dlu63m.Inadditiontotheotherreinforcementsbroughtuptotheseconddefensebelt,the242ndTBand

237thTBof31stTCwerebroughtforwardtodefendtheOzerovskiarea.dgr80.Atnight,PriessofSSTKreportedtoHausserthathisdivisionhaddestroyedonly41tanksand

assaultgunsandcapturedonlyafewPOWs,weaponsandsupplies.Itwasameagerreturn.Mostofthosetankswerefromthe48thGTR.kuz194.Bytheendoftheday,LAHhadreachLuchkiNorthaboutthreemilesnortheastofUlianov.The

31stTCretreatednorthontheOboyanroadwith3rdMC.The52ndGRDhadalsoretreatedeightmilestothenorthbankofthePselRiveratPolezhaev.GeneralVatutinwasalarmedbythe2ndSSPzC’sadvanceandwastryingtobreaktheirmomentum.wdk134.dgk124m.dgr221m.Inthesouthernsalient,the8thFliegerCorpsreporteddowning96planes,1train,44tanks,20

guns and 50 vehicles. These claims, especially the destroyed planes,were high.According toRudenko,theSovietslostonly63planes.cbk61+.It was only the third day into the operation and Hausser’s 2nd SS PzC’s right flank was

exposedduetoKempf’sinabilitytokeepupwiththeadvanceontheeastsideoftheDonets.The2ndSSPzCmadelittlegainsforitwasbusydefendingbothflanks.BytheendofthedayHausser

hadsecuredalinefromTeterevinotoapointnortheastofRozhdesdevskoye.The48thPzC,afterbreaking through the initialdefensezones,also transferred the restof167th ID to2ndSSPzC.RozhdesdevskoyewasjustwestoftheDonetsRiver.snk77+.dgk124m.vzz497.Wittmann and his SS Panzers had destroyed many T34s on their way to Teterevino. A

motorcycle company accompanying the panzers captured a Soviet brigadeHQ before enteringPsyolkneewheretheSovietscounter-attackedbutwererepulsed.TheSSdivisionsweremakingprogress on a narrow front but their flanks could not keep up which gave the Soviets theopportunitytoattacktheSSpanzersfromthesidesaswellasthefront.Vatutinwassendingupreservestostemthegainsofthepanzers.StalinmadeitclearthattheGermanscouldnotmakeittoOboyan.rc197.By the end of the day, more of Vatutin’s reinforcements had arrived in sector, slowing the

Germanadvance,andmorereinforcementswouldbearrivingoverthenextfewdays.Vatutinwasplanningonusingthesereinforcementsforanothermajorassaultinthemorningbutsomeoftheseforcesarrived lateand themajorassault turnedpiecemealandconfused.Hothwanted tobe atOboyanbynowbutwasnotclose to thatobjectiveand thegeneraldidnotmakeanydramaticchanges to his deployments to achieve this. Hoth had always claimed the 2nd SS PzC wasscheduledtomovetowardProkhorovkabutwiththescaleofresistancetheSovietswereexertingagainst all three corps, thosepre-campaignplans shouldhavebeen reconsidered.The troublesthat3rdPzCwashavingontheeasternflankjustmadethingsworseandtheterrainthat48thPzChad to traverse as well, as the pressure the Soviets were exerting on its western flank, wasslowing it down.Tomake the situation evenworse,Model’s 9thArmywas doing poorly andreservesmeantforRokossovskywerenowheadingforVatutin–27thArmy.vzz138.dgk123+.German intelligence sent a report to vonManstein that estimated500Soviet tankshadbeen

destroyedsincethestartofthecampaignbutthatVatutinhadanother1,500remaining.TheSoviet5thGTAunderRotmistrovwasorderedtocontinuetheirmarchtoProkhorovkabut

alsohadauxiliaryorderstoheadfortheProtochinoareaifProkhorovkafellbeforetheyarrived.ThiswastheexpectedroutethepanzerswouldtaketoreachKurskandRotmistrovwasorderedtostopthem,nomatterthecost.HisleadingtankswouldcrosstheOskolRivertothewestsidebythenextmorning.The5thGTAwasstilladay,probablytwodaysoutfromitsassignedarea.StalinalsoprovidedalargeaircaptopreventtheLuftwaffefromgettingnearandidentifyingthesizeofthecolumnsortoharassthetankers.dgk121+.jp156.zra346+.BymidnighteastoftheDonets,KempfGroupwasmakinglittleprogress,alarming4thPzA.It

allowedVatutin to redirect his 2nd TCwestward to attack 2nd SS PzC on its east flank nearGostishchevo. Gostishchevo, situated on the important Belgorod-Prokhorovka rail line, wasmidwaybetweentheLipovyiDonetsandtheNorthernDonetsRivers.vzz3m.vzz5m.Kruger’sDasReichhadtoexpanditsfronttoaccommodateSSTK,shiftingforcesfurthereast

to handle the increase resistance on the east flank along the Lipovyi Donets River. dgk125.dgk222m.dlu63m.At night Vatutin ordered Lt General Chistiakov’s 6th GA in the west and Lt General

Kriuchenkin’s69thArmyintheeasttoprepareduringthepredawnhourstocounterattacktowardthe Iasnaia Poliana, Pokrovka and Iakovlevo region nextmorning.Vatutin became concern forKriuchenkinwhoappearedtobelosingcontrolofthesituationandhisarmy,butallowedhimto

commandthisattack.Theassemblyincludedthe2ndTC,2ndGTC,5thGTC,10thTC,6thTC,31stTC,3rdMCandthe89thGRDand375thRDwiththeobjectiveofdrivingawedgebetweentheSSdivisionsandencirclingasmanyforcesaspossibletodestroy.The2ndGTCalongwith89thGRDcrossingtheLipvoyiDonetswouldattacktowardLuchkiSouthfromtheeast,cuttingofftheGermansnorthofthatvillagefromthosethatweresouthofit.Whiletheotherunitswouldattack towardVasilevka,Komsomolets State Farm andBelenikhino in order to drive awedgebetweenLAHandDasReich.The5thGTCwasinaterriblecondition,havinglosthalfoftheirtanksthedaybefore,buthadabout100tanksstillworking.Deployedjustnorthof2ndGTC,the5thGTCwouldheadalmostduewesttowardLuchkiNorth.The2ndTCwhichhasn’tarrivedinsectoryetwouldattackjustnorthof5thGTC.The10thTCwhichwascurrentlyarrivingwouldattackalongtheProkhorovkaroadtowardTeterevinoNorth.The6thGA,3rdMCand31stTCdefending the Psel bendwould drive south toward theGresnoe,MalyeMaiachki andBolshieMaiachkiareaformingthenorthernboundaryoftheintendedencirclementofthe2ndSSPzC.Onthewestflank,the6thTCwouldattack48thPzCinordertopreventthatcorpsfromsendingunitsto assist 2nd SS PzC. Just like the offensive launched on this day, the planned offensive fortomorrowwouldfailtoreachitsobjectivesandforthesamereasons:thenewbrigadescominginto the sector did not have sufficient time to prepare or to study the intended battlefield andtherefore could not fine tune their attack on the enemy. Most importantly the attacks wereuncoordinatedwithseveralbrigadesarrivingandbeginningtheirattacksmanyhourstoolate.Oneof General Vatutin’s faults was his impatience. He frequently forced an offensive before theparticipantswerereadyandthebigoffensivescheduledfortomorrowisaprimeexample.Halfofthetankbrigadeswerenotevenattheirlaunchpointsorresuppliedfortheattack.Needlesstosaytheattackthenextdaywouldnotgoasitwasintended.Theoffensiveshouldhavebeenpostponedafewhourstoallowforbettercoordinationandpreparation.vzz139+.vzz143+.vzz8m.TheLuftwaffehadsporadicallysupportedthe3rdPzCforthesefirstthreedays.Sometimesthe

supportwouldbestrongandhelpfulandatother timesnonexistent,butduetoattritionandtheneedsof48thPzCand2ndSSPzC,airsupportwoulddiminishdramaticallyontheeasternflankaftertoday.IftheLuftwaffecouldhavesupportedthe3rdPzCproperly,therewouldhavebeenagood chance that Kempf could have linked up withDas Reich by 7/12 and entrapped largenumbersof69thArmy.I’havewonderedhowthecampaignwouldhaveevolvedif48thPzCandtheSSCorpshadstayeddefensiveoncetheHill260.8-Hill241.6-KomsomoletsStateFarmlinewas reached inorder to regroupand temporarilydevotemore air andpanzer resources to3rdPzCforKempftocatchup.VatutinwouldhavehadtodevoteadditionalresourcesagainstKempf,relievingalittlepressureoff theother twocorpswhentheiradvanceresumed.Thegreatestairactivity for both sides occurred in the Malye Maiachki, Verkhopenie, Iakovlevo, Teterevino,NovoeOskochnoe,VerkhniOlshanets,MelikhovoandKazacheareas.dgr254++.Bytheendoftheday,theLAHcontinuedtoextenditssalientnorthward.Thegrenadiershad

reachedtheimportanttownofGresnoe,capturedTeterevinoandIasnaiaPolianaandwerewithinsightoftheimportantKomsomoletsStateFarmthatwassituatedalongtheroadtoProkhorovka.Thewest side of the salient had narrowed from the previous day as theLAH concentrated onmovingtowardtheimportantrailjunctiontothenortheast.Hothwasextremelydisappointedwiththeday’sprogress.HethoughttheSovietdefensewas

about to collapse and expected his coordinated attackwould finally shatter the line.All threecorpsmadelittleprogressandcontinuedtofallbehindHoth’sestimatedschedule.GDhadbrokenthroughtheseconddefensebelt,reachingtheBelgorod-Oboyanroadandhadtheappearanceoffinally takingoffbutallofasudden, the6thTCappearedandhaltedGD’sadvance.Hothwasespeciallydisappointedwith thehigh failure rateof thePanther.Therewere somanyPanthersstillonthebattlefieldthattherecoveryteamswerenotabletobringthembackinatimelyfashionto be repaired.GD had a net loss of 220 panzers including the Panthers in the four days offighting.TohelpGD getbackoncourse,Hothordered theSSpanzers todisengageduring thenightandassemblenorthofTeterevinoNorthandbepreparedtoattacktothenorthwesttowardtheSolotinkaRiverintotheflankof1stTAthatwasblockingGD.ThisactionwouldalsoassistinprotectingLAH’swest flank.With thebenefitofhindsight, thismovebyHoth tosendLAH’spanzersoverthenexttwodaystotheSolotinkaregionwastobeapoordecisionandisaperfectexampleofthefogofwar.Thiswillbediscussedfurtherwiththecoverageof7/9.SeeMap11.gnk186+.Bytheendoftheday,LAHhadonly41assortedpanzersworking.Theystartedthecampaign

with92panzers.Quiteafewof the51downedpanzerswererepairableandwouldseefurtheractioninthedaystocome.Infactbythe12th,LAHwouldhavehalfagainasmanypanzersonthefield.TheLAHhadgainedsomegroundandwasnowfivemilesaheadof48thPzCwhichmeantLAH’s west flank was exposed. The mini-salient that LAH was carving out was growing,exposingmore of its flanks to the enemy. The divisionwas spendingmore of its resources toprotecttheirflanks.Thiswasanissuethatisrepeatedlymentionedinthisbook.Hothhadtohaveseenthissalientfromthefirstday.Heclearlyknewtheproblemsassociatedwithasalient.Hecouldsee48thPzCandespecially11thPzDcouldnotkeepupwith2ndSSPzCandyethedidnotdoenoughtocorrectit.HissolutionwastosendthepanzerregimentsofLAHandDasReich tothenorthwestthenextmorningtocleartheresistanceontheboundarybetween11thPzDandLAH.Whilethereweresomebeneficialresultsofthisaction,itclearlywasnotsufficient.Thepatientwasgivenaband-aidwhenheneededanoperation.Thetankrecoveryandrepairteamsforbothsidesperformedsuperhumanfeatstohaveasmanytanksonthebattlefieldaspossible.gnk166.gnk117.TherewasadownsidetosendingSSpanzerstothenorthwestthenextdaytohelp11thPzD.By

tryingtohelp11thPzD,themomentumofbothLAHandDasReichwashamperedandanybenefitthataccruedtotheoperationwastemporary.TheexactsamethinghappenedtoGDwhenithadtoturnwesttohelp3rdPzD.WiththethreeFrontsthatStalinsenttotheKursksalientthereprobablywasnotanyway theGermanscouldhavewonbut if IwasvonManstein,aconstrictionof theflankswouldhavebeentriedby7/7andinfactwiththedismalstartthe3rdPzChadon7/5,theconstrictionwouldhavestartedon7/6bymovingKempfbacktothewestsideoftheDonets.ThiswouldhavefreedSSTK toheadnorthseveraldayssoonerwhichwouldhavehelpedboth11thPzDandLAH.The167thIDcouldhavebeenredeployedaswell–eitherwiththeSSTKortothewesttosupportthe3rdPzD.Admittedly,makingsucharedeploymentduringbattlewouldnotbeeasybutitcouldbedoneandwithbeneficialresults.ItwouldnothavebeenanyworsethantheredeploymentsthatwerebeingplannedforOperationRoland.Betteryetthanconstricting3rdPzCwouldbetoconstrict48thPzCsector.Thethreearmoreddivisionsof the48thwerenotstrong

enough to advance on such a wide front and still handle flank duties at the same time. Awithdrawalwasinorder.Bytheendofthethirdfulldayoffighting,Hothhadsuffered10,000casualties.TheLuftwaffe

hadstillretainedcontroloftheskiesbutjustbarely.TheSovietpilotsweretenaciousandwouldnotgiveup.The8thFliegerCorpsflew1,829sortieswhiletheVVSflew1,536sorties.cbk61.nzk77.During the night after receivingVatutin’s new attack orders for the nextmorning, his corps

commanderspreparedtheirforces.MajGeneralBurkov’s10thTCwithnearly200tanksmovedsouthontheProkhorovka-TeterevinoNorthhighwayanddirectlyattackedLAH.Burdeiny’s2ndGTC,using140tanks,movedto theriver toattackDasReich southofTeterevinoNorthwhilePopov’s2ndTCwith168tankswastogivesupporttoBurkovassoonasitarrivedinsectorlaterinthemorningofthe8th.Kravchenko’s5thGTCwithonly100tanksalsomovedtotherivernearBelenikhino.Almost600tankswouldbeattackingLAHandDasReich’seastflanknextmorning.Therewere400moretanksattackingfromthenorthandwestandattheveryleastVatutinwantedtoisolatetheSSdivisionsfromtheirsupplylinesbutwasreallyhopingfornothinglessthanthecompletedestructionoftheSSCorps.gnk187.At0300hrsafterhoursofshellingandairraids,theGDalongwiththe3rdPzDand11thPzD

oneachsideresumeditsattackuptheOboyanroad.Atthesametime,DasReichandLAHbegantheir advance fromwest of Belenikhino toward the northwest. At 0400 hrs, these two groupsengaged 1st TA. Katukov asked for air support and the aircraft attacked the Germans in theOlkhovka-Iakovlevo-Kozmo-Demianovka area. A second wave of Luffwaffe showed up andignited a dogfight which saw many planes fall from the sky, many of them Soviet. fkk83+.vzz115+.The11thPzDontherightflankof48thPzClaunchedat0300hrsandtookthehighgrounda

mile east of Dubrova, driving back the 67th GRD. TheGD in the center broke through thedefensesandfinishedsecuringDubrovaanditsimmediatecountrysidebeforemovingnorthontheOboyan roadandat1430hrsafter repulsinganarmorambushcrossed thePenaRiver.A littlelaterthe11thPzDandtheGDmetupwith3rdMCandthe31stTCof1stTAontheOboyanroad.ItisclaimedthatT34sknockedoutfiveTigersatcloserangeinthisengagement.Nearby,notfarfromSyrtsevo,the112thTBof6thTCblockedGDnorthofSyrtsevoclaimingtohaveknockedout15panzerswhichincludedsixTigers.TheseclaimsofdestroyingsomanyTigersseemhigh.The48thPzChadorderstopenetratethroughtheseconddefensebeltbytheendofthedaybutitdidnotseempossible.Verkhopenie,westoftheOboyanroad,wassixmilesaway,Pokrovkaontheeastsideoftheroadwasninemilesawayandthe48thPzCwasfallingbehindthe2ndSSPzCwitheveryhour.The48thPzChadgreaterresistancetoovercomeanditwasgettingworsewithallthereinforcementsVatutinwasbringingtotheline.The86thTBwith60tankshadjoined1stTA.Theseattacksby1stTAwereinsupportof6thGAwhichwasfallingbackinthisimportantsector. The 112th TBwas Katukov’s last reserve; any further help would have to come fromVatutinorStavka.wdk135*.hjj121m.dgr209m.zra61.pck69.hsz122.ThoughGDand11thPzDstartedearly,by0400hrs,theentire500pluspanzerforceof4thPzA

resumed its attack againstChistiakov’s 6thGA, betweenSyrtsevo andLuchki South.A rollingartillerybarrage fell in frontof thepanzers toclear thewayas theymovednorth.Stukaswere

flying above looking for target opportunities: tank columns, manned trenches or artillery. Theboundary line between 1st TA and 5th GTC was between the villages of Luchki South andGresnoe and would be a prime target. This coordinated attack was immediately reported toVatutin,Hismainconcernwasforhisforces(1stTA)infrontof48thPzCandhequicklyreactedbysendingallavailablereservesuptobolsterthelineaswellasredeployingtroopsfrom“quiet”sectorstocombatGDdivisionand11thPzD.mhz251+.mhz260.dgr209m.Unlike the firstnight, thepreviousnight andpredawnhours sawGD stop their advance and

throwupadefensiveposture.Theywereinthemiddleoftheseconddefensebeltandtheyweresurrounded.TanksofKrivoshein’s3rdMCwereredeployingonthewestbankofthePenaRiverand could easily be heard. The 3rdMC consisted of the 1st TB, 3rd TB and the 10thMRBlocatedhereandthe49thTBwhichwastotheeastfightingLAHalongwith1stGTB.Katukov’sbrigades had suffered heavy casualties and requested fromVatutin additional reserves.Vatutinordered anti-tank units from the 38th and 40thArmieswhichwere situated furtherwest of thePena River. Katukov’s last mobile reserve, the 6th TC was moved eastward to blockGD’snorthwardmarch.The112thTBwasintheleadasthe6thTCandalreadyengagedGDandpartof11thPzD.gnk182.At dawn the 48th PzC launched an attack northward, with Tigers in the lead and with air

support,fromtheDmitrievkaandOlkhovkaareaagainstthe1stTBand3rdMBof3rdMCand31stTC.Eventually theGermansbroke into the1stTBline, forcing theSoviets to fallback toSyrtsevo. The Luftwaffe was called in and made several critical runs that inflicted heavycasualtieson theSoviets.Before longthe3rdMBhadtofallbackaswell.Theretreatofbothbrigadeswascoveredbythe49thTBbutwithoutassistancetheyfellbackaswell.Toassist3rdMBatSyrtsevo,Vatutinredeployed112thTBof6thTCtoSyrtsevowhile200thTBwassenttoVerkhopenie,northofthecurrentlineincaseSyrtsevofell.The180thTBwhichhadjustarrivedatOboyanwas sent toStanovoeWoods.The67thGRDwas still retreatingbutwouldmake astand between Syrtsevo and Verkhopenie. Other artillery formations were brought up toVerkhopenieaswell.dgr214+.cbk59.cbk61.dgk404.Atdawn, the3rdPzDbeganmarching towardLakhaninoasordered, arriving thereby0600

hrs.Onthewaytothetown,the3rdPzDcouldhearStukashittingthesurroundingarea.The3rdPzDwas still having troublewithgetting their biggunsup to the line and the air supportwascriticallynecessary.By1430hrs,the394thPzGRof3rdPzDwascrossingthesmalltributaryofthe Pena River, northwest of the Lakhanino area. At the same time, the 3rd PzGR assaultedLakhanino to clear the last resistance from the town. Engineers were brought up withflamethrowersandsatchelcharges togohouse tohouse.Afterclearing the town, theengineersbuiltabridgeoverthestreamtoallowtheremainingpanzerstocrosswhilestilldark.gnk184.cbk61.Mickl’s 11th PzD, to the right ofGD, launched at dawn. They were ordered to penetrate

throughtheseconddefensebeltandreach theOboyanroad.Twofortifiedhills,Hill229,4andHill245.2werekeystrongpointsinthissectorthatMicklwouldhavetotake.Theattackstartedat 0330 hrs and by 0730 hrs Hill 229.4 on their right flank was captured. Taking this hillweakenedthelineandbeforelongtheGermansweremakinggoodgains.Theleadpanzersfoundanotherminefield that slowed their advancebutwith thehelpof engineers they cleared apath

throughandHill245.2wasnexttofall.ThebattleforHill245.2,ontheboundarylinewithGD,initiallygave theGermansa lotof troublebut iteventuallyfell.Luftwaffeaerial recon tried tohurryMickl’sadvanceastheplanesspotted50tanksleavingPokrovkaheadinghiswayandifthehill was not secured before the Soviets arrived, the division would be in a critical position.Additionalbomberswerebroughtinfromothersectorstohelpsoftenthehill.Withtheextrahelpof the Luftwaffe the hill was taken and the lead panzers went ahead, reaching the importantBelgorod-Oboyan road then traveling another mile to reach the Hill 251.2, northwest ofPokrovka,bylateafternoon.gnk185+.gnk163m.At0500hrs,Katukov’s1stTAwith100tankslaunchedanattackonGD,11thPzDandLAHas

theywerepushingnorthfromaroundtheIakovlevoareain6thGAsector.ThisbattleragedforhourswiththeT34sbeingthevictimsofthelongershootinggunsofthepanzers.Beforethebattlewas over the air forces of both sides were brought in, causing further casualties. The LAHclaimeddestroying20tanks.Krivoshein’s3rdMCwashithardaswas6thTC,bothfallingbacktowardSyrtsevoandGremuchi.Soviet artillerycovered the retreatwell, slowing theGermansfromfollowing.With48thPzCapproachingSyrtsevo,Katukovbroughtupthe67thGRDtohelpdefend the critical strongpoint.With theheavy fightingof the last daysplus theminefields andmechanicalfailures,GDhadonly40oftheoriginal192Panthersstillworking.Mostofthe148Pantherswouldbe recovered and repaired to fight again.Besides themechanical problems, itwasquicklydiscoveredthePanthershadpoorradiocomms.mhz253+.dgr209m.Strachwitz started the day with only 73 working panzers, half of them were from Col

Lauchert’sPantherBrigade.Seventy-sixPantherswereoutofactionduetomechanicaltroubles;mostof theothershadwheel and trackdamagedue tomines.Therewereonlya fewPanthersdestroyedfromtankbattles.JustbeforedaylighttheGrenadiersandengineersofGDpenetratedthetankditchandencircledthevillageofDubrova.ThepanzersmovedclosertosupportbuttheSovietdefenseswerestilltoostrong;Strachwitzrequestedairsupport.At0800hrsafteranhourofaerialbombing,thepanzerslaunchedtowardDubrova.Findingsomeweaknessontheeasternperimeter,theGermansshiftedtheirattack.Hill254.5,notfarfromtheroadtoDubrovastartedfiring on the German attack. A few panzers moved toward the hill but were repulsed. ThePanthersranintoaminefieldandweredamagedbymines;unabletomove,theSovietgunsonthehillstartedpoundingthepanzersontheirthinsidearmor.Allthepanzers,aroundfiveorsix,weredestroyed.gnk182.dgk127.dgk409.pck69.OnceGDmadeitpastthetankditch,theadvancetowardHill254.5wasstilltortuousforthe

heavy firecontinued.The remaining twoTigershitminesas soonas theypassed theditchandwereoutofaction.ItwasnowuptothePantherstoreachthetopofthehill.Whilethehillwasbeingfoughtover,Strachwitz’sotherpanzersmadeitpastDubrovaandheadednorth.JustbeforenoonandafewmilesnorthofDubrovaandeastofSyrtsevo,Shrachwitz’spanzersapproachedandsecuredHill230.1.Withoutmuchtroublethepanzersrolledthrough,pastSyrtsevo,andwerenearingHill 218.5when theywere ambushed by 112th TB ofMajGeneralGetman’s 6th TC.Thirty tanks from thenorthand20 tanks from thesouthwere trying toencircleanddestroy theleadpanzergroup.Strachwitzwasabletofallbackandregroupwithoutlosingtoomanypanzers.While this was going on, the Fusiliers ofGD to the southeast were fighting for the town ofSyrtsev,justnorthwestofDubrova.TheRedAirForcewascalledinbuthadlittlesuccessforthe

Fusilierspenetratedthefrontlineandwasfightingwithinthetownbynightfall.Fromwithinthecenterof thetown,theSovietgarrison,withsupportof theirnew12.2cmassaultgun,stagedacounterattackwhichfailed.Sovietartilleryandaerialbombingcontinued;itwasdecidedtopullback from town and try again in the morning. Hill 230.1 was also four miles south ofVerkhopenie.gnk183+.gnk214.vzz2m.wwf45.dgk127+.Shortly after capturing Dubrova Group Strachwitz’s Panthers drove into a minefield where

manypanzersweredamaged.As theGermanswere trying toextract themselves fromthe field,Soviet artillery and tanks were firing on them. Most of them that were recovered could berepaired but it would take time and slow their advance. After Dubrova,GD moved north toSyrtsevandPoint1.2northofSyrtsev.Point1.2wastakenonlyafterfiercehand-to-handcombat.Bothobjectiveswerecostly,especiallyafter twowavesofIL-2aircraftcamein low,batteringman and panzer. After securing the village on 7/8, it was discovered the Soviets had builtunderground bunkers three stories high. The Soviet garrison at Syrtsev fell back to eitherGremuchiorSyrtsevotothewest.hsz122.fkk265.pck69.dgk127.wwf45.wwf86.Moving north with GD, the 11th PzD was north of Dubrova and now twelve miles from

Oboyan. Reaching this far meant the panzers had breached the Soviet second defense belt,dividing a wedge between 1st TA and 5th GTC.GD broke through on both sides of Syrtsev,pushingitsdefendersbackintoSyrtsevoandGremuchi.WiththeSovietsconcentratedinasmallarea, theGermanartillery found themeasyprey. In the afternoon, thepanzersweremovingonSyrtsevobuthitaminefieldandhadtostopwhenSovietartilleryfiredonthem.bt85.On thewest flank, the 48thPzCwas still struggling to penetrate through the seconddefense

belt.The3rdPzDprovidedsecurityforthewesternboundaryinthemorningastherestof48thPzCdrovetowardOboyan.Intheafternoonthe332ndIDrelievedthe3rdPzDinorderforthepanzers tohelpwith thespearhead.Onceon thefront line, the3rdPzDattacked the90thGRDnorthofLukhaninoonthePenaRiver.Totheeast,the3rdPzDattackedtheSovietpositionamilenortheastofIakovlevo,pushingthe52ndGRDnorthward.ThiswasanotherexamplethatshowedtheGermanswereconstantlyunderattackinonewayoranother.Capturingstrongpointswasnotaguarantee that the areabehind themoving front linewas secure.TheGermanswere constantlyhavingtoclearareasmultipletimes.wdk135.InanattempttocurbtheprogressthatGDand3rdPzDwerebeginningtomake,theRedAir

Forcesentalargesquadronofassortedplanestoattack,including82IL-2sand122fighters.Thislarge attack force overwhelmed the few German planes in the sector and inflicted heavycasualties on the ground forces. This group by the end of the day, making repeated attacks,dropped10,000PTABbombsontheenemy.cbk60.Vatutinorderedthe309thRD,9thADand86thTBtobetransferredtothecontrolof1stTA

andbedeployedintheIvniaandZorinskieDvoryarea.ThislinewasnorthoftheGermanfrontandwasintendedtobeablockingforce.dgr215+.The2ndSSPzCandthe48thPzCattackedthe6thGAandthe1stTAwithalmost500panzers

defendingalong thePenaandLukhaninoRiversandas farassoutheastofPokrovka.Expectingtrouble,Vatutinbroughtallthereserveswithinreachduringthenight.Forthefollowingtwodays,bitterfightingwouldrageas2ndSSPzCfoundaweakspotalongthehighwayleadingnorthwestfromPokrovkatoProkhorovka.ThisshiftawayfromOboyanwassaidtobeunscheduledbythe

Soviets.The48thPzCto thewestof2ndSSPzCwasstillheadingforOboyanbutalsohadtoexpand its front in order to protect the SS’s left flank as it shifted to the east. Priess’s SSTKcontinued to push the 49thTBand100thTBeastward as it advanced into theLipovyiDonetsValley.TheLAH,withairsupport,attackedagainthedefensesaroundthePokrovkaandBolshieMaiachkiareas,forcingthe49thTBand100thTBback.dgk123.dgk222m.dlu63m.dgk95m.TheGDoccupiedtheimportantHill230.5againststrongresistance.TheHillwouldbeagood

jumpingoff point to attackSyrtsevo.Other elementsofGD reachedVerkhopenie further north,forcingthe3rdMCback.Atmidnightthe112thTBreachedtherivernearSyrtsevoandattackedGDwhile 200thTBmoved along the bank oppositeVerkhopenie. dgk128. hjj121m. dgk222m.dgr209m.dgk95m.Onthissunnyday,GDcontinueditsattackontheheavilyfortifiedSyrtsevo.ASovietcounter

with thenewlyarrivedelementsof the67thGRDand60 tanks from6thTCattempted topushbacktheGermansinfrontofSyrtsevoandGroupStrachwitzwhichwasonnearbyHill230.5,butit was unsuccessful. Outmaneuvering the Soviets during a severe rocket barrage,GD enteredSyrtsevoby1400hrsandstartedclearingthevillagewhichwouldbesecurednextmorning.The6thPzRof3rdPzD joined in toclear thevillage.Thedefenders fought to thedeath insteadofsurrendering.hsz123.hsz117m.Inlatemorningthe48thPzCbrieflypausedtoreqroup,allowingthe200thTBand112thTBof

6thTCand3rdMCtobetakenoffthelinetorest.The6thMRBand22ndTBremainedonthefrontline.dgr214+.The48thPzClaunchedanattackfromtheSyrtsevo-IakovlevoareatowardKrasnaiaDubrova.

AtthesametimeasmallergroupattackedtowardBolshieMaiachki.Yetanothergroup,probablyLAH,attackedfromtheTeterevinoStateFarmandOzerovskiareaagainstGresnoe.Theobjectiveoftheseattackswastopenetratethelineandencirclealargeportionofthe1stTAand6thGA.Bytheendoftheday,the1stTAstillheldmostoftheseconddefensebeltthatincludedLukhanino-Krasnaia, Dubrova and BolshieMaiachki, just outside ofMalenkieMaiachki andGresnoe. Asmall German wedge had reached the back of the second defense belt at Bogoroditskoe andIvanovskiVyselki.dgr84.nzk90.Getting a late start, the Fusilier Regiment ofGD launched an attack from Lakhanino to the

northeast toward the heavily defended Olkhovaya Gorge and the hills west of Syrtsev.AccompanyingPanthersdroveintoanotherminefieldandwerestuckthereuntilengineerscouldclearapath.TheLuftwaffe came in first to soften theSovietpositionsbutnotmuch laterRedplanesarrivedandadeadlydogfightensued.AstheFusiliersmovedup,verytortuoushand-to-hand fighting occurred and the advance was very slow but eventually Syrtsev was entered,forcing the Soviet defenders to retreat toward Syrtsevo.By evening, several battalions ofGDsucceeded in occupying Hill 230.5 against strong armor forces. Hill 230.5 was a greatobservationpointandagoodjumpingoffpointtoattackSyrtsevofromtheeast.At1350hrstheseelementsofGDandthe6thPzRof3rdPzDcapturedSyrtsev.hsz122+.dgr209m.Inadditiontoexpanding48thPzC’ssectortothewest,Hothalsoorderedthe11thPzD,which

washeadingnorthwestforOboyan,toexpanditssectortoclosethegapwith2ndSSPzCwhichwasnowheadingtothenortheast.The3rdPzDandGDweretoclearallSovietresistancewithinthePenaRiverValley tobeyondBerezovka.With theseorders, theGermansdidnotgainmuch

ground.Thethinningofthelinebyexpandingthesectorfor48thPzConlyguaranteeditsfailuretoreachOboyan.Onceagain theGermansdidnothave the resources todefeat theSoviets in thissalient.Hothshouldhaverealizedthatandcontractedthebattlezonenotexpandedit.The52ndICunderthecommandofMajGeneralFretter-Picoand3rdPzDunderLtGeneralWesthovendrovewestofthePenaRiverwheretheresistancewastoostrongandGDhadtocometotheirrescuewhichslowed theirmomentumto thenorth.This reversalofsortsshouldhavebeenasignal toGeneralHothtobecautiousonhiswesternflankwheretheresistancewasgreaterthanexpected,butheignoredtheevidenceandcontinuedtoprobewestward,weakeninghisnorthernadvance.vzz132+.GeneralVatutinwasonceagainmovinghisforces.TobolsterthelineinfrontofProkhorovka,

the 183rdRD of 69thArmywasmoved to the south of town. To thewest the 161st RDwasquicklymoved into thearea tohelp the71stGRDstop the255thIDand3rdPzD.At thesametime,Mainsteinwasmovinghisforcesaswell.The3rdPzDonthewesternboundarywasmovedasclosetothePenaRiverandatKrasnyiPochinok,northofKorovino,toallowthepanzerstofightnorthward.The52nd ICwasordered tomoveupasclose to3rdPzD inorder to relievesome pressure off the 255th ID. Elements of 167th IDwasmoved east to relieve SSTK nearShopino so SSTK could redeploy toward the Psel River. Later that evening, von MansteinemphasizedtoHothandKempfoftheurgencytoquickenthepacebutwith9thArmyinthenorthdoingbadly,Hitlerdivertedthreeairgroups,roughlyhalfofthe8thFliegerCorps,fromthesouthtothenorthernsector,jeopardizingvonManstein’sforcesevenfurther.wdk136.The 48th PzC, predominately theGD, gained five miles on this day, culminating in taking

DubrovaandadvancingtowardVerkhopeniebybypassingSyrtsevonbothsides.ThegarrisonatSyrtsevo,withoutputtingupmuchresistance,retreatedtothenorthtowardGremuchiorSyrtsevoonthePenaRiver.Thecorps’nextobjectivewasHill260.8,southofNovoselovka.ItwouldbecrestedbyGroupSchimmelmannof11thPzDon7/9andsecuredduringthenight,forcingthe3rdMCtofallback.JustnorthofHill260.8butsouthofNovoselovka,the309thRDwhichhadjustdug inwasable to stop the leadcombatgroupof11thPzD fromreachingNovoselovka.OtherelementsofGDwouldthenjoinupwith11thPzDtotakeonSyrtsevowhichwasthelastfortifiedpositionintheseconddefensebeltbeforereachingOboyan.Aftertakingthetownsthe40thArmycounter-attackedthe3rdPzDofthe48thPzC,haltingitsprogress.Thefirstfewdaysoffighting,the 48th PzC had to struggle against tough and sodden terrain but on this day they found openground more suited for panzers. Heavy shelling of these panzers in the open caused frequentdelaysandcasualties.ThoughsecuringVerkhopenieandwith3rdPzDlaggingbehind,GDwasstillunderfirefromSovietgunsfromthewestbankofthePenaRiver.Addstiffresistancefromthe10thTCand6thTCanditisunderstandablethatGD’sadvancetothePselwasslowingdown.Muchof3rdPzDwasstillintheLukhaninoareawhichwasonlysixmilesfromtheirstartpoint.dgk142.dgk222m.mhz252.mhz272.dgr209m.vzz157.gnk312m.cbk61.fmz221.vzz2m.pck72.The48thPzC’sGDand11thPzD,attackingalongbothsidesoftheOboyanroad,rupturedthe

1stTA’sdefensesaswellastheflankof31stTCtotheeast.RightfromthebeginningtheSovietsattacked48thPzC’sflanks,preventingthecorpstoattackwithfullstrengthtothenorth.ASovietcounter-attack on 48th PzC’s weakened left flank at Krasnopolye especially slowed theirprogress. TheGD and 11th PzD,with the support of nearly 200 panzers and air support, had

previouslypushedthe1stMBand3rdMBbackoffHill254.2andtotheoutskirtsofSyrtsevoandGremiuchi,adistanceof3miles.NortheastofSyrtsevoonHill230.5,the112thTBwasabletorepulse a panzer attack. The Soviets lost 15 tanks in the engagement. Both sides had heavycasualties.TheGermanswereunable to takeSyrtsevo thisday.Hill254.2andPokrovkawereaboutsixmilesnorthofBykovka.dgk126+.dgk131.snk80.hjj121m.dgr209m.vzz99.vzz2m.To reiterate,GD succeeded in reaching the crucial Hill 230.5 on both sides of Syrtsevo,

inflicting heavy losses on the 6th TC as it retreats northward pastGremuchi. By nightfallGDreachedVerkhopenie.TheGermanswereinitiallystoppedatHill230.5duetoheavyminingandanti-tankartillery.OncepastHill230.5,the11PzDwheelednorthwesttowardSyrtsevo,thelastmajorSovietdefensebeforeOboyan.NorthofGremuchi,Hill230.5was finally takenat1330hrs.Onitsleftflank,3rdPzDclosedonBerezovka.ItwasagooddayfortheGermans,whoweremakingmodestgains inallareasand itappearedamajorbreakthroughwasclose.TheSovietsweremovingupreservesandbythenextdayortwotheywouldhavetheupperhand.GDfightingnear Syrtsevowas attacked bymore dug-in tanks.While the tanks fought, theGerman infantrycontinuednorth.OneTigerwastakenoutbyamine.OnceSyrtsevowassecured,GDpausedtoformacombatgrouptoleadthewaytoHill260.8,southofNovoselovka.Totheright,the11thPzDwasable to staywithGD buton the left side the3rdPzDwas fallingbehind,potentiallyexposingGD’sflank.GDwouldhavetostopitsadvanceandhelpthe3rdPzDtocatchup.Thishappenedduring thewholecampaign.Theassaulton the flankswas so fierce, itprevented theleadunits fromconcentrating entirelyon the attack to thenorth.The4thPzA just didnot haveenough men to defeat its enemy and the mechanical troubles of the Panther exacerbated thesituation. The odds of GD reaching Oboyan were becoming slim. wwf86+. rkz168. hjj116.hjj121m.mhz255.dgr209m.vzz128.Asnight fell, the 11thPzD forcedSoviet tanks off a hill north ofGremuchi aswell asHill

230.5,eastofSyrtsevo.ThepanzershadmovedforwardtosecuretherightflankofGDand toprovideastrongerdefenseagainstanightattack.The3rdPzDwasbehindtheothersandGD’sleftflankwasexposedbecauseof3rdPzD’sslowprogress.mhz255.dgr209m.TheforcesofHoth’s4thPzAnearlybroke throughVoronezhFrontdefensesaroundSyrtsevo

butSoviet31stTCcounter-attacked,slowing theGermanadvanceandpreventing the48thPzCfromfullyexploitingtheweaknessintheSyrtsevo-Hill230.5–Gremuchiline.lck283.TheinexperienceofthenewPanthercrewswasshowingandcausingmoretobedestroyedor

damagedthanusual;oneployoftheSovietgunnerswastoattackfromthesidewherethearmorwasonly40mm.ThePanthercrewswouldoftenangle theirgunata targetwithoutconsideringpointing the frontarmorwhichwas the thickest at theenemy. Itwasdecidedafter thebattle tohaveMksridefarthertothesidesandmoretothefronttoprotectthisweakness.rkz167.mhz255.Laterthatnightafterregrouping,ColLeonov’s112thTBcameupandagainattackedthe48th

PzCnearSyrtsevo.SyrtsevowasstillheldbySovietsbutitwassurroundedbytheenemy.Atthesame time, the 200th TB occupied positions farther north along the Pena River’s west bankoppositeVerkhopenie.AstheGermansadvancedtheSovietswereabletotakemostoftheirfieldgunswiththem.Therecentlyarrived112thTBhadbeenactiveallday,makingrepeatedattacksagainstGDand11thPzD.dgk129.snk80.hjj121m.dgk222m.dgr209m.Vatutin, throughout the day, was trying to scrape together every possible man to block the

expectedrouteof48thPzC’sadvance.Attackingalongbothsidesof theOboyanroad,GD and11thPzDpenetratedthrough1stTA’sdefenseswhileturningtheflankof31stTC,whichwasalsobattling2ndSSPzC’sleftflank.Asmanyas300panzers,including40PanthersandsupportedbyStukas,attackedtheSoviets,pushingthemback3milestoSyrtsevoandGremuchi.Hill230.5andHill 254.2 east of Syrtsevo were attacked as well. The Germans suffered greatly for theiradvance but did capture Hill 230.5. By night the Soviets prepared to evacuate Syrtsevo forGremuchioralongthebankofthePenaRiver,southofVerkhopene.TheleadunitsofGDwerefollowing close behind, heading for Novoselovka. dgk126+. dgk129. hjj121m. dgk222m.dgr209m.vzz2m.fmz223.Onthisday,Hoth’s4thPzAwastaskedincapturingthehighgroundneartheroadProkhorovka-

Oboyan.Hothunleashedhundredsofpanzersagainst1stTA.Thepanzersweresurrounding theSoviets.Theinfantryof48thPzCinparticularwasneededtocompletethecirclebuttheirslowadvanceallowedmanySoviettankstoescape.rkz167.At1700hrs,the17thVAlaunchedanattacktowardtheimportantairfieldatRogan.Piloterror

missedRoganandthegroupattackedVararovkabymistake.ThesurpriseattackonlydestroyedoneFw190whiletheSovietslostfiveplanes.cbk61.Lateatnight,withthebigoffensiveplannedfornextmorning,LtGeneralKatukovtraveledto

allhisbrigadecommanderscheckingtheirreadinessandprovidingmotivation.zra61.GermanshadoverrunDubrovaearlieronthisdaybutlostmanypanzersdoingso.Bytheendof

theday, the48thPzChadpenetrated the2nddefensebelt in severalplaces,which couldhavebeenagoodomen,but itwasnot for itcost themtoomanypanzersandmen.ThedefendersofDubrova,theremainsofKrivoshein’s6thGAand6thTC,startedtofallbacktoSyrtsevoonthePenabutwerehithardbyGermanartillerycausingevengreatercasualties.dgk127+.pck69.Bytheendoftheday,the90thGRDsupportedbythe3rdMC,6thTCand31stTCoccupied

thefront linefromjustnorthofLukhanino-KrasnaiaDubrova-MalenkieMaiachki-Gresnoe.The52ndGRDhadfallenback to thenorthernbankof thePsel in theKliuchi-Polezhaevsector.TolookatitfromtheGermanview,the3rdPzDand332ndIDmadenoappreciablegainsandwerestillhamperedbythePenaRiverdefense.TheGD-11thPzDcombohadgaineda little,movingfromtheLukhanino-SyrtsevlineuptoSyrtsevo.The167thIDthatwassentuptothelinetoplugthegapbetween11thPzDandLAHmadenosignificantground.dgr85.dgr86m.Bytheendoftheday,only40Panthersoutof192werestilloperating.Seventy-sixwereinthe

repair shopdue tomechanicalbreakdownsorminedamage. Iwonderwhat the10thBrigade’sperformancewouldhavebeenlikeifthePantherhadbeenaperfectedtankthathadbeenreliableand/orbeenplacedinasectormoreappropriateforitsarmor.Havingnearly200mechanicallyreliable medium weight tanks with a superior gun and better communications, with crewsexperienced,commanderswhoactuallyworkedtogether,anddeployedonadvantageousterrain,it’squitepossiblethe48thPzCcouldhavebeatentheSSacrossthePselRiverorattheveryleastmadeittotheriver.gnk191.The natural barrier of the Psel River and its marsh land caused Vatutin to place the third

defensivebeltanunusuallylongdistanceof18milesbehindtheseconddefensebelt.Therewasnoalternativeas thespacebetween thesecondand thirddefensivebeltswas flat,opengroundanddifficulttodefend.gjz185.

WiththeSovietscounter-attackinginforcetoday,especiallyin2ndSSPzCsector,theGermansmadeonlymodestgainsandcouldonlystabilizethelineaftertakingseveralkeysites.Thefirstfewdays,beforeVatutin’sreinforcementsarrived,sawbettergainsfortheGermans.HausserhadbeenhopingforabreakthroughintheIablochkiareaoreastofGresnoewherethe237thTBwasdefending and if it hadoccurred, hewouldhavehadhis divisions fight throughout thenight toexploit thesuccess.Before thecampaignstartedbothHausserandHothwereconfident that theGermans had enough armor to defeat theSoviets, but doubts had since been growing that theyunderestimatedthestrengthoftheSovietarmy.BesidesthestiffresistancetheSovietshadbeenabletogenerate,GermanaerialreconreportedseeinghundredsoftanksalongtheSSfront.Itwastrue that the 48th PzC and the SSCorps drove deep salients in their respective zones but thesalientswerenarrowand theSovietshadenoughstrength tostillcontrol theoverallbattlefieldsituation.vzz137+.dgk109+.After hard fighting against the 19th PzD the previous day and being threatened with

encirclement,thegarrisonatKreidaevacuatedinthepredawnhours.Sovietresistanceintheareawas still strong and the commanders of 19th PzD and 6th PzD agreed to work together topenetrate theSovietdefenses thatweregivingall threepanzerdivisions trouble.The19thPzDwoulddrivenorthalongthewesternbankoftheRazumnaiaRiverandthe6thPzDwouldbeontheeast side.Eachdivisionwoulduse theother for flankprotectionaswellas the river.Theybothlaunchedatdaybreak,around0400hrs.By0500hrs,theGermanswereattackingKreidaandthesurroundingareaafterthe81stGRDmovedin.gnk178.LeavingtheBatratskaiaDachaareawhilestilldarkandheadingeast,GroupSchulzof7thPzD,

supportedbyanumberofWespegunsandpanzers,traveledunmolestedthroughthewoodswestoftown.LeavingthewoodstheyapproachedHill216.1thenstartedshiftingtothenorthtodrivetoward Sheino. Soviet artillery began pounding the German column. It was decided that thepanzerswouldengagewhiletheinfantrytriedtobypassthisstrongpoint.Sheinowassevenmilesnorth of Batratskaia Dacha and only two miles south of their main objective, the village ofMasikino.TheSovietresistancewastoostrong,forcingthepanzerstopullbackintothewoods.TheSoviet defenderswere a recent attachment to 7thGA–167thTRand262ndTR. gnk175.gnk178.kfz451.In the 3rd PzC sector, the main spearhead was driving in the direction of Iastrebovo and

Sevriukovo. Fighting the whole day along the Razumnaia River, the 3rd PzC had capturedBelovskaia, Iastrebovo and Sevriukovo areas but Melikhovo to the north remained in Soviethands despite repeated attacks. Vatutin ordered the 111th RD and 270th RD into blockingpositionsnorthofSevriukovodgr85.dgr155m.dgr173m.dgr39m.nzk90.Duringthepredawnhours,6thPzDassembledintheareanearGeneralovka,stillbehindthe7th

PzD.At daybreak the divisionmovedout andby1130hrs had captured the fortified townsofIastrebovo and Sevriukovo. The captures were difficult and included house to house fighting.Bothsidessufferedheavycasualties.Bylateafternoonthe6thPzDwascrossingtheRazumnaiaRivertotheeastbankonarepairedbridgeatIastrebovowhentheywereambushed.Theattackwas repulsedand thedivisionwasable tocomplete itscrossing.OnceagainSoviet resistanceslowedtheGermanprogress;theGermanswerestillbehindschedule.Atthispointthe19thPzDand 6th PzD linked up and wisely continued north together along the Razumnaia River. The

divisionswereusingtheriverandeachotherasflankprotection.gnk178.dlu31.dlu51.dgk136.Leadelementsofthe19thPzD,the73rdPzGR,wereadvancingtowardBlizhniaiaIgumenka.

Toreachthevillage,theGermanshadtopassthroughasmallwoodedarea.Thesewoodswerethe beginning of the second defense belt in the sector and it was heavily defended. As theGermansenteredthewoods,theSovietsputupawalloffirethatdrovethemback.ThePzAbt19and27thPzRswungaroundandattacked thevillagefromtheeastwhile the74thPzGRmovednorth about a click from Blizhniaia Igumenka and attacked Hill 215.5. Once the woods werepenetrated,thevillageandhillweretakenquickly.Withoutpause,the74thPzGRheadedforHill212.1whichwasnotreacheduntilafterdark.Thehillwastakenbutthroughoutthenight,Sovietartilleryshelledthehilltop.gnk179.gnk182.dlu48+.dlu66.dlu68m.OntheeastflankKempfshiftedhisassault to thenorthwhichexposedhiseasternflank.The

168th IDwasbrought to the line toguard the flank, replacing19thPzDwhichwould lead thechargetothenorth,closesttotheriver.ThefrontlinewasnowatMikhailovka,aheavilyfortifiedsectorheldbythe81stGRD.Its235thGRRtookthebruntof19thPzDassaultbutthatafternoonitdestroyedfivepanzersandhadtofallbackthreemilestotheeast.Otherelementsofthe19thPzDstruckthe92ndGRDand94thGRDof35thRCaroundBlizhniaiaIgumenka,sixmilesnortheastofMikhailovka.The6thPzD,threemileseastof19thPzDdrovenorthreachingapositionamilenorthofSerukovo.The7thPzD,protectingpartoftheeastfrontalongwiththe106thID,sufferedheavy lossesagainst the25thGRC’sconstantpressureand theattacksby the17thVA. In theseengagements, Group Oppeln-Bronikovski lost eight panzers. The 429th GR of 168th ID, nowattachedto19thPzD,shifteddirectiontoclearKreidaofresistancebeforemovingbackwiththepanzers.Atthesametime,the73rdPzGRof19thPzDheadedforKolchbutwasambushedinthewoodssouthofitsobjectiveandsufferedheavycasualties,forcingKohlertoturnhismenback.wdk133.dgr155m.dgr173m.dlu35.dlu46+.dgk136.IntheKursksalient,theweatherwaswarmandsunnyandtheroadsweredryingandingood

condition.Inthesouthontheeastflank,GroupRaususinghis88batteries,weretryingtorepulsea counter-attack led by tanks. The main assault struck the 320th ID which was defending theimportantbridgeheadatBezliudovka.ItrepulsednumerousattackswiththehelpofcorpsartillerydeployedneartheDonets.Thetwodivisionsof11thIC,the320thIDand106thID,weretryingtostayincontactwitheachotherformutualprotectionagainstthemurderousfirefrom24thGRC.Thesetwodivisionswerebeingoverwhelmedandcouldbarelymakeanyheadwaytoday.The7thGA,whichwas defending againstKempf, had the 35thGRC, the 92ndGRD and the 31st TBtransferredtoitbutitwouldtakeuptoadaytohavetheminposition.wdk132.The7thPzDcapturedMiasoedovodespiteheavyresistanceandmanySoviettanks.Thebulkof

6thPzDwasstillheldupinIastrebovo.The168thIDand19thPzDwerestillcornerednotfarfromBelgorod.Thetwodivisionswheelednorthwestwardagainsttheflankof81stGRD.Itwasdecidedtoshift7thPzDtothewesttoattackSovietpositionsfromthereartorelievethe168thID’sflank.TodothistheMelikhovo-DalIgumnovoareahadtobesecuredfirst.Contacting11thICtothewestwasalsonecessary.TheareathatvonMansteinwantedtakenonthiseasternflankwastooambitious,toounrealistic.KempfdidnothavetheresourcesnecessarytoachieveAGS’sobjectivesanditshowedfromtheveryfirstday,butvonMansteinwasslowtorespondtothisreality.shn159.dgk136.

Afterahardfight,Raus’s11thICoftheKempfGroupreachedthehighgroundfourmileseastof theBelgorod-Volchansk railroad line. In thewoodson thewestbankof theKorenyebrook,11thICfinallywasforcedtogoonthedefensive.Dug-inT34s,anti-tankguns,flamethrowersandartilleryweretoomuchresistancetocontinuetheadvance.snk20.AfteraStuka raid,GroupOppeln-Bronikovskiof6thPzDadvanced fromHill207-Belinska

area toward Sevriukovo-Iastrebovo, after crossing the Razumnaia. The Germans pushed thedefenders out of town and captured the high groundwest of Sevriukovo. The Soviet counter-attackswererepulsedwhileGermanengineersrepairedthedamagedbridgesleadingoutoftown.wwf88.dgr155m.vzz154.On thisWednesday, the 3rd PzC driving northwardwas trying to get behind 81stGRD and

destroyitbeforecrossingtheDonetsandcatchinguptoHausser’s2ndSSPzC.Itwastoughgoingfor3rdPzCagainstwellprepareddefensesandreinforcementsthatwerecominguptotheline.The213thRDand72ndGRDwerealsocounter-attackingthe106thIDand320thIDdefendingthe right flank nearMaslovaPristan, preventing theGermans to break away and head north tosupportLTGeneralFunck’s7thPzD.The7thPzDwasstuckatBatratskaiaDachaandunabletomove to support6thPzD’sassault toward thenorthern region.The7thPzDafter abriefpauseduringdarkness,resumeditsattemptatclearingtheareabeforefollowing6thPzD.AftersecuringBatratskaia,the7thPzDdrovenorth,followingtheeastbankoftheRazumnaiaRiver.TheirnextobjectivebeforeshuttingdownforthenightwasthevillageofMasikino.dgk135+.gnk175.WhilefightingoffrepeatedattackstothenorthandnortheastinthedirectionofMelikhovo,the

106th ID drove Soviet troops into the 7th PzD to thewest and together pocketed elements ofseveraldivisions.Whiletheremainderofthesedivisionswereabletoescape,muchequipmentandheavyweaponswereleftbehind.erz206.The6thPzDunderHunersdorffdroveintoMiasoedovo,pushingtheSovietsback.sPzAbt503,

leadingotherelementsof6thPzD,securedIastrebovo.Boththe6thand503rdmovedupagainstthe92ndGRDand94thGRDof35thGRCwhichhadmoveduptosupportthesagging25thGRCunderMajGeneralSafiullin.LtGeneralSchmidt’s19thPzDonthe3rdPzC’sleftflankreachedandsecuredBlizhniaiaIgumenkaby1600hrsinthe81stGRD’srear.TheGermanstooknomercyon the defenders as they started to fall back, deliberately running over the soldierswith theirpanzers.The168thIDwasstillstucksouthofStaryiGorod,eastoftheDonetsRiver,wasunabletoremovethedefenders.Panzersofthe19thPzDdidarriveandStaryiGorodfinallyfellby1800hrs.bythejointeffortsofthe168thinthewestandthepanzersmovinginfromtheeast.dgk136.dgr95.hjj121m.vzz108.dgr155m.dgr39m.vzz5m.dlu48.shn159.Offandonalldaythereweredogfightsin3rdPzCsector.InthelateafternoonagroupofIL-2s

returned to the area after reloading to find the Luftwaffe was gone, leaving the skies to theSoviets. The planes strafed the front line of the 320th ID in front of the 7th GA which waslaunching an attack in theMelekhov-Chiornaya Poliana area. The aerial attack inflicted heavycasualtiesandconfusionon the infantryatan ideal time.Theairattackalso interferedwith the106thIDfromrelieving7thPzDatitscurrentpositioninorderforittomovenorthandassist6thPzDwhenitattackedtheRzhavetsarea.cbk60+.While the 168th ID with the help of 19th PzD tried to outflank elements of the 81st GRD

defending the river bank, the eastern elements of 3rdPzCafter crossing theKorenRiver, also

startedreceivingincreasedSovietresistancetothesouthbycounter-attackingthe106thand320thIDnearMaslovaPristan.Theseattacksbythe213thRDandthe72ndGRDwithsupportofheavyartillerycausedheavycasualtiesontheGermans.Atthesametimeelementsofthe7thPzDandthe6thPzD,inthecenteroftheline,hadlaunchedfromBatratskaiaDachatowardMiasoedovo.The 117 panzers including 45Tigers of the sPzAbt 503, after escaping aminefield, drove theSovietsnorthwardfromIastrebovo.The35thGRCwasquicklysenttostoptheadvanceanditslead units started shelling theGerman engineers trying to build a bridge over the RazumniaiaRiver.The 7thPzDmade the best gains on this day andwere further north than the other twopanzerdivisions,butthatsituationwouldprobablychangethenextmorningasthebulkofthe94thGRDhadjustarrivedinsector.dgk135+.dgr155m.dgr173m.dgr39m.dlu51+.shn159.shn156m.The3rdPzCmadeslowbutdisturbingprogressagainst theflankof7thGA,underminingthe

Sovietpositions.Alarmed,Vatutinbroughtuptheartilleryfrom38thand40thArmiestocoverthetheflanksof6thGAand7thGAsectors,inanefforttohalttheGermanattack.GeneralShumilovwasorderedtoattackontheflanksasmuchaspossible.dlu57.At1430hrs,the111thRDwasorderedtomovenorthandoccupythelinebetweenChuraevoto

Shebekino to Volchansk. The 270th RD was to defend the line between Nekliudovo andChuraevo,replacingthe15thGRD.The15thGRDwoulddefendtheNovoTroevka,Nekliudovoline.dgr85.dgr100m.

F

9

July7thontheNorthernSalientSeeMap4

or thefirst twodays,Model’s9thArmyforcesmadeonlyasmalladvanceintheCentralFront defenses. Not satisfied with the gains near Ponyri, Model ordered his troops to

resumetheiradvancetowardMaloarchangelsk.Hewashopingthisfeintwouldtakesomeofthepressure off Ponyri. Rokossovsky continued to redeploy his forces to meet the changingbattlefield.Elementsofthe60thand65thArmiesweremovedtosupport13thArmyinthisarea.dgk87m.dgr199m.dgk116m.At dawn, Model’s 9th Army renewed its attack in the middle of Central Front’s sector,

attemptingtopenetrateitsseconddefensebeltaroundthetownofPonyriandnorthofOlkhovatka,sixmilestothewest.PonyriwasanimportantrailroadjunctionleadingtoKursk.The18thand9th PzDs and 86th IDwere in the lead. Ponyriwould see some of the fiercest fighting of thecampaignatthestationandthenearbyHill253.5.The18thPzDand292ndIDattackedthetown5timesandwererepulsedeachtimebythe307thRDof13thArmy,withthesupportoftanksandartillery.At1000hours,theGermans,with50panzers,enteredthenorthwestcornerofthetownbutwere then thrownback.On the east side of town, theGermans captured theMay1stStateFarm.dgk115.fkk102m.dgk87m.dgr199m.nzk88+.nzk89m.dgk116m.lck116m.zro204.Duringthepredawnhours18thPzDassemblednextto9thPzDinfrontofPonyriII.Thetwo

battereddivisionswiththesupportofelementsof6thIDwouldheadforgroundbetweenPonyriII andOlkhovatkabeginningaround1100hrs.The2ndPzDand20thPzD fromwestofSnovowouldalsoadvance towardPonyri IIagainst17thGRCwhichwasholding theseconddefensebeltinthissector.Thissectorwasbeingdefendedbythe6thGRD.AsmallLuftwaffe squadronprovidedprotectionfromabove.Rudenkosentalargegroupoffighterstoattacktheconcentrationof panzers. The Soviets did inflict casualties on the panzers but evenwith theGerman planesoutnumbered,theywereabletoknocksomeofthoseSovietplanesfromthesky.Mostofthe70panzers of 18thPzD,whichwere nowdeployed on the right flank of 41st PzC,were the longbarreledMkIVs.AfewMkIIIshadtheshortbarrel50mmor75mm.Atthesametimeandfartherto the west, the 2nd PzD and 20th PzD would attack southward between Samodurovka andKashara. mhz260+. mhz19m. dgr198m. fkk102m. dgk87m. dgr199m. cbk50. mkz119. nzk88.nzk89m.dgk116m.lck116m.West of Ponyri the 9th PzD pushed the 6th GRD back to occupy the woods. Despite this

advantage,theGermanswereonlyabletowrestlepartofPonyrifromtheSoviets.Furthertothewestoftown,the47thPzC,withsupportfrom6thIDdrovesouthwardtowardOlkhovatkaandtheridge,whichwasakeyobjectiveofModel’s.Rokossovskywantedtokeepthishighgroundand

had prepared a strong defensewith the 70thRD and 75thRD to keep it. dgk115+*. fkk102m.dgk87m.dgr199m.dgk116m.lck116m.The2ndPzDshifteddirection,headingforthegroundbetweenSamodurovkaandOlkhovatka.

Alongwith20thPzD,bothofLemelsen’s47thPzC’sdivisionsattackedbutdespitetheshifttheGermans were hard hit from the determined 13th Army. The Germans were going for theimportanthighground,Hill274.Fromthishill,youcouldseeallthewaytoKurskanditwasthebestobservationpointinthesector.WhoevercontrolledthishighgroundwouldalsocontrolthelandbetweentheOkaandSeimRiversandputitsenemyatadisadvantage.Totherightof2ndPzD,46thPzCfailedtobreakthrough70thArmy’slineafterrepeatedattacks.dgk117+.dgr198m.fkk53.fkk102m.dgk87m.dgr199m.cbk54.dgk116m.lck116m.Notwantingtobelateforthepartyastheywerethepreviousday,theplanesofthe1stFlieger

DivisionwereraidingSovietpositionsalongthefrontaswellasflyingreconpatrolsatfirstlight.Fw190swerelookingforeasytargets.Yesterday,Model’s47thPzCsufferedcasualtiesbecauseSoviet planes arrived at the front first.A little later Soviet bombers, heavily escorted, startedhitting the German lines.Wave after wave would hit the line. Of course this Soviet increasecausedanescalationoftheLuftwaffetoprotectitsgroundforces.cbk49+.dgk116m.Ninety panzers of 4th PzD along with Tigers and Ferdinands were poised south of

Podsoborovkawaiting for orders to attack. The Stukas opened the attack and at 0505 hrs, thepanzersmovedout.Despite beingunder heavy shelling and an exposed left flank, the 4thPzDcapturedtheeasternportionofSamodurovka,justsouthoftheSvapaRiveraswellasattackingHill238.fkk58.fkk104m.dgk87m.dgr199m.dgk116m.lck116m.At dawn, the Germans attacked toward the important town of Ponyri while to the west the

assaultonOlkhovatkacontinued.TheSoviet307thRDbackedby tanks repulsedallattacksonPonyri.At 1000 hrs, theGermans did reach the railroad embankment on the edge of town butwereforcedback.At1100hrsafterregrouping,theGermansattackedagainandinhand-to-handcombat advanced and captured the village of May First before moving on and entering thenorthernoutskirtsofPonyri.CallingforhelpfromallunitsnearPonyri,the307thRDcounteredand once again pushed the Germans out of Ponyri. The Germans shifted direction, bypassingPonyriandattackedthe17thGRC’srightflank,6thGRD,betweenPonyriandOlkhovatkaandby1200 hrs had penetrated the line. By 1230 hrs, the Germans captured the woods west ofBerezovyiLog.By 1930 hrs, theGermanswere approachingPonyri II and nearbyHill 257.0,threatening topenetrate the flankof75thGRDwhichwaspositionedwestofSnovo.The75thGRDshiftedandthencounter-attacked,stoppingtheGermanadvanceandforcingtheGermanstoretreat.fkk102m.dgr116+.dgk118+.dgk87m.dgr199m.dgk116m.At0530hrs,the20thPzDresumeditsattempttoenlargetheirSvapabridgehead.Slowlythey

foughttheirwaytotheeast-westroadonemilesouthofSaburovkabuthadtostopthereforitsright flank was too far behind to protect the panzers’ own flank. fkk54. fkk102m. fkk104m.dgk87m.dgk116m.Intheearlymorning,theSovietsbeganacounter-attackbuttheGermanswereabletorepulseit

andinchitswaytowardTeploe-Plkhovatka-Ponyri,aboutsixmilestothesouth.Theattackwasnearing its critical stage;Modelbroughtup the12thPzDand36th ID tobreak through the lastmajordefensivebeltandgaintheimportanthighground.The46thPzCheadingsouthwestwasin

thelead.snk107+.dgr198m.dgk87m.dgr199m.dgk116m.lck116m.In the46thPzCsectoron thewest flank, elementsof the31st IDand7th ID fought forhigh

groundwestofGniletsintheSoloschonkiareaagainstthe280thRDof70thArmy.The31stIDtook the hill but lost it to a counter-attack that was supported by tanks. Both sides sentreinforcements.The12thPzD,movingoutof reserve,wasordered to thearea.The70thArmysentthe175thRDupaswell,movingintotheFatezhroadareaandthenintothelinebetweenthe280thRDandthe132ndRD.Withthehelpofthe175thRDtheSovietswereabletoholdthehillwestofGnilets.wdk177.fkk102m.dgk87m.nzk87.dgk116m.TheSovietscounter-attackedandmadeprogress towardBolkhov,pushing theGermansback

threemilesonanarrowfront.TheretreatwentallthewaybacktoPodolian;itwasadevastatingsetback.Elementsofall theotherpanzerdivisionshad tosendpanzers there tostop theSovietadvance.fkk61.dgk87m.dgr199m.dgk116m.Heavy fighting the previous two days forcedRokossovsky to take units from 65th and 60th

Armies to reinforce thehardpressed13thArmy in thePonyri-Olkhovatkaarea.AtOlkhovatka300panzersfromthe2ndPzD,4thPzD,20thPzD,18thPzDand9thPzDcrashedinto16thTCand19thTC.The292nd IDand86th IDwere in supportaswellas theentireLuftflotte 4.AtPonyri,theGermansadvancedintothevillagebecomingembroiledinbitterhand-to-handfightingintheschoolHouse,TractorDepot,railwaystationandwatertower.Thebitterfightinglastedalldaywithbothsidesmakingattacksandcounter-attacks.Modelhadtocallupmoreammoforhisforces.ModelwasconvincedthattheonlywaytodefeatRokossovskywasthroughtheheightsofOlkhovatkaandtheplainssouthofthevillagewherethepanzerswouldhaveanadvantageovertheSoviettanks.bt84.je102.fkk102m.lck296.dgk87m.dgr199m.dgk116m.lck116m.The4thPzDwasbrought fromreserve thepreviousnightandattacked towardTeploe in the

morningbutcouldnotgoveryfarduetotheheavyresistanceofthedug-inT34s.ThetanksforcedKahler’s33rdPzRbackfromTeploe.Intheopenfieldsthepanzers,includingtheTigers,wereeasytargetstoSovietartillery;tomakeitharderfortheSoviets,thepanzersrodeatmaxspeed.The nearly 100 panzers the 4th PzD had were mostly 75mm long gunnedMk IVs. The day’sassaultwouldseefivepanzerdivisionsadvancewithinatenmilefront,runningfromMolotychi-SamodurovkaeastwardthroughPonyri.The20thPzD,4thPzD,2ndPzD,9thPzDand18thPzDwouldattackwith300panzersoftheMkIII,MKIVvariety.sPzAbt505withitsTigerswouldleadtheattack.The21stPzBwouldbeattachedto4thPzD.DuringthenightRokossovskybroughtuptwoRDs,threearmorbrigadesandplacedthembetweenTeploeandOlkhovatkawheremuchof the German forces would attack. Once again Rokossovsky correctly anticipated Model’sintentions.mhz281. dgr198m. fkk60+. fkk102m. lck302. dgk87m. dgr199m. dgk116m. lck116m.fzk172.The20thIConthewestflankof9thArmy’sattackzonehadtheprimarydutyofpreventingany

breakthrough from the west that would endanger 46th PzC. Today it was also given otherresponsibilities. General Roman was to create three combat groups and achieve a number ofobjectives.ThefirstgroupwouldlaunchfromSevskandadvancetowardtheDmitryev-Lgovskyline.ThesecondgroupwouldlaunchfromKamarichiandadvancetoDeryugino.ThelastgroupwouldstartatDmitrovsk-OrlovskiareaandheadforMikailovkaandgaincontrolof theSvapaCreekareafromthenorthwest.snk107.vzz4m.dgk116m.

At0830hrsonthisalreadyhotday,the4thPzDandtherestof47thPzCresumeditsmarchonthehighgroundsouthofSamodurovka-Kashara-BitiuglineonbothsidesofOlkhovatka.Elementsof4thPzDand20thPzDweresenttosupportthe6thIDintheiradvance.Thebulkof20thPzDresumeditsattackonHill231andeventuallycapturedit.Thehillwasagoodobservationpointlookingsouth.The21stPzRof20thPzDcontinuedtosupport31stIDinattackingHill234astheremainderof20thPzDmaneuveredaroundHill234,headingtocapturetheareaalongtheSvapaRiver.TheSvapaValleyonemilewestofSaburovkawasreachedandafterabrieffightpushedtheSovietsoutofthearea.Thebulkof4thPzDwasbeingdeployedbetween20thPzDand2ndPzD.Modelhadmade thedecision thatOlkhovatkawas thekeyobjectiveandplaced4thPzDdirectly north of the village at the expense of 9th PzD and 18th PzDwhich needed help nearPonyri.fkk56.dgk87m.dgr199m.dgk116m.lck116m.The20thPzDof47thPzCand4thPzDmaderepeatedattackstowardSamodurovka,seekingto

penetratetheridgelineofdefensesatthejunctionbetween70thand13thArmies,with17thGRCtakingthebruntoftheattack.The81stRDwasmauledbadlythepreviousdayandRokossovskyputtheminreservedirectlybehind17thGRC.Withcloudyskies,theLuftwaffemadefewruns.The ridge line was anchored by Hill 257, north of Olkhovatka. It was also necessary forRokossovsky tobringupMajGeneralKiselev’s140thRD to assistLtGeneralGalanin’s70thArmy’s right flank from repeated attacks. dgk118. dgr198m. fkk102m. dgr115++. dgk87m.dgr199m.nzk88.nzk89m.dgk116m.lck116m.Model’s9thPzDand18thPzDattackedonanarrowsectorwestof thePonyri railway line

towardsthehighgroundeastofOlkhovarka.The2ndPzD,withitsfewerthan100panzers,and20th PzD attacked further west in the direction of Samodurovka. The sPzAbt 505 joined thisassaultaswell.RepeatedGermanattemptsfailedtobreakthroughthisseconddefensebeltheldby 13th Army’s 132nd RD and 140th RD but eventually the Germans were able to push thedefendersback.AnotherpanzerassaultforcewasheadingforPonyri.ModelwasdevelopinghisplantotakethehighgroundofOlkhovarkawhichwouldgivehimtheadvantageovertheSoviets,whiledrivingsouthofthetown.Hisobservationsandartillerysupportwouldhavetheadvantage.The thousands ofmines the Soviets planted and buried tanks were effective, destroyingmanypanzersandmenalike.Takingthisareawouldnotbeeasy.Modeldidnothavemanyrouteshisforcescould take to reachKurskandRokossovskystillhad forces toblock theGermans’path.je102.dgk117.dgr198m.fkk102m.dgk87m.dgr199m.dgk116m.lck116m.The132ndRDwasdeployedwestofGniletsfacing31stID.Nexttothe31stIDonitseastern

flankwas20thPzD.The31stIDwastrailingthepanzerswhichwerealreadysouthofBobrikandapproachingKrasavka.Tokeep the line secure, thepanzers of the21stPzRhad to keep someforcesbehindtostayincontactwiththe31st.Nexttothe132ndRDwasthe775thRDand70thRD.Whenapenetrationoccurredinthe132ndRDsector,thesetwodivisionsshiftedsomeforcesnorth of Teploe, enabling them to close the gap and inflict heavy casualties on the leadingGermansof20thPzDwhoweretrappedatTeploeandcouldnotmakeitbacktotheircomradesin Samodurovka. Samodurovkawasmidway betweenTeploe andKrasavka. dgr117. dgr199m.dgk116m.At1000hrson the41stPzC front, theSoviets finally lost somegroundatoneof thePonyri

villages.Elementsof the10thPzGDpushedback4thGPDashortdistanceatPolevaia.Onthe

eastflankof41stPzC,the86thIDsupportedwithpanzersattacked307thRD.Backedbyartillerysupportandthe13thTDB,the307thRDcounter-attacked,claimingtohavedestroyedtenTigersandtwelveMkIVswhilepushingtheGermansoffthehighground.Intheafternoon,the86thIDattackedagainandrecapturedthehill.On thewestern flank, the PzAbt 21 had just endured an air raid that had caused toomuch

damagebut itwas now1000hrs and the formationwas late for its advance.The assault gunsweresouthofSaborovkaandwerenowheadingforHill234.1andHill228.9,respectivelysouthandsouthwestofGnilets.AsthegroupwasapproachingthewoodssouthwestofGnilets,30T34scame racing out and ambushed the assault guns. Reaction time was slow but the Germansrecoveredandengaged;beforelongtheSoviettankersdisengagedandwentbackintothewoods,allowingtheGermans tocontinuefor theirhills.TheGermanshaddiscoveredminefieldswereeverywhereandmanypanzerswouldbedisabledwithtrackdamage.Sometimesthecrewcouldmakerepairsinthefieldbutmosttimesthepanzerswouldhavetobetowedbacktotheshopforrepairs.Theserepairscouldtakeseveraldaysandthedivisionwouldhavetomakedowithoutforthatperiod.Attimesthereweremanypanzerswaitingforrepairsandthedivisionwouldbeatanextremedisadvantagefortheduration.zzt84.As thedayprogressed,while the47thPzCwerefighting insideBitiug,otherelementsdrove

toward the high ground south of Bitiug and Kashara, five miles southeast of Bobrik. Oncesecured, it was to drive another three miles south and capture high ground on either side ofOlkhovatka.With the 9thPzDand6th ID in the lead, the 47thPzC attacked the 17thGRC.Atnoon, two regiments of 6th ID supported by 50 panzers of 9th PzD struck 6thGRD atBitiug.Nearby,30panzersof9thPzDmadesomegainsagainst75thGRDand3rdTDBatPonyri,twomilessouthofBitiug,aswellascapturingBerezovyiLog.TheSovietscountered,tryingtoretakelostground,andaferociousbattleensuedwherebothsidessufferedheavycasualties.The18thPzDalsoadvancedonasectionofPonyributthe307thRD,situatedontheOrel-Kurskrailline,wasabletorepulsethatattackaswell.With17thGRCbeingpushedback,the43rdTRand58thTRwereorderedtotheareatostopthe47thPzC.WhileModel’sassaultonthefirstdaywaslessthanmaximum,hisattackhadgearedupandwiththisday’seffortshewasputtingeverythinghecouldinattackingthecentralsectorbetweenPonyriandOlkhovatka.BitiugwassouthofSnovoand west of Ponyri. wdk177. dgr198m. lck300. dgr115. dgr108m. dgk87m. dgr199m. nzk90.nzk89m.dgk116m.lck116m.The3rdTCattackedtowardtheconcentrationofGermansatPonyriandjusteastofitwhilethe

18thGRC,furthereast,attemptedtopushbackthe78thADthatwasmarchingsoutheasttowardMaloarckhangelsk.The16thTC,19thTCandthe17thGRCwasassignedto2ndTAandorderedtoattack47thPzC.Modelorderedallfivecorpsof9thArmytoresumetheirattack;the78thADof23rdICstruckthe74thRDtowardLuninka,threemilessouthwestofMaloarchangelskandthenformedadefensiveposition.The18thPzDof41stPzCwasheadingfortheSnovoRiver,westofPonyri.Oncetheretheywouldcrosstheriverandestablishabridgehead.The2ndPzDof47thPzCwas heading for Fatezhwest of Olkhovatka. The 4th PzD, coming out of reserve, wouldassist 47th PzC in its drive south of the SvapaRiver. The 46th PzCwas to head for the newbridgeheadover theSvapaRiverandfor thehighgroundwestofBobrik.Modelalreadyknewthat surrounding the northern defenses were too optimistic and changed to more modest

objectives.wdk176.dgr198m.dgk87m.dgr199m.dgk116m.lck116m.Totheleftof20thPzD,the2ndPzDtookKashara,northeastofOlkhovatka.Samodurovka,to

the west was also an objective and currently being shelled. This appeared to Model as apenetrationoftheSovietthirddefensebelt.Atthesametimethe6thIDstormedthehillstotheeastoftown.Thefightinghadbeenveryhardthesefirstthreedays.Modelestimatedcasualtiesof10,000menwhichwerenoteasilyreplaced.Ammoshellsforthepanzerswerealmostallgone;Modelurgently requestedmore fromBerlin.Thenewlyarrived4thPzDwas followingbehind20thPzDwithorderstotakethechainofhillsfromHill253.5toHill279.Totheleftof4thPzD,the2ndPzDwiththesupportofsPzAbt505,aftertakingKashara,wastostormHill234.1,Hill274,Hill258.WiththecurrentprogressVonSaucken,theCOof4thPzD,movedhisHQtothewoodsnorthofPodolian.At thesame timea little to theeast, the9thPzDand18thPzDwerefighting towardOlkhovatka butweremaking little progress. fkk56. dgk87m. dgr199m. kcz168.dgk116m.lck116m.asz364.At1200hrs, the6th ID, supportedbynearly50panzers (47thPzC), attacked towardBitiug

whichwasdefendedby6thGRD.Afterafiercefightthe6thIDfoughtitswayintothenorthernsectionofthevillage.mkz119.dgk116m.lck116m.Bymidday, the 4th PzD were able to make a gap in the Soviet line about twomiles long

between thevillagesofSamodurovkaandKashara,bothnorthofOlkhovatka.The fightingwashard and several officers were killed. Von Saucken was injured. The 2nd PzD and 20th PzDbegantodrivethroughandheadedfortheareaaroundthekeyvillageofTeploe,2.5milestothesouthwest.ThehilltoptownofOlkhovatkawasjustthreemilesfurthersouth.Rokossovskyaskedforairsupporttohelpplugthiscriticalgap.AtthesametimethreemilestotheeastatPonyri,the9thPzDand18thPzDwerebeingrepulsed.Rokossovskycontinuedtosendartillerytothearea.Maj General Enshin’s 307th RD continued to put up stiff resistance against the two panzerdivisions.Everynight theSovietswouldcontinuetolayminesinfrontof theirpositionssotheGermanswouldhaveclearoldterritoryeveryday.mhz264+.dgr198m.fkk59+.fkk102m.dgk87m.dgr199m.dgk116m.lck116m.The20thPzD resumed its advance southward, aiming to captureSamodurovka.Bynoon the

2nd PzD and 20th PzD had ripped a two mile hole in the Soviet line between Kashara andSamodurovka.Tigerspouredthroughfirstthentheotherpanzersofthetwodivisions,forcingthe6thGRDback.Fromhere,ModelwouldtrytotakeOlkhovatka.The17thGRCwerepreparingtomeettheGermanswhentheyreachedtheslopesnearOlkhovatka.LiketheGermans,theSovietswere nowusing 30mmMGson their planes and theywere eating up theMk IIIs andMk IVs.SamodurovkawaswestofKasharaandnorthofTeploe lck298+.dgk87m.dgr199m.dgk116m.lck116m.At1430hrs,the12thADdeliveredaheavybarrageonthe78thADatProtasovo.The78thAD

wassupportedbyadozenFerdinandsandthenew150mmSturmpanzersandwasabletorepulsethesubsequentattacksby74thRD.The78thADwasalsofightingtothenorthnearTrosnaagainstthe2ndGPDandwereabletotakeahillsoutheastoftown.TothenorthofTrosna,the383rdIDwasdefendingagainstaheavyattacksupportedbytanks,repulsingtheattack.wdk180.dgk87m.dgk116m.FightingintheBerezovyiLogarea,theGermanswiththehelpofairsupport,wereabletopush

the6thGRDbackandby1530hrswasattackingHill257.0andtheKasharasector.AfterwardstheGermans,afterreceivingreinforcements,shiftedbacktoPonyriandattacked17thGRCagainand by 1900 hrs finally started pushing 307th RD back. The 307th RD reformed their linebetweenBazhenovaandsouthofPonyriandadditionalreserveswerebroughtup.IntheKasharasector,the4thPzD,2ndPzDandtoasmallerextentthe20thPzDleadthecharge.InthePonyrisectoritwas18thPzDandtoalesserextent9thPzDintheleadfollowedbyseveraldivisionsofinfantry.dgr116+.dgr108m.dgk87m.dgr199m.dgk116m.lck116m.The18thPzD,86thIDand292ndIDlaunchedacoordinatedattackonbothsidesof Ponyri.

Thedefending159thGARclaimedtohavedestroyedtwoTigersandfiveotherpanzers.At1900hrs,afterapausetoregroup,theGermansattackedagain,withsupportof60panzers,againstthestubborndefensesof307thRD.ThefightingaroundPonyriPCsurgedbackandforth.Totheleftof86thID,the36thIDreinforcedwithFerdinandssufferedheavilyfromthefireof12thADandthecounter-attackof148thRD.wdk178.dgk87m.dgr199m.dgk116m.lck116m.At1700hrs,the18thPzDand9thPzDwithitsremaining30panzersattackedtowardPonyriII

and began pushing the 75th GRD and elements of the 3rd TDB back when a group of IL-2sshowedupandattackedthepanzerswiththeirnewlyequipped37mmcannon.TheSovietplanesattackedtherearofthepanzerswherethearmorwasthethinnestandwereabletostopmanyofthepanzerswhichstoppedthepanzerattack.mkz119.dgk116m.lck116m.Themenof41stPzCmadelimitedgainstakingmuchofPonyriandthesurroundingcountryside

butnofurthersouthwhilethepanzersfurtherwestadvancedandcapturedTeploe,northwestofOlkhovaka.cbk53.dgk116m.On the east flank, the 78th AD of 23rd IC repelled eleven attacks from the 74th RD. The

Sovietswiththesupportofthe12thADweretryingtoretakeProtasovoontheMaloarkhangelskroad.The41stICsentacompanyofFerdinandstoassist.DespitehardfightingbytheGermanstodayalongthewholefront,theywereunabletopenetratethroughtheseconddefensebelt.Sovietartilleryandwellpositionanti-tankgunswereamajorcause to the littleprogressmadeby theGermans.TheGermanswouldnotgainmuchbeyond thispoint.After threedaysof fighting theGermans were almost out of panzer shells and requested 100,000 more. With 500 panzersremaining,thatwas200shellsperpanzer.wdk178.lck311.dgk87m.dgk116m.WhiletheGermansmadeverylittleprogressinthecentertoday,itdidpushbackthe17thGRC

alittle,capturingTeploe.The70thGRDand75thGRDdidregroupandwiththehelpof140thRD in late afternoon attacked fromSamodurovka, hitting the flank of 4thPzD and slowing theadvancenearTeploeandKashara.dgr117.dgk87m.lck116m.Thefightinginthenorthcost9thArmyanother2,800casualties,bringingthethree-daytotalto

13,080.Afterthewar,itwasestimatedthatCentralFronthadover30,000casualties,lostmorethan150tanksand185assortedaircraftinthefirstthreedaysoffighting.Duringthecampaign,Germanintelligenceestimatedthecasualtiesattwicethosefigures,leadingModeltobelievethat9thArmyhadachancetoreachKursk.snz247+.TheRedAirForcecontinuedtobombafterdarktargetsofopportunities.Whenthemovements

of4thPzDwerediscoveredtheyattackedtheformation.Over500sortiesweremadeatnightandinto thepredawnhoursof7/8. Itwasnotapleasantnight for themenof the4thPzD.Themenweresoakedandexhausted,beingshelledandfiredonfromthegroundandfromtheair.Onthe

westsideof47thPzCfront,the4thPzDhadbeeninsertedintothelinenearTeploeand,withthesupportof2ndPzD,attackedlateatnight.Heavyrainfell,slowingtheGermans’advance.TheSovietscounter-attackedwiththe43rdTR,58thTRandelementsofthe2ndTA.Inthenorthernsalientbytheendoftheday,the1stFliegerDivisionhadflown1,687sorties

against16thVA’s1,185and15thVA’s185sorties.OftheSoviettotal,731sortieswerefighters.TheGermansstillhadtheedgeintheskybutthegapwasquicklyshrinking.Infact,theSovietshadmorefightersortiesthantheGermansonthisdayinthenorth.Inthenorth,theGermansstillhadavictoryratiooffivetoone.Bytheendoftheday1stFliegerDivisionestimateddestroying43 planes, 14, tanks, 60 other vehicles, 20 guns and a number of ammo sites. cbk50. cbk55.nzk77.dgk116m.

T

10

July8thontheSouthernSalientSeeMaps12,25

he German advance in the north was less than one mile on this day. To the south theGermancommandersremainedhopefulofabreakthrough,buttherateofattritionremained

high. Soviet strongpoints proved difficult to overcome.Meanwhile,RedArmy counter-attacks,witharmor,preventedsubstantialgains.Theenemytanksstartedshootingataboutamileorless.TheT34sdidwellagainstIIIsandIVs,buttheTigerswereimmunetomoststrikesfromaT34.TheSovietanti-tankswith largergunshadbetterkill ratiosbut therewerenotmanydeployed.TheSovietsweresportingafewAmericanmadeShermansandBritishChurchillsthatweregivenonlend-lease.TheGermansalsofoundastheyexpandedtheircontrolofthebattlezone,bunkersfilledwithAmericancannedfoodandsupplies.jp127.hjj122.kuz194.zow176.InBerlin,theOKHdecidedtocontinuetheassaultatKursk.Itwasclearlynotgoingaswellas

plannedbuttheGermansstillhadhopeforimprovement.InBerlin,aGermanintelligencereportwasgiventoHitlerthatdespitetheincreaseinGerman

campaignsonpartisans inMayand June, their destructionon critical communication lineshadactuallyincreasedthreefoldinsomesectors.IntheKurskarea,Luftwaffehadmade4,000sortiesinsupportofthetroops.Thatday,aclaim

of193Sovietplaneswereshotdownwhilelosingeightplanes.Groundforceswerealsohithardfrom theair.Casualtiesestimatedvarywidelydependingonwhichside they’re frombutOKHclaimedtheLuftwaffehadshotdown700planes in thepreviousfourdays.700tankshadbeenclaimedaswell.Duringthepredawnhoursandwiththerainshavingstopped,theroadsweredryingoutasthe

40thArmywasmarchingcloser to thebattlesector tosupport the flagging6thGAand1stTA.bt85Nowthat4thPzAwasnearingthecriticalPselRiver-Prokhorovkaline,Hothspentmostofhis

timestrengtheningthefrontlineandreachingthepointofdeparturetocrosstheriverandcapturetherailtown,inordertogainaccesstotheallimportantcorridorthatleadstoKursk.Hothfelt48thPzCneededhelptomovebeyondthePselRiversoheorderedHausser’sSStopausetheirattacktowardProkhorovkaandshiftdirectiontothenorthwest,crosstheSolotinkaRiverandgetbehind1stTAand6thGAtosqueezetheSovietsagainst48thPzC,southofthePselRiver.Atthevery least they should strengthen the boundary between 11th PzD and LAH which was theSolotinkaRiver.TheSolotinkaRiverwasatributaryofthePselrunningsouthabouttenmilesandwasthreemileseastoftheOboyanroad.WhenVatutinsawtheSSpanzersheadingwestpasttheSolotinkaRiver, he assumed theSSwas fortifying48thPzC’s attempt to reachOboyan.While

sendinganumberofreservestoreinforce1stTA,Vatutinthoughtthisredirectionfavorabletohisupcomingarmorattack,whichwouldbeprimarilybutnotexclusivelydirectedeastof theriveragainstLAHandDasReich.ThepanzershadassembledawayfromthefrontlineduringthenightandVatutinbelievedthegrenadiersonthelinewerevulnerable.Whatthegeneraldidnotrealizewas that manyGerman guns had been brought up and were now supporting themen. gnk191.gnk193m.gnk196.gnk230.gnk227m.The LAH had an arduous schedule that would see the three regiments going in different

directions.The1stPzGRwouldheadnorthtowardGresnoewhilethethe2ndPzGRwouldheadto thenortheast in thedirectionofProkhorovkawhile the1stPzRalongwithDasReich’s 2ndPzRadvancedtothenorthwest.OnthesouthernbankofthePselRiveratthevillagesofVasilevkaandAndreevka,the99thTB

of2ndTCwerewaitingforSSTKtoreachtheriver.Thebesttankgroundonthenorthsideoftheriver could be reached frombetween these two villages.To the east the other sector favoringtankswaseastofStorozhevoewoods.The285thRRof183rdRDandthe169thTBof2ndTCdefended thevillageofStorozhevoe to therailroad line.All thebrigadesof2ndTCwerealsoorderedtobepreparedtoattacktowardGresnoeortowardHill255.9uponorder,butthatwouldbedifficultsincesomeofthetanksweredugin.vzz183+.At 0500 hrs the 167th IDwasmoving to the line to relieveSSTK from the LipovyiDonets

sector.TheSSTK startedmaking preparations to leave to the northwest toward thePselRiversectorwheretheynowhadtheresponsibilityofcrossingtheriverandestablishingabridgehead.The2ndGTCattackedlatemorningandalargepartoftheSSTKhadtostaytosupportthe167thID in defending the line fromNepkhaevo in the south to Teterevino in the north.Hausser hadreceivedearlyaerialreportsoftanksapproachingbut,notknowingthefulldetailsofstrength,hestillorderedhisdivisions tobegin redeploying to fulfillHoth’sorders toassist48thPzC.ThebattleforSSTK lasted throughout thenightandSSTKdidnotbegin tomoveout inearnestuntilnextmorning.lck282.gnk191+.gnk193m.gnk196.gnk227m.ztc269.pck77.zow153.Thepreparationsforthemajorcounter-attackby10thTC,5thGTC,2ndGTCand6thTCalong

the4thPzA’s front, andespeciallyon theProkhorovka-Teterevino roadaxis,wasgoingpoorlyandthesituationonlygotworsewhenthosepreparationswerepreemptedandthethreedivisionsofthe2ndSSPzCattackedfirst.The183rdRD,theremainsof52ndGRDandthe11thMRBhadmoveduptothelinetosupportthetankbrigadesintheirplannedoffensiveandwerehithardaswell.Firsttoinitiatetheircounter-attack,the10thTCwithnearly200tanksbeganlaunchinganattack on 2ndSSPzC along the road fromProkhorovka toTeterevino.Kravchenko’s 5thGTCwith 100 tanks later joined the engagement from the east, crossing the Lipovyi Donets andadvancingpastBelenikhino,aimingforKalinin.Thetankcorps initiallymademodestgainsbutwererepulsedbyDuetschlandRegimentinfrontofKalinin.Stilllater,Burdeiny’s2ndGTCwith140tanksdeployedsouthofthe5thGTC,joinedinattackingfromNepkhaevobutquicklylost50tanks inadevastatingattackby theLuftwaffe and retreated.The tankerswereprotectedon therightflankbythe11thMRBandthe52ndGRDastheyattackedalongthebanksofthePselRiversouthwardfromKrasnyiOktiabr.The10thTCwassurprisedbyanevenstrongerattackbySSTKandDasReichthatdisruptedtheSovietattack,andinflictedheavycasualties.dgk134.dgk124m.dgk222m.dlu63m.zow151++.

TheSovietstriedtoregroupthebesttheycouldwhileundertheGermanassaultandcounter-attacked but the situation was chaotic, losing momentum, and they failed to regain theircomposure.Whilemany of the brigades attacked theSS, the 6thTC attackedGD near IasnaiaPolianabuthadlittlesuccessagainsttheLuftwaffe’ssupportedcounter-attacks.LAHwasalsoontheoffensiveearlyandreporteddestroying82tanks.Allof2ndSSPzCclaimeddestroying121tanks.GeneralTheodorWischalsoreported66deadand178wounded.OntheSovietside,closeto200Soviettankswereclaimedlostintheseengagementsbytheendoftheday.TheobjectiveHausserwastryingtoachieveincludeda2ndSSPzClinkupto48thPzCatSukho-Solotinoinorder to strengthen the line and assist in clearing the southern banks of the Psel and then toestablishabridgeheadontheotherside.dgk134+.dgk124m.dgr89.zrl222.At0500hrs,onecombatgroupoftheLAHresumeditsattacktothenortheastfromPokrovka,

southeastofVerkhopenie,aimingforthejunctionoftheOboyanandProkhorovkaroads.Therestofthedivisionwouldheadeithernorthornorthwestasordered.LAHquicklymetupwithninetanks and destroyed one before chasing the rest away. By 0800 hrs, the combat group passedthroughMalyeMaiachki,nearlytenmilesnorthoftheseconddefensebeltandcontinuedtodrivetowardGresnoe.SouthwestofVeselyi, theLAHwas attackedby the31stTC,192ndTB,29thTDBandelementsofthe51stGRD.ThebattlelastedalldayandrangedintheLuchki,PokrovkaandBolshieMaiachkiarea.TheLAH destroyedeight tanks in the first twohours andcapturedMalye Maiachki around 1430 hrs. At 1500 hrs Gresnoe fell and the 31st TC fell back toKochetovka.TheLAHcapturedVeselyiby1700hrsbutthenwithdrewtothesouthwesttoLuchkiNorthfortheevening.BeforereachingLuchkiNorththeywereambushed.TwoTigerswerehitbyantitankfirebutwerenotseverelydamagedandthecolumncontinuedtoLuchki.Elementsofthe167th ID and 11th PzD thatwere nearbywere shifted to helpLAH for the day.LAH reporteddestroying19tanksand5planes.wdk139.hjj121m.fkk86.dgr209m.vzz7m.dgk130m.gnk193m.gnk227m.zrl221.During thepredawnhours, thepanzergroupofLAH assembled in theTeterevinoNortharea

and at 0800 hrs, after learningMalyeMaiachki had been captured by grenadiers, launched anattacktowardtheSolotinkaRiverwhichrannorthtosouthfromthePselRiverandpastMalyeMaiachkiandGresnoe.Thissmallriverwaspartoftheboundarylinebetweenthe11thPzDandtheSSCorps.TheLAHwassupposedtojoinupwith48thPzCeastofNovoselovkawhichwaslocatedontheOboyanroad.PanzersofDasReichwere to launchat thesametimeandprotectLAH’s right flank.Hoth also provided additional air support to 48th PzC.Thismaneuverwasintendedtoencircleanddestroy3rdMCand6thTC;pushingthembackwasnotenoughfortheywouldregroupandattackattheriver.SSTKwasalsobeingredeployedtothePselRiversectorthatdayandwouldadditsweighttotheoffenselaterinthedayornextmorning.MuchofHoth’splandissolvedwhenVatutin’stankcorpsattackedLAHandDasReichthatmorning.TheGermanshadtoquicklyturndefensivefortheirownsurvival.ThelaunchingofthisattackbytheSSCorpstook themoutofdefensivemodeandhelped theSovietswhen theyattacked. If theSovietshadbeen prepared and coordinated as Vatutin hadwished, the Soviets could have inflicted heavycasualtiesontheSS.gnk191+.gnk193m.vzz3m.gnk227m.zrl221.Flying tenyardsabove thegroundandusing theirnew30mmcannon, theLuftwaffe inflicted

heavycasualties,about50tanks,onthe2ndGTC.Thiswasarecordnumberoftanksdestroyedin

asinglemissionbytheLufftwaffeandtheonlytimeGermanairpowerwasabletostopanarmoradvance.OncetheSovietresistancedieddown,HaussercontinuedhisadvancetowardOboyan.DasReichpanzersstayedwithLAHtoprotectitsrightflankasitheadedfortheSolotinkaarea.TheSSTK thathadredeployedtothenorthwestweretryingtoinchtheirwaytothebendofthePselRiver.Hausserwasscheduledtomeetupwith48thPzCfurthernorthatSukho-SolotinotojoinforcesandcrossPselRivertoattackOboyantogether.Popov’s2ndTCandBurdeiny’s2ndGTCwerebusyintheirownsectorsandcouldnotassist10thTCwhichwashavingthehardesttime.TheLuftwaffewereflyingoutoftheMikonaiovkaairfieldnearKharkovwhentheyspottedthemovingcolumnandattacked.dgk135.dgk130m.dgr221m.fkk145.Thedaybeganwarm,humidandpartlycloudyasthepanzersoftheLAHpreparedfortheirtrek

westtoassist48thPzC.ThepanzersdidnotleaveontimeduetotheSovietattackbutonceitwasrebuffed,theSSpanzersmovedouttotheirindividualobjectives.Thegrenadiershadalsobeendelayedbuthadresumedtheirmissionsaheadofthearmor.EachregimentofLAHwasgoingtoadvance in separate directions. The grenadiers were moving north and northeast while thepanzerswereheadingtothenorthwest.ThegrenadiersweretocaptureMalyeMaiachki,westofTeterevino North and located near the Solotinka River, before the panzers actually launched.OtherGrenadiersmovedsouthwestonalinefromTeterevinoNorthtoLuchkiNorthtoprotecttheflankfromroamingbandsofmarauders.Thesectoratthispointwasfarfrombeingsecure.TheGrenadiersmetresistance immediatelyafter leavingTeterevinoNorthanddidnotget toMalyeMaiachkiuntil0730hrswheretheyproceededtolaunchanattackfromthemarch.By0800hrsthe town,whichhadbeenabandoned,was inGermanhands.Katukovhadorderedhis31stTCwhichwasdefending thearea tomovenorthalong theOboyanroadwhere the242ndTB(31stTC) was already stationed.WhenWisch learned the Soviets had pulled back in the area, heimmediatelyorderedhispanzerstoadvanceandfillthevoidbeforeSovietreinforcementscouldbe called in.When the panzers ofLAH approachedMalyeMaiachki, the tankers of 242ndTBattacked.AsmallpanzergroupfromDasReichwasparallelingLAHamiletothenorthandwhenthe Soviets attacked both German groups responded. The moving battle was confined to theBolshieMaiachki-Veselyiarea.Whilethebulkofthe242ndTBfoughtthepanzers,asmallgroupsplinteredoffandattackLuchkiNorth.WischfinallyrealizedthatthescopeoftheSovietattacksmayhavebeenlargerthanthoughtandorderedhisremainingpanzerssouthtoLuchkiNorth,akeyjumpingoffsitetothenorth,wherethedefenseswerebetter.Aftertwohoursofmakingnogains,the Soviet tanks pulled back beyond Veselyi. The LAH panzers quickly occupied Veselyi andnearby Hill 239.6 with the support ofDer Führer which happened to be in the area. A newcolumnofSoviettankschargedfromthenortheasttoengagethetrailing2ndPzR.TheSturmAbt2was in the area andquicklymoved to the battle to support the panzers in repulsing the attack.Aftertheattack,theassaultgunssplitofffrom2ndPzRanddrovenorthtowardthePselRiver.Surprising the enemy, this assault group captured Krasnyi Oktiabr and the nearby hamlet ofProkhorovkanextdoor.gnk194++.gnk193m.vzz3m.agk102.agk105.gnk227m.zrl221.zow148.At 0500 hrs, a second coombat group of the LAH resumed its drive north from Pokrovka

headingforBolshieMaiachkiwhichwascapturedtwohourslaterby1stPzRafterafiercetankbattle.Thepanzershadmovedonandthegrenadierswerenowmovingintosecurethearea.ThebulkoftheLAHandDasReichpanzersmovedoutfromnearTeterevinoNorthtothenorthwest,

headingforthevillageofKochetovkaontheSolotinkaRiver.LAHhadtheleadandDasReichwasfollowingonaparallelcoursetoscreentheirflank.Aformationof40Soviettanksfrom10thTC, which had just been transferred from 5th GA to Vatutin, drove down the Teterevino-Prokhorovkaroadtointerceptthem.Afternearlyathree-hourbattleandlosinganumberoftanks,the10thTCmovedofflookingforeasierprey.Theyfoundthe2ndPzGReastofPokrovkawhilethepanzerscontinuedtoadvancetowardtheSolotinkaRiver.ThisearlyadvancebytheGermansdisruptedaplannedcounter-offensivebyVatutin.Thefresh10thTCwhichwastospearheadtheattack was used to try to blunt the Germans’ advance, but the early advance by the GermansforcedtheSovietstoattackbeforetheywerefullyprepared.The2ndTCwouldattacktheflankhours after the engagement started with 10th TC. mhz267. fkk137. fkk319m. lck282. agk102.gnk203+.vzz121++.wwf91.vzz7m+.dgk130m.gnk193m.gnk227m.zrl221.##Afterthe242ndTBpulledbackfromtheengagementwithLAHandelementsofDasReich to

thefortifiedhillsjusteastofVeselyi,theGermansdidnotimmediatelyfollow;theyneededtimetoregroup.Veselyi,Hill227.4andHill239.6werebeingmannedbytheremainsofthe3rdMCandChernienko’s31stTC.Hothhadmadeitapointtoattacktheboundarylinebetween3rdMCand31stTCandtheplanwassuccessful.gnk196.kcz168.kcz17m.Shortlyafterdaybreak,elementsofBurkov’s10thTC leftProkhorovka forTeterevinoNorth

forafrontalattackonLAH.WithLAH’spanzersalreadyontheroadtothewest,therewereonlytwocrippledTigerswhichcouldbarelymoveduetotrackdamageplusasmallgarrisontodefendthetown.AcolumnofSoviettankspenetratedtheGermanline,heldonlybygrenadiers,northoftownandwasheadedfortown.SeeingthedamagedTigers,theSovietsheadedfortheirprey.TheTigersopenedupfirstandthebattlewasjoined.WhenitwasoverthetwoTigershaddestroyed17T34s.Stunnedbytheloss,the10thTCmovedtothenortheasttoregroup.Bytheafternoon,theSoviettankattacksintheLAHsectorhadstoppedbutairreconhadstillspottedlargenumbersoftanksnorthofthePselbendwhichwasprobablythetardy2ndTClateforthelaunch.Afterthisday’sbattles,LAHhadonly40workingpanzers.WischorderedallofthemtopullbackbehindtheTeterevinoNorth-LuchkiNorthlinetoregroup.FreyandhispanzerswereorderedwestagainthenextmorningtogaincontroloftheSolotinkaRiverarea.AfterdarkFreymovedhispanzersintoadeepravinewherehewould launchhisattack in themorning.DasReich panzerswouldalsotakepartintheattack.BothdivisionsweretocrosstheriverandmeetupatKochetovka.TheSoviet tanks continued to attack Das Reich early in the morning from Teterevino North toGostishchevoandKrugerwas forced tokeep someofhispanzerson the front line.gnk199++.vzz3m.vzz5m.PriesswaspreparinghisSSTKtomoveoutforthePselRiversector.Hestillhad99working

panzersthatincluded35MkIVs,52MkIIIsandsevenTigers.Thedivisionwascurrentlyholdinga13mile sector fromPetrovka toShopino in thesouth.A fewof thepanzerswere regroupingseveralmilesbehindthelineatGonkiontheroadthatwouldtakethemnorththroughIakovlevo.The167thIDwasslowinmovingintoreplaceSSTKandthatwasmakingPriessevenlaterthanscheduled.While preparing to leave,Burdeiny’s 2ndGTCwith40 tanks attackedSSTK in theVisloe-Ternovkaarea.GermanartillerystationedsouthofVisloestartedshelling2ndGTC’sreararea to prevent reinforcements from coming up to the line.Bochmannwas ordered to take hispanzers up to the line and block the attack. This was another example of the Soviets having

perfecttimingofattackingtheGermanswhentheywereleastprepared.JustpastHill209.5thepanzers ambushed the advancing T34s. A small group of tanks got past Bochmann but werestoppedbygunslocatedonthehill.TheLuftwaffecamebackandhelpedSSTKwiththeenemytanks.ThefightingcontinuedlateintothenightandyetSSTKwouldstillmakeittothePselRiverbythefollowingday.Atthesametimetothenorth,the5thGTCwaslaunchinganattackagainstDasReich.Vatutin,usingseveraladditionalcorpswastryingtoseparate,isolateanddestroythethreedivisionsoftheSSCorpsbutwiththesupportoftheSSTKpanzersandtheheavysupportofartilleryforDasReich,thetwoGermandivisionsmanagedtorepulsemuchoftheattackwithouttheirlinesdisintegrating.gnk207++.gnk193m.vzz3m.gnk227m.kuz195.zow151.The small contingent ofDasReich tankswas headingwest towardGresnoe, less than three

milessouthofVeselyi,tojoinupwithLAHwestoftheSolotinkaRiver.Atfirsttherewaslittleresistancebutwhen theGermans approachedGresnoe, theyheard the soundsof guns firingonLAHasthatdivisionwaspreparingtoattacktheSovietposition.Hill239.6andHill227.4werenearbyandwerealsoobjectives.DasReichneared thearenaand the31stTCstartedfiringonthemaswell.Withtheirbatteriessetupandfiring,theDasReichadvancedtowardVeselyiandHill 239.6, west of Vesselyi. By noon Hill 239.6 was captured andDas Reich was movingtoward theSolotinkaRiver and thenKochetovka.LAHwas takingcareofHill 227.4, southofVeselyi,duringthisbattle.BeforereachingKochetovka,DasReichsawnearly200tanksof the10th TC crossing the Psel River and heading for TeterevinoNorth.After reporting the Sovietcolumn,thepanzerscontinuedwestandwithinanhourreachedKrasnyiOktiabrwheretheleadpanzerscouldsee11thPzDattackingKochetovka.Whenthepanzersbecamevisible,additionaltanks cameout tomeet themand a small but viciousbattle ensued.The supportingGrenadierswerejustcrossingtheSolotinkaRiver,stilltryingtocatchuptothepanzers.gnk201.gnk193m.By0800hrstheleadtanksof2ndTCbeganreachingtheKamyshevka-Pravorotareaandbegan

theassemblingandpreparationstoattackDasReich.Theeventualattackdidnotbeginfor2ndTCuntil1600hrs;itwastoolatetobeofmuchhelpto10thTC.Vatutin’splanfortheconcertedtankoffensivewasflawedforitdidnotallowitsparticipantsenoughtimetoreachtheirlaunchpoints. to stock up provisions or to study the battlefield. Vatutin had done this several timesthroughoutthecampaignandhis tankbrigadespaiddearlyfor theirprematureattacks.Theleadelements of 5th GTA started arriving in their designated areas north of Prokhorovka. Hothestimated that his forces destroyed 212 tanks that day. Around 500 Soviet tanks had beendestroyedinthepreceedingfourdays.dgr83+.gnk203+.At 0900 hrs, 40 T34s resumed their attack on theLAH whichwas advancing onVeselyi, a

small strongpoint located midway between Sukho-Solotino and Gresnoe that was heavilydefended.At just past noon, theLAH had advanced andwas now attacking into the town, butduringtheprevioushourtheGermanswerestalledagainstheavyfire.Whatbroketheissuewasthemaneuveringof theTigers to theSoviet flank,destroying the lineofdug-inassaultguns.At1000hrs,another40T34sattackedtheeasternflankofDasReichwhichwasmarchingonalinebetweenTeterevino andKalinin.Both Soviet attacks failed to stop theGerman advance.WithTigersalsoleadingthewayandwithStukassupporting, theLAH laterattackedHill237.6nearVeselyiandRylski.Bytheendoftheday,theLAHhaddrivenawedgebetween31stTCand3rdMCthatpenetratedalmosttothevillageofSolotino.Alsobytheendofthedaythefightinghad

beensofiercealongtheSSfront,Hausserreportedhaving40panzersdamagedwhiledestroyingatotalof121tanks.Inthissectoralone45tanksweredestroyed.mhz267++.dgr221m.dgr209m.fkk137.fkk319m.agk102.nzk91.gnk199+.gnk193m.zrl221.In thesouthernsalient, thebiggestairbattleof thedaytookplaceover thesectorwhere2nd

GTCattackedtheSS.WhileGermanfighterswerekeepingtheRedAFbusy,StukasandHs129s,withtheir37mmcannon,attackedthetanksof2ndGTCwhichwereadvancingfromthesafetyofthe nearby woods near Gostishchevo, surprising the grenadiers. Fw 190s dropping the newbombletsthateachcouldcoveranacreofgroundweremowingdownthesupportinginfantry.Inaddition to the losses in the air, anestimated50 tanksof2ndGTCwere severelydamagedordestroyed.The2ndGTCpulledbacktothewoodsspoilingVatutin’sbigcounter-attack.cbk66+.fzk173.pck68+.pck76.zow150+.The48thPzCendedtheiradvanceatPokrovski,threemileswestofMalyeMaiachki.Thisleft

agapontheirrightflankastheLAHmadegreatergainstodayandwerenorthofLuchkiNorth.AshockgroupofDasReichleftTeterevinoandattacked5thGTCandafterastiffbattlecontinuedon,shiftingdirectiontothenorthwestawayfromProkhorovkatocutbehindtheSovietdefendersinordertoreachahilleastofVeselyiby1100hrs.Itwasamarchofsixmiles.Aftersecuringthehill,thepanzersofDasReichmovedonforanothertwomilesandfoughtanotherhardbattleeastofKochetovka.ThethirddefensebeltwasnowjustafewmilesnorthofKochetovka.wdk139.Aspartofthemajortankoffensiveontheflankof2ndSSPzC,Kravchenko’s5thGTCbegan

its attack towardKalinin and thenBelenikhino at 1100 hrs after an hour preparation.Under arollingbarrage,thefirstwaveofthirtyT34sattackedwithmassesofinfantryfollowingbehind.TheDeutschlandRegimentwaiteduntilthetankswereonly500yardsawaybeforefiring.SevenSoviet tankswentup in a fireball but the attack continued.A small groupofT34smanaged topenetratetheline,drivethroughthetownandheadforLuchkiNorthandthevitalroadthatfedthefrontline.NextdoortoDeutschland,DerFührerRegimentwasalsobeingattacked.ManyoftheSoviettanksthatmadeittotherearinbothsectorsweredestroyedbyGermanartillerythathadtolowertheirbarrelstopointblankrange.1100hrswaslatebutnotaslateasPopovwhowouldnot launch his first wave until 1350 hrs. Despite air support, the first wave failed. Afterregrouping,asecondwavewasagainlaunchedatTeterevinoSouthwhichwasalsodefendedbyDasReich.Afewtanksmadeitintotownbutwerehunteddownbyeliteteamsanddestroyedbyeither satchel charges or magnetic mines. Further south at Nepkhaevo, Burdeiny’s 2nd GTCattackedbutwasmetwiththeLuftwaffe’snew3.7cmgunsflownonHenschel’s129s.Theplanesinflictedheavycasualtiesonthefirstwaveoftanks.Whentheplanesleft,thetanksregroupedandattackedtowardHill209.5.gnk204++.gnk193m.nzk91.zrl221.zow149.Aroundmidday,acoordinatedassaultwasmadebythepanzersofLAHandDasReichagainst

Hill 227.4 andHill 239.6,which lay east and southeast ofVeselyi.While thepanzers ofLAHfoughtthethirtyT34sthatcamearoundHill227.4,Peiperandhismechanizedforcewasorderedto take the village of Rylski which was providing flanking support. Das Reich had similarproblemswhenthe237thTBrolleddownHill239.6.RylskifellfairlyquicklythoughresistanceremainedarounditbutVeselyi,furthernorth,wasmoredifficult.KlingandhisfourTigershadtooutflankthefrontdefensesandattackthetownfromtheeast.TheSovietsdidnothaveanythingthat could stop a Tiger and all the dug-in tanks were systematically destroyed by the Tigers.

Rylski was a small village near the east bank of the Solotinka River, southwest of Veselyi.gnk196+.gnk200.gnk193m.AftertakingHill239.6inlatemorning,Reitzenstein’sPanzerGroupheadedfortheSolotinka

River.By1300hrs,thepanzercolumnwasapproachingtheriverandthe11thPzDcontingentwaswaitingforthemonthewesternbank.Withinsightofthesmallriver,aSoviettankforcerushedoutfromhidingandattackedReitzenstein.Fightingforpositionaladvantage,thesmallengagementturnedfiercebutafteranhourtheGermanswereabletooutflankandthenrepulsetheenemywhoretreatednorthalongtheSolotinkaforthesafetyofthePselRiverdefenses.gnk202.gnk193m.At 1350 hrs exploratory units of the 2ndTC repeatedly attackedKalinin butwere repulsed

eachtimebytheDeutschlandRegimentofDasReich.Withthepanzersmovingahead,DasReichinfantry fell behind, unable to support the panzers or be supported by them, and theLuftwaffecouldnottakeuptheslack.Fortheentireafternoon,DasReichwasrepeatedlyattackedby2ndTC.Twopincerswith40tankseachattackedGermanpositionsatTeterevinoNorthandLuchkiNorth.WiththehelpofanearbySSTKbattalion,theattackatLuchkiNorthwasrepulsedbutthesituationatTeterevinowasmoreseriousandonceagaintheLuftwaffewascalledintohelp.Eventhough theGermans gained ground that day, the Soviets began increasing their counter-attackswiththeincreasedreinforcementsthathadarrivedthatdayandthenightbefore.AlongthelongridgestretchingfromeastofTeterevinoNorth,thethirdbattalionofDeutschlandRegimentwasdefendingagainsttheseattacks.DasReichalsostoppedanotherattack,thistimeinfantry,thatwasheading toward Veselyi and by 1100 hrs had taken the high ground to the east. In the earlyafternoonasmalltankgroupfrom2ndTCmadeitpastKalininandwereheadingtowardLuchkiNorthwiththeobjectiveofcuttingoffthecriticalsupplyroutethatfedthefrontsectorsofbothLAH andDas Reich. As the six Soviet tanks were approaching Ozerovski, German artillerybatterieswereabletodestroyallsixtanks,squelchingthepotentialthreatofisolation.fkk138+.wdk140. dgr221m. fkk319m. vzz139++. fkk138. vzz3m. vzz7m. gnk193m. gnk205. zrl221.zow149.AsmallcombatgroupfromSSTKwasadvancingthroughthePetrovski-Sabachevskiareawhen

theywereambushed.Theymadeafightingwithdrawalagainstthelargerforcewithoutsufferingtoomanycasualties.kuz195.Itwasnoonandithadnotrainedthatday.Thehotsunwasbeginningtodrythegroundandthe

panzersandtruckswerebeginningtomovealittleeasier.wwf89.A strong counter-attack in the Hill 258.2-Komsomolets State Farm area, where almost 150

tanksfrom2ndTCattackedtheLAHandDasReich,startledHausserwiththescaleoftheattackincombinationwiththeongoingactions.HeorderedtheleadunitsofLAHandDasReichthathadgottenaheadofeverybodyelse(nearKochetovka,GresnoeandMalyeMaiachki)topullbacktotheline(losingatwomilearea)toavoidhavingthoseforcessplitapartandencircled.The2ndSS PzC was now packed into a tight corridor in the Iakovlevo-Luchki North-Ozerovski-Teterevinoarea.ThemodestsuccessoftheSovietattackcanbeattributedtohardfightingofMajGeneralChernienko’s31stTCnearGresnoe,alongwith2ndTCand5thGTCtotheeastofHill258.2butallthreecorpssufferedheavycasualties.TheyfailedtoforceHothtoshiftforcesfrom48th PzC over to Hausser but it made Hoth more conservative with his orders for the nextmorning.OzerovskiwasjustwestofKalinin.vzz150++.vzz3m.zrl221.

Vatutin, suspecting a shift toward the important Prokhorovka, started deploying some of hisreinforcementsthatwerearrivinginsectorthere;histankerswouldtrytocleartheterritoryheldbyLAH down to theTeterevino-Kalinin-Nekhaevka line.Theother tank corps alsoheaded forDasReichbetweenthehillsnortheastofLuchkiSouthandTeterevino.fkk141.vzz153.At noon south of Luchki South, one regiment of theSSTK with 30 panzerswas attacked by

elements of the 2nd GTC. By 1245 hrs, 40 tanks supported by infantry attacked Visloe andTernovka, not far fromShopino, on theLipovyiDonetsRiver.By 1445 hrs another 25 Soviettanksarrivedandthebattlecontinued.Additionalhelpfromtworegimentsofthe167thIDarrivedin theafternoon tohelp theGermancause.With thenew forces,SSTKwas able to repulse theattacksand,movingthroughoutthenight,reachedtheirassignedlaunchpointwestofLAHforthenextmorningattack.Bynowall2ndSSPzC’sreserveshadbeencalledup;therewouldbelittlechance for additional help. The division destroyed a number of T34s in the engagement andforced theSoviets tocrossover to theeastsideof theDonets.TheSSTK started theoperationwith164panzersandassaultgunsbutbytheendofthedayhadonly112panzersandassaultgunsandsomeofthesewereintherepairshop.OnlyfiveoftheoriginalelevenTigerswereworking;acouplehadbeendestroyedandtherestwereintherepairshop.wdk140+.dgk222m.dlu63m.fkk139.fkk144.fkk322m+.Vatutin counter-attacked theGerman formations nearing thePselRiver.Onepincer launched

from the northwest near Tomarovka while the second pincer would strike from Shopino(southeast) along the Kursk-Belgorod highway. Vatutin was hoping the two formations wouldmeet in themiddleand isolate theGerman front line.Hothalreadyhadhis forceson themovewhentheSovietsstruck.WithnewTigersinthelead,theGermansblastedthroughtheSovietlineof3rdMBand31stTCallowing100panzerstoheadforSukho-Solotino.The10thTCandotherunitswerecalledupfromanendlessreservoirofreservestoblocktheGermansfromreachingOboyan.je104+.dgr155m.dgr173m.dgk130m.Along the long ridge stretching from east of Teterevino, the third battalion ofDeutschland

Regimentwasdefendingagainst repeatedattacks fromSoviet tankers.Someof the tanksbrokethrough the German positions and it was necessary to call for help. Thirty minutes later theLuftwaffeflewbyandhelpedstoptheattack.fkk138.At1345hrs,Hothassignedthefollowingday’staskstothe2ndSSPzC.Thetaskwasclearing

bothsidesoftheGresnoeandtheSolotinkasector.The48thPzCwastoadvancenorthwestoftheSolotinkasectortocrossthePselRiverintheIlinski-Shipysector.Itwasalsotoprotectthewestflankof2ndSSPzC.Aminutelater,HaussercalledbacktoHothtoinformhimthatDasReichwasinfiercebattleintheKochetovkaHillsandthatReconforceswereinpossessionofthehillsatKrasnyiOktiabr,while other patrolswere approaching the suburbsofProkhorovka. fkk140.fkk323m.dgk130m.vzz1m.Betweenthemainforcesof2ndSSPzCand3rdPzC, theLAHwipedoutapocketedSoviet

force that included tanksnearProkovskiwhichwas located just southwestofTeterevinoSouthandtheProkhorovkarailline.TheLAHmovedonalongtherailroadlinetowardProkhorovkabutwasstoppedbeforereachingBogorodits.snk81.dgr76m.gnk163m.Aspartofthemajoroffensive,the2ndGTClaunchedhourslatefromPetrovski,Kriukovoand

Chursinoanddrove towardLuchki. Inconjunctionwith theassaultof2ndGTC,ColSeriugin’s

89thGRDwouldattackalsoonalinethatwouldincludethecaptureofVisloe,ShopinoandErik.Anothercombatgroupconsistingofelementsofthe26thGTB,4thGMRBand89thGRDwouldattacktowardHill209.5andthenearbyStateFarm.Whilethesebattleswereraging,the48thPzCto the west, were modestly gaining ground against 1st TA in the Gremuchi-Verkhopenie area.vzz143+.vzz147+.vzz8m.vzz330+.vzz7m.dgk135.GDreportedtoKnobelsdorffbutthereportthatwassentupthelinestatedtheyhadarrivedat

Verkhopenie.ThiswasanerrorfortheyhadarrivedatGremuchi,threemilessouthoftheirrealobjective.HoththoughtGDwasfurthernorthandinlinewith11thPzDandLAH,whichwereattheSolotinkaRiver,sotheGDdivisionwasorderedeasttojoinupwith11thPzDandelementsofLAH;togethertheywouldforcethePselRiver,destroyingtheremnantsofthe31stTC.WiththemisguidedintelthatGDwasfurtheraheadthantheyreallywere,HothlaterthatnightdecidedtosendLAH panzers back from the Solotinka area east the next morning to resume their attacktoward Prokhorovka. With the heavy tank attacks against Das Reich to the east, Das ReichpanzersthatdeployedalongsideLAHheadingfortheSolotinkaRiverhadalreadybeenorderedbacktotheTeterevinoNorthsectorfordefensivepurposesagainstthefourtankcorpsthatwereattackingalongtheirentiresector.DasReichwasfrequentlyattackedontheirwaybackeastbutwasabletorepulseeachattack.Bythistimethe2ndTCunderPopovhadnotcompletelyarrivedwithits168tanksbutwasbeingdeployedtotheleftofBurkov’s10thTCpiecemeal.The10thTC(200 tanks) driving south on the Prokhorovka road therefore had poor eastern flank support.Kravchenko’s5thGTC’s100tankswerenext,drivingtowardBelenikhinoandIasnaiaPoliana.Burdeiny’s 2nd GTC’s 140 tanks were deployed further south in the Nepkhaevo area. If thisSovietattackhadbeenbetterpreparedandcoordinatedandreadytolaunchatdaybreakitwouldhavecaughtthedefensesofLAHandDasReichlesspreparedwhiletheirarmorwasheadingforthe Solotinka. The piecemeal launch of the Soviet offensive negated much of the potential.gnk193m.vzz2m+.gnk227m.gnk203+*.It is estimated that Popov’s 2nd TC did not arrive in sector until 1350 hrs. It cannot be

overstatedthatifPopov’sforceshadbeeninplaceby0900hrstoassist10thTConitsdriveonTeterevinoNorth that itwas almost certain the Sovietswould have penetrated theLAH /DasReichlineandcausedmassivetroublefor4thPzA.gnk204.gnk193m.gnk227m.Aspartoftheplannedmajoroffensive,2ndTCalsolaunchedlateat1600hrsagainstthe2nd

SS PzC with its 169th TB and 26th TB in the lead and with 99th TB following. They wereunpreparedanddrivingblindtowardHill258.2-TeterevinoNorth-LuchkiNorth.Whenthe169thTBreachedtheKomsomoletsStateFarm,thehidingGermansambushedthemwithdug-inpanzersand mortars, inflicting heavy casualties. At the same time, the Luftwaffe was flying by andattackedthetanksonopenground.SomeoftheplanesweretheJu-87G,carryingthenew37mmcannonsthatcoulddestroyT34sbyhittingtheenginecompartmentandignitingthefuel.WithoutSovietfighters,theGermanshadfreeaccesstothetanks.Theremnantsof169thTBwhichmadeittoHill258.2,aswellastherestof2ndTC,fellbacktoIarZaslonnyiorStalinskoeStateFarmwhentheadvancestalledinlargemeasuretotheeffectiveairattacks.Thestrengthofthisday’sattack, especially after the large losses suffered yesterday, startled Hausser. He immediatelyrecalled thecombatgroupsofbothLAHandDasReich, fightingon theirwestern flankagainst31stTC,backtotheiroriginalpositionstotheeast.vzz145++.pck68+.

The169thTBof2ndTCattackedsouthoftheKomsomoletsStateFarmnearHill258.2whereTigersintheleadsawthemattackingandstartedfiringbeforetheT34scouldshootback.Stukaswereintheareaandflewinattackingthetanksaswell,havingnoSovietfighterstocontendwith.GermanartilleryonnearbyHill224.5aswellasHill258.2alsocontributed.At1800hrstheairattackescalatedwithevenmoreJu88sandJu87sattacking,forcingthetankerstofallback.Withfightingthathadfiringfromalldirections,chaosreigneduntilafterdark.WhensomeoftheSoviettankersfellbacktothewoodsneartheStateFarmotherswereable,withthehelpoftheinfantry,toestablishasmallpositiononthesoutheasterncornerofHill258.2.TheSSexpectinganotherattackduring thenight started erectinggreater defenseson thehill. vzz143+. vzz147+. vzz153.vzz8m.vzz330+.vzz7m.dgk135.HavingjustlostTeterevinoSouth,DasReichregroupedandproceededtoadvancetowardthe

village.FortyT34srolledoutofthevillageonafrontalattack.Quickrecoverybyartilleryandanti-tankgunsalongwithaircrafthelpedthepanzersdestroy11tanksandrepulsetheattack.FourotherStukasweresentoutonasecondwavetothenorthofTeterevinotoattackSovietsthatwereassembling. The Luftwaffe did lose three planes in both engagements.WhileDas Reich wasdefendingitselffromthisattack,threebattalionssupportedbytwelveT34swereattackingtowardnearbyLuchkifromSabachevski.HaussersentabattalionandafewpanzersfromSSTKtoLuchkitosupportthelocalgarrison.Duringtheseengagements,Germanartillerywasbroughtclosertothe line and started shelling Vyselyi and Ternovka, near the Lipovyi Donets River, where theSovietswereassembling.fkk141+.fkk322m+.gnk205.gnk193m.TheSSTKwaslessthanamileeastofHill209.5andonemilesouthwestofVisloeandwas

engagedwithSoviet tanksof26thGTBovercontrolof thehill.TheGermanpressurewas toogreatwhenthe3rdPzRshoweduptosupportthegrenadiersandtheT34sbeganfallingbacktoeastofTernovka,notfarfromtheLipovyiDonetsRiver.The4thGMBwhichweresupportingthetanksfellbackalso.OtherelementsoftheStuGscrestedHill209.5tothewestandheadednorthwhile enemy tankswere firing on them fromnorthwest ofGonki.Hill 209.5was not far fromVisloe which is a mile north of Ternovka. By 1430 hrs, LAH had cleared north of BolshieMaiachkiandHill252.5,2.5milesnorthof Iablochkibut southofVasilevka.Twosmallhills,Hill 220.4 and Hill 251.2, not far from Hill 252.5 were key targets as well. A little later,elements ofSSTK counter-attacked a Soviet group of tanks southwest ofVisloe and destroyedmost of the 25 attackers. The many local armor attacks throughout the day were not overtlysuccessful but they did slow the 2nd SS PzC’s advance. fkk140+. fkk319m. vzz283. vzz143.kuz195.ztc269.The31stTCreinforcedwiththe192ndTBfoughtalldaywiththeSSTKandLAH.By1500hrs,

theGermanshadpushedthe237thTBof31stTCbacktoKochetovka.Elementsofthe86thTB,59thTR(apartof1stTA)wereintheareaanddeployednextto31stTC.Renewedresistancebythe Soviets prevented SSTK from establishing a bridgehead on the northern banks of the Pselwhentheforwardunitsof10thTCarrived.The10thTCwastransferredfromSteppeFront.Thepanzers of Das Reich along with elements of Der Führer had made it most of the way toKochetovkawhen the 31st TC retreated to the north. By the end of the day, theGermans hadadvanced about five miles. This rate of advance was far behind Hoth’s estimate of reachingOboyan by the 7th at the latest. Vatutin estimated the Germans lost 129 panzers on this day.

dgr216.zow149.Up tillnow theprimaryaxisofattack for4thPzAhadbeen towardOboyanbut therewasa

possibilitythat themainaxiscouldshifteast towardthecorridornext toProkhorovka.MarshalVasilevskydiscussedwithGeneralVatutinaboutredeployingsomeofhisforcestoblocksuchapossibility.wwf90.ThePzAbt2,onthenorthernflankoftheadvanceof2ndSSPzC,reachedthesouthernbendof

thePselRiver.ThebattalionofTigersstormedthevillageofProkhorovkaandthenforceditswayintoKrasnyiOktiabr on the southern banks of the Psel.During the brief struggle, some of theSoviettankshadgottenpasttheTigerscreen,headingsouthandreachingthevillageofIablochkitoharassthegarrisonthere.TheLAHandflankingDasReichcolumnsofpanzersadvancingsouthofthePzAbt2towardKochetovkawereattackedbytheRedAF,slowingtheirpaceastheyhadto defend themselves again. The Soviets also lost numerous T34s today going up against theTigers.At1230hrs,theDasReichdiscoveredanotherlargeconcentrationoftanksinthewoodseastofIasnaiaPolianawhichslowedSSDR’sadvance.Another formationofSoviet tanksfrom5th GTC attacked and penetrated the thin German positions in Kalinin and made it to theOzerovski area.German artillery stopped their advance and forced themback to their startingpoint. They lost sevenT34s in the engagement. The reinforcementsVatutin ordered to the linewere nowbeing felt by theGermans and their advancewas clearly slowingdown.ThemajoroffensiveVatutinhadintendeddidnotmaterializebuttheSoviettankersstillsucceededinseverallocalpenetrations.Evenwhenthecoordinatedarmoredoffensivewasconsideredover,theSovietcorps along the Lipovyi continued to launch local attacks. fkk137. gnk193m dgk130m. vzz3m.zow148.Elements of the LAH cleared resistance from Bolshie Maiachki and nearby villages which

were defended by the 31st TC during the day. Later in the day but before dark, LAH nearTeterevinoattemptingtoregroupafteratoughdaywasattackedprobablybyelementsof5thGTCandinfantrysupportofthe183rdRD.Panzerswerequicklydispatchedaswellasanairraidbythe Luftwaffe. The battle was joined for most of the night; the new panzers and air attacksdestroyed a number of Soviet tanks but the Soviets were still able to penetrate the Germandefenses and rout LAH’s supply depot in the rear. The Soviets were eventually pushed back.DuringtheafternoontheSSTKpushed31stTC’sflankbackpastGresnoeandpushedontowardthePselRiver.DasReichhadtocovertherightflankofLAHnearTeterevino.dgk134.dgk124m.wdk140.gnk193m.gnk227m.zrl221.TheprincipleobjectiveHausserwastryingtoachieveincludeda2ndSSPzClinkupwith48th

PzCatSukho-Solotino inorder to assist in clearing the southernbanksof thePsel and then toestablishabridgeheadon theother side.TheSovietcounteroffensiveprevented thatobjectivefrombeing fully realizedaswellas threatening tobreach theTeterevinoNorth-IasnaiaPolianasector that was being defended by the infantry of LAH andDas Reich. This lack of successoccurredevenwithheavysupportoftheRedAirForce.Kravchenko’s5thGTCandBurdeiny’s2ndGTCsufferedheavycasualties for their effort.The4thPzA reporteddestroying212 tankstoday.dgk134+.dgk124m.dgr89.AftertheunsuccessfulstruggleforGresnoeandnearbyVeselyiwhichlastedpastdark,theLAH

fell back to near Luchki North, about three miles south to reduce the exposure to its flanks.

Learningthatthisvillagewasnottaken,Hothorderedthe2ndSSPzCtogodefensiveforthenextmorningtoregroup.The2ndSSPzCwassupposedtofightitswaytothesouthbankofPselbytheendofthedaybutwhileareconbattalionmadetheobjective,therestofthedivisionwasstillat least six miles from the river. The LAH was also to reestablish a link with 11th PzD atKochetovka,westofKozlovkaontheSolotinkaRiver,andSSTKwastoclearallSovietssouthofthe Psel from Kozlovka, just west of Vasilevka. The 167th ID was tasked to close the gapbetween48thPzCandthe2ndSSPzC.ThepanzersfromtheSSTKweretobepulledbackandmaintainedfortheupcomingbattleforProkhorovoka,whileitsinfantryweretocrossthePselandestablishabridgeheadonthenorthernbank.Theinfantrymovedintoattackpositionsduringthenight and at first lightwould force the river.wdk145+. hjj121m. dgr209m. fkk137. vzz187++.vzz8m.gnk227m.At1800hrs,theinfantryofDasReich reachedIasnaia-Poliana,about tenmilessouthwestof

Prokhorovka,butranintostrongresistanceattherailroadeastoftown.By2000hrsthesituationstabilizednearthetownbutDasReichhadtosendanassaultgunbattaliontoreinforcetherightflankwhichwasstillhavingtrouble.wdk140.Hausserandhispanzersof2ndSSPzCwouldbedelayedinmeetingupwith48thPzCnearthe

SolotinkaRiver becauseKempfGroup, fighting east of theNorthernDonetsRiver,was beingweighed down by fierce resistance by 7th GA and 69thArmy and 3rd PzC could not protectHausser’srightflank.Hausserhadtoinvesttoomanyofhisforcesontheflankswhichweakenedhis forwardmovement.Kempfwas trying to get around the stubborn 81stGRDand ambush itfromtherearbutthatwasnotgoingwelleither.dgk135+.Atdusk,asmallgroupofT34sbrokeawayfromthemainbattleandheadedforVisloe,which

SSTK panzers were holding. The two sides started firing on each other when a squadron ofGermanattackplanescameinandstrafedtheT34s.Severalofthetanksweredestroyedandtheremainder immediately pulled back.After darkSoviet planes came overVisloe and, using theburning buildings as beacons, zeroed in on German positions, inflicting some damage on theenemy.Hausser received orders to haveSSTK on the road by first light and to reassemble atLuchkiSouth.gnk210.gnk193m.vzz3m.gnk227m.With most of the panzers of LAH andDas Reich moving toward the Solotinka River, the

remainingTigersandassaultgunsstayedintheTeterevinoNorthareawhereSovietresistancethelasttwodayshadincreased.At1800hrssouthwestofHill252.2twoTigerswereambushedbyagroupofassaultgunsand thoughafewof theT34sweredestroyed,bothTigersreceived trackdamageandwereunabletomove.Arecoverycaravanwasquicklydispatchedduringtheensuingbattletobringthemback;theremainingpanzersandassaultgunsintheareapulledbackandwentdefensiveafterdisengagingfromtheSoviettanks.zrl222.With the 2nd SSPzC trying to thrust forward over the Psel into the rear sectors of 1st TA,

Vatutin,recognizingthedangersentthe2ndGTCfromthewoodsnearGostishchevotorepeatthecounter-attack on the flank and rear of 2nd SS PzC.Vatutinwas not only trying to reduce thepressure on 1st TA but also cut off theGermans’ supply line. The SS PzCwas surprised andunpreparedfortheambushandwouldhavebeenindeeptroublebut theLuftwaffecame inandcausedmuchdamage to theSoviet tanksbefore theycould reach theoutnumberedpanzers.The31stTC’s linehadbeenpenetratedand its forceswere fallingbackwithoutpermission.When

Khrushchev,thepoliticalofficerof1stTA,heardthishewenttoKatukovwithanorderthatallforceswouldstandanddieifneededortheywouldbeshot.IftheGermansgotbehind1stTAthenitcoulddestroyitandOboyanandmaybeevenreachKursk.KhrushchevthenwenttoVatutintohavereinforcementssent.Khrushchev was a miner before the revolution but converted quickly being in favor of the

ideology ofCommunism.Hewas born inKalinvoka in 1894whichwas located in theKursksalient so he was another local boy fighting for his home and country. He was a politicalcommissarfrom1941to1944andwasnotafraidtopushVatutinwhenitwascalledfor.Afterthewar he remained actively in politics and in 1955 after Stalin died took over the reins of thecountryandleaditfornearlyadecadeduringtheColdWaryears.ShortlyaftertheCubanMissileCrisishewasoustedfrompowerin1964byBrezhnevwhotookover.HediedrelativelypooronSept11,1971justoutsideofMoscow.fkk145+.pck68.pck75+.rc198.lck284.wwf90.vzz3m.vzz5m.zmb274.zow150.Earlier in the day,Burdeiny’s 2ndGTCwas deployed nearGostishchevo to blockKempf’s

forcesfrommeetingupwith2ndSSPzC,butVatutinorderedthetankerstoshift90degreesandattacktherightflankof2ndSSPzCandthe167thID.Fordaysthe167thIDwouldbehithardtoreducetheirsupportto2ndPzCmovingforward.Asthe2ndGTCclearedthewoodsandcameoutintotheopenstillafewmilesfromengagingtheGermans,theLuftwaffeflyingbyandlookingfor opportunities dived onto the tanks and inflicted heavy casualties, destroying 50 tanks andcausing Burdeiny to cancel the operation. These Soviet tanks had been undiscovered by theground forces and if they had been able to attackwould have caused heavy casualties on theGermans.The2ndSSPzCreportedwiththehelpoftheLuftwaffe,destroying212tanksthatday.That brought the total to 502 since the start.mhz276++. bt86.wwf90. fkk140. vzz5m.pck76+.zow150++.The10thTCandthe3rdMDcontinuedtoattackSSTKafterdark.Since7/5,the2ndSSPzC

had lossesof202panzers leaving249capableof fighting thenextmorning.Butwith repairedpanzersthatwerebroughtbackforthenextdaythenumberjumpedto272panzers.mhz294.At 2030 hrs Hausser ordered the 2nd PzGR, the bulk of which was deployed near Luchki

South, to immediatelymovenorth to theTeterevinoNorth area to safeguard thenew line fromroamingbandsofshocktroopslookingforaweaknessintheline.DasReichwashavingtroubleandGeneralHausserwasforcedtoexpandLAH’ssectortojustsouthofTeterevinoNorth.OntheotherLAHflank,the1stPzGRwasorderedtomovefurtherwestandcoverSukhnoSolotino.AtnightMajGeneralWischmovedhisHQnorthtowithinthreemilessouthofIakovlevo.zrl222+.Lateatnight,StavkaattachesRotmistrov’s5thGTAtoVatutin’sVoronezhFrontwhilethe5th

GTAwasmovingintoassemblyareasnearStaryiOskolforthetripwestduringtheearlymorningof7/9.TheywouldthenmoveonProkhorovkawiththeir630tanks.Bakharov’s18thTCwasalsoattachedto5thGTA.ThesetankswoulddeployeastofOboyantothenortheastofProkhorovkaassoonaspossible.Inlessthanthreedaysthearmycovered150miles.Zhadov’s5thGAbecameundercontrolofVoronezhFrontandwouldmoveintoprotectthePselRiverinfrontof5thGTA.TopreventtheLuftwaffefromdestroyingthetankcolumn,StalinsentaircoverthewholewaytoProkhorovka from theOskolRiver area. Itwould take5thGAuntil 7/10 to deploy in front ofProkhorovka; the 5th GTA would be a little later. The 5th GTA would assemble in the

Priznachnoe region, sixmiles eastofProkhorovka.TheSoviet third lineofdefense ran just infrontofthetowntoandalongthePselRiver.Tosoftenupthe4thPzA,theSovietAFflewmanymissions. Also the rest of 2nd TC was called up to the same location. Stavka hoped thesereinforcements would prevent the Germans from reaching Oboyan and ruining their thirddefensivebelt,whichwasholdingupwithonlyseveralpenetrations.Inthenorth,itwasdecidedby Stavka that Rokossovsky did not need any further help in stopping Model’s 9th Army.dgk138+.wdk139vzz160++.vzz166+.vzz182.gnk220.gnk227m.cbk67.zro206+.At night Vatutin, realizing that the Germans were heading for Prokhorovka, began sending

forces to the sector. The 10th TC under Burkov was sent to the left flank of 1st TA nearestProkhorovka.The5thGTCwasorderedtoredeployfromtheirTeterevino-KomsomoletslineandheadnorthwesttodefendthecorridorwestofProkhorovka.Tostrengthentheriversectorfurther,Vatutinorderedthe5thGMCtodefensivepositionsinthePsel-ZapseletsRiversectorontherightflankofwherethe18thTCwouldassemble.The18thTCdeployedalongthenorthernbankofthePselfromVeselyi-Polezhaev-PrelestnoetothesouthernedgeofAleksandrovski.ThiscouldhavebeenanerroronVatutin’sparttomovethesethreecorpsinthismanner,weakeningthedefensesdirectlysouthofProkhorovkainfavorofthelinefurtherwest.OtherredeploymentsoccurredaswellneartheDonetsRiverarea.Vatutinfiguredhiscurrentforcescouldandwouldholdback4thPzAforacouplemoredaysuntil5thGAand5thGTAfullyarrived todestroyhisenemy.TheLAHandDasReichhadtobeslowedandpreventedfromcapturingtheimportantrailstationuntilreinforcements arrived, but were these deployments the correct response? vzz177*. vzz8m.vzz1m.gnk193m.gnk227m.Tostrengthenthe7thGAsector,Vatutinorderedthe49thRCof69thArmyto7thGA.At2200

hrs,Vatutinorderedthe183rdRD(69thArmy)toredeployfromtheVinogradovka-Novoselovka(east)-Shipy line to the Prokorovka rail line running in the Komsomolets-Iasnaia Poliana-Teterevinoline.wwf92.After dark Stalin called Vatutin with orders to stop 4th PzA’s advance now, for the major

counteroffensivetocaptureOrelwasdependentonboth9thArmyand4thPzAbeingexhaustedand incapable of any further advance. The consequences of failing to stop 4th PzAwas wellunderstoodbyVatutin.wdk146.To sum up the day’s results of the Soviet armor offensive: At 1000 hrs, the major Soviet

counteroffensiveofficiallybeganwiththeobjectiveofsplittingupandencirclingthe2ndSSPzCbut thefightingactuallybeganearlierwhenthese tankcorpshad todefend themselvesfromtheGermanpreemptiveattack.ThisSovietoffensivewasquicklyplanned,poorlyreconnoitredandpoorlycoordinated.Theunitcommandershadlittletimetoprepareortoregroupfromthelossesof theprevious twodays and the twonewcorpshad togo intobattle from themarchwithnopreparationatall.Besides,theattackwasprematurefortheGermanswerestilltoostrongandtoowellentrenchedtobedefeatedandthesituationfortheSovietsbecamefurtherconfusedwhentheSS preempted their attack. By 1500 hrs the 5th GTC had recaptured Kalinin and reached theOzerovski-ScbachevskilineandahillsouthofSobachevski.The2ndTCtotherightof5thGTCand the 2nd GTC on the left were unprepared and delayed their attack, failing to exploit thesuccessof5thGTC,andmadenogains.The10thTChadinflictedpainandcasualtiesbutfaileditsobjectivesaswell.Thesuccessthatoccurredwouldbetheresultofthedeterminationofthe

combat troops that were supporting the tanks and the tankers that started on time. vzz140++.vzz7m.zow149.By the end of the day, the 2nd SS PzC had reached the following line: LAH reached the

Kochetovka-TeterevinoNorthroadandwaswellonitswayinsecuringthegroundbetweenthetwoimportantvillages.ItalsocoveredthegroundfromTeterevinoNorthsouthtoOzerovski.DasReichhadformedalinefromOzerovskisouthwardtoalittlewayssouthofTeterevinoSouth.TheSSTKtookoverfromheretoTernovkajustwestoftheLipovyiDonetsRiver.TheSShadbeenmoving to the northeast following the Belgorod-Prokhorovka highway but Hoth, despite theincreasingresistance in frontofLAH,wouldordermostof thepanzersofLAH andevenorderDas Reich to resume its northwest trek the following day and secure all the ground to theSolotinkaRiverinordertoreducethepressureon11thPzD’sexposedrightflank.Thisshifttothewest has been criticized for it slowed the momentum of the LAH toward Prokhorovka forbasicallytwodays.TherewerealternativechoicesbutHothwasapparentlyblindtothem.Withthe4thPzAsofarbehindscheduleandtheSovietdefensesomuchtoughertocrackthanexpected,it was wrong of Hoth to continue his diverging attack toward both Oboyan to the west andProkhorovokatotheeast.Whenyouaddtheextremetrouble3rdPzCwashavingtotheequation,itmadesensetocontractthebattlezonenotexpandit.Inmyopinionitisviablethat48thPzCand52ndICshouldhavecontracted theirattackzone, shiftingeastward tostrengthen thierdefensesandtoassisttheSSanywayitcouldinsteadofindependentlymovingalongtheOboyanroad.Orinsteadofcontractingthewesternflank,Hothcouldhavecontracted3rdPzCsectorclosertotheDonetsRivers,althoughitwasgettinglateinthecampaignforthatmeasure.Contractingandnotexpanding48thPzCsectorwouldhavebeeneasierandsafertoaccomplishandwouldhavemadeunnecessary this impromptu trek to theSolotinkaby theSSarmor.The twodays theSSarmorspent in the Solotinka area could have been better spent in forcing the Psel and entering theProkhorovkacorridoraheadofthe5thGTA’sarrival.ThisactionbyHothwouldseemtosignifythat he was unaware of the 5th GTA’s movement toward Prokhorovka. If Hoth had known, itwouldhavebeenmorelogicaltoestablishabridgeheadnorthofthePsel-OSF-Prokhorovkaline,allowinghis2ndSSCorpstodefenditselfandmakingitasdifficultaspossiblefor theSovietreinforcementstoassaultthem.Thissideexcursionisanotherindicationthat4thPzA’sfrontwastoowide.wdk138+.gnk193m.vzz8m.Atnight,LtGeneralTrierenberg’s167thIDmoveduptheBelgorod-Kurskraillinetotheright

of 2nd SS PzC, under the protection of heavy artillery fire from the 238thArtilleryRegimentsituated on high ground near Luchki South. With the Germans holding this sector, it enabledHaussertopushhisbattalionsnorthwardstowardthePselRiver.rc201.dgk94.dgr209m.pck77.HausserreportedtoHoththathiscorpshad121panzersthatwereeitherdestroyedordamaged

to thepoint theyhad tobepulled from the field for long termrepair.Healso reported thathiscorps did not have compensating gains today for those casualties though there were a fewimportantones.GeneralHausserhadbeen2ndSSPzC’sfirstcommanderwhenitwasformedinJuly1942.ThedivisionwasoriginaldeployedinFrancebuttransferredtotheEasternFrontinearly1943whereitparticipatedinthebattleforKharkov.vzz155.zsm261.The80,000menof5thGAunderZhadovstartedarrivingatthePselRiverfromaforcedmarch

of70milestotakepartintheProkhorovkabattle.Itwouldtakeuntilthefollowingnightbefore

thebulkofthetwocorpswereinplace.Theywoulddefenda20milesectorbetweenOboyanandProkhorovka. Other armies were being repositioned between Oboyan and Kursk in case of abreakthrough.je106.dgk139.vzz167.TheSSTK spentmuchof theday trying to redeploy from theLipovyiDonets area to the left

flankofLAHinordertoforceacrossingofthePselandscreenLAH’sleftflankwhenitmadearunonProkhorovka.Thepreparations tomovenorthwestweregoingveryslowlydue toheavyattacksthatwereaimedatSSTK.WhenSSTKdidleavethenextday,thepartial167thIDfounditdifficulttomaintainthelineandDasReichwasforcedtoassist.Thetransferwasmeantforthisdaybutwiththerepeatedattacksthechangeoverwasnotpossible.Bytheendofthedayon7/9whenLAHandDasReichwerenorthandnortheastofBelenikhinoStation,theleadunitsofSSTKwouldalmosthavecaughtuptotheleftflankofLAH.lck282.kcz169.snk20.Bytheendoftheday,theSovietshadmobilizedmanyoftheirreservesbutoperablefrontline

tanksweredowndramaticallyuntil5thGTAarrived.Theywereweakeningandyetthefrontlinewouldnotretreat,knowingmorereserveswerecoming.Despitethemodestresultsofhisarmorattackonthisday,Vatutinstillwantedtoincreasedthenumberofcounter-attackstoweakentheenemy further. The narrow salient Hoth was excavating captivated Vatutin; he was sure thateventually itwould crumble, especiallywhen5thGAand5thGTAarrived.Thatday’s attackswhichincludedsevenSoviettankcorpswerenearlyonthescaleandvoracityofthecomingtankbattleof7/12butsinceitdidnotproducetheresultsof theotherattack, it’snotnearlyaswellremembered. It did however exhaust the Soviet tank corps, allowing the 4th PzA to gain keygroundinthenextseveraldayswhentheyresumedtheirattackinthemorning.fkk84.vzz155.German intelligence discovered a series of large columns of tanks and trucksmovingwest

towardProkhorovka.OthertankconcentrationswerealreadyassemblingatKochetovka,GresnoeandSolotinka.Knowingthis,HausserpulledbackLAHfromthenorthernsalientithadcarvedoutuntilSSTKandDasReichcaughtup.The4thPzAmadefewergainsthatday;theimpactofthoseSoviet reinforcementswasbeginning tobefelt.TheSovietcounterswerestrengtheningand theGermanswere being forced to eithermake a tactical retreat or go defensive. The 1st TAwasbecomingmoreaggressive,with3rdMCand6thTClaunchinglargerandmorefrequentattacks.The 5thGTC and 2ndGTC had been attacking also, with less success but still at great cost.fkk143+.Hothreportedanother125panzershadbeendestroyedorseverelydamagedtoday,bringingthe

totaltojustover400.Itwasalsoreportedthatanother300Soviettankshadbeendestroyedorcaptured.The2ndSSPzCclaimed tohavedestroyed183of those tanks, bringing its four-daytotal to401.TheGermansgainedvery littleground todaybut still leviedaheavypriceon theSoviets.mhz267.lck311.wdk141.Withthedeterminedeffortsof thecounter-attackfromelementsof the2ndTC,2ndGTCand

5th GTC, it had prevented 2nd SS PzC from gaining much ground or achieving many of itsobjectives.Thefollowingday,whenthesetankersstayedonthedefensive,the2ndSSPzCwouldgainfromthreetoeightmiles.vzz259.VonManstein, through recon photos, became aware of the large numbers of tanks thatwere

movingsouthtowardthePselRiver.ForexampleRotmistrov’s5thGTAarrivedattheirassemblyarea near Stary Oskol early that morning and would be still heading west for another day.

Zhadov’s5thGAwasbeingredeployedtosupportthe5thGTAwhenitwasreadytoattacknearProkhorovka. It isnot clear if this sightingwas5thGTAmoving toProkhorovkaoroneof thecorpswhichwas already in sector but being redeployed.The 5thGTAwas still east of StaryOskolwhenthesightingwasmadesounlesstheaerialreconpatrolwasconsiderablyfarthereastthanusualthenitwasprobablyacorpsredeployingtothewestofProkhorovka.ThefactthattheLuftwaffeknewofthisconcentrationoftanks,whether5thGTAorsomeothercorps,anddidnotinterdictitproveshowshorthandedtheLuftwaffereallywas.mhz279.aaa124m.In the last threedaysoffighting,4thPzAandGroupKempfhadfought theirwaythroughthe

firstandseconddefensebeltsandwereinthesixtoeighteenmilezonebetweenthesecondandthirddefensebelt.ProgressonthisdaywasbetterthaninthepreviousdaysforKempfbuttheyhadtraveledonly13or14milesfromtheirstartlineandstillhadover60milestoreachKursk.Inthefirstfourdays,theSovietshadbroughtupmanyreinforcementsandhadseventankcorpsandevenmorebrigades.Theyhad lost500 tanksbut stillhad1500more tanks topreventvonMansteinfromreachingKurskwithevenmoreforcescoming.VatutinstillhadmorethanHothandHothhadlostsomeTigerswhichdegradedhisspearheadattacks.VonMansteinwasunawareofthese forces and believed he still had a chance to reach Kursk. It just would not happen.wdk143+*.AtTeterevino,aGermancrew,pickinguptheirrepairedTiger,wasjustintimetodefendthe

villageagainstanattackof40T34s.ThisoneTigerdestroyed22T34sbetweenseveralattacksbeforetheSovietsfellback.WhentheAProundswereexpended,StaudeggerstartedusingHE.There was a waiting list of 100more panzers in this sector that were being repaired as fastpossible,butinmanycasesthecrewshadtowaitfordaystogettheirmachinesback.ThoughtheGermanswere fortunate to have recovered all those panzers, itwas still a hardship fighting acampaign,awaitingtheuseofthose100panzers.mhz268.agk103+.sgf346.It isestimated that in the last twodays theLuftwaffe flew1481sortieswhile theSovietAF

flew2,600.AccordingtoNiklasZetterlinginKursk1943,thesesortienumbersarelowandthattheGermannumberwasaboutthesameastheSovietnumber.lck315+.Bytheendoftheday,LAHhadonly57workingpanzers,mostofthemwereMkIVs.TheTiger

battalionattachedtoLAHcommandedbyKlingwasdowntoitslastworkingTiger.Wittmannwasinchargeofit.Tenwereintherepairshop.gnk228.Inthesouthernsalient,the8thFliegerCorpsreporteddestroying43planes,84tanks,5guns,2

rocketlaunchersand40vehicles.Another21tanksweredamagedbutrecoverable.cbk67.TheVVSreportedflying1,185sortiesinthesouthernsalient.Thiswasadropof350sorties

from the day before. TheLuftwaffe reported flying 1,686 sorties, a drop of only 143. cbk64.nzk77.Bytheendofthedayandafterfivedaysofheavyfighting,theleadunitsof48thPzCand2nd

SSPzChadeachcarvedoutasalientintotheSovietlineabout18mileswideand12milesdeep.It covered from the salient 48th PzC hadmade at Verkhopenie in the west toLAH’s that hadalmostreachedtheKomsomoletsStateFarmandincludedGresnoeandMalyeMaiachki.WiththepanzerraidthatsawLAHandDasReich’spanzersmoveto thenorthwest towardtheSolotinkaRiver,LAH’s salienton thewestexpanded.Hothhadscheduled inhisplans tobeeven furtheralongthanthisattheendofthefirstorperhapsseconddayasaworstcasescenario.Hothand

vonMansteinwerereallyworriedatthispointthatthecampaignwouldfail.wwf90.Duringthepredawnhours,theVVSflew275sortiesinthesouthernsalient.Theattacks,which

includedbiplanes,attackedalong theDonetsandPenaRivers.At thePena, thepontoonbridgeerectedby3rdPzDengineerswasdestroyedwhichdramaticallyslowedthatdivision’sclearingoftheresistanceinthebend.cbk62.VerkhopeniewasalongslendervillagethatranalongtheeasternbankofthePenaRiver.Since

italsohadaheavybridgeacrosstheriver,bothsideswantedtocontrolthevillage.TheSovietshadturnedthesleepylittlevillageintoastrongpointthatclearlywouldnotbeeasytotake.TherewasanextensivetrenchsysteminfrontofitandaPakfrontdefendingit,aswellasmanytanksfrom 1st TA dug-in on the western bank of the river to stop the Germans. The 3rd PzD andelementsofGD broughtup their ownartillery,Panthers andotherpanzers to takeVerkhopenieaway from the defenders. The Germans would eventually wrestle the village away but in theprocess of fighting thebridgewouldbedamaged and the engineers of 39thEngineerBattalionwouldhavetoworkthroughoutthenighttohavethebridgereadyforpanzersandtruckstocrossinthemorning.wwf89.pck71.Earlyinthemorning,GeneralHoth’s4thPzAresumeditsadvancealongthemainroadtoward

Oboyan to reach the Syrtsevo-Gresnoe area beforeVatutin could bring up additional reserves.TheGDadvancednorthwardalongtheeasternbankofthePenaRiverwhile3rdPzDfollowedonGD’s immediate left flank.The3rdMCattackedGDwith fortyT34s in the leadbut theattackwas repulsed, destroying ten tanks before theywere in firing range. Later, 6thTC’s 112thTBarrivedandattackedtheGermanpositionbutfailedtodislodgethemaswell.The200thTBof6thTC was stationed two miles to the northeast at Krasnaia Poliania, one mile northeast of theOboyan road,waiting forordersbutwasnotbrought in for this engagement.That nightSovietreserveswouldbebroughtup toOboyan. je103.hjj121m. lck284.dgr209m.gnk214.gnk227m.pck70.While themain forceofGD headed directly towardSyrtsevo,Hausherr’s company of tanks

screenedtheirflank.Notrealizingit,thesefourpanzersdroveintoatrapsetupbySoviettankshiding from plain view.Withinminutes all four panzerswere destroyed and LtHausherrwaskilled.Alittlelater,theRemerGroupbrokeawayfromtherestofGDandheadednorth,aimingto reach the Oboyan road. Though attacked from the air, the little ground resistance north ofSyrtsevo,affordedaquickadvanceuntiltheywerewithinsightofthehighwayandapproachingHill241.1,twomileseastofVerkhopenie.Thisareawasdefendedbythe192ndTBand200thTBanduponsighting,thepanzersattackedtheenemyheadon.gnk214+.gnk193m.Syrtsevo,ontheeastbankofthePenaanddefendedby6thTCand90thGRD,wasattackedby

GD again but the line initially held.Another attackwas launched from the south and east thatbrokeintothevillagearoundnoonwiththehelpof6thPzRof3rdPzD.By1330hrs,thevillagewascleared.AtthesametimeanothergroupoftheGDdivisionadvancedtowardVerkhopeniebywayofGremuchi.OncenorthofGremuchi, theGDwas ambushed by 50Soviet tanks.As thebattle raged, additional panzers were ordered to the area to give urgent support. The panzersmade it toHill230.5, eastofSyrtsevo,butwere struckagainbyanewgroupofSoviet tanks.WiththehelpoftheLuftwaffe, thisGermancolumnmadeitintoVerkhopeniebutit lostpanzersfromSovietfireofthe200thTBfromthewestbankofthePenaandfellback.Beingintheopen,

thereturningLuftwaffeplanesdestroyedmanyoftheseSoviettanks.dgk131+.dgk95m.hjj121m.dgk222m.dgr209m.fkk267+.dgr217.gnk193m.gnk227m.At0530hrs,GDand3rdPzDweredrivingnorthtowardthefortifiedvillageofSyrtsevo.Two

panzerformationswereheadingnorth: thefirstgroupwasheadingstraightforSyrtsevoandtheother group forHill 230.5, just to the east of the village.Defending the area that both panzerformationswouldmeetupagainstwerethe3rdMC(1stMB,3rdMB),6thTC(112thTB,200thTB)and90thGRDwhowereputtingupfierceresistance.Tohelptheattack,theLuftwaffewasgiving close support.Waves of 50planes eachwere coming in every30minutes attacking themanydug-in tanks,MGnests andbunkers thatweredeployed to the east andwestof thePenaRivertodefendVerkhopenieandSyrtsevo.EvenwiththeairsupporttheGDdivisionwastakingterrible casualtieswhile gaining ground slowly.Allmorning the fighting continued and itwasnearingnoonwhenGDenteredthevillageandanother90minutesofstreetfightingtoclear thevillage.Theairwarover the fortifiedvillageofSyrtsevoheatedupwhenaRed fightergroupcame

flyingin,lookingforawaytostopthemassivelossestheGermanplaneswerecausing.Germanescorts saw theSovietplanesandvectored to intercept.Soviet fighters,althoughoutnumbered,shot down five Stukas and one Bf 109while losing even greater numbers before they had toevacuate the area, leaving the skies to the Germans.With improved Soviet planes and betterpilots,theJu-87wasshowingitsageandwouldbeusedlessinthefutureontheEasternFront.WhenVatutin realizedSyrtsevowouldprobably fall, heorderedelementsof the38th and40thArmiesunderMoskalenkotomoveeastandattack48thPzC’swesternflank inorder toreducepressureonSyrtsevo.TheremainderofthetwoarmieswouldmovenortheastofSyrtsevotoinfrontofthePselRiveralongwiththefading6thGAtostopthefrontalattackby48thPzC.Theywouldnotbe inplaceuntil thenextmorning.mhz267++.dgr221m.dgr209m. fkk137. fkk319m.gnk214.cbk62.The48thPzCwasfinallyabletolinkupwithLAHatIakovlevowhilethe3rdPzCwasstill

miles behind, causing an exposed right flank for the 2nd SS PzC which the Soviets wereexploiting.lck282.Mickl’s11thPzDresumeditsadvancelaterthanusualthatmorning.Ithadstoppedafterdark,

buildingadefenseforthenightbetweenPokrovkatotheOboyanroad,eastofSyrtsevo.GDwasonitsleftandLAHwasonitsright.ThepanzershadbeenatHill251.2,eastofthehighway,forthenight.Thetwopanzerregiments,110and111,straddledthehighwayasthedivisionmovednortharound1000hrs.The31stTChadmovedback to theothersideof theOboyan roadandMicklwantedtofillthevoid.GresnoewastheirnextobjectivewhichwouldhelpsupportSSTK’sleft flank as they were moving into the Psel River area. The lead units of 11th PzD reachedBolshieMaiachki,joiningupwithelementsofLAH.AsthebulkofthedivisionwasapproachingKrasnyi Poliana, 40 T34s from the 192nd TB appeared to block their path. Air recon alsodiscoveredthatadditionaltanks,probablythe112thTB,wereheadingforSyrtsevo.The167thIDcaughtuptothe11thPzDandtogethertheyadvancednorthward,pastPokrovkaandby1300hrshadreachedHill249.3.Notstopping,the11thPzDcontinuedtoadvance,tryingtoreachtheareaeast ofVerkhopenie. On the east flankwhile the rest of the divisionwas engaged, PzAbt 11headedforKrasnyiPolianawhichwasdefendedbythe192ndTB.Alsointheareawasthe49th

TBandremnantsof3rdMCthatthe11thPzDhadtobealsoconcernedabout.gnk217+.gnk219.nzk91.As11thPzDnearedVerkhopenie,travelingontheOboyanroad,Sovietresistancedramatically

increased.The192ndTB,49thTBandthe3rdMChadduginandwerewaitingfortheGermanapproach.VatutinwantedtostoptheGermanssouthofthePselandVerkhopeniewasthefirstoffourmajorstrongpointsthatwouldtrytostoptheGermanssouthoftheriver.Thepanzersandhalftracksof the leadinggroupof the11thPzDreachedHill242.1, southeastofVerkhopeniewhenSovietartilleryopeneduponthecolumn.BiggerSovietgunsstartedfiringasfarawayasIlinski,amilenortheastofVerkhopenie.Minuteslater,40T34scamedownthehilltoattackthepanzersatpointblankrange.Whilethisengagementwasgoingstrong,therestof11thPzDtriedtocomeuptothelinetostraddletheroadtohelpout.Whenitwasgettingdark,GeneralMickldecidedtowithdrawhistroopsforthenightandtryagaininthemorning.Inthelastthreedaysoffightingthe11thPzDhadlost35panzersandwerenowworkingwithonly37left.gnk219.gnk227m.The lead units ofGD were ordered to Verkhopenie to appraise the situation but because

Syrtsevowasstillunsecured,theGermanshadtogothroughGremuchitotheeast.AtGremuchiabattalionwas left to protect the bridge beforemoving on. Shortly afterwards a Soviet columnattackedfromthenortheastbutwasrepulsed,sufferingheavycasualties.MeanwhileStrachwitzwith his few remaining Panthers advanced past Hill 230.5 to the north. By eveningGD wasapproachingVerkhopenieand inbattlewith thedefenders southof thevillage.WithStrachwitzhavingtrouble,abattalionofGD thatwasleftatSyrtsevowasorderednorthtoVerkhopenietoassist. By late night with the help of the Luftwaffe, Strachwitz had taken Verkhnopenie. Thevillage,whichraninanorth-southdirectionalongthebanksof thePenaRiver,wasdifficult tocaptureandabigpartofthatsuccesswenttotheFlakBattalionofGDthatdestroyedanumberofT34sandSovietaircraftaswell.hsz124.hsz117m.gnk193m.gnk113m.gnk227m.pck70+.InanattempttostopGD, the200thTBattacked,butafteranalldayfighthadtofallback to

behindthePenaRiverwhereitstartedtodiginitstanks.Withthispullbackitlookedlikethe48thPzCwasabouttobreakthroughtodriveonOboyan.Alongwiththe200thTB,the3rdMBand49thMBof3rdMCcontinuedtogrindawayatGD.The31stTCwasalsobeingpushedbackbythe2ndSSPzCandwas tryingtobuildadefensenorthofVerkhopeneacross theOboyanroadandalongtheSolotinkaRiver,forwardofSukho-SolotinoandKochetovkatothePselRiver.The2ndTC,10thTCand5thGTCwerestillattackingthe2ndSSPzCwhichwouldgiveenoughtimefor31stTCtofinishthisnewdefenseline.Besidessendingsomeofitsforcestothewesttohelp3rdPzDand52ndIC,GDwasalsoorderedtoadvancethreemilesandcaptureHill260.8whichwouldmakeanexcellentobservationpointoverlookingtheOboyanroad.ClearlyGDwasaskedtodotoomuchandsentintoomanydirectionstoaccomplishtoomanyobjectives.Itisanotherindicationthat4thPzAdidnothavesufficientforcestogetthejobdone.Withadditionaltroopsofthe48thPzCand52ndICapproachingthePenaRiveralongtheOboyanroad,Vatutinorderedthe200thTBof6thTCandtheremainsof3rdMCandChernienko’s31stTCtofallbacknorthofthePenaRiverandalongtheSolotinkaRivertothePselRiver.TokeeppressureonHausser,the31stTC then attacked southeast fromMalyeMaiachki against the flank of 2nd SS PzC. The newlyarrived10thTCwasorderedtocontinueitsattackintheafternoonalongtheProkhorovkaroadtoward Teterevino to help neutralize LAH’s attack. dgk133. lck283. vzz139++. dgk141m.

dgk222m.fkk84+.dgr209m.gnk312m.gnk193m.kcz168.gnk227m.Inthemorning,theGDdivisionapproachedHill260.8thenwheeledwesttocoverthepanzers

ofthe3rdPzDofthe48thPzCcomingupafterbypassingVerkhopenie.Whenthepanzersweresetto attack thenearbyHill 243.0, the infantryofGD group attackedVerkhopeniewith its bridgeacross the Pena. The panzers were repulsed on the Hill while the infantrymade onlymodestinroads to the town of Verkhopenie.When the Soviets counter-attacked fromHill 243.0, theywererepulsed.AssaultgunswerebroughtuptoaidGDandafteraviciousthree-hourbattlethetownwasentered.35Soviettanksweredestroyedinthislatestengagement.SomeUSsuppliedM3tanksweredestroyed.WhileGDwas fighting forVerkhopenie,majorelementsof3rdPzDweremoving northward clearing the ground fromLukhanino toVerkhopenie to prevent SovietforcesfromexploitingthegapsinthelineandgettingbehindGD.The3rdPzDwasnotmovingfastenoughandelementsofGDwouldbetaskedtostoptheiradvanceandturnsouthtohelp3rdPzD.rc199.wwf89++.bt85.dgk222m.dgr209m.pck72.gnk219.gnk193m.gnk312m.gnk227m.fmz223.fmz222m.In addition to the 2nd GTC, 5th GTC, 2nd TC, 10th TC and 31st TC, a number of other

formationswerealsopreparingforthecoordinatedarmoroffensivethatwouldstartat1030hrsafter a 30minute preparation. The 6th TCwould launch fromwest of the PenaRiver towardIakovlevo.Tothenorthofthe6thTC,the31stTCand3rdMCmovedintotheHill260.8area,justsouthofNovoselovka,topreparefortheassault.Tothesouthof6thTC,the161stRDand71stGRD,nowattachedto40thArmy,wouldattacktotheeasttowardGertsovka.TheGermanssurprisedmanyoftheseformationsbystrikingfirstandthecoordinatedattackednevertookplace,thoughindividuallysomedidadvancewhiletheothershadtostaydefensive.Withthedifferentaxesofattack,Vatutinwashopingtosplitup4thPzAintopiecesbeforedestroyingitbutresults,duetolackofpreparationandpoortiming,wereclearlydisappointingforVatutin.ItwasmostlyVatutin’sfaultforthepoorresults.Herushedhisforces,notgivingthemtimetoprepareorreachlaunchpointontimeorcommunicatewiththeothercorps.Afewregimentsfrom38thArmywerealsotransferredtonorthofthePselRiverintheSemenovkatoGoianinoareaasreserve.Thoughthese Soviet assaults ultimately failed their primary objectives, it did have an importantsecondary benefit. While the Germans were desperately trying to break out of the seconddefensivebelttoreachthePsel,thesenumerouscounter-attackstheprevioustwodayshadcausedtheGermanstoscalebacktheirattacks todefendthemselvesagainst theSoviets.Thisfanaticalaction would be seen numerous times throughout the campaign; the Soviets, regardless of thecosts, would counter-attack on the flanks that caused the Germans to transfer forces from thenorthernfronttothesidestosavethemselves.TheGermansjustdidnothavesufficientforcesonhand in either salient to defeat the large pool of Soviet reinforcements defending a welldevelopeddefenseandthemanycounter-attacks.dgr88.dgr86m.vzz151.gnk193m.dgr127.In addition to the massive attacks by the different tank corps, the 309th RD of 40th Army

launchedanattackeastwardtocutoffthe48thPzCmarchingnorthontheOboyanroad.The309thwassupportedbythe86thTBandthe36thGMRwastomarcheastandcapturetheHill251.4,Hill240.4andHill207.8.Theattackwasnotsuccessfulandthe309thRDandtheothershadtopullbackbyeveninganddefendtheVerkhoenie-Hill261.0-SukhoSolotinolinewhilethe31stTCheldthelineeastofSukhoSolotino,KochetovkaandtheleftbankoftheSolotinkaRiver.dgr88.

dgr86m.dgk412.Infrontofthe3rdPzD,the3rdMChadregroupedandwerenowinthefollowingdeployment

from left to right: the67thGRD, the201stTB,22ndTB,112thTB, the6thMRBand the90thGRD.TheseforcesweredeployedwithinthePenaRiverbendandattemptedtoblock3rdPzDfromadvancingnorthtolinkupwithGD.fkk251.The3rdPzDadvancedinthePenabend,turnedtothesouthwestandbreachedthesectorfrom

therearinthevicinityofBerezovka,forcingtheSovietsbacktowardRakovo.Takingadvantageofthissuccess,the332ndIDcrossedthePenaRiverandcapturedtheareatothesouthernedgeofMelovoe.The332ndIDwasnotstrongenoughtoencirclethegarrisonandtheSovietsescapednorthward.DuringthisfightingtoclearthePenabend,bothdivisionswhichwereflankingbothsidesofGDfellbehindwhileGDcontinuedforward,exposingtheirflanks.A60tonbridgewasconstructedacrossthePenaatRakovowhichwascompletedonthemorningof7/11.Forthenexttwodaysthe48thPzCmovedinandclearedthewoodsnorthofthePenaRiverintheRakovo-Melovoe area. The Soviets counter-attacked at dark but were repulsed. snk81+. dgr172m.dgk222m.mhz290.AboutthreemilesnorthofSyrtsevoandnotfarfromVerkhopenie,theGermanswerebeginning

tobreakthroughthelinetoreachtheeasternoutskirtsofthevillage.Itwasdefendedbythe3rdMB,200thTBandthelatearriving180thTB,49thTBpluselementsofthe51stGRDand67thGRD.Theseuncoordinatedforcesattackedthe3rdPzDthatwerethereplustheGDthatwerejustarriving. It isclaimedtheSovietsengaged100panzers including28Tigersand inflictedheavycasualties. The 48th PzC claimed destroying 95 tanks in the engagement.On the extremewestedgeofthesalient,the52ndICwasmovingupaswellandwereatAlekseevkawhentheywereattacked by elements of 40th Army. The 332nd ID destroyed three tanks near Korovino thatbelonged to the 71st GRD. The 255th ID at Bubny were also attacked by the 161st RD.Verkhopenie,northofSyrtsevobutsouthofNovoselovka,wasonthePenaRiverandbecauseofits bridge was heavily fortified and the German advance was clearly slowing because of theincreasedresistance.Theabovenumbersforpanzerengaged,especiallytheTigersseemhighandaresuspect.wdk138.hjj121m.mhz20m.fkk86.dgr209m.pck70+.nzk91.gnk193m.gnk227m.The48thPzCresumeditsadvancenorthwardalongtheeastbankofthePenaRiverandstraight

uptheOboyanroad,pushingtheremnantsofthe3rdMCoutofthewayuntilapproachingIlinski,whenSoviet anti-tank fire stopped the advance.Despite the heavy shelling, the 3rdPzD camealongsidetheSovietsandoutflankedthem,causing3rdMCtofallbackfromtheriver.dk131.TheGDfrontadvancedalongtheOboyanhighwayfromSyrtsevotoKrasnaiaPolianasector.

Elements of the3rdPzDand11thPzD tookpart in the attacks also.LAH attacked to thewestwhileDasReichattackedmoretothenorthfromtheMalyieMaiachki-Gresnoesector.TwosmallassaultswerelaunchedintotheGresnoe-Vasilievka-Syrtsevo-Berezovkaareasinordertoprotectthe flanks of themain group. Every available panzerwas in this operation and the countwasabout400.TheGermanswerestoppedjustnorthofSyrtsevobythe112thTB,the10thMBand1stMB.The90thGRDwerequicklydispatchedtotheareaasabackup.fkk85.dgr209m.ForthebattleofSyrtsevo,40tanksattackedGDastheformationapproachedthetown.After

quicklydestroyingtentanks,theremainingT34swithdrew.Bymidday,Syrtsevohadfallentothecombine efforts of 3rd PzD and GD. After passing through Syrtsevo and while heading for

Verkhopenie,moredug-intanksfiredontheformation.Afterregroupingandwiththeaidof40thArmy, theSoviets countered, trying to retakeSyrtsevobut the attempt failed.When its infantryarrivedat1500hrsandwiththehelpofthearriving6thPzRof3rdPzDaswellastheLuftwaffe,GDwasabletofightitswayintoVerkhopeniebutatacostoflosingtwoMkIVsandseverelydamaging another.Once there,GroupStrachwitzofGD,withonlyninepanzers left, paused toregroupbeforeattemptingtotravelthelastsevenmilestothevillageofOboyan.Atthesametimethe3rdPzDwasstilltryingtoclearthewestbankofthePenaRiverbutwashavingahardtimeby itself.Other combat groupsofGD quicklymoved ahead fromVerkhopenie: one groupwastrying to capture Hill 240.8 while the other was sent toward the village of Novoselovka andnearbyHill260.8,butbothgroupswerebeingblockedbyheavyartillery.EastofHill260.8,11thPzDwaspreparing toadvanceduenorthattempting tohelpreduceresistancefor theother twocombatgroupsintheirchargenorthward.WithSyrtsevofallenandGDcontinuingtomovenorth,the Soviet defenders were forced to head west across the Pena River. With the SovietcounterattackatSyrtsevo,partsofGDwhichwerescheduledtoadvancetowardVerkhopeniehadto stay behind and defend Syrtsevo, again slowing the German advance northward. hjj118.mhz289.dgr209m.pck71.vzz427.gnk312m.gnk214+.wwf89+.gnk193m.gnk227m.By midday on this Thursday after six hours of fighting, Syrtsevo, not far from where the

StrachwitzGroupwas fighting, had fallen toGD and 3rdPzD,which hadmoved up to assist.However, a counter-attack by the 40thArmy forced the 48th PzC to sendmore panzers to thevillage.GD lostfourpanzersplusothersweredamagedinthislatestbattle.AfterawhilefortyT34sengagedtheTigersof3rdPzDandquicklytenT34sweredestroyednearHill230.5beforetherestcouldleavethefield,withdrawingtotheothersideofthePenaRiver.Verkhopenie,tothenorthandalittlewest,wasGD’snexttarget.WiththehelpoftheLuftwaffe,whichinflictedheavycasualtieson200thTB,theleadelementsofGDarrivedinthevicinityofVerkhopeniethatnight.OtherelementsofGDalongwithelementsof3rdPzDhadheadedeasttowardSyrtsevo.BeyondSyrtsevowasopengroundthatledtothethirddefensebelt.ItisestimatedthatGDstartedthedaywithonlyfortyworkingPanthersbutwiththeheavyfightingthroughouttheday,afewmoreweredown.Fortheafternoon,GDwasspreadoutfrombetweenGremuchitojustsouthofVerkhopeniewith the Soviets attacking this entire flank. Itmade it extremely difficult to defend themselvesagainstthemanyambushestheSovietsweregoodat.ThegapbetweenGDand11thPzDhadnotbeen closed and the Sovietswere taking advantage of that also. It is estimated the Strachwitzgroupdestroyed50Soviettanksthatafternoon.BytheendofthedayVerkhopeniewasstillheldbytheSoviets.wwf89.dgk131+.dgk130m.hjj118.hjj121mmhz271+.dgr209m.fkk266.pck70.lck275.lck285.hsz122+.gnk214+.In the afternoon,while thebattle forSyrtsevowas raging,other elementsofGD hadmoved

north and attackVerkhopenie, threemiles northwest ofGremuchi.After the villagewas taken,Soviettanksmaderepeatedattemptstogetitbackbutfailed.JustnorthofGremuchi,GroupFranzhad pocketed a portion of the attackers.When the pocket was cleared, Major Franz claimeddestroying53tanksandassaultguns.dgk132.hjj121m.dgk222m.dgr209m.gnk193m.gnk227m.Elements of 3rd PzD, with the help of aGD Regiment, finally took Syrtsevo, forcing the

garrison to fall back across the river. The smoke from burning tanks, grass fires and shellingreducedvisibilitytovirtuallyzero.MeanwhileotherelementsofGDwerestorminghillsfurther

northandwerenowonlysixmilesfromOboyan.Sovietreinforcementswerearrivingandtheirresistancewas slowing theGerman advance. The 3rd PzDwere also pushing the enemy backwestandnorthbetweenVerkhopenieandBerezovka.Thisareawouldseeplentyofhardfightinginthedaystocome.hjj121m.dgr209m.fkk250+.nzk91.gnk193m.gnk227m.The48thPzChadadvancedthreemilesontheOboyanroadonthisdaybutfailedtoreachits

objectivesofsecuringSchipyandcrossingthePselRiver.IthadtakenthehighgroundbetweenNovoselovkaonthewestandKochetovkaontheeastwhileforcingthe3rdMCand31stTCtoretreatnorthward.wdk147+.hjj121m.gnk191.gnk193m.gnk227m.The2ndTC, 10thTC and5thGTCwere attacking the 2ndSSPzCwhichwould give their

comradesenoughtimetofinishanewdefenselinethatincludednorthofVerkhopenieacrosstheOboyan road and along theSolotinkaRiver forward ofSukho-Solotino andKochetovka to thePsel River. dgk133. dgk141m. dgk222m. fkk84+. dgr209m. gnk312m. gnk193m. kcz168.gnk227m.vzz139+.dgk412.Upuntilaround1300hrs,the1stMBof3rdMCand112thTBof6thTCwereabletoholdthe

superiorGermanforceofStrachwitz’spanzersandinfantrybutthenhadtofallbackacrosstothewest sideof thePenaRiver.The200thTBof6thTCatKrasnyiPolianawouldalso fallbackafternumerousairattacksandweredigginginwhenanewsquadofStukasflewbyandattacked,causingfurtherdamagetothecorps.The3rdMC,alsoblockingtheOboyanroad,hadtofallbackthreemilestothenorthbutbytheendofthedaywasstillabletoholdontoHill260.8.With10thTCarrivinginsectorthatmorning,Vatutinsentelementsofthe10thTCtothetroubledsectorof3rdMCtohelpclosethegap.dgr216.gnk214+*.gnk312m.cbk64.zra62.Still advancingnorth towardOboyan, the48thPzCwas striving to reach thePselRiverbut

wascomingunderattackonits leftflankfrom6thTC.WithGDand11thPzDin the lead, theyadvanced onHill 260.8 to gain the advantage of height. 3rd PzDwas to shift to thewest andattacktheenemywestofVerkhopenie.GDwasthentoattackHill243whichoverlookedtheflankoftheSovietdefensesatthePenaRiver,takingitawayfrom6thTC.NearbyHill247.2wouldbethenextobjective.Theseengagementsweremadetoeliminatethethreattotheleftflankof48thPzC as itmoved north towardOboyan. Themoveswere timed to coincide with 2nd SS PzCconsolidatingtheiradvanceontotheProkhorovkaaxis.dgk133+.dgk222m.dgr209m.gnk193m.gnk312m.gnk227m.fmz221m.Westhoven’s 3rd PzD was still having trouble advancing against stiff resistance. Trailing

elementsofthedivisionwerestillinLukhaninoremovingthelastremnantsofresistance,whiletherestofthedivisionwasalittlefurthernorthfightingtosecureSyrtsevoandsafeguardingGD’sleftflank.TheSovietshadstrongdefensivepositionsonthewestsideofthePena,includingmanydug-intanks,thatwereclearlyhavingaslowinginfluenceonHoth’sleftflank.gnk216.gnk242+.nzk91.gnk193m.gnk227m.With additional troops of the 48th PzC and 52nd IC approaching the Pena River along the

Oboyan road, Vatutin ordered the 200th TB of 6th TC and the remains of 3rd MC andChernienko’s31stTCtofallbacknorthofthePenaandalongtheSolotinkaRivertothePsel.TokeeppressureonHausser,the31stTC,afterregrouping,thenmadealocalattacksoutheastfromMalyeMaiachkiagainst theflankof2ndSSPzC.At thesametime, thenewlyarrived10thTCwassentsouthalongtheProkhorovkaroadtowardTeterevinotoslowLAH’sadvance.dgk133.

lck283.vzz139++.The4thPzAwouldmakerelativelygoodgainsagainstnewreinforcements,reachingthethird

defensebelt,buttheadvancewouldgetevenharderas4thPzApenetratedintothethirddefensivebelt,crossingthePselRiverandcapturingHill226.6,Hill241.6andHill252.2againstthesoonarriving5thGAand5thGTA.Onthe48thPzCfront,mostoftheSovietswerewestornorthofSyrtsevo on the Pena River three miles north of Lukhanino. The 1st TAwas still tenaciouslyblockingtheirpathtoOboyan.WiththehelpoftheLuftwaffe,the3rdPzDcrossedthePenaRiverafterbreaking through the seconddefensebeltnorthofLukhanino.At1800hrs, they ran intoabattleatSyrtsevowiththe90thGRDand100tanksfromelementsofthe112thTBof6thTCandthe1stand10thMBof3rdMC.The3rdPzDdidcrossthePenaRiverinlimitednumbers;theleftflankof3rdPzD finished securingBerezovka about threemiles to thenorthof thebendwhiledrivingbackthe6thTC.wdk137.hjj121m.dgr209m.vzz2m.Burkkov’s10thTCandPopov’s2ndTCarrivedinthePselRiverareafromtheStaryiOskol

areatoprepareforanattackon2ndSSPzCintheProkhorovkaarea.Togethertheybrought358tanks. The 35th GRC was also brought up to bolster 7th GA’s line. On the west side, threeadditionalTBswerebroughtupandpositionedbetween1stTAand5thGTC.TheseunitsweregoingtobeorderedbyVatutintostoptheSSPzCbyattackingtheirflanks.The6thTCand3rdMCwouldbetaskedtoleadVatutin’sforcesagainst48thPzC.The10thTCwaspartofthe5thGA and Zhadov protested vigorously against Stavka’s decision to give the corps over toKatukov’s1stTA.Thiswasthesecondmajorcounteroffensiveintwodaysthathadasitsmajorobjectivetoisolateandthendestroythe2ndSSPzC.BothoffensiveswerepoorlyplannedandexecutedandmuchoftheblameshouldandwouldfallonGeneralVatutin.Thoughtheattacksdidslow theGermans, it cost the Soviet tankersmore than it should have and failed to return theexpectedresults.dgk114+.mhz239.vzz139+.Fightingalldaywith48thPzCtopreventtheGermansfromreachingthePsel,the6thTCand

3rdMCwereabletostoptheGermans,despitetheairsupport,fromreachingVerkhopenieandHill260.8.Hill242.1alongtheOboyanroadwasalsoheld.OnceagainSovietartillerywouldprovetoomuchtopenetrate.dgr88+.dgr86m.gnk193m.Lt General Franz Westhoven of 3rd PzD moved his HQ to Sirtsev, a village southeast of

SyrtsevoandonlyamilenorthwestoftheformerSovietstrongpointofDubrova.Heordered thePz Abt 3 to the Verkhopenie area to protect the division’s right flank. Westhoven had beenpromotedtoLtGeneralinApril1943.fkk251.vzz2m.zsm57.TheGD had reached theoutskirtsofVerkhopeniewhere itwasattackedby3rdMC.On the

right flankof48thPzC, the11thPzDwasattackedby50 tanks from the5thGTCcoming fromPokrovka.Bytheendoftheday,the48thPzChadgainedsixmilesbutthatwashalfofwhatwasneeded.The1stTAandthe6thGAwith thehelpofrecentreinforcementswerestillputtingupstrongresistancedespitethehighattrition.wdk138.hjj121m.dgr209m.Bytheendoftheday,KnobelsdorffreportedtoHothandlaterrelayedtoOKH,thattherewere

only forty working Panthers. In four days of fighting, nearly 75% of the Panthers were eitherdestroyedorincapacitated.Manyofthesepanzerswererepairableandwouldbefightingagaininafewdays.wwf92.Looking back at the day, the 48th PzC was attacked by the 6th TC, 31st TC and 3rdMC.

Knobelsdorff barely held his position against these fierce attacks. The 3rd PzD did cross thecreek near Valdimirovka to move toward Kruglik but it became apparent that the Soviet tankstrengthwasformidableandgrowingbythedayinthePenabendandthatacoordinatedattackbyGD,3rdPzDand52ndICwouldbenecessary tovanquish it.TheholdofKruglik, if takenthefollowingday,wouldbeprecariousatbestunlessgreaterresourcescameintothearea.WiththenewSoviet reinforcements coming in from thewest and north, the road toOboyanwas firmlyclosed.TheGermans had no chance to reach the town and some of theGerman officerswerealreadyawareofit.Throughprisonerinterrogation,radiointerceptsandhisownreconreports,Hothknewhisforceswerefacingthe2ndGTC,3rdMC,5thGTC,10thTCand6thTCbuthewasstillunderthefalsebeliefthatOboyancouldstillbereached.snk81.wdk138.Though theplanforSSpanzers toheadwestandhelp48thPzCtrap theSovietswestof the

SolotinkaRiverfailed, the48thPzCdidmakemodestgainswhenthepanzersofLAHandDasReichpushedthe31stTCtobeyondthePselRiver.HothdecidedtoreturnthepanzersofLAHandDasReichtotheirsectorsinordertorefitandtohelpdefendagainsttheresumptionoftankattacks on the SS’s eastern flank that started that day. With the 167th ID now in defensivepositionsalongtheeastflank,SSTKwouldbemovingtowardthePselRiveratfirstlight.gnk225.gnk227m.Knobelsdorff sent orders to his divisions for the followingday.The 11thPzDwas to drive

northandcapture Ilinski,amilenortheastofVerkhopenie.GDwas tocaptureVerkhopenieandsecuretheareawhilethe3rdPzDwastocompletetakingLukhanino.AftertakingVerkhopenie,GDwastoshifttothewestandlinkupwith332ndIDandtogethertheywouldadvancefivemilesandattackDolgi.The11thPzD,aftertakingIlinski,wouldstoptheiradvance,godefensiveandpreparefortheinevitablecounter-attack.AftercapturingLukhaninoandwithGDheadingwest,the3rdPzDwasalsotaskedwithclearingresistancebetweenLukhaninoandVerkhopenie.Alsoall4thPzAartillerywasmoveduptoSyrtsevoareaandtheLuftwaffewasputonhighalert tohelpwiththeassaults.gnk219.Lookingbackattheday,the3rdPzDcontinuedtohavetroubleadvancingagainststiffSoviet

resistance.Bytheendoftheday,thedivisionhadnotcrossedthePenaRiverinanymeaningfulway.Knobelsdorffwasplanning tohaveGD stop theirnorthernassaultand turnwestandhelp3rdPzDcrosstheriverandcatchup.gnk242+.gnk193m.gnk227m.The 111thGuardsArtilleryRegiment, 66thRLR and the 12th TDR from 40thArmymoved

southtoreinforcethe6thGA.The1stTAreceived180thTB,222ndTDRandthe38thRLRfrom38thArmy;the59thTR,60thTRand4thARfrom40thArmywhilethe438thTDRand38thRLRcame from theSteppeFront.The5thGTAwasmovingandwouldbe inplace in severaldayswaitingforfurtherorderswhenitassembledsixmilesnorthofProkhorovkaaftera220miletrip.The5thGTChadalreadyarrived,seeingaction,and10thTCwithits200tankswouldbetheresoon.Laterthatnightthe5thGA,whichwasalsotransferredfromSteppeFronttotheVatutin’sVoronezh Front, was making a night march and would soon be in second echelon betweenProkhorovkaandOboyan.The47thArmywasorderedtomovefromnearRossoch,60mileseastto theKorocha area, about 35miles northeast ofBelgorod, to reinforce the third defense beltbehind7thGA.wdk143*.bt85.hjj123m.By Stavka’s order in the predawn hours, 47th Army of Steppe Front, moving closer to

Prokhorovka, traveled from theOlkhovatka,Krivonosovka,Kamenka region to theKhmelevoe,Korocha,Bulanovkaregion.dgr87+.dgr83m.hjj123m.The6thPzD’s11thPzRandsPzAbt503launchedat0645hrsandmadegoodearlyprogress

until reaching the tank ditch andmines in front of the fortified town ofKalinina, due south ofMelikhovo. Between Kalinina and Melikhovo another tank ditch and defense line had beenerected.MajGeneralHunersdorffsenthistwopanzergroupsaroundtheseobstaclesandattackedMelikhovo from the east andwest.Artillerywas also brought up andwhile the Sovietswereunderheavyshellfire,theengineerscameup,neutralizedtheditchandclearedapaththroughtheminefields.Bytheendoftheday,MelikhovowascapturedandtheSovietsintheareahadtofallbacktoregroup.Thirtyassortedtankswerecaptured.Theshellingfrombothsideswassoheavy,theGrenadierscalledMelikhovo“LittleStalingrad”.AfterthefallofMelikhovo,GroupOppeln-BronikovskimovednorthandblockedtheBelgorod-Korocharoad topreventresupply.The7thPzDwasstillforcedtodevotemanyassetsinprotectingtheeastflankofthecorpsfromrepeatedattacksandwerenotmakingmuchprogresstothenorth.gnk212.nzk91.dgr89.hjj123m.dlu59+.Thereducednortherlyprogressfor7thPzDwasduetotherepeatedattacksof94thGRDalong

theMiasoedovo,Hill206.9,BatratskaiaDachaline.At1000hrs,elementsofthe96thTBarrivedandaddedtheirweighttotheattack.Nextdoor,the92ndGRDalsoattackedtheflankof7thPzD.Atthesametime,apanzergroupfrom19thPzDsplitofffromthemainforceanddrovetowardDalniaia Igumenkawhichwasstronglyprotectedbyamajor tankditchandminefields.Becker,thoughwounded,wasabletotakethevillageafterafiercestruggle.Stillanothercombatgroupwas formed from the 19th PzD which drove toward the fortified forest south of BlizhniaiaIgumenka.TheSovietswere able to repulse the attack, retainingBlizhniaia Igumenka and thengeneratedtheirownattackthatpushedtheGermansback.KeepingtheforestandthevillagegavetheSovietsagoodjumpingoffareatothrustagainsttheGermanwesternflankinthemorning.TheSovietAFincreasedtheirsortiesto1,500adaywhichslowedtheGermanadvance.TheRedAirForcewasbeginning to takecontrolof the skies.TheareabetweenBlizhinaia Igumenka to thewestandMiasoiedovointheeast,whichtheGermanscontrolled,wasjustthreetofivemilesinbreadth which gave the Soviets a chance to cut off the salient and destroy the two panzerdivisions;notverysecuretosaytheleast.Regardlessofthethreat,KempfhadorderstoextendthesalientandreachtheSabynino-VerkhniOlshanetsareaassoonaspossible.VonMansteinalsogaveKempfhigherpirorityofLuftwaffeassetstohelpexpandtheirground,especiallyalongtheDonets. dgk136+. dgr155m. dgr173m. gnk211+. dgk222m. dlu63m. dgk95m. vzz3m. dgr89.dgr87m.The3rdPzCdrivingnorthwasabletopenetrateSovietdefensesbetweenRazumnaiaandthe

SevernyDonetsRivers,up to theBelgorod-Korocha roadbutwere stopped therewhenSovietreserveswerebroughtup.bt86.dgr39m.Vatutinwastryingtofunnelthe3rdPzCintoacorridorfromwhichhis7thGAand69thArmies

couldencircle thepanzerdivisions.Alongwiththe92ndGRDand94thGRD,Vatutinalsohaddeployedthreeotherdivisions(213thRD,270thRDand15thGRD)alongtheeasternbankoftheKorenRiverinordertoconfinetheGermans’marchtothenortheast.Kempforderedthe198thIDtocomealongsidethe7thPzDtoprovideflankprotectionintheMiasoedovo-BatratskaiaDachaareaifandwhenthoseSovietdivisionscountered.TheSovietswereattackingtheGermanflanks

inallthreesectorswhichcausedtheGermanstousepanzersasflankprotection.Withthepanzerson the flanks, they were not helping on the drive north. To further combat this increasedresistance,artilleryfrom11thICwassentnorthaswell.gnk211.dlu81.Kempf sent a combat group led by ColonelOppeln-Bronikowski that included 100 panzers

towardBlizhniaia IgumenkaandSevriukovowith theultimategoalofcapturingMelikhovo, tenmilesnortheastofBelgorod.Thesectorwasdefendedbythe92ndGRDand94thGRD.The6thPzD advanced northward and after fighting a 150 minute battle with Soviet reserves, tookMelikhovo from the south after neutralizing an attack of thirty T34s advancing from the town.MajorBake’sPanzerBattalionledthechargeagainstthosethirtytanksandwasabletostoptheattack.The19thPzD,withsupportof the168thIDandadvancinginparallelwith the6thPzD,alsogainedground,bothdivisionsbeingbetweentheNorthernDonetsandtheRazumnaiaRivers.ThisGermanforcewassqueezedfor themostpart intoa tiny threemilefront inorder toenterthese villages but the surrounding countryside was still in Soviet hands. One of the biggestreasons for the advances was due to Hoth concentrating his armored forces into a powerfulspearhead.TheGermansmayhavedestroyed26tanksinadvancingtoMelikhovoby1600hrsbuttheSovietswereformingnewdefensesjusttothenorthwith35thGRCasthemaindefenderandweredeterminedtostoptheGermans.Thetownandthesurroundingareawouldnotbesecureduntilnextmorning.The6thPzDsuffered100deadintheday’sfighting.fkk279.dgk95m.vzz154+.vzz247.dgr155m.dgr173m.dgr39m.gnk211.fzk52.dlu59++.dlu65+.On theeastsideof theDonets, the168thIDhadmade littleprogressandwasstillonly two

miles fromBelgorodas it resumed its attackagainst81stGRDdefendingStaryiGorod.To itsright, the19thPzDand6thPzD launchedanassault against the35thGRC,which included the92nd GRD and 94th GRD. By noon the 6th PzD gained some ground but the 19th PzD wasinitiallyheldupbyheavyartillery.By1300hrs the19thPzDwaseastofBlizhniaiaIgumenka,threemilesnortheastofStaryiGorod,andby1600hrsstruckthe81stGRDatStaryiGorodwith100panzersandairattacks.Afteravicious fight that requiredusing flamethrowers, incendiarygrenades and redirecting artillery, the 19thPzD finally pushed the 81stGRDout ofBlizhniaiaIgumenka. Nearby the 168th IDwas finallymaking good progress andwith help of 19th PzDcapturedStaryiGorod..dgk136.hjj121m.wdk142.dgr95.dgr155m.dgr173m.dgr39m.vzz5m.Bynoonafterbrieflyregroupingandhavingmoreofthetrailingforcesofthedivisionsreach

thefront,the6thPzDand19thPzD,with200panzersandassaultguns,resumeditsattackonthesecond defense belt in front of Kalinina and Melikhovo, eventually driving the 35th GRCnorthward.Theywerenow12milesfromtheirstartlineof7/5.Elementsof19thPzDeventuallyturnedwestandclearedSoviettroopsfromtheirdefensivepositionsaroundDalniaiaIgumenka.By1900hrstheGermanswereincompletecontroloftheMelikhovoarea.Raus’scorpsof198thIDand106thIDontheextremeeastflankcouldnotkeepupand7thPzDhadtoholdbackforcestoassisttheinfantrywhichslowedtheirprogress.Evenstillbytheendofthedayagapopenedbetween7thPzDand198thID.The94thGRDwithtankssupportingattackedthe7thPzDnorthofMelikhovowhile92ndGRDattacked6thPzDwhen the305thRDcameup to support the linebetweenthetwodivisions.wdk142.dgk95m.dgr155m.dgk130m.dlu63+.EastoftheDonets,elementsof6thPzDandsPzAbt503drovefivemilesandcapturedthekey

road junctionofMelikhovoaftera threehourbattleagainst the92ndGRD,95thGRD,and the

96th TB. The 2.5mile wide salient that was being createdwas potentially dangerous for theGermans.VatutinwaswellawarethatifKempfwasabletojoinupwithHausserforhisattackonProkhorovka, itwouldplacehis forces, especiallyhis 48thGRC, at a gravedisadvantage andmade the destruction of this salient the highest priority. The 19th PzD, on 6th PzD’s left,wasslowedbythefightatBlizhniaiaIgnumenkaandwasfallingbehindthe6thPzD.The7thPzDwasstopped betweenMiasoedovo andBatratskaiaDacha against the 94thGRD.The 7th PzD alsoattacked Soviet positions between Koronio and Miasoedovo. The 3rd PzC had to cross theLipovyiDonets if itwas to be able to attack the Soviet position nearBelgorod thatwas stillthwartingthe168thID.dgk136+.dgk222m.dlu63m.vzz153.lck282.dgr155m.dgr173m.dgr39m.shn159.dlu63m.Southeastoftheheavybattlethatincludedthefightingof2ndGTCandLAH,asmallerbutstill

viciousdogfightwasoccurringatShakhovo.Shortlyafter1300hrs the twosidesbrokeoff theengagementandpulledback,eachsidelosingplanes.cbk67.EastoftheDonets,theGermanswhowereadvancingalonganarrow2.5milefrontagainstthe

92nd GRD and 95th GRD, captured the village of Melikhovo after dark. The 96th TB wasoriginally stationed there and between the three units kept theGermans at bay for three hoursbeforebeingforcedtofallback.TheGermanstriedadvancingtowardthevillagesofBlizhniaiaIgumenkaandDalnaiaIgumenkabutwerepreventedbytherenewedresistanceofthe92ndGRDand96thTB.The 94thGRDand 31stTDBprevented theGermans fromdiverting to the east.Vatutinsentthe305thRDtobolsterthelineinthe96thGRDsectorincasetheGermansadvancedthatway.Eventhoughthe3rdPzCandespeciallyCorpsRausweremakinglittleprogress,itdidforce the Soviets to devote large resources in this area and away from the areas west of theDonets.The198thID,whichwasareserveunitfor1stPzA,wasbeingheldnearBelgorodandcouldbeusedbetterelsewheresovonMansteinreleasedit toKempfearlier in theday.fkk87.fkk255.dgr155m.dgr173m.zzt88+.LateatnightvonManstein,knowingthat3rdPzCcouldnotcatchupto2ndSSPzCbywayof

Korocha, ordered Kempf to turn 6th PzD and 19th PzDwest to encircle and destroy the thinsalientofSovietsalongtheDonetsthatwerebetweenthetwocorps.Also,nothavingsufficientreserveshecanceledtheobjectiveoftakingKorochatotheeastandgaveKempforderstocatchupwith2ndSSPzCtothewestbyhuggingthesectorclosertotheriver.ThisshouldhavebeenpartoftheoriginalbattleplanaslongasGroupKempwasbasicallybyitself.ItcouldbearguedKempfspunhiswheelsforthreedaysneedlesslytryingtodrivetoofareast.Duringtheeveningthe2ndTChadbeenwithdrawnfromthesalientandmovednorthtoputpressureonDasReichsouthofProkhorovka.wdk142+.aaa124m++.zzz101m.snk424m++.dgr94+.hjj123m.At2200hrs,elementsofthe69thArmywereredeployedtotheSovkhozrailroadlinefromthe

VinogradovkaareainanticipationofaGermanassaultthenextday.wwf92.On theextremeeast flank,Kempf’s3rdPzCwasstill trying toclose thegapwithSSTKand

surround theSovietsdefending theDonetsRiver sectorbutwashaving troublemovingagainststiffresistance.wdk141.BytheendofthedayafteranespeciallybitterfightaroundtheMelikhovoarea,the7thGAwas

deployedon the following lines:The81stGRDcontinued toholdStaryiGorodandBlizhniaiaIgumenka,notfarfromBelgorod.The92ndGRDalongwiththe96thTBwasdeployedalongthe

Andreevski-Shliakhovolinewhilethe94thGRDwith31stAnti-tankBrigadeheldtheUshakovo-Miasoedovoline.The305thRDdefendedtheSabynino-Ushakovoline.Duringthepredawnhoursofthe9th,the107thRDwasmoveduptoprotecttheVerkhniOlshanets-Gremuchi-Ploskoeline.The 3rd PzC had created a narrow salient by capturing Melikhovo but the Soviets still hadconfined Kempf quite convincingly and the two strongpoints of Blizhniaia Igumenka andMiasoedovowhilebeingthreatenedwerestillheldbytheSovietsandacontinuedthreat to theGerman rear areas. Kempf would devote many resources on 7/9 in capturing Khokhlovo andStaryi Gorod areas adjacent to theDonets River. Kempf also had to be especially concernedaboutaSovietcounter-attackthatwouldcutoffthisnarrowsalientandisolatemuchofhisforces.WiththatregardKempfpausedhisnorthwardmarchandturnedwesttowardtheDonetstowidenhis salient and destroy the Soviets at Staryi Gorod to free up the 168th ID. dgr94. dgr155m.dgr173m.dgr39m.vzz5m.dgk163.The45TigersofsPzAbt503hadbeensplitupevenlybetweenthe threepanzerdivisionsof

3rdPzC.CaptKragenakcalculated that by the endof thisday34Tigershadbeendisabled:7were hit by shellfire, 16 disabled by mines and 9 had mechanical troubles. Two more werecompletewrite-offs.Mostofthe32tankswouldbefixedwithineightdaysbutacoupleofthemhadtobesentbacktoGermanyforrepairs.zzt93.Intheevening,KempforderedHunersdorfftosendpartofhisdivisionwestwardnextmorning

andeliminatethestrongholdofDalniaiaIgumenkathat198thIDcouldnottackleonitsown.The198thIDwouldthencontinuenorthalongtheriver,clearingresistance.gnk212.Duringthelasttwodays,Shumilov’s7thGAhadrepeatedlyattackedthe3rdPzC’srightflank.

Insecondechelon,Shumilovstillhad the15thGRD,270thRDand111thRDwaiting.Healsoshiftedthe92ndGRDand94thGRDof35thGRCtoattacktheGermansadvancingontheLipovyiDonetsRiver.Lately,theSovietAFhadbeenaveraging1,200sortiesadaybuttheGermanstheprevioustwodayshadaveragedonly725sorties.TheGermansstillbarelycontrolledtheskiesbutthatwouldchangeon7/11.dgk137.dgk222m.dlu63m.

E

11

July8thontheNorthernSalientSeeMap5

astofPonyri, theGermanscontinued to try to takeHill253.5butwerenothavingmuchsuccess. In the village, vicious fighting continued at the water tower, railway station,

schoolandtractorfactory.The292ndIDsufferedheavycasualtiesinthehousetohouse,hand-to-handcombatthatsawwavesofattacksandcounter-attacks.Nearbytothewest,the9thPzDwasbeinghithardbyrepeatedrunsfromtheRedAirForce.TheSovietairforcewasstartingtouselarge bore cannons, 37mm, to attack panzers from the rear to destroy them.mhz285. dgk87m.dgr199m.nzk91.dgk116m.lck116m.TheinitiativewouldmovetotheSovietsonthisday.ReserveswerebroughtuptothePonyri

area tostop the41stPzC.The70thArmysent the140thRDand162ndRDtoTeploewhile itmovedthe181stRDclosertothefront.Italsosentordersto229thTRand259thTRtopreparetomoveuptoreinforce13thArmy.ItwasobvioustotheGermanstheSovietswereplanningamajoroffensivethatdayandtriedtoprepareforit.Artilleryshellswerebroughtupandthefrontlinewentdefensive.wdk179.dgk87m.dgr199m.dgk116m.Thebattle forPonyriStationcontinued.At0600hrs, the307thRDwith support froma few

tankscounter-attacked,tryingtoregainthestation;bothsidesstubbornlybringingreinforcementsuptobattle.Bytheendoftheday,theGermanscontrolledmostofthetown.Duringtheevening,ModelrecalledandregroupedhisforcesnearOlkhovatkatoprepareforamajorefforttotaketheimportant town.The fresh10thPzGDwasbrought upduring the night to add itsweight to thebattle.Rokossovskybroughtupthe3rdGAD,4thGADand51stTBof3rdTCandtheheavy27thGTRtostoptheexpectedassaultthenextmorning.dgk120+.dgr118.fkk102m.dgk87m.dgr199m.nzk91.dgk116m.lck116m.On a partly cloudy hot day, the 20th PzD fought a furious battle near the village of

Samodurovka, suffering huge casualties.At the same time, panzers of von Saucken’s 4th PzD,heavily supported from the air, drove between 2nd PzD and 20th PzD, smashing through theSovietdefensesatthejunctionofthe175thGRDand70thGRD,andseizedthesmallvillageofTeploe,westofHill274.For the following threedaysa fiercebattlewouldbe fought for thisvillageand thesurroundinghighground.Rokossoskybroughtup reservessuchas the3rdAnti-tankBrigade under Rukosuyev and theGermanswere unable to take the nearby ridge for anylengthoftime.The33rdPzGRof4thPzDreachedthetopoftheridgebutwasthenpushedoffbyaSovietcounter-attack.Nearby,the6thIDreachedthefootofHill274,justnorthofOlkhovatka,but could go no further. The narrow avenue of approach to the hill and Olkhovatka was anextreme disadvantage to the Germans. Between the well-built defenses and the aerial attacks,

manyGermansandpanzerswerelost.Theweatherinthesouthofthesalientwasalsoclearandwarm, the roads had dried from the last rains and the panzers were moving better. dgk118+.wdk137. fkk63+. dgr198m. fkk102m. lck302. dgk87m. dgr199m. swm139. nzk90. dgk116m.kfz459.lck116m.zro204.pck46+.Afteran initialbarrageat0800hrs, the9thPzD,18thPzD,2ndPzD,20thPzDand4thPzD

with 6th ID renewed their attack along the sector running from Ponyri, Kashara, Kutyrka,PogorelovtsytoSamodurovkatowardsOlkhovatkaandHill274,whichwasdefendedprimarilyby the 17th GRC. The Soviets opened up with a huge artillery barrage that caused heavycasualtieson theattackers.ThesupportingLuftwaffe flew inaheadof thepanzers tosoften theline.Bymidday,despitetheminefieldsandheavyartillery,theGermansbrokethroughthefrontline and the remaining200panzers flooded south towardTeploe andOlkhovatka.The fightingwouldrageinthisareaforthenexttwodays.Modelwasdeterminedtotakethehighground.Ontheotherhand,Rokossovskyunderstoodtheadvantagehehadandwouldfighttokeepit.Allfouroftheabovedivisionsof47thPzC,alongwith18thPzDof41stPzCplusthe4thPzDthatwasattached to 47thPzC, resumed their attack.TheGerman forcewas taskedwith advancing fivemilestoreachalinebetweenOssinovitothesouthandLeninskivillageeastoftheSnovoRiver.Despitepushingbackthe6thGRDalittle,the47thPzCneverreachedtheirobjectivebutreachedonly a small section of the Olkhovatka-Ponyri road, about a mile from their start point thatmorning.The16thTCand19thTCcameuptosupport17thGRC,stoppingtheGermans.mkz120.dgk120.dgk116m.je102+.mhz281+.dgr198m.fkk102m.dgk87m.dgr199m.swm139.lck116m.The 7th ID and 31st ID of 46th PzC deployed to protect the western flank of 47th PzC by

attackinginasouthwestdirectiontowardtheSvapaRiver,northofSamodurovka.Inthissector,elements of the 175thRD and 132ndRD supported by tanks launched early in themorning tocountertheGermanadvance.TheGermansdestroyedtwoKV1sandtwoT34sintheengagement.wdk179.dgk87m.dgr199m.dgk116m.Duringthepredawnhours,theGermanshadassembledsixdivisionsinfrontoftheSoviet13th

Armysector,with theheaviestconcentrationfromSnovotoPodsoborovkatoSaburovkawherethe47thPzCwasdeployed.At0800hrsmovingfromthispositiontheGermansadvancedagainstfierceresistancetowardthesectorfromSamodurovkatoPonyriII.Therepeatedattacks,centeredonHill 257.0,were repulsed by 17thGRC, inflicting heavy casualties on the attackers but by1700hrstheGermanswereabletocaptureHill257.0.ItwastoolateinthedayfortheGermanstoadvance further and theywereprevented from reachingOlkhovatkaand its surroundinghighground for another day. dgk120. dgr198m. fkk102m. dgk87m. dgr118. dgr108m. dgr199m.dgk116m.JustbeforedawnGermanradiointerceptorspickedupanorderforalargeattackon41stPzC

nearPonyri.The1stFliegerDivisionwasgoingtobescrambledfrombasesnearOreltomeetthenewthreat.TheSovietairattackwasincoordinationwithacounterattackledby307thRD,the51stTBand103rdTB.Thegroundattackbeganon timebut theplanesonbothsideswereheldupwhenheavyrainshit.Theplanesdidnottakeoffforthreehours.Inthosethreehoursthe307thRDretookthevillageofMayainbitterfighting.cbk54.dgk116m.LtGeneralEsebecktookchargeofanewlyformedcombatgroupmadefromthe31stIDand

20thPzD,withtheexpressordersoftakingthehillsaroundOlkhovatka.Thisgroupwasonthe

rightflankof47thPzC.Knowingtheimportanceofkeepingthesehills,Rokossovskybroughtupthe9thTCduringtheafternoontostoptheGermanadvance.nzk90+.dgk116m.The 3rdTDB,working in the 17thGRC’s sector, counter-attacked theGerman formation of

several hundred panzers at 0830 hrs, destroying one Tiger and three other panzers. With thesupportoftheLuftwaffe, theGermanscontinuedtoattack,inflictingfurtherlossesontheSovietbrigadebeforemovingon.EastofPonyri,theSovietswithairsupportand50tanks,attackedthe292ndID.Theshattereddivisionhelditslineuntilitwasrelievedbythe10thPzGDandwassenttotherear.AlsoeastofPonyri,the307thRD,129thTB,51stTBandthe27thGTRattackedthe86thIDbutwererepulsed.TheGermansclaimeddestroying50tanksinthisarea.Furthereastinthe23rdICsector,the74thRDbeganaseriesofattacks.wdk179+.dgk87m.dgr199m.dgk116m.lck116m.Pz Abt 21 got a late start on this morning, preparing for the coordinated attack on the

Krassavka-Samodurovkaline.TheSovietspre-emptedtheattackwithoneof theirown.PzAbt21hadtohalttheiradvanceanddefendthemselvesatHill225.4.Theotherdivisionsintheattackresumed theiradvance.By lateafternoon thePzAbt21wasfightingon theapproaches tobothKrassavkaandnearbyTeploezzt84.dgk116m.The200panzers fromassortedunitsof47thPzCreachedKasharaandSamodurovkaas they

aimed for Olkhovatka. Tenmiles to the east, the fighting at Ponyri continued with both sideslosingheavily.Inthelatemorningandearlyafternoontherainsslowed,the1stFliegerDivisionwasabletoblanketthisareawith650sorties.Another523sortiesweremadetotherestoftheline. The 20th PzD’s 112th PzGR, like the other divisions of the 47th PzC, suffered heavycasualties.SomeoftheveteransclaimedthefightingonthisdaywasasbadasitwasinfrontofStalingrad.WithoutthefullsupportoftheLuftwaffe,theGermangroundforceswerehithardbyartillerywhenitwasunmolestedbyaerialattacks.Afewflightsalsocoveredthe41stPzCtotheeast.DuringthisearlymorningrainyperiodtheSovietsdidflyafewbombingmissionsatselecttargets but a mere fraction of what was scheduled to fly. je102. dgr198m. fkk102m. dgk87m.cbk54.nzk77.dgk116m.NorthofOlkhovatkamanyofthe200panzersoftheday’sassaultweresupportedbyartillery

andLuftwaffeattackedtheboundarybetweenthe13thand70thArmies, tryingtobuildalargerwedgebetweenthembutfailed.FerociousfightingdevelopedaroundtheTeploeareaas4thPzDtriedtotakethevillage.NorthofTeploelayHill238.As4thPzD’spanzerscrestedthishill,theywereslammedbywaitingT34sandabatteryofanti-tankgunswhichinflictedheavycasualties.Fighting raged for two plus days as the Germans struggled against the minefields and heavyshelling.bt85.mhz281+.dgr198m.fkk102m.dgk87m.dgk116m.lck116m.Inanotherexampleofpoorcommunicationsbecauseofhisexcessivetravels,Modelwasnot

aware of the way Lemelsen planned on using 4th PzD that day on the battlefield.Model hadintended4thPzDtoremain togetherand toadvancenext to20thPzDin theTeploe-Olkhovatkaarea.Lemelsendetachedthe35thPzRfromthedivisionandattachedthosepanzerstotheshockgroupformedfromLuebbe’s2ndPzDandBurmeister’ssPzAbt503.Withthethreepanzerunitsworkingtogethertheyhad200panzers.Thegrenadiersofthedivisionwouldthenbeinsertedinthelinenextto20thPzDwithoutanyinternalarmorsupport.LubbedidgiveStuGAbt904tovonSaucken.ThoughLemelsenhadmadeanenemyofModelonthisday,hewasstillarecipientof

theKnight’sCrosswithOakLeaves. In late 1943,General Lemelsenwas transferred to Italy.snz249+.zsm69.The47thPzC sent in the 4thPzD to relieve the 20thPzDwhichwas placed temporarily in

reserve atBobrik. The 2nd PzD, 4th PzD and 9th PzDwithmost of the available air supportcontinuedtoattackthe17thGRCwiththeobjectiveofreachingalineaboutfivemilessouthfromOssinovi toLeninski,west of theSnovoRiver.TheGermansmade somegains against the 6thGRDwest of Ponyri II but failed overall to achieve their objective of crossing the road fromPonyri II to Olkhovatka only a mile from their morning start line. The 16th TC and 19th TCcounter-attacked,stoppingtheGermanadvance.Althoughthissectionwasalreadywelldefended,the11thTBof2ndTAand4thGPDaswellasthe129thTBfromtheMaloarkhangelskareaweresenttothisareaforaddedsecurity.wdk179.dgr198m.dgk87m.dgr199m.dgk116m.lck116m.Rokossovskybroughtuphis lastreserveTankCorps, the9thTC,todefendHill253.5tothe

east of Ponyri and the village ofPonyri from the south.Meanwhile the 9thPzDand18thPzDattackedthetwoobjectivesbutwererepulsed.Theheavyrainsthisdaymadeit impossibleforthe panzers and Model ordered them to halt their advance. At the same time, the 20th PzDcapturedSamodurovkaon itsway tohelp4thPzD takeHill 272.ThepanzerswerehelpedbyStukas dropping550poundbombsonSoviet positions. dgr198m. fkk102m. dgk87m. dgr199m.dgk116m.lck116m.The3rdcompanyof14TigersofsPzAbt505arrivedandwereputdirectlyintothefieldnear

Teploe toassist in taking thecriticalHill274.By theendof theday, threeof theTigersweredestroyedwhileonlythreewerestillfighting;therestneededrepairs.Acouplemilestotheeast,viciousfightingcontinuedaroundHill274,thelynchpinofthewesternsectorthatifitcouldbetakenwouldgivetheGermansabetterchancetotakeOlkhovatkajustsouthofit.ButashardastheGermanstried,therepeatedattackscontinuedtofail.Beforethedayended,sPzAbt505waspulled from the line to rest and to repair their Tigers. They would be forced to attack thefollowingdaybutat least theywouldhave29workingTigers,morethanwhat theyhadonthisday.mhz285.lck305.dgr198m.fkk102m.dgk87m.dgk116m.kfz458.In the north during a conference with Model, Kluge made some disposition changes and

orderedthe8thPzDfromVelizetotheOrelsector.The12thPzDwasalsoattachedto47thPzC.GeneralModelknew9thArmyhadlostitschanceforvictory;itwasnowfightingforsurvival.wdk180.zzz101m.dgk87m.dgk116m.At1230hrsModelarrivedat4thPzD’sHQwherehelearnedthe35thPzRhadbeendetached

andthatGeneralvonSauckenandseveralotherofficershadbeenwoundedwhileupattheFrontduringanairraid.Modelexplodedwhenheheardthenews,convincedthatLemelsenhadactedincorrectly.Heimmediatelycalledhiscorpscommanderswithexplicitinstructionsthatdivisionswerenot tobe split apartwithout his permission.The35thPzRwouldbe comingback to4thPzD.Modelwasat4thPzDforfourhourstooverseeoperations.ThedivisiondidcaptureTeploebut not the important hills surrounding the village. The division had suffered horrendouscasualties and without any apparent chance of capturing those hills for it was later learnedRokossovsky had brought up additional artillery batteries to the sector. At this time Modeldecidedtopausetheassaultthefollowingdayinorderforhisbattereddivisionstoregroup.HewassurethathewouldneverseeKursk;hewasalsosurethatHitlerwouldrejecthisrequestto

haltthecampaign.GeneralvonSauckenwasacompetentofficerandwouldeventuallycommandthe39thPzCinJuly1944.snz250+.zsm264.AtPonyriIIduringbattle,the10thPzGDmoveduptothelinetosupporttheexhausted292nd

ID against a renewed attack. As soon as it was possible, the 292nd IDwas ordered back tosecondechelonforrest.wdk180.dgk116m.lck116m.Intheafternoon,elementsofthe9thPzDand18thPzDfoughttheirwayintoPonyri.Theworst

fighting occurred at the train station, tractor building, schoolhouse andwater towerwhere thedefenderswereabletostoptheGermanadvance.ThegrenadierswerealsoabletocapturesomeofthehillsaroundPonyriexceptthemostimportantone,Hill253.5whichwasheavilydefendedbyartilleryandthe1032ndRR.mkz120.dgk116m.dgr108m.lck116m.WhilePzAbt49of4thPzDwasdefendingHill234.0fromaSoviettankattack,therestof4th

PzDresumeditsattacktoregainlostgroundandtocaptureEastTeploeandthenearbyHill272.9.ThedivisionhadthehelpofsPzAbt505andtheLuftwaffe.Topreventflankingfireagainst the4thPzD,sPzAbt505wouldtakeHill274.5nextdoor.The33rdPzRof4thPzDwoulddriveeastfromTeploeagainst253while theBurmeisterGroupattackedfarther to the leftHill272.9andHill 274.5. First Battalion of 35th PzR would join the battle as well. The 20th PzD wascommitted to the right where it covered 47th PzC’s flank and was to advance againstSamodurovkaWest at 1515 hrs. This was a coordinated effort to capture several strongpointvillages and the surrounding hills northeast and northwest of Olkhovatka. If successful,Olkhovatka and its high ground would be next. The Soviet resistance was so fierce that theGerman offensive was stopped about 100 yards north of Teploe. The Germans were able torepulseacounter-attackbutforwardmovementwasimpossibleandthepanzersfellbackaways.fkk62+.dgk87m.dgr199m.dgk116m.lck116m.At Hill 257.0, the 17th GRC defended against repeated attacks from German panzers

numberingupwardsof100unitsTheattackswere initially repulsedbut slowly thedeterminedGermans by 1700 hrs gained the top ground butwere unable to go any farther, failing to takeOlkhovatka.dgk120.fkk102m.dgk87m.dgk116m.EastofPonyrielementsofthe307thRD,129thTB,51stTBandthethe27thGTRattackedthe

86th ID.During the all afternoonbattle theGermans claimeddestroyingor capturing50 tanks.wdk180.dgk116m.lck116m.The78thADwasadvancingslowlyagainst2ndGADdefendinginfrontofTrosna,northwest

ofMaloarkhangelsk.TheGermanswereabletocaptureahillsouthwestofTrosna.At1800hrstothe northeast of 78th AD, the 383rd ID was stalled by heavy artillery from the 48th Army.wdk180.dgk116m.lck116m.Inthenorthatnight,20thPzDcapturedSamodurovka,northwestofOlkhovatkawherepanzer

formationsgainedsomegroundbutstillcouldnotreachthekeycity.Despitethefactthatthebulkofthe9thArmywasdeployedinthecentralsectorofthefront,itcouldnotgainmorethan3milesinfourdays.dgr198m.fkk102m.dgk87m.dgr199m.dgk116m.Inthenorththe1stFliegerDivisonflew1,173daylightsortieswhilethe16thVAand15thVA

flewacombined1070sorties.TheSovietsflew613fightersortiesaspartofthetotal.Withthedailyattrition,theSovietsweredroppingtheirfightersortieswitheachpassingday.LossesforthedayaredifficulttoestimateduetoexaggerationbutitappearstheRedAirForcelostabout50

planes and theGermans lost about a dozen.Though losing a lot of planes, theSovietAFwasplayingavitalroleinstoppingModelfromreachingKursk.cbk55.nzk77.dgk116m.GeneralRokossovskynotedthat theGermansweremakingbetterprogressinVatutin’ssector

than his sector.He placed the blame onVatutin’smismanagement and not on the ability of theGermans. Hewas quite vocal on the subject. Stalin and Zhukovwere also concerned. jp156.dgk87m.dgk116m.Bytheendoftheday,9thArmysufferedanother3,200casualtiesandnotonedivisiongaineda

mile.Makingthesituationworsewasthatthevehicleswereingreatneedofmaintenanceandallthemenwereexhaustedbutmanandmachinewouldbeforcedtocontinuefighting.The2ndPzD,4thPzDand9thPzDhadsufferedtheworstwithallthreedivisionsbelow50%strength.snz251.

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12

July9thontheSouthernSalientSeeMaps13,26A

tavkawasconvincedthattohaveasuccessfulcounter-offensive,theGermansmustbestoppedbefore reachingKursk fromeitherdirectionand the salientmustbekept inplace.To this end,Vatutinbroughtuphislastreservestoblocktheadvance.Healsoorderedhisforcestostepupattackson theGerman flanks for this slowed theadvance.TheGermansneverhadachance tosucceedbecauseof theheavyflankingaction.The600tanksandthemanygunsof the5thGTAwerebeingbroughtuptothefronttodeploybehindthePselandblockthepassagepastOboyanorProkhorovka. The Germans had already decided to shift directions from Oboyan towardProkhorovka.Theactionon thisdaywouldbe thedeathknellof theGermanarmy.Stavka stillhad two armies in reserve if they were needed that were intended for the counter-offensive.dgk138.dgk147.Despiteitsmodestsetbackthedaybefore,Hothorderedthe2ndSSPzCtoresumeitsattackin

the Gresnoe-Solotinka area before heading for Prokhorovka as he decided to do before thecampaignstarted.The48thPzCwastocontinueitsdrivenorthofSolotinkatothePselRiverintheIlinski-Shipysector.Afterreviewingtheresultsof theHill258.2combat,Hothchangedhisordersfor2ndSSPzCand48thPzC.The2ndSSPzCweretoattackSovietpositionsnortheastofBeregovoeandseizetheeasternbankoftheSolotinkaonbothsidesofKochetovka.The48thwastoattackalongtheIakovlevo-OboyanroadwiththeintentofcapturingtheseriesofhillsbetweenKochetovkaandjustsouthofNovoselovka.AfterwardsthecorpswouldturnandrouttheSovietpositionsonthewestbankofthePena.Thenewplans,especiallyconcerningHill260.8andHill240.4,werelessambitiousshowingthewaningconfidenceinHothasSovietreservescontinuedtoappearandashiscasualtylistincreased.vzz152+.gnk193m.gnk227m.dgk143.At0100hrs,the5thGTAwasorderedtomovetotheBobryshevo-Bolshaia-Psinka-Prelestnoe-

Aleksandrovski-Bolshie Seti area. The 5th GTA had traveled 60miles in less than 23 hours.dgr222.wwf92.dgk411.dgk415.dgr86m.Bydaybreak, the2ndPzGRhad redeployed to theirnewsector, justnorthofDasReich, as

ordered.zrl223.Hothwasstilltryingtostrengthentheboundarybetweenhiscorpsbutwith2ndSSPzCheading

towardProkhorovkathattaskwasbecomingharder,noteasier.Additionally,intheprevioustwodaysHothsawaresurgenceofarmoredattacksfromreservesthatdramaticallyslowed4thPzA’sadvanceandhehadtorekindlehisforces’forwardmomentumiftheyweretopenetratethethirddefensivelineandadvancepastProkhorovkaandOboyan.At0200hrstheLAHlinkedwithDasReichbetweenTeterevinoSouthandLuchkiSouthandinthatrespectfortifiedtheeasternportion

ofthelinealittle.Inthemorningthe2ndSSPzCwasallowedtoregroupwhilethecommandercompletedhisbattleplans.Hausser reduced thenumberof attackpoints to simplifyoperationsandorderedthe167thID,whichstillhadthesupportofafewassaultgunsfromSSTK,toexpandtheirsectortoLuchkiSouthandrelieveDasReichofpartoftheirsector.The167thIDnowhadtodefendthelinethatSSTKhadcovered,aswellasasmallpartofthelinethatDasReichwasdefending.Das Reich could now concentrate on the Teterevino-Kalinin-Iasnaia Poliana area.AftermovingfromtheeastflankofthecorpstoLuchkiNorthsector,SSTKcreatedtwocombatgroups. One headed in the direction of Malye Maiachki, Veselyi and Kochetovka with theintentionofpushingthe31stTCtothewest,awayfromtheintendedcrossingpointofthePsel.ThesecondgroupheadedforKrasnyiOktiabr,Ilinski,KozlovkaandVasilevkainordertoforcetheSovietsoutofthosevillagesandtheirdefensesonthesouthsideoftheriver.HausserorderedKrugerofSSDR toconcentrateonmovingnortheasttowardPravorotinordertoscreenLAHastheassaultonProkhorovkaandthemaincorridorcontinued.Duringthepreviousday’sfighting,Hausserpracticallyhadeachregimentofhisdivisionsattackingonitsownaxis;LAHhadbeenabusedtheworst.Thoughonthewesternflank,the52ndICwasorderedtostaydefensivealongthePenaRiverbendinorderfor48thPzCtostabilizethenorthernlineandlinkupwiththeSS.vzz155+.gnk210.gnk227m.wwf96.dgr95.Thenightbefore,theSovietswererepulsedfromVisloebuttheyhadnotgivenuponthearea.

ItseemedlikeagoodspotforpenetrationoftheremainingSSTKandtocloseofftheBelgorod-Oboyanroadandsotheywouldtryagain.At0230hrsfromeastofHill209.5,Sovietforcesthatincluded tanks from the 2ndGTC launched another assault towardVisloe. The surprise attackgained ground and succeeded in reaching Hill 225.9, just east of the important roadway. TheEickeRegimentalongwithabatteryofgunswereatnearbyGonki.TheyrushedthecouplemilestothewesttoVisloeandconfrontedtheattackers,enablingthemtostoptheattackandpushthemback. Priess had orders to redeploy his SSTK to the west ofLAH but the transfer was goingslowlyduetorepeatedattacksby2ndGTC.gnk210.gnk193m.vzz3m.gnk227m.At0300hrs,fourGermanweatherplanessortiedtogetthelatestintelontheweather.Allfour

planesnevercamehome.TheywerethevictimsofroamingSovietfighterslookingfortargetsofopportunity.ThiswasabadstartfortheLuftwaffe.cbk67.It was discovered the previous day during the heavy fighting that there was a gap at the

boundarybetweenLAHandDasReich,notfarfromTeterevinoNorth.DuringthepredawnhourselementsofDeutschlandmovednorthtostrengthentheboundary.zow154.Intheveryearlyhourswhileitwasraining,SSTKwasrelievedoftheircurrentdeploymentby

167thIDandsenttothewestoftheTeterevinoNorth-LuchkiNorthareatoattackalongsideLAH.LAH headed for Sukho Solotino to link up with 11th PzD while SSTK advanced towardKochetovka.The167thIDmovedalongtheLipovyiDonetsasfarnorthasSmogodinowithDasReichguardingthelinenorthofthatvillage.AroundnoonLAH’s1stPzGRcapturedRylskionitswaytoitsmainobjectiveand,alongwithleadingelementsofSSTK,capturedVeselyi.FollowingVeselyi,theSSTKclearedtheeastbankoftheSolotinkaRiveraswellasthevillageofthesamename.AfterleavingRylskithe1stPzGRheadedinthedirectionofSolotino,clearingthegroundasitwent.At1300hrs,the3rdPzRwasattackedbyabout50tanksfromthe24thGTBwestofGresnoe, but the attack was repulsed with 14 T34s smoldering on the battlefield. Nearby the

SturmAbt3wasfightingwith40tanksforcontrolofHill224.5.ThebattlecosttheSoviets14moretanks.RylskiwasasmallvillagewestofMalyeMaiachkiandTeterevinoNorthandsouthofVeseyli and Sukho Solotinowhich straddles the Solotinka River, not far fromKochetovka.fkk146+.fkk319m.lck317.agk121.agk121m.wwf96.vzz5m.gnk193m.gnk227m.ztc269.zrl223.zow154.Atthestartoftheday,Hausserestimatedhaving202panzersdamagedordestroyedwhichleft

249 stillworking.Someof those 202damagedpanzerswouldbe fixed anddeployedonto thebattlefield.lck318.vzz177.In theDasReich sector itwas foggy in the earlymorning and visibilitywas poor but their

listeningoutpostscouldclearlyhearSoviettanksmoving.Inthepredawnhours,the10thTCand5thGTChad redeployedand the2ndTCand2ndGTChadmoved in to replace them.At firstlight,GermanplaneswereuptosearchforthetanksandfoundthemassemblinginthewoodseastofKalininandIasnaiaPoliana.Anattackwouldsoonfollow.ThepanzerbattalionofDasReichhadbeenmovedoff the front lineandwasatOzerovski to regroup.Ozerovskialsohoused thepanzer repair station for theSS.German intelligence also discoveredSoviet concentrations infrontof167th IDwhichwasdeployed southofDasReich nearPetrovski.TheSoviets startedshelling Das Reich and 167th ID. Das Reich started shelling the Soviets to disrupt theirpreparationsandtoslowtheirprogressinbuildingabridgeovertheDonets.WhilethepanzerswereatOzerovski,DeutschlandwasdefendingTeterevinoNorthandDerFührerwasatKalinin,southofOzerovski.gnk230+.gnk193m.gnk227m.Shortly after daybreak, Soviet tanks moved through the village of Ivanovski Vyselok after

leaving the woods near Storozhevoe, heading straight for the Deutschland Regiment. A fewminuteslateragroupof25SovietfighterbombersflewoverthefrontlineaimingfortheHQareaofDas Reich, just south of Kalinin. A fewminutes later a second squadron of Soviet planesattackedthepanzersnearOzerovski.Fortherestofthemorning,theRedAirForcebombedthissector repeatedly, causing death and confusion, and did not receive any resistance from theLuftwaffe. While the aerial bombing continued, Soviet tanks and men maneuvered through aravine toward Kalinin, getting closer to theDer Führer Regiment. The T34s left the ravineheading straight for theGermans.TheGermanPak40swere readyanddestroyedanumberoftanks in the first minutes of the engagement. The remainder of the T34s reversed course andheadedbackintotheravine.The7.5cmPak40gunusinghighvelocityAProundscouldpenetratethe T34 front armor. At the same time that Kalinin was under fire Deutschland, defendingTeterevinoNorth,wasalsounderattack.TheGermancounterfirewassohottheinfantryridingontheSoviettankshadtojumpoff.MortarandartilleryfirefoundthedistanceandaddedtotheresistanceontheSovietforcewhichforcedtheSoviets tofallbackinto thewoods.DasReichhadmorePakguns(5.0cmand7.5cm)thanSSTKandLAHcombinedanditwasthesegunsthatpreventedapenetrationof thefront line todayaswellas thepreviousday.At1130hrsa thirdsmaller attack ensued further south nearNepkhaevo againstDer Führer but thatwas repulsedalso.Thesectorwasquietfortherestoftheday.gnk231+.The 1st PzGR ofLAH and the onlyworking Tiger launched its attack toward the Solotinka

RivertohelpslowdowntheSovietflankattackson11thPzDandGD.MuchoftheLuftwaffewasredirectedtoassistthe48thPzCbutafewplanesremainedwiththeSSandtheywouldflycover

forthegroundassault.By0830hrstheregimenthadreachedtheapproachestoRylskiandnearbySukhoSolotinoon thebanksof theSolotinkaRiverwhichwas their primaryobjective.MalyeMaiachki,alittlefurtheroffwasalsoimportant.Usingthecoverofaravinethemengotasclosetotheirtargetsaspossible;aboutahalfmile.At1000hrs,artillerybeganandthemenlaunchedinthree different groups. The first two objectives, still burning from earlier shelling, had beenabandoned. The Soviets blew the bridge before leaving Sukho Solotino. The panzer groupadvancingonMalyeMaiachkiwasledintoatrap.APaklinehadbeensetupinthewoodsnexttothevillage.Whenthepanzersnearedthewoods, theSovietgunsopenedup.Twopanzersweredestroyed in the first volley.The rest of the panzers regrouped and started firing at theSovietguns. The grenadiers moved on the woods and after a while the Soviet guns were silenced.gnk228+.nzk92.gnk193m.gnk253m.gnk227m.dgr91.dgr86m.The 52ndGRDwas now north of the Psel River andwas defending from the hill north of

KliuchitoHill226.6andtoPolezhaev.The285thRRofthe183rdRDalongwiththe11thMRBof 10th TC were defending in front of Vasilevka, Molozhavaia gully (north of the KSF),KomsomoletsStateFarm,IvanovskiVyselokandStorozhevoe.Malov’s99thTBof2ndTCwasdefendingfromVasilevkatoAndreevka.vzz182+.vzz187.gnk312m.nzk92.PzAbt3,attached toSSTK, left their oldpositionwhichwasbeing takenoverby167th ID

alongtheDonetsRiverandheadedforGresnoe.WiththeheavyrainandSovietshelling,theridetookthreehourstoarrive.TothewestandnorthofGresnoe,thegroundwasdryandthecolumncontinuedontowardKochetovkabutwasstoppedbeforereachingtheSolotinkaRiverbyheavygroundfire.AdditionalbattalionswerebeginningtoapproachtheGresnoeareaaroundthistime,about0830hrs.Airsupportwascalledintoslowtheshellingandtakecontroloftheskies.SSTKhad tomake it across the river in forcewithout sufferingheavycasualties.Hothknew thisandwasquicktosendtheLuftwaffe.HoweverGroupBaumtakingaseparateroute,reachedVesselyi,eastoftheSolotinkaRiverby1130hrswithoutincurringmanycasualties.Adetachmentwassentwest of the river to find the 11th PzD to see how big a gap in the line would expose eachdivision’sflanks.Asthereconteam,supportedbyacompanyofpanzers,approachedHill224.5,eastofKochetovka,asmallgroupofSoviet tanksambushed them.Afterdisabling threeSoviettanks,the237thTBretreated.Asecond,largerattackoccurredlaterthatsurprisedtheGermansfrom a different direction. They fell back to near Hill 224.5 to regroup after losing severalpanzersandthenreengagedaftercallingforartillerysupport.Afterseveralhoursoffighting,14T34s were billowing smoke and fire while several more panzers were destroyed. When theSovietspulledback,Biermeier’sbattalion resumed itsmarch towardKochetovka.At the sametimethetrailingBaumGroupwasenteringLuchkiNorth.WhenleavingtheravineasthepanzercolumnnearedKochetovka,itcouldbeseenthatthetownwasbusywithtanksandvehiclesandmenredeploying,preparingforafight.TheGermanssawtheirchancetoexploittheSovietswhowerenotreadytorespondandstartedfiringintothetown.gnk233++.zow154.After repulsing the many tank attacks and destroying so many tanks in the first days of the

campaign, Hoth believed this day would be easier and that his SS Corps would finally takeProkhorovkaaswell as establish abridgeheadon thenorthbankof thePselRiver. ItwasnotmeanttobeastheSoviets,despiteheavycasualtiesthepreviousdayplannedonkeepinguptheheavyresistanceonthegroundandintheairtoday.TheGermansdidmakegainsinallsectorsin

thesouthbutatahighcost.TheSovietAFwasalmostatparitywiththeLuftwaffeandwouldtryagaintogaincontroloftheskies.cbk67.From0700hrs,repeatedsortiesofIL-2swereaccidentallymadeagainstthe183rdRDwithin

theareathatincludedVasilevkaandHill241.6.CasualtieswerenevermadepublicbuttheSovietdefensesweresaidtobehithard.vzz288+.vzz1m.gnk193m.gnk227m.SSTK had orders to cross the Psel River on this day near Krasnyi Oktiabr and establish a

bridgeheadonthenorthernbanks.ThekeyobjectiveonemilenorthoftheriverwasHill226.6.The hill was an excellent OP and it was strongly defended. From on top of the hill, artillerywouldhaveaneasytimeshellingLAHasitheadedforProkhorovka,justsevenmilesaway.SSTKhadtotakethehillfortheirownneedsaswell,forwhilethehillwasinSoviethands,theycouldalsoshellthenewbridgehead.WhileSSTKfoughttoestablishthebridgeheadaswellasclearingthe southernbankof the river, thepanzersofLAH continued their advance along theSolotinkaRiverarea.ItwasadifficultpropositionforSSTKfortheirdivisionwasspreadoutovermileswithmuchofthedivisionstillsouthoftheriver.Inaddition,someoftheassaultgunsstayedwiththe167thIDtohelpdefendHill209.5againstrepeatedSovietattacks.PriessmovedhisHQtothewoods just southofLuchkiNorthwhichwas stillwithin rangeof theSovietguns.gnk232.gnk227m.snk78.dgr95.Theweatherwascloudybutwarmanddryshortlyafterdaybreak.Therewouldbeheavylocal

thunderstormslaterinthemorningandtheroadsslowedbutstayedpassable.TheLAH resumedits advance to the northwest andmoved throughRyliski to just south of Sukho-Solotino on theOboyanroad.AsmallLAHgroupmoveddirectlynorthandbyeveningreachedthePselRiver,amile east of Kochetovka, after driving back the 31st TC. Despite strong defenses, the SSTKcleared the 51st GRD and 52nd GRD from the area northwest of Gresnoe by 1000 hrs.Grenadiers in half tracks drovewest and crossed a branch of the Psel atVeselyi and anothergroupreachedhighgroundamileeastofKochetovkawhereitencounteredSoviettanks.Athirdgroupdrovenorth sixmiles to reach its objective,Kozlovka, on the southernbankof thePselRiver and began building a bridge as ordered. SSTK had orders to cross the Psel today andestablishabridgeheadsothepanzerscouldcrossthenextday.Thoughartillerywasbroughtupclose to the river, itwould stillbeadifficult assignment toaccomplish for just the infantryasVatutinhadassembledaheavyconcentrationofgunsinthearea.Nevertheless,itappeared,basedon early results, that it could be achieved. gnk236+. gnk227m. ztc269. zow154. wdk146+.fkk319m.LAH resumed its forwardmarchbutwas constantlybeing attackedby2ndTCand5thGTC

alongtheroadtoProkhorovka.DasReich,witharegimentofthe167thID,helditsgroundontheeastflankofthecorpsagainstrepeatedattacksfromthenorthandeastby5thGMCandelementsof 2nd GTC. The rest of 2nd GTC attacked the remaining two regiments of 167th ID but theterraininthesectorwasharshandnotsuitablefortanksand2ndGTCfailedtopenetratetheline.Despitereinforcementsduringtheday,theSovietsfailedtopushDasReichback.The5thGTCwasorderedtotravelatnighttothewestanddeployneartheOrlovkaarea,threemilessouthofthe Psel. Vatutin was making sure that 48th PzC would never reach Oboyan. dgk142. snk81.wdk147.dgk222m.dgr209m.gnk312m.nzk92.gnk193m.gnk227m.TheLAH andSSTK, attacking at the same time, smashed through the shattered 3rdMC and

drove Chernienko’s 31st TC back to Kochetovka. The LAH crossed the Solotinka River andseizedSukho-Solotino,linkingupwith11thPzD,forcingtheSoviettankersbeyondKochetovka.Byday’send,afterbeingrelievedby167thIDontheeastflank,SSTKreachedthePselRiverandafterasharpfightcapturedthevillageofKrasnyiOktiabrfromthe52ndGRDandthe11thMRBof10thTC.AlittlefurthernorthandtotheeastDasReichwasstillbeingrepeatedlyattackedby5thGTCand2ndTCandcouldnotdevotetotalresourcestothefrontalattackeither.Bytheendof theday, the192ndTBwasstillholdingHill251.2andBeregovoi.DasReichand167thIDtriedtoprotecttheeasternflankalongtheLipovyiDonetsRiverformostofthedayandwereabletoprevent5thGTCfromcapturingKalininand2ndGTCfromreachingNekhaevka.AllavailableLuftwaffeplanessupportedtheadvance.TheRedAFwasbusyalso,flyingover1,000sortiesin4th PzA sector alone. dgk140+. dgk141m. snk81. dgk222m. mhz288. vzz185. dgr89. dgr86m.dlu63m.wwf96.vzz280.zra62.zow154+.Hoth’spanzersweremakingsmallgainstowardOboyanbutatgreatcostofmenandpanzers

against1stTA’sdeterminedarmor.Ithasbeensuggestedbysomethathedivertedhismainaxistoward Prokhorovka in an attempt at finding easier prey; Oboyan was to be bypassed. Hisdwindling panzers and assault guns were to attack from the west and south toward theProkhorovka corridor. This steerage change could also aid his right flank in protecting itselfagainstaflankattackfromtheeast.Hisgoalwasalsotoenvelop,withthesupportofthe3rdPzC,theSovietsbetweentheDonetsandLipovyDonetsRiversandthencaptureProkhorovkabeforemajorreinforcementsarrived.The69thArmyunderLtGeneralKriuchenkinwasrepositionedintheProkhorovka-Donets area toprevent the above fromhappeningwhile5thGAand5thGTAwasintransit.dgk139.rkz168.All the Tigers of LAH were in the shop near Teterevino North being either maintained or

repaired.agk120.TheSSTKandLAHcontinued toadvanceagainst3rdMC,southeastofOboyan; the31stTC

hadtowithdrawbehindtheSolotinkaRivernearKochetovkaaswell.Atthesametime,the2ndTCcontinueditsattacksagainstGermantroopsalongtheapproachestoProkhorovka.DasReichand167thIDwereinchingaheadagainstthe2ndTCand5thGTCformostofthedaywhenthe5thGTCdisengagedandstartedmovingwestasperVatutin’sorders.The3rdPzCtotheeastwasstillwaybehindscheduleandnohelptoHausser.The204thRDunderColBaidakof38thArmywascalleduptohelpblockthewaytoOboyanbehindtheshattered3rdMC.Vatutinalsoattachedunits from 38th Army to Katukov’s 1st TA. dgk142. dgk139+. nzk92. dgk130m. gnk193m.gnk227m.rc201.dgk222m.dlu63m.In the afternoon, Burkov’s 10th TC began withdrawing from its position north of the

Prokhorovkaroadandbeganitsmarchwestwardto joinKatukov’s1stTAwhichwasblockingthe Oboyan road. It left its 11thMRB in place, to defend along the Psel River fromKrasnyiOktiabrtoMikhailovka,withthe52ndGRDandits178thTB,whichdefendedonPopov’s2ndTC’s flanknorthof theProkhorovkaroad. Itwas the11thMRB’s fierce resistance that slowedSSTK’s and LAH’s crossing of the Psel River as well as reaching Hill 241.6. Heavythunderstorms also slowed theGerman advancegiving a littlemore time to improvedefenses.Popovhaddeployedhisforceastridetheroad,forwardofKomsomoletsStateFarmandtheraillinerunningsouthpastIasnaiaPoliana.Withthe5thGTCalsomovingwest,theonlyothertank

corpsfacingDasReichwas2ndGTCwhichwasdeployedsouthof2ndTC.Tohelpfortifythissection of the line,Vatutinmoved the 93rdGRD and 89thGRD closer to the LipovyiDonetsRiver. Inadditionto these twodivisions, the51stGRDwasdeployedwestofKrasnyiOktiabrand the 52nd GRD was deployed east of Kransyi Oktiabr to Polezhaev while the 183rd RDdefended the corridor just east of the Psel River and the 11th MRB protected the area thatincludedKomsomoletsStateFarmandStorozhevoe.Whenthe9thGADarriveditwouldfurtherbolsterthissector.dgk166+.dgk222m.vzz185+.vzz8m.wwf109+.Attacking after being redeployed, elements of the SSTK headed north and quickly captured

Veselyi, north of Malye Maiachki, before advancing toward Hill 224.5 one mile south ofKochetovkawhere thefighting intensified.At1300hrs,GroupBeckerofSSTK struckout fromwestofOzerovskitowardKrasnyiOktiabrwiththeintentofcapturingthevillageonthesouthernbankof thePselwestofKozlovkaandVasilevkabeforeestablishingabridgeheadon thenorthbank of the Psel. Late in the day, the 10th TC had to evacuateKrasnyi Oktiabr for Kozlovkabecauseofthisadvancement.TheGermansleftthevillageheadingfortheriverbutwerehaltedonemilefromIlinski.ShiftingtheirdirectionthegroupcapturedKozlovkaat1845hrsbutwerestoppedagainbeforereachingVasilevka.Bytheendoftheday,theSSTKcontrolledalmostafourmile stretch of the southern bank of the PselRiver but failed to establish a bridgehead on thenorthernbankandtherewasstillactiveresistanceonthesouthernbank.TheGermanengineersbrought up the bridging equipment to Luchki North for when the bridgehead was establishedagainstthe52ndGRD.Tohelpwiththetask,HausserfoundabattalionofrocketlaunchersandartillerytobolstertheSSTK.Atthesametime,the48thPzCcontinuedtohitagainstthe1stTAalongandnorthof thePenaRiver inorder toprotect2ndSSPzC’s left flank.vzz156+.vzz7m.vzz9m.gnk237.gnk227m.zow154+.Aroundmidday,Hausser’s2ndPzRofSSTKarrivedatGresnoeonitswaytothePselRiver.

The artillery batteries stopped just north of Gresnoe and started setting up their guns. Soonafterwards,KarlUllrich’s3rdPzRreachedGresnoeon theirway toKrasnyOktiabr.gnk235+.gnk253m.Intheafternoon,vonManstein’sforcesadvancedtowardOboyaninthewestandKorochato

theeast.TheGermanshada20milebreachinthelineintheOboyanareaandasixmilebreachnearKorocha;vonMansteinwas sendinghis forces through thosegapsasquicklyaspossible.OnceagainRokossovskythoughtVatutinwasinerror.Hehadspreadhis6thGAforcestoothinagainst a too long of a defense belt instead of choosing key strongpoints and protecting thosepoints more fully. The Germans hadmade gains of 20miles or more in this sector.With thedecision to have 2nd SS PzC shift direction toward Prokhorovka, itwas critical thatHaussercapturetherail townbefore5thGTAarrived.VonMansteincanceledthedrivetoKorochaandturned Kempf north to help cover the SS’s flank. mhz297. dgr98. dgr93m. hjj123m. pck67m.vzz261.Acontroversyhadsprungupsincethebattleconcerningthemotivesforshiftingthemainaxis

ofattackfromOboyantoProkhorovka.Vatutin’sandtheSovietpositionhasalwaysbeenthattheshiftwasdue to stiff resistanceof6thGAand1stTA,causinganunacceptable slowingof theadvanceof48thPzC;itforcedHothtohissecondaryaxis,towardProkhorovka.HothontheotherhandstatedthathehadplannedonshiftingtotheProkhorovkaaxissincebeforethecampaign.I

personally believe there is some truth to both sides. Hoth considered the Oboyan route theprimaryandconsideredthepossibilityofusingProkhorovkaonlyifthemainaxiswasfailingandthats exactly what happened. I find it hard to believe Hoth’s intentions were to automaticallychangeaxeswithoutamplereasonstodosoandthatconvictionwashelpedalongbythesuccessthe LAH was having. His actions concerning the 48th PzC’s attack toward Oboyan stayedsteadfastafter7/8thoughhewasforcedonthedefensivebytherepeatedattacksfromthewest.Hestillpushed the48th to thenorthwestwhileLAHandSSTK launched theiroffensives to thenortheast. If theProkhorovka axiswas truly the primary axis, the handling of 48thPzC shouldhave been different. If this theory has some truth to it then one can argueHoth’s handling anddeploymentof48thPzC,especiallythePantherBrigade,fromthebeginningwasfaulty.TheGDandthe11thPzDwerethetwodrivingforcesofthecorpswhilethe52ndICandtosomeextentthe3rdPzDwerebasicallyonflankprotection.With48thPzCheadingnorthwesttowardOboyanand the SSCorps heading northeast to Prokhorovka, theGerman linewas actually expanding,makingitmuchmoredifficulttoadvanceandprotectthemselvesfromcounter-attacksatthesametime.Thisgoesagainstoneofthekeyaxiomsofattack;aconcentrationofstrength.dgk146.TheThuleregimentofSSTKattackedandcapturedVasilevkaandKozlovkabylateafternoon

fromthe52ndGRD,butwashaltedtherebytheincreasedSovietresistanceofthearriving11thMRBandhadtodefenditselfthroughoutthenightatthesevillages.SomeofthemenoftheEickeRegimentmadeittothenorthernbankofthePselinthepredawnhoursof7/10butwhenitwasshownthedivisionwasnotreadytosupportthem,theywererecalledtothesouthernbank.Whilethemenwerecrossingtheriver,afriendlyfireincidenthappened.OneoftheGermanrocketsfellshortandlandedamongthemenbutfortunatelyforthemtherewerenofatalities.FromGresnoetoKochetovka, the SSTK lost 18 panzers including three Tigers and had casualties of 88 menincluding19dead.Bytheendoftheday,SSTKstillhad81workingpanersandmostof the18damagedpanzerscouldberepaired.fkk147.gnk236+.gnk193m.gnk253m.gnk227m.The Soviet 5th GTA among other tank units were still working their defenses in the

Prokhorovkaarea.Theyhad800tanksthere.je105.gjz185.fzk54.Afterfightingforhours,theSSTKandLAHdrovethe31stTCtothenorthbankoftheSolotinka

Riverandthe6thPzRofSSTKhadseizedmoreofthesouthernbankofthePselnearthevillagesofKrasnyiOktiabrandVasilevka.Pushingtheenemybackinthissectoralsohelpedrelievesomeof the pressure off 11th PzDwhich also had a good day.By the end of the day the corps hadpassedthroughtheseconddefensivebeltandwasknockingonthedoortothethirddefensivebelt;thePselRiver.Thegainsthatdayweresevenmilesinsomeplaces,outpacingyesterday’sgainthat had actually lost ground in some places. However Vatutin, with two reserve armiesapproaching,wasstillconfidentthathisforcescouldcontaintheGermansasitwascostingtheGermansfartoomuchforthesmallgainstheyweremakingthelastthreedays.Theprevioustwoday’sarmorassaultshadbeensuccessful instopping theGermanadvanceandwith the5thGAand5thGTAquicklyapproaching,Vatutinbeganplanninganewarmorassaultthatwouldfinishoffthe2ndSSPzC.Asthe4thPzAadvancednorthwardandthesalientgrewlonger,theGermanflanks extended, and that meant more resources would be allocated to flank protection. Theadvance was clearly slowing down and with no further reserves, there was little chance ofreaching,letalonedefending,Kurskwhentheforcesgotthere.Itseemedillogicaltocontinuethe

campaign.Unlike at Stalingrad, where Marshal Zhukov had planned months in advance to draw the

Germans into thevortex thatwasStalingrad inorder toencircleanddestroy theenemy,neitherGeneralVatutinnortheStavkaappeartohavehadtheforesightthistime.Itseemstomethatthethirddefensivebeltwouldhavebeen the ideal locationand timing tospringanotherOperationUranus on the Germans. Hoth had carved out a deep enough salient and had suffered enoughcasualtiestomakehisremainingforcesvulnerabletoamassiveflankattackfromeastandwestthatwouldbetheequaloftheoriginalOperationUranus.Usingthefivearmies(5thGA,5thGTA,27th,47thand53rd)ofSteppeFront alongwith7thGA,6thGA,1stTA,69thArmyand40thArmythatwerealreadydeployedshouldhavebeenenoughtoencircletheentirefrontlineof4thPzAafterpenetratingtheflanks.vzz157+.vzz258+.gnk193m.gnk227m.dsk111.NearTeterevinoNorth,elementsofLAHpanzersheadedbyRudolfvonRibbentrop,thesonof

theForeignMinister,weremovingnorthwhen40T34sattacked.Ribbentrop’sMkIVsattacked,quicklydestroyingsixtanksandcausingtheresttoretreat.Movingon,theelementsofLAHandelementsof11thPzDjoinedforcessouthof thevillageofSolotinobymiddayandattacked thevillage,pushingthedefenderstothenorth.MoreandmoreSSTKtroopsweremovingwestfromtheeastflankduty,relievingsomeof thefrontagefromLAH.Their taskwastoclearresistancefromsouthofthePselinordertomakethecrossingaseasyaspossible.Theirfirstfocuswasthefortified village of Kochetovka which was defended by the 6th GA where the fighting wasterrible.Kochetovka,theHQlocationof6thGA,wascapturedthatafternoon,forcingChistiakovtomovehisHQtothenorthwith1stTA.TheSovietswouldregroupandalwayscounter-attackeverygaintheGermansmade,makingthisbattleanotherwarofattrition.mhz294+.swm141.The2ndGTCcontinueditsattackon2ndSSPzC’srightflank(DasReich)alongtheLipovyi

Donets, southofTeterevinoNorth.Thoughpersistent,Burdeinydidnothavemuchsuccessandorderedhistanksbacktotheirstartpositions.dgk167.dgk130m.dgk124m.dgk222m.dlu63m.Tobeclosertohisdivision,MajGeneralWischmovedhisHQtothewoodssouthofLuchki

North,arrivingthereby1600hrs.zrl223.The Soviets began seeing theGermans change their tactical behavior that evening along the

entireline.TheGermanswerebecomingmoredefensiveinthought(digginginandbuildingwireobstacles)asiftheywererunningoutofsteamandneededafallbackpositionincasetheirattackfizzled.Italsoseemedtheprotectionoftheflankshadhigherpriority.ThisactionwasnoticeableonHill258.2andatNekhaevkaandLuchkiSouth.vzz153.vzz185.vzz3m.AtnightvonMansteinorderedLAHpanzerstocontinuetheirtrektothenorthwesttowardthe

SolotinkaRiver to relieve thepressureoff11thPzD’s east flank.TheLAH grenadierson theireast flankwere ordered to continue their drive towardVinogradovka, a little over fourmilessouth of Prokhorovka.The grenadiers inflicted heavy casualties on the 2ndTC and 183rdRDwhowereblockingtheirway.DasReichwouldcontinueitsdrivetotheeastagainst2ndGTC,375thRDand81stGRD.TheSSTKhadevenmoredemandingobjectives.ItwastocrossthePselRiver, establishabridgeheadon thenorth sideandbuildabridgeacross to allow thepanzersoveraswell.wdk150.Fightingallday,whileleadunitsofSSTKcrossedthePselandestablishedasmallbridgehead

onthenorthbank, thebulkof thedivision tried tofollowbutwasstoppedatHill241.6which

was defended by the 11th MRB. The 2nd TC moved into a defensive position along theProkhorovkaroadnearIasnaiaPolianaaftertheirattackfailed.Tomakemattersworse,BolshieMaiachkiwastakenfromthe242ndTBof31stTCearlyinthemorning.The237thTBof31stTChadtofallbackbehindGresnoetothePselRiver,allthewhileprotectingitsflankatTeterevinowhichwasbeingattackedbyDasReich.dgk166.dgk134.dgk211m.nzk92.dgk130m.At2030hrs,GeneralHothradioedhiscorpscommandersthatalargearmorcolumnwasseen

headingwestfromStaryOskolandthatitwasmoreimportantthanevertotakeProkhorovkaandcrossthePselthenextday.Hethentransmittedformalordersforthefollowingday.LAHwastodriveonProkhorovkawhileSSTK crossed the river and drove onHill 226.6, and if possiblereachedtheKartashevkaroad.DasReichwastostaydefensivewhileprotectingtherightflankofLAH.The48thPzCwastocontinueclearingresistancefromthePenaBend.HothhadanticipatedthatreinforcementswoulddrivetoProkhorovkafromtheeastsincebeforethecampaignstartedandheexpectedKempftointercept,providingascreenfortheSSdrivingnorth,butKempfhadmade littleprogress andwas too far behind to help the 2ndSSPzC andyetHoth did little toresolvetheissue.zow155.Late at night theLAH redeployed andwas in a better position to begin their assault toward

ProkhorovkawithDasReich inthemorning.TotheleftofLAH,SSTKwasstill taskedtoclearthesouthernbanksofthePselRiverareainthemorningdespitenothavingtheentiredivisiononthefrontline.HothhadcalledGeneralPriessduringthenighttoreinforcetheneedtoestablishasecurebridgeheadoverthePselandbepreparedtosupportLAHinitsdriveonProkhorovka.TheGermans had to be in control of the corridor before the 5th GTA arrived.Das Reich’s firstobjective after securing Teterevino was to travel the Teterevino-Prokhorovka road whichparalleled the railway for nine miles and capture Hill 252.4, located a mile and half to thenorthwestofProkhorovka.Thisplanwasneverlaunchedorrealized.wwf92.dgk222m.mhz305.vzz1m.vzz11m.nzk92.At 2215hrsMajGeneralWischordered that once 2ndPzGRhadpenetrated the line of the

KomsomoletsStateFarmnextmorning theReconBattalionofLAHwas tomove forward and,avoidingasmuchfightingaspossible,sneakpastKSF,Hill241.6andOktiabrskiStateFarmandthenattackandcaptureHill252.4,northwestofProkhorovka,directlysituatedinthecenterofthecorridortoKursk.Theorderwasoverambitiousandillogicalanditneversucceeded.vzz177.vzz9m.Lateatnight,theleadunitsof5thGTAmovedtotheBobryshevoareanorthofProkhorovkato

waitfortheGermanforcethathadjustcapturedKochetovkaandwasinchingtowardthecorridortoKursk.The5thGAalsomovedup.Vatutincommitted1stTAbutwasworriedhistankforceswould not hold up. With the modest gains made in the area the last few days, Hoth alsoredeployedtheirforcesforthecomingmajorassault.Hothstartedthedaywith599panzersbuttheyweredownto501workingpanzersby theendof thedayandanymajorassaultwouldbedifficultwiththe5thGAand5thGTAnowclosetoProkhorovka.Healsoestimatedthatatleast500 Red tanks had been completely destroyed in his sector. Hoth was still confident that hisforceswerestillstrongenoughtoreachKursk,still50milesfromhiscurrentfrontline.HothandvonManstein underestimated Soviet reserves and in reality did not havemuch of a chance ofreachingKurskattheirpresentrate,especiallywithKempflaggingbehindandwithSSTKleaving

theLipovyiregionforthePselsector.wwf92.bt86.mhk288.nzk92.gnk193m.gnk227m.dgr86m.TheGermanoffensivewasshortonpanzersandinfantry.Whiletheywereusingthepanzerson

thefrontattack,artillerywasbeingusedasasubstituteforlackofpanzersonthesides.FromnearHill 219.8, where several German soldiers were captured, it was also learned from prisonerinterrogationsfromthatrearareathatnon-combatpersonnelwerebeingbroughtuptotheline;aclear indicationthat4thPzAwasrunningoutofcombat troops. Itwasafact thatmadeVatutin,afterreadingareportoftheinterrogations,smileforthefirsttimetoday.vzz260.Shortly before midnight Hoth, after receiving the latest air reconnaissance report, called

HaussertoinformhimthatalargegroupofSoviettanks(5thGTA)werespottedneartheOskolRiver headingwest and reminded him that itwas critical to take Prokhorovka andHill 252.4before the tanks arrived in sector.ThenextdayHoth received additional evidence from reconpatrolsthatnewreinforcements(5thGA)weremovingintothebendofthePselRiver.Hausser,relaying the news, then emphasized the importance of taking control of the Psel River andProkhorovkabeforethesenewforcesbecameoperationaltohisdivisioncommanders.vzz296+.pck53.vzz181.BytheendofthedaytheGermanadvancewasboggingdown.TheactiveSovietdefenseswere

wearingdowntheattackingGermanforces.At 2300 hrs, Rotmistrov ordered the 18th TC to deploy north of the Psel River along the

villagesofVeselyi,Polezhaev,PrelestnoeandAleksandrovski.Inaddition,the5thGMCwassentto the Zapselets River area, nearVeseyli, to guard 18th TC’swestern flankwhere SSTK wasmakingprogress.Muchofthe5thGTAhadarrivedorwouldarrivewithinthenexttwelvehours.The5thGAhadarrivedintheProkhorovkaareatodayaswell.The32ndGRCand33rdGRCof5thGAhaddeployedsince0430hrsthatmorningandwerecurrentlybuildingadefense.The5thGTAwoulddeployfor themostpartbehindthesecorps.While the5thGAwasunpreparedforbattle,the52ndGRD,11thMRBaswellasthe26thTBand99thTBof2ndTCwoulddefendthefrontlinenearthePselRiverforthenext24hours.The169thTBtotheeastwascurrentlyintheStorozhevoe area. Between Storozhevoe and along the Psel River, the 5thGMC and 18th TCweretheprimarymobileunitsdefending.The5thGTC,whichwasinterribleconditionbythistime,waspulledoff thelineandsent toKrasnoe.The10thTCdefendingtheProkhorovkaaxishad been ordered west to the Psel but was unable to quickly disengage, disrupting Vatutin’stimetable.The32ndGRCconsistedof13thRD,66thGRDand6thGADunderthecommandofMajGeneralRodimtsevwhoplayedsuchanimportantpartinkeeping6thArmyawayfromtheVolgalongenoughforMarshalZhukovtolaunchOperationUranus.The33rdGRCconsistedofthe95thGRD,97thGRDand9thGADunder thecommandofMajGeneralPopov.vzz180++.wwf94.AtnightHothrevisedordersfor2ndSSPzC.LAHinitsdriveforProkhorovkawastonarrow

its attack axis and concentrate its strength at the tip of the spearwhileDas Reich was to putpressureontheireasternflanktorelievepressureoffof3rdPzCinorderforKempftoadvancemore quickly.Hoth did not like the terrain south ofOboyanwhich gave the Soviets an undueheightadvantageplusthePselRiverwasalsoanotherobstaclethathedidnotfavor.Hewouldhave to advance north of theTeterevino-Novenkoye line, 16miles south ofOboyan, to gain asuitablebattleground.Also theSovietswerebuildingaconcentrationof tanksatProkhorovka,

about30milesnortheastofBelgorod.IfHothcontinuedtowardOboyanthesetankscouldattackHoth’srightflankputtinghiminseveretroublewithouttheaidofKempf.AlsobymovingtowardProkhorovka,the2ndSSPzCand3rdPzCwouldremaincloserandbeabletohelpdefendeachother.MakingOboyan such a high priority for 48th PzCwas amistake, considering themanystrongpointsandterribleterrainithadtotraverse.Ithasbeensuggestedthatif48thPzChadtakentheeasternflankinsteadof3rdPzCthat48thPzCcouldhavemadegreaterprogressthan3rdPzC,linking with Das Reich before 7/12 and together could have supported LAH in takingProkhorovkaonthatpivotalday.If inthisnewscenario3rdPzChadstayedeastof theVorsklaRiver line, theycouldhaveavoided thehazardous terrainofPenaRivervalleywheresomanystrongpointshadbeenbuilt,givingthemabetterchancetodefendthewestflankalongwith52ndIC.dgk146.snk67.snk72+.dgk124m.lck320+.kcz168+.The52ndGRDwasonceagaindeployedalongacriticalsector.The151stGRRof52ndGRD

was holding the line from north of Kliuchi to Hill 226.6. The 155th GRR held the line fromsoutheastofKliuchitoHill226.6.The153rdGRRdeployedfromHill226.6toPolezhaev.The52ndGRDdisplayed courage and fortitude throughout the campaign anddeservingofVatutin’sgratitude.vzz182.gnk312m.Bytheendoftheday,the1stTAand6thGAandsupportingreserves,forthemostpart,hadso

farcontainedtheGermanadvanceinfrontofthethirddefensivebelt.Itisalsotruethat3rdPzChadfailedtopenetratethelineandengagedtherearof7thGAand69thArmyalongtheDonetsRiversinanymeaningfulway.dgr95.dgr92m.The8thFliegerCorpsflew1,621sortiesandclaimedlosingelevenaircraft.nzk77.SSTKforcesbrokeintothethirddefensivebeltandwereplanningbynextdaytocrossthePsel

River,thelastmajornaturalbarriertoKursk.AsmallbridgeheadwasquicklyestablishedonthenorthbankbyUllrich’sgrenadiersbytakingVasilevka,KozlovkaandthenKrasnyOktiabrbeforetheSovietscouldcounter-attack.PriesswasfirsttoreporttoHaussertheconditionofhispanzerregiment. There were 114 working panzers and assault guns which included 32 assault guns.rc201.wwf95.vzz1m.gnk193m.gnk227m.ztc269.The lead units of 5th GTA started arriving in the Bolshie Seti-Pristennoe-Glafirovka area,

about15milesnorthofProkhorovka.Ofthe721tanksandSPGsthatstartedthetrek227tanksbrokedownandneededrepairs.By1700hrson7/11,101tankswererepairedandontheirwayto Prokhorovka. The 18th TC was then ordered to deploy behind the infantry in front ofProkhorovka.vzz167.ick319.By the endof theday,LAH, nowwith thehelpofSSTK, hadwidened its salient to include

Sukho-SolotinointhewestandcapturedKrasnyiOktiabrinthenorthwhichwasnearthesouthernbanksof thePsel.LAHdidnotgaina lotofnewgroundbutspentmuchof thedayondefense,reducingresistanceintheareatheyalreadyhad.LAHcounteditscasualtiessincethestartofthecampaign:283dead,1,282woundedand30missing.Withtheadvancesmadeby48thPzCandthe2ndSSPzCtodaytheGermanscontrolledtheareabetweenthePenaRiverinthewestandtheLipovyiRivertotheeastandtothenorth;thePselwassotantalizinglyclose.lck318.LAHclaimedthedestructionof17tankswhiletheothertwoSSdivisionsclaimedanother38

tanksandassaultguns.Thisclearlyshowedthecorpswastryingtostabilizeitspositionbeforeadvancingfurther.wdk149.

Theforwardunitsofthe5thGTAbeganarrivingbehindthePselRiver-Prokhorovkalineafterdark.Trailingunitswere still in theBobryshevo-Marinoarea,up to50milesbehind. Itwouldtakethenext24hoursfor5thGTAtocompletetheirtrek.dgr90.dgr86m.Hoth let his 4th PzA rest and regroup for the morning and ordered their advance in late

afternoontowardProkhorovka,butcouldmakeonlymarginalprogressintheVerkhopenie-SukhoSolotino-Kochetovka sector.The4thPzAhadelementsof5panzerdivisionsalongwith4 IDsprotectingtheirflanksanditwasmakingitdifficulttodrivealongtheOboyanandProkhorovkaroads with such a large force devoted to the flanks and not the main axis. je104. dgk222m.dgr209m.SSTK, after takingKochetovka (HQ of 6thGA),moved east to assistLAH by attacking the

fortifiedridge,Hill241.6,thathadacommandingviewofthePselRiverareatothenorthaswellasthecorridortoKursk.TheGermanspoundedtheridgebeforeattackingandwereabletopushtheSovietsoffit.The24thGTBregrouped,launchingacounter-attackthatlastedpastdark,buteventuallySSTKprevailedandtheSovietstankershadtofallback.Thetanksof5thGTAweredesperately needed butmostwere still 60miles away. Zhadov’s 5thGAwith its 80,000menwerecomingtohelpdefendthePselRiver.Bytheendoftheday,withthereinforcementscoming,theGermansdivertedtheirforcestowardProkhorovkaandwith48thPzCfocusedmoreontheirflankthanfront,Vatutinwasbecomingconfidentthattheworstwasoverandthathisforceswereincontrol.It has been argued that Hoth faulted in sending panzer regiments fromLAH andDas Reich

towardthewest thatday.Bytheendoftheday, theSS’ssuccessfuldefenseof itseasternflankagainst themajor tankoffensivegave it a realopportunity tocaptureProkhorovka thenextdaywhentheSoviettankcorpswereindisarray,ifthefullpanzerregimentswerenotnearSolotinka.The panzers of both divisions were too far west to advance early the next morning to takeProkhorovka. The heavy rains during the night and into the morning of the 10th only madelogisticsworse.gnk251++.gnk193m.gnk227m.Ingeneralthe4thPzA’slinehadfullypenetratedtheseconddefensebeltandextendedthefront

line that included from west to east: Novoselovka, Kochetovka, Verkhopenie, Berezovka,IakovlevoandTeterevinoNorth.ThequesttothispointfortheGermanswastortuousandcostlyandtheirmomentumwasslowing.Itisestimatedthat4thPzAhadonly500workingpanzersplussomeintherepairshop.wwf96.gnk193m.gnk227m.At0035hrs,GeneralBurkov’s10thTCwasrelievedof itsdefensesbetweenVasilevkaand

KomsomoletsStateFarminordertoconcentrateitsforcestothewestintheVladimirovkaarea,afewmilessouthofOboyan,tostrengthenthedefensesblockingtheOboyanroad.The2ndTCtookovertheiroriginalposition.ColBaidak’s204thRDof38thArmywasalsotransferredto1stTAinto thisarea for further strengthening.Other formationswerealsobroughtup to thisarea.ColDremin’s 309th RD was moved to the line that included from Oboyan road east to PeresyplocatedonthePselRiver,afewmileswestofVeselyi.GeneralVatutinwasputtingtoomuchfaithin5thGA,andespecially5thGTA,indefeatingtheSSandwassendingtoomanyforcesfromthecorridorovertoinfrontofOboyan.Hehadalreadysufficientforcesinthewesttohandlethe48thPzCandsomeoftheunitsmovedfromtheeasterncorridorwouldhavebeenbetterutilizedwheretheywereagainsttheSS.dgr90.gnk245.dgk139.

At 0400 hrs, elements ofGD resumed their march toward Verkhopenie. By 0700 hrs, theyslowlyfoughttheirwayintothefortifiedvillagehavingtofightahousetohousebattletoclearit.Theeasternhalfwassecuredby0830hrsbutthewesternsidewasharderandtooklonger.Whentheeastsidewassecured,elementsofGDwerereleasedtoheadnorthtowardNovoselovkaandHill260.8.ColonelStrachwitzdidnotgetfarwhenacolumnofT34scomingfromHill240.4,justwest and a little south ofNovoselovka, attacked.Strachwitzwas able to push theSovietsbacktothevillagebuttheprepareddefensesatthevillagewereabletostoptheGermanadvance.Strachwitz pulled back and waited for reinforcements. mhz289. dgr209m. lck314. gnk239.gnk193m.gnk312m.gnk227m.pck71.dgk143.GeneralMickl’s 11th PzD launched at 0400 hrs; the 111th PzGR on the right and the 110th

PzGR in the center as they traveled north along the Oboyan road. The Schimmelmann panzergroupwason the left.Thedivisiondiscoveredaminefield southof Ilinskiwhichwasquicklycleared. The column then crested a hill just past the village and the remains of the 3rd MCdefendingHill260.8openedfireontheGermans.Thebarragewassointensethatthepanzershadtobackupbehindthehilltheyhadjustclimbedtosavethemselves.GDhadbeenorderedtotakethehillthatdaybutfailedtodoso.KnobelsdorffbroughtcorpsartillerytobearonthehillandorderedtheLuftwaffewhichhadhitthehillearliertohititagain.Oncethebarragehadended,thetwoGermanunits assaulted thehill.Attacking thishillwas the first time theGermans saw thedevastating power of a SU122 assault gun. Two direct hits on panzers utterly destroyed them.While the panzers were waiting for the shelling and aerial bombing to end, the 110th PzGRattackedthe51stGRDatPokrovski,northeastofVerkhopenie,forcingtheSovietstofallbacktothenorth.TotheeastofVerkhopenie,the339thPzGRcapturedKrasnyiPolianabeforemovingonandoccupyingthenearbyvillageofBeregovoe,justtothenorth.AtthesametimethatPokrovskiwas captured by the 110th PzGR, the 111th PzGR was driving toward the village of SukhoSolotino,duenorthofKrasnyiPoliana.gnk244+.gnk193m.vzz2m.gnk227m.dgr91.After dawn under a cloudy sky, the Fusilier Regiment of GD resumed its advance from

VerkhopenietothenortheasttowardNovoselovkaandHill240.4,northofNovoselovka.Beforearrivingatitsobjective,theregimentwasattackedandhalted.OtherelementsofGDwereontheroad as well and were heading for Hill 260.8, south and a little east of Novoselovka whichstretchedalongtheroadtoOboyan.The11thPzDontheeastoftheroadwaspreparingtolaunchan attack northward as well. Another battalion ofGD stayed at Verkhopenie to clear the lastresistancefromthetownandthewestbankofthePenaRiver.By0900hrs,thefortresstownofVerkhopeniewas secured.As theFusiliers approachedHill 240.4,Soviet tanks cameover therise and attacked butwere repulsed.GD continued pastHill 240.4 andwas approachingHill243.0whentheywereattackedagain.Afterabriefbattle,GDcapturedHill243.0butstoppedonthe hill to regroup. They lost three panzers in the engagement. hsz125+. fkk269. gnk193m.gnk312m.gnk227m.dgk143+.During thepredawnhours,3rdPzD’sengineers completedabridgeover the tributaryof the

PenaRiver,justwestofLukhanino.ThedivisionwasplanningtomovenorthtohelpsupportGDbuttheRedAirForceflewoverjustbeforedawn,destroyingthebridge.Westhoven,frustratedbytheslowprogress,changedhisattackplanontakingLukhanino.HeorderedhispanzerstomovefromthesouthoftowntotheeastwhichmeantthepanzershadtodrivethroughDubrovabefore

turningtowardtheeastsideofLukhanino.The394thPzGRremainedinthesouthtocontinuetokeepthesoutherndefensesoccupied.By1400hrs,Westhoven’spanzershadfoughttheirwaytoHill 218.5 east of Syrtsevo. At the same time on the west flank, Pz Abt 3 failed to takeAlekseevkaagainst strong resistance.By theendof thedayanddespitemodestgainsmadeby394thPzGRandthepanzergroup,LukhaninowasstillinSoviethands.The3rdPzDstartedthiscampaignwithlessthan100panzersandjustdidnothavethestrengthtoholdtheirownagainstsuchstrongresistance.gnk216.gnk193m.gnk227m.At0600hrs,asquadronofGermanplanesbombedtheVerkhopenie-Novoselovkaareainfront

of the advancing GD division. At the end of the day, Knobelsdorff signaled Major GeneralSeidemannoftheexcellentcoveragetheLuftwaffeprovidedforthe48thPzC.LAHalsoreceivedquality air support as it shifted its advance to the northeast toward Prokhorovka.Vatutinmusthave brought up additional flak guns, as theLuftwaffe pilots bitterly complained of increasedresistance.Bytheendoftheday,the8thFliegerCorpsreporteddowning38Sovietaircraftbutalsolosing28planes.TheVVSreportedlosing32planes.Byprovidingbetterescortprotection,theSovietswereable toreduce thenumberofplanesbeing lost.Theyalsohad improved theirrecon reporting and theVVSwas now responding to sectorswho needed air support quicker.cbk68+.At0700hrs,SovietbombersandfightersmaderepeatedstrikesagainstGermanconcentrations

atVerkhopenie,KrasnaiaPoliana,Sukho,Sukho-SolotinoandKochetovka.At0800hrs,SovietinfantrydrovetowardGermanpositionsalongthis line.At0830hrs, theLuftwaffearrivedandescalated thebattle.By1130hrs,60panzershadpenetrated the lineand reached the southeastoutskirtsofVerkhopenieandalittlelaterasecondpincerattackedthesouthernborder.The3rdMC and the 67th RD defending the town fought back and repaired the gaps in the lines buteventuallytothewestofVerkhopenie,the67thRDwasforcedtofallbacktoKalinovkabyGD.The panzerswere able to fight throughVerkhopeniewhichwas defendedby 1stTB, 49thTB,180thTBandthe203rdTRandheadforNovoselovka.OtherelementsofGDfollowed67thRDbutwere unable to break intoKalinovka.Before reaching the town, the 86thTBand67thRDmovedupandstoppedtheGermanadvance.Justoutsidethetown,31stTCdeniedanypassagethatgotbythe86thTB.At1500hrs,60Stukasandfightersflewinandattackedthe3rdMCand31stTCthatweredefendingtheOboyanHighway.fkk88.fkk323m.dgr209m.gnk193m.gnk227m.dgr91.dgr86m.At the same time that Soviet planes made bombing runs along Verkhopenie, the leading

elementsofGDresumedtheirattackonthetownafterhavingpulledbacktoregroupforthenight.Thesebattalionswerehopingtherestofthedivisionwouldshowupbutwhentheydidnot,theyhadtoadvancewithoutthem.Fortunately,soonaftermovingforward,GroupStrachwitzarrivedwiththeir39panzersandstartedfiringonthenorthernhalfofthetownfromthesouthernedgeoftown.Thetownwasbeingdefendedbyelementsofthe200thTB.TheLuftwaffealsoappearedandstartedbombingtheshrinkingpocket.StrachwitzhadtenTigersandtenPanthersremaining.Asmoreofthedivisionarrived,theyweredirectedpast thetowntowardHill260.8.gnk240+.cbk64..The48thPzCorderedtheGDand11thPzD,withsupportoftheLuftwaffe,toadvanceonand

captureHill260.8whichwasdefendedby6thTC.The3rdPzDand332ndIDwouldjoininand

attackSovietdefenseswestofVerkhopenie.ThenGDwouldmoveonHill243.2(northwestofVerkhopenie)whichoverlookedthePenaRiverandHill247.2whichoverlookedthewithdrawalroutesalongtheBerezovka-Ivnia-Kruglikroad.The48thPzCwouldthenmoveonOboyanatthesame time 2nd SS PzCmoved on Prokhorovka.Das Reich was currently advancing along theLipovyiDonetsRiver,tryingtoreachPavorot.FromthereitwoulddrivenorthtoprotectLAH’seastflankwhenattackingProkhorovkabutevenwithgivingupfronttothe167thID,SSDRwasstillhaving troubleadvancingagainst suchstiff resistanceandwouldnotbe there tohelp theircomrades.dgk133+.dgr172m.dgk222m.dlu63m.fkk269.dgr209m.gnk312m.snk78.fmz221m.The48thPzCwas taskedwithcontinuing itsdrivenorthalong theOboyanroad,pushing the

enemy back to the Psel River and capturing the ridge between Kochetovka and north ofNovoselovka.Thecorpswasalsoresponsibleforencirclinganddestroyingthe6thTCwhileitwas on the west side of Pena River. The 52nd IC was to engage the enemy at and south ofBerezovkaandatthesametimeassist48thPzCinthedestructionof6thTConthebanksofthePena. The 2nd SS PzC was to continue its drive in the Pokrovka-Beregovoe-Sukho Solotinosector.DasReichwastoholdtheLuchki-Teterevinolineagainstallattacks.Withmoreinfantryandarmorcrossingto thesouthernbanksof thePsel,2ndSSPzCwouldfindtheirassignmentshard toaccomplish.TheLuftwaffewas activeon thisday, flyinganestimated1,500 sorties insupportofthismajordriveby48thPzC.fkk143+.fkk323m.dgr91.gnk227m.By1000hrs,the309thRD,originallyof40thArmy,hadreacheditsnewdefensivepositionon

the west flank from Malinovoe woods through Melovoe woods to just outside of Olkhovka.dgr90.gnk245.VonMansteinmovedthepanzersof3rdPzDalongasixmilefronttowardBerezovka.The3rd

PzD made progress on the left flank west of Rakovo-Kruglik road and thus gained a betterposition for anenvelopingattack from the left againstBerezovka.Fightingalldayand into thenight,ittook3rdPzDabout15hourstotakethefortifiedtown.TheGDinthecenterof48thPzCsector made less progress than expected against increased resistance. dgk222m. dgk130m.gnk193m.wwf92.gnk227m.The10thTCattackedalongtheHill258.2-Berezovkafrontwhichwasdefendedby3rdPzD.

Pz Abt 3 launched several flanking counter-attacks, destroying several T34s and driving theSovietsbacknearHill258.2.The10thTCeventuallyfellbackfromtheirattacktoregroupbeforetryingasecondtimetodislodgethe3rdPzDfromthisimportantarea.Whentheyfailedagain,the10thTCwouldbebackthenextmorningtotryagain.fkk254+.fkk323m.gnk193m.gnk227m.Inthemorning,GDand11thPzDofKnobelsdorff’’s48thPzCadvancedonabroadfrontfrom

KrasnaiaDubrovatowardNovoselovkabutbytheday’senddidnotcapturethetownduetothestiffresistanceofthe309thRD,86thTBandthemanytankditchesthatwereduginfrontofthetown.The11thPzDhadadvancedon theroad toOboyan,penetrated the3rdMCandcapturedHill260.8,southofNovoselovkaandlinkedupwithLAH,northofSukho-Solotino.Thiswasanimportantlinkagebecausethe6thGAhadbeenattackingthisexposedflankthelasttwodays.Theboundary between the two German divisions still was not strong but at least it was animprovement. TheGD on 11th’s left also advanced past Verkhopenie to the northeast towardNovoselovkaandHill240.4tothewestoftown.AtHill240.4,avicioustankbattleensuedwiththe86thTB.Stukaswerecalledintoassist.The3rdPzDhadbeenstoppedinfrontofHill244.8

andcouldnotassist.dgk142+.dgk222m.dgr209m.gnk312m.OnthisFridaymorning,theGD,nexttothe3rdPzD,wasnowsituatednorthwest,northeastand

westofNovoselovkabutsouthofHill244.8whichalsolayalongsidetheOboyanroad.Majorelements ofGD deployed north ofVerkhopeniewere about to assaultNovoselovkawhen theyreceived new orders. While the part ofGD that was farthest north would screen for Sovietreinforcementsmovingsouth,therestofGDwouldveer90degreestothewestandheadforHill251andHill247.2,northwestofVerkhopenietohelp3rdPzDagainsttheconstantattacksfrom6thTCand90thGRD.Afterhelping3rdPzD,theGDmovednorthofVerkhopenieagainandby2200hrshad reachedPoint1.3where theywereattacked. Insteadofengaging,GD fell backalittleandwaitedformorning.GDhadarelativelygooddaythatday,helpingitselfinitsnortherlytrek while helping 3rd PzD, but the division still had not secured Hill 240.4, west ofNovoselovka,whichwasanobjectivefortheday.WithGDmovingwesttohelp3rdPzD,ithadputgreater strainon11thPzD tohold thenorthern line.With theblockageof theOboyan roadfairlysecured,VatutinwasmovingreinforcementstothefarwesttoattacktheflanksofGD,3rdPzD,255thIDand332ndIDof52ndICinordertokeepthemfromhelpingthenorthernadvance.dgk144+.dgk222m.fkk87.dgr209m.dgr155m.dgr173m.hsz126.Ontheextremewesternflank,theSovietshadceasedtheirattackson52ndICwhichallowed

the Germans to recapture Voskhod, southwest of Korovino. It was then learned that SovietreserveswerebeingbroughtupandthisquiettimemeanttheSovietswerepreparingforalargerattack.vzz170.By1030hrs and after fighting since thedaybefore, 3rdPzDhad capturedhalf ofSyrtsevo.

While the infantry fought for the restof thevillage,GermanengineerswerealreadybuildingabridgeoverthePenatributarythatwouldallowSchmidt-Ott’s56panzerstocrosstheriverandheadnorth.WhenthebridgewasfinishedthepanzerregimentcrossedandheadedslowlyduetothemuddyroadstowardVerkhopenie.Onthewaytotheirobjectivetwosmallhillsweretaken.BythetimethepanzersreachedVerkhopenie,muchofthefightingwasoverandGDwasfinishingthe securing of the town.By the end of the day, the 3rd PzDwas still fighting to secure bothSyrtsevoandLukhanino.Withthedelayof3rdPzDintakingthesevillages,theywereunabletodrive north of the Pena River to supportGD from flank attacks, which in turn slowedGD’snorthernadvance.gnk243.gnk193m.nzk92.gnk227m.GDand11thPzDhadacoordinatedattackintheVerkhopeniesector.Bothdivisionswereto

launchat the same timeand later in themorning linkup tobeginphase twoof theiroperation.PanzersattachedtoGDattackedfromnearHill242.1,westoftheOboyanroadandthreemilessouthofHill260.8butwereimmediatelystoppedbyheavyshellingfromthehill.IttookGD90minutes to get past the hill and start their drive in securing Verkhopenie and the immediatesurroundingareaontheeastsideoftheriver.Sovietartillerywasstillinthenorthernpartoftownandcausingmuchhavocwith11thPzDtotheeast.NotknowingGDhadbeendelayed,11thPzDproceeded to attack and capture Ilinski but once there started receiving heavy shelling fromSovietartilleryfromHill260.8,nearlythreemilesnorthofVerkhopenie.ThehillhadcompletedominanceovertheflatlandtoitsimmediatesouthandtheSovietartilleryforcedthe11thPzDtofallbackuntilhelparrived.This lackofcommunicationbyGDwas inexcusable.Theydidnoteven report their delaywith CorpsHQ.WhenKnobelsdorff heard of 11th PzD’s problem, he

switchedairsupportfromGDtothe11thPzD.ElementsofGDadvancedpastVerkhopenieandstartedmarchingtowardHill260.8.BythistimemostoftheLuftwaffesupportingthissectorwasdirectedtowardthishill.gnk240+.WhileGD fought forcontrolof theVerkhopeniesector,11thPzDwasadvancingon itswest

flankinordertojoinupwithelementsofGD.Together,afterVerkhopeniewassecured,theyweretodrivenorthandcapturethefortifiedvillageofDolgionthewestsideoftheBerezovka-Kruglikroad,justsouthoftheTolstoeWoods.WhileGDand11thPzDadvancedonDolgi,the3rdPzDresumed its attack on the Pena River line. The 332nd ID was also advancing toward Dolgi.KnobelsdorffwasplanningonsqueezingtheSovietforcesdeployedwithinthePenaRiverbendbetweenthesefourdivisions.TheGermanscouldnotallowSovietforcestoremaininthissectorif they had any chance of reaching Oboyan. The flaw in the plan was thinking the 332nd IDwithoutanyarmorsupportcouldtravelthefivemilestoDolgithroughSovietheldterritory.Whenthe332ndID launched, it soonboggeddown;Hoth foundLuftwaffe support toget thedivisionstartedagain.The332ndIDnevermadeittoDolgi.TheGermansdidpocketsomeSovietforcesbutfellfarshortoftheintendedobjective.gnk239+.gnk193m.gnk227m.The1stTAand6thGAfacing48thPzCmadeonlyminorattacksandinsomecasesfellback.

The3rdMCwasstillholdingthelineonthePenaRiverfromKrasnaiaDubrovainthesouthtoNovoselovkaonthenorth,withthe67thGRDopposingthewestflankofthe48thPzC.Someofthepressureonthewestflankwasrelievedwhenthe3rdPzD,usingallitspanzers,fewerthan100panzers,forcedthe6thTCacrossthePenaRiver,westofKrasnaiaDubrova,afterrepeatedattacks. From north ofKrasnaiaDubrova up toNovoselovka, thewestern linewas still beingdefendedby200thTBof6thTCand67thGRD.The3rdPzDfollowed,crossingtherivernorthof Alekseevka while continuing its attack in the Syrzevo area on the east bank of the river.wdk148.hjj121m.hjj117m.OntheroadtoOboyan,sixGermandivisionsincludingthreepanzersmadeanalloutattemptto

breachthethirdSovietdefensebeltbeforeOboyan.Twocolumns,onewith200panzersandtheotherwith60,triedtobattertheirwaythroughT34s,infantryandobstacles,andwiththeSovietairforcetryingtostopthem.TheGermanspenetratedthelineandreachedKochetovka,theHQofChistiakovwhofellbackwithhis6thGA.Chiefofstaff,Penkovsky,stayedwiththetroopswhileChistiakov set up his newHQ further to the rear. TheGermanswere nowwithin 12miles ofOboyanbutthelastfewdayshadbeencostlyinmenandpanzersandtheirmomentumwasquicklyslowing. The German axis was shifting from Oboyan to the northeast to the high ground atProkhorovka.There,theGermanscouldbypassOboyan.je104+.kcz168+.Knobelsdorffsentmuchofhis48thPzCtocaptureNovoselovkabutafterfightingalldaythe

village remained inSoviethands.The11thPzDunderMichldroveup theOboyanroad,brokethrough3rdMCandseizedHill260.8,southofNovoselovkaand linkedupwithLAHnorthofSukho-Solotino. They were stopped by the 309th RD and heavy artillery fire south ofNovoselovka.NovoselovkawasnortheastofVerkhopenie.The48thPzCand2ndSSPzCwerebeingslowlyseparatedasthe2ndSSwasheadingtowardProkhorovka.dgk142.snk81.wdk147.dgk222m.dgr209m.gnk312m.East of theOboyan road, a combat group from11th PzDunderGeneralBalck andwith the

supportofpanzersfromGDinthearea,tookHill260.8whichwasthearea’shighestelevation

andanimportantsteppingstonetoadvancingonNovoselovka.GroupStrachwitzofGDresumedhis drive northward in the direction of Hill 240.4. West and north of Verkhopenie,GD wasslowedbyheavyflankingfireonHill243.0,delayingitsarrivalatHill260.8tohelpsecureitand the surrounding areawith11thPzD.TheHillwasdifficult to takedue to themanydug-intanks waiting there.With the help of theLuftwaffe and the rocket regiment, the Soviets wereforcedoffthehill.Threepanzerswerelostinthecapture.Afterthehill,GDmovedontowardthefortifiedvillageofNovoselovka.ThenearbyHillHFwascapturedintheprocessofassaultingNovoselovka. Other elements of GD moved off toward Hill 258.2, three miles west ofVerkhopenie to secure it, which would help 3rd PzD catch up. At 1900 hrsGD resumed itsadvancenorthofVerkhopeniebutwasquicklyblockedby30tanks.Insteadoftacklingthetanks,Strachwitz pulled back for the night, deciding to do battle in themorningwhen hismenwererested. Only 25 tanks were destroyed by GD that day. hjj119. dgk142+. dgr209m. fkk269.gnk193m.gnk312m.dgk141m.gnk227m.Asthe48thPzCinchednorthward,its3rdPzDandthe332ndIDattemptedtoprotectthewest

flank.Latelythefiercestfightingwasonitswesternflanknotitsnorthernfront.GDlinkedupwith11th PzD and moved toward Kochetovka but they were stopped by the reinforced 10th TC.dgk140+.dgk141m.dgk222m.dlu63m.GDhadveeredwestasorderedtocloseupandprotecttheflankof3rdPzDwhileitsecured

Verkhopenie,capturingitafterahardfight.ThehillatVerkhopenie,Hill258.2,wasalsocapturedaswasHill244.5ontheroadtoOboyan.Thiswouldbethedeepestpenetration3rdPzDhadofthecampaign.DuringthenightGermanengineersreinforcedtheoriginalbridgeoverthePenaandbuiltanew16tonbridgeaswell.Alsoinsector,the3rdPzD,northofVerkhopenie,regroupedduring the night andwas prepared to advance at first light.While pausing atVerkhopenie, theGermans discovered near theKubaossvski ravine, northwest of Berezovka, a concentration oftanksandbynextmorningthatconcentrationgrewtoincludethehillsnorthofthatdefile.PzAbt3, located on the ridgewest ofVerkhopenie, discovered the tankers aswell.TheSoviet tanksgrew at an alarming rate; elements of 3rd PzD were ordered back to Hill 258.2, west ofVerkhopenie,todefenditandpreventanambushinto therearareasofall thedivisionsof48thPzC.fkk251++.gnk216.gnk227m.At1130hrs,elementsofGDand3rdPzDescalatedtheirattackonVerkhopeniesectorfromthe

west between Krasnaia Dubrova and Novoselovka, with 100 panzers and close air support,againstthe67thGRDand200thTBof6thTCwhichwereheavilybombedbutstillputupstiffresistance.DespitedestroyingfivepanzersanddamagingtwoTigers,theSovietshadtofallbackfivemiles to thenorth.The309thRDof40thArmywasmovingup to assist the67thGRD inslowingtheGermanadvancebuthadnotarrivedinanyrealstrengthyet.However,bytheendoftheday thewholedivisionwouldbeassemblingbehind67thGRD.Nearingdusk, thedivisionsawactionwhen the67thGRDwas forced to fall back into the linewith309thRD.wdk148.gnk216.hjj121m.hjj117m.dgr209m.dgr217.gnk227m.dgk409+.pck70.At1130hrsafterfightingforalmostaday,the200thTBof6thTCstartedslowlytoevacuate

Verkhopenie and the surrounding countryside toward the west. With Verkhopenie falling intoGermanhands,agapopenedontheeastsideofthePenaRiverthatHoth,notrespondingquicklyenough,wasnotgoingtoexploit.Aftertherecentheavyfighting,Katukovorderedthe31stTCto

fall back to thenorthern sideof theOboyan road.Anyunit to the southof the roadwasbeingthreatened with encirclement. Vatutin also ordered the 309th RD and 29th ATB, plus otherattachmentsfrom40thArmy,tomoveeastandbolstertheOboyanroaddefensesagainstGDand11thPzD.gnk215+.gnk193m.gnk227m.As the48thPzC (11thPzD)movednorthbetweenVerkhopenie andSolotino, 16miles from

OboyanandwestofProkhorovka,Sovietreservesweremovingtotheline,slowingtheGermanadvance. TheGD and elements of 11th PzD attacked again from the Krasnaia Dubrova areatowardNovoselovka against the 3rdMC and the 67thGRD.By noon the presure became toogreatandtheSovietsbegantopullback.Thisretreatforcedthenearby31stTCtofallbackaswelltoavoidbeingambushedontheirflank.The3rdPzD,attackinginthePenabend,advancedup the Rakovo-Kruglik road past Berezovka, but trying to move north after taking the villagefailedbecausetheSovietswereheavilydug-inintheareawoods.The52ndIChadbeenunabletocrossthePenaRiverandHothwashopingGD,bymovingtothewest,couldforcetheSovietsto fall back to avoid encirclement.Vatutin’s response to this ploywas to send reinforcementsfrom 40th Army. 11th PzD was completely halted. In the woods between Malinovoe andMelovoe, the newly arrived 309th RD and the 51st GRDwere also able to stop the Germanadvancetothenortheast.EastoftheDonets,theadvanceof3rdPzChadlengtheneditsflankandKempf had to commit greater forces to protect itwhich slowed his northwardmarch.GeneralHothcouldclearlyseetheimpactthelengtheningsalientwashavingonhisflanksandhiscorps’inabilitytomaintainthenorthwardadvancewhileguardingagainstthehordesofSovietstryingtocutoffthesalientandisolatehisarmy.Apartfromaskinghissuperiorforreinforcementswhichhe knewwere not available, and except for a fewminor actions to safeguard theSS from theravagesof5thGTAthatwasnownearingthebattlefield,Hothdidnotinstituteanymajorchangestohisstrategy.dgr91.rc202.bt86.dgr209m.gnk216.fmz223+.The10thTCwasarrivinginpositionsouthofOboyanandpreparingtoblock48thPzCfrom

reachingtheimportanttown.The204thRDand184thRDwerealsoarrivinginsectoraswellasnumerous other tank units. The SovietAFwas also giving the sector top priority.On the eastflank,Vatutinmoved the69thArmyalongside7thGAbetween the twobranchesof theDonetsRiver.Totheeastthe69thArmy,consistinginthemainof81stGRD,89thGRD,92ndGRD,93rdGRD,94thGRD,107thGRD,183rdGRD,305thGRD,375thGRD,2ndGTC,148thTR,96thTB,30thTDBand27thAnti-tankBrigadewasmovingclosertotheline.Regardlessoftheareasomeunitswoulddeployor redeploy in forwardpositionsbutmostwouldbebehind the thirddefensivebeltatthisstageofthecampaign.wdk149+.nzk92.At1200hrsinVerkhopenie,the200thTBbegantoquickenitsevacuation,headingnorth.Other

Soviets deployed in the area moved west and crossed the Pena River. At this time, GroupStrachwitzleftthemoppingupofVerkhopenietothegrenadiersandstartedheadingforHill260.8ontheeastsideoftheOboyanroadandtheretreatingSoviettankers.Onthewaytothehill,moreT34s appeared and attacked Strachwitz from the flank.Without calling for air support, Stukasflew by attacking the Soviet tanks.A dozen tankswere destroyed andwith the threat ofmorepanzersarriving,therestoftheT34spulledbacktoHill260.8.Atthesametime,theleadunitsofGDwhohadbeenmarchingnorthapproachedNovoselovkaandHill240.4,eastofthefortifiedtown.SovietartilleryonHill260.8startedshellingtheGermancolumn,stoppingitinitstracks.

T34sthenattackedbutStukascameintorepulsetheattack.ThesmallpanzergroupcontinuedandbytheendofthedaywastwomilesnorthofNovoselovka.IthadbeenadifficultbutmodestlysuccessfuldayforGD.Thedivisionhadbeengivenseveralassignmentsthatbrokethedivisioninto several combat groups, spreading them out and breaking up their already deterioratingcohesion and overall attack strength.Verkhopenie had been a difficult objective and there hadbeenseveralSoviettankgroupsroamingthearealookingforeasypreytocontendwithaswell.The Luftwaffe played an important part in GD’s advance that day, destroying many tanks.gnk241+.gnk193m.gnk227m.Atnoon,vonMansteinordered1stPzAtosendthe24thPzC,whichincludedthe23rdPzDand

Viking,uptoKharkov.The24thPzCarrivedthenextdaywithlessthan150panzersbutsincethe48thPzChadonly132workingpanzers,itwouldbeadoublingofstrength.VonMansteinknewitwouldbedifficult togetHitler’s releaseof the24thPzCbut itwas theonlyway the4thPzAwouldreachKursk.wdk150.vzz158.gnk157.gnk220.From north of the Petrovka area, leading elements of the 5th GTC attacked LAH but were

repulsed each time. North of Berezovka, the 332nd ID was attacked while other attacks atDmitrievkaagainst255thIDwerebeingmade.The332ndIDwaseventuallyabletopushbackthe90thGRDwestwardbeyondZavidovkaandtrailingelementsofthe3rdPzDreachedRakovoon thewest bank of the Pena by noon. These divisionswere trying to repair the line that theSovietshadravagedfromearlierattacks.Anothersectionofthelinefor332ndIDhoweverwaspushedback.The52ndIC,fightingonthewestflank,wasorderedtosendmentotheeastflank.TheSovietsweregivingsomuchtroubleto52ndIC’sflankthatHothrequestedthe2ndArmytothewest initiateanattackon38thArmy,and40thArmy to reduce thepressureonHoth’swestflank.VonMansteinrefusedtherequest.The2ndArmyhadbeenhithardintheearlymonthsof1943,againsttheSovietwinteroffensivethatpushedthembackfromtheDonRiver,andstillhadnot recovered.VonManstein felt the tworifledivisionsandone tankbrigade facing2ndArmywas too much to handle. Hitler refused to counter von Manstein’s order as well. wdk147.hjj117m.The 3rd PzD, using only Mks, was really struggling to push back Soviet resistance at

BerezovkanearthePenaRiver.HothhadtostopGD’snorthwardadvancealtogetherandshiftalargepartofthedivisiontothewestagaininthesamedaytoassist3rdPzDinstoppingtheever-growingresistanceonthewesternflank.TherestofthedivisionwouldstayinplaceandblockanyattemptsbytheSovietstopenetratetheline.ThissidewaysfightingwouldlastaweekwhichmeantthatthewholeGDdivisionwouldnevermoveforwardinthecampaign.WithHill243.0andHill247.2beingusedtosuchanadvantagebytheSoviets,itwasdecidedGDwouldcapturethosehillswhiletryingtoassist3rdPzD.WithelementsofGDhelping3rdPzDatBerezovka,thevillagefellbutassoonasthepanzersreturnedtoGDinthenorth,the3rdPzDwashaltedagain.Itwas not strong enough to go it alone. The 332nd ID had similar troubles at Berezovka,AlekseevkaandMikhailovka.Hothcontinued tobeuninspired in thinkingofanewstrategyforthe 48thPzC; arguably this lack of insight for 48thPzCwould play amajor role in 4thPzA’sundoing.mhz290.lck314.vzz2m.gnk193m.gnk227m.fmz221m.BitterfightingragedbetweenVerkhopenieandSolotinoas4thPzAcontinuedtostrikethe1st

TAand6thGA,tryingtofindweaknessaswellastostablizetheirline.WhilemuchofGDfought

forthetown,11thPzDcontinuednorthtomeetwithLAHatSukho-Solotino.DuringthebattleforVerkhopenie,atankbattleragednearbyonHill243.0.GroupWietersheimtookthehillandthenmovednorth,headingforHill240.4andNovoselovka.ThiswaspartofamajoroffensivevonMansteininitiatedtoputpressureonthetwoarmies.VonMansteinthoughttheSovietswereabouttobreakandwantedtoexploittheirweakness.The48thPzCand2ndSSPzCadvancedalongatenmilefrontwithhundredsofpanzersleadingtheway.dgr209m.lck312++.lck318.gnk312m.dgk144.The11thPzDwastheonlypanzerdivisionof48thPzCthatwasconcentratingitsfulleffortin

movingnorthtoclearthesouthernPselRiverarea.Vatutinwaspreparingtosend1stTAand6thGA south to split the 48th PzC in half. mhz295+. dgk211m. vzz261++. dgk130m. gnk193m.gnk227m.Group Strachwitz of GD moved out from south of Verkhopenie to the northeast toward

Novoselovka.ItpassedHill260.8aimingforHill240.4,justwestofNovoselovka.Atthesametime, the 11th PzD on the east side of the Oboyan road also headed for Hill 240.4 but bothdivisions ran into Soviet armor before reaching that important hill. The tank battle escalatedquicklywiththelongfiringgunsoftheTigersgettinginthefirstkills,buttheT34sweremovingquickly,tryingtogetinclosetooutmaneuverthebiggerpanzers.TheGermansbrokethroughtheSovietscreenandwereabletoreachNovoselovkaandHillHFdespiteadditionalattacks.TheleadcolumnwasabletoreachHill244.8ontheroadtoOboyan.fkk270.gnk312m.dgk143.AfterleavingVerkhopeniebutbeforereachingthenorthernNovoselovkasector,ColStrachwitz

receivedneworders.Assoonaspossible,hewassupposetoturnwestagainandassist3rdPzD.Aspartof its trekwestward toassist3rdPzD,GroupStrachwitzofGDadvanced towardHill251.4 and Hill 247.0 beforemoving on and attacking 6th TCwhich was blocking 3rd PzD’sadvance.Strachwitzhad39assortedpanzerswhich included tenTigers and tenPanthers.BothGDand3rdPzDaskedforairsupportbutwithalackofplanes,onlyGDreceivedit.ElementsofGDwereheadingnorthtowardNovoselovkaandtheresistancewastough.Bytheendoftheday,NovoselovkafelltotheGermans,forcingthe3rdMCtopullbackbehindthe309thRD.Bytheafternoon,the3rdMCand31stTCwereinaconfusedstateanditwasagoldenopportunityforGDtobreakthroughtoreachOboyan.Howeverthe10thTCbeganarrivinginsectorandslowedtheGermansdownuntilmoreofthecorpscouldarrive.lck314+.dgr217.The 11th PzD pushed forward into the Kochetovka area and westward along the road to

Oboyan.Partofthe48thPzCwasdefendingthePenaRiverlineandVatutinmovedthe10thTCintopositiontoattackthe48thPzCifnecessary.Aheavyrainstartedwhichwouldslowthetanksdown.rc201.dgk139+.dgk222m.dlu63m.Inmidafternoon,theGD,LAHand11thPzDcontinuedtheattempttopenetratethelinesouthof

Novoselovka, finallyoverrunningastubborn86thTBwhichcaused the31stTCtoquicklyfallbacktothelinedefendedby309thRDtopreventencirclement.ThelinewasfromNovenkoetoKalinovka and included Hill 251.4, Hill 240.0, Hill 235.9 and Hill 207.8. This deploymentwouldstrengthenthedefenseacrosstheroadtoOboyan.fkk89.dgk410.After3rdPzDdrovethe6thTCacrossthePenaRiver,theGDand11thPzDfollowedwiththe

intention of finishing off the tank corps near theOboyan road atNovoselovka, 12 to 15milesaway fromOboyan. Elements of the 3rd PzD stayed at the PenaRiver and began clearing the

swamplandofthemanySovietsstillhidingthere.TheleadunitsofGD,headingforNovoselovka,werealreadynortheastofVerkhopenieandwereapproachingHill240.0whentheywereshelledandhadtostoptowaitforartilleryandreinforcements.Whilefightingwiththe6thTC,theGDcleared theareaeastofVerkhopenie,andamileor twonorthofSyrtsev.The48thPzCgainedsomegroundonthismorningagainstthe3rdMC,the31stTCand6thTC.TheGermansclaimeddestroying101tanksalongtheOboyanroad.TheSovietsclaimedtohavedestroyedatotalof295panzersbutthesenumbersseemhigh.wdk148.hjj121m.hjj117m.mhz289.dgr209m.fkk251.Afterreceivingordersthedaybefore,the5thGAstarteddeployingalongthenorthbankofthe

PselRiverbetween theOboyan roadandProkhorovkaandwere ready for thecoming fightbydark.The5thGTC,whichhadbeendefendingtheBelenikhino-Teterevinosector,wasorderedtothewestalongtheOboyanroadnearOrlovka.Theyarrivedonsiteat0100hrson7/10.The40thArmy’s219thRDwasorderedtomovenorthfromRakitnoeareatoKruglikarea.The204thRD,10th TC and 67thGRDwere ordered to occupy theKruglik-Malinovoe line by nextmorning.These actions were taken due to the Germans reaching the Gresnoe, Ozerovski and IasnaiaPolianalinebythepreviousnight.wdk150.dgr97.dgr93m.Elements ofGD were trying to clear the last of the resistance from the fortified town of

VerkhopenieandHill260.8.Atthesametime,the11thPzDtotheeastofthevillagewereheadingnorth,whiletheLuftwaffewasbombingthewestsideofthePenainordertosoftenupthearea.LeavingVerkhopenie, theGD recon groupmoved out but quickly bumped into the 86thTB.AbattleensuedandwiththehelpofthepassingLuftwaffe,the86thTBfellbackandtheGDwasable to reach Hill 243.0, one mile west of Verkhopenie. When 3rd PzD was stuck west ofVerkhopenie, elements ofGD had to be diverted to help 3rd PzD get free. Theywere neededfurther north. Together they broke out andwere able to head north. BothGerman corpsmadedisappointingprogressinplacesthatdayandit lookedlikeGDwouldbeneededon theflanksand thatwouldgreatly be felt by the front linedivisions.Verkhopeniewas eventually cleared.dgk143+.dgk222m.dgr209m.fkk269.gnk193m.gnk312m.vzz439.gnk227m.Intheafternoon,LtGeneralKnobelsdorffstartedreceivingreconreportsoftwomajorSoviet

tankconcentrationsintheVerkhopenie-Novoselovkaarea.ThefirsttankgroupingwasthreemileswestofVerkhopenie,whilethelargertankgroupwasheadingsouthnearVladimirovkabutstillnorthofNovoselovka.ThislastgroupwasBurkov’s10thTC.Withthe3rdPzDspreadthinalongthePenaRiver,thefirstsightingcausedKnobelsdorfftoorderthe3rdPzDtogodefensiveuntilgreater clarity was resolved. In the northern case,GD was ordered to postpone their currentmission,assembleasmuchaspossibleandbepreparedtodefendagainstamajorattack.Alittlelater an order from Hoth reached Knobelsdorff that canceled all offensives forGD until thetacticalconditions improved.Theywouldnever improveand thatday’sadvancewasbasicallytheir last to thenorth.Nextmorning,moreofGDwouldveer to thewest to assist 3rdPzD inrepulsingthefrequentSovietattacksontheirflanks.Byexpandingtheirbattlezonefurtherwestover the lastcoupleofdays,Hothhadenlarged the lineandweakenedhisdefensesandyethemadenorealattempttocorrecttheoverindulgencewhenitwasproventhat3rdPzDneededthefrequenthelpofGDtocurbtheSovietincursions.gnk242.gnk193m.dgr172m.gnk227m.dgk412.On its left flank, the3rdPzDwasbeingharassedsomuch that it couldnotcontribute to the

advancenorthward.TheleadunitsofthedivisiondidmanagetoreachHill244.8ontheroadto

Oboyanbutitwasataheavycost.Totheeastof48thPzC,the2ndSSPzCwasmeetingheavyresistanceaswellfromthe10thTC(beforeleavingthearea)and31stTCalongitsentireline.Insupportofthegroundadvance,theLuftwaffecarriedout1,500sorties.dgk144+.FromnorthoftheNovoselovkaarea,whilefightingthe309thRDandthe3rdTC,GD turned

west,stayingnorthofVerkhopenie,towardHill232.8toassist3rdPzDagainstthe6thTC.The10thTCwithelementsof67thGRDdeployedalongthelineKruglik,KalinovkaandMalinovoewereorderedtoprepareforbattleandattackGD’sflankastheytraveledwest.Atthesametime,SovietpositionsnearLakhaninoandShepelovkawerebeingaggressivelyattackedaswell.HothwasconvincedflankresistancehadtobereducedbeforecrossingthePsel.LtGeneralHoernleinwasorderedto turnwest thensouthand,withthesupportof3rdPzDdrivingnorth, toencircleand destroy 6th TC,which had been causingmuch trouble on 48th PzC’swest flank. vzz261.dgr91.dgr217.The11thPzDattackedthe31stTCandthe51stGRDdefendingOrlovka,locatedeightmiles

southwestofOboyan.ThetotalcountforGermanpanzersinthesouthatthisstagewasfewerthan500operablebuttherewasabacklogofdamagedpanzersthatwouldberepaired.The11thPzDwouldtraveloverfivemilesonthisday,movingtowardPokrovskiontheeastsideoftheOboyanroad. In the evening GD, now driving in a northwest direction to the Pena River, reachedNovoselovkaafteradvancingsixmiles.wdk148+.hjj121m.At2200hrsHothsignedOrderNo.5,describingtheobjectivesforthefollowingday.The48th

PzCwould continue along theOboyan roadwhileLAHmade a direct run from theTeterevinoarea on Prokhorovka and the high ground to the west. SSTK was supposed to establish abridgehead across the Psel while Das Reich remained defensive. The 3rd PzC which wasconcentratedintheMelikhovosectorwastodrivetowardandcrosstheDonetsRiver.The52ndICwassupposedtocrossthePenaRiverandclearthewestbankofresistance.Atthispointthe4thPzAhadfewerthan500panzersandassaultguns,with2ndSSPzChaving294ofthem.Theopeningstagewouldstarttomorrow.CrossingthePselRiverwasthefirstobstacleandwiththerecentheavyrainstheriverwasswollen,makingithardertoforgeandtoerectabridgeoverit.All the work done on this daywas in preparation for the final lunge across the Psel and thecaptureofProkhorovkaandthesoutherncorridortoKursk.wwf97.vzz170++*.lck321.HothvisitedKnobelsdorffinthefieldandreprimandedhimfortheslowprogressofthe48th

PzCandespecially3rdPzD.HoththenvisitedWesthoventomotivatehimaswell.Hothwantedthe3rdPzD tocross thePenaenmasse the followingdayandnoexcuseswouldbe tolerated.gnk244.IthadbeenaprettygooddayfortheGermans,atleastonsomeoftheiraxesofattack.The48th

PzChadcapturedVerkhopenie,Sukho-SolotinoandGresnoewhichwerelocatedontheswampyriverbasinsoftheseconddefensebeltthathadslowedthepanzersdown.Thetwopreviousdayswiththeheavyreinforcements,the1stTAand6thGAhadslowedtheGermans’advancebutwiththe heavy casualties of those armies, the 48th PzC had gained seven miles that day and wasbreakingoutofthisseconddefensivebeltintotheopen.However,ithadcostthe48thsomuchinmen and panzers to get to this point that theymight not have enough left to penetrate the thirddefensebelt.Thearrivalofthefresh10thTCenabledtheSovietstohaltthe48th’sadvance.The48thhad less than140workingpanzersbut ifvonMansteincouldgetHitler’sapproval touse

24thPzC,anothernearly150panzerscouldbedeployed.With thegains thatday, the48thPzCwasalmostabreastofthe2ndSSPzCwhichhadbeenmilesahead.vzz157+.vzz258+.Withitgettingdark,asplintergroupofGD,stillsouthofNovoselovka,stoppedforthenight.A

patrol was formed to head west during the night to recon the Kruglik area. Stukas had beenperiodically bombing Hill 260.8 for most of the day but GD failed to take it. Later in theafternoon, the panzer regiment of 11th PzD arrived and after continued shelling and aerialbombing,theSovietswereforcedoffthehill.TheGermansthendroveseveralmoremilesnorthofthehillbeforestoppingjustsouthofHill244.8.MicklreportedtoKnobelsdorffthathehad57assorted panzers still working including the obsolete Mk II, Hummels and flame-throwingpanzers.gnk241.gnk244+.gnk301.Lateatnight,3rdPzDclearedBerezovkabywayoftheRakovo-Kruglikroadofenemytroops

from the west. The Soviets stopped the 48th PzC after leaving Berezovka for Kruglik at thesouthernedgeofalittlewoodsnorthofBerezovka.wwf92.dgk222m.mhz305.Lateatnight,SovietinfiltratorsfromthewestbankofthePenaslippedbackintoVerkhopenie

tocausehavoc.fkk269.Atnight,Vatutinredeployedhisforcestomeetnewexpectedthreatsinthemorningagainstthe

shiftingGD,3rdPzD,255thIDand332ndID.GoingagainstZhukov,the1stTAdugintheiranti-tank guns and went defensive. Vatutin, after receiving reinforcements andmaking these recentredeployments, felt confident the Germans would be defeated. He was relying on 69th Army,whichhadrecentlybeenmovedupintotheDonets’triangle,tostop3rdPzC.VonMansteinknewatankcolumn(5thGTA)wasmovingwesttoengageandheorderedKempftospeedhisadvanceandinterceptRotmistrovtopreventhimfromattacking2ndSSPzCinfrontofProkhorovka.The2nd SS PzC received their orders late at night to advance on Prokhorovka and to establish abridgeheadoverthePselRiverinthemorning.ThoughtheGermanswereawareoftanksmovingintosector,theywerenotsurehowmanytankswerecoming.dgk145+.nzk92.Thelastthreedaysthe38thArmyand40thArmyhadtransferredtoVatutinthefollowing:two

rifle divisions, one AA division, three tank brigades, four tank regiments, three AA brigades,eight anti-tank artillery regiments and one gun artillery regiment. It’s no wonder the Germanswereslowingdown.dgr90.Bytheendoftheday,GDwasapproachingNovoselovkaandinfacthadcapturedsomeground

tothenorthofthetown,whiletotheeastoftheOboyanroad,the11thPzDhadreachednorthofPokrovski,whichmeantnorthofVerkhopenie.BothGermandivisionshadgainedaboutsixmiles.Itwasagooddayfor48thPzCforithadprettymuchcaughtupwiththeSS,thoughtheboundarybetween11thPzDandLAHwasstill injeopardy.The3rdPzDdidgainsomegroundalongthePenaRiver.wdk149.nzk92.There are a number of alternative strategies that would have worked better. One such

alternativewouldhavebeentonarrowtheattackaxisfor48thPzCsothatGD,switchingplaceswith11thPzDandbeingonthedirectflankoftheSS,wouldhaveattackedtothenorthwhiletheotherdivisionsof48thPzCcouldhaveprovidedflankprotection.ThestrengthofGDalongsideLAH in the early days and then next to SSTK in the later stage would have been extremelycompelling.With part of 11th PzD safeguardingGD’s right flank and the rest of the divisionassisting3rdPzD, thewestern flankwouldhave faredbetteras longas itdidnot stray too far

west beyond the PenaRiver, especiallywhen you considerVatutinwould have had to devotemoreassets to thenorthern lineand feweron thewestern line.Witha small attackzone, thesedivisionswouldhavehadmanyfewerstrongpointstocapture.Inmyestimation,if48thPzChadstayedeastof theVorsklaRiver line,avoiding thePenaRivervalley, theycouldhaveavoidedfrontalattacksonthetoughstrongpointsofCherkasskoe,Syrtsevo,Lukhanino,Dubrova,thePenaRivercrossings,Berezovka,TolstoeWoods,Verknopenie,Novoselovkaandanumberofstronglyheldhills.Despitetheheavycasualtiesinmenandpanzersintheearlydays,Hothstillploughedon with his original axis of attack. Even after taking these strongpoints, while his strengthdramaticallyfell,theSovietresistanceremainedstrongduetothereadyreservesof38thand40thArmies situated to the west coming into sector. The previous night and again the followingmorning, Hoth received intel that additional infantry and tanks were coming to the salient. Amajorcounter-offensivewascomingandallHothdidwastopushKnobelsdorfftodomoreofthesamebeforetheSovietattackwaslaunched.Perhapsitwastoolatebythe9thor10thtomakemajor changes in 48th’s deployment but Hoth’s obsession in attacking along the Berezovka-KruglikroadoverthecomingseveraldaysseemednotthebeststrategyifProkhorovkawasnowtheprimaryaxis.Kriuchenkin’s 69thArmymovedup to defend theProkhorovka-LipovyiDonetsRiver sector

between6thGAand7thGA.AtthesametimeotherSovietunitswerestopping3rdPzCeastoftheNorthernDonets.dgk139.dgk222m.dlu63m.With the3rdPzC turningnorthandwest,Vatutin,over thisand the followingday, transfered

manydivisionsof7thGAtothecontrolofthecommanderof69thArmywheretheywouldtrytoblocktheapparentnewpathoftheGermansandpreventthe3rdPzCfromjoiningupwithDasReich.With6thGAweakening,69thArmyreceivedgreater responsibility incoveringa largersector that now extended as far west as Vasilevka and as far south and east as Belnikhovo,Shopino,Kiselevo,ShliakhovoandMiasoedovo.Oneofthefirstchanges69thArmymadewastomove2ndTCand93rdGRDfromtheRozhdestvenkaareafurthernorthtotheLeski-Shakhovo-DalniDolzhik areas. These redeploymentswould be completed by nextmorning. The 7thGAcontinued to be active in attacking the flanks of 7th PzD and 11th IC in the far east. dgr97.dgr93m.dgr155m.dgr173m.After leavingMelikhovoforKhokhlovo, the6thPzDwasquicklystoppedbystiff resistance

fromLebedev’s96thTB in thegrovenearHill217.4.By1800hrs,aftera four-hour fightandrunningoutofammo,theremainingfewT34sfellbacktoKiselevoleavingthegroveoftreesonthathill totheGermans.Despitethemodestgains,neitherthe6thPzDnorthenearby19thPzDcould’breakthroughtotheDonetsandwerestilltryingtopenetratethroughtheseconddefensivebelts.vzz248.vzz3m.dgr155m.dgr173m.dgk162+.zzt90.In3rdPzCsector, the6thPzD led theadvancewith itsnearly100panzersandassaultguns

against92ndGRD,takingthehighgroundnorthofMelikhovo,12milesnortheastofBelgorodandcrossed theBelgorod-Korocha road.ThenearbyvillagesofCholchlovka andSchischinowerealsoeventuallycapturedbutatahighcost.The19thPzDand7thPzDadvancedoneithersideof6th PzD, providing flank protection.Later in the day north ofMelikhovo, the Soviets counter-attacked,forcingpartof6thPzDtogodefensivewhiletherestofthetrailing6thPzDcrossedtheRazumnaiaRivereastofOlkhovatka.TothesouthandonlyafewmilesfromBelgorod,the168th

IDwas still trying toovercome the strongdefensivepositions aroundStaryiGorod.Rauswasstillprovidingprotectionontheextremeeastflankagainststrongresistanceandwasnotmakingmuchprogresseither.The7thPzDalongwithLtGeneralForst’s106thIDalsoattackedtowardKasikino.fkk89.dgr155m.dgr173m.vzz5m.wdk149.hjj121m.dgr39m.wwf96.vzz5m.hjj123m.dlu80.OntheeastsideoftheDonetsnorthofMelikhovo,the6thPzDfinallyseizedtheheightssouth

ofShliakhovo.Thenthe6thPzDand19thPzDlinkedandfinallycapturedthevillageofKelekovowhich led to the destruction of two Soviet RDs and the fall of Belgorod Heights, whichsubsequently allowed Kempf’s force a little more maneuverability in moving north. ThedifficultiesKempf’sforcesmetwithwasshownbyGroupWestphalian’s6thPzD’slosses.Thedivision started the campaignwith 117 panzers but by the end of the day, therewere only 35panzersstill fighting.Thisdaywas theworstdayof thecampaign, losing48panzers.Manyoftheselosseswereduetominedamagebutmostofthesemachineswererecoveredandrepaired.sPzAbt 503 had 34 of its 44Tigers damaged or destroyed; 16 of them bymines. Twenty-twoTigerswouldbe repairedandon the field later thatday.EightotherTigerswouldbe repairedwithin eightmore days and a fewmorewould have to be sent back toBerlin for repair. ThesupplyroadBelgorod-KorochaalsofellintoGermanhands.shn160.lck327mhz307.hjj123m.Therestof69thArmymoveduptothelinebetweenthetwoDonetsRivers.Thearmyincluded

81stGRD,89thGRD,92ndGRD,93rdGRD,94thGRD,107thRD,183rdRD,305thRD,375thRD,2ndGTC,148thTR,96thTB,30thTDBand27thAnti-tankBrigade.wdk150.TheheaviestfightingofthedayeastoftheDonetsoccurredinthesectordefendedby81stGRD

and92ndGRD.Aftermultipleattempts topenetrate the line, theGermansoutflankedthe282ndGRR,broke through the line and reachedHill 185.7on the road running fromStaryiGorod toDalniaiaIgumenka.ThevillageofPostnikovwasalsocapturedbutShishinlandthehighgroundeastofthevillagestayedtemporarilyinSoviethands.Itwasdiscoveredthatthe81stGRD,92ndGRD and 375th RD by 2200 hrs began pulling back to the Kiselevo-Hill 211.5-Shliakhovo-Sabynino line.The81stGRDwas eventually redeployedwith the48thGRCalong theDonetsRiver on the Hill 147.0-Hill 213.4-Novo Oskochnoe-Shcholokovo line. Vatutin also sentreinforcementstodefendKiselevo-Hill211.5–Olshanets.The73rdGRD,375thRD,89thGRD,107thRD,305thRDand92ndGRDwithsupportofthe4thMRBof2ndGTCwouldsacrificeeverythingtostopthe19thPzDfromgettingthroughtotheDonetsandlinkingupwithDasReich.The69thArmyhadfewtanksandmostoftheburdentostopthepanzerslayoninfantrybutsofartheyhadpreventedtheGermansfrompenetratingtheseconddefensebelt.NovoOskochnoewasduewestofKazacheandnortheastofKrivtsevo.vzz248++.vzz3m.dgr155m.dgr173m.dgr39m.nzk92.vzz5m.The6thPzDregroupedatMelikhovobeforeitmovednorthwiththe19thPzDinthedirection

ofPostnikov,while7thPzDstruggledtodefenditslineeastoftheNorthernDonetsRiveragainstincreasingSoviethostilities.Kempf still struggled, farbehindhis schedule,being littlehelp to2nd SS PzC.By the end of the day, the 6th PzD had only 40 panzers and four capturedT34sworking.sPzAbt503whichwasworkingwith6thPzDhad15workingTigers.ItwasatthispointthatHothchangedhisbattleplan toalter theaxis fromOboyan toProkhorovka.OneadvantagethisdirectionshiftwouldhavewasthattheSSdivisionswoulddriveclosertothe3rdPzCwhich

wouldhelptakesomeofthepressureoff3rdPzC.dgk145+.fkk280.vzz247. lck327.dgr155m.dgr173m.At2200hrs,afterlosingBlizhniaiaIgumenka,Postnikov,DalniaiaIgumenkaandShishinothe

81stGRD,92ndGRDand375thRDwereofficiallyorderedtofallbacktoavoidbeingencircledbythe6thPzDand19thPzD.Theyweretoreformto thenorthwestnearer to theDonetsRiveralong theKiselevo,Hill 211.5, Shliakhovo and Sabynino line. These divisionswould have tohurrybecausetheleadunitsofthe6thPzDand19thPzDweremovingquicklythroughthegapstowardthisline.Shortlyafternoon,the19thPzDcapturedHill211.5.Atthesametime,the442ndGR,defendingBlizhniaiaIgumenkawasbeingheavilyattackedandwasindangerof losingthevillage and opening a gap in the rear of 19th PzD. Schmidt immediately recalled severalbattalionsfromthe168thIDtoreturntothevillagetoassistthe442ndGR.Thevillageheldwiththeextrasupport.AtAndreevski,GroupBieberstein(Major)wasupagainstastiffdefensebutwasslowlygettingtheupperhand.Afterlosingthesekeysites,MajGeneralGoriachev’sforceshadtofallbackandsetupnewdefensesalongthelinefromwesttoeast:Sabynino,Shliakhovo,SheinoandUshakovo.Unitsinvolvedwiththisnewlineincludedthe305thRD,375thRD,92ndGRD,96thTBand107thRDandweredeployedintwoechelons.ThesecondlineincludedNovoOskochnoe, Verkhni Olshanets, Komintern, Shukhtsovo and Hill 221.0. Vatutin remindedGoriachevthatitwascriticaltodelayKempfasmuchaspossibleandthatthe3rdPzCmustnotlinkupwithDasReichbeforeRotmistrovlaunchedhisattack.vzz249+.vzz10m.vzz1m.nzk92.dgr155m.dlu80.dlu88+.Inthe3rdPzCsector,6thPzD,7thPzDand19thPzDmademinimalgains.Schmidtof19thPzD

at theendof thedaydecided itwouldbeprudent tomoveback toBlizhniaia Igumenkafor thenight.Kempf’smain objectivewas to capture the road junction atKorocha and to divert 69thArmyawayfromtheDonetsandtheSS,buthewasnotclosetodoingit.Thisslowprogressalsomeant Kempf would not intercept and stop 5th GTA from reaching Prokhorovka. dgk145+.dgk222m.fkk87.dgr209m.dgr155m.dgr173m.hjj123m.AtnightGeneralBreithestablishedGroupNorth,whichwascomprisedofmostof6thPzDand

elementsof19thPzD.Twobattalionsofartillerywerealsoattached.ItwouldbecommandedbyHunersdorff.HisordersweretopenetratetheSovietlinenorthofMelikhovoandthentodriveonDalniaia Igumenka and destroy the tank concentration deployed near there. Once achieved,HunersdorffwoulddrivetotheDonetsRivernearShcholokovoandintotherearof81stGRD,whichwasblocking168th ID’s advance, andbetween the twoGerman forcesdestroy the81stGRDandasmuchofthenearby375thRDaspossible.Theremainderof19thPzDalsoshiftedwesttojoinupwith168thIDtoformGroupSouth,underthecommandofSchmidt,andbetweenthetwocombatgroupscrushedthe81stGRD.Schmidt’sfirstobjectivewastocaptureBlizhniaiaIgumenkaandthesurroundingareaandthentodestroytheSovietinfantrydeployedinthewoodsamilesouthofthevillage.Atthesametime,the198thIDwasorderedtomoveupandreplacethe7thPzDinprotectingtheeasternflank.The7thPzDwasbadlyneededin3rdPzC’sdrivenorthtolinkupwith 2ndSSPzCwhichwas bynow just south ofProkhorovka.SeeMap 13. gnk237.vzz12m.nzk92.dgr155m.dlu74+.

W13

July9thontheNorthernSalientithonlyafewlocaloffensives,Modelhadsomeofhisforcesrestandregroupfortherenewedfightingthatwouldstartthefollowingday,buthecouldnotallowtheSoviets

acompletedayofrest.Thelocalattacksonkeytargetswerelaunchedmostlyinpreparationofgaining better launching positions for the following day’s big offensive.Rokossovsky used theslowdaytoprepareforthemajoroffensivethatwouldstartinthreedaystimeintheOrelsalient.Bytheendoftheday,thelinewasprettymuchwhereitstarted;theSovietline,fromeasttowest,ran along the Trosna, Protasovo, Bazhenova, Ponyri, Hill 257.0, Samodurovka, Hill 250 andBuzovaline.dgr118.dgr108m.dgr199m.nzk91+.Atdawn,around0500hrs,GeneralRudenkosentasquadronofover170planestoattack47th

PzC’srearareasnearSaburovkawhiletheGermanswerepreparingtoattack.Thelowfrontthatblewinthedaybeforewasstillhangingoverthesalient.Theskywasstillovercastandmorerainwasexpectedalittlelater.Manyofthesepilotswerefrom15thVAandweregreenrookies.Theattackwasconfusedanddisorientedandlittledamagewas inflictedonthe47thPzC,but itdidcauseenoughofaconfusiontocauseadelayin their limitedattack.Whentheairattackbegan,GermanfightersscrambledbutbythetimetheyarriveditwastoolateastheSovietshadalreadyleft. While eight Soviets who had strayed from the formation had been downed, a goldenopportunity for experienced German pilots to attack rookies had been lost. Due to weatherconditions,sorties forbothsidesweredown.The1stFliegerDivision flew877sortieswhile16thVAhad327bombermissionsalongwith448fightersorties.cbk70.nzk77.AfterapredawnbarragethatstruckthedefensesatOlkhovatka,the47thPzCattacked.Atfirst

lightnearly200panzersof2ndPzD,4thPzDand20thPzD,9thPzDplusthemenofthe6thIDchargedtheridgenorthoftownfromtheirassemblypointintheTeploe-Kasharaarea.Theridgewas defended by the fresh forces of the 162nd RD of 70thArmy. This ridgewas part of theseconddefensivebeltandhadbeenextensivelybuiltup;itwouldbeextremelyhardtotake.Thecorpsfoughtalldaybutmadenoprogressagainstheavyartillery.OntheOlkhovatka-Ponyriroadtotheeastoftheridge,the2ndPzD,9thPzDand6thIDwereengagedinheavyfighting.Shellingcame from between Ossinovyi and Leninski further south. wdk181. dgk121.dgk138.dgk147.fkk102m.dgk87m.dgr199m.lck116m.JusteastofTeploeontheleftflankof4thPzD,the70thGRDcounter-attackedwithsupportof

tanks from237thTRbut theattackwas repulsed.Next to the4thPzD, thePzAbt21deployednortheastofSamodurovkaalsoreceivedtheattentionofthe237thTRbutitwasabletorepulsetheattackaswell.ThePzAbtlaunchedtheirownattacktowardHill274.5,southeastofTeploewhichwas initiallydefendedbya lineofdug-inT34s.The small arms firewas so fierce thatGermaninfantrycouldonlyadvanceshelteredbehindtheirpanzers.Casualtieswerehorrendous.

AswastheSovietSOP;theywouldengageandtieuptheattackingforcewiththesedug-intanksandwhen the timewas rightamobile forceof tankswouldattack frombehind thehill aswasdonehere.fkk65.dgk87m.lck116m.dgk116m.zzt84+.(July9th)GnMajDeichmannwas appraising the performance of his Fw 190 pilots over the past four

daysinregardstotheirabilityinpenetratingescortcovertoreachanddestroySovietbombers.Hispilotsforthemostparthadnotbeenassuccessfulasexpected.TheSovietpilotshadsteppeduptheirperformance.cbk70.The 2nd PzD and 9th PzD once again tried to breach the Olkhovatka-Ponyri road but after

fightingalldayfailedagain.At2200hrs,the6thGRDlaunchedacounter-attackalongtheroadjust east ofOlkhovatka, gaining an upper hand.Thiswould be the deepest the 9th PzDwouldadvance; the days to follow would see the division being pushed back. mkz120+. dgk116m.dgr108m.lck116m.Inthe46thPzCsector,the31stIDand20thPzDworkingtogetherlaunchedanattackacrossa

tenmilefrontthatsawasmallpenetrationofthelinebetweenGniletsandBobrikandinfrontofSamodurovka.TheSovietsquicklyclosedthegapatahillsouthof town.Therestof46thPzCremainedonthedefensive.Onthe41stPzCfront,the18thPzDand292ndIDlaunchedanattackat 0630 hrs and after overcoming stout resistance the Germans, with the help of Ferdinands,breachedthedefensivebeltona500ydfrontatPonyriPC.TheSovietscounter-attackedintheafternoonbutwereunabletopushtheGermansback.TheLuftwaffewasbroughtintohelpshutdowntheSovietcounter.wdk181.dgr198m.fkk102m.dgk87m.dgr199m.wwf48.lck116m.AtthemeetingwithKluge,Lemelson,Harpeandothers,Modelinformedofthelatestoffensive

thatwould start nextmorning.The47thPzCwould capture thehills nearOlkhovatkabygoingthrough Teploe andMolytyschi, due south of Teploe and due west of Olkhovatka. The attackwouldinvolvethe2ndPzD,4thPzDand20thPzDandtheyweremovingintoattackpositionsasthemeetingwasproceeding.Ifthebreakthroughdidnotmaterialize,the10thPzGD,12thPzDand36thIDwouldbereleasedfromreservetojointhebattle.RokossovskyknewthisaxisofattackwascriticalfortheGermansandwouldbringnewreserveseachnight.ThaGermanattackbeganafterapreperationandincludedthefrontbetweenTeploeandSamodurovka.Thatevening,OKHreleased the 12thPzDand36th ID toModel and a newplanwas created.This latest plannedattack never launched for the Soviets countered on 7/11. fkk336+. lck305. dgk87m. dgr199m.lck116m.snz252.The6thID,supportedbyassaultguns,assaultedHill253.5nearPonyri.Hill274furtherwest

wasalsoattackedbutbothattackswererepulsed.TheheavyfightingatOlkhovatkaandTeploecontinued with the Germans making minor gains. Much of the German fighting that day wasdefensiveortacticalasModelcalledforadaytoregroupbeforeresumingtheoffensiveon7/10.During thepredawnhours, 4thPzDwasordered to defend theSamodurovka-Teploe-Hill 240-Hill234line.Inthepasttwodaysoffightingthe35thPzRof4thPzDhadlost50ofits90panzersanddesperatelyneededthisdayofftomakesomerepairs.Theyhadalsoused94tonsofammoand that needed replenishing because 4th PzD alongwith 2nd PzDwould lead the assault thefollowingday.SomeofthefrontreconunitsnearSamodurovkaandHill238hadlostcommswithHQandthathadtobecorrectedaswell.dgr198m.fkk65.fkk101m+.dgk87m.dgr118.dgr199m.lck116m.bt86.(July9th)

The508thGRcapturedHill 239.8, eastofPonyri. Itwasoneof a fewminor successes theGermanshadalldayanditgavethemhopethatPonyricouldbetakenandkept.BeforePonyriandOlkhovatkacouldbetakenthefortifiedhill,Hill253.5northofPrilepy,hadtobetakenfirst.Hill253.5waseastofPonyributitcouldnotbeleftinSovietcontrolifasuccessfulmarchsouthofPonyriwastobeaccomplished.TheregimentwiththehelpofFerdinandscapturedtheimportantHill 253.5 later in theday.Once southof thishill, theSoviets launchedanattack that stopped508thGR’s advance.They fell back toHill 253.5.With the capture of these twohills,ModelanticipatedhisforceswouldsoontakePonyriandthesurroundingcountryside.mhz286.fkk102m.dgk87m.dgr199m.wwf54.dgk115.pck47+.AtPonyri,therailwayembankmentwascapturedby292ndIDthenthedivisionwaitedforthe

18thPzDand9thPzDtostrugglewiththerestofthevillage.ThepanzersdideventuallytakeHill253.5eastofthevillagebutfailedtotaketheremainingridgewhichwasdefendedbythe1032ndRR.TheGermanswereinPonyributitwasnotsecured.wwf54.dgk87m.dgr199m.lck116m.SovietswerefinallydrivenfromTeploebutatgreatcost to theGermans.Hill272wasstill

held by 3rd Antitank Brigade with dug-in T34s. Within 48 hrs, 3rd PzR and 35th PzR hadcaptured thehillbut theSovietswouldnotgiveup thehill andcounter-attacked.TheGermanswouldtakethehilltwicebeforefinallylosingittotheSoviets.6thIDfoughtitswaytothebottomofHill274butcouldgonofurther.dgr198m.dgk87m.lck116m.AtKursk,ZhukovspokewithStalinandbothagreedtheGermanoffensivewasnearitsendand

that itwas time for their long-awaitedoffensive to start.OperationKutuzov, the attack towardOrel,wouldbeginon7/11or7/12atthelatest.Atthesametime,ameetingwithModel,Kluge,HarpeandLemelsenconcludedthenorthernattackhadfailedbuttheoffensivemustcontinueintheOlkhovatkasectortopreventRokossovskyfromsendingforcessouthtohelpVatutin.The47thPzC would attack the high ground southwest of Olkhovatka while the other panzer divisionswould attack the high ground in the Molytychi to Teploe area. mhz286. mhz19m. dgr198m.fkk336.lck306.fkk102m.zzz101m.mkz121.kfz459.At1830hrs,90He111sstrucktheSoviet linesinthecenterof thelinethatwasfacing47th

PzC.Resultsweremixed.Thisairattackwasinpreparationforthebigoffensiveplannedfornextmorning.cbk71.(July9th)The41stPzC,whilestrugglingwiththeenemy,wastryingtoprotecttheeastflankof47thPzC

andremaincontactwith23rdIConitseasternflank.RokossovskywouldnotallowtheGermansamomentofrest;ifhisforceswerenotattackingtheGermans,hisartillerywouldshellthem.TheSoviets attacked the 41st PzC along the railroad east of Ponyri II. In the 23rd IC sector, theSovietssentsmallraidingpartiesagainstthe78thADand216thIDthatwentintothenight.Inthecenter,the47thPzCwasdefendingitssmallgainwhilethe46thPzCwasstillindefensivemode.Modelorderedapause in the afternoon to rest andmaintain thepanzers for another attempt atbreakingthelinenextmorning.wdk180+.dgk87m.dgr199m.lck116m.The9thArmygainedacoupleofmilesandpenetratedtheSovietthirddefensivebeltbutthe

advancewasstoppedbeforereaching the importantOlkhovatka.The9thArmyhadonlygainedelevenmiles since it started the campaign. The Tiger Battalion, sPzAbt 505,was expected toclear thewaybut ithad failedagainst thehorrendousshell fireof thousandsofRokossovsky’sguns.sPzAbt505wassentintoreserveforthenightandthe46thPzCtookitsplaceintheline.

fkk102m.dgk87m.GeneralModelknewbytheendofthedayhisoffensivehadfailedandhealsoanticipatedan

attackagainst2ndPzAnortheastofOrelanyday.HewasreceivingaerialreportsoftheSovietsmassingforanattack.Hejustdidnothavetheairassetstoattacktheconcentrations.TokeepupappearancesandtokeepRokossovskyfromsendingtroopstoVatutin,theassaultwouldcontinuefor two more days. Rejecting Hitler’s orders, Model started quietly moving forces to Orel.mkz121.lck116m.

T

14

July10thontheSouthernSalientSeeMaps14,26B

he Allies landed on Sicily on this day. Hitler felt threatened and decided to cancelOperationCitadelinordertosendforcestoItaly.TheAllieslanded160,000menand600

tankson the island.Somehistorianssay thatusing theAllied invasionwasawayforHitler tosavefaceandtoclosedownCitadelbeforeaconclusiveordisastrousresult.Whilethiswasasecondary issue, Hitler sent more forces to the south and north of Kursk to help stop SovietoffensivesthanhesenttoItaly;OrelandMiusRiverareasbeingthetwomostimportant.dgk151.lck338.lck376.gjz188.cbk74.sgf350.fmz229.zro210.asz365.zow130.Since most of the men on the assembly lines had now been drafted, Hitler ordered that

foreignersinoccupiedterritoriesbesenttoGermanytoworkinthefactories.During the predawn hours, greater numbers of tanks from 5th GTA began arriving north of

Prokhorovka.AlsoarrivingsouthofOboyanwas38thArmy’s204thRD.VatutinwasmakingitimpossibletoreachthetownfortheGermans.dgr94.dgr92m.zro207.VonMansteinorderedHothbeforedawntomoveapanzerdivisionfrom4thPzAto3rdPzCto

quickenitspaceofadvance.Hoth,notwantingtocomplywithhisorder,talkedhiswayoutofitas it would interfere with Panzer Order No. 5 that had already been circulated to the corpscommanders.ThatwastheorderthatcommandedHaussertoshifttheSStothenortheasttowardProkhorovka.Hoth had intended to shift directions before the campaign started and as he hadalwaysasserteditwasnottheresultofstiffresistanceinfrontOboyanorthedeploymentof5thGTAtotheProkhorovkasectorthatwashisprimaryreasonfortheshift.gnk252.snk83.DasReichwouldplayamostlydefensivepartintheday’sactionaswellasprotectingLAH’s

eastflank.TheDeutschlandRegimentwasclosesttoLAHwhileDerFührerwasfurthersouth.The167thIDwasfurthersouthofDasReichbutwouldbeexpandingtheirsectorsoDerFührercouldmovefurthernorth.The167thIDwouldcompletetheirexpansionbylateafternoon.Fromsouthtonorthwouldbe331stGRand315thGR,and339thGRwouldbeonthenorthend.Theshift in167th ID to thenorthwascompletedby theendof theday.DerFührer then started tomove to theirnewsectorduring thepredawnhoursof7/11.The redeployment forDer Führerwasmademostdifficult by the constantpressureof smallSoviet attacks.Thepanzerswere inreservenotfarfromOzerovskiwhichwasamilebehindthefrontline.OnJuly8th,DasReichhad94panzersbutitwouldstarttheday’sfightwithonly56panzers,whichincludedonlyoneTigerandsevenconfiscatedT34s.FightingintheSolotinkaareathepreviousdayhadbeencostly.TheSovietshadthe10thTCand5thGTCintheareaandtothesouththe2ndTC.The5thGTCwouldberedeployedtothewestalongtheOboyanroadthatdaytoblockthe48thPzC.The93rd

GRDalsomovedintothelineinorderfor2ndGTCtomovefurthernorth.Vatutincontinuedtomovehisforceslikechessmenclosinginontheendgame.gnk260+.zow157.As a tactical concern, the width of the Psel River at the bend was about 30 yards but the

swampygroundonthesouthernbanksoftheriverwasupto200yardswide,makingthecrossingdifficultwhileunder fire.The engineersofSSTKwould have a difficult timebuilding bridgeswhileunderfirefromgroundandairforces.vzz187+.The panzers ofDas Reich and LAH had returned to the Teterevino North area after their

advance to the Solotina River. That day, LAH would be responsible for straddling theProkhorovkaroadandcapturingthe importantrail junction.DasReichwouldattack to theeastand northeast to help relieve some of the pressure off LAH. At the same time SSTK wouldadvanceonKochetovkaand,ifpossible,crossthePselRiverandestablishabridgeheadonthenorthernbanks.The11thPzDonSSTK’sleftflankwouldalsoadvance,attemptingtosolidifytheboundarybetweenthetwodivisions.zrl224.The6thGAand69thArmywerepreparingforthemajorassaultof2ndSSPzC.Themoraleof

these two armies after fighting five vicious days was still good as the soldiers knew majorreinforcementswereabouttoarrive.TheirboundarylinewasthePselRiver.Onthewestsideoftheriver,the51stGRDof6thGAwasdefendingHill211.9andHill207.8while52ndGRDwasholdingHill226.6-Polezhaevsector.The183rdRDandthe11thMRBof10thTClayinfrontofLAH and Das Reich on the Vasilevka, Komsomolets State Farm, Ivanovski Vyselok andStorozhevoe sector. The 2nd GTC and the 6th GMRB of 5th GTC were defending the linenorthwest of Belenikhino to Teterevino to Zhimolostnoe. The 2nd GTC at that point had 141workingtanks.The2ndTChad116workingtankswhichincluding43T70sandafewChurchills.vzz187.vzz8m.vzz1m.gnk253m.gnk312m.wwf110.At 0500 hrs, the 93rd GRD started moving up to the line to face the SS Corps between

VasilevkainthewesttoBelenikhinointhesoutheastreplacing2ndGTCsothatthetankerscouldmove further south and east and have coverage of Belenikhino, Leski, Shakhovo and DalniDolzhik.The89thGRDwasmovedtothelinethatincludedKalinineasttotheLipovyiDonetsandHill187.7.The6thGAwould remainstationary.The51stGRDwoulddefendHill211.9,Hill207.8andIlinski.The52ndGRDwouldbedeployedbetweenHill226.6andPolezhaevonthenorthernbanksofthePsel.The285thRRof183rdRDandthe11thMRBof10thTCwouldconfrontLAHandDasReichontheline:Vasilevka-Molozhavaiagully-KomsomoletsStateFarm-IvanovskiVyselok-Storozhevoe.The2ndGTCand6thGMRBof5thGTCheldthelinenorthwestofBelenikhinotoTeterevinoSouthtoZhimolostnoe.The285thRRof183rdRDwouldberightbehind the2ndGTC.Vatutinwaswellonhisway tohavinghis forcesdeployed for themajoroffensiveslatedfortheearlymorningon7/12.vzz186+.gnk312m.wwf110.zow157.Around0500hrs,a smallcontingentofSSTKmoved to the river to reconnoiter thenorthern

shoreandtrytoforcetheriverandestablishabridgehead.Thesmallcombatgrouplaunchedaprobing attack at dawn that initially failed to cross the Psel.After several hours of persistentfighting,thenowbattalion-sizedforcestillcouldnotcrossthePselRiver.Stoppingtheattempttosecurealodgment,thesmallcombatgrouppulledbackandwaitedfortherestofthegrenadierstoarrivebeforetryingtosecurethenorthernbanks.dgk164.vzz187+.The SSTK was behind schedule clearing the southern banks of the Psel with the muddy

conditionsandthestiffresistanceof the11thMRBand33rdRC.Eventually the leadingTigerscleared theway to the river on 7/9 and theSSTK formation prepared to cross and tentativelycapturethevillageofKliuckionthenorthernbankofthePsel,southeastofVeselyiinthepredawnhours.FromKliuchitheformationwouldthenheadfurthernorthonalinethatincludedVeselyi,Hill 226.6 and Beregovoe to give further screening for LAH as it made its final run onProkhorovka.TheLuftwaffe,sparinglyatfirstbutexpandingtheirmissionsastheskiescleared,precededSSTK,bombingHill226.6and theextendedgroundnorthwestof thebend in thePselRiver.Theinitialattackfailedduetoheavyshellingcomingfromthehillandthegrenadiershadto fall back. Priess was organizing a larger force for the second attempt at 1000 hrs in themorning.TheattackforcewouldconsistofapinceractionandincludedGroupBeckerandGroupBaumwhowouldattackalongtheKozlovka-KrasnyiOktiabrsector.While theattacklaunched,everygun fromSSTK and some fromLAHwould try to shut down the batteries on topofHill226.6.TheLuftwaffewouldsupporttheattack.Stukaswouldattackthehillwhilegroundattackaircraftwouldassaultthedefensesalongthenorthernbankoftheriver.Lowcloudcoverandaflash thunderstorm finished the Luftwaffe’s participation almost from the very start. In theafternoonthecloudcoverimprovedandStukaswereout,bombingHill226.6.Bytheendoftheday a bridgehead had been established, Kliuchi had been captured and Hill 226.6 tenuouslycapturedaswell.mhz305.fkk148.fkk319m.vzz1m.gnk312m.wwf109.zrl224+.zow156+.InanattempttostopSSTKfromcrossingthePselandLAHfromreachingProkhorovka,reserve

elementsof the183rdRDsupportedby tanksandartillery,werebroughtup todefend the line:Vasilevka-KomsomoletsStateFarm-IvanovskiVyselok.The1stPzGRofLAH,whichhadbeendriving toward the Psel to link up with SSTK and solidify the front line before moving onProkhorovka, had stopped and were regrouping before advancing. vzz189+. vzz8m. dgk167.zrl224.AlittlenorthwestofIvanovskiVyselok,the183rdRDof48thRCwasdefendingthetrenchin

front ofKomsomoletsStateFarm.Theywerewaiting for the advancing 2ndPzGRandhopingtheir gunswouldwhittle the enemydownbefore it reached the front trenches.Das Reich wasfightingtopenetratetheSovietpositionsalongtheStorozhevoeforestandbreakthroughtoIamkiaswellasprotectingLAH’seasternflank.ElementsofPopov’s26thTB,deployedatOktiabrskiStateFarmaboutamileawaytothenorth,hadorderstostriketowardHill241.6andHill258.2to thesouthofKomsomolets, to relieve thepressureon the183rdRDwhen theGermanswereencountered.Thistankforce,plusforcesalreadyintheareacomingtogether,plusartilleryonthePselbankswouldbeabletoslowbutnotstopLAHfromdrivingthroughthefarm.The2ndPzRofLAHwithairsupportwashavingbetterluckagainsttheChurchillsandtheir57mmgunsthantheT34s which were more prominent. The 15th GHTR moved up at 1330 hrs and momentarilyslowedtheTigersfurtherinfrontofHill241.6butlost11oftheir12tankstotheTigersandtheLuftwaffeabove.vzz192+.vzz3m.gnk253m.zow157.At0530hrs,theThuleregimentofSSTKresumeditsadvancefromVasilevkaandKozlovkato

thePselRivertocontributewiththerestofdivisionincrossingtheimportantbarrier.AirreconshowedtheSovietswerequicklyerectingnewdefensesnorthofthePsel,afteranearlierprobingattackcrossedtheriverbutfailedtoestablishabridgehead.WhileSSTKwascrossingtheriverand advancing toward Beregovoe, LAH would drive for the high ridge three miles east of

Kartaschevkaandalongthe linewithProkhorovkabeforedescendingontherail town.Asmallcombat group of LAH supported by a few tanks and rocket launchers had assembled in theMolozhavaiagully to thenorthofKomsomoletsStateFarmandwaspreparing tomakeanotherruntowardProkhorovka.Popovof2ndTCdiscoveredtheGermansandwaspreparingtorepulsetheattack.EvenwiththehelpoftheLuftwaffe theattackwasrepulsedbytheartilleryof285thRR and LAH had to fall back to their starting point. While the defense of this section wasoccurring,VatutinhadinitiatedhisownoffensivetodisruptDasReich frommaintainingLAH’seasternscreenThe2ndTCwascalledontomakethisstrike.fkk147+.vzz188+.vzz8m.fkk323m.gnk253m.dgr99.zrl224.Duringthepredawnhours,LtColonelAkopov’s245thTRwasattachedto52ndGRDandby

0600hrs,wasoccupying the lineon thenorthern slopesofHill 226.6.The regimenthadeightlightUStanks.vzz195.gnk253m.gnk312m.At0600hrsandforthenextthreehours,Germanplanes,flyingbelowtheclouds,strafedthe

285thRRonthenorthernbanktosoftentheSovietdefensewhileSSTKbroughtupmoremenandweapons to the river. This German deployment was slowed bymuddy conditions and againstheavyresistanceof the52ndGRDandartillerycominginfromnearVasilevkaandAndreevka.TheGermanschose the locationof thecrossingcorrectly, for thebend in the river reduced theamountofflankfirebutitwasstilldifficult.Asaresultofprisonerinterrogations,plusspottingvehicletrafficintheareathenightbefore,reinforcementswerebeingsenttothePselRivernearVasilevkaandAndreevka.Elementsofthe99thTBweresentalsoalongwiththeinfantry.AfterrepulsingthesmallattackofLAH’sshortlyafterdaybreak,Popov’s2ndTCalongwith

the183rdRDchargeddowntheProkhorovkaroadintothedefensesofLAHandDasReich.Thebattle was fierce and the Soviets had to fall back, suffering heavy casualties. Popov wouldregroupandtryagain.Notfarawaytothesoutheast,the2ndGTCunderBurdeinywasalsopulledfromthelineandsenttoMaloeIablonovotoregroupaftersufferingheavycasualtiesaswell.The93rdGRDtookitsplace.Whenthe10thTCwasorderedwesttoblockthewayofthe48thPzCtoOboyan,the2ndTCwasorderedtoblocktheroadtoProkhorovka.dgk167.wwf110.vzz188+.Hausser ordered his 2nd SS PzC to penetrate the third defensive belt and reach the

Prokhorovka Station-Hill 252.4-Beregovoe- Hill 243.5- Kartashevka- Hill 236.7 line. At thisstageofattritionandwiththelengthoftheflanksthathadtobedefended,thattaskwouldseemnearlyimpossible,asduringthelastfewdaystheSShadfailedtoaccomplishthetask.Tomeetthese objectives and do it before the armored column arrived, each division would have toadvancebetweenfivetoeightmilesthatdaythroughthethirddefensivebelt.Iftheseobjectivescouldbeaccomplished,itwouldallowthe2ndSSPzCtothenturnsouthanddestroy69thArmy’s48thRCalongwiththehelpof3rdPzC.ThenthetwoGermancorpscouldturnnorthagainandheadforKursk.Hill252.4lessthantwomilesnortheastofProkhorovkaandHill243.5,onemilenorthwestofKorytnoe,wouldbekeyobjectives.LAHwouldadvancetowardProkhorovka-Hill252.4 whileDas Reich headed for the high ground one mile southeast of Ivanovski Vyselokbefore turning north toward Iamki-Pravorot then Prokhorovka. The SSTK was to extend theirbridgehead to the northeast along the Psel River. Later in the day,Deutschland Regiment didcapture Ivanovski Vyselok after a hard fight but the assignments for SSTK andLAH were tooambitiousatthisstageinthecampaign.DerFührerRegiment,southofDeutschland,hadalonger

sectortoprotectfromIasnaiaPolianatoNekhaevkaandwasunabletogainmuchground.SSTKwouldfollowthewestbankofthePselnorthwardtoguardLAH’sleftflank.Ifpossible,SchipytothewestandonlysixmilesfromOboyanwouldalsobecaptured,thoughneitherSSTKnor11thPzDever got close to accomplishing this objective.The48thRCunderMajGeneralRogoznyconsistedof183rdRD,93rdRDand89thRD,amongotherattachmentsthatwouldbeblockingtheway.KartashevkawastwomilesnorthofVeselyiandthreemilesnorthofKrasnyiOktiabr.Korytnoe, which was another key objective, was about two miles north of the Kartashevka-Prokhorovka road. vzz175++*. vzz185. vzz1m. vzz130+. vzz3m. vzz11m. wwf101. dgk184m.wdk154.zrl224.dgk146.South of Prokhorovka, heavy rains in the predawn hours prevented the attack force ofLAH

(includingpanzerswhichwerehaving troubles in themud) in reaching their designated launchareanearTeterevinoNorth,by0600hrsasplanned.Wisch,theCOofLAH,wantedtowaitforrestofhisdivisiontoassemblebeforeattackingtowardProkhorovkabutwasorderedbyHaussertoattackassoonastheartillerypreparationwasover,piecemealifhehadto.Theirobjectiveswould be to clear the groundwest of the railroad, IvanovskiVyselok, theKomsomolets StateFarmandHill241.6locatedalongtheroadtoProkhorovka,whichallhadtobetakentohaveachanceof takingProkhorovka.WhileLAH travelednorth along the railroad track towardKSF,Deutschland Regiment was to attack to the east toward Ivanovka and Vinogradovka. If theseobjectives could be taken that day and ifDas Reich couldmake comparable gains, then bothdivisionscouldassaultProkhorovkatogetherthenextday.Deutschlandgainedaboutamilethatdaybut failed to reach either town.DerFührer also attacked butmade it only to the railroadoppositeBelenikhino.zow157.Kraas’s2ndSSPzGRmoved intopositionbetweenTeterevinoNorthandIvanovskiVyselok

andwaitedforthesignaltobeginitsmarchtowardIvanovskiVyselokbeforemovingtowardtherail line,KSF,Hill241.6and ifpossibleProkhorovka.During this time,Frey’s1stPzGRwaswithdrawing from the Solotinka River area back to Teterevino North. When the entirecoordinated2ndSSPzC’soffensiveresumedlaterthatmorning,theboundarylinebetweenLAHandDasReichincludedTeterevinoNorth,theforesteastofIvanovskiVyselok,StorozhevoeandIamki.TheboundarylinebetweenLAHandSSTKincludednorthofTeterevino,Vasilevkaandtheothervillages runningalong thePselRiver.The sectorswere triangularwithTeterevinoNorthbeingacommonpoint.zrl224.Intheearlymorninghours,asmallSovietsquadronattackedtheairfieldatVararovka,notfar

fromBelgorod.Approachingtheairfieldathunderstormarose,makingvisibilitydifficultbutthemissioncontinued.TheambushwasacompletesurpriseandtheGermanswerenotprepared.Thebombers and fighters destroyed a number of Junkers, including several that were trying toscramble.ThoughmostoftheSovietplanesreceivedflakdamagenonewereshotdown.cbk74.ThedefenseofIvanovskiVyselokandtheKomsomoletsStateFarm,aswellasVasilevkaand

Kozlovkatothewest,wascriticalfortheSovietsastheGermanswouldbepassingthroughthiscorridortoreachthePselRiver’snorthernregionandKursk.Vatutinwouldloadthissectorwitheverygun,mortarandtankhecouldfindtostopHothatthisthirddefensivebelt.TheStateFarmwastwomilessoutheastofKozlovkawhichwasamilesouthoftheriverandhadtherelativeflatterrainneededbythepanzers.vzz189.vzz7m.

LAH’sattacktowardtheProkhorovkarailembankmentstartedlate;itwas1030hrs.LAHwasgoing to reach the rail line then follow it toProkhorovka.The2ndPzGRwas in the lead andwould have to secure Ivanovkski Vyselok first. On approaching the village, two Soviet tanksrushed out from the nearby woods and tried to ambush the column. The Soviets did destroyseveraltrucksbutgrenadiers,usingshapedcharges,destroyedbothtanks.Thegrenadiershadatthistimenopanzersupport.Afteranhourmarchtheregimentreachedtheraillinethenshiftedtothenortheast towardProkhorovka.Withinminutes the regiment,nowsupportedbyaplatoonofassaultguns,sawthebigKomsomoletsStateFarmahead.JustnorthofthefarmwasHill241.6whichwasnexttotherailroadanddefendedbythe11thMRB.Therailembankmentwasashighas30feetabovethegroundinplacesandtheSovietsexploitedthatheightfactortothemaximum.Thegrenadiersandgunsmovedonto the farmanddiscoveredaminefield in frontof it.SovietartilleryimmediatelystartedfiringfromHill241.6.TheGermanswereintheopenandhelplessbutthenfourTigersappeared,headingdirectlytowardthehill.TheSovietshellingmovedfromthegrenadierstotheTigers,givingthesoldierstimetoregroupandmoveahead.Theengineerscontinued to clear themines.Kling’sTigerswere takingmanyhits to their front armor; itwashavingnoeffectbutastheTigerscamewithinrangeoftheentrenchedT34stheystartedaimingforthethinnersideskinofthepanzers.TheTigersstoppedandsystematicallydestroyedeachtankbeforemovingon.gnk255+.vzz3m.vzz9m.The southern attack by 4th PzA and Army Detachment Kempf had sufficiently reduced the

forcesofVatutin’sVoronezhFront to justify the releaseof theSoviet5thGTAfrom theSteppeFront.IfVatutinhadwaitedanotherdaybeforeaskingfor5thGTAorifGeneralRotmistrovhadtakenlongertoarriveatProkhorovka,thechancesthatthecombinedeffortsofthe2ndSSwouldhave taken Prokhorovka by 7/12 were much improved and would have placed tremendouspressureon69thArmy,whichwastryingtoholdback3rdPzCdrivingnorth.The5thGTAstartedarrivingintheProkhorovkaareaingreaternumbersthatday;Rotmistrov,

beforehisentirearmyhadarrived,dispatchedavailabletanksalongthePselRiverandpositionswest of Prokhorovka. He also redeployed his 40,000 men along the Psel from Oboyan toProkhorovka.Thisprocesswouldtaketwodays tocomplete.The3rdPzCcontinuedtoslowlyadvancenorthward.AftertheearlierattackonLAHattheKSF,Popov’s2ndTCmovedwesttodefendKochetovkaagainsttheSS.WhiletheSSwasbeingattacked,the1stTAdisposedalongthe Oboyan road was preparing to move against the 48th PzC along the Pena River if theopportunityarose.dgk138+.dgk168.Traveling at night, the 24th PzC, arrived at Belgorod from theDonbas to participate in the

comingattackonProkhorovkaifsoordered.je105*.Astwoofthedivisionsof2ndSSPzCwereheadingforProkhorovkaalongbothbanksofthe

PselRiver,itwasdowntolessthan300panzerswhile3rdPzCtothesoutheastwasdowntolessthan200.Rotmistrov’s5thGTAwhichwasmovingtowardthisareawouldhave830-850tanks,includingitsnewattachments.Tothewest,the48thPzCand1stTAcollectivelyhadanother700.In the next few days, asmany as 1,250 tankswould fight along the eastern flank of theKursksalientandabout570on thefield immediatelywestandsouthofProkhorovka,mostlybetweenthe Psel and LipovyiDonets Rivers. These tank numbers do not include the hundreds battlingagainsteachotherin48thPzCsector.dgk151+.dgk222m.dlu63m.zpm195.

LtColMalov’s99thTBandColBorodkin’s11thMRBcounter-attackedSSTKandby1100hrshadpushedtheGermansbackfromProkhorovka,KozlovkaandpartsofVasilevka,foilingSSTK’sattempttoexpandtheirbridgeheadandlinkupwithLAH.TheProkhorovkamentionedabovewasbetween Krasnyi Oktiabr and Kozlovka and was a different village six miles west of THElegendaryProkhorovka(Station).vzz189.vzz5m.dgk164.dgk165m.At1030hrs, theLAH launched theirmainattack towardProkhorovka.GroupBeckerheaded

straightforthesouthwesterncornerofKomsomoletsStateFarmwhileGroupSandigheadedeasttoward the rail line before turning north. At the same time, SSTK launched another moreaggressiveattacktowardKozlovkaandVasilevkainordertokeeptheSovietsfromconcentratingtheirartilleryonLAHandhopefully tokeepVatutin fromsendingreinforcements thereaswell.SSTKwasmet by a Soviet counter-attack by the 99thTB and the 11thMRBwhich drove theGermansbackfromKozlovka.vzz189.zrl227.The start timewasdelayedby four hours due to theheavy rains that slowedbothgrenadier

regimentsofLAHinreachingtheirindividualstartpoints.Afterrefueling,the1stPzGRbeganitsdrivetowardProkhorovkafromnearSukhnoSolotinoat1045hrs.Hausserdeliberatelygavetheregimentalatestartbecauseoftheheavyfightingithadbeeninthepreviousday.By1300hrsandhaving been constantly attacked by Popov’s 2nd TC, the LAH regiment finally reached andstormedtheKomsomoletsStateFarmfromthesouthwest.Theleftflankof2ndPzGRhadalreadyengagedthedefendersfromthesouthandeastandtogetherbothregimentswerefinallypushingthedefendersoff theFarm.ImmediatelyafterwardthedivisionattackedthefortifiedHill241.6withitsmanydug-intanks.Therewasnotimeforrest;thegrenadiershadtosilencethosegunsthatwerecausingsomuchdamage.TheTigersinthedivisionhadalreadybeguntoattackthehillin order to reduce the shelling of the grenadiers at the farm. Being greatly outnumbered, theremainingfourTigerstookonahostofT34sinfrontofthehill.VatutinhadanticipatedtheattacktowardProkhorovkaandduringthenightdeployedeverygunthatcouldberoundeduptopreventtheGermansfromreachingProkhorovka.InspiteofVatutin’sefforts,by1630hrsthehillwasinGermanhands.Theycounted53tanksand23Pakgunsdestroyedonthehill,inadditionto197POWscaptured.Beforethehillcouldbemannedanddefensesimproved,sappersclearedminesfromtheapproaches.A totalof367minesencased inwoodwerecleared.LAH lost26killed,168 wounded and 3 missing in today’s fighting. mhz306. mhz314. fkk87. dgk166. vzz8m.gnk253m.gnk312m.zrl224.zrl230.dgk165m.zow156.TheinfantryofLAHmadelittleprogressinadvancingtowardProkhorovkaasSovietartillery

onthePselRiverandtotheeastatVinogradovkaweredeadlyaccurate.The2ndPzGRmadeittotherailroadnortheastofTeterevinoNorthanddroveanothermiletowardProkhorovka.Despitebeingattackedbytherecentlyarrived183rdRD,10thTCandthe93rdGRD,thisregimentwasabletojoinupwithSSTKbynightfall.ThepanzerregimentofLAHwasfightingtotheeastintheMalyeMaiachki andGresnoe areawhere they pushed back theSoviet defenders another threemiles.wdk151.AttheKomsomoletsStateFarm,Kling’sTigers(onehadturretdamageandwasonlypartially

functioning)crossedoverthetankditchtheengineershadfilledinandwereinitiallyaimingtheirangeratthebunkersinfrontoftheStateFarm.Thegrenadiersandassaultgunsshifteddirection,cuttingacrossthefarmandadvancedonHill241.6whichseemedthemoredangerousofthetwo

positionsandby1430hrsHill241.6wasinGermancontrolandbeingfortifiedagainstcounter-attacks. Some of the Soviet defenders surrenderedwhile otherswere able to escape. gnk257.gnk260.zrl227.By mid morning, Das Reich resumed its difficult advance to the northeast from east of

TeterevinoNorth, trying tocross theProkhovrovkarail line toreachStorozhevoe.Afterahardday’sfight, it failedtoreachitsobjectivebutmanagedtoreachandsecureIvanoskiVyselok,asmall village lodged in a long ravine south of Prokhorovka road and just southwest ofStorozhevoe. To facilitate the coming tank battle, the last regiment of 167th ID moved fromPokrovka,westofLuchki,totheLipovyiDonetstorelieveDerFührerofDasReichprotectingthesouthernflankoftheLipovylDonetsline,inorderthatthefulldivisioncouldparticipateinthebattle for Prokhorovka. dgk166. dgk184m. dgk95m. dgk222m. dlu63m. dgr209m. vzz3m.gnk253m.DasReichhad troublesalso. Itsdrive toward thevillageofStorozhevoewasslowwith the

heavyresistanceof2ndTC,fightingthemeveryinchoftheway.DasReichwasorderedtowardStorozhevoetorelievepressureoffLAHatKomsomoletsand toassistLAH in thefinal runforProkhorovka.mhz306.mhz314.fkk87.vzz8m.gnk253m.gnk312m.Throughoutthemorning,theLAHmaderepeatedattemptstotakeKomsomoletsStateFarm,just

northwestofIvanovskiVyselok,butwererepulsedbyfierceshellingfromthe99thTB,11thMRBandthe1502ndDAR,locatedontheleftbankofthePselRiver.The26thTBalsosupportedfromnearHill241.6whichwasamilesouthofAndreevkaon thesouthernbanksof thePselRiver.EventuallyLAHbroke through the linenearHill258.2,defendedby285thRR,andheaded forIvanovskiVyselok.The26thTBdeployedjustnorthoftheKSFandHill258.2senttanks,whichincludedChurchills,toblocktheSSfromreachingtheirobjectivebutthetankscouldnotstoptheTigers leading the assault and eventually the twohills and state farmwere captured. vzz192+.vzz8m.dgk167.West of the corridor several hours after the recon force tried to breach the river, the two

infantryregimentsofSSTKattackedacrossthePseltosecureatentativeholdonthebridgeheadbeforeseizingHill226.6,thekeyhighgroundjusteastofthesmallfortifiedvillageofKliuchi.Theadvancewasslowagainstthe52ndGRDand11thMRB.ThisfailureofaquickexpansionofthebridgeheadnorthofthePselmadeitdifficultforLAH todrivenortheast,forcingHaussertodelaythe largerattackplannedthat includedLAH’sdriveonProkhorovka.Bynoon,SSTKwasfreeandhadsecureda footholdon theriver’snorthernbankeastofKliuchiand therestof thecorpsresumeditsattack.HausserrushedLAHinattackingtowardProkhorovkawhenthedivisionwasnotproperlypreparedandtheypaidfor that impatience.Havingwaitedanotherfourhourswouldhavegiven theGeneralbetter results.TheSovietspaidahighpricefor theirassault theprevious day and were not prepared for another attack if the division had attacked as one.dgk164.dgk124m.dgk222m.lck326.gnk312m.wwf99ztc269.dgk165m.WhenSSTKfailedtotakeHill226.6duringthepreviousnight,theLAHcombatgrouphadto

waittoseeifitwascapturedduringdaylight.ThatmorningLAHwasconcernedthatifitlaunchedfromHill241.6(notyetcaptured)towardProkhorovka,theSovietartilleryonHill226.6wouldfind them.Despite theconcerns,LAH couldnotwaitany longerandatapproximately1100hrsbegantheiradvanceanyway.By1300hrs,the2ndPzGRreachedandwasfightingforHill241.6

andthewoodsnextdoortotheeast.Infrontofthehillalonglineofdug-intankswerewaitingforthecomingattack.TigerswereintheleadandstartedfiringAPshellsagainstthetanksandHEroundsagainst theMGbunkers.ThefightingwasfiercebutwiththehelpoftheTigers, the2ndPzGRcapturedthehillby1630hrs.Hill241.6wasaboutamileduesouthofAndreevkawhichwasonthesouthernbankof thePselRiver.Thishillwascritical for theGermansfor itwasagreatOPandanequallygoodlaunchingpointtoattackHill252.2andProkhorovka.The1stPzGRhadaharddaythepreviousday,ingainingcontrolofSukhoSolotinosoHaussergavethemthemorningtoregroup.agk122+.vzz1m.wwf100.zrl227.Since thedaybefore,DasReich had been struggling to captureKalinin, east of theLipovyi

DonetsRiverandnotfarfromOzerovski.Aregimentfrom167thIDmovedintopositionsintheKalinin area to relieve Das Reich so it could shift direction to the northeast in order toconcentrateitspowertowardStorozhevoeandIamki.ItwouldalsotakesomeofthepressureoffLAH as the 10th MC and 5th GMC were attacking them along the Prokhorovka road. Otherelementsof167thIDwerefightingintheShopinoarea,aboutsixmilesnorthofBelgorod,againstthe81stGRDand375thRD,inordertorelievesomeofthepressureoff3rdPzC.AsmallgroupfromDasReich’srightflankhadactuallymadeitacrosstheLipovyiDonetsnearPetrovskiandwerefightingagainstthesametwoSovietdivisions.TheGermanpressureinthisarea,alongwiththerecentsuccessof6thPzDand19thPzDalongtheDonets,wasanimportantcontributingfactorcausingthe69thArmytobegintheirretreat to thenorth.TheSSTK, fightingforcontrolofbothsouthernandnorthernbanksofthePsel,weremeetingupwiththe5thGAwhichwasbeginningtoenterthesector.wdk152.vzz3m.dgr86m.dgr93m.vzz7m.While in the field in the late morning, Staudegger, the hero at Teterevino North two days

earlier,receivedhisKnight’sCross.HewasthenflowntoPrussiatoseeHitlerbeforegoingonleave.agk123.Ataboutthesametime,the2ndPzGRwasfightingitswaytowardHill241.6.Theremainder

ofthetwogrenadierregimentsofSSTKwereworkingtheirwayacrossthePselRivertobolstertheforcesalreadyoverthere.Onceacrosstheriverandaftersecuringthebridgehead,Hill226.6andKliuchiwould be targeted.German intelligence had identified seven batteries of assortedgunsonandbehindthathillthatcouldreachbothSSTKandLAH.Slowingtheredeploymentevenfurtherweretheheavyrainsthatturneddirtroadsandthecountrysidetodeepmud.Notonlythepanzers but the artillery batterieswould be late arriving at their jump points. Priess of SSTKcalculatedthatitwouldbe1000hrsbeforetheremainderofhisregimentswouldmoveacrosstheriver,thatwashourslaterthanbothHothandHausserexpected.ThevillageofKliuchi,southwestofthehillandHill226.6itselfwerealsoprimetargetsfortheLuftwaffewhencloudcoverlifted.Besidestheheavyrainsduringthepredawnhours,theskiesweresoovercastintheearlymorningthattheLuftwaffecouldnotfly.Evenwiththerepaircrewsworkingthroughoutthenight,LAHhadonly45assortedpanzersoperationalfortheday’sattack.Forcingtheriver,securingabridgeheadandcapturingHill226.6inquicksuccessionwasanecessityifSSTKwasgoingtoprovideflankprotectiontoLAH,buttheygotalatestartandwouldrunfurtherbehindscheduleasthedayworeon.Thoughcapturingtheirtargets,thedivisionwasrunninghoursbehindscheduleanditthrewoffthe entire SS’s timetable as the SSTK were supposed to drive north in parallel with LAH toprotecttheirflank.vzz176.+gnk254+.gnk253m.vzz1m.zrl227.

At1200hrsSSTKlaunchedalargerattacktoforcethePselbutfailedthefirstattemptduetoheavyshellingandsmallarmsfire.WiththesupportofthemortarteamstosuppressSAfirefromthenorthbank,andusingrubberrafts, theshocktroopssucceededincrossingtherivernorthofKozlovka by 1700 hrs and within an hour had secured the first trench line of the village ofKliuchi.SSTKmademodestgainsthatdayasVatutinmadeitdifficulttocrossthePselandhadblocked theGermanadvancefromreachingKartashevka,whichwouldbeSSTK’sanchorpointbeforeturningeasttohelpLAHwithProkhorovka.OnceKartashevkawassecured,theSSTKhadplannedoncrossingthePseltotheeastsideatPetrovkawhichwasonlythreemilesnorthwestofProkhorovka. Once on the east side SSTK could screen LAH’s west flank. vzz196. gnk263.vzz11m.fxk311.vzz244.Since0600hrs,LAHwastakingheavyshellingfromthewestbankofthePselRiverandfrom

thesoutheastareaofVinogradovka.Despitethisshellingacombatgroupof2ndPzGRmadeittotherailroadlineduewestofBelenikhino.ReachingthispointspurredgreaterSoviettankassaultsfromthedirectionofStorozhevoe.TheLAHwasstillabletoreachHill241.6againstthefierceresistanceof285thRR(183rdRD)by1400hrs,capturingitlaterthatafternoonandbydusktheyhadreachedthewoodsdirectlynorthofStorozhevoe.The169thTBwasalsopressuredandfellbackfromIvanovskiVyselokbuttheLAHwasstoppedbythetanksdefendingtheroutenorthofStalinskoeStateFarm.LAHalsoexpandeditsleftflankinordertomakecontactwithSSTK forthenightwhen1stPzGRresumed its advance in theafternoon.TheStalinskoeStateFarmwassoutheastofHill252.2andonthefringeof thenortheastcornerofStorozhevoeForest.fkk149.vzz1m.vzz8m.vzz176.vzz191.gnk326.gnk253m.gnk323m.ThePzAbt3ofSSTK, fighting itsway intoKochetovka, joined forceswith11thPzDat the

churchnearthecenterofthetownasordered.zow157.Asordered,theLAHpanzersresumedtheirattacknorthwardwhilethegrenadiersofDasReich

attackedeasttowardVinogradovka,aboutfourmilessouthwestofProkhorovka.DasReichandtworegimentsof167thIDwouldmaintainpressureontheLipovyiDonetstopindownthe2ndGTC,the375thGRDand81stGRDwhile3rdPzCmovednorth.SSTKwouldcontinuefor thehigh ground on both sides of the Psel northwest of Prokhorovka. After completing the heavybridgeonthe11th(1420hrs)itwouldthenmovetowardPetrovkaalongthecorridor’sedge,alsonorthwest of Prokhorovka. The 48th PzC continued to battle 6th TC in its attempt to reachOboyan.wdk150.dgk222m.dlu63m.lck328.kuz195.Hill 226.6 was the important high ground east of the village of Kliuchi which was also

defended by the 52ndGRD and the 11thMRB.The first attack on the hill failed but by earlyafternoon and despite the muddy conditions from the predawn rain, SSTK secured a smalllodgmentatitsbase.Itwasaprecariouspositionandthedivisionhadtocrestthetopifitdidnotwant tobedestroyed.Meanwhile thegarrisonatKliuchiwaspreventingSSTK fromadvancingnorthwardalongthewesternedgeofthesector.WhileKliuchiwasinenemyhands,SSTKwouldhavetoworryaboutflankattacksandthoughthecriticaltimetablewasalreadybehindschedule,the timewouldhave tobe invested in taking the strongpointon thewestern edgeof the line ifSoviet flankattackswere tobeprevented.Moreof theSSTKdivision finallywascrossing thePsel and expanding the small bridgehead on the north side toward Kliuchi. Still more of thedivisionwouldhave tocrossbeforeexpanding thebridgehead tobeyondHill226.6.TheLAH

hadtopostponetheirlaunchuntilalmostnoon,tomakesureSSTKwouldmakeitacrosstheriverandkeeptheSovietsbusysotheywouldnotattackLAH’sleftflankwhenitmadeitsfinalrunonProkhorovka.wwf100.dgk222m.lck325.gnk253m.gnk312m.nzk94.vzz1m.vzz8m.vzz244.Itwasnotuntilnearly1400hrsthatDeutschland(DasReich)wasabletolaunchtheirattackto

thenortheast.TheyweretomovenorthandscreenLAH’seastflankasitdrovepastHill241.6which had just fallen. LAH had to attack with an exposed east flank; the Soviets took fulladvantageofthisanditcostLAHgreatly.DasReichdidnotgofarbeforetheSoviets,hidinginthe Storozhevoe woods, ambushed them and slowed their advance further. This lack ofcoordinatedeffortbythesetwodivisionsisanotherexampleoftheGermanscostingthemselvesassetsthattheycouldnotaffordtolose.gnk263.gnk253m.vzz10m.In the afternoon the skies cleared and theLuftwaffewas able to supportSSTK in forming a

bridgeheadonthenorthsideofthePselandadvanceamodestway.ThebridgeheadcenteredonthelightbridgeerectedbyengineersandextendedahalfmiledirectlynorthwestofMikhailovkatoHill226.6,northeastofBogoroditskoe,andKliuchi.KliuchiwasahalfmileeastofKrasnyiOktiabr.fkk149.vzz1m.vzz176.vzz191.gnk312m.By1200hrs,theLAHadvancethathadstartedneartheTeterevinoNorthareatothenortheast

hadclearedthebendintheraillineleadingtoProkhorovka,andby1400hrs,fromtherailroadembankment, the 2nd PzGR of LAH had been able to penetrate the first trench in front ofKomsomolets StateFarm against the 169thTBof 2ndTC, although itwas then held up.Afterfightingforthreemorehours,KSFandHill241.6,justnorthoftheFarmandsittingbesidetherailline,wascaptureddespitefierceshellingbytheSovietsfromseveralhilltopsandrepeatedtankattacks originating from the Stalinskoe State Farm. The Soviet line from IvanovskiVyselok toStorozhevoewasstillbeingheldby1400hrsbutDasReichcontinued to increase thepressureandIvanovskiVyselokwasteetering.vzz189+.vzz8m.dgk167.vzz196.zrl227.By 1500 hrs, the 2nd PzR of LAH drove the 285th RR from the west front trenches of

KomsomoletsStateFarm,clearingthefarmasitheadednorth.Atthesametime,theleadTigersofLAHapproachedHill241.6totheimmediatenortheastofKSFwhilethe2ndPzGRcontinuedtoattackedtherearof285thRRand169thTB,whichhadredeployedinthewoodsnorthoftheFarm.SoviettankscomingfromStalinsktothenorthrushedtosupportthe169thTBbutafterfourhoursofhardfightingwereunabletoreachthecrestofHill241.6andtheremainderof285thRRhad to fall back to the 99th TB’s position at Vasilevka. The LAH was also able to force thetankers to abandon Ivanovski Vyselok and head for Storozhevoe. Losing Komsomolets andIvanovskiVyselokwasaseriousthreatfortheSovietdefensesinfrontofProkhorovka,lessthansixmilesaway,butStorozhevoewasstillholdingeventhoughDasReichcontinuedtofightforituntilmidnight,asdidSSTK, forgreatercontrolof thebridgehead.TheGermansmovedquicklyontothegroundjustevacuatedbymovingalongtherailroadembankment,usingits20-footheightforcover.vzz191+.vzz196*.vzz8m.dgk171.WhilethetwogrenadierregimentsofSSTKweresecuringabridgeheadonthenorthernshore

ofthePselRiver,thepanzerregimenthadrolledintoKrasnyiPolianafromGresnoe.Withoutabridge tocross thePsel, thepanzerswere isolated.ThePioneerRegiment680afterpausingatGresnoeearlierinthedayhadbeenshelledshortlyafterleavingGresnoefortheriver.Theyhadtowait the shellingout in a ravine andwere late in arriving at the river to assistwith bridge

buildingduties.gnk268.gnk253m.fzk311.The bulk of SSTK had moved to the corps’ left flank and had crossed the Psel north of

Kozlovka, resuming its attack at 1600 hrs under air support and light rain against GroupPantiukhov’s52ndGRD in thebendof the river.The first penetrationof the trenchesof155thGRRoccurredamilesoutheastofKliuchi.TheSovietregimentcouldnotwithstandthepressureofthelargerforceandhadtofallbacktowardthewoodsnortheastofOktiabrskiStateFarm.Ahalfhourlaterat1800hrs,leadelementsofSSTKadvancedtowardKliuchiwhichwasdefendedby the151stGRR.Abriefbutviciousbattle eruptedbut the151stGRRalsohad to fallback.OnceKliuchifell,theSSTKheadedforVeselyi.FromKliuchi,GroupBaumattackedthenearbywoods.GroupBeckerheaded forHill226.6.Hill226.6,northeastofKliuchi,was reachedbymidnight.Though52ndGRDwaspushedbackfromitsfronttrenchesit,alongwiththeattached245thTR,gaveupgroundgrudgingly anddid stopSSTK from takingHill 226.6.At 2030hrs,HausserwasinformedthatSSTKestablishedabridgeheadatKrasbyiOktiabrandhadlinkedupwith11thPzDatKochetovka.Hausserorderedthepanzersandheavyequipmenttocrosstheriverthatnightsothatthedivisioncouldattackearlynextmorning.TherewasstillastrongcontingentintheKliuchiareaandafterregroupingtheSovietswouldcounter-attackthevillagelaterthatday.Kliuchi was located on the northern banks of the Psel River across from Krasnyi Oktiabr.vzz193+.vzz195+.vzz1m.vzz8m.gnk312m.Underanumbrellaofheavyartilleryandair support, theSSTK had forceda crossingof the

Psel River and then created a small bridgehead on the north side at the same time as othermembersofSSTKcapturedthevillagesonthesouthernbanksofVasilevka,KozlovkaandKrasnyiOktabyr,allwithinsixhours.WhilefightingonthenorthsideoftherivertheartilleryandtherestofSSTK,despitethepouringrain,cameacrossaswell.TheEickeregimentengagedthecriticalHill226.6andeventuallysecuredpartofthehillbyevening.Stukascontinuedtoflymissionsaslateaspossibletosoftenuptheremainderofthehill.SSTKsuffered430casualtiesthatday,thehighesttotalforanydayinthecampaign.mhz306.LateintheafternoontherainstoppedintheProkhovokasectorandtheskiesimprovedtopartly

cloudy. Stukas took to the air but by this time, the day’s heavy fightingwas history. TheLAHsufferedheavycasualtiesonthisday,having197eitherkilledorwounded,andgainedlessthantwomilesinmostplaces.gnk257.gnk260.IntheDasReichsector,eastofLAH,thedivisioncontinuedtorepulserepeatedattacksinthe

BelenikhinoandKalininareas.AnattackbyDeutschlandRegimentwasabletoreachthebendinthe railroad line near Ivanovski Vyselok. At night and in preparation of aiding LAH in themorning,therightflankofDasReichwasrelievedbythe331stIRof167thID.Inaddition,therearareaofDasReichhadmadecontactwith11thPzDearlierinthedayandnowoccupiedthelineHill227.0-Hill235.9-Hill248.3andtheroadforkonHill232.8atKochetovka.Theentire167th IDwasordered tomoveupcloser to the right flankofDasReich to safeguard its flankwhenitattackedinthemorning.fkk149+.lck327.fkk323m.Trierenberg’s 167th IDmoved into defensive positions along the railway line, just north of

LuchkiSouth.WiththehelpoftheLuftwaffethedivisionwasabletoholdoffrepeatedattacksbySoviettanks.Thedivisionhadnopanzersupportandhadtorelyonitsartillerytostopthetankattacks.pck77.

AfterattackingKliuchi,theSSTKReconBattalionheadsforVeselyi,whichwasaboutamiletothenorth,toinspectthebattlefieldbutwerestoppedbeforereachingit.vzz194.vzz1m.WiththeGermansthreateningProkhorovka,the24thArmyand4thTCmovedtoKursktostop

theadvancementiftheGermansmadeitpassProkhorovka.At1930hrsRegimentCO,Becker,radiosPriess(SSTK)informinghimthatthebridgeheadwas

establishedandthattheleadunitswereatthefootofHill226.6andwouldcontinuetofightforthehillduringthenight.Justbeforedark,theLuftwaffefinallyshowedtohelpthegrenadierswithHill226.6.Panzerswerestillonthesouthernbankofthisshallowriver,waitingforthebridgestobecompleted.Withoutthepanzersandwithcloudyskiestopreventheavyuseofairsupport,theinfantryhadtorelyonmortarandartilleryfireforsupport.ThoughtheLuftwaffewashesitanttofly,theRedAirForceflewmanymissionsagainstSSTKthatday.Laterintheevening,Sovietdefenders began to back away from the river, allowing the Germans to modestly enlarge thebridgeheadandbeginsendingmoreforcesacross theriver.SSTK stillhad78panzersworkingplusafewassaultguns.gnk267.gnk253m.vzz1m.vzz8m.By2100hrswhileSSTKwassecuringKliuchiandareconteamwasadvancingonVeselyi,the

restofthedivisionwasestablishingasmallbridgeheadatKrasnyiOktiabronthenorthsideofthePsel.OthermembersofSSTKmadecontactwith11thPzD.IthadbeenaharddayforSSTK;itlost430men.Itwastheworstsinglelossofthecampaignforthedivision.Thedaywascloudyandrainybuttheroadsremainedusable(barely)inthisareawhichallowedSSTKtostayactive.After dark, the Soviets made repeated attacks on the fledgling bridgehead and for a while itlookedlikeSSTKwouldbepushedintotheriverbutitheldontoasmallpieceofturf.Thatnightthelightpanzers,trucksandgunsweresentacrosstheriver;Priesswantedhisdivisiontogetanearlystartinthemorninginexpandingthebridgehead.vzz194.nzk94.ztc269.zrl227.dgk164+.Additionalreserveunitswerecominguptotheline.Vatutinsensedaclimaxwascomingand

hebroughtupasmanyresourcesashehadalongthelinebetweenOboyanandProkhorovka.Inthissmallarea,hehad850tanksandwouldtrytoencircleanddestroyhisenemy.je106.rkz168.Duringthenight,the7thGAARofColSazonov’s9thGAD,whichwaslocatedatStaryiOskol,

wasorderedtotheProkhorovkaareatotheleftoftheraillineby0400hrsnextmorning.Itwasa75miletripbuttheregimentmadeitthankstotheStudebakertruckstheyweredriving.Theyhadtoerectdefensesandcommunicationsfromscratchbuttheywerereadyby0700hrson7/11.Therestofthedivisionwouldbedug-ininfrontofProkhorovkabythenextnight.vzz239+.vzz9m.wwf110.In theSS sector by the endof the day, theSoviets controlled the area east and southeast of

Teterevino North, the area just outside of Leski and Belenikhino, the area just outside ofVinogradovkaandtheareasouthandnorthoftherailroadwestofStorozhevoeandeastofHill241.6. The Soviets were hugging the German line, not giving anything away for free. fkk150.fkk320m.fkk232m.vzz8m.Determined to take Prokhorovka,Hausser, late at night, renewed his orders for both the 1st

PzGR and 2nd PzGR of LAH to attack toward the important rail station in the morning. TheGermanshadtogaincontroloftherail lineandthecorridorleadingtoKurskandProkhorovkahadtobetheirsifitweretofall.ForDasReichtosupportLAHbetter,the167thIDwasorderedagain to increase their sector to the north so that Das Reich could reduce their sector and

concentratemoreforceintheStorozhevoearea.SSTK,whichwascurrentlyintheGresnoearea,wasorderedtoclearthevillagesalongthesouthernbankofthePselRiverandpreparetosecurethebridgeheadonthenorthside.wwf101+.vzz8m.Bytheendoftheday,vonMansteinsummarizedhisArmy’sresults.Thefirsttwodaysofbattle

sawpenetrationofthefirsttwodefensebelts.Onthethirdday,48thPzCbrokeintoopenterritoryaboutsixmilesfromOboyanandheadedforthethirddefensebelt.Sovietreinforcementsstartedarrivingtothelineingreaternumbersonthisthirdday.On7/11,the2ndSSPzCwasnorthofthePselRiverandmakingafinaldriveonProkhorovka.fkk151.TheSovietcounter-attacksintheareaswheretheGermanshadmadeinroadsinthesouthwere

increasingandtheGermanadvancewaspeteringout.TheSovietstookbackNovyiOskolinthesouth,amongseveralotherimportantvillagesalongthePselRiver.Evenwithouttheinfluenceof5thGAand5thGTA,Soviet resistancehaddramaticallyslowedtheGermansalongpracticallytheentirebattlesector.NothinghadbeeneasythatdayanditwouldgetalotharderoncethetwoSovietarmiesdeployed.TheGermansmade few gains on this daywhile Soviet reserves continued to build up.Von

Manstein still saw Oboyan as the primary initial objective, while the 2nd SS PzC would betaskedwithdestroyingthenewlyarrived69thArmy.HealsohadtohaveKempfandRauscatchup if theywere tobesuccessful.With this inmind,vonMansteinhadcanceled theadvanceonKorochatotheeastanddirectedKempfmoretothewesttoassist2ndSSPzC.VonMansteinalsowantedthe24thPzCtojointhefightingby7/17ontheeastflankof4thPzA.Hewasalsotryingtogetthe8thPzDand12thPzDintothesectoraswellasinfantryfrom2ndArmywhichwastothewest.ItwouldbeadifficultjobtopersuadeHitlertoreleaseanyoftheseunits.TheoriginalplantoreachKorochawasamistakestrategicallyandwaitingthislongtochangetheplanwasalsoamistake.After the first few days of experiencing heavy resistance from7thGA, vonMansteinshouldhavemadechanges.wdk154.aaa124m+.snk424m+++.dgk113.dgk146.hjj123m.Along theProkhorovka roadafterbriefly regrouping, the2ndTCcounter-attackedagainand

becameenmeshedinarunningbattlewithLAHandDasReich.Bytheendoftheday,theSovietdefenderswerepushedbackfromHill241.6andthenearbyKomsomoletsStateFarm.Duringthenight, thebulkof5thGAarrived to supportPopov.Sazonov’s9thGAD,whichwouldplayanimportant roleover thenext fewdays, startedarriving thatnightandbegandiggingdefenses infrontofProkhorovka.The33rdGRCof5thGAwasbroughtuptoblockthepathof2ndSSPzC.Its95thGRDand97thGRDdugindirectlybehindtheshattered51stGRDand52ndGRDtothewest of 9thGAD.MajGeneralBobrov’s 42ndGRD,whichwas held in reserve, prepared toassisteitherofthesedivisionsorthenearby9thGAD.Vatutinalsoorderedgreaterairsupportinordertopreventanyexpansionofthenorthernbridgehead.WiththeSovietsconcentratingon2ndSSPzCaslightreliefwasgivento48thPzC.Afterdark,the183rdRDshiftedpositiontorelievethe 5th GTA in order that it could move over to bolster 1st TA. dgk167*. dgk130m. snk82.gnk260.vzz322.gnk284.gnk293.gnk193m.wwf110.gnk227m.LAH, advancing between the Prokhorovka road and the railroad, made good progress until

reachingthefirsttrenchinfrontoftheKomsomoletsStateFarmbuteventuallycapturedKSFby1500hrs.ItwasamajorwinforLAHforitsetupthedivisiontomoveonHill241.6andthenHill252.2.AfterKSFtheyshiftedalittleeastandassaultedHill241.6andinitiallywerestopped

bytanksthatweredug-in,butbynightfallwiththehelpofTigerstheHillfelltotheGermans.TheLAHhaddestroyed53tanks,23gunsandcapturedafewprisoners.TheKomsomoletsStateFarmwas twomiles south ofKozlovka and the villagewas onemile south of the bend of the PselwhereSSTKwasplanningoncrossinginforce.Hill241.6wasalittlenortheastofKomsomoletsStateFarmanddefendedby11thMRBwhichwasalsobeingattackedby the2ndPzGR.AfterbothKSFandHill241.6werecaptured,theentire2ndPzGRmoveduptothelinebetweenthehillandtherail lineandbeganbuildingnewdefensesagainst thecounter-attacksthatwouldbecoming.ThelinewestofHill241.6allthewaytotheSSTKboundarywasmorethinlydefendedbutwasmorestableafterthesuccessesof1stPzGRmadethedaybefore.ThoughbothLAHandSSTKmadefewgainstoday,theywerecriticalonesthatwouldhelpthedivisionsassaultinthemorning. It would be another tough day driving deeper into the third defense belt. dgk166+.snk81.wwf100+.vzz187++.vzz8m.lck327.Bytheendoftheday,Sovietforcesexhaustedasever,knewtheGermanscouldnotwin.Inthe

northsincethestartof thecampaign, theGermansgainedonlytwelvemilesona tenmilefrontwhileinthesouth,theGermansgained30milesona30milefront.ThetwoGermanfrontswerestillover50milesfromeachother.jp169.Bytheendoftheday,4thPzAhadgainedupto30milessincethestartofthecampaignandhad

crossed the Psel, establishing a small bridgehead before moving toward Oboyan but certaingeneralsknewtheassaultwasnearlyoverandtheirobjectiveswouldneverbemet.wwf90.The2ndSSPzCgainedonly twoor threemiles on this daybut it had several successes. It

capturedtheKomsomoletsStateFarm,capturedHill241.6anditestablishedasmallbridgeheadonthenorthernbanksofthePsel.LtGeneralKriuchenkinof69thArmyhadnofurtherreservessoduringthenighthehadtoredeployactiveforcesfromotherareastothesetwokeyhotspots.Hesent Morozov’s 81st GRD to help 48th RC along the line: Hill 147.0-Volobuevka-Sazhnoe-Krivtsevo-Shcholokovo.Hewasinsecondechelonandwasorderedtopreparetocounter,alongwith2ndGTC,inthedirectionBelenikhovoandMalyeMaiachkiintotheleftflankofDasReichwhen theorderwasgiven.Volobuevkawasnear theeasternbankof theLipovyiDonetsRiver,northofRozhdestvenka.The81stGRDonlyhad3500men so itwas reinforcedwith the227thRRof183rdRDby

moving18milesintoaflankingpositiononthelineatStorozhevoe-Vinogradovka-ZhimolostroetoprotectProkhorovkaStationandinpreparationforifacounter-attackwasordered.ThisattackwouldhittheflankoftheLAHdrivingthroughtheirmainaxisofKomsomoletsStateFarm-Hill241.6-OktiabrskiStateFarm.TheLAHsufferedcasualtiesofalmost200soldiersbutitdestroyedaclaimed76tanksandassaultgunsaswellascapturingafewPOWs.ShchlolkovostraddledtheDonets River about three miles south of Ryndinka. dgr102. dgk165m. gnk253m. vzz196++.wwf101.vzz12m.Thepreviousdayhadbeenprettygoodfor4thPzAandthesalienthadgrownto25mileslong,

but it was running out of fuel and ammunition and its menwere exhausted. Though importantobjectives had been captured, the progress on this day was minimal and Maj General vonMellenthinwroteinhisjournal:“ItcouldnolongerbedoubtedthatthebackoftheGermanattackhadbeenbrokenanditsmomentumgone.”wwf90.Bytheendoftheday,theGermansalientthatHothwasexcavatinghadnotgrownmuch.The

48thPzChadreachedjustsouthofKruglik,KalinovkaandKochetovkawhileSSTKhadsecuredmoreofthesouthernbankofthePsel.LAHwasnowatKomsomoletsStateFarmandjustwestoftheStorozhevoe.DasReichwasjustoutsideBelenikhino.Vatutinorderedhisforces toprepareforamajorcounter-attackoneither7/11or7/12at the

latest.The6thTC,10thTC,31stTC,3rdMC,5thGTC,204thRDand309thRDwouldattacksouthtowardtheKruglik-OlkhovatkalineandoncereachingNovenkoe,shiftdirectionandheadfor Iakovlevo-Pokrovkaarea tomeetupwith6thGAand5thGTAinorder toencirclea largeportionof4thPzA.dgr219.While the LAH moved towards Prokhorovka, trying to capture the important rail junction

before 5thGTA could intervene, the SSTK moved into the Corps’ left flank, crossed the PselRiverandbyduskhadtakenKrasnyiOktiabrandsetupasmallbridgehead.Afterdark,whilethedivisionsweremakingpreparationsandGeneralHausser completed lastminutedetails for theattackonProkhorovka thenextmorning,General vonManstein tried to commit 24thPzC fromreservestoassistintakingProkhorovkabutHitlerrefused.rkz168.pck77.pck83.Inthesouth,the8thFliegerCorpsflewonly682sorties.nzk77.Duringthepredawnhours,MajGeneralGetman’s6thTCalongwiththeweakened90thGRD,

the3rdMC’s1stTBand10thTBregroupedalongthePselRiverandsouthwardalongthePenaRiver.Vatutinknewthe48thPzCwasexhaustedandwasplanningonexploitingit.TheseSovietforceswerenearlypreparedwhenGD’spanzersshowedup.The10thTCmoveda littlesouthand deployed along theKruglik-Kalinovka line and across theOboyan road in support of theremnantsofthe3rdMC(1stGTB,49thTB,3rdMB).The5thGTCwasalsoattachedtothe1stTAanddeployedintheZorinskieDvoryandOrlovkaareas.Vatutinreleasedthe204thRDfromreserveandsentitovertothe1stTAtoblock48thPzCfromreachingKruglik.dgr217.wwf103.Burkov’s10thTCwasalsobroughtuptoreinforcetheshattered1stTAnorthofNovoselovka.

Duringthepreviousday’sbattle,Knobelsdorffof48thPzCnoticedtheweaknessbetween6thTCand3rdMCneartheroadtoOboyanandmovedforcesduringthenighttothearea.The6thTChad nomore than 100 tanks left but during the night 10th TCwouldmove in behind and addanother 120 tanks to the coming battle. The 48th PzC and its attached 10th PzBwas down tobelow200runningpanzers.During thepredawnhours, the5thGTCalsoarrived toblock48thPzC’sadvanceontheOboyanroad.VatutinwasmakingsurethatKnobelsdorffwouldnevermakeittoOboyan.gnk242.wwf111.dgk152+.dgk222m.dgr209m.wwf103.Duringthepredawnhours,additionalreinforcementsarrivedfromoutsidethesectortobolster

6th TC. The 60th TR from 38thArmy and 66thGMR plus others from 40thArmy arrived tosolidify the line north of Verkhopenie. At thismoment, Verkhopenie and Kalinovka wereunoccupied.WiththesupportoftheLuftwaffe,thepanzergrenadiersof48thPzClaunchedanattackagainst

thehighgroundsouthofKruglikandagainst theroad leadingnorth throughKruglik.Bothwerebeingdefendedby6thTC.Whiletherestof4thPzA,underHoth,attackedinthedirectionofthePselRiverandProkhorovka,elementsofGDbrokethroughtothenorthontheroadtoOboyan,inflictingheavycasualties.lck322.hsz128.TheGD, thoughexhausted, had continued to swing to the southwest todefend from the ever

increasingthreatonitsflank,as the3rdPzDwasnotupto thetask.Thissloweditsnorthward

progress.TheirnewobjectiveswereHill243.0,northwestofVerkhopenie,andfurtherwestHill247.0,southofKruglik.Aftertakingthehighground,GDmovedtotheforestsnorthofBerezovkatohelpthe3rdPzDatHill251.5andHill247.0whowerestymiedbystiffresistance.ItsmashedintotheblockingSovietforceandtogethertheGDpanzersand3rdPzDbrokethroughtheSovietline.TheSoviettankersdefendingthosehillsfellbacktothosesamewoodsnearBerezovka.TheLuftwaffe came in to support.The restofGDwasordered to standbyonHill 260.8 along theOboyan roadand3rdPzD tookover the lead flankingposition.Thiswas stretching3rdPzD’scapacitiesasTolstoewoodswasaSoviet strongpointwheremanyattacksagainst the3rdPzDwere initiated from. The 52nd IC was then to move up as well. dgk157. fkk270+. fkk321m.gnk253m.nzk94.wwf103.fmz225+.fmz221m.fmz224m.hsz127.During this cloudy and rainy day, Col Dremin’s fresh 309th RD moved up to support the

shattered3rdMCandtherecentlyarrived5thGTC,alongtheOboyanroad.Knobelsdorffof48thPzC detected theweak junction between 6th TC and 3rdMC and throughout the night shiftedforces of GD and 3rd PzD to attack it at daybreak. The remaining 11th PzD would haveresponsibilityinadvancingontheOboyanroadtoprotectGD’swesternandsouthernmovements.The11thPzD’s110thPzGRhaddeployedonHill232.8andstayedincontactwithGD,stationedjust outside of Kalinovka. The 111th PzGRwas defending east of Hill 244.8 to theMelovoeWoods.Mickl’s panzer groupwas approaching Hill 244.8 to join up with Strachwitz’s groupwhenSoviettanksandinfantrycrestedthehillandattacked.Bytheendoftheday,48thPzCwasnowdowntoanarguable173runningpanzers.Thisnumberincluded30Panthers,someofwhichwereintherepairshop.dgk153.dgr218.gnk245.gnk274.wwf104.dgr99.ThebulkofGDassembledduringthepredawnhoursnearHill244.8toregroup.Thehillwas

aboutsixmilessouthwestofthebendinthePselRiverbutthedivisionwouldnevergobeyondthehill.Atdaybreak,KnobelsdorfforderedtheGDtoheadsouthonthewestsideofVerkhopenienearHill 258.5 and theTolstoewoods (referred to sometimes asTolstoeWoods) to crush theSovietdefendersinthePenabend.Thedefendersconsistedof3rdMC,6thTCandtheremnantsof 67thGRDand90thGRD. If this couldbe accomplished then48thPzCwouldhave a goodchancetoreachOboyanagainstlighterresistanceonitswestflank.Hothknewtheoperationwasrunning out of time but felt this delaying operation was necessary for the overall success ofOperationCitadel.VonMansteinandHothatthispointfelttheGermanshadachanceofreachingKursk,notrealizingthat5thGTAand5thGAwerenearingthesector.gnk270.gnk253m.At0330hrsGD,attackingtheboundarylinebetween6thTCand3rdMC,foughtahardbattle

with 200th TB of 6th TC southwest of Novoselovka, in rugged terrain that limited armormovement.Earlyinthefight,the16thVAsentasquadrontoslowtheGermansdown.Theplanesdidcause the48thPzC tohalt temporarily and topullbackbut, after theLuftwaffe intervenedforcing the Soviet planes to leave the sector, the Germans resumed their advance. During thebattlethatGDwaswinning,Vatutinbroughtupreinforcements; the112thTB,6thMRBand the60th TR, but still could not stopGD.GD continued to advance and tookHill 247.0 south ofKruglik along the Kruglik-Berezovka road after daybreak, severing Getman’s 6th TC’scommunicationswithHQand10thTCandthreateningtheviabilityofhisentireforce.GDmovedonandafterthethree-hourfightwith10thTC,capturedHill243.0northeastofVerkhopeniebutsuffered heavy casualties doing it. ColonelGraf Strachwitzwas injured and handed command

overtoCaptainvonWietersheim.Getman’s6thTCwasshattered,havingonly35tanksleftintheexchange,andhad to fallback.LeadingelementsofGD approached thevillageofKruglikbutwere then firedonbySoviet rockets, halting the advance and forcing thepanzers to fall back.Duringthenight,Vatutinsentuptheremnantsoffourtankregimentstosupport6thTC.dgk153++.vzz594. dgk154m. dgr172m. dgk222m. fkk84. dgr209m. cbk74. wwf105++ jp168. wwf105+.gnk253m.zra62.fmz221m.hsz128.While elements ofGD attacked towardHill 243.0, other elements of the division launched

fromnearNovoselovkaheading forKalinovkaandVladimirovka,whichweredefendedby the10thTC.The10thTCattackedtheGermans,inflictingheavycasualtiesandforcingtheGDtofallbacktoregroup.KalinovkawaswestofNovoselovkawhileVladimirovkawasafewmilesnorthofNovoselovkaalongtheroadtoOboyan.dgr218.dgr172m.LeadingelementsofGDwerepushingaheadtowardKruglikwhich,ifcaptured,wouldcutoff

the Soviet’Russians’ supply route to the south. South ofKalinovka and east of theBerezovka-Kruglik road,GroupStrachwitz carriedout its assigned taskof screening the right flankof themain thrust driving on Hill 247.0, south of Kruglik, by attacking Hill 243.0. Kruglik andKalinovkawereimportantfortifiedstrongpointsinthewestandwhentheywereapproachedbyrecon forces ofGD after Hill 243.0 was captured, T34s came out of their hiding places andattackedafteranambushbyrocketfirefailedtostoptheGermans.TheGDcouldnotmovefurthersotheydugineastofKalinovkaandsouthofKrugliktoregroupandtoblockthepathifSovietreinforcements leftKruglik.BeforeGroupStrachwitzattackedHill243.0at0500hrs, ithad todefenditselfagainstanambushsouthwestofNovoselovkaatPoint1.8.hjj120.mhz292.hsz127+.fkk271+.gnk270.gnk275.wwf103++.fmz221m.By0700hrs,ShractwitzhadcapturedHill243.0but itsadvancehadbeenstoppedwhenthe

112thTBand200thTBcounter-attacked.WiththehelpoftherocketregimenttheSovietswererepelled.Whileon thehill, theGermans regroupedand then resumed their advanceafter1300hrs.Bytheendoftheday,48thPzChadreachedNovenkoe,creatingasalientinthepositionsof6thTCand184thRDandthreateningtorolltheSovietsup.dgr218.The3rdPzD joinedGD as darkness fell atVerkhopenie but the3rdPzDhad to split its 70

panzergroupintotwotodefendagainsttwothreats.WhilebeingorderedtojoinupwithGD todefendVerkhopenie,the3rdPzDsentsomepanzersandmensouthtoBerezovka,wheretheleftflankof6thTCreneweditsattack.Whenthe3rdPzD’spanzersapproachedthenorthernedgeofBerezovkatheysurprisedthebattered6thTC,encirclinganumberoftanksanddestroyingthem.Itwas abadday for6thTC,whoby the endof thedayhadonly35 tanks and assault guns stillrunningandonlyhalfofthemwereT34s.Thetankcorpshadstartedthedaywith100tanksandthecampaignwith200tanks.DuringthedayotherSoviettankersjoinedthefray.SoutheastofKalinovkaaround1000hrs,elementsofGDwereattackedwhentryingtomake

contactwith11thPzDandwereforcedtogointoahedgehogdefense.Shiftingdirectiontoeludetheheavyfire,theGDGroupmovedontheintersectionnearHill258.5butfoundheavyfiretherealso. The 3rd PzD to the southwest, and trying to advance,was also struck by heavy fire andcouldnotprovideassistance.Inearlyafternoonthe2ndAPCSquadronandaassaultgunbattalionpassed through theKubaossovskiValley, the road toKruglik toHill 258.5, about 1,000 yardssoutheastofHill247.0toassist.TheSovietsupplyroadtothiswoodedareaatHill258.5was

finally severed, allowingGD to capture the hill. Hill 247.0, Hill 243.0 and Hill 258.5 werecapturedonthisdaybuttheseimportantvictoriesweretemperedbythehugecost.ThewoodstothewestofHill258.5andKruglikwouldbethenextimportantobjectivesbutbothwereheavilydefendedandwouldnotbeeasytotakeeither.MoreoftheFusilierswerearrivingtotheareaandthatwouldhelp.TheStrachwitzGrouphadcapturedHill243.0butwasnowmeetingheavyfireonitswestflank.Therestofthedaywasusedtobringmoretroopsupandtostabilizetheline.Bytheendoftheday,GDDivisionwasspent,makinganyfurthermeaningfulgainsinthefuturesuspect.SeeMap23.rc203.dgk222m.hsz127+.fkk271+.fkk323m.dgk154++.fmz221m.During the predawn hours, Katukov’s 1st TA reorganized itself along the Psel River to the

Oboyan road and southward along the Pena River. Getman’s 6th TC, 90th GRD and 3rdMCdefendedalongthePenaRiveronthe1stTA’srightflank.Thetankbattlebetweenthereinforced1stTAand48thPzC’sleftflankintensifiedandwouldcontinueforthenextfourdays,preventingthe48thPzCfromadvancingorhelping2ndSSPzC.dgk152.At0400hrs,whileStrachwitzandhispanzerswerewaiting for11thPzDtoshownearHill

244.8 to be relieved, the Soviets launched an ambush from behind the hill. Itwas during thisengagement that Strachwitz had his arm crushed andwas forced to hand over his command toWietersheim.SeveralotherpanzerswerehitaswellbuttheSovietattackwasrepulsed.Whenthe11thPzDdidarrive,GDbrokeupintotwogroups:thepanzersheadedtowardKruglikwhilethegrenadiersheadedforKalinovka,dueeastofKruglik,tosetupnewdefenses.KalinovkalayinthemiddleofavalleythatterminatedtothesouthnearHill258.5.UnknowntoGD,Getman’s6thTCwasdefendingthatvalley.TothenorthofKalinovka, the10thTC,with100tanks,hadjustmovedthereandwasawaitingorderstoattack.BetweenthetwoSovietcorps,theGDgrenadiersweregreatlyoutmatched.ItwasrainingduringtheGermanmatchanditdidslowthemdown.ThepanzershaddrivenpastKalinovkaontheirwaytoHill258.5,locatedwestofVerkhopenienearTolstoeWoods, when they were ambushed near Hill 232.8. The attack was repulsed and theSoviet tanksof the200thTBof6thTCheadedback in thedirectionofKalinovka.ThepanzergroupcontinuedonintherainbutitwasattackedagainbyanotherSovietforcejustnorthofHill258.5.Afterseveralhoursoffiercefighting,thepanzersstartedpushingtheSovietsbackthoughthebattlewasstillengaged.gnk270+.gnk283m.dgk155+.wwf103.vzz594.hsz129+.ElementsoftheFusilierRegimentofGDandthe11thPzDweredrivingtowardthePselRiver

whentheywereambushedbythe10thTCandelementsofthe31stTCcominginatbothflanks.TheGermans,thoughoutnumbered,wereabletorepulsetheattacksandmoveforwardtocaptureHill 244.8 which lay astride the road to Oboyan north of Novoselovka, just 13 miles fromOboyan.TheGermansduginontopofthehillandrepulsedthecountersthatcame.WhenmoreofGDarrivednextday,theywouldattempttocrossthePsel.AtthesametimeotherelementsofGDalittletothewestoftheimportantroadwerehithardbyarocketattackthatcamefromjustsouthofKruglik.Theywerecurrently fightingwith6thTCwhen the rockets started falling.mhz293.lck324.gnk301.pck72.FightingforSyrtsevocontinuedthroughoutthepredawnhoursbutbydawntheSovietsfoughta

grudging withdrawal to the northwest. It was discovered that day from an interrogation of acaptured general that the Soviets knew all about Operation Citadel and had prepared for it.gnk273.gnk253m.

Vatutin sent his 22nd GRC into the western flank of 48th PzC in order to prevent it fromenteringtheheatedbattlewestofProkhorovka.rkz168.The11thPzD,fromnortheastofVerkhopenieandsoutheastofNovoselovka,hadbeenfighting

alldayalongtheroadtoOboyanandbyeveninghadgainedthreemiles,reachingKochetovkatomeetupwithSSTK.Theleftflankof11thPzDhadgainedonlyonemiletoKalinovkawhereittiedinwithGD.GDwasonthewestsideoftheOboyanroadandadvancedthreemilestoreachKalinovka,aboutthreemilesnorthofVerkhopenie.TotheleftofGDfrom0800hrs,the3rdPzDhadtodefenditselfalldayfromSovietcountersbutbytheendofthedayhadadvancedtoapointover amile northwest of Berezovka, south of theGD position. wdk152+. hjj121m. dgr209m.gnk253m.In the52ndICsector, the332ndIDeliminatedmostof the6thTCandhaddriven thenewly

arrived184thRDoutofAlekseevkaonthePenaRiver.Thesouthsideoftheriverwasnowclearof Soviets. Further south of Alekseevka, other elements of the 332nd ID were defendingthemselvesagainstrepeatedattacksnorthwestofKorovinobythe71stGRD,whilethe255thIDdefendedagainst twoattacks southwestofBubnyby the100thRDof40thArmy.With thebadweather, air raidsbyboth sideswere reducedand the roadsweredeteriorating,making traveldifficult.Itwasanotherdifficultdayfor3rdPzD;itfoughtalldayandcouldonlyreachtwomilesnorth ofBerezovka nearDogi andTolstoeWoods. It continued to be unable to staywithGD,whichforcedGDtostopitsadvance,turnbackandsupport3rdPzD.wdk153.gnk253mdgr98.dgr93m.The255thID,332ndIDwouldcontinuetoprovideflankprotection.TothewestofGD,3rd

PzD,whichstartedthecampaignwith70MkIIIsandIVs,wasnowdownto23workingpanzersandwasstrugglingtodefenditselfletaloneadvance.mhz306.mhz314.fkk87.vzz8m.gnk253m.gnk312m.AshockgroupfromGDandafewassaultgunsadvancedthroughtheKubaossovskiValleyand

finally reached the road toKruglik fromHill 258.5 by dark.The groupwas now1,000 yardssouth ofHill 247.0 and had effectively blocked the supply route fromKruglik to Tolstoe andBerezovka.ThisshockgroupwouldalsostopanyreinforcementscomingfromthenorthtoassistthedefendersofTolstoeWoodswhenthe3rdPzDandelementsofGDattackedit.hsz128.Theweatherturnedagainst theGermans; itwascloudywiththunderstorms,makingtheroads

almostimpossiblefortrucks.TheLuftwaffewasalsorestricted.By1600hrs,elementsofSSTKhadpenetratedthelineatKozlovkaandatKochetovka,enablingthemtojoinupwith11thPzD.AsecondlightbridgeacrossthePselwascompletedatKrasnyiOktiabrafter6thPzGRcapturedthetown.wdk151.gnk253m.pck77+.NorthwestofBerezovka,the3rdPzDbrokethroughtheSovietlineholdingtheRakovo-Kruglik

road and succeeded in outflanking the Soviet forces, which included the 112th TB (6th TC),forcingthemtofallbackintothenearbywoods.WithGDnearby,thetwodivisionswereabletoencirclethesmallSovietforce.TheLuftwaffeflewintohelpclearthepocket.Itisestimatedthat48thPzCwasdown to219panzersandassaultgunswhen thedaystarted.Another46panzerswerelostthatday,leaving173panzersworking.Inthelastweekoffightingthe48thPzChadlost263panzers.Only25ofthenearly200PanthersthatGDreceivedweretotalwrite-offs;therestneededrepairsfrommechanicalfailureorbattledamage.20Pantherswerereadytogobackinto

the field by next day, raising the count of working Panthers to 38.GD had only 87 panzersincluding the 38Panthers still running. In a fewdays’ time,whenCitadelwas canceled, therewouldbe44operablePanthers.Oftheremaining120Panthersthatwererecovered,80wereinthe repair shop due to mechanical failures and the rest had battle damage. mhz291+. hsz130.nzk177+.hjj120.Vatutin,realizinghisfront lineinthewestwasshattered,broughtupreinforcementsthenight

beforeandcontinuedtodosointhemorning.Besidesthe10thTC,184thGRDand204thGRD,the309thRD, theweakened67thGRDand the5thGTCwerebroughtup toblock theway toOboyan.Alittletotheeast,Chernienko’s31stTCwasalsobroughtuptocoverthebanksofthePselRiverwherethe51stGRDandelementsofthe309thRDweredug-in.Mostoftheseunitswouldnowbeunder1stTAleadership.wff103+.Thethreatto48thPzC’swesternflankwasbecomingsoseverethatmostofGDhadtoassist

the 3rd PzD in safeguarding the flank, leaving the 11th PzD the sole responsibility of pushingacross thePsel to reachOboyan. Itwasa task thatoneweakeneddivisionwouldbeunable toaccomplish.wwf104.The48thPzCresumeditsattacknorthward,takingthevillageofPokrovskithenmovingonto

thehillfivemilestothenorthandcapturingit.ThenortherncombatgroupofGD,afterclearingresistance east ofVerkhopenie, turned southwest to destroy the Soviets thatwerewithdrawingwestofthePena.Atthesametime,the3rdPzDretookSyrzevoandthehighgroundtothesouth.fkk255.fkk323m.At1130hrsGeneralGuderianarrivedatKnobelsdorff’sHQtoreceiveapersonalsitrepandto

discuss thenewPanther.Guderian agreedwith the field commander that the crewsof thenewPanthers were poorly trained and that the machine went into battle before all the bugs wereworkedout. Itwasalsopointedout that thesidearmorwas too thinbut thenewgunwasverypotent.Thefuellineswerealsoinneedofextraprotectiontoreducethechanceforfires.WhenGeneralGuderian returned toBerlin, he completed a critical report summarizing the good andbadpointsofthePanther.Speersusedthisreporttomakeimprovementsinthemachine.gnk275.zzt98+.Afterabriefbutbitterbattle,the332ndIDcapturedVosschodandthenhadtodefenditfroma

Soviet counter-attack.TheSovietswerealsounsuccessful inblowing thebridgeatZavidovka.On the right flankof the52nd IC, the255th IDwerebeingpushedout of their defenses in thewoodssouthwestofBubnywhere itwas lost inhardhand-to-handcombat.Theoutposts in thevillageofTrefilovkawerepulledoutaswell.fkk255.The48thPzCstruckthe6thGAand1stTAasittriedtopushclosertoOboyan.GDwheeled

southandclearedSovietforcesontheleftflankofthecorps.Luftwaffeassistedwithraids.bt87.The52ndICmovednorth,crossedthePenaandjoinedwith3rdPzDagainst theSoviet40th

Army.WhiletheGDpanzergroupwasfightingoffthe6thTCnorthofHill258.5,itwasdiscovered

that another Soviet column of 40 tanks was heading south from Kalinovka. Not capable ofhandling both Soviet forces, Wietersheim requested 3rd PzD dispatch a panzer group fromVerkhopenietointerceptthelargeforce.Knobelsdorffagreedandsenttheorder.DespiteaheavyaircapofSovietplanes in thesector,3rdPzDsentapanzercolumnwest to intercept.Driving

into another thunderstorm, the ground turned tomud and slowed their progress but at least theSovietplaneshadtomoveoff.WhenSchmidt-Ott’spanzers(3rdPzD)reachedGD,justnorthofHill258.5,thebattlewasstillraging.By1900hrs,thetwoGermanforceshadforcedthe6thTCtoevacuatethehillandweresecuringthetopforanylastresistance.The6thTClost65ofits100tanksandthesurvivorsofthe200thTBand112thTBhiduntildarkbeforeheadingsouthfortheBerezovkaareawherethe184thRDwasstationed.gnk271+.pck72.hsz130.After helping the Strachwitz group capture Hill 258.5, the Schmidt-Ott group of 3rd PzD

moved further south and renewed its attack on Soviet positions onHill 243.0. TheLuftwaffe,whichhadbeenabsentallmorning,finallyshowedupandstruckthegunsontopofthehill.By1800hrsitwasestimatedanother50tanksweredestroyedbetweenthepanzersandtheStukas.Almost100tanksweredestroyedbetweenthefightingforHill258.5-Hill243.0area.With theheavylosses,theSovietsfellbacktothenorth,whilethepanzersofthe3rdPzDcontinuedsouthtowardBerezovkatojoinelementsofGDclearthatsector.Schmidt-Ott’spanzersweretravelingsouthoppositetheTolstoewoodsalongtheKruglik-Berezovkaroad,southofHill258.5,whenabatteryofSovietgunsopenedfireonthecolumn.Thepanzershadtoimmediatelyleavetheroadandheadcrosscountrytotheeasttoavoidthebarrage.Schmidt-OttstoppedforthenightofftheroadandwouldresumehismarchtoBerezovkain themorning.Nofurtheractionoccurredthatnightforthetiredpanzergroup.SeeMap23.gnk273.pck72.When it was discovered that the Soviets had abandoned the area immediately west of

Solotinka,Micklorderedhispanzergroup tosecureHill232.8and thenmoveeast toward theboundarywith2ndSSPzC,whichwasadvancingtosecurethenorthernsideofthePselRiver.PzAbt11,attachedto11thPzD,attackedHill232.8andafterathree-hourbattledrovethedefendersoff.Asthisbattlewasraging,theGermanscouldseeSoviettanksandinfantryheadingfornearbyHill244.8.ItappearedtheSovietshadnotgivenuponthathill.WhenHill232.8wascaptured,theGermansconsideredattackingtowardHill244.8tointerceptbutquicklyrejectedthatthoughtwhenitwasdeterminedthatnearly50Soviettankshadassembledthere.gnk275.WhilepartofGD hadmoved south toHill 258.5, the remainder of the division, alongwith

elements of 11thPzD, stayed in theKruglik-Kalinovka area.TheGermanswere split betweenthesevillages,tryingtoblocktheSovietsfromsendingreservesandsuppliesfurthersouth.TheoriginalplanwastohaveGDapproachKruglikandbringartillerytobearonanyconvoythatleftthe townbutwhenMajorFrantzsawtheextremeactivitywithin the town,hedecided toattackand capture the town if possible, or destroy as much as possible and fall back if the Sovietresponsewas toostrong.Justbeforedusk,he launchedandgotwithin300yardsof thevillagebefore the Soviet guns and rockets started firing. The town could not be captured for lack ofinfantryandtheassaultgunspulledbacktothesouthandestablishedablockingposition.IthadbeenaharddayforGD.TheyavoidedapotentialcatastropheatHill258.5buttheygainedlittlegroundandcouldnotcaptureKruglikorKalinovka,thoughtheymaintainedblockingpositionstothe south. After starting the campaign with 300 assorted panzers,GD was now down to 20.gnk272.TwoSoviet shockgroupswerebeingprepared foramassivecounter-attack.The firstgroup

was being assembled in the Novye Lozy-Belenikhino-Prokhorovka-Polezhaev-Veselyi-Kochetovkaareaandincludedthe5thGTA,ariflecorpsof69thArmyandtworiflecorpsof5th

GA. The second, smaller group which consisted of the 6th GA and 3rdMC of 1st TA, wasassemblingintheMelovoe,Novenkoe,KruglikKalinovkaandHill244.8areas.Totheeast,the49th RC of 7th GA was preparing an attack along the line Hill 209-Gremuchi-Hill 202.8.vzz261++.vzz268.vzz428.The48thPzCwasnownomore than twelvemiles fromOboyan, the lynchpinof theSoviet

defenses on the southern salient. It beganmassing its panzers along a fivemile front west ofProkhorovka. Hoth intended the SS to join up with the Kempf Army to the east and captureProkhorovka while the 48th PzC took Oboyan. Kempf’s advance was meeting stiff resistancefrommanySovietunits.The24thPzCwas just released from reserves andwasnow travelingnorthfromtheDonbastoclearresistancenorthofBelgorodandwouldthenmoveontoassistatProkhorovka. That was with Hitler’s permission.With the extreme resistance the Soviets hadgeneratedandwiththestateofexhaustionandattritionhisforceswereexperiencing,IarguethatbothOboyanandProkhorovkawerenotattainableandthatHothshouldhavechangedhisplanstoone or the other, preferably Prokhorovka. Von Manstein did not have the resources for bothobjectivesaswellastryingtoencirclethe48thRCwiththehelpof3rdPzCintheDonetsRiversector.rc204.By theendof theday,Hothhadbecomeslightlymoreconfident thatafterGDhad taken two

importanthillsandblockedKruglikandKalinovka,that4thPzAhadachanceofreachingKursk.ThisattitudeofHothaloneclearlyshowshedidnotunderstandthescaleofreinforcementsthatwouldsoonbearriving.GDwasnowapproachingKruglikandtherehadbeenlittleresistance;the Germans started to believe the Soviets had evacuated when all of a sudden, hundreds ofrocketspouredfromthevillageagainstthepanzers.ThefirstattackfailedagainstsuchresistanceandGDhadtofallback.Also, in the3rdPzCsector it lookedliketheSovietsalientalongtheDonetsRiverwasfinallybeginningtorecede.Evenatthislatedate,Hothwasnotawareatankforcethesizeof5thGTAandanarmythesizeof5thGAwerenowpreparingamajorcounter-attack.HothhadwastedtoomuchtimefightinginthePenaRiverareainsteadofredesigninghisattackplanwhilehehadadequateforcestoreachProkhorovkaandbeyond.Nowitwastoolate.gnk281.wwf103.Friction was building between vonManstein and Hoth. VonManstein wanted Hoth to give

more attention and assets to 3rd PzCwhileHoth seemed obsessed in clearing the PenaRiverregion.HothsuggestedtovonMansteinthat24thPzCbedeployedeastoftheDonetsinorderfor3rdPzCtocatchup.LookingbackitcanclearlybeseenthatvonMansteinwasrightandHothwaswrongaboutconcentratingsomucheffortinthePenaRiverarea.ThePenaRiverregionwasablackholethatateupthe48thPzCandcontributedtothecorpsstallingitsadvanceduetohighcasualties inmenandpanzers. Italsopreventedthe48thPzCfromcrossingthePselRiverandsupporting SSTK which badly needed that support.When 24th PzC was still held back, Hothcontinued toneglectKempfandconcentrateon thePenaRiverarea.Hoth seemed to forgethistimetable and the possibility thatVatutin hadmore reserves that could be brought up, and vonMansteinhad confrontedHoth for the last threedays about the east flank and allowedHoth toneglectit.gnk275.At0600hrsaspartofGroupSouth the19thPzD,minus itspanzerswhichwerewithGroup

North,movedoutandattackedBlizhniaiaIgumenkafromthesouthwest.TheRedAirForceflew

lowoverthevillageandstrafedtheGermaninfantrythatwerenowjustenteringthevillageandfightinghousetohouse.Schmidt,seeingtheSovietplanesandknowinghismenwereintrouble,sent thewaiting PzAbt 19 in to support the attack.After defeating the remaining bunkers thatringedthevillage,thepanzersenteredthetownandtogetherwihtheinfantrywereabletopushthe Soviets out. This is just one of many examples that show the 3rd PzC received little airsupport.Withgreaterairsupport,KempfmighthavebeenabletoreachProkhorovkabythe12th.gnk239.Afterthebitterfightingthepreviousday,Kempfpausedmostofhisforcesonthismorningto

regroupandtobringhisartilleryclosertothenewline.The3rdPzCcouldnotpausetoolongforit had to catch up to 2nd SS PzC in order to divert enemy strength away from Prokhorovka.vzz251.Duringthepredawnhours,Vatutinhadtorecallthe92ndGRDbackuptothelinenexttothe

305th RD; it had been sent to the rear for rest the previous day but a gap formed betweenKiselevo,Hill122.5,ShliakhovoandHill224.4andtheyhadtoplugit.Thesepreparationswereneededasthe3rdPzC,with19thPzDinthelead,wouldattackinthemorningbetweentheDonetsandRazumnaiaRivers. The 168th IDwould be on the left next to theDonets and heading forKhokhlovoandKiselevo.The6thPzDtotherightof19thPzDwouldlaunchfromtheMelikhovoareatowardKazacheandeventuallyRzhavets.Nexttothe6thPzDontherightflankwas7thPzDandprotecting7thPzD’sflankwas198thID.Toreducetheflankfrontageof7thPzD,the326thGRof198th IDhad to increase its frontage.The increased frontageproved toomuchandMajGeneralvonHornhadtosendotherelementsofthe198thIDnorthwardtohelpthe326thbeforeitshattered against the constant pressure. The 7th PzD was at Miasoedovo and it had to breakthrough the94thGRD’sdefensesalong theheightsnorthof town if itwas tocatchupand thenprotectthe6thPzD’sflank.ItspenttheentiredaytryingtobreakloosebutitfailedandstayedintheMiasoedovo sector. Kempf wanted the 7th PzD to bemore involved with the drive northinsteadofusingmostofitsresourcesindefendingtheeasternflank.Heorderedthe198thIDtoexpanditssector totakeovermoreof theeast linefor7thPzD.Additionalcorpsartillerywasmoved up to assist 7th PzD in its move north. Kiselevo was two miles north of Khokhlovo.vzz251+.vzz3m.dgr155m.dgr173m.dgr39m.vzz3m.dgk170m.gnk268+.dlu83.dlu87.shn160.At1200hrsfromjustnorthofMelikhovo,HunersdorfflaunchedhisGroupNorthtowardHill

230.3.Withinanhour thehillwashisandhewasdrivingwest towardSabynino,southwestofHill230.3.Allthewhile,the168thIDlaunchedintothewesternedgeoftheSovietsalientalongtheDonetsRiver.Otherelementsof thecombatgrouptorethroughtheSoviet linenearDalnaiaIgumenkaand,drivingsouthwest,reachedtheStateFarmwhereagroupofT34swerestationedtokeepthecorridoropentoallowtheassortedSovietforcestoescapethepocketthatBreithtriedtoform.MostoftheSovietshadgonenorth,evadingtheclosingnoose.TheGermanshadbeentooslowinclosingthepocketbutatleasttheSovietstrongholdalongtheriverhadbeenbroken.The168th ID could nowmove northwith the panzers and by the afternoonhad reachedBlizhniaiaIgumenka. Von Manstein wanted the Luftwaffe to go after the fleeing Soviets but all of theLuftwaffewasbusyintheothertwocorps’sectorsandcouldnotassist.Ithadtaken3rdPzCfourdaystoclearanareathatwasscheduledtobetakeninthefirstdayofoperations.KempfwouldnevercatchupanditwouldbeacriticalfailingasDasReichwouldbeforcedtoprotectitsflank

and was never much help with LAH in taking Prokhorovka. The situation could have beendifferent ifKempfhadbeenable tokeepupwiththeadvanceof theSSandprotect theirflank.Thoughrisky,thetwodivisionsof24thPzCthatwereintheareashouldhavebeendeployedby7/6 or 7/7 to help clear this Soviet salient near the river for it was causing an impossibleconditionfortheSSmovingnorth.IthasalsobeenarguedthatKempfshouldhavereceivedsomeofthenewPanthersinhelpingtoscreenthefareasternflankorperhapshadgreaterprioritywithLuftwaffesupport.TheseandmanyotherindicatorsshowtheGermansjustdidnothaveenoughpanzers,planesandmentosucceedinthisoperation.gnk237+.gnk253m.vzz3m.At 0700 hrs, the 375th RD counter-attacked the 168th ID. Maj General von Hutner was

preparingtoattackwhentheassaultcame.Insteadofgoingdefensive,heorderedhis168thIDtoattack.IthadbeendiscoveredthattheSovietswerecrossingtheDonets,headingfortheShopinoareaandbuildingnewdefenses.Kempfwantedthisescaperouteblockedinordertotrapasmanyoftheenemyaspossibleontheeastside.TheSovietcounterhadbeenrepulsedandthe168thhadgainedground,capturinghundredsofPOWsanddestroyingmanytanks.Itwasfinallylookinglike3rdPzCwouldcatchuptoDasReichandstabilizetheline.dlu90+.Kempf’s3rdPzCwasstillstrugglingwith7thGA.Itsfailuretostayupwith2ndSSPzCwas

puttingadragontheSS’sadvance.While48thPzChadtocontendwithjusttheleftflankattacks,the3rdPzChadbotheastandwestflankattacks.The19thPzDandthe168thIDhadtodefendagainst the enemy along the Northern Donets and Lipovyi Donets Rivers as they advancednorthwards.KempfalsohadtodefendhislongrightflanksouthwardtoMaslovoPristan,whichhadjustbeencaptured,againstevenstrongerresistance.Thisstruggleforcedthe2ndSSPzCtouse its 167th ID andDas Reich to protect its unguarded right flank along the LipovyiDonetsRiver.dgk161.dgk222m.dlu63m.lck246.dlu90.The6thPzD,whichstarted thiscampaignwith105workingpanzerswitha fewmore in the

repairshop,enteredaminefieldandlostseveralmorepanzers.Bytheendoftheday,therewereless than 40 panzers left in the division including severalMk IIIswith either 37mm or 50mmguns. A couple of converted T34s were part of the arsenal as well. rkz168. lck327. gnk269.gnk253m.fzk52.ItwasanotherfrustratingdayforKempfandBreithfortheir7thPzDand19thPzDwerestill

tied down defending themselves against repeated flank attacks. The trailing units of 6th PzD,which were deployed to the right of 19th PzD, were able to drive northward a little as theyheadedforMelikhovo;19thPzDalongwiththe168thIDweretryingtocleartheeasternbankoftheDonetsandprotect6thPzD’sflankat thesametime.Ontheothersideof6thPzD,7thPzDwas tieddownassistingCorpsRaus inguarding thefareasternflank.Shumilovgaveorders to81st RD and 375th RD to start pulling back to avoid being encircled and to help block theGermans infrontofProkhorovka.Whenthe6thPzDlaunchedfromMelikhovo, itwasattackednearHill 230.3 by Soviet tanks and infantrywhich it repulsed.A second group attacked nearShliakhovo, south of Hill 230.3, penetrating 6th PzD and threatening to encircle part of thedivisionfurthersouth.Thetrappedpanzersfoughttheirwayoutandcaughtuptothebulkofthedivisionbutitwasacostlyaffair.Earlier,withthehelpofengineers,6thPzDwasabletocrossthe tankditch twomiles fromMelikhovo.mhz308. lck328.dgr155m.dgr173m.gnk269.vzz3m.vzz10m.

The7thPzDremainedeastofRazumnoetoprotecttherestof3rdPzC’srightflankasitdrovenorthwards.Thedivisionwasfinallyrelievedby198thIDwhenitmovedupintotheline.The6th PzD and 19th PzD would stop for the night to regroup near Melikhovo. The two panzerdivisionsfoughtalldaybutcouldnotadvancemuchagainststiffresistance.TheyweretoattackShliakhovo,twomilestothenorth,earlynextmorningbutwouldgetalatestartduetothecriticalneed to regroup.The168th IDwas finally able tomovequicklyon thewest flankof3rdPzCalong the east bank of the Donets River, arriving at Khokhlovowhile its recon team reachedKiselevo.Thislackofoverallprogressclearlyshows3rdPzCneededgreatersupportyetHoth,despitevonManstein’surgings,continuedtoignore3rdPzC’splight.shn160.dgr155m.dgr173m.dgr39m.vzz248.vzz3m.dlu83.The 7th PzD coveredKempf’s long eastern flank toMiasoedovo and lent support toCorps

Raus which was under constant pressure. Additional pressure in the Rzhavets region wasprovidedbythe72ndGRDandthe213thRD.Nearby,Shumilov’s15thGRDwasmovingtowardBatratskaiaDachawhichwas defended by the 320th ID and 106th ID,which had already lost40%of itsstrength.Whilehelpingthe infantry the7thPzDwasunable toassist6thPzDwhichwasalsohavingtrouble.Thepressurewas to lessena littlewhenthe375thGRDand81stRDwasmovedtonorthofMelikhovo,where6thPzDwasstrugglingtobreakthrough.The89thGRDremainedintheareatoharassRaus.ItwasVatutin’splanfor15thGRDtopenetratethelinenearBatratskaiaDachaasthe3rdPzCcontinuedtoadvancenorthwardpastMelikhovoarea.dgk162+.dlu63m.dgr155m.dgr173m.dlu87.At 1400 hrs after clearing corridors through the minefields, the 19th PzD attacked toward

KiselevofromKhokhlovoandHill217.4againstthestiffdefenseofthe4thMRBandthe92ndGRD.Alongthisline100tanksweredugin,slowingtheGermanpacenoticeably.TheflankingHill 211.5 had Soviet artillery and theywere firing on theGerman advance as well. SeveralChurchillstiredtooutmaneuverthepanzersbuttheleadTigerstoppedtwotanksintheirtracks,forcingtheremaindertoretreat.Afterseveralcostlyattempts,the19thPzDcapturedKiselevoby1600 hrs. The capture of this important strongpoint brought the 3rd PzC one step closer toreachingtheDonets.SeeMap23.vzz253.vzz3m.gnk253m.OntheeastsideoftheDonets,GroupKempfwentdefensiveagainstthecountersof25thGRC

and the 35thGRC,which allowed the trapped contingent in the sliver of a salient next to theDonets to headnorth, allowingKempf tomake someprogress in this area.The17thVAmaderepeatedbombing runsagainst theGermans tohelp the25thGRCand thestragglerswhowereheading north. The 7th PzD was still holding a defensive front between Melikhovo andMiasoedovo,13milesnortheastofBelgorodontheRazumnaiaRiver,facingthe94thGRD.NorthofMelekovo,the6thPzDrepulsedaSovietcounterthatwassupportedby50tanks.The19thPzDwasattackedatDalnaiaIgumenkaby92ndGRDwhilethe168thIDdrovebackanattackbythe81stGRDatStaryiGorod.Unbelievably,the168thIDwasstillonlyafewmilesfromBelgorod.TheGermanswere able to pick upmuch needed supplies in the field thatwere leftwhen theSoviets quickly evacuated this strongpoint. wdk153. hjj121m. dgr155m. dgr173m. dgr39m.cbk69.vzz5m.The19thPzDhad seen suchheavy fighting in theopeningdaysof the campaign that its two

grenadier regiments only had a total of 400 combat soldiers each. Kempf again asked von

Mansteinforthe24thPzCasareplacementbuttherequestwasdenied.ItwasnotvonManstein’sfault;Hitlerwouldnotallowtherelease.gnk269.While the twootherpanzerdivisionsof3rdPzChadbeenbusyclearing thesalientnear the

Donets,the7thPzDhadarelativelyeasymorning.TheSovietshadnotattackedwhilethe198thIDmovedin toreplacethe7thPzD.Thiswasthefirstchancethepanzershadtoreceivesomemaintenance.Thedivisionwasnowdownto50panzers,includingthreeTigers.gnk239.At1700hrs,Morozov’s81stGRD,nowapartofGeneralRogozny’s48thRC,wasorderedto

theline:Hill147.0-Volobuevka-Novoselovka(east)-Krivtsovo-Shcholokovoandinstructedtobepreparedtoattackalongwiththe2ndGTCtowardBelenikhinoandMalyeMaiachkionorders.AfterfightingforfourdaysatStaryiGorodtoblockthepassageof168thIDand19thPzD,the81stGRDhadlostmuchofitsheavyequipmentandmanymen.ThesurvivorswereexhaustedbutwerestilldeterminedtostoptheGermans.The227thRRof183rdRDwassentfurthernorthtoStorozhevoe,VinogradovkaandZhimolostinoelineinordertokeepDasReichor3rdPzCfrompassing.KnowingtheSSwouldresumetheirattacknorthwardthenextmorningVatutinalsotriedtoreinforcethelinefromthePselRivertoProkhorovka.vzz198.vzz5m.Atnight, theSovietsmaderepeatedarmoredassaultswithmountedinfantryin thePetrovski-

Sbatshevskiarea(northeastofBelgorod)butwererepulsedeachtime,atgreatexpense.fkk151.vzz7m.TheKempfGroup pushed northwards as the enemy continued to attack their east flank.The

corpsstoppedalongtheBelovskaialineforthenight.The4thPzAgainedasmuchassixmilesonthisdayoncertainaxesandonceagaintheKempfGroupcouldnotcatchup.AccordingtoHoth’soriginalplan,the3rdPzCshouldhavereachedProkhorovka,settingupa

defenseagainstfurtherreservescomingintothesectorfromtheeasttoprotectthe2ndSSPzCasit drove through the corridor. General Breith was still 20 miles south of this area with dimprospectsofreachingProkhorovkaandyetHothdidlittletoassisthiseasternflank.pck72+.Kempf,knowinghewasbehindschedule,stillallowedhisdivisionstoregroupformuchofthe

day.Trailingforcesandartillerywerebroughtupclosertothelineandpanzersreceivedaquickmaintenancecheck.Hedidsendout reconforces toreconnoiterbutnotmuchbeyondthat.ThispauseallowedtheRedArmytomakechangesintheirdeployment.The92ndGRDbroughtupits280thGRR(LtColNovikov)alongsidethe276thGRR(MajSimonov)alongtheKiselevo-Hill211.5 sector.TheGermanswereheading straight for this sector togain control ofmoreof theDonetsRiverastheydrovenorth.Hill211.5wasnortheastofKiselevo.vzz251.vzz10m.The198thID,apartofCorpsRaus,continuedtoholdbackthemanyattackslaunchedby7th

GAbutwith the accumulated attrition, itwas becoming harder and harder to do so against anenemythatseemedtohaveabottomlesswellofreinforcements.lck327.Kempfclaimedtohavedestroyed170tanksandbatteringseveraltankregimentsandfourrifle

divisionssincethestartofthecampaign.TheSovietswerestillbringingupreplacementsanditwasonlyamatteroftimeuntilthisnewpressurewouldimplode3rdPzC.The111thGRD,78thGRD, 270th RD and 15thGRDwere all positioned east of the Koren River ready to deployagainstCorpsRausand7thPzD.wdk153+.

T

15

July10thontheNorthernSalientSeeMap6

heGermanswerestoppedfarshortofcuttingtheOrel-KurskrailroadlinebutModeldidnot have reserves tomake another attempt at the important rail line. zzz101m. dgk87m.

dgk122m.Inthepredawnhours,the15thVAattackedairfieldsnearOrelbutwereunsuccessfulandlosta

few planes in the process. Destroying German planes on the ground would not only helpRokossovskydefeat9thArmy, itwouldalsomake it easier todefeat2ndPzAwhenOperationKutuzovbegan.cbk71.dgk122m.cbk12m.Inthe4thPzDsectornearTeploewheretheGermanswerebeingpushedback,Kahler’s33rd

PzRregroupedandresumeditsattack,reachingHill260.Intoughhand-to-handcombat,the33rdPzRwasabletocrestthehillbutunderheavyshellingtheSovietsimmediatelycounter-attacked.In this engagement alone the regiment had over 100 casualties. For the day the entire divisionsuffered 500 casualties while it expended 200 tons of ammo. The costs of reopening the gaptowardOlkhovatkawerehighandthereturnwasmiminal.fkk68.dgk87m.dgk122m.lck116m.Whilethe47thPzCmadenogains,the46thPzCwiththe258thID,7thIDand31stIDinthe

lead,attackedtheeastflankof70thArmy.The258thIDattackedthe280thRDbutwererepulsedandthenwerecounter-attacked.The7thIDmadealittleprogressbutthenthe175thRDcounter-attackedandtheGermanshadtoretreat.BothdivisionsfailedintheirobjectiveofreachingtheKursk-Orelhighway.SixT34swerereportedlost. In theearlyhoursontheeastflank, the74thRD and 148th RD, with support from tanks and planes, attacked the 78th AD of 23rd IC atProtasovo.TheSoviets lost12 tanksbutdidgain someground.Throughout thewholeday, the78thADand216thIDreceivedheavyshellingfromthe12thAD.Despite this,elementsof the78thADwiththehelpofFerdinandstookahillnearTrosnaandanothergrouptookthetownby1300hrs,capturing824POWs.wdk182.dgk87m.dgk122m.lck116m.The41stPzC’s86thIDand10thPzGDsufferedheavyshellingfromthe5thArtilleryDivision

and theSovietAFbefore being attacked by the 307thRD at Ponyri PC.At 1800 hrs, a smallraidingsquadofeightT34stookahillnearPonyriPCbutwerethenhitbyStukasanddrivenoff.According to Soviet POWs, they had suffered heavy casualties during this operation.wdk182.dgk87m.dgr199m.dgk122m.lck116m.After a brief pause, the 47th PzC which had the most panzers, resumed its attack with the

objectiveoftravelingthroughTeploeandtravelingthreemilestogaincontrolofthehighgroundnearMolotyschi.TheBurmeisterBrigadewhichincluded2ndPzD,4thPzDand20thPzD,afterinitiating the attack, were to remain behind at Samodurovka north of Teploe in reserve until

needed.TheterrainnorthofTeploewasdifficultandthe47thPzChadatoughtimeinadvancingthrough it against heavy artillery shelling.By noon the assaultwas canceled and the 47thPzCmovedbacktoitsstartline.TheSovietsfollowedtheretreatwithelementsofthe2ndTA,19thTC,40thGRD,70thGRD,75thGRDand the1stGAD.wdk182.dgr198m. fkk102m.dgk87m.dgr199m.dgk122m.lck116m.VonSaucken’s4thPzDwiththesupportofsPzAbt505resumeditsadvancetocaptureTeploe.

Afterwards,otherpanzerunitswoulddrive throughthegapandheadforOlkhovatka.The33rdPzRof4thIDfinallytookthetownafterhardhousetohousefightingwheretheCOwasalmostkilled by snipers. Nearby at Hill 235, Stukas bombed it before an assault force with Tigersleading thewaymoved in. Twenty-two T34swere destroyedwhen Soviet hunter/killer teamsmovedinontheTigerswhichwerenotyetdefendedbyotherpanzersorinfantry,buttheGermanassault failed anyway. Because of some confusion in 4th PzD’s command, the infantry wasbroughtintoolateandagoodchancetopenetratethelinewasmissed.TheRedArmyrespondedquickerandby1700hrs,hadbroughtupmoretanksandmenandcountereddriving12thPzRbackeastofTeploe.PzAbt49wasnearbyandhelpedslowtheSoviets,giving12thPzRtimetodiginandthelinetostabilizealittle.PzAbt49arrivedat1900hrstoassistandwasabletoestablishcontactforHQwiththeseforces.fkk65+.dgk87m.dgk122m.lck116m.StavkaorderedOperationKutuzovtobeginintwodays’timebutwithonemajorchangeinthe

plans.WithCentralFrontsufferingsomanycasualtiesitwoulddelayitsattackforseveraldaysinorder to regroup. TheWestern Front and Bryansk Front would begin on 7/12, though probingattacksstartedadayearlier.Theobjectiveoftheoffensivewastoattacktheflanksof53rdICanddriveinward,surroundingitandthe35thICinthecenteroftheline.WithCentralFrontstartinglate, it gaveModel a few days to transfer forces from quiet sectors to the hot sectors whichgreatly helped the shattered 2nd PzA, at least for a few days.When Central Front joined theoffensive, theGermanswouldbe forced toeventuallypullback to save itself. cbk83.mkz121.dgk231m.snk433m++.The9thPzD tookSnovo,BityugandBerezovyiLog thencrossed theSnovoand reached the

northernpartofPonyriII.NorthofOlkhovatka,theybrokethroughbothdefensebeltsandyetintheprevious fourdays, theGermanshadgainedonlysevenmiles. fkk102m.dgk87m.dgr199m.dgk122m.lck116m.ModelrelievedColGeneralRudolfSchmidtof2ndPzAforhiscriticismofModel’srunningof

Citadel. The Gestapo arrested and escorted the General back to Berlin. This would prove ahorrendousmistake,fortwodayslatertheSovietoffensivebegan.GeneralClossnerof53rdICwasinthepositiontoreplaceSchmidtbutModeldidnotthinkClossnerwasqualifiedsoModeltookoverwhile2ndPzAwasstationednearOrel.Noreplacementwasimmediatelynamedastheunitwas expected to go to Serbia but by 8/15when the 2ndPzAwas still fighting nearOrel,GeneralLotharRendulicbecameCOof2ndPzA.The5thPzDwasModel’sonlypanzerreservetobackup2ndPzAfortheOrelsalient.TheOKHalsohadthe8thPzDand2IDsdeployedtotherearinreserveaswell.dgk232.dgk87m.dgk122m.lck116m.snz238.zsm259.swm139+.AsmallgroupofGermanfighters, lookingforeasyprey,attackedasquadronof30bombers

nearFatezh.FiveSovietplaneswereshotdown.ItistheorizedthatthisSovietgroupwasheadingfor the nearbyGerman airfield and theGerman ambush saved the airfield from attack. cbk71.

dgk122m.While2ndPzDand4thPzDwereassembling,Germanartilleryopenedfireonthehighground

atOlkhovatka.Luftwaffe attacked battery positions aswell. Regardless of the heavy rain, thepanzersadvancedagainstheavyfire.Despitethefirepowerof200panzers,theSovietsheldtheirpositionsnearPonyrithoughthegrenadiersof4thPzDdidcaptureTeploeafterhoursofhousetohousefighting.bt86.dgr198m.fkk102m.dgk87m.dgr199m.nzk94.dgk122m.lck116m.RudenkowantedtostoptheGermanadvancebeforereachingOlkhovatkawhichwasdefended

by the shattered remains of 2ndTA.His recon patrol discovered a panzer assembly area nearKashara.Beforenoon thegeneral sent208planes todestroy thepanzers.Despite aheavy flakdefense, theSovietplanes swoopeddownanddestroyedanumberofpanzers,vehiclesandanammodump.TheGermanassaultwasdelayedbytheattack.cbk71.dgk122m.The12thPzDandthe36thMDwasmovedupclosertotheline,soontobeinsertedintothe

fighting.The5thPzDand8thPzDweremovedtotheTrosna-Fatezhroadandwerepreparingtodrivesouthalongit.nzk94.dgk122m.lck116m.After losing their tenuous hold on the hill, theGermans tried once again to take the heavily

fortifiedHill253.5,northeastofPonyri.ThistimetheFerdinandsofsPzAbt654ledthechargebut again the attack failed. The wall of steel coming down that hill was too much, even forElefants.mhz286.dgk87m.dgr199m.dgk122m.FearingthattheSovietswouldmoveanydayagainsttheOrelsalient,Klugesentthe8thPzDto

Oreltobolsterthe200,000-man2ndPzA,whilethe9thArmystillhadalmost300,000men.The2ndPzAhadnopanzersleftandonlyafewassaultguns.cbk83.dgk231m.snk433m++.The right flankof9thPzD reached thebaseof the ridgeatOlkhovatkabut couldnotgoany

further.Ifyoustudytheengagementsincapturinghillsbetweenthenorthernsectorandsouthernsector,youhavetoaskwhywasHothsomuchmoresuccessfulthanModel?Hothhadtoughhillsin front of him like Hills 230, 241, 252, 260 and 244, just to name a few, but these wereconqueredwhileHills274,253andafewothersinthenorthwereneversecurelycaptured.DidHoth’sforceshavemoredeterminationorweretheymorecunningintheattack?Itispossiblebutdoubtful.DidHothhaveabetterattackplanthanModel?Theanswertothisquestionwouldbeyes,butwasittheonlyfactortoconsider?Werethereextenuatingterrainordefensefeaturesthatmadeadifference?It’spossibleinsomecasesbutdefinitelynotallcases.CentralFronthadanadvantage inmen andweaponry overVoronezh Front butwas it themain reason forModel’shard-fought but in the end dismal performance? Arguably this leads me to consider thatRokossovsky’s command decisions had a clear impact among the other considerations justmentionedandthereasonwhy9thArmygainedless thanhalf thedistancethat4thPzAdidandwhy9thArmyhadgreatercasualtiesaswell.fkk102m.dgk87m.dgk122m.lck116m.Ontheeasternfrontof theOrelsalient, itwasdiscoveredthat theSovietshaddeployed200

batteriesinfrontofthe262ndIDsector(35thIC).The432ndGR,whichhadtodefendasixmilefront,wouldbethehardesthit.Toassistthe262ndID,Rendulicredeployedcorpsartillerytothesectorandmovedafewbattalionsfromothersectorstheretohelpout.Thisaddedstrengthwouldsave thousandsofsoldiersandslowtheSoviet’Russians’assaultwhenpreliminariesbegan thenextday.fkk340.dgk231m.snk433m++.TheOKHallowedthe9thArmyamorningofresttoregroupandthelastofModel’sreserves,

the10thPzGD,wasorderedupto thefront toassist the292ndIDin thePonyri-Prilepyline tomakeone final attemptofbreaking through.Even though thedivisionswere less than20milesfromthefront,ittooktwodaystoreachthelaunchareas.Bodenhausen’s12thPzDandGolnick’s36th IDarrivedadayearlier.Evenwith thehelpof theLuftwaffe,whichhadbeen reinforcedfromairfields furthernorth, these twodivisionscouldnotpenetrate theminefieldsandbunkersthatwerestrewnalongthisline.Thedaywaswindyandrainy,makingitharderonthepanzersand planes to navigate. This new PzGD had seven artillery battalions, and a NebelwerferRegiment which was desperately needed but the attack still failed. During this movement, aSoviettankbrigadeattackedtheGermansinPonyributwasrepelled,nevergettingclosetothevillage.TheGermanshadPonyributwerenowfacingthelastandtheheaviestdefendedlineyet.Whatwastocomewouldbeworsethanwhathadalreadybeenexperienced.Stalinbelievedthatif theGermanscapturedKursk,Hitlerwould thendrive towardMoscow.Thisperceptionwascrucial inwhy theCentralFrontwas fortified toagreaterextent thanVoronezhFront.dgk87m.dgr199m.gjz191.mhz287.cbk71.nzk94.dgk122m.lck116m.snz253.cbk12m.kfz459.pck48.The German 9th Army gained only a mile today. Model decided to go from offensive to

defensiveexpectingaSovietcounter-attack.Stillhopeful,ModelwasalreadyplanningthenextoffensiveaftertheSovietcounter-attack.TheLuftwaffeclaimedanother126Sovietplanesshotdown.dgk87m.gjz191.dgk122m.The1stFliegerDivisionreportedlosingonlysevenaircraftonthisdayonflying1136sorties.

Duringthedayanddespitethebadweather,theLuffwaffe’s1stFliegerDivisionflew661sortiesjust in the Teploe area. Any visible artillery battery or tank concentration was attacked. TheLuftwaffedidloseoneofitsbestaces:MajorReschwith94victorieswasshotdownandkilledonthisday.The16thVAflewonly301missions.cbk71++.nzk77.dgk122m.TheSovietpilotshad flownnearlyaround theclocksince thestartandwerenowexhausted

andtiredofbattle.Someofthepilotswhenflyingtheirpatrolswouldavoidthebattlezoneandjustskirtittoavoidafight.WhenRudenkofoundoutaboutthepracticeheinformedhispilotsthatanybodycaughtinsuchacowardlyactwouldbeeithertransferredorarrested.Therewassolittlecontactbetweenthetwosidesinthenorththatdaythat1stFliegerDivisionreportedlosingonlysevenplanes.cbk73.dgk122m.

G

16

July11thontheSouthernSalientSeeMaps15,18,26C

ermanintelligenceestimated1,227SoviettankshadbeendestroyedthusfarinOperationCitadel,raisingHoth’sconfidenceabouttomorrow’sattack.fkk151.Anticipatingamajor

battleinthenextdayortwo,VatutinlinedupeveryartillerypiecehecouldfindfromthebendofthePsel,fromPrelestnoetoOktiabrskiStateFarm,alongtherailroadtoLutovo.Heconcentratedahundredgunsandalmost200mortarsalongthissection.vzz205+.Northof thePselRiverthroughoutthepreviousnightandthepredawnhours, theSSTKwere

defendingtheirprecariousholdontheirbridgeheadagainstconstantattacksbythe31stTCandelements of the 33rd GRC of 5th GA, which were still arriving in sector. With little heavyequipment in thebridgehead, the attackingT34shad tobedestroyedbydemolition teams.Theengineersdesperatelyworkedthroughoutthenightandearlyhoursagainstheavyrainsandheavyartilleryinbuildingalightbridgetoaccommodatethetrucksandlightpanzers.Itwascompletedatdaybreak.TheengineersthenstartedworkingonaheavybridgetogettheTigersover.Oncethewholedivisionwasacross,theirmainobjectivewouldbeHill226.6andthenHill252.4inordertogiveLAHflankprotectionwhentheymovedonProkhorovka.Hausserwantedtheseobjectivescaptured that day but the Soviets were not cooperating. While the bridgehead was beingdefended, the Eicke Regiment continued to clear the southern bank of the river of Sovietresistance.Therewasa largeconcentrationofSovietartilleryonHill252.4 thatwas stoppingLAH’sadvance.HaussermadethehillapriorityforSSTKtotake.HothwasaskingtoomuchofSSTKandinfactof2ndSSPzC.TheSSTKnevergotclosetoHill252.4andtheSovietartilleryonthathillplayedhavocwiththeSSfortherestofthecampaign.Hill252.4wasnortheastofHill226.6 and almost due north of Hill 252.2. See Map 23. mhz319. mhz343. vzz218+. lck334.vzz226.gnk312m.agk124.vzz202.vzz1m.MajGeneralPopov’s33rdGRCofZhadov’s5thGAhadbeenordered to the line todefend

Prokhorovka and the corridor to thewest of it. Traveling all night, the lead units of the 33rdreachedtheirdestinationatdaybreakandbegandiggingin.Liakhov’s95thGRDand97thGRDdeployed along the north bank of the Psel River on the line Veselyi-Polezhaev to support thedepleted 51st GRD and 52nd GRD. The 9th GADwas also brought up to defend Vasilevka,PrelestnoeandIamki.The9thGADhadnearly9,000men,thehighestcountofthesevendivisionsin 5thGA but it had the least number of anti-tank guns at about 75. To bolster the division’sartilleryweakness,Popovattached the301stDestroyerAnti-tankRegiment to it.The9thGADconsistedofthreeregiments:23rdGAR,26thGARand28thGAR.dgk167**.vzz200+.vzz204.gnk260.vzz214.

At0330hrs,elementsofthe97thGRD,whichhadjustarrivedinsector,attackedtheextremewesternendoftheSSTKbridgehead,notfarfromKliuchi.Itwasaprobingattacktosearchforweak spots in the line.TheSSTK had preceded this attackwith one of their own andwithoutstoppingtookonthissecondgroupofSoviets.Atthesametimeonthesouthernbanksoftheriver,theEickeRegimentwasdefendingitselfandtherearareaofSSTKnearthevillageofVasilevkaagainstasurprisedcounter-attack.Atabout1300hrs,GermanartillerystartedshellingthevillagebeforeEickeadvanced.Surprisingly,the99thTBwithitsT34sandKV1sattackedfirstaftertheGerman shelling stopped. Krivoshlein ordered their own shelling to continue with the Soviettanks barreling down at the village. The new German rocket barrage turned the tanks, whichheadedbacktothenortheastaswellasstoppingthegarrisoninsidethevillagefromsupportingthe once advancing tanks. Therewas still a gap betweenSSTK andLAH on its right andMajGeneralPriesswasconcernedthattheSovietswouldtrytoexploitthatgapagainasthe99thTBjust did. The heavy bridge over the Psel had still not been completed and the panzers werewaitingimpatientlytocrosstheriverandheadforHill226.6.gnk293++.gnk283m.zrl233.Evenwith thecontinuedbarrage,PriessdidnotbelieveKnochlein’sbattalionofT34scould

takeVasilevkaonitsown.Abattalionofpanzersthathadrecentlyarrivedat theriverandwaswaitingforthebridgetobecompletedwassenttodobattlewiththeT34sthatwereinthearea.Meierdress’spanzersarrivedshortlyafter1400hrsandKnochleinwouldgiveadditionalsupporttohisbattalioninfightingthepanzersandby1500hrshadenteredthewesternedgeofthevillage.gnk296+.gnk283m.Afterdarkand into thepredawnhoursof7/11, the58thMRBafter travelingover100miles

werearrivinginsector.Itwastheonlyreserveleftof2ndTCanditwasbroughtuptotheline:Mikhailovka, Andreevka, the woods northwest of Storozhevoe, Hill 245.8 south and west ofProkhorovka.Their arrivalwas timely for ithelped repulseapanzer attackbyLAH just hourslater.The99thTB,26thTBand169thTBthenmoveduptothis lineandfortifiedit.The33rdGRCof5thGAweredeployingbehindthislineinsecondechelon.vzz200++.vzz222.vzz9m.AcombatgroupfromSSTKlaunchedat0415hrswiththeintentionofclosingthegapwestof

ProkhorovkaandlinkingupwithLAHaftercapturingAndreevkaandMikhailovka.At thesametimeSSTKwasattemptingtosecureandexpandabridgeheadoverthePsel.Allofthepreviousnightandearlyonthismorning,theremainsof10thTCthatwerestillintheareahadattackedtheSSTK’s bridgeheadover thePselRiver butwithout success. Further slowingupSSTK was anattack on its left flank betweenKochetovka andKozlovka by 31stTC at the same time as theGermans were beginning their advance against the 51st GRD and 52nd GRD. At 0830 hrs,anothertankattackhitthebridgeheadandwiththeroadsbeingbad,theSSTKranoutofartilleryshellsbeforemorecouldarrive.At1420hrs,anothernewbridgeacrossthePselRiverbetweenBogorodizkoyeandVeselyiwasopened.ThenewbridgecouldhandleTigersbuttheroadsweresobadfromtherainthatexpansionofthebridgeheadwasslowanddifficult.LAHwasdrivingtowardKozlovkaandVasilevkawithtentativeplanstoreachasfarwestasKochetovka.HausserhadwantedtoconcentrateLAH’sstrengthfortherunonProkhorovkabutcouldnotduetothegapbetweenSSTKandLAH.Ithadtobeclosedfirst.Planeswererestrictedduetothecloudcover.wdk155.pck78.vzz188+.vzz8m.gnk283m.By2100hrsofthepreviousnightthe151stGRRof52ndGRDandthe245thTRcounteredat

thesecondtrenchlineandforcedSSTKback to thefirst lineatKliuchibutwerestopped theremomentarily.TheSSTK still had the bridgehead that includedKrasnyiOktiabr, just outside ofKliuchiandthesouthernslopesofHill226.6,northeastofBogoroditskoe.Bytheendoftheday,SS5thPzGRand6thPzGRhadcapturedKliuchiandwereinpartialpossessionofHill226.6totheeastofthevillageandnorthofthePselRiver.Thefightingcontinuedandby0400hrsof7/11theGermanswerepushedoutofthefirsttrenchlineofKliuchiwiththehelpofthefirsttanksof5thGTA’s18thTC.However, they failed topush theGermans from thebend in the river.ThegroundtotheimmediatenorthofthehillwasstillinSoviethands.KliuchiwasahalfmileeastofKrasnyi Oktiabr. wwf100. dgk169. dgk184m. dgk222m. vzz1m. vzz195. vzz8m. gnk253m.gnk312m.zow159.The 2nd SS PzC and especially the LAH, had gained more ground the day before than

Rotmistrovanticipatedwithregardstohis launchpointandwasnowoccupyingthegroundthat5th GTAwas originally going to assemble and launch their attack from. At 0415 hrs on 7/11Vasilevskyarrivedatthe2ndTCobservationposttostudythelandscapetoseeifchangesshouldbemadetoRotmistrov’soriginaloffensiveplans.RotmistrovhadarrivedtoProkhorovkabeforehis tanks to make plans, though the lead tanks were now arriving during the predawn hours.Within24hrshiswholearmywouldbeinsector.Quiteanaccomplishmentforsuchalargearmytotravelsofarinjustacoupleofdays.vzz208.wwf111+.dgk179.vzz245.IntheProkhorovkaareabeforedawnonthisSunday,the3rdPzCmadeitsbigpushnorthfor

Prokhorovka using 6 divisions. They had to catch up withDas Reich to form a stable line.Severalhours later at0900hrs, theLAH,DasReich andSSTK launched aswell.At the sametime, the 48th PzC was attacking toward Oboyan in order to keep the Soviets from sendingreinforcements toProkhorovka.During theentirebattle in theHill252.2area,heavy rainsandstrongwindsbufferedthefield.Shortlyafternoon,upto100panzerswerestraddlingtheroadtoProkhorovka; later still more panzers arrived between Prokhorovka and Storozhevoe. Thesetownswerenotonlyinjeopardyfromtherisingnumbersofpanzersbutalsotherearof5thGTAwasatriskasitwasassemblingintheareaforthefollowingday’soffensive.je106+.dgk184m.gnk283m.vzz9m.Before dawn, the 6th PzGR of SSTK passed through the murderous fire of Soviet artillery

commandingtheheightsonthenorthsideofthePsel.TheGermansproceededtostormthevillageofKrasnyiOktiabr,establishingthebeginningoftheirexpandedbridgeheadovertheriver.Theyheldthevillagefromrepeatedcounter-attacksandthenbegantoexpandit.Therestofthedivisionwaited,especiallytheheavyarmor,untilthebridgewascompleted.fkk152.fkk320m.A violent thunderstorm hit the Teterevino North sector before dawn where the LAH were

preparingtoadvancetowardProkhorovka.Theheavyrainsslowedthepreparations,turningtheroads tomudandmakingcrosscountry travel almost impossible.Threemiles to thenorthwestwas the Psel River and to the northeast Prokhorovkawas about the same distance. Along thebanksof thePselwasaseriesoffortifiedvillagesthathousedSovietartillerythatcouldreachSSTKorLAH.ThosevillagesincludedKozlovka,Vasilevka,Mikhailovka,Prelestnoe,Petrovkaand Polezhaev. These strongpoints would be attacked on this day and be involved in heavyfightingwiththeSSastheywerestrategicallysituated.ThesevillageslinedthewesternsideofthecorridortoKursk,whileProkhorovkawastheanchortotheeasternentrancetothecorridor.

Locatedinthecenterofthiscorridor,butclosertoMikhailovka,wasthegiantObtiabrskiStateFarm.ThefarmhadmanycinderblockbuildingsandtheSovietshadturneditintoafortressthatwouldbedifficult to take. Just to theeastof this farmwasHill252.2whichwasalsoheavilydefendedbythe52ndGRDand183rdRDwhocouldalsofireontheattackersofthefarm.Bothsideshadmanycasualties fighting forHill 252.2.Hill 245.8 on the eastern side of the tracks,northoftheStorozhevoewoodsandnexttotheStalinskoeStateFarm,wasalsoanotherkeyheightthat was well defended by the 58th MRB and supporting tanks and artillery. Each of thesestrongpointsalsohadminefieldsandanti-tankditchestoprotectit.TeterevinoNorthwasjusttwomileswestoftherailroadembankmentwhileanotherkeyvillage,IvanovskiVyeselok,wasjustonthe other side of the embankment with a road that led directly to Prokhorovka. SeeMap 23.gnk281+.gnk283m.vzz1m.vzz8m.mjk89.zow157.In the early plans of the defense of the southern salient, Hill 252.2 was recognized as an

importantpartinthethirddefensebelt.ItwastheguardiantotheentranceofthelandcorridortoKurskbywayofProkhorovka.Trencheswerebuiltinfrontofit,tothesidesandonittoprotectthe artillery that was planned to be emplaced there. During the predawn hours, the 9th GADarrived at the hill and immediately began expanding the trench system and adding their ownartillery.WhentheGermansoverranthishill,theywouldtakeadvantageofthesedefenses.Hills241.6,242,5and231.3wouldalsobefortifiedintimetostop5thGTAon7/12.vzz320+.AssoonastheGermanartillerylaiddownacoveringbarrage,Kraas’menmovedintotheopen

fieldinfrontofHill252.2.TheSovietsmallarmsresponsewasabsolutelymurderous;thentheartilleryhaditsturn.ThegunsonHill252.4tothenorthstartedfiringandafewminuteslatertheguns from the Storozhevoe woods began to fire. The entire Soviet defense had been built onmutuallyprotectingstrongpoints.Whenonewasattacked,anotheroneandusuallymultipleothersiteswouldfireontheattackers.TheGermansweremarchingintoakillzoneandatatimewhentheirpanzerswereinshortsupply.Thefirewassobadthegrenadiershadtostopanddiveforcover;ashellhole,depressionortheoccasionalravinewoulddo.TherewasaluckybreakforLAHattackersastheskiesstartedtoclear.TheStukaswereupintheairandpreparedtopoundtheheavilybunkeredHill252.2andthesurroundingcountryside.By0830hrsthegrenadiershadreachedthefootofthehillwhereitwasdiscoveredanotherminefieldhadbeenplaced.Whileitwas rainingbombs fromalldirections, theengineersmovedupand startedclearing themines.Oncepastthemines,thepioneersfoundatankditchthathadtobetakencareof.ThefewTigersunderKling’scommandmovedupandpasttheditch,blastingthemanybunkerslinkingthetopofthehill,ignoringthemanyhitsfromthesmallPakguns.RidinginaVformation,theassaultgunsscreenedtheTiger’sflanks.StukaswerecalledinagainandwithoutairsupportHill252.2wouldhaveprobablystayedwiththeSoviets.DespitehavingaLuftwaffeliaisonofficer,afriendlyfireincidenthappenedthatkilledanumberofgrenadiers.gnk285.gnk288.gnk283m.vzz9m.cbk75.AtfirstlightintheProkhorovkaarea,Sovietairplanesdropped200tonsofbombstohaltthe

Germansfromreachingthevillage.OntheGermanside,HothorderedtheLuftwaffetospendalltheir resources supporting the 2ndSSPzC.Thismade it especially difficult on 48thPzC.TheLAH andDasReich were currently only 4.5miles from Prokhorovka and only onemile fromIamki.Hothwantedtotakethetownbeforetheadditionalreservescouldblocktheadvance.At0500hrsinrainyweather,theLAH’s2ndPzGRresumeditsattackalongtheroadtoProkhorovka

with its remainingfourTigers in the lead.Twomilesahead, its firstobjectivewas theheavilyfortified Hill 252.2. As they approached the hill, Soviet artillery from near the villages ofPetrovka and Prelestnoe to the north opened fire on the German column. As the Germans gotcloser to the hill, T34s coming fromAndreevka and Iamki attacked the flanks ofLAH. rc222.mhz315.vzz1m.agk123.zrl231.AsthebattleforHill252.2heatedupandtheGermanTigerswereascendingthehillwhilethe

assaultgunswerestillatthebase,thetanksfrom169thTBadvancedfromanearbycopseoftreestoattacktheassaultgunsfromtheeast.TheT34swereredliningandthemountedinfantrycouldbarelystayonthetanks.TheGermanassaultguns,whichwerenotimmunetotheT34shell,kepttheircomposureandturnedtofacethechargingenemy.Duringtheengagement,CommanderKlingwaswoundedandhad tobeevacuated.His second,Schultz, tookcommand.Schultzewas thenwoundedandWittmannwasinchargeoftheTigers.EngineerswithshapedchargesweretakingontheSoviet tanksaswell.ThetankattackpeteredoutandthesurvivingT34sfellbackto thewoods while the Tigers crested the hill, grenadiers following. Both sides suffered heavycasualties.By1430hrsHill252.2wasinGermancontrolandthelastresistancesilenced.Leeryofacounter-attackafterdark,thegrenadiersdecidedtodefendthetopofthehillandresumetheiradvanceinthemorning.Laterthatnight,orderscamedowninstructingthe2ndPzGRtostayonHill252.2andenhance itsdefenses.Thishillwouldbeusedasaanchor to launch fromwhendrivingnorththroughthecorridor.TherecentlypromotedLtColFrey’s1stPzGRwouldresumeclearing the Storozhevoe woods which was turning out to be extremely difficult. gnk288++.zzk320.Underacloudyskyandarollingfog,acombatgroupfromLtColKraas’2ndPzGRofLAH

along with Tigers and assault guns attacked from west of the rail embankment, moving overmuddy ground, heading straight for Hill 252.2 and the Oktiabrski State Farm, which weredefendedbythe26thGARofthe9thGAD.Ifpossible,therestofregimentwouldnotlingeratthehill but head toward Prokhorovka.Once the hill was taken the rest of the panzers of 1st PzRwouldmoveupandattacktheOSFalongwiththeothers.Fartheroutfromthehill,minesweresporadicallyplaced;asoldierneverknowingwhenhisnextstepwouldbehislast.Thepioneerswereinthelead,doingthebesttheycouldtofindandclearthemines.ThelastfourTigersofthedivisionfollowedbehindtheengineers.Thecombatgroupwouldattackthenorthwestcornerofthe hill. The other 52 panzers of the divisionwere back at TeterevinoNorthwaiting forHill252.2tobesecuredbeforemovingouttorunthegapandheadforProkhorovka.Atthesametime,Frey’s 1st PzGR headed east, closer to the rail line, toward StorozhevoeWoods to clear theresistancethatwasconstantlyharassingtheeastflankofLAHandDasReich.Thewoodswhichwere defended by the 169th TB of 2nd TC and supporting infantry were located northeast ofIvanovskiVyselok. If they couldbe cleared thenHill 245.8wouldbe the last natural obstaclebetween LAH and Prokhorovka. Hausser wanted these two regiments to capture their initialobjectives then bothmove on Prokhorovka together from two directions: south and southwest.Stukas had been ready to strike the hill before the assault force reached it, if the skies hadpermitted. The 55th Werfer Regiment began shelling the villages of Prelestnoe and PetrovkawhichhadartillerythatcouldreachinfrontofHill252.2.gnk284.wwf112+.zrl232.By 0600 hrs, the 18th TC, which still had eight USM3 light tanks, was deploying on the

northern slopes ofHill 226.6 and trying to keep 6th SS PzGR from securing the hill. vzz195.vzz8m.Atdaybreak,the11thMRB,withsupportfromelementsofthe99thTBandthe1502ndDARof

2ndTC,wereattackedalongthesoutheasternoutskirtsofAndreevka-MikhailovkaandthesmallhillonemilesouthwestoftheOktiabrskiStateFarmbyheavytankandartilleryfirefromtheleftflankofLAH.ThedefensesincludedaminefieldandanantitankditchinfrontofHill252.2whichwas heavily covered by the 9thGAD.When the ditchwas reached at 0625 hrs, theGermansincreased the covering fire to keep the defenders busy while they prepared a way across it.Failingtocrosstheditch,2ndPzGRofLAHwasforcedtopullbackagainstthewitheringfire.Atthe same time 1st PzGRmoved to Luchki North andwas about to attack toward Storozhevoeincludingthepositionsheldby227thRR.Wisch,theCOofLAH,fearingacounter-attackagainsthis2ndPzRduringtheirwithdrawal,orderedthe1stPzRtostopitsattackanddefendtheflankof2ndPzGRwhileitmovedback.The55thWerferRegimentwascalledupandstartedshellingtheartillery positions along the river to assist the fall back. vzz212+. vzz218. vzz9m. gnk283m.zrl231.After a fewminutes to regroup, the 2ndPzGR attacked again toward the hill and 1st PzGR

resumeditsadvancetotheeast.ThebattleforHill252.2intensifiedasLAHhadjustovercomethe tank trench in front of the hill, allowing trailing battalions tomove up.AsGerman planesstruck and artillery narrowed in on their targets, more Soviet tanks came pouring in fromAndreevkaandMikhailovkatocounter theGermanpressure.Atthesametime,about0630hrs,elementsoftheLAHwerefightingtoclearthewoodsnorthofthevillageofStorozhevoeII.TheGermans could not leave enemy troops hidden in these woods behind as they moved towardProkhorovka.Bytheendof theday thewoodshadbeenclearedbut theGermanswereslowedbeforereachingthevillageofStorozhevoe.Fightingthroughoutthenight,theGermanspenetratedinto thevillage, fightinghouse tohouse.Thestate farmatStorozhevoe Iwouldnotbe reachedtodayeither.DasReich,whichwastoworkwithLAH in takingthehill,wasstucksouthof thevillageofVinogradlovkaagainstadeterminedenemy,the26thTBofPopov’s2ndTC.mhz317.vzz218+.lck333++.At0630hrs,elementsof1stPzGRjoinedtheattackwith2ndPzGR,andwiththesupportofa

companyofTigers,attackedSovietpositionsatStorozhevoe.Atthesametime,Soviets,usingatwo pincer action, attacked eastward from Andreevka the original LAH group defending itswestern flank.TheLAH penetrated the 183rdRD and 169thTB’s line, forcing it back towardProkhorovkaandthe52ndGRD’sdefenses.TheLuftwaffewascalledintohelpthewesternflankbyattacking theSovietassault forceplus theirbatteries,placed invillagesalong thePsel.The28thGARmovedintopositionsouthofProkhorovkatoblockthe2ndSSPzC.TheLAHfollowedwith the support of theLuftwaffe, finally capturingHill 252.2 after a bloody fight that lastedhours.FromtheHill,thepanzersdrovetowardOktiabrskiStateFarm,reachingitby1530hrsbutwerestoppedbymassiveartilleryfireandthenewlydug-in9thGADplacedpracticallyalongtheentireLAH sector.All thewhile thatLAH was defending itself, corps batteries were shellingOSF,Hill 252.2 and Lutovowith the anticipation thatLAH would repulse the attack and thenmoveontheaboveobjectives.Theskieswerealreadybeginningtoclearanditwouldbeahotandmuggyday.dgk171+.dgk184m.dgr222.gnk284.wff112++.zrl232.

At0630hrs, the1stPzRofLAHwaspreparing to advance from theBolshieMaiachki areatowardLuchkiNorth.The55thWerferRegimentwouldfireonthebanksofthePselinordertoreduceSovietshellingduringtheoperation.At0730hrsanadditionalpreparationstartedontheright sideof the line in this sector.At 0900hrs, theGroupKrass of 2ndPzGR launched theirattackwithTigersintheleadontherightside.By1000hrs,theGermanshadpushedthe227thRRof183rdRDbacknorthof therailroadembankmentand into thedefensivebeltof the26thGARof9thGADin frontofHill252.2and theOktiabrskiStateFarm.ElementsofLAH werenowabout twomiles from theoutskirtsofProkhorovkabutHill252.2had tobecaptured firstbeforetherailroadjunctionwasattacked.vzz214.vzz217+.gnk284zow158With thesupportof50Ju-87shitting thehill, theLAHeventuallysecuredHill252.2and the

subsequent success in keeping it against the counter-attacks of 29th TC. The Oktiabrski StateFarmwastheirnextobjective.DuringthisbattleasquadronofHe111sattackedSovietpositionsnorth of Prokhorovka, losing two planes to heavy flak. The 8thFlieger Corps lost 16 planeswhile shooting down 23 planes. However, theLuftwaffe was more successful against groundforces,allowingthe2ndSSPzCtomakemodestbutimportantgains.mhz319.vzz218.lck332++.cbk76.At0650hrs,the2ndPzGRofLAHwhichhadpausedtoallowagroupofpanzersandassault

guns to arrive, launched again slowly along the woods one mile southwest of Iamki towardProkhorovka, against the 227thRR and287thRR (183rdRD), elements of the 58thMRBandtanksfrom169thTB.TheattackwasrepulsedbyheavyartilleryfirefromjustbeyondHill252.4,Prelestnoe and Petrovka. Soviet tanks countered from the woods, six miles southwest ofProkhorovka,afterafewofthepanzerswerestruckandburningfromtheshelling.At0900hrs,80planesattackedtheSovietartillerypositionsnearthewoodsbutthereweresomanygunsinthe area that it did not slow the shelling much when some of the guns were destroyed. TheGermanspulledbackbuttriedsixmoretimestobreakthroughalongbothsidesoftherailroadbutfailed until thePeiperGroupwas able to get across the line at the boundary between the tworegimentsand thenheadedforHill252.2and theOktiabrskiStateFarmto thenorthwestof thehill.WhenGroupBeckerreachedthetankditchinfrontofHill252.2,theshellingwassoseverethatBeckerhadtobackawayandaskedforairandartillerysupport.TheLuftwaffe,overthenextcoupleofhours,maderepeatedattacksontheSovietpositions.Forthepreviousfewdayswhenthe 2nd SS PzC reached the Prokhorovka axis, Vatutin had set up a kill zone leading toProkhorovka.Heavyartilleryconcentrationshadbeenestablishedonbothsidesofthiscorridorof death the previous night and the fire was worse than it had been. On the west side nearVasilevka,Andreevkaandothervillagesclosetotheriverandontheeastsidealongalinethatincludes Storozhevoe also received extra guns. vzz210++. vzz226+. vzz1m. cbk75. wwf112.zrl231.Supportedbyonlyafewassaultguns,elementsoftheLAH,travelingsouthandeastofthePsel

River came under heavy artillery fire when assaulting Hill 241.6, south of Vasilevka andAndreevka.TheSovietshadduginmanytanksonthehillanditwasaformidabledefense.SSTKforcesnearMikhailovkaremainedincontactwiththeLAHbutcouldnotprovidemuchassistance.ThoughitcostLAHseverely,76Soviettankswereclaimeddestroyedduringtheassaultforthehill. At the same time Col Lipichev’s 53rd MRB attacked the LAH recon forces south of

OktiabrskiStateFarmandnorthofKomsomoletsStateFarm.TherestofLAHwithacompanyofTigers in the lead marched along the Prokhorovka rail line past Hill 252.2 heading to thenortheast.dgk164+.vzz207.vzz8m.dgk165m.dgk189+.At0700hrsthecloudsstartedtodissipateandthesunwouldbegintodrythelandasanew

waveof25Germanbombers, flyingwithescorts,bombed theSoviet line fromStorozhevoe toOktiabrskiStateFarminpreparationforthecontinuingassaultby2ndSSPzC.Ninemorewavescameinuntil1300hrs.FacingeastalongtheKalinin-PetrovskilineandheadingforProkhorovka,elements ofLAH andDasReich,with support of almost 100 panzers in theTeterevinoNorth-Ivanovski Vyselok-Komsomolets area, launched their combined attack. The Germans drovedirectlytowardthe227thARandthe285thRRwhohadjustmovedintotheVinogradovkaarea.IvanovskiVyselokwas justsouthof theKomsomoletStateFarmandVinogradovkawasa littlesouthofIvanovskiVyselok.TheRedAirForcewasbusyalso;bombingtheleadunitsofLAHinthesamegeneralarea.Thegrenadierscouldnotwaitfortheskiestoclearandlaunchedbeforeany air support was provided but were still appreciative when their bombers showed up.vzz209+.vzz234.vzz3m.vzz215.vzz7m.At 0700 hrs Priess radioed General Hausser requesting an emergency shipment of artillery

shells; thedivisiondidnothaveenough to last theday.ThewarehouseatTomarovka,westofBelgorod,sent1,00010.5cmshellstoGresnoebuttheshipmentdidnotarriveuntillatethenextday.Without the ammo, the northern bridgehead was seriously threatened by the depleted butaggressive Soviet force that was made up of the 51st GRD, 52nd GRD and the 11th MRB.Germanintelligencealsodiscoveredadditionalreinforcementsweremovingsouthintoblockingpositions: 33rdGRC of 5thGA.GeneralHausserwas also told that the bridge over the PselRiverwouldnotbecompleteduntillatemorningwhichdelayedthepanzersfromcrossingandputaddedstrainontheGrenadiers.gnk293.gnk283m.At0830hrsLAHapproachedHill252.2,notquitetwomilessouthwestofProkhorovka,LAH

penetrated theSoviet first lineofdefense thenshifteddirection to thenorthwest for less thanamiletocapturetheheavilyfortifiedOktabriskiStateFarm,beforemovingbacktotheroadandHill252.2fromthenorth.The9thGADhadmovedintopositionsouthofthetownthepreviousnight andwaswaiting to stop theGermanswhen theyarrived.Theseairborne troopswere thevanguard of Zhadov’s 5th GA. Just behind Zhadov was Rotmistrov’s 5th GTA, arriving andpreparingtoaddtheirweighttothecomingoffensive.AstheLAHbeganassaultingHill252.2,theSovietresponseinartillerywassointensethatLAH immediatelycalledforassistance.Despitelowcloudsandrecentrain,theLuftwaffequicklyarrivedandstartedpoundingthehill.At0900hrs,additionalGermanartillerymovedintorangeandstartedshellingthehill.GeneralHothknewthishillhadtobetakenandquicklyandallavailableresourceswerebeingused.At1330hrs,theSovietscounter-attackedPeiper’sbattalionon thesouthslopeofHill252.2alongwithKling’sfourTigers.ThefightingwasfiercebutKlingandPeiperandhismenwereable torepulse thetankerswith thehelpof planes thatwere circlingoverhead.mhz316. fkk152. vzz1m. agk123+.wwf116.Rotmistrov and his staff arrived early in themorning to the Prokhorovka area ahead of his

forcesbutasthedayprogressed,unitsofthe5thGTAand5thGAwouldbearriving.The42ndGRDplustankandartilleryunitsarrivedintheOktiabrskiarea.Hisgeneralplanwastodrivein

asouthwestdirectionfromProkhorovkatowardtheKomsomoletsStateFarmPokrovkaareaand,withthehelpof1stTAand5thGA,wouldencirclethe2ndSSPzCanddestroyit.AtthispointGeneral Rotmistrov thought the 2nd SS PzC was being held and that he would have time tocomplete the finedetailsofhiscounter-offensiveplans.LaterwhenRotmistrovwasdiscussinghisplanswithValsilevsky,theGermansbrokethroughthelinenotfarfromBelenikhinoandthewoodsnext toStorozhevoewhichweredefendedby169thTBandthe285thRRof183rdRD.The 5thGTA’s 18th TC and 29th TC had to throw those plans away and charge in a chaoticfashion tostop theLAH,SSDRandSSTKdivisions.Tomakeconditionsworse forRotmistrov,Kempfwasfinallymovingandwasnowonly12milesfromProkhorovkaandcouldpotentiallyattack 5th GTA’s flank later the following day. It turned out Kempf was close enough toProkhorovkaasRotmistrovdidchangehisplans.Hehadtosendtanksandartillerytoward3rdPzC which diluted his main attack against 2nd SS PzC. wdk155. mhz322. mhz329. vzz368+.vzz8m.wwf118+.Vatutin was making last minute changes to his plans for the major offensive which was

scheduledtobeginthenextday.Mostofthe80,000-man5thGAwasexpectedtoarrivelatethatnight or early the following morning. The 5th GTA had already begun to arrive and werepreparingfortheassaultaswell.Hewantedhiscurrentforcestoholdthelineinordertogive5thGTA a good launch point but the SS foiled Vatutin’s plans by reaching Hill 252.2-OSF area.lck320.lck164m.lck260m.lck308m.vzz9m.gnk283m.TheGermans believed the Sovietswere out of reserves and believed their progresswould

improvestartingthatday.HowevertheSSTKhadtroubleincrossingthePselRiverduetothefactthatthe5thGAwasjustarrivinginsectorandwerealreadyhelpingtheshattered51stGRDand52ndGRDdefendtheline.wdk158.BeforeVatutincouldcommencehiscounteroffensivenearProkhorovka,2ndSSPzClaunched

itsattackwiththesupportofLuftwaffe.FromHill241.6,LAHstartingatdawn,struggledforwardalongtheProkhorovkaroadwithDasReichprotectingitsrightflankagainstthe2ndTCfire.LAHhad initial successbutwas thenstoppedatHill252.2, just southeastofOktiabrskiStateFarm.Duringthisstruggle,the99thTBharassedtheGermansnearAndreevka.Tigerswerecalleduptosupport1stSSPzGRandwiththeirhelptheywereabletoforcethe2ndTCtoretreatuptheroad.Vatutingave2ndTCand2ndGTCtoRotmistrovtobolsterhis500plustankswhenheattacked2nd SS PzC in the morning. The two tank corps were to attack in the Vinogradovka andBelenikhinoareas.dgk169+.dgk184m.dgk222m.vzz218+.vzz1m.wwf111+.gnk283m.Duringthepredawnhoursontheeastflankof2ndSSPzC,the167thIDrelievedDasReich

fromflankdutysouthofKalinin.The167thIDtookoverasectionofthelinefromDasReichsothattheSScouldconcentratetheirstrengthandpenetratethestubbornresistancetothenortheast.Soviet artillery hidden in thewoodswould also fire on theLAH assault on the Stalinoe StateFarm and Hill 252.2 and the artillery had to be silenced as well.Das Reich’s panzers hadreturned from the Solotinka River assault and were resting at Ozerovski and would be acontributing factor to the advance as well. This would be the first major attempt to clear theStorozhevoeWoodsandtheGermanswereexpectingaviciousfight.DasReichstillexperiencedhard fighting against 2ndTC at Ivanovka, north ofKalinin but southwest of Prokhorovka. The167thID, in theirnewposition,wasbeingattackedbythe81stGRDand375thRDandhadto

start withdrawing to the south of Shopino. wdk156. dgr209m. hjj121m. dgr221m+. gnk284.gnk283m.vzz9m.OnthisSundaymorning,FMVasilevskyandLtGeneralS.P.IvanovarrivedatVatutin’sHQat

Oboyantosupervisethenextday’saction.Vasilevskywouldstaycloseto5thGTAwhileIvanovwouldmovefurthereasttoKorochatowatchover7thGA.dgk175.mhz322++.mhz329.hjj123m.The2ndPzGRontheeastflankandinchingitswaynorthward,wasattackedbytankscoming

fromIamki.Theengagementoccurredneartheanti-tankditchsouthofOktiabrski.TheLuftwaffeentered the battle by attacking the artillery on top of Hill 252.2. The 2nd PzGRwas able toadvancepast the several trenches to reach the foot of thehill.Thepanzerswere firing fromadistanceasthepioneersclearedlanesthroughtheminefieldsforthepanzerstoadvance.Asthelaneswerecleared,Peiper’shalftracksrolledforward,attackingthesouthernslope.Betweenthepanzers, motorized infantry and infantry, not to mention the aerial and artillery support, thedefenseonHill252.2wasfinallyweakeningwithitsdefendersbeginningtofallbacktotheOSF,though it would take several more hours before it was secured. It was one of the bloodiestengagementsofthecampaignbutthegrenadierscouldnotrestbecausetheOktiabrskiStateFarmnextdoorhadtobecapturedandthefightingtherewouldbetheequalofthehill.agl123.vzz9m.gnk283m.At0905hrsafteraheavyartillerybarrageplusairstrike,LAH’s2ndPzGRresumeditsdrive

towardProkhorovka.With thehelpofa fewTigers theLAH regiment reached thebaseofHill252.2 and the village of Lutovo, not far from the Oktiabrski State Farm and southwest ofProkhorovkaby1000hrs,butwasstoppedbystiffresistanceofthe26thGARdefendingthehill.dgk172.dgk184m.vzz218.vzz205.zrl232.At1115,40 tanksdriving from Iamkiand40 tanks fromPetrovkaattackedLAH positions at

StalinskoeStateFarmnearHill252.2.Aftertwohours,theattackwasrepulsedandtheSovietslost 40 tanks.Afterwards the remainderof the tanksplus elements of 31stTBof 29thTCand170thTBof18thTCattackedtheOktiabrskiStateFarmwhichhadjustbeeninfiltrated.vzz321.At0930hrs,tworegimentsofDasReich,supportedbynearly100panzersandassaultguns,

attacked the 2ndTC and elements of the 69thArmydefending the flank ofKomsomoletsStateFarm,southeastoftherailroadaboutthreemilessouthwestofProkhorovka.Otherelementsofthe2ndTCattacked thesouthflankofLAH in theVinogradovkaareaaboutsixmilessouthwestofProkhorovkabutitwasrepulsedbytheDeutschlandRegiment.wdk155+.TheSSTKwasstillclearingthesouthernbankofthePselRiver.Bymidmorningthegrenadiers

had captured the village ofVasilevkawhich had been defended by the 99thTB.The 99thTBretreatedtothesoutheastandranintoanLAHPzAbt.Theensuingbattlelastedintothenight.TheSSTKmadelittlegainsonthisday;itsonlysuccesswasthetakingofVasilevkabutVatutinwasalreadyplanningtotakeitback.ThevillagestothenorthofVasilevka,Prelestnoe,MikhailovkaandPetrovkawereallinSoviethandsandtheirartillerywouldgoafterbothSSTKandLAH inthemorning.ThebiggunswerestillsafelysecuredonHill252.4.TheSovietsweremakinggooduseofthousandsofanti-tankgunsinthissector,thecorridorthattheGermanshadtopassthrough;thereweremoregunspermileherethananywhereinthesalient.Fortherestoftheday,theSSwasdefendingitselfagainstconstantcounter-attacks.ThiswasnotagoodsignfortheGermans.gnk290+.gnk283m.

By1030hrsafter regrouping, the2ndPzGRofLAH attackedupHill252.2again.This timewith thehelpof sappers, thepanzersmade it across theantitankditchandstartedclimbing theslopeswhileGerman artillery bombed the crest and reverse slopes aswell as theOktiabrskiStateFarmwherealargeconcentrationofSovietartillerywasdeployed.TheLuftwaffereturnedandhitthehillandstatefarmaswell.Intheafternoon,theGermanassaultledbythepanzersofPeiper’sGroup finally gained traction andwere able tomove almost amile northward to thecrestofthehill.vzz217+.zrl232.Inthemorning,DasReich,withsupportofartillery,launchedanattackfromTeterevinoonthe

axis IvanovskiVyselok-Storozhevoe.Afterabitter fighta fewpanzersand infantry fought theirwayintotheoutskirtsofStorozhevoebutwerestoppedafterfightingforhoursattheedgeofthevillage.vzz243.vzz3m.vzz9m.Peiper’sbattalionlaunchedadrivefromthesouthernportionofHill252.2towardtheOSFand

as the formation was moving up the hill, the Luftwaffe flew by and accidently bombed theformation,damagingcouplepanzersincludingtheonethatPeiperwasin.Withoutapausefortheincident,PeiperchargedthehillwithMG42sblastingandcrestedthehillat1300hrsagainstthe287th GRR. Eventually, after repeated attacks and with the assistance of the rest of LAH, heenteredtheOktiabrskiStateFarmnextdoorby1400hrs.Thefightingcontinuedforawhilebutitwas finally “secured” andwaswhere he stayed for the night after repulsing a strong counter-attack and preparing for the big tank battle expected the following morning. LAH Grenadiersarrivedandtookcontrolofthestatefarm,clearingresistanceintheimmediatearea.AllthewhiletheLuftwaffe,insmallwavesof15to20planesevery20minutes,bombedthesector:Hill252.2,Hill252.4alittlefurthernorth,BarchevkaandtheOktiabrskiStateFarmwhichwasdefendedbythe26thGAR.The26thGARwas runningoutof ammoandhad to resort topickingupammofromthefallen.Afterdark,theartilleryofthe9thGADarrivedinsector.The23rdGAR,alsoof9th GAD, was deployed behind the 26th GAR in Prokhorovka as reserve. Even though theGermanshadcontrolofthefarm,theSovietshadnotfallenbackveryfarandwereexpectingtotake back the farm in the morning when the massive counter-attack began. fkk154+. vzz214.vzz218++.vzz229.vzz8m.gnk284.gnk283m.By early afternoon and while Peiper’s panzers and motorized infantry were attacking

OktiabrskiStateFarmfromthewestandsouth, the2ndPzRofLAH, ledbya fewTigers,wasattackingthefarmfromthenorthandeast,shatteringtheleftflankof287thRRandforcingittoretreattowardPrelestnoe.Afterovercomingtwotrenches,theTigerscontinuedforwardpastthefarmandenteredPetrovka,whichwasalsodefendedbyelementsof287thRR.TheSovietshadlostmanytanksonthisdaydefendingHill252.2andthenearbyOSFwhichworriedVatutin;thelossmeanttheiroffensivethefollowingdaywouldhavelesspunch.vzz224++*.vzz1m.vzz9m.gnk283m.dgk177+.SeeMaps18and23.DuetothefamousKurskMagneticAnomaly,agroupofYak-9sgotlostandfiveoftheplanes

hadtomakeemergencylandingswhentheyranoutofgas.Membersofthe31stTBofthe29thTC(5thGTA)complainedthattheyreceivednoairsupportbefore1300hrs.cbk81.LeadelementsoftheLAHadvancedontheOktiabrskiStateFarm(notfarfromHill252.2)but

hadtoretreatbacktoHill215.4fromheavyartilleryfireontheirfirstattempt.Infrontofthefarma tank trenchwasbuilt preventingpassage.Sapperswere calledup and after a shortwhile of

usingexplosivestofillinthetrench,LAHcontinuedtowardthefarm.Theywouldwaituntilmoreofthedivisionarrivedbeforetryingtotakeit.dgk174.TheSSTKexpandedtheirbridgeheadonthenorthernbankofthePselandreachedHill226.6.

ThedivisionalsoclearedSovietresistanceonthesouthbankthatwasattackingtheleftflankofLAH.ThevillageofKliuchiwas takenbutwhen reinforcements from95thGRD,supportedbyIvanov’s100thTB(31stTC)cameup,thedriveoftheSSTKwasstoppedandtheGermanshadtofighttokeepKliuchi.WhiletheSSTKhadcapturedpartofHill226.6,the290thGRRthwartedallattemptstocompletethecaptureofthehill.SSTKcapturedVasilevkaonthesouthbankofthePsel, forcing the99thTBback,but itwasunable todrive furtherwhenelementsof95thGRDcameuptosupportthe99thTB.TotherightofLAH,DasReichclearedIvanovskiiVyselokbutcould not reach Vinogradovka in the valley beyond. dgk176+. dgr172m. dgk222m. vzz227+.vzz9m.gnk283m.gnk312m.As the LAH of 2nd SS PzC advanced up the Prokhorovka road, it bumped into the new

defensivepositionofthe9thGADnearOktiabrskiStateFarm,ashortwaywestofProkhorovka.Sincelatethepreviousnight, the9thGADhadhastilymovedintodefensesat thefarmthathadbeen started by 183rd RD along the line south of Prokhorovka, but had not completed itsdispositionwhen theLAH attacked next morning. Still, the artillery fire was so fierce in thissectorfromallthegunsthatweredeployedacrossthecorridorthatLAHhadtofallbacktothereverseslopesofHill215.4 to regroup.ThedefensesonHill252.2and thevillageofLutovo,alsosouthofProkhorovka,werebeingshelledasthepanzersapproached.Elementsofthe95thGRDdefendingHill252.2hadtofallbackasLAH’s60panzerscrestedtheHill.Hill252.2waslessthanamilesouthwestofProkhorovka.TheGermanswereadvancingonsuchanarrowfrontandwerecreatingamini-salientwhichtheenemymighttrytocut.LutovowasmidwaybetweenHill 252.2 and Prokhorovka. dgk171++. dgk184m. snk81. vzz218+. vzz320. lck336. nzk95.wwf115.wdk155.The2ndSSPzCwouldrecorddestroying125Soviettanksthatday,intheirdesperatestruggle

tocaptureProkhorovka.ItwasbeingsupportedbytheLuftwaffeasitmadeitswaynorthtowardProkhorovka.TheSSTK struggled toexpand itsbridgeheadwhichwasanchoredonHill226.6nearthenorthernbankofthePselRiver,whiletheLAHdroveforwardfromHill241.6alongbothsidesofProkhorovkaroadwhichwasdefendedbythe2ndTC’s169thTB.DasReichwasstillprotecting LAH’s right flank. Two hour’s later, the LAH had traveled two miles against stiffartilleryfirebeforebeingstoppedinfrontofHill252.2,justsoutheastofOktiabrskiStateFarmand north of Iamki.LAH was down to 90 AFVs. The Soviets also had a good tank recoverysystemandsomeofthetanksthatcouldbereachedonthebattlefieldwererecoveredandrepairedorsalvaged.dgk178.dgk169+.dgk184m.vzz1m.gnk312m.Reactingtothelatestbattleaction,Haussersubmitedneworderstohiscommanders.Priess’s

SSTKhad toexpand itsbridgeheadnorthof thePsel, completeclearingHill226.6andprotectLAH’sflankasitmovedonProkhorovka.Kruger’sDasReich,advancingonLAH’sright,wouldhave to clear Storozhevoe and capture Vinogradovka before moving on to help LAH takeProkhorovka. The LAH would move past Storozhevoe, capture Iamki before moving onProkhorovka.ThekeytothesuccessoftheplanwasSSTKquicklycapturingHill252.4,whichhadalargeconcentrationofartillery,andthesubsequentprotectionofLAH’sleftflank.Without

this,therewaslittlechanceforsuccess.HausserbroughtupeverygunhecouldtocoverSSTK’sadvance.Hill252.2wassouthwestofProkhorovkaandwestof IamkiwhilenearbyHill252.4was further north and near Beregovoe II. See Map 18. mhz320+. vzz218. vzz1m. vzz9m.gnk283m.gnk312m.WhilefightinginthenorthwestcorneroftheStorozhevoewoods,asmallcontingentofSoviets

were able to manuever behind LAH’s 1st PzGR and were threatening to domuch damage. Acoupleoftheassaultgunssupportingthegrenadiersactedquickly,cuttingbackandengagingtheenemy,forcingthemtofallbackwhilegrenadierswerebroughtuptocovertheirflankbetter.By1700hrsmuchofthelargewoodswereinGermanhands.Thegrenadiersthenmovedtowardthetown of Storozhevoe but the shelling coming from nearby Leski, Vinogradovka and Pravorotquicklystoppedtheadvanceandthe1stPzGRhadtofallbacktothesafetyofthewoods.Alittlefurthersouth,DasReich reachedtherailroad,capturing thewoods, ravineandhillsoutheastofIvanovskiVyselok.zrl232+.zow158.At 1330 hrs, the 26th GAR and the 169th TB counter-attacked toward Hill 252.2 and the

village ofLutovo, southwest of Prokhorovka, against 2ndPzGRofLAH. The 99thTB, havingbeenforcedoutofVasilevkabySSTK, joinedtheattackonHill252.2.Whilestillengagedthatnight,ColLiakhov’s95thGRDshiftedforcesandjoinedthebattle.AdditionalpanzersandplaneswerecalledupandoverpoweredtheSovietforcesbetweentheboundaryof the95thGRDand9th GAD, making them fall back to the west. The Germans were now only a mile fromProkhorovka.Bytheendoftheday,theLAHhadsmashedthe2ndTCandisolated99thTBinthePselvalleyafterdrivingitoutofthevillageofVasilevka.The29thTCand18thTCweresettingupdefensesalongtheforestbordernearStorozhevoefortheexpectedadvancethefollowingdaybythe2ndSSPzC.ThesmokeandsoundsofbattleattheKomsomoletsStateFarmjusttwomilesto the rightwere present.Even before the fighting died down for the night, theGermanswerebringing guns and rocket launchers closer to the line; they were determined to take theirobjectivesthenextdayandtheymighthaveif5thGAandespecially5thGTAhadnotarrivedinsector and begun settling into defensive positions. Vatutin was feeling the pressure that theGermanswereexertingandfeltcompelledtohavehistwonewarmiesattackinthemorning.Itispossible,evenprobable,thatbetterresultscouldhaveresultedifthetwonewarmieshadstayeddefensivebehindthisthirddefensebeltandworndowntheenemy.WithmanyfewerTigersandpanzersingeneralandfewershocktroops,theGermanassaultforce,whilestilleffective,didnothave the punch that it had had the first fewdays,whichmeant the twonewarmies had a realchanceofstoppingtheSSwithoutasuicidalattack.TheSSobjectivesforthenextdayincludedProkhorovka,Hill252.4,Hill236.7andallthegrounduptotheKarashevka-Prokhorovkaroad.SeeMap8.dgk173++.dgk184m.vzz218+.cbk75.vzz202.wwf118.zrl233.dgk179.At1300hrs, theSoviets launchedasmallattackfromeastofTeterevinoNorth,skirtingDas

Reich andheadingnorthwest toward1stPzGRofLAH,whichwasdeployed frombetween anarea north of Storozhevoe and Hill 252.2. Discovering the Soviet assault force, elements ofDeutschlandRegimentofDasReichattackedtheSovietflank.AfteraninitialGermansurge,theSovietsregroupedandthenrepulsedtheattackandbydarktheDeutschlandwasfallingback.BytheendofthedayDasReichhad88workingpanzersand58PakGuns.LAHreportedhaving60panzersand30assaultguns.The2ndPzGRofLAHalsoreporteddestroying21tanksand45guns

plus capturing 320 POWs. The regiment also reported 21 killed and 203 wounded. gnk292.gnk283m.zrl233+.gnk292.gnk283m.Afterfivehoursoffighting,additionalpanzersarrivedatHill252.2andby1330hrs,LtCol

Kashpersky’s26thGARwasbeingforcedoffthehillandwasretreatingtothenorthtotheOSF.Tostop this retreat,Vatutin sent someof the tanks from18thTC to strike the right flankof theGerman assault and to block the panzers from reaching the Oktiabrski State Farm. The LAHquickly consolidated their gains andprepared tomoveoff the hill andhead for theOktiabrskiState Farm to the northwest, whichwas also heavily defended by artillery.When it was firstthoughtthehillwouldbecaptured,artillerywasimmediatelysenttowardthehill.Counter-attackswereexpectedandHausserdidnotwanttolosethehillandfightagaintoregainit.Thethoughtofsuchaneventsickenedhim.Thecounterattackslastedintotheevening.dgk172.dgk184m.vzz218.vzz205.zrl233.At1410hrs,theLAHwasfinallyoverpoweringthedefendersofHill252.2butsinceSSTKand

DasReichwerelaggingbehind,theLAHwouldsoonhavetostoptheiradvanceintothecorridorfor fear of isolation. However, with themomentum of LAH, OSFwould be attacked that dayregardlessoftheconsequences.WithsomuchSovietartilleryonHill252.4,takingProkhorovkawouldbedifficult;clearingthehillfirstwasnecessarybutHausser,seeingthemodestadvanceofSSTKandDasReich, did notwantLAH extending itself toHill 252.4 andgetting cut off.TheattackonHill252.4wouldhavetobeforthefollowingdayafterSSTKmadefurthergains,butVatutinwouldhaveotherideasandthe5thGTAwouldattackinthemorning.WhilethebulkofLAHwerefightingintheHill252.2-Hill245.8area, the1stPzGRofLAH traveled through thewoodsnorthofStorozhevoeonamoredirectroutetoProkhorovka.vzz226.vzz1m.vzz9m.OnthePselRiver,itwasafrustratingdayforSSTK.Onlypartofthedivisionwasonthenorth

side and the remainder of the division was on the south side waiting for the bridge to becompleted.Itwasreadyat1420hrsbutbythenitwasraininghardandthegroundwasmuddy.Thedivisionhad tobesatisfiedby justcrossing theriverandpreparing thebridgeheadfor thepanzersandartillerythatwouldbecomingoverearlynextmorningtoparticipatewiththerestofthedivisioninexpandingthebridgehead.fkk155.fkk320m.While theLAH was slowly advancing fromHill 241.6 towardHill 252.2 and theOSF, the

SSTK was expanding its bridgehead on the northern bank of the Psel. SSTK crossed a Pseltributary, gained a foothold on Hill 226.6 and advanced toward the villages of Kliuchi andVeselyitothewestofHill226.6butwerestoppedatKliuchiwhenthe284thGRRof95thGRD,supportedbythe100thTBmoveduptoengage.The290thGRRwerebeingpushedoffthehillbutwithnewreservesweretryingtoretakeit.TheLuftwaffemadeitaprioritytosupportthe2ndSSPzConthisday,especiallytheSSTK.InorderfortheLAHtotakeProkhorovka,theSSTKhadtoadvancenorthwardtogaincontrolofHill252.4andthePselRiverintheareaofthehill.HothandHausserweregivingthedivisionasmuchhelpastheycouldtoaccomplishthiskeyjob.The55thWerferRegimentwasalsomoveduptoKSFtosupporttheassaultofOSF.SeeMap18.At1450hrs,HausserinformedHoththattheheavybridgesoverthePselwerecompletedbut

thepanzersandheavyequipmentofSSTKwouldnotbecrossinguntilnextmorning. Itwas toolateinthedaytobeginoperationsanditwasnotsmarttosendpanzersacrosstoabridgeheadthatwasnotfullysecure.Priesswasalsolowonfuelandtobeginadifficultassaultwiththechance

ofrunningoutoffuelwassuicidal.Thefuelwouldarriveinthemorning.ThesouthernbanksofthePselforasmuchas500yardswerenormallysoftbuttherecentheavyraincausedthegroundtobeextremelymuddy,makingitdifficultforpanzer,truckandmantonegotiate.ItwasnotagooddayforSSTKbecauseof thedelayof theengineers,arrivingso late tocomplete thebridges. Italsogavethe5thGAand5thGTAtimetopreparefortheirmajoroffensive.ItmayhavebeenawasteddayforSSTKbutitwascostly,thedivisionexperienced75deadand375wounded.Bytheendoftheday,SSTKhad94workingpanzers,includingtenTigers.Italsohad21assaultguns.gnk296+.MajGeneralWischofLAHmovedhisHQagain; this time itwaswithin the town limits of

LuchkiNorth.HaussercalledWischathisnewHQandpersuadedhimtopointallhisartilleryonHill 226.6 next morning to assist SSTK in securing the hill and the surrounding area. zrl233.dgk177.VonMansteinorderedthe2ndSSPzCtocontinuetowardProkhorovkabuttoshiftoffthemain

road in order to avoid the heavy defenses blocking them. LAH would travel through theKomsomolets State Farm and along the railroad line to reach Prokhorovka.Once the hillwassecured, SSTK would attempt traveling along both banks of the Psel River to reach theirobjectivesofShipyandKartashevkaandHill252.4.Thethirdregimentofthe167thIDwasstilladvancingtoLuchkitofreeupelementsofDasReich,inorderforthegrenadierstotakepartinthedrivenorthontheeastside.WhilethemainactionwasnearProkhorovkaHothwastryingtostablizehiswestflankfor tomorrow’soffensiveaswell.Ontheextremewesternboundary, the52ndICwasattemptingtoclearthe90thGRDfromtheRakovoarea,justnorthofthePenaRivertorelievethepressureoff3rdPzDandGDsotheycouldfocusondrivingnorth.Theweatherhadcleared from the previous night and conditions were improving for the German assault. TheLuftwaffewasexpectedtoassistbutshortlyafterdaybreakheavyrainscame,turningtheroadstomud andmaking it difficult to fly. Toward the afternoon theweather did improve, still partlycloudywithstrongwindsbuttheplanesstartedflyingtosupportthegroundforces.InadditiontothefightingattheOktiabrskiStateFarmtheLAHadvancedalongatwomilefront

between nearby Iamki State Farm andAndreevkawith the support of assault guns and planes,tryingtodriveawedgebetweenthe95thGRDandthe9thGADnearPrelestnoeandthesouthernedgeofPetrovka toclear theentrance to thecorridor.With theStateFarmfallingaround1700hrs, the Soviets pulled back to the southwestern slopes of Hill 252.4, less than two milesnorthwestofProkhorovka.TheadvancethatdayofLAHthatsmashedthedefensesof2ndTCandisolatedits99thTBinthePselvalleyalsodroveawedgebetween95thGRDand9thGAD.ThiscreatedasalienttowardProkhorovkathatwasnotduplicatedbyDasReich,SSTKor48thPzCwhichmeantLAH’sflankswereexposed.WhentheLAHcapturedtheOSF,itquicklyenhanceditsalready good defenses, including laying mines and bringing up more artillery to assist in thefollowingday’s attempt to takeProkhorovka.Hill 241.6,Hill 242.5 andHill 231.3were alsofortified.TheSSTKwaslateincrossingthePselRiveratPetrovkaandadvancingonHill252.4tosilencethegunstherethatwouldgiveLAHachancetotakeProkhorovka.DasReich,on theothersideofLAHwasalsohavingtroubleinprovidingprotection.dgk174+.dgk184m.vzz320+.vzz325.vzz9m.lck336.gnk283m.gnk292.After a fierce fight, 2nd PzGR of LAH captured Hill 252.2 on the western side of the

Prokhorovkacorridor.WithProkhorovkaonlyamiletotheeast,Hill252.2wasanexcellentOP,beingabletolookintothevillage.Peiper’sbattalionwasthenorderedtodefendthehillagainstcounter-attacks throughout the night while the rest of the division moved back because of itsexposed flanks. Lt Col Peiperwas isolated afterLAH retreated for the night. Lt Ribbentrop’spanzershadbackedoffsouthofthehill.TheclosestfriendlywasSSTKatVasilevka,aboutthreemilestothesouthwest.Tothesoutheast,DasReichwastwomilesaway,deployednorthoftheStorozhevoewoodsbutcompletelytieddowntoitssectorandunabletoassistSSTKiftheneedarose.SotheGermansdidnothaveastrongpresenceattheentranceofthecorridortostartthenext morning. Though there were no counter-attacks, Peiper could hear Soviet tanks movingcloser throughout the night within the three mile corridor from the Psel River in the west toProkhorovkatotheeast.HeknewanattackwascominginthemorningandtriedtopreparehismenbuttheycouldneverbepreparedfortheSoviettidalwavethatwouldbeunleashedshortlyafter daybreak.The corridorwas fairly flat fertile ground that sawmanywheat and sunflowerfieldsgrowing.Itwas throughthiscorridor thathundredsofRotmistrov’s tankswouldadvancethenextmorning.gnk315+.cbk76.sgf347.cbk12m.zrl232.EventhoughtwolightbridgeshadbeencompletedacrossthePselRivernearBogoroditskoe,

travelacross thembecameimpossible. Ithadrainedsomuch in the last fewdays that theroadleading up to the bridge was so deep in mud that not even panzers could navigate it. PriessinformedHausseroftheroadconditionsat1420hrs.Withtherainandcloudcover,airsupportwas also canceled.Bothgenerals agreed that themajor assault northof the riverwouldbeon7/12.PriessagreedwithHausser’sanalysisthatthefollowingdaywouldbethelastdayforSSTKtoexpandthebridgeheadandmovethedivisionover.After7/12theSovietreinforcementswouldmakecrossingtheriverimpossible.zow158+.By1700hrs,thelineheldbytheLAHranfromStorozhevoetothenearbyforest(1stPzGR)to

northwestofHill252.2 (2ndPzGR) to thehillwestofOktiabrskiStateFarm (1stPzR)and itwouldnotchangemuchbytheendoftheday.dgk177.dgk184m.zow158.At1700hrs,whilethemainforceofSSTKwasdrivingtowardPetrovka,asmallcombatgroup

with a dozen panzerswas forcing the Psel furtherwest and trying to captureKrasnyiOktiabrwhichwasdefendedby290thGRD.Thediversionfailedandthe290thGRDpushedtheSSTKsouthoftheriver.Atthesametimesouthoftheriver,withSSTKattackingfromitsrightflankandLAH fromits left flank, theSSTKpenetrated the linedefendedbyLtColMalov’s99thTBandwasabletofightitswayintoVasilevka.The99thTBregroupedandthencounteredandwasabletopushSSTK out ofVasilevka.During this engagement the 99thTB’sCO,LtColMalov,waskilledinaction.Afterregroupingthemselves,theGermanslaunchedanotherattackandwereabletopenetrate the left sideof the line,hitting the287thGRRhardandcausing them to fallback.Withthe287thGRRof95thGRDfallingback,itexposedtheflankof99thTBandallowedSSTKtoencircleelementsofthe99thandtoreachPetrovka.The99thTBfoughtthroughouttheentirenight tosaveitself.Totheeast, theLAH fellbackalsobutafter regroupingwasable to finallytakeOktiabrskiStateFarmbytheevening.vzz235.vzz231.vzz1m.vzz8m+.dgk174.At1700hrs,the2ndTCand2ndGTCcameunderthecontrolof5thGTA.Withover200tanks

thatthesetwocorpshad,Rotmistrovnowhadagrosstotalof931tanks:581T34s,314T70sandafewSUs.Therewouldbe707tanksreadytolaunchinthemorning.558tankswouldbeinfirst

echelon,spreadalonganarrowfivemilefront,whiletheremainderwouldbeinreserve.Therewerealsoalittleover100tanksthatbrokedownintransitthatwouldbemadeavailableinthenexttwoweeks.The18thTCwoulddrivebetweenthePselRivertotheeastofPrelestnoeandHill 241.6while the 29thTCwould launchbetweenHill 241.6 toStorozhevoe.The5thGTRwouldbe in reserve.When theGermansgainedground thepreviousday, theSoviet tankcorpshadtostartalittlefurtherbackbutstillinthisgeneralarea.TheplanwouldbefortheSoviets’pincerstomeetintheLuchkiNorthandIakovlevoarea.VatutinwasplacingextremepressureonRotmistrov’sassaultinthemorningtostoptheGermanassaultthentosplitandencirclealargeportionof4thPzA.WhentheGermansreachedHill241.6 thatday, theplanhad tochange; theboundarylinebecametheOktiabrskiStateFarmandbecauseof the terrain, the18thTC’sfrontnarrowedtolessthantwomiles.Theplanandthehopewastooambitiousandhadlittlechanceofcompletesuccess.vzz277++.With Burdeiny’s 2ndGTC now under the operational control of 5thGTA, Rotmistrov gave

Burdeinyhisordersforthemajoroffensiveinthemorning.The4thGTBwascurrentlyengagednorth of Belenikhino and the 25th GTB was fighting near Storozhevoe. Both units started todisengagedandmovebacktoprepare.The26thGTBwasinreserveatShakhovobutmovedoutafter dark andwould be ready to attack east ofVinogradovka bymorning.Nearby, additionalartillerywasmovedtoHill252.4tosupportthe95thGRD’s287thGRRinthePetrovkaareainthemorning.The26thGTBwouldhaveitsorderschangedandwouldnotparticipateintheattackagainstDasReich.RotmistrovwouldsenditsouthtowardtheDonetsintheRyndinkasectortoblock3rdPzCfromlinkingupwithDasReich.vzz235.vzz10m.vzz3m.dgk193.At1900hours,Rotmistrovfinishedhisrevisedattackplansforthe5thGTAandthe5thGAfor

thefollowingday.WiththeGermansapproachingProkhorovka,theSovietassaultwouldbeledbythe29thTCand18thTCintheProkhorovka-BelenikhinoareaandwouldtravelalongsidetheforestadjacenttoStorozhevoe.Furtherwestthe18thTCwouldparallelthePselRiver.TheleadunitsofLAHbeatRotmistrovtohislaunchareasthatdayandwouldhavetostartfurthernorth,placing his tanks at a great disadvantage. The whole Soviet attack plan had to be revised.dgk175+.dgk168+.dgk184m.dgk222m.vzz11m.EvenafterLAHhadtakentheOktiabrskiStateFarm,theresistanceremainedfierceasthe29th

TChadbeendeployed just to thenorthof thefarmfor itsassault in themorning.TheGermanscouldgonofurtherandwentdefensive.lck335.vzz9m.GeneralKrugerofDasReichcompletedmovinghisHQtothewoodseastofLuchkiNorthby

1745 hrs. Soon after arriving, he received the daily action report from his staff. The reportshowedthedivisionhad69workingpanzersand27assaultgunsavailableforthestartofthebigoffensiveinthemorning.zow160+.TheLAHhadmadesomedifficultprogressthatdaybytakingHill252.2andthenearbyOSF

butby1900hrs,theday’sfightinghadexpired.TheprimaryeffortbyLAHhadbeencenteredonthefarmbuttheflankingareaswerestillinSoviethands.IfLAHwasnotcarefulorprepared,thissalientcoulddisappearinaflashaswellasalargepartofthedivision.Inotherwords,LAHhadcarved out amini-salient with its sides exposed, soHausser orderedLAH not to attempt anyfurtheradvancementand insteadordered thedivision togodefensiveand toprotect itself fromcounter-attacksduringthenightandearlynextmorning.Trenchesweredugandartillerybrought

up.Thissalientsplitthe95thGRDand9thGAD’sdefenselineintwoandisolatedthe99thTBof2ndTCwithitsotherbrigadestotheeast;thiswasahugeadvantagetotheGermansifthesalientcouldbeheld.Kashpers’s26thGARof9thGADhadbeen split aswell andnowmost of theregimentwasontheeastsideofOSFrunningeasttoIamkisouthofProkhorovka.The28thGARandthe23rdGARweredeploredbehind26thGARinthesecondandthirdtrenchesrespectively.Behindtheregimentswasthe57thGTRwithits21KV1sandantitankguns.wwf116+.By resuming its attackalong the road toProkhorovkaby0500hrs, theLAH hadmade some

progresstodaybutsinceSSTKandDasReichwerestruggling,itfounditsflanks,inadditiontothe mini-salient in the center, exposed. Consequently, Maj GeneralWisch decided to halt theadvanceandgodefensiveuntiltheotherdivisionscaughtup.mhz319.vzz218.lck332++.cbk76.zrl233.In the early evening, around 1900 hrs, Marshal Vasilevsky visited General Rotmistrov to

receiveasituationreportandfoundthattheGermanswerefurtheralongthanexpected,spoilingthe original attack plan. Vasilevsky called Stalin with the bad news and the dictator becameconcernedandangry.VasilevskyorderedRotmistrovtorunanotherreconbeforeassemblinghistroopstothestartpoint.Whilethefirstrevisionof18thTC’sattackplanofassaultingnexttothePselRiverremainedthesame,duetothesmallerassemblyareatheattackaxisforthe29thTCwasexpandedtoincludenotonlydrivingdowntheProkhorovkaroadtowardTeterevinoNorth,retakingOSF andHill 252.2 but also to advance north of the Storozhevoewoods toward theKomsomoletsStateFarm.Potentially thiswasabetterplan,whichwouldgive the29thgreaterfreedomofmovementaswellasputtingpressureonseveralkeypoints.Thischangetothenorthinthelaunchpointwouldhaveadevastatingeffectonthefollowingday’soffensivefor5thGTA.VatutinwaspressingRotmistrovtoattackbefore3rdPzCcouldlinkupwithDasReich.HedidconsidertwootheralternativeplansforRotmistrov’soffensivebutrejectedtheminfavorofthe“corridor”route.ThefirstalternativeconsideredattackingSSTKnearHill226.6,pushing themback to the southern banks and then driving on Iakovlevo. It was rejected because of thedifficultiesassociatedwithcrossingtheriveranditsborderingswampland.Theotherattackroutewasin69thArmysectorontheShakhovo-Iakovlevoaxis.WithoutgivingmuchofanexplanationVatutinrejectedthisroutealso.Iseriouslywonderwhatwouldhavehappenedifboth5thGAand5th GTA had stayed defensive on that fateful 7/12 instead of attacking from a compromisedposition. The farther north the 4th PzA drove, the thinner their flank defenses became and thelongerSoviet resistanceworedown theGermanarmywithin the thirddefensivebelt, themoreproductive the Soviet counter-attack should have been when it occurred. vzz228. wwf118+.zro208.pck79+.dgk175+.vzz241.dgk179.vzz271.MarshalVasilevsky,afterstudyingthesituationreport,orderedRotmistrovtosendthe18thTC

toPetrovkatoassistthe9thGAD.TheGermanshadalreadystoppedtheiradvanceforthenightinthis sector and would not resume it until near daybreak. However, when Vasilevsky wasinspectingthedefenseswithRotmistrovinanotherarea,theyranintopanzersthatwerechargingaheadwhichshockedbothofficers.Rotmistrovhadtoredeployhistanksfurthernorthasalaunchpointforthemorningoffensive.MajGeneralI.I.Popovof33rdGRCorderedthe9thGADandthe95thGRDnottowaitfordawnandtoattacktheGermansalientduringpredawnhours.TheattackwaslaunchedinthedirectionoftheOktiabrskiStateFarmbutitfailedagainstthestrong

defensestheGermanshaderected.Underthisnoiseofthisbattle,Rotmistrovmovedhistankstotheirnewstartpositions.vzz241+.lck337+.At 1920hrs, and despite heavy rains andmuddy terrain, an armored combat group attacked

alongthesouthernbanksofthePsel,drovethroughMikhailovkaandattackedHill252.2.ItwasalastminuteattempttoweakentheSovietlinewithinthecorridorbeforethebigoffensivebeganinthemorning.DuringthisadvancetheGermansmetwiththegreatestresistancefromthe233rdARsouthofPetrovka.Though takingcasualties, theGermanspushed theartillery regimentnorthofPetrovka. The 48th RC under Rogozny, 2nd TC and 2nd GTC prepared to counter-attack andretakethehill.AdditionalartillerywasmovedtothetopofHill252.4.Otherredeploymentsweretakingplaceaswell,aspartofmajoroffensivethatwouldstartinthemorning.The4thGTBwasmoved along the rail line north of Belenikhino while the 25th GTB was attacking towardStorozhevoe and theStalinskoeiStateFarm.The26thGTBwasmoving fromShakhovo to thewoodseastofVinogradovka.Elementsofthe95thGRDweresenttotheareanorthofOktiabrskiStateFarmtobolsterthe287GRR.Thediscoverybythe2ndPzGRofLAHofthebuildupnorthofOktiabrskiStateFarmcausedtheGermanstoabandonPetrovka.Withthereinforcementsnorthof Oktiabrski State Farm, theLAH stayed at the farm, developing defenses and disrupting theattackplansof5thGTAforthemorning.vzz234.vzz9m.Inaddtiontotheordersgivento5thGTAand9thGADtoattackthenortheastquadrantof4th

PzAtomorrowat0830hrs,Vatutinalsoorderedthefollowing-the52rdMRBandelementsofthe9thGADwouldsupportShumilov’s7thGA’s49thRC(73rdGRD,270thRDand111thRD)inanattacktostopKempf’sforceseastofRazumnoeinthemorningandtopreventKempffromjoiningupwith2ndSSPzC.Neithercommanderwantedafrontalattackbutthe2ndSSPzCweregettingtooclosetothePselandProkhorovkatodoanythingelse.OtherelementsofZhadov’s5thGAweretoattack48thPzCandpreventthemfromcrossingthePselRiverorsendingtroopstohelptheSS.dgk179+*.dgk184m.vzz200.vzz8m.dgr39m.Atnight,HausserorderedtheHill226.6areaandallalongtheSSlinetobefullysecuredby

morningandthatextrasentriesweretobepostedduringthenighttopreventsurprises.DasReichreceivedspeciala incentivetoattackearly, tocompletelyseizeStorozhevoeandVinogradovkaandstrikeBelenikhinowhileprotectingLAH’sleftflank.DasReich’sDeutschlandRegimentwasable tocapture IvanovskiVyselokbut failed to reachVinogradovka.The2ndSSPzCrecorded125Soviettanksdestroyedtoday.TheGermanshadinflictedheavycasualtiesontheSoviets-thesmashingof2ndTC,whichwastoplayanimportantpartinRotmistrov’sassaultnextmorning,was especially destructive. SeeMap 18. dgk177+. dgk184m. dgr172m. dgk222m. mhz317++.vzz227.Bynightfall,leadelementsofLAHenteredthevillageofStorozhevoebuthadtospendtherest

of the night clearing Soviet resistance street by street as well as the nearbywoods. TheDasReich was unable to keep upwithLAH’s advance, thus exposingLAH’s right flank to attack.LAH’s advancehad inflictedheavy losseson2ndTCaswell as isolating99thTB in thePselvalleyandthreateningtheseparationof9thGAD.Thelossesto2ndTConthisdaywouldhaveaneffectonthebigtankengagementofthenextfewdays.dgk174+.dgk184m.mhz317+.wwf116.The tank battle near Prokhorovka would see 294 panzers from 2nd SS PzC including 26

capturedT34splusKempf’s135panzers,iftheycouldgetthereintime.The5thGTAdeployed

642tanksand30SPgunsforanumericaladvantageof3to2,thoughlessthan500tankswouldbeinfirstechelon.Theratiowouldbe2to1ifKempfdidnotarriveontime.Thisdidnotincludetanks thatwerenot targetedfor thiscampaign.The5thGTAalsohad40,000mentoadd to theoffensive. The LAH, which was to take the brunt of 5th GTA’s assault, had only 70 workingpanzersandwas theweakestof the threeSSdivisions.Between the1stTAand5thGTA, theywould have 1,000 tanks going up against the entire 2nd SS PzC and 48th PzC from betweenKrugliktothebendofthePselRivertoProkhorovkatoBelenikhino,southofProkhorovka.Itwasadistanceofabouttenmilesandmuchofitwasrollinghills.ThelargestofthetankbattleswouldbebetweenLAHand18thTCand29thTC,andwouldbeheldbetweenthebendofthePselRiverand theProkhorovka rail line.Vatutinadded the2ndTCand2ndGTC,plusotherunits, to5thGTAforthebigassaultnextmorning.Zhadov’s5thGAwasalsotocrossthePselRiveranddrivethe Germans back. dgk160**+. dgk169. dgk184m. gjz186. mhz330. fkk155. vzz9m. vzz11m.dgk287.rc205.vzz264.Atnight,the1694thAnti-aircraftArtilleryRegimentwasredeployedtotheeasternbankofthe

Psel River near Vyshniaia Olshanka, northeast of Hill 226.6 to help defend against the SSTKcrossingtheriverandjoiningupwithLAH.vzz274.vzz9m.dgk213m.At2215hrs,Zhadovbroughtuphis6thGADto theSredniaiaOlshanka-Hill243.5-Ostrenki

line.Vatutinneededheavyreservesashisfirstechelonwasgreatlyweakenedandnearcollapse.The 52nd GRD had only 3,300 men and the 10th TC’s 11th MRB had only 1,400 men. Thehealthiestdivisioninthesectorwas95thGRDwhichhad8,700menandwasinsecondechelonbetweenVeselyiandKluichi.vzz383*.vzz9m.Atnight,elementsoftheLAH infiltratedthewoodsjustnortheastofStorozhevoeandbrought

upanti-tankguns, settinganambush for thenextday.ColVolodin’s25thTBandCaptLunev’s1446thARhadassembledinIamkiandtheirrouteofattackforthenextmorningwouldtakethemintothistrap.Theinfantryofthe25thMRBwouldfollowbehindthetanksbuttheywereexpectedtofallbehindandunabletoprotectthetanks.vzz332+.vzz9m.dgk191.At2000hrsasmallcontingentofLAHandafewsupportingpanzersbrokethroughthelineat

OSKandheadedforProkhorovka.By2200hrs,thisforcebrokethroughtheouterdefensesofthevillageheldby183rdRDandheadedfortheinnerring.Theywerestoppedbythe23rdGARandthe28thGARjust500yardsfromtheoutskirtsofProkhorovkaandamilefromthebrickfactorylocatedinsidethevillage,buttheincursionwaspushedbackbyadesperatecounter-attacknearHill 252.2. The LAH had originally launched that day from Hill 252.2 and had made someimportant gains but it was decided by 2400 hrs that their position was too exposed andsubsequentlysomeunitsfellbacktothetrenchesoneithersideofHill252.2,negatingmostofthegainsmade.Workingthroughmuchofthenight,theGermansenhancedthetrenchsystemnearthehill as well as near the villages of Prelestnoe, Mikhailovka and Andreevka (SSTK). Thesedefensiveactionswouldturnouttobewise,foritwasintheseareaswherethe18thTCand29thTCwouldattackinthemorning.Atthesametime,thefarwesternflankoftheSSalsosloweditsadvanceandsettleddownintheKrasnyiOktiabr-KozlovkaareatoprepareforthefinalpushtotakeProkhorovkathenextmorning.dgr222.dgr93m.vzz236+.vzz238++.vzz9m.Afterlearningthe2ndSSPzChadcapturedKomsomoletsStateFarmandIvanovskiVyselok,

Burdeinyorderedthe755thDAB,withthenew85mmAAguns,tosupportthelineonthenearby

highgroundtokeepVinogradovkaandStorozhevoefromfalling.vzz243.vzz9m.vzz3m.During the day, fierce fighting occurred east of the Storozhevoe woods, near and on the

approaches to theStalinskoeBranchof theOktiabrskiStateFarmwhichstraddled the rail lineandwas defended by the 227thRRof 183rdRD.With the help of the 169thTB and the 58thMRB, the 183rd RD was able to keep the Germans from gaining much ground, though theStalinskoe State Farm was captured by LAH and the 169th TB was nearly encircled nearStorozhevoe by Das Reich. At 2030 hrs, Burdeiny ordered the 25th GTB to deploy nearStorozhevoetoprotectthe169thTBandtopreventanyfurtherpenetrationbytheGermans.WhentheKomsomoletsStateFarmfell,Burdeinyalsosent the755thDABfromShakhovo to thehillonemileeastofVinogradovka,tocontainanyfurtherbreakout.Shortlyafterarrivinginsector,theGermansattackedtowardVinogradovkabutafterabrief,uglyfighthadtopullback.Bytheendoftheday,1stPzGRwasknockingontheedgeofStorozhevoeitswoodsandtheProkhorovkaroad,while2ndPzGRheldfromtheroadtojustnorthwestofHill252.2and1stPzRheldOktiabrskiStateFarm.vzz242+.vzz9m.dgk177.InadditiontoRotmistrov’smultipleprongcounterstrikeagainstthe2ndSSPzC,thetanksof1st

TAwere toattack thebounday linebetweenGD and the11thPzD in theKalinovka sector, theareaaroundtheKubaossovskigorgeuptoHill258.5areaandthendriveintotheinteriorandjoinup with 5th GTA along the Krasnaia Poliana- Iakovlevo line. The 5th GMC, stationed atPriznachnoe east of Prokhorovka, was in reserve and would be used to exploit the firstpenetration and then head in the direction ofLuchki andPogorelovka.The primary tank corpswouldoccupiedjump-offpointsalongthePrelestnoe,StorozhevoeandMaloeIablonovolinebymidnightleadinginto7/12.Withthefightingeasingonthisday,positionsdidnotmovemuchafterdark.dgr223+.dgr209m.fkk273.zzz101m.Afterdark,the9thGADlaunchedacounter-attackfromPetrovkatowardtheOktiabrskiState

Farmatthesametimeasthe95thGRDdrovessouthtoeliminatetheSSTKbridgeheadnorthofthePselRiver.Bothdivisionsfailedandhadtofallbacktotheirstartpositionsbydaybreakof7/12.Vatutinwastryingtomovethelinetoimprovethelaunchpointfor5thGTAinthemorning.vzz323.vzz467.vzz9m.vzz11m.At2250hrs,Haussertransmittedrevisedorderscontainingminorchangestoreflectthelatest

battlefieldconditionstohisdivisions:TheSSTKwouldmovefromitsbridgeheadandcapturethehillstothenortheast,travelalongthePselRiverand,whileprotectingLAH’sleftflank,reachtheProkhorovka-Kartashevkaroad.LAHonSSTK’s right flankwould finishcapturingStorozhevoeandthewoodstothenorthofit,thenmoveonStalinskoeStateFarm,Iamkiandtheridgeonemiletotheeast.DasReichwouldcaptureVinogradovkaandIvanovkathenmoveandcapturethehillssouthwestofPravorotandthehillonemileeastofStorozhevoe.ItissignificantthatonlySSTKwastoinitiallylaunchwithitsfulldivisionagainstasectorwhiletheothertwodivisionsweretolaunchwithonlyaregimentortwo,leavingtheresttostayonthedefensive.ThisseemstosignifyHausser’sawareness that theSovietsweregoing to launchanoffensive.The smallbridgeheadthatSSTKheldnorthofthePselwasshelledformostofthenightandintotheearlyhoursof7/12.vzz297.vzz9m.ztc269.Both von Manstein and Hoth believed Vatutin had used most of his reserves and that the

Germansdidnothavetoworryaboutmajorreinforcementscomingintosector.Thisassumption

resulted inHoth’s deliberate attention in spending the previous several days clearing up flankresistanceattheexpenseofnotgaininganyappreciablegroundtowardthePsel.VonManstein’sdesiretopocketanddestroy69thArmybetweenthetwoDonetsRiversconsumedhisattention.Itcan be argued that both decisions were their achilles heel but some will say that it was anabsolutenecessitytorelievethispressurebeforemovingon.Bythefollowingdayandcertainlybeforetheendofthemonthbothofficerswouldseetheirchoiceswerenotpossible.AgainthissevereresistanceonthewesternflankandalongtheriverstotheeastshowedthatvonMansteindidnothaveenoughforcestodefeatVatutin.Inadditionto5thGAand5thGTAredeployingtoProkhorovka, the remainder of Konev’s Steppe Front was beginning to move towardProkhorovka,whichwouldbepartofthemajorcounteroffensivethatwouldstartinafewdays.wdk158.dlu92+.Most of the day for Das Reich was one of defense and redeployment. The division was

preparingforamajorassaultonthefollowingday.ThesectorsouthofKalininthatwasheldbyDerFührerwasnowbeingtakenoverbythe339thGRof167thID.PzAbt238wouldsupportthe infantry.The315thGR tookover thePetrovski sector and the331stGRwason their rightflank.DerFührerwouldmovenorthandtakeoverpartofsectorcurrentlyheldbyDeutschland,southofStorozhevoe.ThiswouldfreeDeutschlandfortheassaultonStorozhevoeandthewoodstothenorth.The167thIDwouldthenadvanceeastwardtowardtheDonetsRiverinanattempttolinkupwith168th IDandpocketSoviet forces that hadbeengiving3rdPzC trouble. gnk292.gnk283m.vzz7m.dlu90.Whilewaitingfor5thGTAtoarriveatProkhorovka,Vatutinhadseveraldaystostudythebest

routeforRotmistrovtotakeonhisoffensive.WithLAHdrivinguptheProkhorovkaroadandwithSSTK being redeployed to the Psel River, it seemed obvious to the Soviet commander thatGeneralHoth had decided on theProkhorovka corridor to reachKursk.Never one to avoid aconfrontation,Vatutin,thinkinghehadtheadvantageinnumbers,believedthebestwaytohandlethegreatestthreat,SSCorps,waswithahead-onfrontaloffensive;strengthagainststrength.ForVatutin,thiswasachangeinthinking,forupuntilthatmomenthisstrategyhadbeenflankattackswiththeobjectiveofgettingbehindthefrontline,isolatingandthendestroyingthecorps.Torushnearly400tanksdownanarrowcorridorintoawell-prepareddefenseofthestrongestcorpsof4thPzA,bristlingwithmanygunsandTigers,seemslikeabaddecision.Acontinuedflankattackwouldhavebeenmoresensible.Withaseverepenetrationby5thGTAoneitherflank(48thPzCbywayof the extremewestern andnorthwestern sectoror3rdPzCbywayofpassing through69thArmy sector)would have causedHoth to stop his northern advance and try to repair thedamagedlinebeforethesituationbecamedesperateandirrevocable.WhiletheGermanswereinatemporarystateofconfusionandredeployment,Vatutincouldhaveescalatedtheoffensivewithhisfiveotherarmies.TherewasjustnowayGeneralHothcouldignorethepotentialdestructionofeithercorps.vzz262+.vzz267++.dsk111.Thiscampaignwouldbeanotherexample inagrowing listwhere theGermanswere“aday

lateandadollarshort”.MoscowandStalingradaretwoeasyexampleswhereitisshownthattheGermanArmyjustdidnothavetheresourcestoputtheSovietsaway,buttherearemore.TheSSwereattackingacriticalareaonthisdaythatwasbeingheavilyreinforcedbythearrivalof5thGAand5thGTA.Ifthe4thPzAhadbeenalittlestronger,deployeddifferentlyandhadgreaterair

supportthenit’sareasonabletheorythattheSScouldhavebeenfightingforthethirddefensivebelt two days earlier, before the reinforcements arrived. Hoth lost some air support when asquadronofplanesweresentnorthtohelpModel.If24thPzChadbeeninvolvedinthefightingfromthebeginning.IfthePantherhadprovenmorereliable.IfHothhaddeployed48thPzCand3rd PzC differently. IfKnobelsdorff had not run out of artillery shells. If it had not rained somuch.IfHitlerhadnotdelayedtheoffensivesomuch.Allthese“ifs”wouldplayagainst4thPzA,allowingthe5thGTAonsceneintimetoblockHausser’spathtoProkhorovka.Inordertoprotectthenewlyarrived5thGAandthe5thGTAfromairattack,Vatutinbroughtup

the 29th and 6thAnti-Air ArtilleryDivisions to cover the respective armies. These divisionswere broken up by regiments and spread across the sectors from Iamki in the east to the PselRivervalleyinthewest.The5thGAhadalreadybeendeployedforadayandhadalreadytakenadvantageofthisaircover.vzz289+.vzz9m.Inpreparationforthemajoroffensivethefollowingday,theVVSgroundedallbombersforthe

day,allowingjust thefighters tomakeraids.Thebomberswerebeingmaintainedandrepairedandtheirpilotsgivenafewhours’rest.TheSovietfightersflewmanysortiesonthisdayandtheskiesover the southern salient sawmanydogfights.The largest air battle occurred in3rdPzCsectorwhereKempfwasbeginningtomakegains.Vatutinwantedtostoptheadvance;hecouldnotallowthe2ndand3rdcorps to join.WhentheSoviet fightersstartedattacking thepanzers,Kempfcalledforairsupportandtohissurprisereceivedit.InthenorththeLuftwaffeflew933sortieswhiletheRedAirForceflew595.cbk76.nzk77.InthefiercefightingforOktiabrskiStateFarm,afewpanzersandsupportinginfantryofLAH

brokethroughthelineofthe26thGARandheadedeastforProkhorovkabutwereslowedbythesecondtrenchdefendedbythe23rdGAR.ThecriticalarrivaloftheRedAFstoppedtheadvance,forcing the Germans to fall back. The heaviest fighting of the day ocurred in this small areabetweenOktiabrskiStateFarmandStorozhevoe,involvingLAHandDasReichagainstvariousSovietunits.TheLAHattackedtheaxisthatincludedthestatefarmwhileDasReich,beginningfromTeterevino,attackedalongtheaxisIvanovskiVyselok-Storozhevoe.Therecentarrivalofthe755thDABtothisareaslowedtheGermans’advance.vzz228.vzz242+.vzz9m.Bytheendoftheday,2ndPzChadseenafulldayofheavyfightingandshowedfewgainsfor

their effort, but theywere important gains.Overall the2ndSSPzChadgained threemiles theprevious twodays;LAHhadcaptured theKomsomoletsStateFarm,OktiabrskiStateFarmandHill252.2.DasReichwasfinallymakingprogressinthedirectionofStorozhevoewhileSSTKcrossedthePselandweremovingtowardHill226.6.Apartofthe2ndTChadbeenencircledonthesouthernbanksof thePsel in theMikhailovkaarea, sufferingheavycasualties.Heavy rainsthatdaymadeitimpossibleforSSTKtolaunchitsmajoroffensivefromitssmallbridgeheadontimeanditwasahardshipontheothertwodivisionsintryingtomaneuver.WhiletheGermanshadmade several penetrations of the first row of northern defenses, the second linewas stillstrong.GeneralVatutinhadbecomeconcernedabouttheGermanprogressthepasttwodaysbuthe was wagering everything on General Rotmistrov’s offensive beginning the next morning todestroy the enemy.On theother side, thekey successes his armygained in theprecedingdaysgave encouragement toGeneralHoth.He nowbelievedProkhorovka and other key objectiveswouldbetakenthefollowingday.OntheProkhorovkaline,twoGermancolumnswerenearing

Prokhorovka,onefromthewestandtheotherfromthesouth.Onthewesternflank,the48thPzChadnotgainedalotofterritorylatelybutwasabletorepulsemostofthemanycounter-attacksthat were launched between Berezovka and Kruglik, assaults aimed at separating and thendestroyingthemthenextday.Hothbelievedhiswesternpanzercorpswouldcontinuetoholdoffthe enemy while the 48th made several key offensives tomorrow. vzz244. vzz9m. gn312m.zow158.Je107++.Bytheendoftheday,theGermanlineinSSsectorconsistedofKochetovka,KrasnyiOktiabr,

Vasilevka,thenorthernslopesofHill252.2,OktiabrskiStateFarm,KomsomoletsStateFarm,thewestern edgeofStorozhevoe, IvanovskiVyselok, IasnaiaPoliana,Belenikhino andall thewaysouthtoGostishchevoII.HothwasputtingpressureonHaussertohaveSSTKcatchuptoLAHinordertoscreenLAH’sleftflankduringthefinalrunforProkhorovka.SSTKhadtosecuretheHill226.6areaandcapture252.4inordertoachievehisorders.HausserwassendingeveryavailableguntoSSTKtohelpsupportPriess’sadvance.Thoughalotofgroundwasnotcapturedtoday,keyobjectiveswereandtheSSwerefavourablydeployedtomoveonProkhorovkainthemorning.The 48th PzC did not gain much either for it spent much of its efforts on the western flankprotectingitsgainsofthelasttwodays.The11thPzDgainedalittlenorthofKochetovkatoday.The3rdPzDwasmakinggainswestofthePenaRiver.Thesalientof48thPzCand2ndSSPzCwasnow20milesacross.vzz227.gnk312m.vzz272.vzz3m.vzz5m.Near midnight, Vasilevsky returned to Rotmistrov’s HQ and ordered the 5th GTA to be

preparedtoattackasearlyas0300hrsthenextmorning.Whilemanyofthetanksofthe5thGTAhadarrived,itwouldbe0130hrsofthe12thwhenthefinaltanksarrived.Therewouldnotbemuchtimetomaintainthetanksandpreparefortheassault.vzz245.vzz442.vzz9m.dgk179+.Theheavyfightingofthepastweekbroughtthecountofplanesworkingfor2ndVAdownto

472aircraft:266fighters,140bombersandtheremainderwerefighterbombers.The17thVAhadjustover300assortedaircraft.For thebigoffensive thenextday, the2ndVAwouldattack4thPzAand17thVAwouldattack3rdPzC.Goingupagainst17thVAwouldbe8thFliegerCorpswhichwas taskedwith helpingKempf reachDasReich in order to have a coordinated attacktowardPravorotandtheProckhorovka.cbk78.After investigating the terrain of the intended assault, the Soviet reconnaissance team

recommendedtoRotmistrovattackingalongtheShakhovo-Iakovlevoaxiswhichwasdefendedbythe167thID.Thisroutewasrejectedbecauseofterraindifficultiesforthetanks.Itwasdecidedthemain attackwould be carried out between the Psel River and Storozhevoe on a front thatwouldbelessthanfivemileswide.vzz271.gnk283m.The three regimentsof9thGAD,whichwouldplayan important role in the followingday’s

fightingweredeployed:Kashpersky’s26thGARwasdug inbetweenOktiabrskiStateFarm toHill252.2 toLutovo.The23rdGARwasdeployedbetweenKartashevkaand theProkhorovkaStationinsecondechelonwhilethe28thGARwasdugintothesouthwestofthestationinfirstechelon.The9thGAD’sartilleryfor themostpartwasdeployedalongtherailroad.The287thGRRdefendedfromPrelestnoetoOktiabrskiStateFarmandbetweenthefourregiments,alinefourmileslongwascovered.vzz205*+.vzz11m.lck333.Vatutin’splan for theassault in themorningagainst the twowesternGermancorps involved

Katukov’s1stTA,Chistiakov’s6thGA,Rotmistrov’s5thGTAandZhadov’s5thGA.Shumilov’s

7thGAwithits49thRCwouldattackGroupKempftopreventKempffromlinkingupwithDasReich.Vatutinrepositionedhis10thTCinordertoattack3rdPzDwithits23workingpanzersinthemorning.dgk197.dgk183m.lck332.Bytheendoftheday,The4thPzAcompleteditssecondphaseofoperationbynightfall,which

washighlightedby thesuccessfuldefenseof theexpectedSovietcounterattackaround thePenaRiver valley area. This flank had to be stable before next morning when the big offensivelaunched. The 48th PzC claimed 7,000 POWs, 1,300 enemies killed and 900 destroyed orcapturedtankssincethestartofthecampaign.ItwasestimatedthatvonManstein’sforcesinthesouth, since the start of Citadel, had fatally lost 116 panzers. The remainder of the damagedpanzerswererepairableandwouldfightanotherday,butnotnecessarily in thiscampaign.The4thPzAdestroyed1,000planesandcollectedotherbootyfromthebunkersandvillagesthatwerecapturedaswell.snk83.sgf347.gnk309.gnk283m.Thebeginningof the thirddefensivebeltwas just southofProkhorovkawestwardalong the

PselRiver.Thefourthdefensivebeltwas13milesnorthofthislineontheSeimRiver.Vatutinwas determined to stop theGermans at the third defensive belt. If theGermans penetrated thethird belt, Vatutin would lose manymen fighting a rear guard action back to the Seim River.Besides, he figured Stalin would sack him if he could not stop the Germans at Prokhorovka.vzz233+.WiththeordersHothissuedforthenextday,itseemsapparentthatheandvonMansteinwere

awareofacounter-attackbutunawareofthesizeofthereinforcementsthathadarrivedinsectorinthelast24hours.Hadhebeenaware,hisprimaryattentionwouldhaveshiftedfromthe48thPzCtotheSSandtheattacksfor48thPzCinthePenaRiverbendwouldhavebeenpostponeduntilclarificationofthebattlefieldwasdetermined.ItwouldhavebeenprudentfortheSStohavegonecompletelyonthedefensiveinsteadofreceivingnewlocalattackorders.ThiswasclearlyanintelligencefailureonthepartoftheGermans;Hothwasbeginningtofeelconfidentthathis4th PzA could reach Kursk but that attitude would change within 24 hours. gnk304. gnk309.gnk283m.HothhadgivenHaussergeneralorderstotakeProkhorovka,leavingthecorpscommanderto

planthedetailsoftheattack.HausserwantedLAHtotaketherailtownfromthenorthandsouthwiththehelpofSSTK.HisplanwastoooptimisticasSSTKwasobligatedtosecureHill226.6,defend the line toVeselyi and takeHill 252.4, Polezhaev, Petrovka and theKartashevka roadbeforeattackingProkhorovkafromthenorthwest.OnceSSTKstartedcrossingthePselthenLAHandDasReichwouldbegintheiradvance.TheLAHwouldadvancestraightuptheProkhorovkaroad and capture Storozhevoe Forest and the Stalinskoe State Farm whileDas Reich wouldadvanceeastwardbetweenVinogradovkaandIvanovkaandcapturethehighgroundjusteastofthosevillages,beforeshiftingtowardPravorotandscreeningLAH’seast flank.Considering thestiff resistance theSovietshadputup the last fewdaysandthemodestgains theSShadmade,theseplansseemfartoooptimistic.gnk310.vzz1m.vzz11m.gnk283m.wdk154.Withelementsofthe11thPzDapproachingHill244.8,asmallSoviettankgroupambushedthe

leadvehiclesbutafterthreeSoviettanksweredestroyed,therestofthetanksfellbacktothehill.Alittlelater,alargerSoviettankforcesupportedbyinfantrylaunchedagainandthistimebrokeintothedefensesofthe11thPzD;hand-to-handcombatensuedwiththegrenadiersprotectingthe

mortar crews. The 11th PzD had planned on attacking the hill right after sunrise but with themuddyroadsmuchofthedivisionwasstretchedoutformilesbehindandhadtowaituntil1100hrswhenitwasbetterprepared.Micklwastosplithisforcesandattackfromthesouthandnorth.The southerngroupwouldattack first but itwouldbea feint; thenortherngroupwouldbe themainassaultforce.TheskiesweremostlycloudyandtheLutfwaffewasnotmuchhelpwiththeassault;the11thPzDwashithardbythelargeconcentrationofgunsonthehillanditwasforcedtoretreat,sufferingheavycasualties.The lowlyingfogalsopreventedaccurateshellingby theGermans as well. General Mickl did not want to attack the hill under these conditions, andespeciallywithoutairsupport,butKnobelsdorffoverruled.VonMellenthin,Hoth’sChiefofStaff,claimed theattack faileddue topoorplanningandpoorexecution,especiallyartillerysupport.MicklwantedtotackleHill239.6totheeastandnexttotheDistMelovoebeforeattackingHill244.8.GeneralMicklwasofferedgreaterartillerysupporttotakeHill244.8.Insteadofattackingthehill,Mickl‘spanzergroupmovedtowardthelowlyinghillssouthwestofOrlovka,justthreemiles from the PselRiver. The 111th PzGRmoved out and headed for the Solotinka area andKochetovka.AtKochetovkatheGermanscouldseeabout50tanksofthe5thGTCredeployingonthenorthsideoftheriver.Hothalsoordered52ndICtofinishcapturingRakovoonthenorthbankofthePenaRiverbeforeclosingupon3rdPzD.gnk301.cbk75.During the predawn hours,German artillerywasmoved up to cover theBerezovka-Tolstoe

areastohelpscreenthebigattackonBerezovkascheduledforfirst light.TheStukaswouldbepartoftheassaultaswell.gnk273.gnk283m.TheGDof48thPzC,afterfightingallday,pushedtheremainsof6thTCand90thGRDoutof

Kalinovka,wheretheystoppedforthedayandpreparedfortheassaultthenextdayonthePselRiverwith3rdPzDand11thPzD.ThetwoSovietformationsfellbacktothewestofChapaev-Novenkoe-Krugliklinewhichwasbeingdefendedbythe184thRD.The11thPzD,onGD’sright,secured Hill 260.8 which ran alongside the Oboyan road, not far from Novoselovka. Whileregrouping behind the defense belt held by 184th RD, the 204th RDwas able to fend off theGermanattacknearKalinovkaandKruglik.HothwouldaskKnodelsdorfftosucceedincrossingthePselRiverthefollowingday;itwasataskhewasunabletodothatdayandtheSovietswouldbeevenstrongerinthemorning.Itwasnotanenviableassignment.dgk158+.dgr99+.gnk312m.Onthemorningofthe11th,the48thPzClaunchedacoordinatedthree-prongedattacktofinally

destroy the 6th TC,which had caused somuch trouble the last few days. The first prong leftZavidovkaandattackedColElin’s6thMRBwhilethesecondprongstruckfromSyrtsevotowardBerezovka. The third prong launched from Tolstoe Woods area toward Krasnyi Uzliv andChapaev.Thisconcentricattackhadasitssoleaimtheencirclementanddestructionof6thTC.Bynoon,thefirstprongheadingforZavidovkareachedandcapturedRakovo.ThesecondprongwasnearingBerezovkaand the thirdgroupdidcaptureKrasnyiUzliv.The6thTC found itselfpartially encircled with shell fire coming down on it from three sides and was taking heavycasualties. They tried to disengage but theGermanswould not let go, however after dark theremains of 6th TC was able to break loose and head west for Novenkoe. dgr218. dgk170m.dgk184m.HothwasconvincedthatthePenaRiverbendhadtobeclearedbeforemovingnorthtoOboyan

butthe3rdPzDand52ndIChadfailedtobudgetheSovietdefenses.At0600hrs,theLuftwaffe

struck targets south ofHill 258.5 to soften up the defenses for the upcoming attack.While theplaneswerebombingthedifferentsites,theleadunitsofGDanditspioneerswereapproachingthe hill to clear it ofmines.Hill 258.5was duewest ofVerkhopenie and just due east of theTolstoeWoods.ThemainbattlegroupwasapproachingHill237.6,southofHill258.5andonemilenorthofBerezovka.Hearingtheairattacksonthehill,thisbattlegroupspeededupitsmarchand joined the overall attackwithout further preparation.Before reachingHill 237.6, panzers,upwardsof60MkIIIsandPanthersattackedtheSovietdefensesonHill243.8,fourmilessouthofHill258.5andonemilewestofLukhaninowhereforthelastthreedays,the3rdPzDhadbeendesperately trying toclear the townand thesurrounding territory.Hearing theGermansnearingBerezovka, theSoviets in the areabegan evacuating to thewest butwaited too long andwereshelledastheyescaped,tryingtoreachtheTolstoewoodswhereaheavyconcentrationoftanksandinfantrydeployed.Theheavythunderstormsofthepredawnhoursandintothefirsthoursofthedaymademovingdifficultandslowwhichonceagainwasadisadvantage to theGermans.gnk298+.gnk312m.AftercapturingHill237.6andHill243.8andapproachingBerezovka,Knobelsdorffordered

3rdPzDtojoinGDinattackingBerezovka.gnk299.Afterhelping3rdPzDthepreviousday,majorelementsofGDresumedtheiradvancetoward

Oboyanwhileanarmoredcombatgroupstayedbehindtosupport3rdPzDwestofthePenaRiver.The3rdPzDandelementsofthe332ndIDclearedSovietresistancefromtheBerezovkaareaandforcedthe71stGRDwestwardfromRakovoandChapaevalongthePenaRiverandcloseduptothe184thRD’sdefensesextendingsouthwardfromNovenkoetoMelovoeonthePena.Katukovsenttheremainsof10thTCtoNovenkoetobolstertherightflankof1stTA.The219thRDalsoarrivedfromreserve.dgk157+.dgr172m.dgr92m.dgk222m.The 11th PzD took a hill two miles north of Kochetovka. The Soviets countered, trying to

retakethehillbutfailed.TheGDwasclearingupresistancealongthePenabetweenBerezovkaandVerkhopenie.The1stTAand6thGAremaineddefensive,content just tokeeptheGermansfromadvancing.Onthe52ndICfrontinpredawnaction,the332ndIDdefendeditselfagainstacounter-attack against 90thGRD and 184thRD at Zavidovka. The 332nd IDwas still able tocrossthePenaatAlekseevkainthemorningandwasatRakovobynoon.The255thIDdefendingnear Bubny repulsed battalion-size attacks from the 161st RD. wdk157+. hjj121m. gnk193m.dgr209m.gnk227m.In themorning, the 5thGA’s 32ndGRCbeganmoving into defensive positions on the north

bankofthePselriverintheOboyan-Olkhovatkasector.Infrontofthemwere1stTA’s31stTCand10thTCwithelementsof6thGA’s51stGRDwhichwerealreadyinbattlewiththeenemy.The33rdGRCwerebeingdeployed along theSemenovka-Veselyi linebehind the52ndGRD.vzz168.dgr96.dgk170m.dgk184m.At1000hrsonthisSundaymorning,GDwasabletofinallycaptureHill243.0.SovietPOWs

statedthePselwasbeingfortifiedandthatVatutinwouldtrytostoptheadvanceattheriver.The3rd PzD moved up to support GD. It was a fairly quiet day in 48th PzC sector. No majoroffensiveswereplanned,onlysmallskirmishestoimprovethecurrentline:thecrossroadssouthofHill248toHill233.8by11thPzDandtheboundaryofGD tothehillseastofKalinovkatoKubaossovskiGorgetoHill247.0(southofKruglik)toHill258.5by3rdPzD.Ontheotherside

of this line elements of 69th Army and 1st TA were waiting to stop them. hjj120. hsz129+.fmz221m.At 1200 hrs, the panzers ofGD arrived at Berezovka to help the 3rd PzDwith the Soviet

garrison.Thepanzersbrokeupwithhalfattackingfromthewest.ThePantherswenttothesouthoftownandattacked.The394thPzGRand3rdPzGRcrossedthePenaatSyrtsevoandfollowed.The3rdPzDhadalreadyentered the townon the east side.Sensingweakness in thenortheastquadrant,6thPzRshiftedtothataxis.WhilethebattleforBerezovkawasragingandthepioneerswereclearingthelastoftheminefieldsonHill243.8,gunscouldbeheardatnearbyRakovo,onthebanksofthePenaRiver,atitsmostsouthernpoint.The332ndIDwasnowattackingitbuttheinitialassaulthadbeenrepulsed.Anelementof332ndIDswungaroundtothenorthofthetownand linkedupwithpanzers fromGD nearHill 243.8 at around1500hrs.Hill 243.8was fourmileswestofLukhaninoandfourmilessouthofHill258.5.gnk299.gnk283m.The10thTCandtheremainsofthe5thGTC,withacombinedtotalof200tanks,wouldlaunch

theiroffensiveintothewesternflankof48thPzCthefollowingmorning.InsteadofhittingtheGDdivisionasplanned,itwouldstriketheleadunitsof3rdPzDwhichwascurrentlymovinguptocoverGD’sflankatKalinovka.Partofthe3rdPzD,the394thPzGR,wasstillintheBerezovkasector trying to clear the last resistance that lingered.By latemorning the resistance had beenreducedandthebulkofthedivisionwouldheadnorth.The332ndIDwasalreadymovinguptodefendthesectorfromSovietattackscomingfromwestofthePenaRiver.gnk301.The3rdPzDandthe332ndIDclearedSovietresistancefromtheBerezovkaregion,forcingthe

71stGRDwestwardfromRakovoandChapaevalongthePenaRivertocloseupwiththe184thRDatNovemkoe-MelovoeonthePena.Elementsofthe10thTCwereredirectedtosupportthe1stTAaroundtheNovenkoearea.Atthesametime,GDattackedtheKalinovka-KrugliklineatKalinovkainitspursuittoheadnorth.Meanwhile,the204thRDfendedofftheGermanprobes.While the 2nd SS PzC headed toward the northeast, the 48th PzC continued its slow advancetowardOboyan.SeeMap23.dgk158.snk81+.dgr172m.dgk222m.nzk95.Chistiakov’s6thGA,strengthenedwiththe10thTCand5thGTC,aswellas1stTA’s3rdMC,

preparedforthemajoroffensivestartingthenextdaythatwouldencirclethe48thPzC.The22ndGRCof6thGAwouldleadtheadvanceandconsistedofthe90thGRD,184thRDand219thRD.Starting from the Kruglik-Chapaev-Novenkoe line, it would drive south then east along theSyrtsevo-Iakovlevoaxisandmeetupwith5thGTA,encirclingthebulkofthe48thPzCand2ndSSPzC.The184thRDand219thRDof40thArmywere todeploybehind10thTCandclearresistanceafterthetankersdrovethroughbutLtGeneralMoskalenkoresistedgivinghisdivisionsupandtheywerelatearrivingforthestart.Thisdelaywasmosthelpfulto48thPzC.Nexttothe22ndGRC,the23rdGTC(204thGRD,309thGRDand67thGRD)wouldalsostartnearKruglikanddrivepastVerkhopenie towardPokrovka.The71stGRDwouldguard thecorpsright flankand51stGRDwouldbereserve.vzz427+.kcz168.dgk106m.dgr99.dgr93m.TheSovietswouldalwayscounter-attackafterlosingastrongpointintheattempttorecapture.

TheGermanswerewellawareofthispracticeandpartoftheGermantacticalMOwouldbetoquickly set up defenses in order to repulse these attacks. Thiswas a part of phase two of anoperation.ItbecamesecondnaturefortheGermanstogodefensive,especiallyinthelaterdaysofthecampaign.

Aspartof6thGA,the5thGTC’s21stGTBand22ndGTBwouldattackfromtheNovoselovkaandKuznetsovoforestareainthedirectionofHill208.0,Sukhodolforest,Shepelevka,LukhaninoandIakovlevo.IakovlevowasthecenteroftheGermanattackzone.Handingoveritsdefensebeltto204thRD,the10thTCwouldadvancefromNovenkoe,Tolstoewoods,VerkhopenieandHill251.4 and capture Krasnaia Dubrova, Pokrovka and Ulianov, Hill 237.6 and Hill 254.5. The183rdTBwouldlaunchfromnearNovenkoeandheadforVerkhopenieandHill251.4.The186thTBinsecondechelonwouldheadforPokrovkaandUlianov.The178thTBwouldattackalongtheaxis:Novenkoe,Hill237.6andHill254.5.AllthisactionwasinanattempttogetbehindandisolatetheGermanfrontline(48thPzC).ThebasisforthesedifferentaxesofattackwastocarveuptheGermanterritoryinordertodestroy4thPzAmoreeasilybutafterdaysofheavyfighting,allofthesetankbrigadesweregreatlyweakenedandtheirordersweretooambitious.ThosetwoSoviettankbrigadessufferedheavyloseson7/6,northofIakovlevo.vzz428+.Togetaheadstart,6thGAand1stTAlaunchedtheiroffensivetoday,the3rdMC’s31stTC,

204thRDand309thRDwouldhold thecurrent line incase theGermanscounter-attackedandpenetratedthefirstline.The3rdMCcouldonlygoontheoffensiveif48thPzCwasretreating.Bynextmorningthisorderwouldchangeandthe3rdMCalongwiththe204thRDand309thRDwould launchwith the rest from the line:Kalinovka-Malinovoe-Hill 211.9. The combat groupwouldattackGDand11thPzD.vzz429.Vatutinformedaplanfor1stTAtocounter-attackthatwouldstartoutbyattackingtheleftflank

of48thPzCandthendestroy4thPzAbymeetingupwith29thTCandencirclingmuchofthe4thPzA.KnobelsdorffrealizedtheSovietswerepreparingamajorcounterandtriedtopreparehisforcesforit.The255thIDmoveduptothesouthernbankofthePenatoscreentheleftflankofthe48thPzC.NearthePenaRiver,the3rdPzDengagedSoviettanksinafiercebutshortbattlethatallowedtheGermans tocapture100 tanks.This insightofmoving the255thIDfurthernorth totighten the line by Knobelsdorff would be helpful in the 48th PzC’s attempt in repulsing thecomingmajoroffensive.Inthemorning,the7thGAand69thArmywoulddrivewestandsouthagainstKempfwiththeobjectiveofhavingthetwopincersmeetandencircle3rdPzC.dgk159++.snk82.Atnight,the11thPzDandGDadvancedonHill260.8andHill244.8alongtheOboyanroad.

This was the important high ground leading to Oboyan that would give 48th PzC a greatobservationpostandartilleryposition.OnlythePselRiverwasthelastnaturalbarrierbeforethetown.Afarworsebarrierwouldbethecounter-attacktowardGresnoe,IakovlevoandBykovkathat Vatutin was preparing, whichwould start the nextmorningwith the objective to stop theadvancebeforetheKruglik-Olkhovatkalineandatthesametimehavethe6thGAcounter-attacktoward IakovlevoandPokrovka.Thisattackwould impede theGD fromhelping11thPzDand3rdPzDwiththeassaultonOboyanandthatfailurewouldrestrict48thPzCfromgettinginvolvedinthebigtankbattleplannedforthenextdaynearProkhorovka.dgk159+.fkk102m.gnk312m.Inthe48thPzCsector,both11thPzDandGD,movingin tandem,advancednorthwardalong

the Oboyan road. The 11th PzD captured Hill 260.8 whileGD, with the help of 11th PzD,capturedHill244.8.ThehillwasanimportantOPandbothsideswantedit.After losingsomeground,theSovietsregroupedandwereabletostoptheGermansfromanyfurtherprogress.Theprogressmadeby the11thPzDallowed them to shrink thegapwithLAH to their right,which

easedthepressureonbothdivisionsbyalittlebit.dgk159.lck331.gnk312m.vzz428.IntheProkhorovkasector,theattackofthe2ndSSPzCgainedonlyalittlenetground,yetthe

SSTKwasabletoseizeandstabilizeabridgeheadoverthePsel,movingnorthward.Nearby,the48thPzCcaptured100workingSoviettanksabandonedwithemptyfueltanks.Thoughtherewereexceptions,GeneralHothconsideredsomeoftoday’sgainsimportantones,butwiththe9thArmytothenorthatastandstill,thebenefitsofHoth’ssuccesseswerequestionable.snk83.Lateatnightandintotheearlyhoursof7/12,the3rdPzD,332ndIDand255thIDrelievedGD

in thewest so it couldprepare for thebigassaultplanned for themorning.All threedivisionswereweakandexhaustedandwouldbeunabletofullystopVatutin’scounter-attackswhichbeganthatsameday.Duringthisredeployment,the3rdPzDreplacedtheGDonthesouthernslopesofHill260.8,eastandsoutheastofKalinovka.TheSovietsquicklycounter-attackedanddrovethe3rdPzDofftheHill.GDwasgoingtoleadtheattackacrossthePselRivernextmorningandwasmovingtoitsjump-offpoint.The2ndSSPzChadalreadycrossedtheriverandHothwasplacingalotofpressureonthe48thPzCtocatchupandstraightenouttheline.Kalinovkawasduewestof Novoselovka but due east of Kruglik. rc210. hsz129. fkk271. dgr209m. gnk312m.mhz314.fmz226.fmz227m.Besides relievingGDnearHill260.8, the3rdPzDalsohadresponsibility fordefending the

Berezovka-Verkhopenieareaandthe332ndIDfilledin3rdPzD’sformerlinesnorthofthePenaRiver forward of Rakovo. The 255th ID stretched its lines northward toMikhailovka. TheseredeploymentsweremeanttostrengthenthefrontlinesinthehotareasbutitalsoweakenedtheflankswhichVatutinwould take advantage of. TheGD was concentratedwest of theOboyanroad,workingtheflanksandnotthenorthernfront.Thedilemmaof48thPzCbeingstretchedtoofar,clearlyshows that48thPzC like the4thPzA,and like6thArmyatStalingrad, justdidnothave enough panzers and especially men to defeat the Soviets. dgk204+. dgk211m. dgr172m.dgk222m.dgr209m.gnk312m.IthadbeenamildlysuccessfuldayforGD,3rdPzDand332ndIDfortheyhadtakenseveral

keyhills,andthenclearedRakovoandBerezovka.Inaddition,anumberofcounter-attackswererepulsed.TheSovietswerestill strong in thearea for theyhadbeenreinforcedbyelementsof40th and 38thArmies to the northwest. Theywere especially strong at TolstoeWoodswoodswhichranalongtheBerezovka-Kruglikroad,wheretheywouldharassGermansastheypassedby.AtKalinovka,tothenorth,GDhadjustbeenabletoenterthetownbutwasunabletodefeatthelocalgarrisonandwasforcedtopullback.The3rdPzDwasorderedtoKalinovkatofreeGDelements there in order to resume its advance. It was estimated that 6th TC, which had beenbattling48thPzCfordays,wasnowdownto35workingtanks.Theaccompanying3rdMCwasinworsecondition.GDwasnoworderedtoreassemblenorthofNovoselovkabynextmorning,to attack and push the recently arrived 10th TC north of the Psel River. gnk300. wwf121.gnk283m.Vatutinwasalreadyredeployinghisforcesforthefollowingday’sbigoffensive.Hemovedthe

10thTCand the5thGTCfrom in frontofGD over to thewest andwasplanningon attackingGD’swest flankand slicing through it inorder to reach the Iakovlevo-Pokrovkaareawhere itwasplannedtojoinupwiththe29thTC,comingfromtheeasttosurroundamajorportionof4thPzA.TheplanwasaudaciousandunrealisticbutthatwasatrademarkofVatutin,Zhukovandthe

Sovietgenerals.gnk300.gnk283m.Fortheprevioustwodays,Hoth’smainfocushadbeenon48thPzCinorderforthemtocatch

upandalign themselveswith theSSCorps.Thefront linehad tobesolidwithnogaps if theyweretoreachKursk.Hothcontinuedtobeslowanddeliberate,neglectingthetimetablethatwasso important at the beginning of the campaign. It seems the general was over confident afterinflictingheavycasualtieson1stTA,3rdMCand6thTCandapparentlywasunawareofthesizeofthereinforcementsthathadjustbeguntoarrive:5thGTAand5thGA.TheGermanscouldnotaffordtothoroughlyreconthesectortogetamoredefinitivepictureofwhatwasfacingthemanditmadeHothmakepoorchoices.While theLAHandSSTKwereattacking in thenorth,partof48th PzCwould still be clearing the Pena bendwhichwould take another few days.With theextremelymuddy terrain, Hoth understood why 48th PzC, trying to cross the Psel, made onlymodestgainsagainst increasing resistancebutwhatmadehim think thatwithout anyadditionalsupportforthe48thPzCthenextdaythatthesituationwouldimprove?Itwascriticalforthe48thtocrossthePselandjointhe2ndSSPzCinexpandingthebridgeheadandformingaunifiedfrontnorthoftheriver.gnk303.gnk283m.Other elementsofKonev’sSteppeFrontwereordered todeploynorthofPselRiver line to

block any further incursions towardOboyan and to prepare themselves for themajor counter-offensivethatwouldsoonbecoming.Itwouldtakecoupledaysforthereinforcementstoarriveinsector.wwf91.Late at night and into the very early hours of 7/11, a combat group from the 7th PzDwas

movingwest to the southof6thPzD,whichwascurrentlydeployedaroundMelikhovo, and inconcert with 19th PzD at daybreak drove along the Donets toward Khokhlovo, Kiselevo andSabyninotryingtooverpowerthestubbornSovietline.shn160.dgk162.At 0200 hrs from northwest of Hill 217.4, in the Dalniaia Igumenka sector, a massive

preparationbeganthatlastedthreehours.ThentheLuftwaffecameinlowandstrafedtheSovietlinesbeforeKempf launchedhis forces. Itwasa two-prongattackwith theobjectiveof takingKiselevo,KhokhlovoandSabynino,situatedalongtheDonetsRiver.At0930hrs,the19thPzDalongwith168thIDdrovealongtheDonetswhilethe7thPzD,furthereast,wasdrivingfromthenorthernoutskirtsofMiasoedovotothenorthwesttowardthesamevillages.Theiraxisofattackwasdefendedbythe94thGRD.TheresistancefromKiselevowithitssurroundingminefieldsandtheadjacentHill211.5withitsmazeoftrencheswashorrendous.By1400hrs,the19thPzDhadmade three attacks against the 92ndGRD but failed each time.Aftermoving artillery onHill217.4andgathering50panzers,anotherattackwasmadeandby1525hrs,thepanzerswereableto break through and enterKiselevowhere they fought hard to secure it.Khokhlovo fell soonafterwards.With the fallof these twovillages, the19thPzDhad reached theDonetsandwerenowfacingthe375thRD,whichhadjustreceivedorderstofallback.The74thPzGR,afterdark,triedtotakethemazeoftrenchesnearbybutfailed.KempfwasunderorderstocatchuptoDasReichandcontributetothecaptureofProkhorovkabutthe69thArmyand7thGAwereputtingupunbelievableresistance.The3rdPzC, thoughmakinggoodprogress thatday,didnotmovefastenoughtoencircleanylargeconcentrationsoftheenemy.The92ndGRDalongwiththe96thTBfellbacktotheVypolzovka-AlekseevskiVyselokline.SeeMap23.vzz252++.vzz3m.dgr102+.dgr155m.dgr173m.dgr93m.dlu100.

Whilethe73rdPzGRfoughtforKiselovo,the429thGRattackedthe89thGRD.Theregimentpenetrated the lineandadvancedon thevillageofPetropavlovkawhichwasquicklycaptured,thoughthe73rdPzGRhadtodefendthevillageagainstacounter-attack.ItthenmovedonnearbyBelomestnazha,Hill 190.5 andHill 211.6, capturing those aswell. The regiment then tried tosecure thewoods to thenorthof thehillsbutgotboggeddown inheavy fightingandcouldnotmakeanyfurtherprogressthatday.dlu100+.dgk163.Withthesuccess19thPzD,168thIDand7thPzDwashavinginclearingtheeasternbankofthe

northernDonetsRiver,the375thRDand81stGRDonthewesternsidewereorderedtopullbacktothenorthsideoftheLipovyiDonetsanddefendtheKiselevotoKrivtsovoline.ItwasfeltthatifthisraidalongtheDonetswassuccessfulitwouldhelpthe6thPzDbreaklooseastheyheadednorthfromMelikhovotowardKazache.dgr103.fzk52.dlu96+shn160..With the combat group heading toward Sheino, the rest of LtGeneral von Funck’s 7th PzD

moved northward toward Melikhovo, trying to screen 6th PzD’s right flank while 6th PzDpreparedforitsassaultnorthwardfromMelikhovo.The6thPzDwasdelayingtheirattacktoseeifenemyforceswereleavingtheirsectorfor theriver tohelpstop19thPzD.The429thGRof168thIDwasstillattachedto19thPzDduetoitsweakenedcondition.dlu96.Atdawn,the6thPzDwithsupportfromthesPzAbt503,whichhadjusthaditsthreecompanies

reunited, launched their attack northward fromMelikhovo toward Shilakhovo andwas able topenetrate thelineof305thRDandthe107thRDdeployeddirectlybehindit.The6thPzDwasthen able to drive eight miles northward through the line and seize Olkhovatka, Olshanaia,OskochnoeandKazache.Awedgewasalsocutintotheprepareddefensesof107thRDandtheentire division had to fall back. This sudden move north also made 89th GRD’s positionuntenable just south of Gostishchevo and it had to fall back as well. To allow this retreat,Kriuchenkinorderedtheshattered81stGRDrearguarddutyforthegeneralexodusofthearea.The81stfellbacktotheKrivtsovo-Ryndinkaline.Evenwiththissuccessfuladvance,Kempfwasstill15to20milesfromProkhorovka.Kriuchenkinshiftedhisexhausted375thRDtoblockthisnewgapattheline:Shakhovo,ZhilmestneandNovoselovka(east).The375thRDwouldbolsterthelinethat2ndTChadgenerallyreachedyesterday.The305thRDand107thRDfellbacktotheBalkaRazumnaia-Gremiacheline.The94thGRDfellbackbehindtheKorenRiverintheSheino-Ushakovoarea,justnorthofthe15thGRD.dgk162+.dlu63m.vzz251++.vzz3m.gnk298.nzk95.vzz5m.vzz12m.dgr93m.dgr155m.dgr173m.dgr99.dgr103+.fzk52.dlu82.shn160.zzt90.With thesecuringofMiasoedovo, the7thPzD’sfrontcoveredfromMiasoedovoin thenorth

down toRaus’s sector. The 11th ICwas having trouble in theRzhavets (southern)-BatratskaiaDachaareawith72ndGRDand213rdRD.The15thGRDhadjustarrivedandwasaddingtheirweighttothebattle.The198thIDwasbroughtuptohelp320thIDand106thIDholdtheline.The326thGR,positionedatBatratskaiaDacha,wasparticularlyunderalotofpressure.At1700hrsafterapausetoregroup,the15thGRDattackedBatratskaiaagainwithtanksinthelead,followedby infantry.During the pause,German sappers laid newmines in front of their positionwhichdisabledanumberof tanksduring theircharge.TheSoviets,withfanaticalspirit,wereable toadvancetothetownlimitswhere,withbayonetsfixed,foughtmantomantodestroytheenemy.Atdusk,failingtopenetratetheline,theystartedtofallback.The198thIDlostover100menthatday.dgk162+.dlu63m.dgr103.dgr155m.dlu87+.dlu97+.

Inthemorning,vonMansteinvisitedKempfathisHQatDolbinotogivehimapeptalkandtoexplain how important itwas for 3rd PzC to catch upwithDas Reich. Kempf argued that heneeded24thPzCbutHitlerwouldnotreleaseit.lck329.Bytheendoftheday,theKempfGrouphadsetupdefensivepositionsforthenightandwhen

theSoviet5thGTA’smassiveoffensivelaunchedinhissectorthenextmorning,Kempfwasabletorepulseit.Inonesector,GeneralKempfwasthenabletopenetratetheboundarybetween107thRD and 305thRD, northeast of Belgorod, that allowed a few panzers to race north along theDonets.jp174.lck330.Torecap,themorningstartedeastoftheDonetswithKempfjumpingoffwith6thPzD,7thPzD

and 19th PzD, supported by elements of three infantry divisions, paralleling the river. To thenorthwest,48thPzCreneweditsdriveonOboyan.The2ndSSPzCbegantofightitswaytowardsProkhorovka.Heavyrainsduringthenightmadeitslowgoingforthepanzersandinfantryalike.Beforelong,theGermanswerepenetratingthedefensesofthe5thGTCinfrontofStorozhevoe,southwestofProkhorovka.rc206.dgk184m.WithRzhavets andRyndinka being threatened by the advance of 6th PzD, a battalion of the

375thRDwassenttoShakhovotoblock6thPzDfromreachingProkhorovkafromthataxis.Tostop the Germans from expanding their bridgehead, the 92nd GRDwas ordered to cross anddefendthewestbankoftheDonetsbetweenShcholokovotoVypolzovka(nearRyndinka)whilethe305thRDwastocrosstheDonetsbetweenKolomytsevoandNovoSlobodka.Bymidnight,theGermanlinewasgenerallyKiselevo-Khokhlovo,-VerhneOlshanetsbuttheyhadsalientsthatwent further north.Vatutin hadwanted to transfer several antitank units from this sector to 5thGTAbutwiththisbreakthroughhadtoleavetheseforcesneartheDonets.ShcholokovoisonthewestbankoftheDonetsaboutthreemilessouthofRyndinka.vzz408++.dgr221m.Atthesametimeasthe19thPzDwasdrivingnorthalongtheDonets,the6thPzDheadedeast

totheRazumnaiaRiverbeforeshiftingnorthtofollowalongtheriver.Itwasimportantforthe6thPzD to capture thebridgeover the river atKomintern toprevent theSoviets from resupplyingtheirforceswestoftheriver.ThisbridgewasalmosttenmilesfromthebridgeatRzhavets.Tosecurethe6thPzD’sleftflank,the19thPzDsupportedbythe168thIDwouldattempttocapturethebridgeovertheDonetsatSabynino.gnk269+.gnk283m.vzz10m.vzz3m.The2ndSSPzCjustbarelybrokethroughthethirddefensebeltnearProkhorovkabutthe5th

GTAwascominguptopushtheGermansback.The42ndGRDhadalreadyarrivedandseveraltank brigades would arrive by early evening. Vatutin expected the 5th GTA, when all unitsarrived, to lead themajor assault to pushback theSSCorps thenext day.To the east,Vatutinordered his armies to stand and fight to the lastman. Itwas critical to prevent 3rd PzC fromjoiningupwithDasReich.Tomakethishappen,the89thGRDof69thArmywassentintostopthe 168th ID advancing north along the railroad east of the Lipovyi Donets River. Advancingnorthoftheriverthe168thIDwouldbeabletoattacktheflankandrearoftheforcesstrugglingwithDasReich.ItcouldbecatastrophicfortheSovietsifthe168thcouldreachthe167thIDandSSDR.The107thRDwassenttoKazachetoholdbackthenorthflankofthe7thPzD.wdk158.dgk222m.dlu63m.GroupHorst of 19thPzDbegan its drivenorth, paralleling6thPzDwhichwas further east.

After penetrating the Soviet line,Horst advanced over threemiles and from a fightingmarch,

attackedKiselevo.HeandGroupSchmidtattackedfromthesouthandeast.By1900hrsthetownfell.HorstresumedhisadvancetowardSabynino,justeastoftheDonetsandnexttothefortifiedHill211.5whichitwouldreachthefollowingday.Thevillagewasastrongpoint,aswasthehill,andtheywerecloseenoughtoeachother togivemutualsupport.The19thPzDwouldhaveitshandsfullwiththisengagement.gnk298.vzz3m.vzz10m.In the afternoon, ameetingwas held between vonManstein,Hoth,Kempf andBreith at the

Dubino HQ. The discussion was about what to do with the flagging 3rd PzC. Von Mansteinsuggestedthat theentirecorpsredeploytothewestof theDonetsandgocompletelydefensive.ThiswouldallowDasReichtoconcentrateentirelyonanorthwardadvance,fightingsidebysidewithLAH towardProkhorovka.Kempf,whohadhadanegativeoutlookontheroleof3rdPzCsince the beginning after the long delays, wholeheartedly endorsed the proposal. Lt GeneralHermannBreithbeingmoreoptimisticfavoredstayingthecourse;vonManstein,likingwhatheheard,agreed.Inthenexteightdays,Kempfwouldrepeatedlytrytohavehiscorpsstaydefensiveandeach time itwouldbe rejected.HitlerwasdisappointedwithKempf’sattitudeand it’snotsurprisingthatKempfwouldlosehiscommandinthenearfuture.PriortoKempfbecomingCOinNovember1942,BreithwasCOof3rdPzD.erz208.snk22.zsm57.Thisdecisiontostaythecoursefor3rdPzCwastoughtomake.Therewassomelogicingoing

defensiveonthewestsideoftheDonetsbutitwastoolateinthecampaigntoredeploy,withthemajor offensive to take Prokhorovka scheduled the next day. I would have been in favor ofdeploying3rdPzCwestoftheriverfromthestartofthecampaignanditwouldstillhavemadesenseuptotheendof7/6whenlittleprogresswasmadeanditwasobvioustheresistancewouldbecostlytoovercomewithoutadequateresources.Attackingto thenorthfromDalniaiaIgumenksandMelikhovoareas the6thPzD,headingfor

Shliakhovo, a key anchor near the rear of the second defensive belt, was trying to split theboundary between 276th GRR and the 1004th RR. After capturing Shliakhovo, the panzerscleared Hill 230.3 and Olkhovatka. The hill was difficult for it had a number of batteriesstationed there, but sPzAbt 503 and the Bake Group quickly captured it. After capturingShliakhovoandOlkhovatka,the6thPzDwouldultimatelyheadforKazache,hopefullycapturingtheimportanttownbeforequittingfortheday.Beforecapturingthemainobjectiveoftheday,the6thPzDhadtocaptureHill233.3andthevillageofSnamenkawhichturnedouttobedifficult.Ithadbeenrainingthatmorningandthepanzerswerehamperedbythemuddyground.OlkhovatkawasatinyvillageduenorthofSkliakhovoandwestofKomintern.vzz254+.vzz10m.dgr155m.dgr173m.dgr93m.dlu95+.At 1300 hrs, 3rd PzC artillery began to shell Shliakhovo; toward the end of the hour, the

Luftwaffedroppedtheirdeadlycargo.Atabout1415hrs,thegroundattackonShliakhovobeganwiththeattackingforcesdrivingalongbothsidesofRazumnoeRiverwiththemainefforttowardShliakhovo.The6thPzD,westofRazumnoeRiver,attackedtothenorthandseizedShliakhovoandlaterOlshanaya,OskochnoyeandfinallyKazache.Atthesametimedrivingtotheeastof6thPzD, the7thPzDattacked towardShieno.The3rdPzChadnowpenetrated theSoviet seconddefense belt and was in a position to operate in open terrain. At 1530 hrs, the 282nd GRRlaunched a counter in the direction of Sabynino and Kiselevo but it was stopped, with GRRsuffering heavy losseswhen theLuftwaffe flew in low strafing the advance. The left flank of

276thGRDhadtofallbacktobehindHill230.3butwerepushedasidewhenthe6thPzDcamethrough. At 2300 hrs, the 35th GRC ordered its troops back to the line from Vypolzovka toAleksandrovka.The19thPzDprotected6thPzD’s flankduring theattackandwasalsoable toreach Soyshno and then Saverskoye. The 3rd PzC was then ordered to cross the Donets andsupport the SS Corps in its envelopment of the 69th Army. shn160. dlu63m. dgr39m. vzz5m.shn160.dlu63m.dgr39m.vzz5m.Alongwiththesuccessofthetwootherpanzerdivisionsandafterahardfightby6thPzDto

capture Shliakhovo, the 6th PzD without pause advanced on Verkhne Olkhanets. With thispressure,SovietdefensescollapsedalongtheSheino-Shliakhovo-Kiselevolineallowingthe3rdPzCtomovefurtheralongtheRazumnaiaandDonetsRivers.Thisretreatwascriticalasthe69thArmywasgettingsqueezedandVatutinscouredtheareaforreservestobringuptosavehismenand stop the advance from reaching Prokhorovka. With this advancement, FM von Mansteinmoved his reserves (24th PzC: 17th PzD, 23rd PzD andViking) closer to the front, closer toBelgorod.Generally speaking, the 3rdPzC, on a line,moved fromMelikhovo area toVerkhniOlshanets area; it was a good day for 3rd PzC. jp170. jp172. mhz309. dgr209m. dgr102.dgr155m.dgr173m.vzz3m.vzz5m.With theGermans approachingOboyan, Prokhorovka andRzhavets, the Soviet 5thGTA, its

attachmentsandreserves,includingthe2ndTCand2ndGTC,movedtotheirassemblyareasforthecounter-attackin theBelenikhinoandProkhorovkaarea.Alsoincludedin the850tanktotalwas the5thGMC’s212 tanks,whichwouldbe in reserve.Besides the reserveVatutuinhad tosendanarmorgroupsouthtowardoffthe3rdPzC,leavinghismainattackgroupdownto500tanks.The3rdPzC,nowgainingmomentum,wassouthofthem,waitingforthe4thPzAtoattacktheSoviettanksfromthefrontsotheywouldhaveagoodchancetoencirclethemfromtherear.Asthe4thPzAnearedthem,theSovietsrealizedtheirdangerouspositionandretreatedfromtheenvelopment, giving theGermans an easier advance toProkhorovka.TheSoviets regrouped toadd reinforcements and attacked the Germans, who were trying to complete the takeover ofProkhorovka.Withmoreofthearriving6thPzDand19thPzDinthesector,theGermansdrovethe Soviet tanks back. The two divisions pursued the Soviets creating a bridgehead over theDonetsaftertakingRzhavets.UsingtwocapturedT34sasleadtanks,theGermanspassedthroughSovietlinesandwereabletoreachandcaptureRzhavetswithoutmuchofafight.EventuallytheSovietsdiscoveredthetruthandattackedtheGermancolumninsidethecitydistrictbutitwastoolateandtheGermancombatgrouptookcontrolof thecity.Itwasamajorcoupfor theaudiousGermans.jp176+.dlu63m.dgk222m.mhz328*.je106.rkz168.pck80.gnk309.fzk172?.zow160.Afewhours lateraftercapturingKazache, into thepredawnhoursof7/12,aspecialcombat

groupof6thPzDcapturedRzhavets,surprisingthegarrison.The6thPzDhadbrokenthroughtheseconddefensivebelt.Withtoday’sprogress,the19thPzDmovingtowardSabyninoand6thPzDscatteredbetweenKazacheandRzhavetshadcreatedalargerpocketbypressingthe81stGRDintheRzhavets,Strelnikov,Krivtsovo,Sabynino sector against thebanksof theDonets.The leadunitsof6thPzDwerenowlessthan11milesfromProkhorovkaandbecomingarealthreatto5thGTA’sflank.vzz255.vzz10m.dgk106m.vzz3m.dgr155m.dgr173m.gnk283m.dgr99.The7thPzDlaunchedat1000hrsagainstthe15thGRDand94thGRDof35thGRCalongthe

linefromwestofMiasoedovoeastwardtoSheino.TheSovietinfantry,withsupportofartillery,

wereabletorepulsethefirstfewattacks.By1500hrstheboundarylinebetweenthetwoSovietdivisionswas detected betweenMiasoedovo andSheino and exploiting thisweakness, the 7thPzDwiththesupportofupto50panzers,attackedagain.By1700hrs,theGermanshadreachedtherearareaof283rdGRRand288thGRRandwerethreateningencirclement.Fightingthroughdarkness andwith the help of an ambush attack fromMaj Chuev’s 286thGRR, the other tworegimentswereabletoescapetheclosingpocketbuthadsufferedheavycasualtiesintheprocess.AtthesametimeasthedivisionattackedMiasoedovo,asmallcombatgrouprodeuptheroadtoSheinoandanothergrouplaunchedanattack into thewoodsbetweenKalininandMiasoedovo.ThesuccessthethreepanzerdivisionshadonthisdaywasencouragingandKempfbelievedthatalink-upwithDasReichwasnowpossibleandwiththatlink-upthe48thRCof69thArmycouldbegintofeeltheGermanpincersslowlyclosingaroundthem.vzz255.vzz10m.dgk106m.vzz3m.dgr155m.dgr173m.gnk283m.dgr99.fzk171.ColonelRusskikh’s94thGRD,supportedby tanks,counter-attacked thesouthernflankof7th

PzDatSheino.TheSovietresistancewaslessthatdaybuttherearguardof69thArmywasonlythreemilestothenorthpreparingandwaitingfortheGermanstoarrive.Totheextremeeast,the15thGRDarrivedinfrontofthe106thID.The270thRDmovedinbehindthemandthe111thRDwasbehindthe213thRD.wdk157.vzz3m.vzz5m.vzz10m.Inthenorth,Model’s9thArmyhadbeenstopped.Inthesouth,theSovietswerefightingbitterly

and2ndSSPzC’sadvancewasslowingdown.Theattritionandexhaustionwasclearlyhavinganeffect.TheSSclaimed94tanksdestroyed,mostlyby2ndTCatKomsomolets.Only309SovietPOWswerecapturedandonlyfiveSovietairplanesshotdownduetothebadweather.Inthe3rdPzCsector,theSovietswerewithdrawing,givingKempfaneasiertimeinadvancingnorth.Whilethe6thPzDand7thPzDwerestillstrong,the19thPzDhadsustainedheavylosses.VonMansteindiscussedwithHoththatwithModel’sfailure,arethinkingoftheirplansandobjectiveswouldbenecessary. Von Manstein again told Kempf how important it was for 3rd PzC to reachProkhorovkainordertohelp2ndSSPzCdefeat5thGTA.snk84.wdk156.mhz287.mhz309.Aspartof thecoordinatedattackon the line that includedKiselevoandShliakhovoby19th

PzDand6thPzD,by1600hrsShliakhovowasbeingclearedandelementsof6thPzDhadbrokenthroughthelinewestofShliakhovoandheadedpastVerkhniOlshanetsandHill230.3,inordertoreachKazacheforthenight.Rzhavetswastheirmainobjective,whichtheleadunitswouldreachintheearlyhoursofthenextmorning.vzz402.dgr155m.dgr173m.vzz254+.vzz3m.dgr103.GroupSchmidtof19thPzDwiththesupportoftheLuftwaffe,brokethroughthelineheldby

280thGRRof92ndGRDandby1600hrscapturedKiselevo.HorstandSchmidtwereattackingthetownfromdifferentanglesandSchmidtontheeasternaxiswasluckierthanHorsttoenterthetownfirst.FromnearKurakovkanorthwestofKazache,the89thGRDmoveduptoKiselevoandcounter-attacked 19th PzD. The 92nd GRD stationed at Sabynino was also ordered south toKiselevo.The96thTBattheoriginallineregroupedandwasheadingforKiselevoaswell.ThecombinedSovietstrengthstoppedSchmidtandweretryingtoencirclehim.Kempf,realizingtheimportanceof19thPzD’smission,at1900hrssenttheLuftwaffeintosupport.Aftertheairraid,Schmidtattacked.The89thGRDstartedtofallbackbutranintotheleadunitsof6thPzDwhichwerealsoheadingfor theriver.With the48thRCindisorder, the168thIDon the left flankof19thPzDwasabletocrosstheDonetsandheadtowardGostishchevowhichwascapturedfrom

89thGRDlaterthatnight.KempfwasnowacrosstheDonetsintwoplaces,thoughnotsecured,andraisinghavocwith48thRC.Withtheday’sprogress,the19thPzDand6thPzDhadcreatedalarger pocket by pressing the 81stGRD in theRzhavets-Strelnikov-Krivtsovo-Sabynino sectoragainstthebanksoftheDonets.vzz255.vzz10m.dgk106m.dgr155m.dgr173m.gnk283m.dgr99.vzz403++.vzz3m.vzz5m.vzz406.vzz5m.Towardduskthe3rdPzCmovedintopositionfromthesouthtomakearunonProkhorovkain

themorningaswell.Duringthenight,elementsofthe5thGTAarrivedintheareatotakepartintheengagementnextmorning.TheSSPzCwasnotawareofthescaleof5thGTAand5thGAthathadalreadyarrivedandwerethreateningtheSS.Thoughthepresenceof3rdPzCdeployednearRyndinkadidhaveamodestimpactonVatutin,ifKempfcouldhavebeenjustfivemilescloseritwouldhavehadamuchgreatereffectonthedispositionsof5thGTAfortomorrow’soffensive.bt88.After dark, Hunersdorff’s 6th PzD supported by Capt Kageneck’s sPzAbt 503, captured

Kazache,8milesfromtheDonetsRiver.TheythenmovedtowardAleksandrovka,withthemainobjectiveofcapturingRzhavets12milesawayand theotherkeycrossingsiteover theDonetsnextmorning.By1900hrs, the6thPzDmaking thebiggestgains,broke through the92ndGRDline,scatteringitsforcesandbydarkhadreachedandcapturedKazacheattherearoftheseconddefensivebelt.Afewhourslater,intothepredawnhoursof7/12the6thPzDcapturedRzhavetsandbrokethroughtheseconddefensebelt.Theleadunitsof6thPzDwerenowlessthan11milesfromProkhorovkaandbecomingarealthreatto5thGTA’sflank.Atthesametimenextmorning,Schmidt’s19thPzDwouldfordtheDonets,driveonKrivtsevoandjoin6thPzDatRzhavetbynighttime.Facingbothpanzerdivisionswouldbethe81stGRD,89thRD,92ndGRD,93rdGRDandthe305thRDwhichweresupportedbytanks.dgk198.dgk222m.dlu63m.gnk298+.vzz3m.dgr103.fzk52.At2000hrs,withtheLuftwaffeflyingcover,theGermansadvancedfromShliakhovotoward

Lomovo against elements of the 35th RC. German bombers were hitting Kazache, VerkhnilOlshanetsandNovo-Oskochnoemuchof theday.By2200hrs theGermansbroke intoVerkhnilOlshanets,eastoftheDonetsandnearHill230.3.vzz236.vzz3m.At sundown the 3rdPzCpushed forward into the area north ofSheino.German intelligence

informedFMvonMansteinthatSovietreservesthatwereassembledeastofKharkovwerenowmovingnorth.In order for theKempfGroup to continue to screen 2ndPzC’s east flank, it had to advance

northwardbetweenUshakovoandSobyshnowhichwasstronglyheld.TheywerehavingtroublekeepingupbutdidbreakthroughthedefensesnearAleksandrovka,justsouthofHill241.5.AfterbreakingthroughRazumnoeandtheDonetsatRzhavets,thedriveonSkordnoyewouldrequireallof3rdPzCifitweretofall.Oncecaptured,itcouldthenhelp4thPzAinclearingouttheDonetstriangle.The4thPzAwasbeingfrontallyattackedtothepointwhereitcouldnotclearthetrianglebyitself.VonMansteinconsideredending3rdPzC’sattackandredeployingitwestoftheDonetsRiver to be linked with 2nd SS PzC but decided against the move. snk52+. vzz417. dgr39m.erz208.vzz12m.On the eastern flank the 19th PzD supported by 168th ID on its left begun to saturate the

Khokhlovo-Kiselevosector,about12milesnortheastofBelgorodontheLipovyiDonetsRiver.

Unabletowithstandthepressureandfearingthe167thIDwouldcrosstherivertoencircle,the375thRDbeganwithdrawingnorthwardabouttenmiles,allowingthe168thIDtoadvance.The19th PzD continued north on the east side of the Donets, passing through Khokhlovo in themorning then Kiselevo by midday, ending the day with its lead combat group over 19 milesnortheast ofBelgorod and a gain of 8miles for the day and showing the Sovietswere finallygiving ground. To the east of 19th PzD, the 6th PzD leading the charge also had a good day,penetratingtheSoviet lineatShliakhovoanddrivingthe305thRDandthe92ndGRDbacktenmiles to in front ofRzhavetswhere a new linewas forming.SeeMap15.wdk156. dgk222m.dlu63m.vzz10m.vzz3m.With the penetrationofKazache, the 6thPzDwasnoweightmiles southeast of the northern

reachesoftheDonets.IftheSoviet69thArmy’sfrontcontinuedtogiveway,Kempf,astheplanwasdeveloped,couldcrosstheriverbarriertotakewhatwouldbe5thGTAintheleftflankandrear and roll up the entire left flank of Voronezh Front. Blocking Kempf’s advance was thefortifiedtownofRzhavetswithitsbridgeover theriver,buthehadplansfor takingthecityaswell.aaa125m.dlu63m.pck83.gnk298.cbk76.vzz3m.fzk52+.By theendof theday, the threepanzerdivisionsof3rdPzCpenetrated thedefensesof96th

GRD and 305th RD, both of 35th GRC among others, in the sector that included Shishino,Khokhlovo,Kiselevo,Sheino,MiasoedovoandKazache.This advancewasnowdeep into theseconddefensebelt.Nextdoor, the92ndGRDand96thTBheld the linedespiteheavylosses.The3rdPzC,sincethestartoftheoperation,hadadvancedbetweentheDonetsRiverinthewest,past theRazummaiaRiverandhalfway to theKorenRiver in theeast. In thenorth faceof thesalient, the3rdPzCstartedthedayalongthelinesouthofKhokhlovo-DalniaiaIgumenkatotheRazummaiaRiver.Withthisday’sgains,the19thPzDadvancedalongtheDonetsasfarnorthasSabynino.The7thPzDhadsecuredMelnikhovoandmoveduptoShliakhovo.The6thPzD,inthecenterofthelinemadeitpastMelnikhovoandShliakhovoallthewaynorthtoKazache,carvingoutamini-salientofonlyafewmileswidethatsatontopofthelargersalientthat3rdPzCwasbuilding.Intheleadforthe6thPzDweretheremaining19TigersofsPzAbt503.TheseTigers,plusthe6thPzD’s11thPzR’s40panzers,madeaneffectivebatteringram.The7thPzDhadaboutthesamenumberofworkingpanzerswhile19thPzDhadabout25.vzz402.dgr155m.dgr173m.dlu93.The3rdPzCcontinueditsadvanceandwasabletoreachthelastSovietdefensivebelt.Itwass

estimated that in the previousweek, the corps captured 24,000 POWs, destroyed or damaged1,800 tanks, 1,080 assault guns and 267 guns. FM von Manstein still held the reliable butweakened24thPzCinreservebutwasconsideringusingthemtobackupthe3rdPzCifhecouldgetHitler’spermission.fzk316.kfz452.Later thatday, itwasdecided thatRotmistrovwould release thebattalionofKV1s from5th

GTAinordertomovesouthandattacktheTigersofsPzAbt503thatBreithhadleadinghisforcestowardProkhorovka.With theGermansnowin theAleksandrovkaarea,Kempfwasnowpushinghiscommanders

harderthanevertojoinupwithDasReich.The11thIChadtostoptheexpectedattackthatwouldbecomingtobreakthroughitslinesandattackthepanzersfromtherear,andsoprepareditselffor it. The 6th PzD would be used as the eastern screen while the rest of 3rd PzC moved

northward. As the 7th PzD and 19th PzD attacked toward Shakhovo, the 2nd GTC counter-attackedbutwiththeaidofthe167thIDonthewestsidewasabletorepulsetheSovietattack.ThepanzergroupdidcrosstheDonets,establishingtwosmallbridgeheads.TheattackonvillageofShakhovowouldbeginthefollowingday,aftertakingthewoodedareasouthofGostishchevo.1,000 POWs and large amounts of weapons and ammo were captured at Gostishchevo.GostishchevowastenmilesnorthofBelgorod.SeeMaps15,23.snk53+.lck283.vzz3m.erz208.vzz5m.vzz12m.

A17

July11thontheNorthernSalientmajor Soviet counter-attack got under way. The 41st PzC at Ponyri PC received theheaviest attacks but the 46th PzC and 47th PzCwere also hit hard. The Soviets were

targetingthepanzercorpsfordestruction.Elementsofthe23rdICdefendingTrosnafoughthardbutweredrivenback.Intheevening,Klugereleasedthe12thPzDand36thIDtothe46thPzCinthehopeofabreakthroughoftheseconddefensebeltthenextmorning.Atnight,aGermanattackonOlkhovatkafailedandtheattackersretreatedtotheirstartline.Theentire9thArmywasnowdefensive.sPzAbt653andsPzAbt654stoppedalloffensiveactionandwentdefensive.wdk183.fkk336.dgk87m.dgr199m.lck116m.Though the gains from the previous day were small, the Germans were still hopeful that

Olkhovatka,justafewmilestothesouthofthepresentline,couldbecaptured.ButthissuccessdependedonregainingtheflankingHill253.5whichwaslostthedaybefore.WithalltheSovietguns emplaced on this hill, the Soviets could tear to shreds any advance on Olkhovatka theGermanswouldmakeandRokossovskywasbringingmoregunstothefrontbythehour.BetweenOlkhovatkaandPonyrianimpenetablewallofgunshadbeenerectedoverthelastcoupledaysand9thArmyjustdidnothavetheresourcestooverwhelmit.Bytheendoftheday33rdPzRof4thPzDwouldhavejust347menstillfightingbutthankstotherepairshops,thepanzercountof35thPzRwasnowupto60;sPzAbt505nowhad11Tigersreadyforcombat.fkk69.dgk87m.FMKlugefinallyreleased12thPzDand36thIDtoModel.Modelimmmediatelyorderedboth

divisionstotravelthroughthenightandassemblenextto4thPzDnorthofOlkhovatkainordertoparticipateintherenewedattempttotakethecriticaltownandthesurroundingcountrysidewhichwasplannedtogetunderwayshortlyafterdaybreak.Modelhesitatedandinsertedjustaregimentof12thPzDintotheday’sfighting.HeexpectedtroubleatOrelandwaspreparingtosendforcestothesalient.nzk95.AsfightingatPonyri-Olkhovatkadieddown,theSovietsbeganprobingattacksinpreparation

forOperationKutuzov,theplanneddestructionoftheGermanforcesintheOrelsalient.UnitsoftheWesternFrontandBryanskFrontattackedthe55thIC,35thICand53rdICof2ndPzA.Oncethe penetration occurred, the 3rd TA would punch through and roll into the German rear,threateningthepositionsof9thArmyonthesouthernfaceoftheOrelsalient.FortheoffensivetheSoviets had accumulated over amillion troops from three fronts. The smallest armywas 50thArmy of Western Front, which had only 54,000 men. bt87+**. zzz101m. dgk87m. dgr199m.lck116m.East of Orel while the probing attacks were underway, the Soviets opened a surprise

bombardmenton2ndPzA(formerlyunderSchmidtbutnowunderModel)thatwouldprecedeacounter-attack beginning nextmorning,moremassive than any previous attack in the area.The

attackby11thGAwas launchedfromSukhinichi in thenorth. Itwas the idealchoice toattack.The2ndPzAwasextremelyweak thereand just to thenorthof theGerman lineahugewoodsallowed the Soviets to assemble their forces without being observed. FM Kluge initiallydismissed the attack as unimportant but by the end of the day, when the attack continued, hechangedhismindandcalledupwhatfewreserveswerelefttothearea.Meanwhilefurthersouth,theSovietshadplannedforseveralreserveunitstojointhefrontlinesonanothercounter-attackandexpectedthemtobeinplacebythestartoftheattackbuttheyweredelayed,weakeningtheassault.TheGermans,withthefullsupportoftheLuftflotte6repelledtheSoviets,forcingthemback but thewoodswere effective in concealing the Soviets and theGerman planes did littledamageto theiroriginal launcharea.Nextday, theassaultonly increasedaroundthesalient. Inthisnorthernsector, theSovietsappearedtobeaimingforKhotynetsinordertocut thecriticalBryansk-Orelhighway/railroad.FordaystheLuftwaffekepttheSovietsatbayuntilartilleryandAGCreservescouldbebroughtup.TheGermanplanesdidmakestrikesagainsttherailtownsofnearbyKozelsk andKaluga to the north, in the hopes of interrupting the Soviet logistics. TheLuftwaffewerenowusingarmor-piercingshellsthatcouldpenetrateSoviettank’s’rearplating,eitherknockingouttheengineorhittingthefueltank.SeeMap22.jp172.je108.snk168zzz101m.aaa125m.aaa106m.dgk231m.snk433m.In the afternoon in the 2nd PzA area, the Bryansk and Western Fronts started increasing

pressureontheGermanlinenorthandeastofOrel.SomeSovietreserveswerestillbeingheldbackwithpotential to increase thepressureon theGermans.TheSovietsstilloutnumbered theGermansbyover2 to1 inmost categories.AGCordered the9thArmy to the south tohalt itsadvance, go defensive and be ready to shift troops to help the 2nd PzA. jp173. zzz101m.dgk231m.snk433m.Probing attacks by Bryansk and Western Fronts in the Orel salient had begun. The

reconnaissancetroopswerelookingforpointsofweaknessfromwhichtoattackinforcethenextday,whentheoffensivewouldbeginforreal.Modelimmediatelyunderstoodthemeaningoftheseattacks and that night started sending forces from 9th Army north to the Orel salient. kcz169.dgk231m.snk433m.The 47th PzC was worn out and battle weary; any further attacking by the corps was

impossible.Kluge assigned the12thPzD tohelpbolster the sector from the expected counter-attacks.The5thPzDand8thPzDwould alsobe comingover to the sector.wdk183. dgk87m.dgk231m.InthelateafternoononthenorthernflankoftheOrelsalient,the11thGAwasgainingground

toward Khotynets. A flak battalion was sent from nearby Karachev as a stopgap measure toprevent the enemy from cutting their supply line. Using their 88s and their 20mm guns, thebattalionwasabletoholdofftheattackuntiltheLuftwaffecamebackandmoreartillerycouldbebrought up to plug the hole.When the Sovietswere approachingKhotynets,Model shifted theentireairsupportfrom9thArmytoprotectthissector.Withoutairsupport,the9thArmywouldhavetogodefensive.Itwascriticaltoholdthisrailline,notonlyforsuppliesandtroopscomingintothesalientbuttherailroadwouldbeneededwhenevacuationordersweregiven.TherewasahugesupplydepotatOrelandModelwantedtotakeasmanysuppliesaspossiblewithhim,notleavinganythingfortheSoviets.SeeMap22.snk169.dgk231m.snk433m.

Rendulic’s35thICof2ndPzAwasdeployedalongthelineabout30mileseastofOrel.Muchofthelinewasdeployedbehindanarrowbutdeepriverthatwasimpossiblefortankstonavigatewithoutabridge.Butoncepastthisobstacletheterrainwasmostlyflatandidealfortanks.Hiscorpswasdowntolessthan40,000men,200gunsandnopanzers.Hisareaofresponsibilitywas80miles longandwasdividedbetween the34th ID,56th ID,262nd IDand the299th ID.TheSovietshadbeenconcentratingforcesintheNovosilareaandby7/11had16RDsand300tanksplusanother1,100tanksalongthelineinthegeneralarea.snk218+.zzz101m.dgk231m.snz259+.snk433m.OntheeveofthefullstartofOperationKutuzov,theSoviet2ndVVSmademassivebombing

runsacross the linefromitsBryanskFront,hittingGermanbatteriesandpanzerconcentrations.Theoperation’sobjectivewastodriveintotherearof the9thArmybygoingthrough2ndPzAdefenses in theOrel salient. This counter-offensive had been planned formonths thanks to theLucy Spy ring that informed the Soviets of theGerman offensive thatwould start by 7/6. TheSovietswaiteduntil9thArmywasexhaustedthenlaunchedalimitedattackonatenmilefront,hoping to surprise the Germans while their concentration was on Kursk. Model had to usereserves intended for the salient on this assault. rc221. dgk230. zzz101m. dgk231m. snk433m.mkz121.lck116m.Lateatnight,Modelorderedhislastreservesofthe9thArmy,the10thPzGDunderSchmidt

andthe31stID,toattackinthecentralpartofthelinenearPonyri.TheyrepelledastrongSovietcounter-attackat therailstationatPonyributwereunabletoholdholdthetown.Bythispoint,eventheGermansknewKurskcouldnotbewonbutModelwouldnotgiveup.WiththeprobingattacksbytheSovietstothenorthandeastofOrelbeginning,thesewouldbethelastresourcessenttotheKursksalient.je108*.mhz287.zzz101m.dgk87m.dgr199m.swm139.lck116m.Bytheendoftheday,totalcasualtiesfor9thArmysincethestartofOperationCitadelwere

estimatedtobe22,273.Itwasalsoestimatedthatthefivepanzerdivisionsof41stPzCand47thPzChadsufferedover6,500casualtieswhichgivesanindicationhowbadtheinfantrydivisionswere hit. The figures for unrecoverable panzersweremodest and planes ofLuftflotte 6wereextremelylightatonly94planesforhavingflownover10,000missions.snz254.

T

18

July12thontheSouthernSalientSeeMaps16,19,20,27

hefirstobjectiveofthedayfor1stPzGRand1stPzRwastomoveoutatdawnandcapturetheStalinskoeStateFarmnearHill252.2andthentomoveeastandcaptureIamki,southof

Prokhorovka. The 2nd PzGR was to wait until SSTK had advanced past Hill 226.6 and wasattacking towardHill 252.4,beforemovingnorth fromHill252.2.The2ndPzGRwas tohelpsqueeze and destroy the Soviet defenders between itself and SSTK before shifting east andattackingProkhorovkafromthenorth,while1stPzGRwasattackingfromthesouth.zrl233.Inthepredawnhours,elementsof the95thGRDand9thGADlaunchedanattackonLAH in

ordertopushthembacktogive5thGTAalittlemoreroomtomaneuverinthemorningattack,buttheattemptwasrepulsed.Underthenoiseproducedbythisassault,thetanksof5thGTAmoveduptotheirultimatestartingareas.vzz241.Thiswasabigdayinthecampaignasbothsidesexpectedtodeliverthevictoriousassault,the

knock-out punch that would doom the other side and allow themselves to complete theirintermediateobjectives.VonMansteinexpectedhisforcestocaptureProkhorovkaandsecuretheimportantcorridorleadingtoKursk,secureandenlargetheirbridgeheadoverthePselRiverandbereadytolaunchanattackonOboyaninthenextdayortwo.Healsoexpected3rdPzCtocatchup toDasReich and close the pocket around elements of 69thArmy and consolidate the line.Vatutinontheotherhand,expectedwiththemassivearmorof5thGTAtobreakthebackofthe2ndSSPzCandbeginpushingbackthe4thPzA.Whiletherewasintensefightingonthisday,bytheendofthedaybothGeneralsweredisappointed,withneithersideachievingtheirobjectives.WhileitcostVatutinmuchmoreinmenandtanksanddidnotbreakthebackoftheSS,hewasable tohalt theGermanoffensiveandwouldeventually,over thenext twoweeks,push the4thPzAbacktotheirstartingpoint.dsk111.Atmidnight and into the predawn hours, the tank corps of 5thGTAbeginmoving into their

launchpositionsfornextmorning’sgrandoffensive.Theareawherenearly400tankswerebeingpositionedwasaboutsevenmilesinlengthbytwomileswideandmanyofthemonlyonetotwomilesfromtheGermanline.TheGermansentriesallalongthelinecouldhearthecommotionofsomanytanksanddreadedthecomingofthemorning.HQwasquicklyinformedofthetanksandreinforcementsweresenttothekeysectorsandinplacebydaybreak.AftertheSoviettankswereinplace, themenof the9thGADfacingLAHand95thGRDfacingSSTKmoved intoposition.vzz295.vzz341.wwf123.Priesswas ordered to secureHill 226.6 at dawn beforemoving on to other objectives, so

while the Soviets were busy deploying, the men and panzers of SSTK were also getting into

position. The role for SSTK became critical. It was imperative for the division to expand itsbridgehead, secure Veselyi, Hill 226.6 and Hill 236.7 (1.5 miles north of Veselyi) beforereachingtheProkhorovka-Kartashevkaroad.ItwasthentoadvanceandpreferablycaptureHill252.4beforeLAHreachedProkhorovka.InthiswaythedivisioncouldprotectLAH’sleftflankasitmadearunforProkhorovka.ThesethreehillswouldmakegreatOPsforeithersidebutwerenow defended by 51stGRD and 52ndGRDwith 95thGRD in second echelon.North ofHill226.6,the95thGRDalsocoveredHill243.5,eastoftheVoroshilovStateFarm.Asofthenightbefore,Vasilevka on the southern bank of the Pselwas in the control of the 99thTB and thatwouldhavetobetakenbySSTKalso.ThevillagecouldbeusedasalaunchpointofadvancebytheSovietstoretaketherivercrossingandthenSSTKwouldbeinbigtroubleonthenorthsideofthe river. Priess was also aware of the tank situation on the other side of the river and wasconcernedforthecomingmorning.vzz341.vzz382+.vzz442.vzz1m.gnk343++.gnk313m.Also important for the east flank of 2nd SSPzC,DasReich had to secure Storozhevoe, its

woodsandPravorottotheeastinordertosecureLAH’srightflank.AllthreedivisionshadtobeinlineiftheyweretosecureProkhorovka.vzz341.vzz382+.vzz442.vzz1m.gnk312m.ElementsofSSTKalsodeployedatVasilevkaandalongpartofthePselRiverbank.Therewas

anextensiveassaultplanfortheSSthatdayanditdependedonSSTKenlargingthebridgeheadasfar north as theKartashevka road, before turning east to protectLAH’s western flank when itattacked Prokhorovka, but Priess also had to defend the southern bank of the river. Hearingextensive tank noise during the predawn hours did not make Priess over confident about hisupcomingoffensivebutthepanzerslaunchedprettyclosetoplanandthegrenadierswouldhaveto rely on theLuftwaffe and their artillery to stop any attack. By 0900 hrs, the 3rd PzRwascrossingthePseltobolsteritscomradesandtoinitiatetheattackwhenordered.PriessalsodidnotknowMajGeneralPopov’s95thGRDand97thGRDof33rdGRCof5thGAhadmovedinandbolsteredtheshattered52ndGRDonthefrontline.Behindthe33rdGTCwas42ndGRDandthe 11thMRBdefending theKartashevka road. Itwould be a very difficult day for theSSTK.gnk343++.gnk313m.vzz341.vzz1m.ztc270.At0030hrsLAHconductedareconinforcethatincludedmenandafewpanzers,startingfrom

thewoodsnorthwestofStorozhevoeandattackingnorthtowardLutovo.ThegarrisonatLutovo,made up of the 25th TB of 29th TC and its 25th MRB, were prepared and counter-attackedquickly,repulsingtheGermanswhofellbacktoStorozhevoewithinthehour.ThepreviousdaytherewerenotanksatLutovo;thistoldHausserthatnewtankshadbeenbroughttothelineandwouldsoonattack.LutovowassituatedsothatatankoffensivewouldrunpastStalinskoeStateFarm, Komsomolet State Farm and Storozhevoe. Hausser immediately ordered a platoon ofassault guns to setupanambushon this expectedaxis.Hoth, also suspectingamajor counter-attack,orderedanunusualnumberofreconsduringthepredawnhours.BydaybreakHothwouldhaveagoodunderstandingthatanattackwascomingandwouldpostponedhisadvanceuntiltheSovietoffensivewasbeatenback.LutovowasnortheastofHill252.2,abouthalfwaybetweenthehillandProkhorovka.vzz295+.vzz444+.dgk184m.ThedaybeganwiththeGermansdeployedalongthefollowingline:The167thwashalfmile

southwest of Gostishchevo to Soshenkov.Das Reich was from northeast corner of Kalinin tosoutheastcornerofIasnaiaPolianatoStorozhevoe.LAHdeployedfromStorozhevoe,Oktiabrski

StateFarmandHill252.2tojusteastofthevillagesonthesouthernbankofthePselRiverwhereSSTK tookoveralongthePselRiver.TheGDwashalfmilesouthwestofHill243.0 toamilewestofVerkhopenie.The11thPzDwasbetweenSSTKandGD.The332nd IDwas fromHill237.6toBerezovkatonorthofthewoodseastofChapaevtoChapaev,andthe3rdPzDdeployednorthof332ndIDtotheboundarylinewithGD.vzz438*+*.vzz3m.vzz5m.vzz7m.Rotmistrov’sattackplanforthedaywasambitiousbutstraightforward;itcontainedthreemain

axesofattack.Histankcorps,withtheinfantryof5thGAfollowing,wouldattackalongthesevenmilefrontheldby2ndSSPzCbutthemainthrustofhistankswouldbeonthreeaxesfromthreedirectionsthatwouldmeetinthegeneralareaborderedbytheGresnoe,KomsomoletsStateFarm,TeterevinoNorthtriangletodissectandthendestroytheSS.Thefirstaxiswouldinvolve18thTC(181stTB,170thTB)drivingsouthwestalongthePselRiverclearingthevillagesonthesouthernbankasfarasVasilevkabeforeturningtothesoutheastandheadingforPokrovka,GresnoeandKomsomolets.By taking the villages, itwould isolate theSSTK bridgehead north of the river,whichwouldbevulnerabletothe5thGAdrivingsouth.wwf133+.kuz95.Whentheoffensivebegan,thesecondaxis,thatofthe29thTC(25thTB,31stTB32ndTB)to

theeastof18thTC,wouldstraddletheProkhorovkaroad,pastIamkitoKomsomoletsStateFarm.PenetratingLAH’seasternflankanduponreachingthefarmwouldisolateLAHfromDasReich.The thirdaxiswas2ndGTCand thecorpshaddeployed to the southeast in theZhimolostnoe-InvanovkaareaandwoulddrivewestandalittlenorthtotheTeterevino-KomsomoletsareatogetbehindDasReich.Withthesupportof29thTCtothenorthand2ndTContheeasternperimeter,thethreecorpswoulddestroyDasReich.Theinfantryfollowingthetankerswouldsqueezeandeliminate the last of the resistance.Vatutinwas evenmore ambitious,wanting to take a biggerchunkofthe4thPzAbyhavinghisforcesmeetintheIakovlevoareaafterthe2ndSSPzCwasdestroyed. Skvortsov’s 5th GMC (10th GMB, 11th GMB, 12th GMB) was originally held inreservebutthatwouldchangewhenRzhavetsfell.Therewereadditionaltankbrigadesinvolvedinthisoffensiveandthosewillbediscussedastheoffensiveevolves.Theplanfor29thTC,whichhaditsgreatestconcentrationoftanksnearthebrickfactoryjust

outside of Prokhorovka,was to drive south along the road/railway to the east of 18thTC andattackbetweentheOktiabrskiStateFarmandIamki.The33rdGRCof5thGAand32ndMRBand53rdMRBof5thGTAwouldfollowthetankstosecurethearea.Betweenthetwomainpincersofthe18thTCand29thTC,alongafrontofalmostfourmiles,atotalof234tankswereinfirstechelon,hundredsmorewouldbesecondechelonandmoreinreserve.The29thTCwithits170tanks,consistingof32ndTB,25thTBand31stTB,wouldhavethetoughresponsibilityoftakingthewell-fortifiedOSFandthentheKSF.The18thTCwithits140tanksinfirstechelonconsistedof181stTB,170thTBand the32ndMRBandwouldhave toneutralizeHill252.2aswellascapturingthekeyvillagesonthesouthernbankofthePsel.Bothbrigadeswouldhavethesupportof the 127th GRR of 42nd GRD. The 32ndMRB and 53rdMRB, as well as several mortarregiments,wouldbeinsecondechelon.Khliupin’s110thTBandthe36thGTRof18thTC,withacombinedtotalofaround100tanks,wereincorpsreserve.The5thGMCwith228tankswouldbein5thGTAreserve.AftersendingsomeofhistankstoblockKempf,Rotmistrovstillhadasmanyas600tanks(notall infirstechelon)tocontendwiththe294panzersandassaultgunsof2ndPzC.Forthatday’sassaultthe5thGTAwithitsrecentattachmentshad501T34s,261T70s

and31Churchill tanksaswellasafewassaultguns;thatwouldtipthescalesat justover800vehicles, poised near Prokhorovka preparing for the coming tank battle. wwf94. dgr222+.vzz309.vzz441+.gnk309+*+.gnk313m.gnk320.vzz318.vzz341.wwf121. sgf348.wwf133++.wwf140.IfHothandHausserhadnotexpectedacounter-attackandgoneonthedefensive,notbringing

artilleryclosertothelineduringthenight,Rotmistrov’splanmighthavebeenmoresuccessfulbutthe fact is that every available gun was brought up to the line and contributed greatly to theGermandefenseduringtheSovietassault.Bytheendof1942,GreatBritainhadstoppedsendingtheheavyChurchilltanktoStalin,who

thought little of it and did not want any more of them. The tank had a 12 cylinder gas 350horsepowerengineandatopspeedof16mph.TheonesatKurskwereamongthelastofthe301tanksthatweresenttoRussia.wwf95.According to Rotmistrov’s plan, 18th TC on the west side of Oktiabrski State Farm was

headingsouthwestalongthethePselRivertostrikeSSTK’spositionstraddlingtheriverandtoseparateSSTKfromLAH.The29thTC’s25thTBwouldbreakthroughOktiabrskiStateFarmandKomsomoletsStateFarmandheadforLuchkiNorthandIakovlevo,inordertoisolateLAHfromDasReich.Partof29thTC,mostlythe25thTB,alongwith2ndGTCtothesoutheastwouldthendrivebehindDasReichwhile2ndTCwouldattackthedivisionfromthefront.Rotmistrovwoulddiscover by the end of the day that preparations had been poor and that cooperation andcoordinationbetweenthedifferenttankcorps,andbetweentankcorpsandinfantry,wasterribleandwouldproducemiserableresults.vzz298.dgk180.fkk327.EvenwiththeGermansadvancingfaster thanexpectedthenightbefore,Rotmistrovhadbeen

abletochangehisplansandcommunicatethosechangestohiscorpscommandersconcerningtheattack,especiallythelaunchpositionagainstSS2ndPzClaterthatmorning.Intheoriginalplan,theOSFwasstillinSoviethandsandtheattackwastobeginalongthatline,butwiththefarminGerman hands, Rotmistrov had to start further back in the corridor and then attack twostrongpointslikeHill252.2andtheOSK.Thisaspectchangewasoneofthemajorreasonsforsuchacostlyassault.The18thTCand29thTCwithunder300tanksinfirstechelonwouldtaketheleadpositionagainstLAHandSSTK.The25thTBof29thTCwouldattackintheStorozhevoesectorandBurdeiny’s2ndGTCwouldattackfurthersouthagainstDasReich,whilePopov’s2ndTCremainedonthedefensivetoscreenagainstDasReich’sadvancetowardIamkifromsouthofStorozhevoe. These last two emancipated corps still had 187 tanks.Alongwith the secondarybrigades,Rotmistrov’s5thGTAwouldhavejustover800tanksathisdisposal,thoughonly600tanksparticipatedintheday’soffensive.Nowtheprimaryfrontwouldbedilutedbysendingthe26th GTB and others to Trufanov in order to face both the 2nd SS PzC and 3rd PzC. In theProkhorovkaarea,atmost1,100,probablyfewertanksfought.Thiswasnotthelargesttankbattlerecorded.During the firstmonth of thewar in the Brody-Dubno sector, a tank battle betweenSouthwest Front and 1st PzG involved about 3,800 tanks, maybe more. gjz186+. wwf94.dgr222+.mhz327.pck80+.lck344.sgf348.wwf111+.zra348+.zow160.vzz554.In the predawn hours, 2nd GTC regrouped its remaining 97 tanks in an area east of

Belenikhino.ThesetankswouldattackDasReichdefendingpositionsfromwestofVinogradovkaalong the rail line to Belenikhino later thatmorning.While the 18th TC and 29th TC had the

primarypositionandresponsibility,therolefor2ndGTCwasalsoimportant,foritwastoassistthe25thTBfurthernorthtoisolateanddestroyDasReichontheeasternflankofthe2ndSSPzCsector.The29thTCwasthecenterof5thGTA’sfrontanditwouldforthemostpartattackdowntheProkhorovkaroad.Theweakened2ndTC,positionedbetween29thTCtothenorthand2ndGTCtothethesouth,wouldtrytojointhelinebyprotectingtheflanksbetweenStorozhevoeandIvanovskiVyselok.The21KVtanksofthe53rdGTRwhichwereoriginallyorderedtoprotectBurdeiny’s flank between Storozhevoe and Ivanovski Vyselok were redirected southward tosupport the thinning ranks of Popov’s brigades. These KV1s would however deploy againstKempf if the 6th PzD and 19th PzD broke through the front line blocking the 3rd PzC fromreachingProkhorovka.ElementsofSkvortsov’s5thGMCwithatotalof228tankswouldbeinreserve.The3rdPzCwasdesperatelyneededtosupportDasReichinreachingProkhorovkabutKempf

was at Rzhavets, 12 miles away, with his forces just crossing the Donets. From Rzhavets, ascoutingpartyleftafterdarkheadingeasttowardKurakovkaandAlexsandrovka.BeforereachingAlexsandrovka,theGermansdiscoveredalargearmorformationassemblingoutsideoftown;ithadtoquicklyreversecourseandheadbacktoRzhavets toreport itsfindings.After thereportwasgiven,the11thPzRof6thPzDwasroundedupandsenttoKurakovkaafterdarktoprepareanattackonthisSovietarmorgroup.GeneralHunersdorffcouldnotaffordtohaveastrongarmorgrouptohisrearwhileadvancingovertheDonetstowardProkhorovka.Eliminatingthisthreattothe 6th PzD’s rear was essential but it diluted and delayed 3rd PzC’s advance towardProkhorovka,reducingthepressureoff69thArmyforafewhours.dgk180+.dgk184m.dgr172m.dgk222m.pck82+.vzz366+.lck365.zzt90.Bymorning,thebulkofZhadov’s5thGAhadfullyarrivedintheProkhorovkasectorbutwith

Zhadovinsecondechelonhisforceswouldhavetoenterthebattlewithvirtuallynotanksupport.The10thTChadbeenpartofthe5thGAbuton7/9itwasattachedto1stTA.The11thMRBof10thTCwasstillhoweverdefendingnearthekeyHill226.6.Zhadov’sleftflank,consistingoftheColSazonov’s9thGADandMajGeneralBobrov’s42ndGRDwouldattackbetweenthePselRiver andStorozhevoebehind the tanksof 5thGTA.The right flank, consistingof 52ndGRD,95thGRD(33rdGRC)and97thGRDwouldattackSSTKinthebendoftherivertoeliminatethebridgeheadcurrentlycenteredonKliuchi,southwestofHill226.6.Itwouldalsoattack11thPzDintheKochetovkaarea.When33rdGRCbrokeintoKochetovka,ittemporarilyseveredthelinkbetween11thPzDwithSSTK.The33rdGRCwas tokeepSSTK northof the riverbusywhile18thTCsweptbehind theGermanssouthof theriverandencircled them.The left flankwouldthenheadforGresnoe,MalyeMaiachkiandIakovlevo.Followingbehindthe33rdGRCwouldbe32ndGRD’s13thGRDand66thGRDalongside33rdGRC’s97thGRD.TheseplansdidnotmaterializeasPriess’sSSTKattackedfirst,afterputtingdownasmallprobingattack.SSTKhadto gain ground quickly in order to catch up and screen LAH’s advance. vzz322+. vzz380+*.vzz1m.gnk312m.nzk96.kuz193.zrl234.zow161.Inadditionto theambitiousattackplansfor5thGTAand5thGA,Vatutinalsohadimportant

attackplans for1stTAand6thGA.The5thGTCand19thTC,onseparateaxes,woulddrivethroughthewesternfrontof48thPzC,dividingtheGermancorps into thirds,againstwhich6thGAwould follow up and finish crushing the 48th PzC. The two tank corps would link up at

Iakovlevoalongwiththecorpsof5thGTAafter theirseparationofthe2ndSSPzCintothirds.TogetherallthesetankcorpswouldformaimpenetrablewallthatwouldrolluptheGermansasthey tried to avoid destruction from the infantry heading south. As customary with Stavkaplanning, their plan was too ambitious and lacked coordination and sufficient preparation.wwf132+.ThefallofRzhavetsandthecrossingoftheDonetsbytheGermanswerethreatsthatcouldnot

beignoredandVatutinandRotmistrovhadtoactwithoutdelaybytransferringforcestotheriver.Sincetherewerenotsufficientmobilereservesinthesector,frontlinebrigadeswouldbepulledfromthemainattackforce.ThisweakeningofRotmistrov’sforcesbyover100tanksandseveralPakbatterieswouldsorelybefelt.Rotmistrov’sreservenowconsistedof10thGTBandthe24thGTBwhichonlyhadatotalof96tanks.By0515hrs,the5thGTAwasatitsmodifiedstartlinePrelestnoe-Storozhevoe-Maloe Iablonovo and waiting for the launch signal. The attack wasoriginallyscheduledfor1000hrsbutValsilevskywanted tocontrol thebattlefieldandbeat theGermanpanzerstothefield,sotheattackwasmovedto0830hrsaftera30-minutepreparation.Thebarragecame fromnear theOktiabrskiStateFarm,KomsomoletsStateFarm,StorozhevoeandStalinskoeStateFarm.Somuchwashappeningtothe5thGTAintheearlyhoursthatitwaschaoticandthiswascompoundedbynewCOsworkingtogetherforthefirsttimeandlackingtheinitiative to thinkbeyondtheorderswhenitwasnecessary.At theendof theday,manySovietofficerswouldcomplainthatthepreparationwaspoorlyfocusedandnotaggressiveenough.Thesamewould be said for theVVS,whichwas delinquent for such amajor offensive. vzz300+.vzz306++.wwf136.Duringthepredawnhours,theLuftwaffesent61planesoutonspecialmissionstohelpeasethe

advanceofthegroundforcesshortlyafterdaybreak.Sevenbombersbombedtherailwaystationat Staryi Oskol, east of Prokhorovka, in the hopes of slowing reinforcements and suppliesreaching thebattle zone.The raidwas successful and largeexplosionscouldbe seenerupting.TheremainderoftheGermanplanesattackedSovietpositionsbehindthefrontlineontheroutesthatthe2ndSSPzCwouldtakeinthemorning.Theimportanceofthesemissionswastelling,fortheskieswereheavilyovercast.cbk76+.cbk78.Inpreparationfortheiroffensive,the2ndVAand17thVAflew240bombersagainstGerman

positionsalongthe lineMalyeMaiachki,BolshieMaiachki,PokrovkaandGremuchi.Thiswasthegeneralareawhere29thTC,18thTCand2ndGTCwere tomeet inaencirclementattack.Additionalplanesfrom17thVAattacked4thPzA’ssupplyroutessouthwestofBelgorod.cbk77.Duringthepredawnhours,thunder,lightningandheavyrainshittheDasReichsector,causing

delays.AfterLAH finished capturing the area north of Storozhevoe,Das Reich’sDeutschlandRegimentwastoconductanadvanceeastwardinthedirectionofIamki.Forthatmatter,theentireDasReichdivisionalong itswholesector fromStorozhevoe toTeterevinoSouthwas toattackbutthemuddyconditionsslowedtheirpace.ThepanzerregimentinthecenterofthesectorwouldheadforVinogradovkaandIvanovka.Theattackby2ndGTCandtoalesserextent2ndTC,wasanimportantpartofthemainoffensiveby5thGTAthatpre-emptedtheGermans,forcingthemtogodefensive.Hausserhadwarnedhisdivisionsofapendingattack,instructedthemtostabilizetheirlinesaheadoftimeand,withonlyafewexceptions,hadgonedefensive.gnk340.gnk313m.wwf123.

At0300hrs,elementsofthe29thTCalongwiththeattached10thTBlaunchedaprobingattacktotherightofHill252.4inthedirectionof thewoodsnorthofKomsomoletsStateFarmtothenorthern outskirts of BolshieMaiachki to Hill 251.2, in preparation to themain attack whichwould start at 0830 hrs. Their objective was to reach Grushki-Storozhevoe-Hill 223.4-Pogorelovka and destroy theGerman positions onHill 255.9 northeast of Teterevino and thenHill258.9.Behindthe29thTC,the53rdMRBwouldfollow,advancingtowardHill258.8andnearbyStorozhevoe.TheimportantHill252.4whichbristledwithSovietartillery,wasoneandahalfmiles northwest of Prokhorovka andwould support the attack.A number of other smallerattacksbetween thePselRiver and just southofStorozhevoewere initiated toprepare for themajorattackaswell.vzz272+*.dgk174.dgr224.vzz8m.zrl234.At0315hrsonthisMondaymorning,theSSTKdrove,inpouringrainswiththegroundquickly

turningtomud,intothecitylimitsofVasilevka,engaginginhousetohousecombat.SoviettankscomingfromPetrovkaenteredVasilevkafromtheeast.TigershadalongerrangeoffirethantheSoviettanks,sotheSovietsrushedinandfoughtthe

Germansupclose, trying toequalize. Inoneexample,aSovietcommanderdiedafterbeinghittwice by aTiger but the driverwas still alive.With theT34 burning and belching smoke, thedriveracceleratedtofullspeedandrammedtheevadingTiger.Thecrashofa100tonsshooktheground.jp184.The LAH started the day with only four operational Tigers under the current command of

MichaelWittmann.RotmistrovbelievedtheGermanshadupto100TigersandheschooledhisdriverstoraceinandshootatpointblankrangeinordertoneutralizetheTiger’sthickhideandpowerfulgun.RotmistrovwasluckythattherewereonlyahandfulofTigersavailable,otherwiseitishardtoimaginehowfewtankswouldhavesurvivedtheday.gnk310.During the very early hours, the engineers of the 51st Motorized Sapper Battalion cleared

pathwaysthroughtheextensiveminefieldsacrosstheProkhorovkaraillinetospeedtheattackby2ndGTC.vzz362+.Atfirstlight,SovietbombersandfightersbombedandstrafedGermanpositionsintheattack

zonesof thecomingoffensive.After theairstrikes,Sovietgunsopenedup to furthersoften theGerman line.Of special interest to theSovietswereSSTK’s bridgehead north of the Psel andLAH’spositiononHill252.2whichwasonlyamilewest from theedgeofProkhorovka.AnyGermansneartheraillinewerealsohit.gnk315+.At0450hrsmovingoutfromnearHill241.6,agroupofthe1stPzRofLAHlaunchedtoward

Stalinsk, capturing it.With the help ofDasReich, Storozhevoe and Iamkiwould be next. ThecombatgroupthenmovedtodefendtheProkhorovkaroaduntilreinforcementscame.DasReichwasintheprocessofclearingandstrengtheningtheareabetweenStorozhevoeandVinogradovkabeforelaunchingtheirmainattackeastward.ThesevillageswerepartofthesouthernapproachtoProkhorovka andwere important to control.The 3rdPzCwas too far south to give anydirectassistancetotheoperationbutvonMansteinwashopingthatthe3rdPzCwascloseenoughthatitmightbeable todivertSovietarmorawayfromProkhorovka.The26thGTBof2ndGTCwasdiverted from the Storozhevoe area to stop Kempf from enlarging his new bridgehead nearRyndinka.dgk178+.dgk184m.dgr172m.vzz362++.dgr221m.gnk365m.Justbeforedaybreak,theeastflankofLAHwaspreparingtolaunchtheirattacknortheastward

withtheobjectiveoftakingStorozhevoe,thewoodsnorthofit,StalinskoeStateFarmandIamkiand then advance on the hill onemile east of Storozhevoe-Iamki.With the aid of SSTK afterclearingthePselRiver,bothdivisionswouldmoveonHill252.4andProkhorovka.DasReich,screeningLAH,was tomarchforwardandmakecontactwithLAHatStorozhevoe,clearing thehillsnortheastoftownwhiletherestofDasReichalsomovedonVinogradovka-Ivanovka.Theywere then to hold the line: Ivanovka-the ridge southwest of Pravorot- hill one mile east ofStorozhevoe.IfLAHandSSDRsucceededintheirplansand3rdPzCcouldcontinueadvancing,thetankcorpsattachedto5thGTAandtheinfantryof69thArmywouldbeinrealdangerofbeingpocketed.fkk157+.gnk313m.Dawnbrokeon thisMondayand itwasheavilyovercast throughout thesouthernsectorwith

heavylocalshowers,makingitdifficultforbothsidestomaneuver.zow161.At0500hrs, theLAH joinedupwithSSTK in theattempt tostrengthen theboundary linebut

withdaybreaktheSovietairfleetbombedbothgroups,slowingtheirprogress.At0600hrsnorthofHill226.6theSSrepulsedaSovietregimentattheProkhorovka-Petrovkalinewiththehelpofstrongartillerysupport.Nearing daybreak along the seven mile front from west of Hill 226.6 to Hill 252.2 to

Vinogradovka, the 2ndSSPzCwere completingpreparations for theirmajor assault andweremoving into the front linepositions.Hothsuspected theSovietswould launchanoffensive thismorningsothepreviousnighthehadorderedhiscorpscommanderstofortifydefensesandonlylaunch after the Soviet attack had been repulsed. In addition, all available artillery andammunition was made ready. Gresnoe and Hill 241.6 were especially well prepared andfortified.Hothmayhaveexpectedanassault, butnotnearly to the scale thatoccurred.Sunrisewas0502hrs.lck343.vzz309.gnk312m.During predawn hours, Soviet recon forces reported their findings to HQ. The Germans

showedheightened activities atKomsomolets StateFarm,Storozhevoe,Oktiabrski StateFarm,Hill 241.6, Vinogradovka, Ivanovski Vyselok and Teterevino. Storozhevoe appeared to havefallenandtheGermanswereheadingfurthereasttowardZhimolostnoe.vzz443.At0525hrs,theSSTKlaunchedtheirattackfromKliuchinorthwardinatwo-pincerformation.

TheleftgroupheadedforVeselyiandHill236.7whichwasdefendedbythe151stGRRof52ndGRD, while the right group headed northeast for Hill 226.6, Hill 235.3 and then Polezhaev.Betweenthesetwopoints, twowell-placedtrenchlineswerebuiltwhichwouldnotbeeasytodefeat.Thisareawasdefendedby155thGRR.ThewesterngroupwasabletobreakthroughthelineandwasheadingforVeselyibutheavyartillerystoppedtheGermansandforcedthemtofallback.ThisGermanattackwassearchingforweaknessandwhenitdidnotfindanyinthewest,retreatedand then thedivisionconcentrated itseffortsonHill226.6 to theeast.TheSSTKandLAHregainedcommswitheachotherandwhenthe5thGTAattackedtheybothwentdefensive.Ataround1100hrs,thebulkoftheSovietoffensivehaddissipatedandLAHresumeditsadvance.When Priess discovered LAH was on the march, he resumed his offensive toward Hill226.6/Polezhaev.Hehadbeenordered to reach theKartashevka road todaybut itdidnot lookpromising.ThoughRotmistrovfailedtodestroytheSS,hewasabletostoptheGermanadvanceformostofthemorningplusinflictedheavycasualtiesontheenemy.Hausser’sforceshadlostallrealmomentumandwouldbeunabletoaccomplishallofthetheirobjectives.vzz385++.vzz383.

vzz11m.gnk312m.kuz193+.The95thGRDwascalleduptothefrontlineinthebendoftheriver.The151stGRRandthe

155thGRR stayed on the north side to stop SSTK from expanding their bridgeheadwhile the153rdGRRwascrossingtheriverandattackingthevillagesofthesouthernbanktopushSSTKout. Mikhailovka would be first. The 126th GRR of 42nd GRD would join the battle forMikhailovka.vzz384+.At0530hrs,alargesquadronofGermanbombersflewovertheSovietfrontlookingfortargets

ofopportunityinpreparationforthecomingassaultbyLAH.Spottingtanks,probably29thTC,thepilotsdivedagainstheavyflaktowardthevisibletanks.vzz298.By daybreak, the 5thGA had fully assembled in the bend of the PselRiver. It consisted of

sevendivisions,almost63,000menreadyforbattleand1,800fieldgunsandmortarsofvaryingsizes,butalmostnotanks.WithmuchoftheSSTKnorthofthePselwithitspanzers,the5thGAwouldbeatadisadvantage.ItwascriticalforSSTKtobesuccessfultodayifHothweretohaveanychanceof reachingKursk.TheSSTK had to secureHill226.6and reach theProkhorovka-KartashevkaroadwithoutsufferingheavycasualtiesandbepreparedtotakeHill252.4toprotectLAH’sflank.vzz380.gnk312m.At0600hrsBurdeinyof2ndGTC,situatedeastofIvanovka,instructedhiscrewstoprepare

for battle. They would try to penetrate past the Komsomolets State Farm and head for thePokrovka-Iakovlevoareawhereitwasdiscoveredbyairreconaconcentrationofpanzerswerestationed. German bombers and fighters flew by and attacked, slowing their preparations.lck343+.gnk313m.Despiteshelling,airraids,rainandmud,theengineersofSSTKfinishedtherepairsonthe60

tonbridgeoverthePselRiverbydawn.ThefewremainingTigerswerenowabletocrossoverandjointhedivisionfortheirmarchtowardHill226.6whichwasdefendedbythedepleted52ndGRDof6thGA,31stTCof1stTAandtherecentlyarrived95thGRDof5thGA.AdditionalunitsofZhadov’s5thGAwouldbearriving in thearea thatdayaswell.Priess’sSSTKhadonly itsmen and 121 panzers to take that hill, expand their bridgeheadwhich, currentlymeasured 2.5miles wide and 1.5 miles deep, as well as protect the left flank of LAH as it drove toProkhorovka.ItwasadauntingtaskandHausserknewit,pouringasmanyassetsintothesectorascouldbefound.WiththesupportofartilleryandtheLuftwaffe,SSTKpushedthedefendersinfrontofthehillandfinallyattackeditbymidday.DespitefanaticalresistancebytheSoviets,thehill was in German hands by 1330 hrs. After regrouping, Priess continued his march to thenortheast and despite heavy rains, the Luftwaffe continued to fly sorties as late as it could.mhz343.clk359+.gnk312m.wwf124.At0600hrs,Rotmistrov’s18thTCand29thTCwerejuststartingtheirengines,preparingto

beattheGermanstothepunchintheirassaultsouthwardawayfromProkhorovka.HoweverwhileRotmistrovwasstandingathisobservationpostonHill230 justsouthwestofProkhorovka,hesawGermantankactivity.Hispre-emptivestrikeappearedlostandhismenwouldhavetofightwithout the advantage of surprise. The panzers had an umbrella of artillery preceding theiradvance but they would soon move into observed range of the Soviet guns and the responsewouldbeexpectedlyheavy.TheSovietAirForcewasalertedaswellbutwereslowtorespondandwouldmisstheopening.AGermanreconplanespottedtheSoviet tanksof18thTCgetting

ready tomoveout anddroppedapurple smoke shell towarn theoncomingLAH tanks.Withinminutes the panzers saw hundreds of tanks coming at them. Rotmistrov had reached hisobservationpostinanorchardatdaybreakandwaswatchingalltheaction.Hehadsenthiskeystaff officers to the brigade HQs to oversee their actions. mhz231+. lck343. lck346. dgk187.vzz298+.mhz335.zrl234+.Shortlyafterdaybreak,whileRotmistrovwaspreparinghisattack,Sovietartilleryopenedup

along the line with 2nd SS PzC, in the hopes of disrupting German assault preparations andcommunications.vzz298.At0600, theDasReichwerewaiting in thewoods southofProkhorovka to advance andat

0630hrsStukasbombedSovietpositions across fromDasReich.Before long, Soviet fighterscameinanddrovethebombersawaywhichinitiatedabombardmentofGermanpositions.Whenthebombardmentfinished,tanksfrom29thTCmovedouttoconfrontthegrenadiersandthefewpanzerssupportingthem.TheT34swouldtrytocloseinonthepanzersandespeciallytheTigerswhere thepanzers lost theirsomeofkeyadvantages.Rotmistrovwasunder the impression thathisforceswouldface100Tigersbutinrealitytherewereonlyahandfulleft.Priess, the CO of SSTK, though needing every panzer north of the Psel decided to keep a

companyofpanzerssouthof the river toprotecthisbridgesatBogoroditskoeand topreventaSovietassaultsouthoftheriverfromisolatingtheforcesnorthoftheriver.vzz341.vzz348.Though the leadunitsofSSTK had crossed the river andwere advancingbeforedaylight, it

was not until 0900 hrs or a little later that SSTK’s 3rd PzR had crossed the Psel and startedattackingnorthwardagainstthe151stGRRof52ndGRD.The95thGRDinsecondechelonwasbeginning tomove up to bolster and then replace 52ndGRD, but theSSTK attacked too soonwhile there was confusion in the ranks. It penetrated the line northeast of Kliuchi and beganspreading out heading for Hill 226.6 and the secondary objectives of Polezhaev and Veselyi.Fierce fighting erupted between Hill 226.6 and Veselyi. After regrouping the 52nd GRDcountered towardKliuchi,Kozlovka,BogoroditskoeandVasilevkabutwerestopped.vzz384+.vzz442.gnk312m.dgk184m.vzz348.EvenbeforeSSTK couldadvance from itsbridgehead, theSoviets launcheda smallprobing

forcefromVesselyi.TheambushwassmallbuteffectiveandPriesshadtoactquicklytoplugthegapbeforeitgrewtoolarge.Meierdress’sbattalionofpanzerswassentandwasabletoplugthegap by 0730 hrs. Soviet planes showed up and started pounding theGerman defenses aroundVasilevka.WhenMeierdress returned,hewas thenordered tobepartof theassault across thePsel.By0900hrs, thewholepanzerregimentofSSTKhadcrossed theriverheadingnorthandwithin the hour a small contingent had slipped past Hill 226.6 and was heading for theKartashevkaroad.gnk344.Justafterdaybreak,PeiperonHill252.2andelsewherealongthelinecouldhearmanySoviet

tanksbeingstarted.Peiperknewitwouldnotbelongbeforehesawthemmovingtowardthehillandorderedhismentopreparefortheassault.Theywouldbefacingthe32ndTBof29thTCandtheouteredgesof170thTBof18thTC.gnk317.At 0600 hrs a Soviet recon probe was launched against LAH to check the strength of its

defenses. The attack was quickly broken off and the men fell back. At 0630 hrs, SSTK nearVasilevkasawlargeassemblyofmenandtanksgrowingonemileeastofPetrovka.At0830hrs

SSTKsaw40tanksandlessthanadivisionofmengatheringeastofVasilevka.By0900hrsLAHpositionssaw200tanksormoreingroupsof30to50movingoutofthecorridorstraightatthemandalongthelinefromVasilevkatoStorozhevoe.The29thTCwasspreadingouttocovergroundbetweenHill252.2,thenearbystatefarmsandtheStorozhevoeWoodstotheeast,whilethe18thTCcovered thewestern sideof thecorridor as far asVasilevka.Before longevenmore tankswereattackingtheflanksofSSCorps.gnk317.zrl234.At0600hrs,Burdeinyof2ndGTCreceivedamessagefromRotmistrovstating6thPzDhad

crossed theDonets atRyndinka.Burdeiny immediately pulled the 26thGTBwhichwas facingwestandpreparingtoattackwiththe25thGTBagainstDasReich,andredeployed thebrigadesoutheastwardnearPlotatoprevent6thPzDfromexpandingtheirbridgehead.With26thGTB’s44 tanksheadingforPlota thismeant2ndGTChadonly97 tanks left tostrikeDasReich.The11thMRBand12thMRBwerealsosenttostop3rdPzC.vzz363.dlu102.By0630, air traffic control reported toGeneralHausser that150enemysortieshadalready

beencountedintheSSTK/LAHsector.ThiswasmorethanusualforthistimeofdayanditwasanindicationthattheSovietswereuptosomething.zow164.The1stPzGRofLAHlaunchedat0650hrsadvancingeastwardsouthoftherailline,clearing

SovietresistancefromtheStorozhevoearea.TheirultimateobjectivewasthecaptureofIamki,lessthantwomilessouthwestofProkhorovka.dgk182.dgk183m.At0710hrs,theSovietbombersreachedtheirtargetareawhichcenteredaroundLuchkiNorth.

TheGermanfighterstriedtointerceptthebombersbuttheSovietescortskeptthematbay.cbk78.At0730hrs,the2ndPzGRontheleftflankofLAHmovedoutwith the intentionofreaching

Hill252.2andOktiabrskiStateFarm to secure the front linebefore advancingdeeper into thecorridor. They arrived at the farm at 0815 hrs and after a small pause continued their treknorthwardbutat0830hrs,the18thTCand29thTCchargedtheirpositionwithinfantryfollowingbehind.Ahugebattleeruptedbetweenthefewpanzersthatwerealreadyonthelineandthe1stPzRthatwasstillcominguptothelineaswellasthe2ndPzGRthathadjustarrived.dgk182.dgk183m.In theearlymorningundercloudcoverand recentheavydownpours that turned the roads to

mud,theSovietsshelledSSTKasitadvancedtothenortheastonthenorthwestbankofthePselRiver.Usinghit and run techniques,T34swouldambush theGermancolumn,hittingquickandhardandthenrunningoff.Thedivisiontighteneditsformationandkeptongoingandbyeveningwould reach the hill directly west of Polezhaev, not far from the Psel River. At the hill, theSovietsattackedagain.Theattackwasrepulsedwith14T34sbeingdestroyed.Ontherightflankofthe2ndSSPzC,DasReichwasadvancingfromnearStorozhevoe,alsodefendingitselffromfrequenttankattacks.Despitelosingmanytanks,thisfrequentattackingbytheSovietsseemedtobeworkingas theGermanadvanceon theflankswasdefinitelyslowing.Thiswentonallday.The three divisions reported toHausser at the end of the day that 244 Soviet tanks had beendestroyed.fkk158+.zow162.Rotmistrov’s18thTC,inanarrowattackzoneeastofPetrovkainthePselvalley,facedLAH

andtherightflankofSSTK.The29thTCwouldbegintheirattackbetweentheOktiabrskiStateFarmandStorozhevoe.FurtherSovietgunswerebroughtupduringthenighttosupporttheattacknextmorning.Vatutin’smasterplanwastohavehiseasternandwesternpincersdrivesouthand

meet in the Iakovlevo-Bykovka area to encircle 4th PzA. The 5th GTA would drive throughPetrovka,BrochorovkaandBelenikhino towardPotrovka, IakovlevoandBykovka.The1stTAand 6thGAwould advance toBolshieMaiachki and Iakovlevo.The 7thGAwould conduct asecondaryattacksoutheastofBelgorodtowardthewest.Theplanwashighlyover-optimisticandhadlittlechanceofsuccess.dgk180*.fkk327.By0800hrs,afterwarmingtheirenginesandreloadingtheammoracks,theremaining1stPzR

ofLAHwithits67panzersbeganmovingnorthtowardHill252.2andtheOktiabrskiStateFarm,tosecurethefrontlinewith2ndPzGRbeforemovingfurthernorth.OneoftheobjectivesforthedaywastocaptureHill252.4andneutralizethegunstherethatwouldbeusedtocutdownthegrenadiersadvancingonProkhorovka.BeforereachingbeyondHill252.2,the18thTCand29thTCappeared.TheGermansdiscoveredSoviettankshadmassedontheridgebetweenthemselvesand theProkhorovka-Petrovka line.The leadGermanunits firedpurplewarning shells toalertotherunitsoftheimpendingdanger.Thesunhadbeenuponlytwohoursandthedaywasalreadywarm, humid and overcast. Though early rains had made the ground difficult, a new stormexpected this afternoonwould not impede themajor tank battles occurring thatmorning in theLAHsector,butwouldinfluencethosealittletotheeast inDasReich sectorwhere thegroundwassofter,therainwouldimpedethetanksofbothsidesforthetankbattlescontinuedintolateafternoonandearlyevening.dgk163+.dgk182+.dgk189.dgk184m.At0800hrs,acolumnof30T34swasheadingfortheforestnearStorozhevoe.The1stPzGR

ofLAH,headingforStorozhevoe,spottedthecolumn.Germanartilleryopenedfireonthecolumndestroyingseveral tanksbutthecolumnmadeit totheforest.Soonapurplesmokecanisterfellfrom a recon plane showing the Germans another Soviet column moving toward them. Thiscolumn had 45 tanks. All of a sudden these different tank groups launchedwith support fromartillerymakingthingsdifficultforLAH.Anothergroupoftanksfromthe53rdGTRshowedupand all together over 100 Soviet tankswere swarming toward theGerman positions. Germanartillerysavedtheday,destroyingmanytanks.Theleadtankswerefromthe25thTBof29thTC;thetrailingtankswerefromthe2ndTC’s169thTB.The169thhadbeenorderedtostaybackandprovideadditional firepower to theattack.Soon theair forceofboth sideswerehaving theirownduelinthesky.Beforelong,400tanksfrom5thGTAwereinthefightallalongthe2ndSSPzCsector.dgk186++.dgk184m.TheLAHhadmostofitspanzerstothesouthofHill252.2,withonlyafewonthefrontline

when theSoviets attacked.Ribbentrop’s companyofonly sevenpanzerswhichweredeployednearHill252.2wereawakenedby thenoiseof tanksandquicklyprepared forbattle.Minuteslater,purplesmokewasseeninthesky,asignalthatenemytankswerecomingandminutesafterthatTarasov’s170thTB,about60tanks,wereheadingstraightforRibbentrop.Tarasov’s170thTBwaseastofthe181stTBandwouldcoverthegroundasfareastasHill252.2.Inminutesthehillwouldbehitbythe170thTBonthewestand29thTC’s32ndTBontheeast.Tarasovleadinghisbrigadewouldnotsurvivetheday.dgk185.gnk317+.agk124+.vzz311.wwf126+.fzk174++.zrl234.Shortlyafter0800hrs,whentheleadingtanksof5hGTAattacked,thebarragethathadstarted

earlier and included thedreadedKatyusha rockets escalated toa thunderousdin that shook thegroundandquicklyleftalingeringcloudofsmokehoveringabovetheground.dgk187+.gnk326+.

At0830hrswhenthe76thGMRfireditslastrocketdowntheroadfromProkhorovka,the18thTC and 29th TC began theirmain assaultwith a regiment of the 42ndGRDmounted on theirtanks. The 32nd MRB of 18th TC and the 53rd MRB of 29th TC in their transports werefollowing closely behind but thewalking infantry could not keep up.By 1000 hrs the infantryfoughttheirwaytotheoutskirtsof theOktiabrskiStateFarmbuttheywasrunningoutofammoandtherestofthe42ndGRDwaselsewherepreparingtheirownattack.Thingsbecameconfused.Theassaulton thefarmand towardHill252.2(defendedby the2ndPzRofLAH andPeiper’sbattalion) slowed,but a little to theeast the32ndTB (ColLinev)of29thTChad reached theKomsomoletsStateFarm.Oncehearingof thispenetration,Rotmistrovorderedelementsof the5thGMC,inreserve,tojointhebattleandexploitthefirstbreakoftheday.Itwasaround1400hrswhenColMikhailov’s 10thGMBof 5thGMCwas called out of reserve to deploy in theOstrenkiareatostrengthentheline,whileatthesametimeColOvcharenko’s21stGTBwassenttotheVoroshilovStateFarm,tothenorthwestofProkhorovka,topreventtheSSTKfromlinkingup with LAH or attacking the rear areas of 5th GTA. vzz322++. lck343+. dgr226. vzz307.dgk188+.At 0830 hrs, elements of Burdeiny’s 2nd GTC made probing attacks with part of its

approximately100tanksallocatedtothissector.Itwascasuallysupportedbythe183rdRDandtogether theymoved out to attack the southeastern flank of 2nd SS PzCwith the objective ofeventuallyattackingwith thesupportof the29thTCtoencircleDasReich,withatmost its95panzersandassaultguns,alongwiththeeasternflankofLAH.TheDeutschlandRegimentofDasReich had left Ivanovski Vyselok and was heading toward Storozhevoe to assist LAH in itseastwardadvance,aswellasstrengthenthelinethereincaseanoffensivebeganthatday.Itdidnottravelfarbeforebeingambushedby25thGTB.WhileDeutschlandwasbusywiththe25thGTB, the 4th GTB rushed past the engagement and struck the flank ofDer Führer Regiment,whichwasdefendingtheBelenikhinoarea.DasReichwasusingT34sconfiscatedfromKharkovearlier that year tohelp repulse theSoviet assaults. Inone instance, a columnofGerman-heldT34s moved toward T34s preparing to attackDas Reich and when they were close enough,started shelling the startled victims of 2ndGTC.The fighting intensified onDas Reich’s rightflankasthe2ndGTCexpandedtheassault,drivingalargerwedgebetweenDasReichand3rdPzCtothesouth.Withthearmorof3rdPzCsofarbehindDasReich,DasReich’ssouthernflankwas somewhat exposed and needed the 167th ID to protect it. dgk192. dgk184m. wwf137+.zow162+.The initial success of the 32nd TB of 29th TC in bypassing theOktiabrski State Farm and

breakingintotheKomsomoletsStateFarmwasshortlived,evenwithelementsof29thTC’s53rdMRB giving ground support. The Germans counter-attacked from the OSF to the north andsurrounded many of the troops of the 53rd MRB at KSF. Though the Soviets suffered heavycasualtiesinthismovingpocket,thefreeremnantsof53rdMRBmovedbackintothenowvacanttrenchesontheOSF,whichtheGermanshadinitiallyabandoned,andcouldnotbeexpelled.Thesoldiersontheeastsideofthefarmthatwerenotencircledbutcouldnotgetbacktotheirlinesfell back toward Iamki.Nearly400 soldiersdied andanother700were injured from the53rdMRBinthefightingatorneartheKomsomoletsStateFarmonthisday.AfewT34swereroundedupforacounter-attacktorelievethepocketbutontheirwayalongtherailroadwereambushedby

German assault guns and all the tanks were destroyed. The 32nd TB, one of the units thatdefendedTulain1941,carriedonlyT34s.vzz326+.vzz442.vzz61.By0830hrs,theprimarycorpsof5thGTA,havingformedtwopincers,launchedtheirassault

that intended to penetrate the German line, head to the rear areas and then encircleLAH andSSTK,andperhapsmoreoftheSS.ThewesternpincerwouldbeMajGeneralBakharov’s18thTCandtheeasternspearheadwouldbe ledbyKirichenko’s29thTC.The18thTC’s181stTBand 170th TBwould be responsible for the lead in the area between the PselRiver andHill252.2inclusive.The29thTCwouldhavethelandeastofHill252.2andthevillageofIamkitothe east.The32ndTBwould lead the assault and to the east, the25thTBwouldhead for theStorozhevoesector.Insecondechelon,the9thGAD,42ndGRDand31stTBwouldfollowtheleadtanksandcleartheremainingresistance.WiththeGermanartilleryprimedandwaitingfortheoffensivetobegin,theseleadbrigadessufferedheavycasualtiesinthefirstminutes.vzz309+.The181stTB,commandedbyLtColPuzyrevwhowasclosesttothesouthernbankofthePsel

River,was tasked to eliminateSSTK from the villages on the southern banks.Afterwards theywere toshiftdirections,andwithanysupport fromthe170thTB,headforGresnoeandMalyeMaiachkiandthenjoinupwiththe29thTCand2ndGTCtoencircletheSSCorpsincludingtheheavily defended Hill 241.6. The observers on Hill 241.6 were looking out at the fairly flatlandscape to the north. On their left was the Psel River’s big bend that eventually headed tonortheast.Directly in front lookingup the corridor, the roaminghills couldbe seenandon theright theStorozhevoewoodsblockedpartof theviewof the30-foothigh railwayembankmentthatledtoProkhorovka.FurthersouthoftheStorozhevoewoods,anobserverwouldbeableseethelowroaminghillsturnintoalandscapeofruggedgulliesandravinesaroundtheBelenikhinoarea. The villages along the Psel river, west of OSF included Prelestnoe, Andreevka,MikhailovkaandVasilevka.wwf123.TheterraininthecorridorfavoredtanksclosesttotheOktiabrskiStateFarmandthebulkofthe

tanks of 170th TB were concentrated in this area. The Germans took advantage of thisconcentrationwith their artillery and before the 170th TB reached the Oktiabrski State Farm,manyofthetankswerehit.TheLuftwaffealsoflewmanysortiesdespitepartiallycloudyskies.TheMe110sandStukaswereadeadlycombination.Airsupportandastrongartillerypresenceweretwomajorreasonsfor5thGTA’sheavycasualtiesduringtheday.The127thGRRof42ndGRDwas following the tanksand suffered from the air strikes aswell.The36thGTRwas tofollow aswell butwhen its commander, LtMitroshenko,was seriouslywounded from the airstrike,the36thGTRpausedtorecoverandhaveMajPlissovtakethelead.Otherreasonsforthepoor results included poor intelligence that missed the newly built fortified defenses on themorning of 7/12 and poor coordination of infantry and armor aswell as the lack of effectivesupportfromartilleryandairwiththearmor.vzz319+.vzz323.vzz340++.gnk347+.Itwasexpected that the32ndTBwouldhave fought itswaypastOktiabrskiStateFarmand

wouldbefightingforKomsomoletsStateFarmby1000hrs.The2ndGTCwasorderedtolauncha full scaleattackat1000hrsagainstDasReich along the IasnaiaPoliana-Kalinin-Ozerovski-Sobachevskilinetosupportthe32ndTB.Withthesetwopincers,RotmistrovwantedtoencircletheLAH/SSDRforcesintheStorozhevoe-Iamkiarea.ThiswouldbethestartoftheseparationofLAHandSSDR.Theleftflankof2ndGTCwastobreakthroughandmakeitswaytoIakovlevoto

blockanyGermans from retreating.Thiswasanover-optimisticplan thathad little chance forcompletesuccess.Hausserwasquicktorespondtopenetrationswithreinforcementsandartillerycoverage, which prevented deep penetrations. TheLuftwaffe was also quick to vector planeswhere theywoulddo themost good.The25thGTB,whichwouldbe the lead tankers for thisattack,werestationednearVinogradovka.Severalmortarandartilleryregimentswouldstaytheretosupportthetankersattack.vzz361+.To the left of 25thGTBwas its sister brigade, the4thGTBunderColBrazhnikov.The4th

GTBwouldattackatthesametimetowardKalinin,duesouthofIasnaiaPolianaandsouthwestofVinogradovka.Toaddpunch to theattack,MajZotov’s1500thDARandMajSereda’s1695thAARwere brought up to contribute the fire power of their guns.Col Savchenko’s 4thGMRBwouldattack towardSobachevskiandLuchki.Bothbrigadeswouldbesupportedby the273rdMortarRegimentandthe755thDestroyerAnti-tankArtilleryBattalion.TheRedAirForcewouldalsoattackGermanconcentrationsintheIvanovkaandVinogradovkaareas.The26thGTBwasoriginally planned to assemble behind Lt Col Bulygin’s 25th GTB for the attack but with thecrossingoftheDonetsby6thPzDatRzhavets,the26thGTBwasheldbackincaseitwasneededtoblocktheadvancing3rdPzC.The16thGuardsMortarRegimentwasattachedtothe2ndGTCto assist in clearing a path for the tankerswith its rockets. In addition, the 32ndTB and 53rdMRBwerepreparingdefensesattheKomsomoletsStateFarm.GeneralVatutinwasbringingupto the fronteverygunhecould find topreventanybreakthroughduringRotmistrov’soffensive.vzz362.vzz3m.Whenthe18thTCand29thTClaunchedthatmorning,theyhadtotravelatleastamileonopen

ground before engaging the panzers. The 8th Flieger Corps was already in the air and wasplanningonraidingSovietpositionsinpreparationfor2ndSSPzC’sattack.WhenthesquadronofHs129s,Ju87sandFw190sspottedtherowoftanksontheridge,theyimmediatelydivedonthevulnerabletanks.TheSovietflakgunsinthesectoropenedontheplanes.Anestimated248sortieswereflownbytheGermansforthebenefitofthe2ndSSPzCthatmorning.TheHs129sandtheStukaswiththe37mmcannonwereespeciallydeadlytotheSoviettanks.The32ndTB,andtoalesserextentthe31stTBof29thTCwhichwasfurthernorth,wasespeciallyhithard.CaptRudelwascreditedwith12tanksthatdayusinghissinglecannon.ItwasafavoritepracticebyGermanpilotstoattacktheexternalfueltanksonthetanks,whichwasusuallygoodenoughtolightthewholevehicleablaze.Atthatmoment,theRedAFwasabsentbutSovietartillerytriedtotakeuptheslackandslowtheGermanpanzerswhichwerenowinsight.cbk79.zow148.At0835hrs, the170thTBadvancedacross thesmallvalleysoutheastofPetrovka,smashing

intotheadvancedpositionsofLAH.Theengagement,justnorthofOktiabrskiStateFarm,quicklybecamechaoticwithneithersidemakinganyappreciablegainsuntilthe1000thAARcameuptosupport the170thTB.Together they forced theLAH to slowly fallback toOktiabrski.Despitelosing30ofits60tanksmostlyfromthefewpanzersthatwereupfrontandartillerythathadbeenbroughtuptothelineduringthenightandaerialattack,the170thTBstillfollowedtheLAHandengagedagain.vzz341.The170thTBdroveclosertoHill252.2than181stTBwiththeintentionsofheadingtoward

thegapbetweenSSTKandLAH.Ribbentrop’ssevenpanzerssawtheSovietscomingandbegantoscale thehill togainanyadvantageonthelargerforce.AsthepanzersweremovingupHill

252.2 they saw another group of Soviet tanks about a kilometre away to the northeast ofOktiabrskiStateFarm,headingsouth;theywerepartof29thTC.RibbentropstoppedhiscompanyandstartedfiringontheSoviets.HispanzerswereMkIVswiththehighvelocitygunandevenatthatrangecouldstopaT70orevenaT34withasidehit,butwithinminutesmoretanksfromthe170thTBwereheadingdirectly towardRibbentrop.Thiswashismain concern andhehad tobreakaway from the first group to the right and concentrate on the new threat. TheT34swereinstructedtorushinandattackthepanzersatcloserangetonullifytheirlongerrangeadvantage,buttheSoviettankerswouldfindtheGermanswerealsogoodatarms-lengthfightingandwoulddestroymanyoftheT34s.vzz311.zrl235+.BeforereachingtheOktiabrskiStateFarm,thepanzersof1stPzR(LAH)weremovingtoward

thefrontlineinthevicinityofHill252.2whentheywereattackedbySoviettanksracingtowardthemfrompositionsonthelastdefensiveridgeontheProkhorovka-Petrovkaline.TheT34susingtheir speed tried to outflank and out-maneuver the panzers. The Germans stopped where theywereandstartingfiringat theT34s,about800yardsaway,quicklyknockingoutseveral tanks.NorthofOktiabrskialongtheProkhorovka-Petrovkaline,theleadpanzersof1stSSPzRwhohadarrivedand2ndPzGRwereattackedbyanother60tanksfromabout1,000yardsaway.Duringthethree-hourbattlethe1stSSPzRinflictedheavycasualtiesontheSovietsastheirtankstriedtoclosethegapandfightatpointblankrange.EventuallytheSovietsdidsucceedingettingclose,inflicting casualties on theGermans.Similar small tank attackswere launched along the entirelineof2ndSSPzC.dgk185.At0830hrs,the5thGAattackedsouthwardheadingtowarditseventualobjectiveofGresnoe

whileotherelementsofthe32ndGRCand33rdGRCwith40tanksheadedforKochetovka,westof Gresnoe and a important strongpoint on the boundary between SSTK and 11th PzD. SomepenetrationofSSTK/LAHlineallowedtheSovietstoattackartillerypositionsoftheLAHtotherear. The SSTK, while inflicting heavy losses on the Soviets, eventually did advance to thenortheastalongthePseltowithinsixmilesofProkhorovka,withthecaptureofPolezhaevwhichwas defended by elements of 95th GRD. At 2000 hrs, the 67th GRDmoved up to break thestalemate,whichforcedthe2ndSSPzCtostopitsadvanceandgodefensive.Alsoatthistime,the11thPzDandSSTKattackedthe52ndGRD,defendingalongside5thGAwith100panzersandmotorizedinfantryplusairsupport.AcouplehoursafterdaylighttheSSTKfinallyhaditsTigersacrossthePsel,strugglingtocatchupwiththeotherpanzersinordertoextendtheirbridgeheadnorthward.wdk160.dgr221m.dgr225.gnk313m..MichaelWittmann,workingwithLAH,andhiscompanyofTigersweresouthoftheOktiabrski

State Farm when he saw many tanks from the 18th TC moving southwest past Ribbentrop’sposition heading for Andreevka. In the open field, Wittmann, Kling and their fellow Tigersopenedupat1,800yards,knowingtheSovietswouldnotshootuntiltheyreached500yardsorcloser.TheMkIVs, idlingbehindtheTigers,wouldhavetowaituntil thetanksgotwithin800yardsforalethalshot.TheT34smaneuveredtogetincloseusingtheirspeedandagilitybutwiththefewMkIVsscreeningtheTigers,theSovietattemptagainsttheTigerswassuicidal.Beforelong,fouroftheMkswerehitfromadistanceoflessthen225yards.ThoughmanySoviettanksweredown,someSovietsbrokethroughthisGermanscreenandheadedwestwheretheymetupwith shellfire from German artillery at Gresnoe. mhz333++. fzk173+. fzk311++. zrl235+.

zow164+?.AstheSovietoffensivegainedtraction,the18thTC’s181stTB,travelingsouthwestalongthe

PselRiver’ssouthernbank,headedforAndreevkaandVasilevkawhentheLuftwaffeshoweduplooking for targets of opportunity. They dived on the tanks through cloudy skies, inflictingcasualtiesbutthetankerscontinuedonwithouthesitation.Neartheirlaunchpoint,the18thTChadtocontendwithanumberofravinesthatranwestandeast.Becauseofthis,the181stTBmovedfurthereastcloser to170thTBbutafterpassing thoseravines, the181stTBwasable tomoveclosertotheriverasordered.gnk344+.gnk313m.vzz342.mjk92.To the left of 18thTCwasMajGeneralKirichenko’s29thTC. Itwas comprisedofLtCol

Linev’s31stTB,ColMoiseev’s32ndTBandVolodin’s25thTBandlaunchedatthesametime.The32ndTB, leading31stTB,drovebetweenHill252.2, theProkhorovkarail lineandIamkiwhilethe25thTBattackedfromeastofIamkitowardStorozhevoeanditswoodsinsupportwith169th TB of 2nd TC. Each of these brigades of the 29th TC had approximately 60 tanks.Allwould be used in the attack, with none left in reserve. The 31st TB and 32nd TB had themisfortuneofattackingLAHatitsstrongestpoint, theOktiabrskiStateFarm,andwouldpaytheprice for that bad luck. The 53rdMRB under Lipichevwould be in second echelon. dgk189.vzz342+.wwf125.zrl234.DasReichwasheadingforIamkiwhen40tankscamerushinginwiththeirgunsblazing.Das

ReichwassoutheastofStalinskoeStateFarmandwastryingtosecuretherightsideofthewoodsandalongtherailroadlineleadingtoProkhorovka.Thenasecondwaveoftankswerespotted;thistimewithenoughleadtimetheGermanartillerystartedshellingbeforethetankswereintheirown firing range.At the end of this secondwave, Soviet artillerywhichmust have just beenmovedup,startedfiringontheGermanforces.Theattackshadescalatedquickly.fkk161+.Once pastRibbentrop, elements of the 170thTB, drivingmore to the east of 181st TB and

closer toHill 252.2 andOktiabrski State Farm, aimed for the territory on thewestern end ofSSTK’s sector and attackedKron’s PzAbt 3 as it approachedKochetovka. Additional Sovietriflemenweremovingupand the fightingbecame fierce.Kochetovkawason thewest flankofSSTK,westofVasilevkaontheSolotinkaRiver.TheSolotinkaRiverwasatributaryofthePselRiver.Kron’sbattalionwasalsoscreeningtheeasternflankof48thPzC’s11thPzDandwasquiteisolated.Ifnotcareful,hisgroupcouldbeencircledanddestroyed.gnk344+.gnk313m.WithinminutesoftheopeningengagementnearOktiabrski,andwithmoretanksarrivingfrom

both sides every minute, the open field was ablaze with burning tanks and moving tanksmaneuvering and firing as quickly they could. Some of the Soviet tankswere behind anti-tankdefenses,firingateasytargetsasadditionalwavesofSoviettanks,30to40strong,arrivedasthebattledeveloped;fewerpanzerswerecomingup.Thistankbattleofmaneuverabilitylastedoverthreehoursandbydark192T34sandT70swereleftbehindwiththeirhullsspurtingflameandsmoke.Amongthedeadtankslayhundredsofdeadsoldiersandontheperimeterofthistankfieldlaymanyimpromptufoxholesinwhichsomeofthelivingwonderedifthebattlewasreallyover.Itwastrulyaneeriesight.ThetankrecoveryteamswerealreadyontheirwaytosalvageasmanypanzersaspossibleastheLAHretainedcontrolofthefield.fkk163++.Despite the fierce tank battle west and south of Prokhorovka, the 73rd PzGR captured the

nearbytownofSabynoat0900hrs.jp195.

Inthemorning,theLAHwasdrivingnorthalongthePetrovka-Prokhorovkaroadwhen50tanksattacked,hittingdirectlyonPeiper’sbattalionofpanzers, ignitinga fiercebattle.By0900hrs,Peiperhadstabilized theGermanpositionandcounted15burningSoviethulks infrontofhim.fkk159.KurtSametreiterandhisTigercrew(ofLAH)deployedwestofIamki,knockedout24tanksof

the29thTConthisdayandwasawardedtheKnight’sCross.agk124.Intheafternoonthesituationwasbecominguntenable.The5thGTAwasforcedtodiscontinue

itsattackandgoonthedefensive.The2ndSSPzDlostmomentumbutthemotorizedinfantryintheProkhorovkasectorwasabletorepulsetheSovietattacksandthencounter-attacktothenorthatthePselbridgehead.NorthofthePselRiver,SSTKhadnowassembleditsnearlyfullcomplementof121panzers

andassaultgunsofthe3rdSSPzRandwasdrivingnorthwardfromHill226.6inordertobreakthrough the newly erected defenses held by 6th GA’s 52nd GRD and by 1st TA which heldpositions furtherwest.By1300hrs theHill226.6 sectorhadbeenclearedand thebulkof thepanzers were trying to catch up with the leading Tigers that had already taken off for theKartashevkaRoad.BeforereachingtheTigers,theMarkIVswereattackedbythe95thGRDwhowereheadingforthehilltoretakeit.WiththehelpofasecondLuftwaffeattack,SSTKpushedthe95thGRD back to Polezhaev. The Soviet resistance regrouped and stiffened and theGermanswerehaltedatPolezhaev.The95thGRDwasnowshatteredandRotmistrovsentthe42ndGRDto bolster it.Nearby, the 24thGTBof 5thGMCwas sent to nearbyVoroshilov State Farm tostiffenthelinewith18thTCand5thGAagainst theTigerformationthatwasroamingthearea.dgk193+.vzz1m.gnk312m+.kuz195.The series of tank battles evolving from the Soviets’ three main axes of attack would

encompass an arc about 12 miles long that started south of Prokhorovka near the villages ofIvanovkaandLeskionthesoutheastcornertothesouthbankofthePselRiverinthenorthwestcorner. Theweatherwas cloudy and,with recent heavy rains,made the dirt roads difficult inspotsforwheeledvehicleswhichimpactedtheGermansworst.WiththeSSTKonthenorthwestandLAHandDasReichtotheeastandsoutheast,the2ndSSPzCdrovetocontrolbothsidesofthe road to Prokhorovka as well as expand their bridgehead north of the Psel. The SovietsestimatedthattheSSCorpshad500panzersincluding100TigersandFerdinandsbutthisnumberwastoooptimistic.Thenumberwascloserto300panzers,assaultgunsandahandfulofTigersandalltheFerdinandswereinthenorthwithModel.wdk158+.hjj121m.Sincedaybreakandbefore themainSovietoffensivebeganandagainafter the initialSoviet

armor attack, a detachment fromDeutschland Regiment ofDas Reich (left flank) had tried tosecureStorozhevoeand its surrounding lands from thewest inorder to stabilize their line,butfailedeachtime.Itwasdefendedmostlybythe169thTBofthe2ndTC.DasReichhadcapturedthe southwest corner of thewoods,west of the village but it needed reinforcements if greaterprogresswastobemade.AfewmoremembersofDeutschlandarrivedandtogetheralongwithartillerysupportenteredthevillageandwerefightingstreetbystreetforcontrolof thevillage.The remainderofDeutschlandRegimentwas in the process of leaving IvanovskiVyselok andheading toward southern Storozhevoe to supportLAH and the rest of its regiment but did nottravelfarbeforebeingambushedbytanksofthe25thTB(29thTC),withsoldiersofthe9thGAD

ridingonitsdecksandthe55thGTR.ThepanzerregimentwasfurthersouthnearBelenikhinoandunabletohelpbuttheregimentalartillerywasabletotargettheoncomingtanksandstartedfiring.Several waves of 30 tanks each attacked their positions and the Germans were greatlyoutnumberedandfightingforsurvival,beingpushedbacktothevillageofVinogradovkawheretheGermanshaderectedaspeedydefense.DasReichhadcaptured26newT34sinMarchwhenrecapturingKharkov andwere now using thosemachines against the Soviets.mhz341. vzz3m.gnk325++.zow162.The2ndSSPzCwasnowfightingalongitsentiresector.WhileSSTKwasbeingattackedinthe

Vasilevka/AndreevkaareaandLAHattackednearHill252.2andtheOktiabrskiStateFarm,DasReichandtherightflankofLAHwerebeingattackedbyVolodin’s25thTBof29thTC,the169thTBof2ndTC,55thGTRandthemenofthe28thGRRalongtheStorozhevoesector,includingthenearbyforestthatDasReichwasfinallypenetrating.Withtanksinthelead,theT34swouldfireon themove to prevent themore accurate panzers fromhitting themandwould therefore oftenmisstheirtarget.Withthecommanderofthetankthegunneraswell,hisvisionwaslimitedandhecouldnotseethetargetsorthethreatsaswellastheGermantankcommanderscould.gnk326+.vzz321.vzz1m.kuz193.As part ofVatutin’s plan of attacking 2ndSSPzCon its flanks,Rotmistrov’s tanks attacked

LAH and Das Reich from the Prokhorovka railway embankment south to Storozhevoe andBelenikhino.SouthofProkhorovkaeastoftherailline,the29thTC’s25thTBwiththesupportofthe 9th GAD attacked and inflicted heavy casualties onDas Reich’s left flank, while it wasalready inbattlewith the2ndTCand2ndGTC,whichwereattacking its central and southernflank.The 25thTBhadmade a brief penetration near theKomsomolets State Farmbut itwasquickly closed.Near Storozhevoe, the 136thGRR (42ndGRD) and 26thTB counter-attacked,trying to push back the SS, but the Germans were able to hold the line with the help of theLuftwaffewhichinflictedheavycasualtiesonthe136thGRR.Alittlesouthof25thTBandthe2ndTC,the2ndGTCrepeatedlyattackedDasReichformostoftheday.ThefightingthelasttwodaysmayhavebeenatacticalsuccessfortheGermans,fortheypunishedtheSovietsbutitwasastrategicsuccessfortheSovietswhowereabletoholdtheadvanceandrecoverfromtheirheavycasualtieswhiletheGermanscouldnot.fkk329.lck361+.vzz339.The first tobreak through theGermanscreenatOktiabrskiStateFarmandHill252.2wasa

groupof15T34sfrom32ndTB.Oncepasttheline,theSoviettankerscontinuedpastthewoods,Hill242.5andHill241.6andbrokeintotheoutskirtsofKomsomoletsStateFarmfromthesouth.ItwasadistanceofthreemilesintotheGermanreararea.Elementsfromthe53rdMRBtriedtofollowbutwereattackedfromtheairandlosttouchwiththetankers.Despiteallowingsomeofthe tanks of the 32ndTB to pass the farm andHill 252.2, after an hour of fierce fighting, theOktiabrskiStateFarmwas still controlledbyLAH’s2ndPzGR(Krass).EachSSdivisionhadexperiencedaminorpenetrationof their linebut thiswas theworst. ItwasnotcriticalyetbutHausser had to close the gap before Soviet reinforcements could arrive in strength. vzz314.vzz319.vzz441.dgk189++.At0920hrs,afterstabilizingthelineafterthefirstwaveofSovietattacks,theLAHbegantheir

driveuptheProkhorovkaroad,whenawaveoftankswithmountedinfantrycamebarrelingdowntheroadandattacked.Itwastheremainsof32ndTBof29thTCwith35tanksintheformationas

wellasthe31stTB.agk124+.At 0920 hrs, the 32nd TB attacked along the Prokhorovka road against the road junction

southwestofSwch.QuicklysixpanzersfromLAHwereputoutofcommissionat220yardsbutthe remainingpanzersandartilleryknockedout19 tanks.While thisbattlewas raging,a smalltanksquadwithinfantryridingontopambushedthesupportingbatteryonHill241.6.Thegunnershad to depress their guns and fire point-blank range at the oncoming tanks. The attack wasrepulsed.dgk179+.As the tank battle escalated, the tanks became so close to each other that shells sometimes

penetratedboththesidearmoraswellasfrontalarmor.Insomecases,theshellinventoryofthevictim tankwouldblowaswell,blowingoff the turretwhichwould landmanyyardsaway. Itdoes not bare thinking about what happens to those inside. As the commanders of both sidesrealizedthescopeofthetankbattle,theyeachcalledinairsupport.Intheair,themanydogfightsbecamealmostasimpressiveasthelandbattle,wherenearly1,100tankswerebattlinginasmallareasouthandsouthwestofProkhorovka.WhiletheGermanswereadvancingslowlyagainsttheSoviet front, Soviet tanks attacked on the sector running from Petrovka to the station atBelenikhino, southwest of Prokhorovka, and along the line of the Psel. Once again as perRotmistrov’s orders, the T34s rushed inside the Tiger’s lethal range and fought the heavierpanzersatpointblankrange;itwasalongshotwithpoorpossibilitiesforsuccess.jp183.je109*.dgk222m.mhz328+.The initial LAH/29th TC tank engagement escalated when a second group of Soviet tanks

appeared.TheSoviets,movingsouthfromProkhorovkawith35tanksfrom32ndTB,hitfirstandashorttimelaterasecondformationof40tanksfrom31stTBclashedintoLAH.TheleftGermanpincermeant toscreen therightpinceras itheadedforProkhorovkafromnearOktiabrski.ThetwoenemiesmetnorthandnortheastofHill241.6.TheGermansstartedfiringat800yardsbutthe Soviets, using T34s and T70s, were able to get in close, about 500 yards, and destroy anumberofthepanzers.ThiswasthesecondtimethatmorningthatLAHwasattackedby29thTC.The32ndTBhadfallenbackandregroupedbeforeattemptingthissecondattack.TheGermansclaimeddestroying62Soviettanksinthisseriesofengagementsalongthiscriticalroadway.SeeMap27.dgk190.ManyoftheSoviettankersdidnotstaytofightitoutwithRibbentroporthearrivingpanzersof

1stPzR;theywouldfireonthepanzersastheydrovebyfortheyhadatimetabletokeep,buttheywere slowed once they arrived at the first tank ditch, south of Hill 252.2. The trench wasoriginallydugbytheSovietsbutitwasenlargedthepreviousdayafteritwascapturedtoformatankditchtotrapanddestroytheSoviettankswhentheywereforcedtostop.Bytheendoftheday,Ribbentroplostfivepanzers:twowererepairable,plushisown,buttwowerecompletelydestroyed along with their crews. Ribbentrop drove back to behind his lines, picked up arepaired panzer and returned to the battle. It is estimated that 100 Soviet tanks were eitherdestroyedorwereconfiscatedattheditchwhenthecrewsabandonedthem.ItisclaimedbysomeoftheGermansurvivorsthatsomeoftheT34sgoingatfullspeedthatfellontopoftanksthathadalready fallen into the ditch were able to back out undamaged. This feat was especiallyimpressive to the German soldiers firing at them. This enlarged tank trap was dug out of theconvictionthattheSovietswereplanningamajoroffensivethatday.Bythistimeanewwaveof

Soviet planes flew in to drop their deadly cargo as theGerman flak guns opened up on them.gnk319++.gnk320.gnk328.sgf349.vzz295+.vzz327.At1000hrsfromsouthwestofHill252.2,20panzersexitedaravineandheadedstraightfor

thenewlyerected9thGADposition.At800yardstheSovietgunsopenedupwiththepanzers(noTigers)returningfire.Thepanzerscreatedasmallgapinthelineandelementsofthe28thGARfellbacktowardProkhorovka.vzz239+.vzz11m.mjk92.Popov’s2ndTC,havingalreadylostmore thanhalf its tankssince thestartof thecampaign,

wastheweakestcorpsin5thGTA.Evenwiththeirmechanicsworkingthroughoutthenight,thecorpshadonly52working tanks to start theday.Evenworse, itsbrigadeshadbeendeployedthinlybetweenStorozhevoe,PravorotandIamki.Itsassignmentforthedaywastoholdthelinebetween2ndGTConitsleftand29thTConitsright.The2ndTCwasonlyallowedtoattackifits two neighborsmademajor penetrations. The bulk of 58thMRB,which had received tanksfrom2ndTC,wasdefendingIamkiandStorozhevoe.Eventhoughthe2ndTCdidnotgoontheoffensive until later in themorning it still had a difficult day; it defended in the Storozhevoe,Ivanovka,BelenikhinoStationandTeterevinoareasagainsttheadvancesofDasReichand167thID.The2ndTCconsistedofthe58thMRB,26thTBandthe99thTB.vzz368*++.The2ndGTC,withelementsofthe183rdRDof69thArmysecuringtheirrightflank,launched

fromtheVinogradovka-Belenikhinoarea,attackingtowardKalinin.Onitssouthernflank,ithitthesouthernboundarybetweenDasReichandthe167thID,thoughSSDRwashitharder.TheSoviettankscameinwavesbuteventuallymorethan50tanksmadetheassault.Thebattlelastedallday,thoughthe2ndGTCwasabletoapproachKalininby1430hrsbutwasunabletocaptureitandhadtoeventuallyfallback.wdk160.dgr221m.dgr225.vzz11m.gnk313m.Around1000hrsandheadingsouth,the31stTBof29thTCafterbeingreleasedfromreserve

entered battle, heading past Hill 252.2 from east of the Oktiabrski State Farm. The Germanartilleryusing105mmand155mmgunsfromHill252.2andHill241.6openedfireonthetankers.Shortlyafterwards theLuftwaffecame in,adding theirweight to thebattle.The31stTBdroveintoawallofsteelandsufferedheavycasualties.The25thTBon31stTB’seasternflankalsosufferedheavycasualtiesfromintenseshellingfromHill241.6.Alreadybloodiedinbattle, the32ndTB,afterbrieflyregrouping,movedsouthwestalongtherailline,meetingstiffresistanceastheSoviettanks,parallelingthe31stTB,triedtomaneuverclosetothepanzers.Theiradvancequicklystoppedbuttheydidnotfallback.Diggingintheyreturnedfirebutsoonlost40tanksand350menwiththeirexposedlocation.Afterathree-hourbattle,62Soviettanksweresmolderingontheimmediatebattlefield.lck357.vzz316++.dgk191.gnk313.By1030hrs,elementsoffourtankbrigadesandtheirsupportinginfantrywerestillstuckatthe

Hill252.2-OktiabrskiStateFarmbarrier.Rotmistrovhadtocapturethehillandfarmifhewasgoingtomoveforwardinanymajorway;hecouldnotbypassitandleavesuchstrongpointsinhisreararea.Asmallgroupoftanksfromthe32ndTBof29thTCdidslipbythefarmandwasnowfighting its way into the Komsomolets State Farm. The intelligence arms of each side let themilitarydown.TheGermansexpectedacounteroffensiveandbuiltdefenses tostop itbutHothhadno ideahow large theattackwouldbe.On theSoviet side,VatutinandRotmistrovhadnoideahowwell theGermanshadbuilt theirdefenses.This,coupledwith theshortplanningandpreparationperiod,wouldclearlyshowpoorresultsbytheendoftheday.vzz325.vzz342+.

The181stTBwasapproachingVasilevkaonthesouthernbankofthePselRiverby1000hrswhen German 88s, panzers, mortars and rockets opened fire. By 1100 hrs the tank brigade,despite the heavy resistance, had determinedly fought its way to the town limits. In order topreventthetownfromfallingaswellashavingtheircommunicationssevered,TigersfromHill226.6 were called back and together with the SSTK were able to push the 181st TB out ofVasilevkaandbacktoAndreevkabyearlyafternoon.Afterclearingtherivervillages,the181stTBwassupposedtoturnsouthandclearGresnoeandMalyeMaiachkiwhereGermanartillerywasemplacedbeforeturningnorthagaintoisolatetheSSTK’snorthernbridgeheadandblocktheretreat path of the SS along with the 29th TC, when they had succeeded in their penetrationattempts.However,atthispointitwaslookingdoubtfulthateitherwouldhappen.ItwasacostlydayforSSTKasitsufferedover300casualtiesincluding69deadand20armoredvehicleslost,buttheirassaultreachedtheheightsnorthofPolezhaevandinflictedheavycasualtieson31stTC.vzz340++.gnk347.ztc270.pck81+.The 2nd SS PzR, stationed nearOzerovski, launched eastward towardVinogradovka.Once

captureditwastoturnsouthtowardIvanovka.gnk340.Vzz3m.The25thTBwiththesupportofthe25thMRBand169thTBlaunchedtheirattackfromIamki

but soon found itself in a tank trap thatLAH had created thepreviousnight.TheGermanshadantitankgunswaitingandwhenthe25thTBpassedby,theGermansattackedthecolumn.Ofthe32T34sinthecolumn,26weredestroyed.ThesurvivorsmadeittothesoutheastofStorozhevoe,whichwasstill inSoviethands, to regroup.The25thTBwasnowthesizeofabattalionwithmostlyT70s.At1200hrs,theremainingelementsof25thTBattackedtowardIvanovskiVyselokandwhiletheLAHhadencircledandwerereducingelementsofthe32ndTBplusthe53rdMRBatKomsomoletsStateFarm,DasReichhadaprotectivescreenthatstoppedthe25thMRBfromfreeingtheencircledSoviets.Bytheendofthedaythe25thTBhadlost50oftheir69tanksandwerepositioneddefensivelysoutheastofStorozhevoe.vzz332++.gnk323.Followingthe left flankof168thID, the167thIDcrossedtheLipovyiDonetsRiverheading

north.FromwestofTeterevinoSouthandfromNepkhaevo,theSovietscounteredthe167thIDonits left flankbutwererepulsed.Alittlefurthernorth in thefiercestfightingforLAH, theywereablesofartoplugthepenetrationsattheOktiabrskiStateFarmandregainedlostground,butitdid not gain any new ground. Elements of SSTK that were guarding the Psel bridgehead atBogoroditskoe,justwestofVasilevka,repulsedallattacksby18thTC.vzz438+.dgk184m.By1100hrs,elementsofthe25thGTBof2ndGTCunderBurdeiny(supposedlysupportedby

the183rdRDthathad launchedfromtheVinogradovkaareaalongtheIasnaiaPoliana-Kalinin-Ozerovski-Sobachevskiaxis)withthehelpof29thTCtoitsnorth,wassupposedtosplitthe2ndSS PzC. To ensure success with the operation, the 273rdMortar Regiment was positioned atIvanovka to lendahand.The183rdRDdidnot launchuntil theafternoonand itwasnotmuchhelp to the 25thGTB.Onewonders how the Soviet attackwould have gone if the 183rd hadlaunched on time andwith determination. The 26thGTB had unexpectedly been dispatched tostop Kempf from enlarging his bridgehead on the Donets near Ryndinka. Its right flank wasoriginallysupposedtosecuretheStorozhevoeareaanditsleftflankwastopenetratetoIakovlevoby1700hrs.Duringthepredawnhours,SovietengineershadclearedpathsintheminefieldneartheProkhorovka tracks,which speeded theassault for25thGTBand its infantry in this attack.

vzz362++.lck369.dgr221m.dgk184m.ThebattlewithDerFührerRegimentofDasReichand25thGTBbeganwithawaveof30

tanks driving from the direction of Belenikhino, but 25th GTB was unable to initially breakthroughtheGermandefensestoreachitstarget,IasnaiaPoliana.However,itdidreachandsecurethewoodsnear IasnaiaPolianaby1300hrs and the smallvillageofOzerovski after that.ThesmallSoviet force setupdefenses in thevillageandweredetermined tohold thevillageuntilreinforcementsarrived,buttheGermanscounterattackedandwipedoutthedefenders.Divertingsomeoftheirtanks,theSovietsdrovethroughthenearbywoodsandattackedtheGermanartillerybatteries, destroying them, butwere unable to travelmuch further after hitting a line of dug-inanti-tankguns.At 1130hrs, other elements of the25thGTBattackedDasReich first from theKomsomoletsStateFarm-IvanovskiVyselokareawith20tanksbutwerethevictimsofaheavyrocketattackthatinflictedheavycasualties.SoonafterwardstheLuftwaffeflewinandstrafedtheSoviet formations, forcing the Soviets back. Shortly afterwardswhen little progress had beenmade,Burdeinyorderedhis25thGTBbacktothewoodssoutheastofVinogradovkatoregroup.TheGermanshadthisareaundershellfireandthe25thGTBhadtomaneuvertowardthewoodseastofIvanovka.The4thGTBand4thGMRB,tothesouthof25thGTB,angleditsattacktowardLuchki in an attempt to help encircle a large part of 2nd SS PzC, with the help of the otherbrigades.TheLuftwaffe showing upwhen it didwas propitious, for if the 25thGTBwas notforcedbackandwasabletocontinuethefightforKSFalongwiththepenetrationsbythe18thTCfromthewestand29thTCfromthenortheast,thefarmmighthavefallenandputadangerousholein theLAH/DasReich line.vzz363+.vzz441*.dgk184m. lck363+.dgr104.dgr221m.gnk313m.vzz11m.zow162.At1100hrsontheleftflankofLAHwherefewpanzersweresupportingtheattack,the18thTC

broke through, allowing some tankers from the 110th TB to drive south before the gap wasplugged.At1130hrsasmallpenetrationoccurrednearHill252.2bythe32ndTBbut thatgapwas also filled. After regrouping and adding the strength of the 9th GAD, the Soviets madeanother attempt for thehill and the adjacentOktiabrskiStateFarmand at 1300 hrs pushed theGermansback.Bymorning, theGermanshadwithstoodRotmistrov’sgiganticattackbutbythistime in the campaignwere unable to exploit it for further gains. The Sovietsmaintained theirdefensiveresistance.lck357+.vzz327.DasReich’sDeutschlandRegimenthadadvancedfromIvanovskiVyselokhoursbefore,when

it was struck by lead units of Bulygin’s 25th GTB. It was now 1100 hrs and both sides hadcontinuedtobringreinforcementstotheareaandtheskirmishhadturnedintoaviciousbattle.The25thhadheavyartillerysupportthathittheGermanshard.WhiletheDeutschlandRegimentwasdefendingitself,Brazhnkiov’s4thGTBhadsweptpassthefrontline,crossedtheraillinenorthofBelenikhinoandintotheeasternoutskirtsofthevillageofIasnaiaPoliana,attackingthenorthernflankofDerFührerRegiment.Theregimentwasnowbeingattackedbyelementsofseveraltankbrigadesandithadlittlearmortosupportit.ItdidhavestrongartillerysupportfromnearKSF,whichsaveditfromdestruction,but theSovietsdidforcetheregiment tofallbackintoIasnaiaPolianainanorderlyretreat.Atthesametime,the25thGTBdrivingfromVinogradovkamadeitsouthofBelenikhinobutwascounter-attackedandhadtofallbacktotheeastofIasnaiaPolianaandKalinin.By1430hrs,DasReichsentreinforcementstosupportitsthreatenedrightflank;the

Soviets disengaged and fell back for the night. It started raining hard and the dirt roadswereturning to mud, discouraging both sides from traveling in the dark. The 26th GTB under ColNesterov(2ndGTC)hadbeenredeployedtowardPlota-Ryndinka tohelpstop the6thPzDand19thPzDfromexpandingtheirnewbridgeheadonthewestsideof theDonets.DasReichwasluckyforthe26thGTBwassentsouthtowardPlota;ifitwasnotforthetransfer,the26thGTBwouldhaveexploited thatgapbetweenGermandivisions.25thTBwaspartof29thTCwhile25thGTBwaspartof2ndGTC.dgk192+.dgr221m.vzz362+.vzz364+.dgr39m.wwf137.InandaroundthevillageofVasilevka,SSTKartillerywaswinningthebattleagainstthe18th

TC’s181stTBandithadtofallbacktoAndreevka,wherethebrigadejoinedupwithelementsofthe 170th TB. Together theymoved east, having the 23rdGAR riding on their decks, back toattack and get behindLAH in the corridor. This time the Soviets would be facingWittmann’scompanyoffourTigers.Wittmannsawthetanksracingtowardhimfromoveramileawayand,despite being greatly outnumbered,moved to intercept.Wittmann started firingwhen the tankswereamileout,longbeforetheSovietscouldfire.WhentheSovietswerejust1,000yardsaway,almosteveryTiger roundhit their targetand theSovietshad togetcloser stillbeforehavingachancetodestroyaTiger.Inthisexchange,adamagedT34hadgottenclosetoaTigerandwasgoingforasuicideruntodestroyit.ItdidramthefrontoftheTigerbutbeforetheammunitionintheSoviet tankdetonated, theTigerwasbackingupandwhentheT34exploded,theTigerwasonlyfiveyardsawaybutsurvivedtheexperience.gnk329++.vzz11m.vzz323.wwf123+.fzk311.fzk314.Moiseev’s31stTB,despitesufferingheavycasualties in itsopeningengagement, struckHill

252.2 and for several hours tried to push theGermans off. Linev’s 32nd TB, after pausing toregroup,moveduptosupportthe31stTB.Eventhe9thGADhadtolaunchanattackthatreachedthe footof the reverseslopeofHill252.2.The9thGADtried togivecover to the tankcrewstrying to escape the tank trap. In front of the trap and after fighting for hours against superiornumbers,Ribbentropwasstillaliveandfightingontopofthehill,destroyingT34sat30yards,asquick as the loader could work. In the desperate struggle to keep the hill and the eventualwithdrawalPeiper lost 20ofhishalf-tracks and trucks.Ribbentrop claimed the reason for theSoviets’poorkillratiowasthefactthecommanderofthetankwasalsothegunneranddoesnothavethetimeorvisibilitytomatchtheGermanproficiency.gnk322.zrl235+.Resuminghisadvanceat1100hrsafterrealizingtheworstoftheSoviettankcounteroffensive

wasover,Priess’sSSTKwithagroupofupto60panzershadfoughtitswaytothebaseofHill226.6by1200hrsaswell as to theoutskirtsofKrasnyiOktiabr,whichwasdefendedby11thMRB.By1215hrs,40panzersand200motorcyclistsmadeittoHill226.6andthencrestedthehill,drivingelementsof the52ndGRDback indisarray towardOlshankaaswellas losing itscommswith5thGA.By1300hrs,Hill 226.6was loosely secured alongwith the first lineoftrenchesnorthofKliuchi.NotstayinglongonHill226.6exceptforasecuritydetachment,SSTKstartedmovingtowardHill236.7whichhadacommandingviewtowardthenorthandeast.Hill236.7 was due north of Hill 226.6 with its crest just south of the important Prokhorovka-Kartashevka road.Thehillwouldbe tough to takebecause someof 95thGRD’s artillerywasplacedthere.Zhadov’sHQwasthereaswell.WithHill226.6inGermanhands,ColKarpov’s24thGTBof5thGMCwascalleduptotheVoroshilovStateFarmtoblocktheadvancingpanzers

from reaching thecriticalKartashevka-Prokhorovka road.Wherewas theLuftwaffe?Theyhadbeenabsentinthissectorallday.TheLuftwaffedidsupportSSTKalittlebutnotasmuchasthetwootherSSdivisions,especiallyLAH.vzz387++.vzz400+.dgk194.vzz1m.gnk312m.The25thTBand28thGARattackedGermanpositionssouthof therail line toStorozhevoe,

where they penetrated theGerman line and drove to theProkhorovka road.Theyweremet bywaiting panzerswho drove them back into Storozhevoe and along the southern slopes ofHill252.2tothefieldsjustoutsideofIamki.WhiletheSovietsdidnotgaingroundinthissectoronthisday,theycertainlyhaltedtheGermanadvanceonProkhorovka.Atacostof53killedand321wounded,LAH claimed tohavedestroyed192 tanksand19anti-tankgunswhile losinghalfoftheirpanzers.LAHalsoclaimedcapturing250POWs.The18thTCwashardhitbutnotashardasthe29thTC.Bothcorpswereinaprecariouspositionas2ndTCon29thTC’sleftflankwasunabletomoveduetoSSDR’sadvanceeastward.ItwastypicalofSoviettankcrewstostaywiththeir tank when immobilized and fire off the remainder of the shells before evacuating. Astationarytankwaseasypreyforpanzers,withtheirsuperioropticsandguns;manytanksweredestroyedinthisfashion.dgk191+.dgk184m.vzz333*.zro209.The 2nd SS PzC continued its advance toward Prokhorovka but its line was becoming

disorganizeddue to themanySovietattacks fromalldirections.TheLAH hadbeenhit hard intheTeterevino-OSF-Hill252.2areatodaywhileatthesametimeSSTKhadforcedthePselRiverandstruggledwithclearingHill226.6andbeyond. Itwas the importanthighgroundneeded toattack the fortified village ofKliuchi. The initial attack failed and the 52ndGRD retained theground. This failure also strained the German line as the main assault of LAH was trying toadvanceontheroadtoProkhorovka.TheSSTKhadtotakeHill226.6andseveralotherhillstothenorthtoreducetheshellfireonLAHasitdroveonProkhorovka.dgk164.dgk124m.dgk222m.gnk312m.TheLAH,drivinguptheroadtoProkhorovka,brokeintothevillagebutwasquicklycounter-

attackedbythenewlyarrived29thTC,whichwasbeingpressuredbybothLAHandSSDRsouthandwestoftherailroad.The25thTBandthenthe18thTCjoinedthefight,whichescalatedintoapitchbattle.The18thTCwithT34tanksinthe181stTBand170thTB,penetratedtoOktiabrskiby1430hrsandwasgreetedbyafewTigers,whichinflictedheavycasualtiesonthetwoTBsastheywerepushedbackintoProkhorovka.BytheeveningtheLAHhadbeenpushedoutoftherailjunction.wdk160.vzz332+.Withthe18thTCand29thTCfightinghardintheProkhorovka,VasilevkaandKalininareas,

Vatutinbroughtelementsofthe10thTCclosertothefrontincaseitwasneededbytheothertwotankcorps.The18thTCalsobroughtupthe110thTB,whichwaswaitinginreserve,toprotectitsrightflankagainstthepossibilityofSSTK inthenorthernreachesoftheirbridgeheadturningsouth toattack181stTCin the rearor flank,while itattemptedanotherattack in theVasilevkaarea.At 1300 hrs, the 110thTBmoved up next to the 32ndMRB east of Prelestnoe andwaswaitingfortheordertoattacktowardValsilevka,GresnoeandMikhailovka.Atthesametime,the170th TB and 181st TBwere ordered to resume attacking towardAndreevka. The 110th TB,alongwiththe36thGTR,hadnotgonefarinmovingtotheirdesignatedpositionswhencruisingLuftwaffespottedthemandattacked.Bylateafternoonitisestimatedthe18thTCand29thTC,after fallingback,had a combined total of roughly200 tanks.Mostof themwere concentrated

nearPetrovka,northwestoftheOktiabrskiStateFarm.TheywouldtrytoblockSSTK’spanzersfromcrossingthePselRiverandsupportingLAHnearProkhorovka.The9thGADand42ndGRDwouldbeinsupportinthisPetrovkasector.fkk169.vzz347.vzz1m.By1100hrs,elementsofthe25thGTB(2ndGTC)werefallingbacktowardanareasoutheast

ofStorozhevoetoregroup.The29thTCanditsattachments,alongwiththe136thGRRof42ndGRDwhichwas following, had also stalled a halfmile east of theOktiabrskiStateFarmandwerefightingastaticdefense.Inlessthanthreehoursoffightingthe29thTChadlost60%ofitstanks.The32ndTBhadlost40tanks,25thGTBlost48tanksandthe31stTBlost30tanks.Theysufferedcasualtiesofnearly2,000menaswell.vzz334+.vzz11m.dgk192.Elements of the 18th TC attempting a second run and driving from the Andreevka area,

ambushedthedefendersonthecriticalHill241.6.Reactingquickly,theLAHsentreinforcementsto thehill but theSoviet tanks inflictedheavycasualtieson the artillerybatteriesbeforebeingrepulsed.Tankersfromthe170thTBandthe181stTBhadsplitoffandwereattackingtowardIvanovskiVyselokandhadalmostreachedDasReich,southoftheKomsomoletsStateFarm.Atthe same time at theKomsomolets State Farm, elements of the 29th TC and 32ndMRBweretrapped and fighting for survival. The two Soviet forces could not link up and were fightingseparately.With the situation stabilizing forLAH in their center,Haussermotivated their rightflank at theKomsomolets State Farm to greater heights.Within the hour, theLAH was able toretakelostgroundandre-establishedcontroloftheKomsomoletsStateFarm.vzz351.zrl236+.Justbeforenoonafterregrouping,the26thTB(2ndTC)attackedDeutschlandRegimentnear

Storozhevoe before it could mount a counter-attack. After repulsing two Soviet attacks,DeutschlandwasabletoinitiatetheirownassaulttowardStorozhevoeintheearlyafternoon.By1400hrs,MajorBlissinger’sbattalionreachedthesouthernedgeofthetownandbegantofightitswayin.Afteranhouroffightinginthetown,theGermanscontrolledthemajorityandwerenowclearing the last resistance in the town.Das Reich and LAH were now linked together moresecurely.gnk340.Ataroundmidday,at the railroad lineeastof IasianaPoliana,DasReich repulsedanattack

with Soviet infantry while its left flank resumed its attack on Storozhevoe against strongresistance. Elements of theLAH, stationed at KSF twomiles southwest of Prokhorovka, heldagainst repeated tank attacks.At the same time to thewest,SSTK elements repulsed repeatedattacksaimedatdestroyingtheirbridgeheadoverthePselatBogorodiskoye.ThebulkofSSTKwasstillfightingtosecureandenlargetheirbridgeheadnorthofthePselandforcontrolof thehilltothenorthofHill226.6,justwestofPolezhaev.fkk169.dgk184m.gnk313m.By1200hrs,theGermancommandknewtheirassaultonProkhorovkawouldfailanddecided

tosupportthemainassaultforcedrivingtowardOboyan.AshockgroupfromSSTKwithalmost70 panzers was dispatched along the northern bank of the Psel River in theKrasnyi Oktiabr-Kozlovka region; their task to envelop the flanks of 6thGA and 1st TA and then to reach theregionnorthofProkhorovka in the rearof5thGTA.With thehelpof air support, thisGermanassaultgrouphadpenetratedthelinedefendedbytheweakened52ndGRD.By1300hrstheyhadcrestedHill 226.6 and the line to thewest of the hill but just to the north, the 95thGRDwaswaitingandattackedthemomentGermanpanzerscrestedthehill.At1800hrs,whentheGermanscouldnotbreakthrough,95thGRDstoppeditsassaultandpulledbacktoregroup.At2000hrs

afteranair raid, theGermansattacked the95thGRDagainand this timesucceeded inpushingthembackandcapturingPolezhaev,butwereunabletoadvancefurtheralongthisaxisbecausetheremainsof18thTChadbeenorderedtostoptheGermansattheriver.Afterlosingthehill, the52ndGRDcounteredtotrytorecapturebutfellbackwhenitcouldnotwrestlethehillfromtheGermans.The52ndGRDwasabletohaltSSTKfromadvancingpastthehilltothewest.dgk194.dgk222m.dgr225.vzz1m.gnk312m.IntheareanorthofKochetovkaandKrasnyiOktiabr,westandsouthwestofProkhorovka,the

32ndGRCof5thGApushed theGermansback, reaching thehighgroundbetweenKochetovkaandKrasnyiOktiabr.TheSoviet advancewasbrought toa stopwithaGermancounter-attack.The294thGRDreachedtheoutskirtsofKochetovkaandtriedtoenterthevillage,fightinghand-to-handbutanotherGermancounter-attackpushedthe294thout.The95thGRDand52ndGRD,with the attached 181st TB and 170th TB, had to shift direction to assist the 294th GRD instoppingtheGermancounterattackandpreventingencirclementofsomeoftheir troops.fkk329.gnk193m.gnk227m.VonMansteinorderedtheLAHandSSTKtoclearthePetrovkaarea.SSTKwastothenmove

fromBeregovoetoKartschevkaandforceacrossingofthePselRiver,advancingintotheprimecorridornexttothePetrovkaareawhereLAHwasstationed.Thiswasthepreliminarypartofamasterplan toencircle anddestroy theSoviet forcesbetween2ndSSPzCand3rdPzC to theeast.LAHwasdownto50panzerswhileDasReich,after repairingsome,had83panzersandSSTK had54.Assault gunswere20, 24 and20 respectively.Hausser estimatedhis corps lostbetween60and70panzers thatday,butsomewouldbe recoveredandrepaired.SeeMap 16.dgk209.dgk212.dgk213m.vzz11mWhile Deutschland was fighting for control of Storozhevoe, Der Führer Regiment was

defendingthelinebetweenIasnaiaPolianatoKalininagainstamostlytankandinfantryattackby2nd GTC. Around noon the 4th GTB, with at least 50 tanks, found the boundary betweenDeutschlandandDerFührerandattacked,tryingtoexploittheweaksector.Itquicklypenetratedthe line and drove toward IasnaiaPoliana.As the tanks approached the village,GermanMGsopenedontheSovietinfantryridingonthethetanks,killingmany.Thetankskeptcoming.gnk340.gnk313m.Byearlyafternoonandwithoutmuchpausetoregroup,theSSTKhadlaunchedfromHill226.6

withtherestofitspanzerstowardHill236.7.Thishillwasanexcellentobservationsiteandbothsideswantedit.Afiercebattleensuedasthepanzersdrovetowardthecrest.TheGermanswererepulsed,with16panzersburningalongwithmotorcyclesandinfantrylayingonthebattleground.SSTKhadtofallback.Whilethishillwasbeingcontested,the11thMRBhadregroupedandwasattackingHill226.6,tryingtoregaincontrolofit.vzz388+.gnk312m.Atnoon,elementsofLAH infiltrated thewoodsnorthof thevillage andcapturedStalinskoe

StateFarm,whileotherelementsofDasReichdrivingfromIvanovskiVyseloktriedtocompletethe circle from the south and southeast of Storozhevoe.With LAH successful in repulsing theattacksattheOktiabrskiStateFarmandtheSSTKfinallygainingtractionandpushingtheSovietsbackinthebendoftheriver,Hausser,tryingtoachievetheinitiative,launchedattacksagainsttheflanksof18thTC,whileatthesametimemotivatingDasReichtocompletetakingStorozhevoeandreachPravorotfurthereast.Shortlyafter1200hrs,the29thTC’s25thTBpassedthroughthe

lineandattackedDasReichbutfailedandhadtofallback.The169thTB,58thMRBandthe55thGTRfoughtalongsidethe25thTB.Quicklyfollowing,DasReichenteredthewesternoutskirtsofthe village of Storozhevoe by 1400 hrs and had secured it by dark. By gaining control ofStorozhevoe,DasReichhadclosed thegapbetween itselfandLAH.StorozhevoewassouthofHill 252.2 and the Oktiabrski State Farm. vzz372++. gnk366. dgk191. dgk184m. vzz349.zow163+.WithModelhavingtroubletothenorth,includingthenewSovietoffensiveintheOrelsector,

vonMansteinvisitedHothtogetafirsthandaccountofthesituationinthesouth.Hewantedtosee ifHoth could continue the offensive, keepingVatutin busy in order to prevent forces frommoving north againstModel, aswell as to destroy the Soviet divisions of 69thArmy fightingbetweentheDonetsRivers.vzz440.At 1300 hrs,more than three hours after 2ndGTChad launched, the 183rdRDof 48thRC

launched its attack toward theKalinin-Ozerovski-Hill 232.0 linewhichwas defended byDasReich.Ifthe183rdhadlaunchedwiththetankers,resultsmayhavebeendramaticallydifferent.Asthe183rdRDapproachedthelineinfrontofKalinin,theGermansfiredarocketbarragethatinflicted heavy casualties. After a brief fight, the 183rd RD fell back. At the same timeTikhomirov’s93rdGRDattackedthe167thID’slinebetweenTeterevinoSouthandSoshenkov.The battle extended into the night and the 93rdGRD had broken through the line northeast ofSmorodinobuthadtofallbackafteritranlowofammo.AtSoshenkovelementsofthe93rdGRDcrossed the Donets and established a small bridgehead on the east side. The 627th PioneerBattalionwascalledupandwereabletoblocktheSovietsfromheadingwesttowardPetrovka.SoshenkovwassouthofRozhdestvenka.vzz367+.vzz574.vzz7m.By1300hrsthe95thGRDand42ndGRDintheKrasnyiOktiabr-Kozlovkaarea,southwestof

Hill226.2,hadfoughtallmorningandthendidtheirbesttodisengageandwithdraw.TheSSTKcontinuedinanortheasterlydirectiontowardtheVeselyi-PolezhaevlinetodestroytheelementsofZhadov’s5thGAthatwereregrouping.Inresponsetothisbreakintheline,Zhadovorderedthe24thGTBofthe5thGMCtotheVoroshilovStateFarmwhereitwouldcooperatewiththe18thTCand the infantryof5thGAtostop theenemyarrivingatPolezhaev.TheSSTKhadnotonlyrepulsedtheattacksby5thGAandthetankcorpsof5thGTA,ithadgainedsomegroundandwaswithin shelling distance of the importantKartashevka-Prokhorovka road.With these gains thatthreatened the penetration of the third defense belt, Zhadov and Rotmistrov cobbled togetherforces along this road where they finally stopped SSTK. dgk194. vzz460. dgk222m. vzz1m.wdk160.gnk313m.Intheearlyafternoon,2ndGTCand2ndTChadbrokenintothewoodswestofBelenikhino

and the farms east of the village of Kalinin near the Lipovyi Donets, taking the railwayembankment from the Germans in fierce combat. Later in the afternoon, LAH andDas Reichlaunched a counter-attack in the Kalinin-Belenikhino-Storozhovoe area that lasted far into thenight.dg134.je110.dgk222m.dlu63m.dgr221m.The 167th ID had been busy that day defending itself and the southern flank ofDer Führer

against repeated attacks. Near Smorodino a Soviet attack penetrated the line but the gap wasclosed with a German counter that inflicted heavy casualties. German artillery made thedifferencethatdayandwasaprimefactorfortheGermansholdingtheirlines.vzz368.vzz7m.

AtthesametimethatHill236.7wasbeingattackedbySSTK,anothercombatgroupofSSTKwasfightingforHill235.5tothesoutheast,notfarfromtheVoroshilovStateFarm.Thishillwasalso defended by the 95th GRD and artillery. Keeping both these hills just south of theProkhorovka-Kartashevka road was critical for the Soviets if they were to keep SSTK fromjoiningupwithLAH.TheSSTKmadeitsdeepestpenetrationtowardtheimportantroadat1730hrs and from thatpointonwas fightinga staticbattle as theSovietsbroughtupmoreartillery,which finally stopped the Germans. The 95th GRD suffered heavy casualties as well as theartillery personnel in stopping the Germans. The 24th GTB of 5th GMC was ordered to theVoroshilovStateFarmarrivingat2030hrs,whilethe10thGMBwassenttotheOstrenkiareaincaseSSTKresumeditsadvance.The51stGTRwassenttoMalaiaPsinkaat2310hrstoblockSSTKfromadvancingbutbythentheSSTKhadstoppedforthenight.TheSSTKlost46tanksthatdayincludingtenTigers.Manyof thesepanzer losseswerecausedbyartilleryandrockets thathad been brought up on the day andwere firing from across the Psel River. All Tigers wererecoveredandwererepairedandreturnedtothefieldstarting7/14.Inthe5thGAsector,Zhadovkept his forces on alert all night in case of a night attack. Hill 236.7 straddled the importantKartashevka-ProkhorovkaroadthatstayedinSoviethands.vzz391++.vzz396++.vzz401.vzz1m.At1300hrs,whenthetwoleadingtankcorpsofthe5thGTAwerebeginningtomakeinroads

intotheOktiabrskiStateFarm,afriendlyfireincidenthappenedthatsettheSovietsgravelyback.Asmallgroupfromthe2ndVA,lookingfortargetstohit,mistakenlybelievedtheywerestrikingGermantroopsdefending thefarmbut inreality itwasSoviet troopswhohadfought theirwayinto the farm. The planes, using their 30mmMGs and the PTAB bombs, wreaked havoc anddestructionontheirtanksandmen.vzz329.At1300hrsafterfightingforhours, twobrigadesof29thTCalongwith28thGARcaptured

Hill252.2,pushingtheGermanpanzersback2milesandcapturingSovkhozOkatybrskiaswell.However, at the same time the German forces penetrated 33rd GRC in the Krasniy Oktiabr-Ochetovkaarea,forcingthetwoSovietdivisionsnorthoftheVeselyi-Polezhaevline.OncetheretheGermansthreatenedtherightflankofthe5thTRbutthe24thGTBwascalleduptostrengthentherightflank.Aspartofthecoordinatedattackby5thGTA,the29thTCattackedagainwithitsrightflankalongtherailroadtowardKomsomoletsStateFarm.ThoughcapturingHill252.2,the32ndTBand31stTBcouldnotdrivefurtherduetoincreasedresistancefromdug-inpanzersandassistancefromtheLuftwaffe.Beforethehillwasrecaptured,the1stBattalionof32ndTBwasencircledanddestroyedsouthofHill252.2.dgr224+.dgk191.vzz8m.jp198.vzz1m.WiththelikelihoodofProkhorovkanotfallingtoday,GeneralHausserwasorderedtoforman

armoredcombatgroupfromSSTK’s3rdPzRandwiththesupportoftheLuftwaffeshiftdirectiontothewestandattacktheflanksof6thGAand1stTAinanattempttotakepressureoffthe48thPzC’sbidtocrossthePsel.ThislefttheTigers,afewMarkIVsandmostofthegrenadiersofthedivisiontotacklethedefensesnorthofHill226.6alongtheVeselyi-Polezhaevlinetothemselves.This is thegeneralareawhere the200 tanksof18thTCand29thTCwouldfallback towhentheiroveralloffensivewascanceledbutlocalattackswouldcontinuepastdark.SSTKwouldnotadvancebeyondthispoint.dgk193++.dgk222m.vzz1m.gnk312m.dgk231m.snk433m.Lipichev’s53rdMRB,insecondechelon,cameuptosupport31stTBwhenitstalledinfront

of KSF and together they penetrated LAH’s line southwest of Oktiabrski and into the

Komsomolets State Farm. Exploiting this success, the remains of 31st TB and the 53rdMRBadvancedandby1730hrshadenteredintotheKomsomoletsStateFarm.Afterthecenterofthefarm,SovietforcespulledbackfromitssalienttoHill252.2tostabilizethelinenextto25thTBandtoavoidencirclementduringthenight.TheSovietshadpenetratedtheLAHartillerylineonHill241.6andhadnotknownit,butwithalittlefurtheradvancetheycouldhaveencircledLAH’sHQwhichwas also stationed onHill 241.6; a golden opportunity lost due to the fog ofwar.dgk190+.vzz8m.vzz333*.gnk332.At1300hrswithallthefiercefightinghappeningatOktiabrskiStateFarmandHill252.2,the

170thTBplustheinfantryofthe9thGADand42ndGRDfinallyinfiltratedthefrontlineatthefarm,forcing1stPzGRofLAHtofallbackaboutahalfmiletothesouthfromtheOktiabrskiStateFarm.WiththeheavyartillerysupportfromHill241.6,theSovietsstillhadahardtimeintakingtherestofthefarmbutwiththeGermanslosingsomeground,itmadeiteasierforthe181stTBtomovesouthwestalongtherivertowardthevillagesthattheyweresupposedtoclear.Bythistimetheleadunitsofthe181stTBhadcapturedMikhailovkaandthesereinforcementsalongwiththe36thGTRwouldsupport thesecondattackonAndreevkaandValsievka.At1400hrs,withhisbrigadestalledinfrontofAndreevka,Bakharovcalledthe32ndMRBtothelinetohelpbreakthestubborndefense.dgk191.vzz347+.By1300hrsthefirstofthe150tanksof5thGTAthatbrokedownonthewaytothebattlezone

arrivedatProkhorovka.Itwouldtakeaweekforallofthemtoarrive.Withouttheseadditions,the18thTC,29thTCand2ndGTCinfirstechelon,Rotmistrovhadabout450tanksattackingthatmorning.With5thGMCand2ndTCinsecondechelonorreserve,another300tankswouldbeatRotmistrov’sdisposal.wdk159.AfterbeingpushedoutofStorozhevoeby1400hrs,theSovietremnantsofthe25thGTB,the

285thRRof183rdRDandabattalionof58thMRBcontinuedtodefendalineeastandsoutheastofStorozhevoe.At1505hrs,twobattalionsandadozenpanzersfromDasReich(Deutschland)splitoffandheadedfromthewoodsnorthofIvanovskiVyseloktowardthenortheast.Atthesametime, after stabilizingKSF, two battalions and 14 panzers ofLAH attacked the 285th RR andquicklyforcedthemtofallbacktowardPravorot.Withthesetwosuccessfulactions,Storozhevoewasjustaboutencircled.VatutinwasalsoworriedthatifStorozhevoeandPravorotfellthenDasReichcouldturnsouthandlinkupwithKempf,encircling48thRCof69thArmy.Topreventthatfromhappening,Rotmistrovorderedtheremainsof5thGTAtoresumetheattackregardlessoftheconditionoftheindividualcorps.The169thTBwouldactasascreenwhilethe26thTBandthe58th MRB would attack from Ivanovka along the rail line toward Hill 234.9 (east ofBelenikhino), Belenikhino and Teterevino. The advance failed but it did slow the Germans’advance.vzz375++.vzz574.vzz365.vzz369.ElementsofMajGeneralTikhomirov’s93rdGRDcreatedabridgeheadontheeastbankofthe

Donets,headingforPetrovka,butthe627thPioneerBattalionof167thIDblockedtheirwayandinflictedheavycasualtiesonthe93rdGRD.vzz368.At1400hrsSavchenko’s4thGMRB,drivingwestnextto4thGTB,reachedtheSobachevski-

Ozerovskilinebutwasimmediatelyhaltedbyheavyartilleryfire.vzz363.Around1330hrsafterleavingHill226.6,elementsoftheSSTKmadeittothewesternbankof

thePselnorthofPolezhaevandtriedtoforceacrossingintotherearoftheassembling18thTC.

After an hour of bitter fighting, the 18thTC repulsedSSTK from forming a bridgehead on theeasternbank.At1530hrs,30additionalpanzersleftHill226.6andadvancedinthedirectionofPolezhaevbutwererepulsedbythe153rdGRRandartillery.Movingawayintotheravinewestofthevillage,theGermancolumnresumedmovingnorthtowardHill236.7.Thehill,defendedbyelementsofthe95thGRD,wasattackedbutagaintheGermanswererepulsedandhadtofallbackby way of the ravine. This was a critical tactical victory for the 95th GRD; the hill was avaluableOPintheSovietthirddefensivebeltandifithadbeenlost,itwouldhavebeenamajorcoupfortheGermans.Afterregrouping,theSSTKtriedtocapturePolezhaevagainandby2000hrshadcapturedthetown.Despitethehour,thetroopsdugintodefendagainstpossibleambushesduringthenight.Thenextdaythe95thGRDwaswithdrawnfromthelinetoregroupandthe31stTBand32ndTBwould be reinforcedwith the 53rdMRBand elements of 9thGAD.vzz390.gnk312m.dgk194+.After takingHill 226.6 just north of the Psel River from 155thGRR and 11thMRB,SSTK

continued to drive in a northeasterly direction and by dusk, the division, with the help of airsupport,hadbeenabletocapturePolezhaevwhiletheTigershadmovedontotrytosecuretheBeregovoe-Kartaschevka road by dusk. This success against 5th GA alarmed Rotmistrov andsincehisonlyarmorremainingwasinreserve,hecalledonKarpov’s24thGTBof5thGMCtomovetothevicinityoftheVoroshilovStateFarmandnearbyHill228.3tosupportthe5thGAandblockSSTK’s advanceby attacking theGermannorthern flank. In addition, the10thGMBwasdeployed justnorthof theKartashevka road toeitherdefend the roador toassist24thGTB inattackingSSTK’spanzers.Rotmistrovalsosentthe6thGADtoassist24thGTB.Whentherestofthe division was unable to join the Tigers at the critical road, the Tigers were called back.vzz383.mhz343+.fkk169.lck369.gnk372.gnk312m.gnk365m.vzz11m.kuz195.At1400hrs, the5thGTAfinallypushedtheSSTKwestwardenabling theSoviets to liberate

VasilevkaafterafiercebattlethatsawtheGermanssufferheavycasualties.jp199.Despitethecloudcover,theSovietAFmade893sortiescomparedtotheLuftwaffe’s654.The

Luftwaffe,despitethelowercount,stilldominatedtheairinthesouth.lck356.FromsoutheastofKalinin,Soviet tanks,believedtobe2ndGTC,brokethroughthelineand

headedforLuchkibutwerestoppedbyheavytankfirefromDasReich.EightSoviettanksweredestroyed.Until1500hrs,2ndGTCtriedtoreachLuchkiwhentheGermanscountered,stoppingtheadvance.TheGermansthentriedtopenetratetotherearandrollupthetankcorps’rightflank.At2000hrs,Burdeinyorderedastoptotheoffensiveandtogodefensive.HausserhadreceivedreportsearlierinthedaythatatankconcentrationwasformingtotheireastandheorderedDasReich to stop its advance and go defensive. This order probably savedmanyGermans whileinflicting heavy casualties onBurdeiny. The 2ndGTC lost 54 of its 94 tanks.One reason forBurdeiny’sfailureagainstDasReichwasduetothelackofcoordinationwith183rdRDand6thGMRB.vzz365++.WhileLAHwasovercomingtheoffensivebythe18thTCand29thTC,DasReichhadpushed

asidetherightflankofthe2ndGTCaswellaselementsof25thTBandhadmanagedtofightitsway toStorozhevoe,where itwascurrently fighting streetby street to expel the169thTBandelementsofthe58thMRBfromthevillage.Bytheafternoon,theonlyareaofconcernforHausserwastherepeatedattacksby18thTConSSTKattheboundarylinewithLAH.By1430hrs,SSTK

was fighting on the outskirts of Andreevka against the 36th GTR which was supplied withChurchilltanks.Thedivisionwouldenterthevillagewithinthehourandstartsecuringitstreetbystreet. At the same time, the village of Vasilevka was being secured and defended against acounter-attack by elements of 18thTC.Elements of the 18thTChaddiverted fromAndreevkaalong thenearby ravineandwascurrently fighting for the importantHill241.6with itscentrallocation.ElementsofSSTK triedtofollowbutwerestoppedbyheavyartilleryfire.Therewasgiveandtakeformostoftheday.Onesidewouldmakesomegainsinonesectorbutgiveitbackwhen the other side regroupedor received reinforcements.This exchangeof groundwasoftenrepeated;thevillagessouthofthePsel,theOSF,KSFandStorozhevoewereprimeexamplesofthissavagebackandforth.vzz349++.Elementsofthe28thGARof9thGADof33rdGRCwasfollowingbehind29thTC.Whilethe

tankerswerestalled incombat, the infantrycontinued tomoveandby1400hrshadpassed thesouthwestedgeoftheStalinskoeStateFarmandhadreachedthenortheastedgeofthewoodstothewestofStorozhevoe.By1700hrs,theregimenthadreachedthesouthernedgeofthewoodsandwas heading for IvanovskiVyselokwhen itwas attacked.After a brief skirmish, the 28thGARhadtofallbackintothewoods.Alsoincludedin33rdGRCwasthe52ndGRDandthe95thGRD.Thesetwodivisions,alongwiththe11thMRBof10thTC,weredefendingthebeltnorthofthe PselRiver that includedHill 226.6 against the advance ofSSTK.After crossing the river,SSTKafterrealizingthattheSovietswerestrivingtoreachGresnoe,MalyeMaiachki,TeterevinoNorth and theKomsomolets State Farm, increased their artillery barrage, putting up awall ofsteel against the penetrators. If successful then Pogorelovka and Iakovlevowould be next, butthose objectives would never materialize for 5th GTA that day. vzz335++. vzz380+. vzz1m.gnk312m.vzz8m+.After losing Oktiabrski State Farm and with Komsomolets State Farm being infiltrated,

Hausser called up for air support. At around 1300 hrs, small groups of planes totaling 150fighters/bombers, Me 110s and Ju 87s, showed up and for the next hour attacked Sovietformations,especiallythe31stTB.Hill254.5onthenorthwestedgeofthefarmwasofspecialinterest to thepilots.BothSoviet infantryand tankswerepinneddownandunable toadvance.Whentheplanesleft,theSovietspulledback.Withthebulkof18thTCand29thTCsqueezedintotheareabetweenthePselRivertothewestandtheStorozhevoewoodstotheeast,theLuftwaffehadplentyoftargetstohit.vzz328++.vzz283.SmallgroupsofSovietaircrafthadmaderepeatedattacksalongtheProkhovokaroadaswell

as the small airfield at LuchkiNorth. Each time therewas littleGerman interferencewith theattacks.TheSovietsdroppedtheirloadsandreturnedhometoreload,butwiththenextruntheirluckranoutfor theLuftwaffewerewaitingfor them.Withinminutes,ahalfdozenplanesweredownandtheremainderoftheSovietplanesbuggedout.Itwasarelativelystrangedayfortheairwarinthesouthernsalient.TheVVShadmostoftheirassetsonthetwoflankswhichcontrolledtheskies,whilein2ndPzCsectortheLuftwaffehadcontrol.ThisairsupportfortheSSdivisionswasamajor reasonfor their repulsingsomanyenemytanks.TheLuftwaffe reported losing19planeswhiledowning16enemyplanes.cbk81.By1400hrsafter fierce fighting, the170thTBof18thTCalongwith troopsof5thGAhad

nearly recaptured theOktiabrskiStateFarmwhile the181stTBof18thTCwas fighting in the

Vasilevka-Andreevkaareawithitsrightflank,whereitencounteredstrongresistancefromSSTK.ItwasabletopushbackSSTKtoKozlovkaandbrieflyrecaptureVasilevkaby1800hrs.The18thTCtriedtomovefurthersouthbutwasstoppedbyheavyshellingcomingfromGresnoe.Bylatein the day and to avoid being pocketed, the 18th TC had fallen back and was defending thePetrovka,PrelestnoeandAndreevkaline.Thiswouldbeoneofthemajortankbattlesofthedaythatwouldcontributetothelegend,butitwasnotaslargeasthebattleintheHill252.2sector.dgk182+.dgk189.dgk184m.dgr224.gnk312m.gnk347.dgr222.dgr224.vzz1m.lck346.kuz195.AfterrealizingthattheSovietplantoentrapSSTKonthenorthsideofthePselhadfailedand

that the Soviet attackwas losing steam,Hausser ordered an attack to keep the Soviets on thedefensive.Besides,Hausserhadmanyobjectivestoaccomplishonthisdayandhecouldnotwaitany longer to achieve them. At 1430 hrs, shelling increased and the 2nd SS PzC began theircounter-attacks.TheSSTKbrokethroughthe52ndGRD,overranthe95thGRD’s284thGRRandemergedontheriverbanknearPolezhaev.IntheprocessSSTKencircledthe11thMRB,plustheleadingTigerswereabletoshellthecolumnof110thTBthatwasontheothersideoftheriverandheadingforMikhailovka,destroyingseveraltanks.TheGermansresumedtheirattacktowardAndreevka andMikhailovkawhile another battalion headed for Vasilevka fromKozlovka. By1400hrs,LAHhadalsorepulsedthe29thTC’sattackonHill252.2andelementsofthe32ndTB,53rdMRBattheOktiabrskiStateFarmhadbeenpocketedandwerebeingreduced.TheSovietshadnotgivenuponthehillorthefarmanditwasnotguaranteedtheGermanswouldstillholdthem by the end of the day. The remnants of the 25th TB had been thrown back to their startpositions. It was recognized by both sides that the 29th TC’s advance had failed its mainobjectiveofgettingbehindtheSSandpocketingit.vzz348+.vzz11m.ztc270.At1430hrs,the2ndGTCwith25tanksandwiththesupportofthe456thMRB,brokethrough

theGermandefensivebeltandreachedtheoutskirtsofKalininwhereitengagedtheDasReichgarrison. The Germans countered and with the Soviets disorganized had to fall back. VonMansteinwasquotedassayingthiswasthemomentofclimaxwherehewouldwinorlose.Hestillhadthe24thPzCandthe17thPzDinreserveandthoughtthathecouldstillwininthesouth.jp199.hjj121m.vzz367.vzz441.dgr221m.DasReichwasupagainst repeatedattacks fromall flanks;Krugercalled forair support. Ju

88sandJu87swerevectoredinagainst2ndGTC’s4thGTBand4thGMRB,whichwereclosinginonKalinin.Aftertheairraid,theSovietspulledbacktoregroupbutresumedtheattackonasmallerfront.vzz331.By1500hrs,asmallgroupoftanksfromthe4thGTB,advancingfromVinogradovka,reached

theoutskirtsofKalininbutwerequicklydestroyedbyasuperiorforcefromDerFührerwaitingfor theirarrival.Additional tanks fromthe4thGTBarrived too late tosave the leadunits,butwerethenattackedbyapassingsquadronofplanes,forcingtheSoviettanksbacktothesoutheastofthevillage.AtthesametimethattheattackonKalininwasrepulsed,DeutschlandRegimentlaunchedanattackonStorozhevoeandthenearbywoodstofinishthejobthatLAHandtheyhadstarted this morning in clearing the important village. The village was secured by 1600 hrs.vzz364.DuringaslowmomentwhentheSoviettankshadpulledbacktoregroup,DasReich resumed

its advance and was approaching Vinogradovka when 40 German planes struck the 4th GTB

defendingthevillageaswellasthe4thGMRB,whichwasdefendingnearKalinin.AllthewhileotherelementsofDeutschlandofDasReichcontinuedtoclear thegroundaroundStorozhevoe.AsthebattlewasmovingtowardKalininandwiththehelpof4thGMRB,the4thGTBwasabletorepulsetheinitialattackonitsflank.By1800hrs,withthesupportof339thIRof167thID,the2ndPzRofDasReichattackedtheexposedflankof4thGMRBwhilethe4thGTBwasfallingbacktowardBelenikhino.The4thGMRBstayedtoscreentheretreatandhadtoendureapanzerattackaswellasaLuftwaffestrafing.Tomakethesituationworse,theRedAirForcecamebyandaccidentlybombedthe4thGMRBaswell.Thebrigadesufferedalmost300casualtiesbeforeitcoulddisengageandfallback.JustlikeLAH,DasReichforthemostparthadstartedthedayinadefensiveposition,butoncethelinewasstabilizedbyearlyafternoon,itwentontheattackinearnest.Thoughattackingthroughoutitsentiresector,DasReichconcentrateditsprimaryeffortsatStorozhevoeandintheVinogradovkasector.Withouttheaidofairsupportthatday,DasReichwouldhavesufferedmuchgreater lossesandwouldhavefallenbackinanattempttoclosetheseveral brief gaps that had appeared that would have been exploited by the Soviet tankers.vzz365+.zow163.Bytheafternoonwiththehighcasualtiesofthearmoredoffensive,Rotmistrov’srightflankwas

under severe pressure. The 18th TCwas on the verge of collapse near Petrovka; Rotmistrovbrought up 10th GMB of 5th GMC to the Ostrenki region and the 24th GTB was moved toVoroshilovStateFarmareatowardoffaGermanattempttopenetrateintothe5thGTAreararea,west of Prokhorovka. These Soviet reinforcements caused Hausser to go on the defensive.VoroshilovwasanimportantroadjunctionalittlewaysnorthwestofProkhorovka.Ostrenkiwasfour miles due north of Petrovka. Konytnoe was three miles due north of Petrovka. rc215.aaa125m.dgk184m.dgr226.vzz398.vzz11m.Bymidafternoon,anotherseverethunderstormhittheDasReichsectormakingmovementover

grounddifficult.The2ndTCand2ndGTC,whohadbeenbattlingwithDasReich since earlymorning,decidedtofallbacktotheeastoftherailroadembankment.Lateinthedayafterallthelosses,Burdeinywhowasdisgustedthathelost26thGTBwhenitwassenttoRyndinkatostop6thPzDfromjoiningupwithDasReich,ponderedwhat theresultswouldhavebeenwith thisextrabrigadeagainstDasReich.Burdeinylost44tanksofthe26thGTBwhichheintendedtousetoopenagapbetweenDasReichand167thIDandgetbehindDasReichtodestroyitalongwithhis other brigades.However, by nowhewas no longer able to go on the offensive due to thelossesand immediately set aboutpreparingnewdefenses for thecomingcounter-attackofDasReich. Soviet tanks, which had extra fuel tanks on the side, were often targeted by Germangunnersandplanes.Sovietbrigades lostmany tankson thisdaywhen theseexternal fuel tanksweretargetedandthefieryfuelmixtureenvelopedtheenginecompartment.gnk341+.At1600hrs,anothersmallgroupofpanzers,around20,leftHill226.6headingnorthforHill

236.7,whichwasstilldefendedbythe95thGRD.Soonafterleavingthehill,thepanzersenteredadeepravineinordertoavoidcontactwiththe11thMRBor52ndGRDwhichwasinfrontofthehill.ReachingHill236.7,thepanzersexitedtheravineandstartedfiringonthehill.vzz390.gnk312m.vzz1m.Malov’s99thTBof2ndTC,whichhadonly19tanks left,wasfightingfor itssurvivalafter

beingencircled in theVasilevka-Andreevkaarea.The99thTBwouldwait fornightfallbefore

tryingtobreakouttotheeast.Theremaining26thTBwasregroupingatGrushkiwhiletherepaircrews worked on their tanks. The 99th TB’s HQ was at Krasnoe, east of Storozhevoe, andcommunicationswerenotalwaysintact.vzz369.In25thTBand2ndTCsector,DasReichfinallycapturedStorozhevoeby1600hrs,expelling

the last resistance that had doggedly fought on for the last two days. At 1930 hrs RotmistrovorderedPopov’s2ndTCtoattackfromBelenikhinotowardIvanovskiVelselokandKomsomoletsStateFarm, into the right flankofDasReich.Rotmistrov also orderedBakharov’s 18thTC toattackfromthewestandlinkupwithPopovnearKSF.Theorderatthislatestageinthedaywasdesperate considering the circumstances.The 18thTC tried to break out ofVasilevka butwasunableandtheattemptedencirclementofLAHfailedalmostfromtheverybeginning.Ataboutthissame time, the 1st PzGRwas attacked from the east side by the infantry of 9thGAD and thesupportofthe25thTB.Thetanksdidnotleadthechargebutstayedbehindandcontinuouslyfiredalongwithartillerywhiletheinfantryadvanced.Theassaultwasrepulsed.Bytheendoftheday,the18thTClost56%ofitstanksandhadonly65machinesstillworking.Postbattleevaluationsof Bakharov, the commander of 18th TC, were negative. It is claimed he had been slow torespond to battlefield conditions and made several errors in judgement; he would lose hiscommandshortly,butwouldprovehisabilityandeventuallywouldcommandthe9thTClaterinthe year. It has been suggested that if theRedAF had amore prominent role on this day, thenumberoftankslostwould’havebeensmaller.Anotherconditionthathadanegativeinfluenceof5thGTA’s attackwas its starting position,which had been too far northwhere ravines playedhavocwiththetanks.Bakharovalsobelievedhiscorpsdidnotreceiveenoughartillerysupportandthatthiswastherealcauseforhiscorps’casualties.vzz355.vzz358*+.gnk366.zrl237.Intheafternoon,the36thGTRandthe1000thAARwasordereduptothelinetosupportthe

170thTB,whowere now fightingSSTK’s right flank and threatening to rupture their line andsever theboundarybetweenLAHandSSTK. Inaddition to sendingaTigercompany fromnearHill 226.6 to assist, German batteries at Gresnoe shifted their shelling to this hot spot. ThisartillerybatterystationedatGresnoehittheSovietforceshard,forcingthembackaswell.Duringthisengagement,MichaelWittmannandhisTigercompanystoodfastagainstmanyT34sroaringdownonthem.dgk188+.snk84.lck349.gnk312m.fzk311+.WhiletheSSTKgrenadierswerefightingtokeepVasilevka,apanzergrouphadleftHill226.6,

travelingnortheast,andwasfightingwith95thGRDforcontrolofPolezhaev,nearthewestbankofthePselRiver.JustbeforemidnighttheTigersreachedtheKartashevka-ProkhorovkaroadandwerenowonlythreemilesnorthwestofProkhorovka.AfterdarkthetanksdisengagedfromwestofVasilevka,andBakharovbeganregroupingthe18thTC,makingpreparationstocounter-attackalongthesouthernbankoftheriverinthemorning.Bakharov’s32ndMRBonthenorthernbankofthePselRiverwasstillstrugglingwithelementsoftheSSTK.ThepanzerswerealsoshortonfuelandammowhichforcedtheGermanstobecautious.Duringthehardfightingthatday,SSTK losttheuseof45panzers,includingalltenTigers.Manyofthesecouldberepairedifretrievalwaspossible.Withthisloss,SSTKhad56workingpanzers.Therewerealso316casualtiesincluding69dead.gnk348++.vzz1m.Exploitingthebrief,modestsuccessof18thTCwhenearlierafewofitstanksfoughttheirway

totheedgeofKSF,,the53rdMRB,anattachmentto5thGTA,advancedquicklyandby1730hrs

hadenteredtheKomsomoletsStateFarm.AGermancounterprovedtoostrongandthe53rdMRBhadtofallbacktoHill252.2,whichhadbeenrecentlyrecapturedandwasnowdefendedbythe25thTB.Aspartof thiscoordinatedoffensive, the2ndGTCwasattacking fromVinogradovkaandBelenikhinoregioninthedirectionofKalininby1430hrs,butbeforereachingitsobjective,wasattackedbya tankcolumnofDasReichmovingnorth,whichwouldprevent the2ndGTCfromreachingKalinin.Withthe29thTCfallingbehind,exposing2ndGTC’srightflank,thecorpscommanderdecideditwouldbewisetofallbackuntilthenewlinestabilized.The2ndGTChadlosthalfitsstrengthsincethestartofthecampaignandwasdownto100tanksbytheendoftheday.dgr225.vzz8m.vzz333*.gnk313m.Lateintheafternoon,whenthe53rdMRBlostitstanksupportandfailedtotakeHill241.6,

whichwasheavilydefendedbyartillerywithgunsupto155mm,itfellbacknorthofHill252.2.Bakharovthenorderedhis18thTCreserve,the110thTBand36thGTRtoformanewlinesouthof the53rdMRB,181stTBand170thTB,allowing themto regroup.Thenewdeployment for110thTBwasnorthofVasilevka,whereVatutinexpectedtheGermanstolauncharenewedattacknorthward.TheGermansdidnotwait until the followingday, but launched late that afternoon.TheSSTK, north of the Psel, attackedBakharov’s 32ndMRB,whichwas able to slowSSTK.Whilethisnewengagementwasevolving,the31stTBof29thTCstruckLAHbetweenOktiabrskiStateFarmandStorozhevoeforonemoretime,butitstrucktheLAH’sstrongestsectoranddidnotmakeanygains.The170thTBjoinedinandattackedtheLAHonitsleftflank.Afterregrouping,the32ndTBlaterjoinedinandtogetherthethreebrigadeswereabletopushtheLAHbackintheOktiabrskiarea,butataterrificcost.Ithadbeenanextremelylongdayforthemenofbothsidesandyet the fighting continued in certain key sectors. In theother sectors, themenwere eating,cleaning their weapons and getting resupplied. dgk189+*+. dgk184m. vzz8m. gnk333++.gnk313m.vzz348.vzz1m.Atnight,northofthePsel,Rotmistrov’sforcesattackedSSTK,buttheattackwasuncoordinated

and failed. His tanks had to withdraw. SSTK had broken off battle with 24th GTB in lateafternoonandhadduginforthenightwhentheywereattackedagain.The18thTCand29thTChad also broken away early in order to regroup its 200 tanks in preparation for resuming theattack in the morning. Bakharov’s 170th TB, 181st TB and 110th TB was ordered to attackVasilevka in the morning. The 6th GAD was ordered out of reserve to join the attack in themorning.dgk212.dgk195+.On the left flank of 167th ID, nearest toDas Reich, many penetrations were occurring, but

everytimeacounter-attackclosedthegap.The167thID,underTrierenberg,andDasReichwerethenorthernprongwhile3rdPzCwasthesouthernprongthatweretryingtoencircle69thArmy’s48th RC. TheDas Reich was trying to drive east from Storozhevoe toward Pravorot beforeheadingsouthtocaptureVinogradovkaandLeski.The167thID,whichwasalreadysouthofDasReich,was supposed to reachLeski and protectDas Reich’s flank and rear. The Soviets hadattackedDasReichsinceearlymorningandhadpreventedtheGermansfromreachingPravorotbuttheyhadfailedtodestroy,orevenpushback,theenemyasordered.ThoughtheSovietswerebeing pushed back slowly,Das Reich would try again for Pravorot in the morning. vzz365.vzz474.dgk183m.By1700hrs,Bulyginknewhis25thGTB’sattackonDasReichhadfailedandhisscoutshad

informedhimthatGermanreinforcementswereontheway.Heorderedhistankstodisengageandfallbacktotheeast.TheGermanartilleryfollowedtheretreatandthe25thGTBhadtofallbackfartherthanitwantedtoavoidtheshelling.vzz365.ItwaslateafternoonjustsouthoftheOktiabrskiStateFarmandthedeathanddestructionofthe

largesttankbattleofthecampaignwasbasicallyoverandthecombatantshadfallenbacktolicktheirwounds.A lonely soldierwas sitting in a shell hole, trying to reclaim hiswits and stopshaking.Itwasstilldaytimebutitwashardtotellfromwherehewassitting.Withinhisviewhecould see at least 50 maybe 60 spires of smoke and flames bellowing from destroyed tanks,darkening theskyabove thefield.Add the thousandormoreexplosionsand thedirt thrownupintotheairandyouhaveshadesofarmageddonaroundyou.Thedayhadbeenhotandmuggyandthepollutionhungjustashortwaysofftheground.Thesoldierwasgivingthanksforstillbeingalivebutcouldnotunderstandhisluck;somanyofhiscomradeshaddiedthatday.Ifhemadeitthroughthewar,itwouldbeanexperiencehewouldneverforgetnomatterhowlonghelived.dsk111.By 1800 hrs, the 18th TC had captured Vasilevka and reached Kozlovka but between Hill

217.9 andHill 214.6, a distanceof twomiles, theGermanshaddug in andwere able to stopthem.GermanartilleryfromGresnoewasaddingitssupportinstoppingthetankers.The18thTCalongwiththe36thGHTRand32ndMRBsetupdefensesalongthelineVasilevka-Mikhailovka-PrelestnoetojustoutsideofPetrovka.The18thTChadbeenabletopenetratethreemilesbehindtheGermanline;itwasthebestperformanceofthedayfor5thGTA.Whilethe5thGTAhadmadesome early gains across the line theGermans figured out the Soviet intent and counteredwithheavy aerial and ground artillery which was able to push the Soviets back, except for thisprogressofthe18thTC.Elementsofthe5thGMCwasstillavailablebutRotmistrovchosenottousethemtosupportthe18thTC.AfterreachingKozlovka,the18thTCand36thGTRfellbackandstabilizedthelineclosertoVasilevka.vzz354+.vzz343.Inthelateafternoon,the169thTBwiththeotherremainsofthe2ndTClaunchedanattackfrom

Ivanovka to thenorthwest towardTeterevino.TheSoviet forcewasunable toreachTeterevinoandhadtostopandgodefensive,despitedestroyingseveralpanzers.vzz378.dgk213m.The24thGTBof5thGMC,the18thTCandthe5thGAattackedGermandefensesatPolezhaev

whileMikhailov’s10thMBmoved toOstrenkov, sixmilesnorthofProkhorovka, toblock theGermanadvance.The6thGAnextto5thGAwastowaituntiltheGermanswereexhaustedthencounter-attackeastoftheOboyanroad,eastwardtothePselRiver.Inthemeantime,theSSTKdugintoitsadvancedpositionsandforcedthe18thTCtodivertpartofitsforcetothePselRiver’snorthernbanktoassistthe11thMRB.Fortheday5thGTAwhiledivertingtheGermanadvancehadnotstoppedit.Popov’s2ndTCandBurdeiny’s2ndGTCwerenowineffectiveasafightingunit, leavingtheshaken18thTCand29thTCwithatotalof200tankstoresumethefight.The18thTChadtocontendwiththreedeepravinesrunningthroughtheirsector,makingtheirjobofplanningandexecutingthatmuchtougher.dgk195.dgk205+.dgk212.vzz342.vzz1m.Afterdark,recoveryteamsofbothsidescommencedbringingdamagedtanksfromthefieldto

berepairedasquicklyaspossible.Other teamswereoutbringing in thewounded, thedeadorlookingforprisoners to interrogate.Laterstill, sapper teamswentout in frontof their lineandplantedadditionalminesforthenextday’sbattle.vzz445++.

Muchwasexpectedfrom2ndGTC,despitelosing26thGTBtoTrufanov;itwastheleftpincerintheattacktoisolateDasReich,butnotonlydiditfailthattask,itwaspushedbacktwomilesfrom its startingposition. It also lost54of itsnearly100 tanks that tookpart in theoperation.Thoughhavinggoodartillerysupport,thecorpshadpoorcooperationwiththeinfantryofthe48thRC’s 183rd RD and the 6th GMRBwhich was defending the sector and this was one of thereasonsforthepoorperformance.vzz367.Atnight,Haussersenthisdivisioncommandersordersforthenextday.DasReichwastogo

defensiveandimprovetheirlineandbepreparedtohelp167thIDiftheSovietsattackedthem.LAH was ordered to stay in place and try to improve their boundary with SSTK, but to bepreparedtoassistSSTKifneededwhentheylaunchedtheirattacktotheeast.SSTK,withtheonlyoffensiveintheworks,weretocrossthePselandsqueezetheSovietsbetweenthemselvesandLAH.TheEickeRegimentwastoresumeitsadvancealongthesouthernbankofthePsel,clearingresistancewhileSSTK’spanzergroupheadedforProkhorovkaalongtheKartashevkaroad.Thiswas highly optimistic as the remnants of 5thGTA, around 200 tanks,were being concentratedaroundPetrovka,justsouthofthekeyroadandnearthePselRiver.gnk364.gnk365m.LateatnightontheProkhorovkabattlefield,thenoise,exceptforpouringrain,finallyceased.

Counting the burning carcases one could see hundreds of tanks, field guns and trucks lyingwreckedon thesteppe;more thanhalfof5thGTAlaybroken in thesamefieldsbut itcouldatleastsayithadhaltedtheGermans.AtOboyantheGermanswerestoppedaswell.Forthenextthreedays,theGermansmadefeebleattemptsatProkhorovka,buttheyallfailed.Onthenorthernboundary, Rokossovsky had also stopped the Germans and did so without using a lot of hisreserves.je110+.Atnight,vonMansteinvisitedHoth’sHQbut thegeneralwaswithHausserat the time.Von

MansteinorderedvonMellenthintosendthe167thIDacrosstheDonetstohelpthe168thIDand3rdPzCquicken their pace.VonMansteinwantedHoth to do this days earlier butHoth foundwaystoavoiddoingit.VonMansteinalsowantedLAHtostayinplaceuntilSSTKhadcrossedthePselRiveratPetrovkaandthentogethertheywouldattacktowardProkhorovka.Petrovka,juston theoutsidewesternedgeof thecorridor,was fourmileswestofProkhorovka.Muchof theremainsof5thGTA’stankswereblockingthewayofbothGermandivisionsanditwouldnotbeaneasyadvancesincetheGermanswouldbeoutmatchedagain.gnk364.gnk365m.kuz195.Sch.G1 of 8thFlieger Division reported losing eleven aircraft caused by heavy flak while

fightingoverProkhorovka.SixofthoseplanesthatweretotaledwereHs129s.Inothersectors,theGermansreportedknockingdown12planesindogfights.cbk81.Afterdarkitstartedraining,turningeverythingtomudandputtingthefinishingtouchestovon

Manstein’shopesofencirclingthe48thGRCbetweentherivers.lck370.The heaviest tank battles of the day occurred in and around the Oktiabrski State Farm/Hill

252.2area,theValsilevkasectorandtheStorozhevoe/Vinogradovkasectorandincludedthe300panzersof2ndSSPzCandcollectivelyover650tanksof18thTC,29thTCand2ndGTC,plustheirattachmentsduringtherepeatedwavesofattacks.Theclaimsofupto2,000tanksengagedata single battlefield are exaggerations. At most, there were 1,100 tanks spread out on threeseparatefieldswithinasixmileradius.TheGermans,whilehavingfewerpanzers,didhaveoneadvantage;allpanzershadradioswhileontheSovietsideonlytheCOshadradios.TheGerman

crewsknewonlySovietcommandtankshadradios,sotheywouldsearchforantennasandtargetthetankfordestruction.vzz319+.Afterdark,HothorderedSSTKtocontinueitsexpansionofthePselvalleywiththesubsequent

objectivetoassistLAHintakingProkhorovkaandHill252.4.Bytheendoftheday,around2230hrs,SSTK artillerywas firing on the important Prokhorovka-Kartashchevka road but this leadforcewasnearlyisolatedandinrealdangerofbeingencircledifthedefendersdecidedtoattack.When SSTK approached this road, it represented the farthest point north 4th PzA achieved.Almost as soon as the lead panzers reached the key road Priess ordered them back to thebridgehead to avoid being isolated by the growing number of reinforcements coming into thesector.Priesswas listening to theSovietcommunications,hearing theorders tohavenewunitsmovetothePolezhaevsector.vzz455.vzz460.kuz193.ztc270.ztc270m+.zow166.BytheendofthedayDasReich,havingbeenonthedefensivemostoftheday,hadnotmade

any impressive gains and did not come close in capturing Pravorot but they did inflict heavycasualtiesonthetheSoviettankbrigades.GeneralKrugerwasencouragedthatthefollowingdaywouldbebetter,especiallyifitwasdry.gnk342.IthadbeenacostlydayforbothsidesbutespeciallyforRotmistrov,whoestimatedhaving400

tanksdestroyedorbadlydamaged.Hestillhadthe24thGTBwithabout100tanksandthe10thGMBof5thGMCtouse in themorning.Vatutinalsomoved the6thGADof5thGAup to theKartashevka road to stopSSTK in themorningwhen they resumed their advance. German airreconnaissancenotedthefreshreservesandinformedPriesswhodreadedthecomingbattleforhisexhaustedmen.gnk350.gnk313m.rc215.bt89.gjz186.dgr222*.zec270.ztc270m.Ribbentrop’scompanyoftankswasadisruptiveinfluenceontheSoviettankersnearHill252.2

andgavetheotherpanzersofLAHtimetomoveupandconfrontthelargerforceonamoreequalterm.BetweenthefiercefightingforHill252.2andthekillzonethatwassetupatthetankditchnear thehill,Rotmistrov’sattack lostmuchof itsmomentum.By theendof theday,Hill252.2wasstillGerman.Ribbentropdestroyed21tanksandforthisfeathewasawardedtheKnight’sCrossonJuly15th.gnk329.gnk333.fzk174++.fzk184.zrl235+.By theendof theday, the181stTBsufferedheavycasualties from thepounding it received

fromtheSSTKartilleryintheearlymorningplusthedamagecausedbyLAHTigers,otherpanzersandtankdestroyerteamsfortherestoftheday.Itsbrother,the170thTBwasonlyalittlebetter.Late in the afternoon, the170thTBwasordered topull back fromHill 252.2, redeploy to thewestwiththe99thTBandresumetheattackonVasilevka.MostoftheSSTKartilleryhadbeenstationedatGresnoealldayandstoppedthisnewattackaswell.TheSoviettankspulledbacktoAndreevka toavoid thebarrage.When theSovietspulledbackLAHdidnotpursueandstayedbehind their defenses to regroup. Gresnoe was southwest of Vasilevka by four miles. Lt ColKazakovbecametheCOof170thTBafterLtColTarasovdiedwhenhistankwasdestroyedbyashapedcharge.gnk332.gnk335.gnk313m.pck81+.dgk188+.ThetankbattleofProkhorovka,theso-calledlargesttankbattleinhumanhistoryandamajor

partof theBattleofKursk,was thepivotalbattle in the southern salient.On thenorthbankofPsel, on Hausser’s left flank, SSTK fought a series of savage close quarter tank and infantryengagementswith the 31st TC and 33rd RC. In the center, the 18th TC and 29th TC attackedmostlyLAHbutalsotheSSTKforceguardingthesouthernbankofthePsel.On2ndSSPzC’sright

flank,theSoviet2ndGTCslammedintoDasReichacrossthegapwhichCitadel’stimetablehadrequired to be closed byKempf Corps, still some 12miles from Prokhorovka, stalled by theforceswhichGeneralRotmistrovhadsentsouthonVatutin’sorders.Bydusk,the2ndSShadtowithdraw,incurringheavylosses.rc214+.bt89*.When the scope of the Soviet counter-attack is considered and the meager results made

compared to theexpectations,creditmustbegiven toHausserandHoth for their insightof thecoming attack and the subsequent preparations made to cope with it. Recon reports from theLuftwaffe, spotting the many reinforcements coming from the east and north, helped in theirevaluations. On the other hand, Vatutin claimed that even if his offensive did not achieve theplannedgoals,itdidstoppedtheGermans’advanceandatacostthatwouldpreventthemfromreachingKursk.vzz440.vzz444+.vzz452+.The27thand53rdArmiesofKonev’sSteppeFrontalongwith the4thGTC,whichhad400

tanks,wereredeployedto theOboyan-Kurskareaandwouldtakepart in thecounter-offensive.The27thArmy,whichwasstationedatElets,wasoriginallyorderedtoRokossovskybutZhukov,whowasnowatKursk,decidedVatutinneededitmoreandredirectedLtGeneralTrofimenko’s27th to thesouthernsalient,closer toProkhorovka.LtGeneralManagarov’s53rdArmy,whichhadbeendeployeddefensivelyalongtheKshenRiver,wassent totheBunino-Nekhaevosectoralong theSeimRivernorthofProkhorovka.vzz168.dgr96.dgr242m.dgk221.dgk241.gjz181.kcz167.nzk92.dgk79.dgk424.Duringthenightandintothenextmorning,SStroopscontinuedtohammerattheSovietinfantry

between Veselyi and Polezhaev, but at 1000 hrs on the 13th, the 5th GTA counter-attacked,stoppingtheGermansfrommovingpastthosevillages.je112.vzz1m.Stalinwas not satisfied that theSShadbeen stopped today, andwas lividwithVatutin and

Rotmistrovforlosingsomanytanksandshatteringtheoncemighty5thGTA.Thegeneralswereluckytokeeptheirjobs,thanksinparttotheinterventionofVasilevskyandZhukov.Itisestimatedthatupto400tanksof5thGTAwereeitherdamagedordestroyedoverthenext

coupledays.LateatnightafterhearingofthetremendouslossesRotmistrov’s5thGTAsufferedtoday,StalinorderedZhukovtoKursktooverseetheregroupingoftheirforcesandtomakesuretheGermanoffensivewasreallyfinished.Inhisusualmanner,StalinbypassedVatutinandtalkeddirectly toRotmistrovandVasilevskybeforecallingZhukov.Rotmistrovwassupposedtohaveencircled2ndSSPzCthatdayandeliminatedit,butthatclearlydidnothappen.IfRotmistrovhadreally been as successful as Soviet doctrine claimed, there would have been no need to getZhukov up in themiddle of the night to run toKursk.He arrived atKursk the next afternoon.Vasilevsky,beforeheadingsouthtoalesscriticalsector,stuckupforRotmistrovwhichprobablysavedhimfromexecutionforthisdebacle.Khrushchevwasintroubleaswell.mhz347+.vzz457.gjz188.kcz169.wwf140+.By the end of the day, the SS Corpsmade some small but important gains after 5th GTA’s

offensive exhausted itself.Moving fromHill 226.6 north of the Psel, theSSTK advanced pastPolezhaev to just south of theKartashevka-Prokhorovka roadwhere itwas halted by reservesmovinginto theareaandheavyartillery.TheLAHadvancedto theeastandnortheastalongtheroad toProkhorovka and though it got close to the village, itwas prevented from entering thevillagebysomefanaticresistancebythelocalgarrison.TheDasReichmadeitpastStorozhevoe

butwasstoppedsoonafterwardsaswellasbeinghaltedalongtheroutesouthtoVinogradovkaand Zhlomostnoe. A little further south, Belenikhino was threatened but never captured. Bynightfall, theGermansalienthadincreasedintwosmallareas.Thefirstwasasliver thatgrewfromSSTK’sbridgeheadnorthandthesecondwasonthenortheasternflankcarvedoutbyLAHandDasReich.TheGermanshaddonewell thatday tokeepfromimplodingfromthemassivecounter-offensive and still make gains, but the fact is that the German forces had sufferedrelativelylargelosses,hadnotcapturedmuchoftheenemyanditsforcesweretotallyexhausted.WhiletheSovietforceswerealsoexhausted,theyhadmoremenandtanksandwouldbeabletohold theGermans basically along the lines of that night until SteppeFrontmoved in and theirmajorcounter-offensivestarted.zow166.MajGeneralWischofLAHreportedhislossesforthedaytoCorpsHQ.Menkilledamounted

to48withfivemissing,whilewoundedwere321innumber.Hausserwasalsoinformedthat192tanks,3planesand19gunsweredestroyed.GeneralHausservisitedWischonthebattlefieldandverifiedthenumberofdestroyedtanks.zrl238.The less than stellar results of the Soviet counter-offensive can be attributed to the lack of

planningandcoordinationof the5thGTAand5thGA.The42ndGRDand9thGADprovidedpoorsupporttothetanks.Itisestimatedthat5thGTAhadcasualtiesofover5,500menincluding1,500killed.The29thTCsufferedtheworst tankdestructionofall thecorps, losing103tankswhilethe18thTClost84tanks.The5thGMClostalmosthalfofits207tanks.The2ndGTClost54tanksandthe2ndTClost22tanks.Inall,the5thGTAlostabout400tanksthatdayandmorethan half of themwere irrecoverable. The above corps still had 366working tanks includingthosethatbrokedownontheroadtoProkhorovkaandhadbeenrepairedbuthadnotarrivedonsite.Thelossesthe5thGTAsufferedthatdayweregreaterthanthe1stTAand6thGAlostinthefirstweekoffightingbuttobefairtoRotmistrovhehadnotimetoprepareorplantheoffensiveor theauthority torebukeVatutin’sdesperateplan.The2ndSSPzClostabout850menand70panzersatbest,butsomeofthosepanzerscouldberecovered.Casualtiesestimatesrunashighas163panzersbyothersources.cbk81.vzz344.vzz440+.gnk363.WestoftheDonets,theGermansgainedlittleandwhileKempfgainedsomeground,thegains

weremeaninglesswith Prokhorovka still in Soviet hands. The Soviets launched their counter-offensivenorthofOrelthatdaywhichaddedawholenewdimensiontotheGermans’problems.wdk163.vzz438.wwf142++.zzz101m.Withthegreatlossesintanksandmensufferedthatday,bothsidesduringthenighttimehours

triedtoregrouptheirmenandrecoverasmanytanksoffthebattlefieldaspossible.ManytankswererecoveredintheAndreevka,Hill241.6,OktiabrskiStateFarmandStalinskoeStateFarmareas.Itwasabusynightafterahorrendousdayoffighting.vzz445+.The 4th PzA had been able to break into the first defensive belt on the first full day of the

assault, but it took three days to break through the second defensive belt to reach the thirddefensive.Inthecomingdays,the2ndSSPzCwouldbreakintothethirddefensivebeltbutwouldbeunabletobreakthroughitandheadfortheSeimRiver,halfwaytoKursk.Evenifthe2ndSSPzC had been able to capture Prokhorovka that day and had begun traveling north along thecorridortoKursk,itwouldhavehadtotakeonseveralrestedarmiesaswellastwoothertankcorpsthatwereonlydaysawayiftheywereneeded.wdk170+.

TheSovietswerequick topointout thateven ifProkhorovkafell, therewerestillnumerousstrongpoints leading toKursk,with the SeimRiver fortifications themost heavily defended toclear before reaching Kursk. It’s a feat that could not be accomplished by the Germans afterlosingsomanypanzersandmen.dgr223.WiththeSovietsbeginningtheirmajorcounter-offensivetowardOrelthatday,itwascritical

fortheGermanstotakeProkhorovkaandracetowardKursk,whichwouldforceRokossovskytoredeployandpotentiallyeasethepressureoffModel.pck83.zzz101m.The Soviets prepared for their major counter-offensive toward Belgorod and Kharkov.

Konev’sSteppeFrontbegantodeploy.The47thArmy,the3rdGMCand1stMCbegantomoveoutfortheNovyiOskol-Velikomikhailovkaarea.vzz502.AfterthetankbattleforProkhorovkawasfinished,theGermanscountedover400destroyedor

damagedtankson thebattle field.The tanks thatcouldbe immediatelyrecoveredby theenemywerequicklydestroyedso thatVatutin’s recovery teamscouldnot repair them.The legend thatclaimsLAH lost hundreds of tanks that day is patently false. The nextmorning,LAH andDasReich reported toHausser that their combined total ofworkingpanzershad actually increasedfrom the day before and were now up to 190 panzers, thanks to the repair crews workingthroughoutthenight.Hothwasskepticalofthenumbersofclaimeddestroyedtankssohevisitedthe battlefield near Prokhorovka. In an area of only 500 yards by 1,000 yards but when thegeneralcounted90smolderingenemytanks,hebecameabeliever.HethentraveledsouthtothefrontlinesinfrontofDerFührersector.LookingeasttowardBelenikhinoandusingascopehewitnessedthesamedestructionbutonasmallerscaleandcongratulatedLtColStadlerforajobwelldone.ThejobofstoppingasuperiortankforcewithpracticallynopanzersimpressedFMvonMansteinandover thenext fewdaysheawarded250 IronCrosses to thedivision.To thesouthofDerFührer,the2ndPzRalsoperformedwellagainst2ndGTCwhileassisting167thIDinstoppingtheattackingtankers.OneofthoseIronCrosseswenttoCaptMennelwhohad,injustthree days, 24 victories in the Teterevino, Luchki, Kalinin and Iasnaia Poliana area. sgf350.kuz193.fzk173.fzk313+.pck82.zow163.zow167.zow170.Forsuchanimportantdayontheground,itwasrelativelyquietintheairregardingdogfights.

The2ndVAand17thVAran893sortiesagainst the8thFliegerCorps’654.Thiswas thefirsttime theSoviets flewmore sorties than theGermans in the south.With the attritionof thepastweek,theLuftwaffespentmostofitsassetsin2ndSSPzCsector.Theothertwocorpsreceivedonlyoccasionalsupport.cbk78+.nzk77.SovietoffensivefurthersouthofKharkov,nearTaganrogandStalinoseriouslythreatenedthe

GermanlinesoHitlerrefusedtorelease24thPzCtovonManstein.Afterdark east ofKalinin,DasReichwas rebuilding their defenses against a renewed tank

attackthatwasexpectedbynextmorning.zow164.By theendof theday,Vatutinbelieved theGermanshadbeenbroken, though fightingwould

continue.SovietforceshadstoppedtheGermanadvance,claimingtohavecaptured70,000menanddestroying2,952 tanksand5,000 trucks in theBattleofKursk.TheSovietsclaimedlosing2,800tanksand24,000POWsjustonthesouthernsalient.ThefiguresquotedbytheSovietsarehighfor theGermansidebutwerepresentedfor thepurposesofSovietpropaganda.FMKlugesignaledtheOKHthat9thArmywasexhausted,hadsuffered30,000casualtiesandcouldnotfight

anymore. Itwasestimated thatColGeneralHothhadcasualtiesof29,000.After thecampaign,ColGeneralKirovsheevestimatedthethreefrontsthatweredirectlyinvolvedwiththedefensivephaseofOperationCitadelsufferedcasualtiesofnearly178,000men.TheVoronezhFronthadthemost casualties, followed by Steppe Front which nearly had as many casualties. The CentralFront had less than half as many casualties as either of the other two fronts. je112. fzk316.dgk274+.By the endof the day, theLAH held the following line: Starting at the southeast quadrant it

shareddefendingStorozhevoethen,movingnorthandwest,thelineranthroughtheStorozhevoewoods(1stPzGR),Hill252.2, theedgeofOktiabrskiStateFarmwestwardtoAndreevka(2ndPzGRand1stPzR)zrl238.ThefightingwithintheconfinesofOperationCitadelwouldcontinueforafewmoredaysbut

thelineattheendofthedaywouldnotchangemuchduringthatperiod.Thefightingforthenextfewdayswouldbeanticlimactic.AfterstudyingOperationCitadelclosely,itcanbearguedthatGeneralGuderianwascorrect,thatCitadelnevershouldhavelaunched.EvenafterdrainingtherestofentireEasternFronttoaminimum,vonMansteinandKlugestilldidnothaveenoughmenorpanzers toget the jobdone.With theextremeresistanceHoth(andModel)met thefirst fewdays, it should have been realized Operation Citadel was a mistake, for even if Oboyan orProkhorovkaandOlkhovatkatothenorthwerecaptured,thecontinuedresistanceontheextendedflankswouldhavespelled4thPzA’sand9thArmy’sdoominthelongrun.Thatflankprotectioncouldneverbemaintainedand2ndArmyonthe“nose”of thesalientwasnotstrongenoughtoinfluencetheoutcome.TheycouldhavelaunchedCitadelinearlyMayasvonManstein,KempfandotherswantedtopreventtheSovietshavingtimetofortifythesalientastheydid,butanearlystartwouldhavepresentedproblemsfortheGermansaswell.Thoughthe5thGTAand5thGAreceivedmostoftheattentioninthisday’sliterature,thefactis

thatthe1stTAand6thGAfightingthe48thPzCdeservedrecognitionfortheircontributionintherepeatedattacksandtheirresilienceinstoppingthe48thPzCfromadvancingpastthePselRiver.dsk111.wwf108.During thepredawnhours, the5thGTCmoved into launchpositionalong theNovoselovka-

KuznetsovaWoodslineandwouldattackeastwardalongtheShepelevka-Lukhaninoaxis.Atthesametimethe10thTCwasmovingalongtheNovenkoeareaandpreparingtoattacktowardtheBerezovka-Syrtsevo line.The204thRDmovedup into10thTC’soldpositionalongside309thRD,3rdMCand31stTCtopreventaGermanbreakthroughincasetheoffensivefailed.dgr219+.GeneralKnobelsdorffwaspreparinghiscorpsfortheattackwhentheSovietspreemptedhim.

GD, sixmiles south ofVosnessenovka on the far left flank,was to drive north to the village,pushingtheSovietsbackastheyadvancedandthenshifttothenortheastinordertoconcentratetheSovietforcesandencirclethemwiththehelpof11thPzD.WhileGDwasmarchingnorthandbeforeengagingtheenemy,theartilleryofthe5thGTCstartedshellingtheGermancolumn.Afterawhile,the10thTCdrovefromhidingplacesandattacked.gnk351.At0620hrs fromwestof the lineKruglik-Hill254.5-Hill247.0,Soviet tankersattacked the

side of the GD column which was heading north from Hill 247.0. The Germans wereoverwhelmedandhadtoretreatsouthward.Atthesametime,otherelementsofGD,whichwereheadingforKalinovka,wereattackedfromthefront.Theyquicklyfoundthemselvesintrouble,in

fiercehand-to-handcombatthatinflictedheavycasualtiesonbothsidesandforcedtheGermansto withdraw, but eventually they turned the situation and regained lost ground. The deepestpenetrationwasbythe183rdTBof10thTC,whichgotcloseenoughtoVerkhopenietofeeltheshellingthattheGermangarrisonwasfiring.WiththemanyattacksonGDthatday,theiroffensiveplanswere canceled and the division began to regroup and prepare to resume the attack nextmorning.The3rdPzDhadatoughdayaswell,fortheSovietscounteredandretookthevillagesofGertsovkaandBerezovka.IftheSovietscouldpenetratethe3rdPzD’sline,theycouldracetotheeastandencirclethe3rdPzDandperhapsevenGDandthe11thPzD.The3rdPzDregroupedandwouldlaunchanattackthenextdaythroughKubaossovskiGorgetowardHill243.0andhelpdefend and mitigate the threat from the concentration of Soviet forces at Kalinovka. hsz129.fkk271++.vzz431+.vzz176.gnk163m.gnk312m.fmz221m.Intheearlymorning,the10thTC,nowtemporarilycommandedbyMajGeneralAlekseevuntil

Burkov’swoundshealed,with100tanksandsupportedbythe219thRD,launchedanattackfromwest of Novenkoe toward Berezovka and Syrtsevo. Before reaching Berezovka, the 10th TCengagedelementsofGDand3rdPzDatTolstoewoods.TheSoviettankerswereabletopushtheGermansaside,forcingthemtofallbacktotheeasttothePenaRiver.Tothesouthof10thTC,the5thGTCsupportedbythe184thRDlaunchedanattackfromnearMelovoetowardShepelovkaandLukhanino.Lukhaninowasin thegeneralareawhereVatutinwantedhisforces toconvergeafterpenetrating the front lineand separating theGermandivisions.On theeastof theOboyanroad, the6thGA’s23rdRC,3rdMCand31stTCwereorderedtodefendtheroadonthefirstGermanassaultbutthencounter-attackaftertheGermanadvancesputteredout.dgk205.vzz431.dgk211m.dgr172m.hjj121m.dgk222m.dgr209m.AlongwiththepanzergroupofGDmovingnorthalongtheBerezovka-Kruglikroad,theFusiler

RegimentofGDwasalsomovingnorth,leavingbehindthePzAbt3todefenditsoldposition.TheSoviettankswaitedlongenoughfortheFusilierstotravelnorthawayfromsightandsoundand then attacked thepanzer battalion. It quicklypenetrated the line and forcedPzAbt 3 backtowardKalinovka.gnk351.gnk312m.After the332ndIDmovedup to3rdPzD’soldposition, the394thPzGRof3rdPzDstarted

advancingnorthwardalongtheBerezovka-Kruglikroad,whentheywerehitbyaviciousbarragethat included rockets.Withoutwaiting for the shelling to stop, Soviet tanks from the 5thGTCattackedthedefensivepositionsof332ndID.Themenofthe332ndstartedtopanicandbegantofallback.Seeingwhatwashappening,Schaeferputupalineofblockerstostoptheretreatbeforeit turned into a rout.Knobelsdorfforderedelementsof thepanzer regimentofGD deployed atBerezovka to head toward the 332nd ID and stem the Soviet attack. The panzers arrived andrestoredorder,helpingtheinfantryrestorethelinethatstretchedfromTolstoeWoodstothePenaRiver.Aroutwasavoidedbutitwasnotanauspiciousbeginning.Atthesametimenextdoor,thePzAbt3,whichhadalsojustmovedupintotheoldGDpositions,wasattackedbythe204thRDandthe86thTBandwereforcedbackinthedirectionofKalinovka,whichwasbeingheldbyGDGrenadiers.PenetratingthegapthathaddevelopedwiththeretreatingPzAbt3,theSoviettanksdrovetowardandattackedKalinovka.TheGermansonthewestsideoftownwereforcedbackfromtheirfront trenches.MajorBethke, leadingthecounter-attack,forcedtheSovietsbackandreoccupiedtheirouterdefenses.gnk351.

Vatutin wanted to crush the 48th PzC for once and for all. He already had his currentdeploymentsattack332ndID,PzAbt3of3rdPzDandtheFusiliersofGDalongtheBerezovka-Kruglikroad,butnowhealsobroughtthe10thTCintothesectoraswell.The183rdTBreachedTolstoeWoodswhile the186thTBdrovepast theTolstoewoodsandattackedHill258.5.Thetwobrigadeshadimmediatesuccessandwerethreateningtocut48thPzC’ssupplylines.Hastily,the394thPzGRof3rdPzDandthePzAbt327wereredeployedwestofVerkhopenietoblocktheSovietprogress.TheSoviettankersweremovingfast,nothavinganyresistanceinfrontofthem,andsoonreachedandattackedthe394thPzGR.TheGermanssurprisedthetankersbylaunchingtheirownattackwhichsuccessfullyhalted theSovietattackandforced theT34sbackwards.Adisasterhadbeenavertedbutthe3rdPzDhadbeentooweaktostandonitsownsincethestartofthecampaignandthedivisionwasgettingweakerbytheday.KnowingtheSovietshadbroughtinreinforcements to theTolstoeWoodsarea,KnobelsdorfforderedLtGeneralHoernlein’sGD toredeploy thepanzer group to theTolstoewoods-Hill 258.5 area to helpWesthoven’s 3rd PzDclearthearea.TheGDwouldnotadvanceanyfurthernorththanthatday’spositions.gnk352.At dawn in the 11th PzD sector, the Soviets attacked the division’s right flank. It was a

diversionaryattackthatwashopedwouldpullmoreGermantroopsfromthemainattacksector,thecenterofthe11thPzD’sline.Atalittlepast0800hrs,themainattackwaslaunchedonbothsidesoftheOboyanroad.Therewasnoartillerypreparation.Duringthepredawnhours,aSovietambushsquadhadinfiltratedtheGermanlinesandhidinanearbywoods.Whenthemainattackwaslaunched,thissmallcommandoteamattackedthegrenadiersfrombehindandstartedapanic.TheGermansquicklypulledback,leavingagapinthefrontline.Micklsentagroupofpanzerstothegap toclose itand tostabilize thesituation.Thecounter-attackwassuccessfuland the linewas stabilized, but the 11th PzD had lost contact with SSTK at Kochetovka to the northeast.gnk353.At 0800 hrs after an artillery preparation, Katukov’s 1st TA along with other attachments

attacked the 332nd ID defending near Chapaev; fighting lasted for most of the day whenKravchenko’s tanks reachedRakovo but could not force the 332nd back over the PenaRiver.Novenkoe, west of Verkhopene, was first cleared and then the assault force of ColAndrushchenko’s 183rdTBmovedon toVerkhopene.Afterwards they severed theBerezovka-Kruglikroad.At thesametimethe178thTBand186thTBwaspushingthe3rdPzDbackintoBerezovka,despite fiercecounter-attacks.By theendof theday,3rdPzDhadonly40workingpanzersandwerenolongermuchhelptothetroubledGD.dgk206.dgr172m.dgk222m.dgr209m.vzz2m.gnk312m.The48thPzCwasbeginning its attack across thePselRiverwhen22ndGRCsupportedby

elementsofthe10thTCattacked.Knobelsdorffimmediatelyhadtohalthisadvanceontherivertodefendhimselfagainsttheambush.The48thPzCeventuallyrepulsedtheattackbutbythenitwas too late tocross theriverasOperationCitadelwasbeingcanceled.The leadunitsofGDwereeastandsoutheastofKalinovkaandwerewaitingfor3rdPzDtorelievetheminordertomove to Hill 260.8 for the intended attack shortly after daybreak. The first units of 3rd PzDarrivedatHill247.0,southofKruglikbutwouldnotrelieveGDalongtheOboyanroadstartingwiththeBerezovka-Verkhopeniesectoruntilnextmorning.ThatnightasuddenbarragekilledLtBremerofGDbeforehis scheduled relief.The332nd ID tookover3rdPzD’s formerposition

northof thePenaRiver, forwardofRakovo. In turn, the255th IDmoved into theMikhailovkaarea.APzRwasduginatKalinovkaandwaswaitingfor3rdPzDtocometoclearthepotentialthreatofbeingpocketed thatwas facing them.On theway, the leadelementsof3rdPzDwerestruck atHill 247.0, south ofKruglik, but bymorningwere able to free the trappedPzR.Thenewly-arrived9thRDand13thGRDalsoparticipatedintheattackwestofProkhorovkaagainsttherightflankof11thPzD.NearKrasnopolye,the219thRDtriedtopushbackthewestflankof48th PzC. Both of these attacks failed, causing many casualties for the attackers. dgk204+.dgk222m.dgr209m.fkk273.gnk312m.dgk159.cbk79.Ithadbeenadifficultdayfor48thPzC; theSoviets launchedmanyattacksalong theirentire

line, penetrating it in numerous places and forcing the Germans back to save themselves. IfGeneralHothhadanyaspiraionstoreachOboyan,thosedreamswerenowshattered.Itwastimetoretrenchandgoonthedefensive.Vatutincontinuedtoputpressureontheenemybysendingreservestothefront.Whilethe18th

TCand29thTCstruckat2ndSSPzCsouthwestofProkhorovka,andthenewlyarrived5thGMCbeganacounter-attackagainst thenewbridgeheadnearRyndinka, thenewlyarrived219thRD(40th Army) attacked the 48th PzC on its western flank near Krasnopolye. snk84. wdk120.zzz101m.vzz11m.At 0900 hrs, the 5thGTCwith elements of the 184thRD launched a counter offensive that

smashedthroughGermanlinesandapproachedChapaevnearthesouthernbendofthePenaRiverby1300hrs.Elementsofthe332ndIDfoughthardbuthadtofallbackfromasuperiorforce.By1700hrs,SoviettankersreachedthenorthernoutskirtsofRakovoonthenorthernbankofthePenabutwerehaltedby fierce rocket firecoming from the town.At thesame timefurthernorth, the10thTCwhichhad120tanksdroveintoGD,pushingitbackandoccupyingTolstoeWoods.TheGermansregroupedandwereabletostopthe10thTCinthewoods.The3rdMC,31stTCand309thRDof40thArmyalsolaunchedanoffensivebutfailedtogainanyground,beingstoppedbyheavyartilleryfire.Bytheendoftheday,the5thGTCwouldhaveonly14workingtanks.TheGDdrivingwestofVerkhopeniewereambushedandfoughtoffthe3rdMCand67thGRD.Intheafternoon,the6thGAcontinuedtoattackwestofthebulgewiththe204thRDand309thRD.Byeveningthepanzerdivisionsofthe48thPzCwereonthedefensivefromthecombinedattacksofthe6thGAand1stTAonbothsidesoftheOboyanroad.However,theleftflankof309thRDwascounter-attackedbythe11thPzD,stoppingtheiradvance.WestofGD, the3rdPzDholding thewestflankof48thPzC,washitbytheuncoordinatedeffortsofelementsof10thTC,the204thRDand309thRDofthe23rdGRCsouthwestofKalinovka.JustwestoftheOboyanroadandnorthofVerkhopenie,the3rdMCandthe31stTClaunchedanattackonthe3rdPzDat0830hrsinthedirectionofNovoselovka.The3rdPzDwashaltedbutitdidwellnottolosegroundagainstthisdouble attack. For the next two days the 1st TA continued its offensive but did not gain anyground.On7/15,the1stTAwentdefensiveandhandeditssectoroverto5thGAand6thGA.On7/161stTAwentintosecondechelon.wdk160+.hjj121m.vzz434.dgr209m.gnk313m.dgr220.dgr92m.vzz430*.vzz2m.dgk424.AspartofthemajoroffensivethatVatutininstituted,the71stGRD,onthewestflanksouthof

the 5th GTC and 10th TC, launched an attack in the Korovino-Krasnyi Pochinock area.AfterwardsallthreeunitswoulddriveonRakovo,BerezovkabeforeendingupatIakovlevo.Just

aswith5thGTA, the1stTA/6thGAwere tostrikeonmultipleaxesandmeet in theIakovlevoarea.Elementsof23rdGRC,the3rdMCandthe31stTCrolledalongtheroadtowardthesouthfrom the Kalinovka area. The 255th ID, 332nd ID, the 3RD PzD, 11th PzD, andGD offeredstubbornresistance.TheSovietsmadeoveramile’sadvancebeforetheGermansregroupedandwereabletohaltthemalongthelinebynightfall.fkk328+.On the farwestern flank, the 52nd ICwas defending its full 12mile front against repeated

attacks. Lt General Schaefer’s 332nd ID at Chapaev was being pushed back, but the attacksagainstZavidovka and thewoodswest ofKorovinowerebeing repulsed.AtMikhailovka andKrasnyi Pochinok, the Soviets had entered the villages but were thrown out with Germancounters.LtGeneralPoppe’s255thID,defendingsouthwestofBubny,repulsedallattacks.The57thIDwasquietallday.Thecloudyskyandfrequentrainstormsreducedairactivityforbothsides.fkk170.At 1000 hrs, a squadron of IL-2s attackedGerman artillery positions in the Sukho-Soloino-

Pokrovka-Ozerovskiarea,whichwasasmuchastenmilesbehindthefrontline.GermanfightersattackedbuttheSovietescortsdidagoodjobofkeepingthebomberssafe.Bythispoint,withtheattrition the Soviet fighters experienced therewere just enough fighters to be used as escorts.There were no longer Soviet fighters flying independently, looking for targets of opportunity.cbk81.At1000hrs,additionalelementsof the5thGTClaunchedtheirattackonChapaev.Theyhad

onlyoneregimentfromthe184thRDtosupportthem.The22ndGTBwasontherightwhilethe21stGTBwasontheleft.TheadvancewentslowlyastheLuftwaffemademanyattacks,plusthegroundwaslitteredwithminesandtheSovietsappershadtoclearacorridor.By1400hrsthe21stGTBslowednearChapaevbutthe184thRDwascatchinguptothetanks.Withthehelpoftheinfantry,Chapaevfell,inflictingheavylossesonthebattalionof332ndIDdefendingthetown.Asmallcontingentof184thRDstayedatChapaevwhile therestmovedtowardRakovo.AfterthreehoursofhardfightingtheSovietsgottowithinamileofRakovobutwerehaltedbyafierceartillerybarrage.RakovowasonthenorthbankofthePenaRiver.vzz430.gnk312m.vzz2m.While theGD slowly advanced along thewest sideof theOboyan road, 3rdPzDcontinued

defendingtheBerezovka-Verkhopenesector.The332ndIDmovedintothevacatedareathatwasfilled by3rdPzD, along the north side of thePenaRiver north ofRakovo.The255th IDwasstretching its lines northward toMikhailovka.While this arrangement strengthened 48th PzC’snorthernside,itssouthernsidewhenfacingwestwardwasasweakasever.The10thTC,with100tanksremainingandsupportedbyKotelnikov’s219thRD,hadregroupedduringthenightandadvancedthatmorningontheoutskirtsofNovenkoeandthentoBerezovkaandSyrtsevo.Atthesametimeto thesouth, the5thGTCwith70 tanksand184thRDadvanced towardShepelovkaandLukhanimo. The shattered 6th TCwith 50 tankswas following the infantry.Vatutin’s newoffensiveinthewestwasnowinfullswing.dgk205.dgr172m.hjj121m.dgk222m.dgr209m.SouthwestofthePselRiver,the97thGRDof33rdGRCof5thGA,repulsedanattackby11th

PzD and then launched its own attack at the boundary line between the 11th PzD and SSTK.Without tanksupport, the97thGRDwasstoppedaftermakingmodestgains.TheSSTK, seeingtherewerenotanksintheSovietattack,continuedtoattacknorthwardagainsttheadjacent95thGRD.The31stTCwith its70 tanks,wasavailablebutwasnevercalledup toassist the97th

GRDorthe95thGRD.Thoughitwasasmallmeasureofrisktosendthe31stTCforward,itwasamistakenot to allow the31stTC to also attack theboundary line, for itwasveryweakandvulnerable.vzz435.SmallerSovietattacksonGermanpositionsatZavidovkaonthesouthernbanksofthePenaand

inthewoodswestofKorovinowererepulsed,but theattackonelementsof the332ndIDnearChapaev caused heavy casualties and the garrison had to pull back. It tried to regroup andrequestedreinforcementstoretakethelostground.Otherelementsof332ndIDwereabletoholdHill237.6andBerezovka.ThevillagesofMikhailovkaandKrasnyiPochinokwererecapturedwhentheGermanscounter-attacked.The255thIDdefendingBubnysuccessfullyrepulsedseveralattacks.The57thIDsawnofightingalongtheirfront.GDmaintainedaholdofHill243.0notfarfrom Verkhopenie. The weather was cloudy with scattered rains but the roads remainedmanageable.SeeMap23.vzz439.On5thGA’srightflank,the32ndGRC’s13thGRDand66thGRDwasabletokeep11thPzD

of48thPzCgainstoamileintheKochetovka-Hill174.0-Hill227.6-Bobryshevoarea.Nearby,the97thGRDof33rdGRCwasabletolimittheinfantrytotwomiles,stoppingthemalongtheMalaiaPsinka-Hill246.4line.vzz399+.nzk96.Aboutmidday,the3rdPzD,tryingtoadvancealongtheOboyanroad,wasattackedanditsline

penetrated.Thepanzers,whichhadcomeoffthelineandfallenbacktoresupply,hadtomakeanemergencyrunbacktoHill258.5nearTolstoetoprevent3rdPzD’sleftflankfrombeingrolledup.Hill258.5wasretakenbutthepanzerswaitedtherefortheinfantrytoarrivebeforemovingontothewoodsnearTolstoe.InthisengagementanumberofUStanksweredestroyedaswelllargecachesofUSrationscaptured.hjj122.hjj123m.Onthehighground2.5mileswestofVerkhopenie,the11thPzDheldoffrepeatedattackswhile

3rdPzDwastryingtoplugthegapthattheSovietshadopenedwestofVerkhopenie.ElementsofGDweretryingtoclearthewoodswestofVerkhopenie.fkk169.Bylatemorningonthewesternflankof48thPzC,thecoordinatedattackbythe5thGTCand

10thTCagainst the332ndIDand the3rdPzDweremakinggainsanddisrupting theGermans,especially the 3rd PzD. The panzer’s front line in theVerkhopenie-Berezovka areawas beingperforatedandeventually its left flank shattered.TheSovietswere able to reachGD and11thPzDaswell.Someunitsstartedfallingback,trucksheadingsouthontheOboyan-Belgorodroadcreatingaroadjam,givingtheSovietAirForceeasytargetstodestroy.Itwascleartheoffensivein 48th PzC sectorwas at an end. This is another example of aGerman flank not keeping upagainsttoomuchresistanceandsupportingtheSS.ItisalsoanotherexampleoftheGermanArmynothavingsufficientforces.lck366++.The1stStormAviationDivisionwasbroughtupandattackedGermanlinesatVerkhOlshanets,

Shliakhovo and Melikhovo, while the 291st Storm Aviation Division attacked towardVerkhopenie,Syrtsevo,Dmitrievka,Novo-Cherkasskoe,Dubrova,IakovlevoandPetrovka.Muchof theSovietair supportwasawayfromthe immediateProkhorovkaaxis.Therewere friendlyfireincidentsonbothsidesbutmoresoontheSovietside.Withtheairforcesofbothsidesactivethatday,manytanksweredestroyedordamagedfromairattacks.vzz329+*.dgr155m.dgr155m.dgr173m.Ontheleftflankof5thGTC,the10thTC,whichstartedwith100tanks,alsofoundthegoing

slow.Evenwiththesupportofthe219thRD,theformationwashaltedattheTolstoewoodsbyheavyartilleryfirefrom3rdPzDandGD.vzz430+.Afterthebitterfightingthedaybefore,inwhich48thPzCinflictedheavylosseson6thTC,3rd

MC and 90th GRD, Knobelsdorff ordered his corps to regroup that morning and prepare toresume the attack in the afternoon.GD was to assemble on the Oboyan road by 1500 hrs toresumeitsattacknorthward.The11thPzDalreadyassembledtotheeastoftheroadwouldjoinintheattack tocross thePselRiver.The3rdPzDwasmoving to fill thevacancyofGD southofKruglik near Hill 247.0 while 52nd IC’s 332nd ID and 255th ID was also being redeployedcloserto3rdPzD.Sowhenthe6thGAand1stTAlaunchedtheiroffensive,the48thPzCwasintheprocessofregroupingandill-preparedtodefendagainstamajorattack.TheGermansreactedquicklybutstillsufferedheavycasualties.vzz429.Overthelastcoupleofnights,Vatutinhadorderedmortarcrewsuptothelinetoparticipatein

today’soffensive.FromKorovinointhesouthtoVasilevkainthenorththesemortarcrewsusingthelargerM20rocketscausedmuchdeathanddestructionduringthisassault.Thefootsoldiersofthe332ndIDandthepanzercrewsoftheSSweretherecipientsofthisdestruction,anddreadedtheweapon.vzz396+.gnk312m.The48thPzCfoughthardagainststiffattacks,buthadnotlostmuchgroundbytheendofthe

day.NearNovenkoye,10thTCmadesomegainsbutthe48thPzCcounteredandrecapturedlostground.snk84.At 1600 hrs after spending nearly seven hours with Hausser, von Manstein arrived at

Knobelsdorff’sHQ.After learning the SS had gone defensive thatmorning, the fieldmarshallfoundouthis48thPzClostsomegroundandwasforcedonthedefensiveaswell.Whilehisbosswas present, Knobelsdorff issued orders for the next day. No major offensives were listed;insteadthecorpswouldcleanupthelineandimprovetheirdefenses.Itwasimportantthat11thPzD link up with SSTK and have a continuous line.GD and the 3rd PzD would try to clearresistance from between the Kalinovka and Hill 258.5 areas. Once achieved, the combinedcombatgroupwouldfightitswaysouthtothePenaRiver,cuttingoffthesupplylinesofthe5thGTC.With5thGTC’slinesofcommunicationcutandwith332ndID,3rdPzDandtheGDgroupclosing,itwashopedthe5thGTCwouldbepocketedanddestroyed.HaussergavesimilarordersofcleaningupthelinefortheSSaswell.ThesedefensivemeasureswereaclearindicationofHoth’ssurpriseandconcernovertheday’sdevelopments.HehadplannedontakingProkhorovkathatdayaswellasexpandingthePselbridgehead,withthe48thPzCfollowinginjustafewdaysbutinsteadthe4thPzAwasstoppedthatday,sufferingheavycasualties.GDendedthedaywithonly47workingpanzerswhile11thPzDhad34panzers and3rdPzDhad23panzers.At thisstage,thethoughtofcontinuingnorthwardwasimpossible.Itwouldtakeeverythingthe48thPzChadtosurvivefurtherattacks.gnk353+gnk363+.gnk365m.zow162.South of the Pena River at Rakovo, the 52nd IC was attacked again by the 22nd GRC,

supportedbytanks.The184thRDand219thRDof40thArmyalsojoinedthebattle.At1100hrs,the71stGRDresumeditsattackatKorovinoandKrasnyiPochinokanddroveintothesouthflankof332ndID.At1700hrs,the219thRDandthe5thGTCdroveintothenorthflankof332ndID,whilethe90thGRDhitthecenterof332ndIDatRakovo.Withfourdivisionsattackingatonce,the332ndIDwashavingahardtimekeepingitsintegrity.wdk161.gnk312m.

Late thatafternoon,MajGeneralMicklgotpermission tohavehis11thPzDmoveback toabetterdefendablepositionandtoshortentheline.ThedivisionwasjustbeginningtomovebackwhenitwasattackedonitsrightflankastheSoviettanksandinfantrywereaimingtoreachHill235.9,notfarfromKochetovka.gnk353.vzz460.Intheearlyevening,the3rdPzDmoveduptoforwardpositionstorelieveGD,whichwould

movetoHill260.8tolaunchtowardthePselRiver.TotherightofGD,the11thPzDweretotryandcleanandstabilizethelinenearKochetovka.LaterthatnightafterGDpulledout,theSovietsattacked3rdPzD,forcingthemtofallback.The48thPzCwasindirestraightsbythistimeandtherewaslittlechanceforfurtheradvancement.wwf132.wwf135m.MajGeneralvonMellenthin,theChiefofStafffor48thPzC,wroteinhisdiary:“Thesituation

on the left flank had deteriorated to such a degree that an attack northwards was no longerpossible.”cbk81.fmz226.VonManstein,notwantingtogiveuponreachingKursk,orderedthe24thPzC,withalmost150

panzers, to move from Kharkov to Belgorod over night. With so many Soviet reserves, theadditionofanunderstrengthcorpswouldhavemadelittledifference.TheGermanshadthinnedouttheentirelinebeforeCitadelstarted,sovonMansteincouldnotasktheotherarmygroupsforassistance.The2ndArmyforexamplewasholdingasector37mileswidewhile4thPzAwithtwiceasmanymencoveredasimilardistance.wdk163+.mhz297.vzz453.vzz455.aaa124m+.VonMansteinhadplannedtodeploy24thPzC(Viking,23rdPzDand17thPzD)toProkhorovka

butwhen theSoviets launched amajor offensive south ofKharkov across theMiusRiver andtowardIzyum, thoseunitshad tobedeployed there instead.The48thPzCon thewestern flankwas also stopped by now. Hoth wanted to stop 2nd SS PzC’s advance, shift units and breakthrough in the west. Kempf also lost the 7th PzD, which brought him to a stop as well. Theoffensivewasjustaboutfinished.snk54.dgk423+.Bytheendoftheday,the48thPzClostgroundonitswesternflankfromtheChapaev-Rakovo

area in the south to theNovenkoe-Kruglik area in the north. Looking back on the day, all theoffensiveplansKnobelsdorffhadordered forhiscorpswereallpre-emptedbySovietattacks.The48thPzCspentthewholedayonthedefensive.gnk353.ForaGermanvictoryatProkhorovkatomeananything,the48thPzChadtosecuretheroadto

Oboyan.Thatwas theGermanplan; toattackKurskfromtheaxisofOboyanandProkhorovka.Vatutinwould do everything possible to prevent that. Late in the afternoon and into the night,elementsof5thGTAandPopov’s2ndTCandotherswere repositioned toblock the48thPzCfromexpandingtheirbridgeheadonthePselRiver.dgk179*+.Inthepredawnhours,insteadofadirectdaylightattackonRzhavets,the11thPzRof6thPzD

withacapturedT34intheleadofthecolumn,droveintoRzhavets,capturingtheimportantcityafter a sharp but brief fight with very little loss and capturing the critical bridge across theDonets.The92ndGRDand96thTBof69thArmywereguardingthetownaswellasthetownofAleksandrovka,sixmilestotheeastwhichwasalsoattacked.Atdaylight,notknowingthetownhad been captured, theLuftwaffe attacked Rzhavets, inflicting injuries onHunersdorff and hisstaff.The6thPzD,attackingtowardAleksandrovka,wasbeingrepulsedateveryattempttotakethetown.19thPzDwouldbecalledintohelp.Sending19thPzDtoassist6thPzDslowedtheirforward progress to cross the Donets. The 114th PzGR was sent to the bridge to secure it.

dgk198+++.dgk202.dgk222m.dlu63m.gnk383.nzk96.wwf152+.dlu102+.Beforedawn,elementsof6thPzDunderMajorBake’scommand took the important townof

Rzhavets,with its bridge over theDonets, by stealth.WhileRzhavetswas being captured, thebulkof6thPzDwassixmilesfurthereastattemptingtotakeAleksandrovkaagainstelementsofthe96thTBtoremoveresistanceon their flankwhenRzhavetswassecured.The6thPzDalsocapturedVypolzovkaandtheRyndinkabridgeheadbythe114thPzGR,buttheholdwastenuous.TheSovietsatAleksandrovkapinnedthe6thPzD,precludingaquickcrossingoftheDonetsandjoiningupwithDasReich to takeProkhorovka.At the same time, the 19th PzDwas trying tocrosstheDonetsatShcholokovoagainstMajGeneralMorozov’s81stGRD(7thGA).Anumberofbrigades from5thGMCand2ndGTCwere transferred from5thGTAtoward theDonets tocurbthesecrossings.Artilleryand161tanksweretakenawayfrom5thGTAfortheiroffensivewiththisaction.The89thGRDatKurakovkawerelosingtractionandbeingpushedback.rc207.dgk183m.pck83++.fkk281++.vzz236.vzz300*.vzz402++.vzz407+.vzz419+.lck363+.dgk201.dgk221+.dlu63m.fzk53+.In the predawn hours, Vatutin and Rotmistrov learned the 6th PzD had taken the bridge at

Rzhavetsandthe19thPzDhadalsocrossedtheDonetsRiveratShcholokovo,southofRzhavets,wherethe81stRDwastryingtostoptheGermanadvance.Rotmistrovwouldhavetosendpartofhis reserve, the5thGMC,and the53rdGTRto the river tohelpTrufanovstop thenewthreat.Vatutin, around 0500 hrs, also ordered a brigade from 2ndGTC to theHill 243.8–Hill 242.7sector,westofPodolkhi,toblocktheGermans’pathonthewestsideoftheDonets.Thisdilutiontohismainattack in thecorridoragainst theSSwasunnerving, forRotmistrovknewhewouldneedeveryassetpossibletodefeattheGermans.Withtheseandotherdilutions,thegeneralkeptthe10thGMBwithits51stGTRand the24thGTBas reserve.Already in thesoutheastsectorwas the92ndGRDand the96thTB,whichwould linkupwith thenew reserves and join thebattle.Inadditiontothesegroundforces,Vatutinincreasedhisairstrikesneartheriver.Vatutin,seeinghowcloseKempfwastoProkhorovka,alsosent200Pakgunsto69thArmytoslow3rdPzCfurther.Abattalionof24KV1swerethemainpowerofthe53rdGTRandwerealsosenttofacetheTigersofsPzAbt503.gnk311.gnk314*+.gnk313m.vzz300.nzk96.IntheearlyhoursofthemorningafterBakecapturedRzhavets,GeneralHunersdorffandsome

ofhisofficerswerestandingjustoutsideof11thPzR’sHQwhenaHe111,mistakenlythinkingthe CP was Soviet, bombed it. Fifteen died and 49 were wounded. Hunersdorff was slightlywounded but stayed with his command. Colonel Oppeln-Bronikowski was more seriouslywounded and had to give up his command toMajor Bake, who also suffered minor wounds.MajorvonBiebersteinand14juniorofficersdied.Thisfriendlyfireincidentwasadisastertothedivision,buttomakemattersworse,twodayslatertheGeneralwouldbehitbyasniperandsuccumbtohiswounds.Thesetwoeventscrippledthecommandstructureof the6thPzD,fromwhichitneverfullyrecovered.fzk55.dgk201.zzt91.WiththeGermansnearRzhavetsandwithGostishchevoinGermanhands,theSovietdefenders

(48thRC), during thepredawnhours, started fallingback from the linebetweenSabynino andShliakovotoavoidencirclement.Atthesametime,elementsofthe375thRDinreserveweresentfromtheZhimolostnoesectortotheRyndinkaareatoblockthe6thPzDor19thPzDfromreachingDasReich.With6thPzDtakingRzhavetsbeforedawnandthe27thPzRof19thPzDadvancing

along theDonetsRiver towardRyndinka, the89thGRDand the leadingelementsof375thRDwere falling back to escape encirclement.WhenStavka heard of the unauthorized retreat, theyimmediatelystoppeditasacounterattackwasplannedafterdaybreakandthisdisorderlyretreatwas counter-productive. The 7th PzD was ordered to the Kazache area to support 6th PzD.vzz408+.erz209.vzz5m.dlu101+.dlu103m.Duringpredawnhours,69thArmyregroupedafteritsretreattoescapeencirclement.The93rd

GRDheldtheRozhdestvenka-Druzhnyilineandthe81stRDheldtheNorthernDonetslinefromKrivtsevo toRyndinka.The89thGRDheld thesouthernsectorof theDonets fromKiselevo toKrivtsevo.The 92ndGRDwith the 96thTB occupied a prepared defense belt along the frontVypolzovka-Novo-AlekseevskiiVyselok.The107thRDand305thRDheldthelinethatincludedRazumnoe andGremiachewhile the 94thGRD defended the Shliakhovtsevo-Sheino-Ushakovoline.dgk163.dgk405.dgr209m.vzz3m.Beforedaybreak,SovietreconforceseastoftheDonetsreportedtheirfindingstoHQ.In69th

Armysector, theGermans showedheightenedactivitiesatRzhavetswhere they’werecrossingtheDonetsandheadingforShipyandShakhovo.Kazachehadfallenandthesurroundingareawascurrently being cleared. This informationwas then relayed toRotmistrov andVatutin. vzz443.pck83.At0500hrs,afterlearningthestartlingcoupdemainatRzhavets,VatutinorderedRotmistrov

tosendadditionalarmortotheRyndinka-Avdeevka-BolshiePodiarugiareatoblockKempffromreachingProkhorovka.ColGrishchenko’s11thGMBandColBorisenko’s12thGMBof5thGMCandthe26thGTBof2ndGTCwassenttobolsterTrufanov’sforces.ThesereinforcementswouldbeunderthecommandofGeneralTrufanov.The92ndGRDandoneregimentof375thRDwasalso sent to support the armor. Theywere in position by early afternoon.The 3rd PzC finallystartedmakingheadway after fivedaysof crawling itsway towardProkhorovka, but this newSoviet forcesentearly thatmorningwouldslowKempfat theriver.dgr104.dgr93m.vzz413+.cbk81.Atdawn,6thPzDstruckwiththesupportofafewTigersfromthesPzAbt503,inacoordinated

effortwith19thPzD,alongtheeasternbanksoftheNorthernDonetsdrivingthroughKhokhlovo,KiselevoandSabynino.ArearguardatSabyninowasmakingitdifficultfor19thPzDtocaptureit. Moving on after Sabynino, the lead elements of 19th PzD met up with 6th PzD south ofRzhavetsaround1630hrs.TheywerethenorderedtoRyndinka.Theadvancehadpenetratedthelineof305thRDandbumpedintothe107thRD,sixmilestotherear.The89thGRDalsohadtofallback to thesouthofGostischchevo.Thebattered81stRDtried toprotect89th’s retreatbystopping the German advance at the Donets from Krivtsevo to Ryndinka. Other tank brigadesmovedupalong theeasternbankof theKorenRiver toputadditionalpressureon thepanzers.TrailingelementsofKempfGroupwerestill15milesfromProkhorovkaandtheRausCorpswasunable to provide adequate screening. The pressure was getting worse with more reservesmovingup.Therestof69thArmyfellbackandregroupedafterdark.SabyninowasontheeastbankoftheDonets,southofKrivtsovo.dgk163.vzz252+.vzz12m.vzz3m.erz209.dlu108.After taking Rzhavets and the bridge across the Donets, Hunersdorff, the CO of 6th PzD,

quicklysentthe114thPzGRacrosstherivertoRyndinkatoprotecttheirnorthernflankandsecurethebridgefromsabotage.gnk315.fzk53+.dlu102+.pck86.

InanattempttoplugthegapmadebyKempf’sthreepanzerdivisions,Kriuchenkin’s69thArmyduring predawn hours made the following deployments. The 89th GRD occupied positionsbetweenKiselevoandKrivtsevo.The81stGRDdefendedthewesternbankoftheDonetsfromKrivtsevo to Ryndinka while the 92nd GRD with the 96th TB occupied the line betweenVypolzovka and Novo Alekseevski Vyselok. The 107th RD and 305th RD occupied defensesalong the lineRazumnoe ravine-Gremuchi. The 94thGRDwith the 31stABdefended the linePloskoe-Novoselovka(east)andalongtheeasternbankoftheKorenRiver.Totheleft,7thGA’s15th GRD continued to defend along the line Sheino-Solovev State Farm. The 93rd GRDremainedonthelinebetweenRozhdestvenka-Druzhnyi.dgk163.dgr209m.vzz3m.dgr39m.Shortlyafter0500hrsMajGeneralBurdeinyorderedColNesterovtoredirecthis26thGTB

southward toward theAvdeevka-Plota area to stop the 3rd PzC from crossing theDonets andreachingProkhorovka.(Thebrigadewouldbesentfurthersouthonceitsinsector.)Thisgreatlyweakened the attack planned on Das Reich’s southern flank near Belenikhino-Leski area.Burdeinynowhadlessthan100operabletankstobeginhisoriginalplannedassault.PlotawasthreemilesnorthwestofRyndinka.vzz362+.gnk354.Atdawn,thebridgeheadatRzhavetsonthesouthernbankoftheDonetswasreinforcedbya

PanzerGrenadierRegiment.Preparationswerebeingmadetobreakoutofthatbridgeheadandtobring the rest of the division across the river. Just as theGerman columnwasmoving on thebridge, theSovietsblewthebridge.TheSovietsalsocounter-attackedinadelayingactionandthe6thPzDhad topostpone theircrossinguntil theattackwasputdown.The leadunitsof6thPzDfoundacrossingsixmilesfromRzhavets;advancingunitsmadethecrossingbutwerestruckbyfriendlyfirefromLuftwaffeaircraft.Rzhavetswas11milessouthofProkhorovka.AtdawnRzhavets was still not completely secured, so 6th PzD had to take time to secure it beforebreakingout.At1115hrs,nearRzhavets,Vypolzovkawascaptured,pushingtheSovietdefenderstowardAvdeevka.ThisnewbridgeheadwestoftheDonetsworriedVatutin.HehadtodivertapartofRotmistrov’sforcestothesectorandawayfromthemainassault.rc209.dlu63m.vzz412.dgr221m.fzk53+.pck86.Atdaybreak,the69thArmywasstillfine-tuningtheirpositionsandwasnowholdingtheline

where theGerman spearheadwasmaking themost progress. The 305thRD and 96thTBwasholdingtheline:Vypolzovka,Aleksandrovka,AlekseevkaandPloski.The92ndGRDwasfallingbackduringthenighttothislineandwouldsupportthe305thRDduringthedaylighthours.The81stGRDwasholdingthelinetothesouthwestbetweenRyndinka,ShcholokovoandStrelnikov.Evenwith all of thenewdeployments of the last fewhours,Vatutinwas stillworried about abreakthrough.vzz410+.Duringthepreviousday,6thPzDcapturedKazache,eightmilessouthoftheDonets,andearly

this morning, with the support of Tigers from the sPzAbt 503, started moving towardAleksandrovkatoclearthedivision’srearwhileBakemovedonRzhavets.Thekeycrossingsitesover the Northern Donets would be for the following day. At the same time, the 19th PzDadvancedalongthesouthernbanksoftheDonetsheadingtowardKrivtsevo.Theywouldlinkupwith 6th PzD after dark at Rzhavets, south of the Donets. At Rzhavets, the tank battle nearProkhorovkacouldbeheard.WithGermancontrolledT34s,thefirstdefensebeltofRzhavetswaspenetrated.SoontheSovietsdiscoveredtheirerrorandstartedshooting.By0500hrs,Vatutinhad

orderedelementsof5thGTAdetachedfromthemainattacktoheadsouth toblockthenorthernand western perimeter of Rzhavets. Aleksandrovka was located on important high ground sixmileseastofRzhavets.MajorBakeledthestealththrustofthe11thPzRintoRzhavetsandtookthe credit for keeping hismen cool when the lead tank stalled in front of the Soviet garrisonguarding the road. The 6th PzDwould have extreme trouble clearing Aleksandrovka and thatdifficultywasaclearsignalof3rdPzC’sdeterioratingcondition,andtheimpactthatwouldhaveontherestofthecampaign.dgk198++.dgk202*.dgk222m.dlu63m.Elements of 6th PzD (3rd PzC) launched early thismorning from the Kazache area toward

Novo-Alekseevski Vyselo, capturing it later in the afternoon. Another attempt to takeAleksandrovkafailedwhen96thTBcounter-attacked.dgr104.dgr93m.The26thGTBof 2ndGTCwas traveling towardPlota as orderedwhenTrufanov, the area

commander,calledthebrigadewithapossiblechangeoforders.Ifneeded,the26thGTBwouldheadfurthersouthforShakhovotoprovidefurtherfirepowerincase81stGRD,defendingnearbyShcholokovo,neededhelp.Itturnedout81stGRDneededhelpandthe26thGTBwassentsouthtoassist.Bothareaswerebeingattackedby19thPzD.Onceinthearea,adefensewasquicklybuiltonHill228.4thatoverlookedtheimportantShakhovo-Ryndinkaroad.At0955hrs,the11thGMB arrived from Krasnoe in the Rzhavets, Vypolozovka, Shipy area.Within this area, Hill135.0wascapturedby theGermansandabatteryofrocket launchersdeployed there.The11thGMBwasorderedtorecapturethehill.The12thGMBalongwiththe92ndGRDweretaskedtoretakeKransnoe Znamia andVypolzovka.At the same time, the 53rdGTRwas to attackHill241.5,northofAleksandrovka,beforemovingontoAleksandrovka.Alittlelater,the3rdMBof5thGMC arrived on the Shipy-Ryndinka road,where both the 19th PzD andDas Reich wereheadingtoward.Trufanovnowhad157tanksinhismakeshiftcombatgroup.KransnoeZnamiawas east of the Donets, a mile north of Vypolzovka. SeeMap 21. vzz414+. vzz423. dgr104.dgr221m.6thPzDwasattemptingtoenlargetheirbridgeheadintheRyndinkasector,whiletothesouth

the19thPDwasattemptingtoforcetheDonetsnearShcholokovo.Thispenetrationinthissectortookonurgentproportionsfor2ndGTC;Burdeinysenthisdeputycommander,ColPoloskov,to26thGTBwhichhadmovedintothisareatofortifytheline.Uponsurveyingthearea,Poloskovordered 26th GTB to set up defenses on Hill 228.4, situated along the important Shakhovo-Ryndinkaroad.vzz414.GeneralKempforderedMajGeneralvonHornof198thIDtoimmediatelyrelieve7thPzD,the

bulkofwhichwasdeployedintheRazumnoevalley.LtGeneralvonFunckwasorderedtodrivemost of his 7th PzDwestward and link upwithDasReich to stabilize the line and clear anylingeringresistanceinthepocketthatwouldbeformed.GeneralvonFunckhadbeencommanderof7thPzDsince1941but,despitebeingacompetentpanzercommander,wouldbetransferredtothe23rdIClaterthatyear.InSeptember1944,Hitlerwouldfirehim;thereasonwasthoughttobebecauseofhisaristocraticbackground.dlu104.zsm84+..Southeast of Prokhorovka, elements of the 6th PzD and 7th PzD were still advancing

northwardstowardRyndinkaandRzhavets,whiletheleadunitswerenowonlysevenmilesfromthe SS PzC attacking Prokhorovka. Rotmistrov ordered reserves down to block these trailingdivisionsfromreachingthePlotaline.Partof7thPzDhadtostaybehindtosupport11thICbeing

attackedandwasfaltering.je109.dlu63m.nzk96.dgr221m.At 0745 hrs, BattleGroupHorst attacked Sabynino in order to break through the last flank

position of the Soviet defensive belt. In the Pena salient area, Soviet formations penetratedGermanlinesforcingthe48thPzCtogoonthedefensive.At0900hrs,the49thRCof7thGA(73rdGRD,270thRD,111thRD)attackedKempf’sright

flank, elements of 7thPzD, east ofRazumnoe at theSolovevStateFarmand thePolianaStateFarm.Thiswasanattempttoslowdown3rdPzCfromhelpingguard2ndSSPzC’srightflank.TheSovietsonlyachievedpartialsuccessbyreachingHill207.9andHill191.2,lessthanatwomilegain.ButitwasgoodenoughtodisruptKempffromlinkingupwithHausser’s2ndSSPzC.Bytheendof thedayKempfwasstillninemilesfromProkhorovka.After losingRzhavets thismorning,theSovietsquicklyralliedandwereabletoprevent3rdPzCfromgainingmuchgroundtoday.dgk197.dgr104.dgr39m.dgr93m.The7thPzDhadtoprovidesecurityfortheeastflankof3rdPzCbecauseoflackofinfantryfor

flankguards.OnKempf’ssoutheastboundary,CorpsRaushelda13milefront,holdingbackanincreasingnumberofdivisionsassignedtothe49thRCof7thGA,includingfourfreshdivisionsthatarrivedthepreviousday.The73rdGRD,270thRDand111thRDof49thRCwithsupportofthe27thGTBattackedCorpsRausat0900hrs.Justlikein4thPzA’ssector,therewasnotenoughinfantrytoprotecttheflanksanddriveforward.wdk162+.Inthe3rdPzC’ssector,the17thVAflew134sortiestohelpthe69thArmyrepulseanattackby

thepanzers.The lowcloudcover restrictedGermanbombers from taking to theair in thewaytheyshouldhave.cbk79.Elements of the 19th PzDwere sent to reinforce the bridgehead on theDonets atRzhavets-

Ryndinka, about twelvemiles fromProkhorovka.The rest of 19thPzDwas trying to cross theDonets near Shcholokovo with the intent of capturing the village. The 69th Army had justreceived the 35th GRC, which filled the gap between Prokhorovka and Rzhavets. As the dayprogressedeastof theDonets, the92ndGRD,94thGRDand305thGRDwereable tocontaintrailingelementsof6thPzDfromreachingKazache.The6thPzD,whichhadbeenbadlymauled,neededhelptobreakoutbutthe19thPzDand7thPzDhadbeenunabletogiveassistanceuntillater. The 19th PzD, along with the 168th ID, did make progress clearing the area along theDonetsintheKhokhlovo,KiselevoandSabyninoareas,but7thPzD,furthereast,madefewgains.The distance between Belgorod and Prokhorovka was about 30 miles. dgk162+. dgk165m.dlu63m.vzz413+.dgr155m.dgr173m.vzz12m.TravelingfromKrasnoe,the11thGMBreachedtheRzhavets,Vypolzovka,Shipylineby1000

hrs and started preparations to attack 6th PzD at Ryndinka. Elements of the 375th RDwouldsupportthetankersinpushingthe6thPzDtotheeastbankoftheDonets.MajGeneralTrufanov,whowasinchargeofforcesintheDonetsarea,wasatabigdisadvantageashewascommandingahodge-podgeofunitswithouttheaidofaHQstaffandthesituationwaschaotic.Itwouldbeevenmore difficult to takeRyndinka, for theGermans had artillery on nearbyHill 135.0.Theattackersconcurrentlyattackedthehillalongwiththetown.Inmidafternoon,alargeformationofLuftwaffecameswoopinginandcausedmuchhavocontheSoviets.Atthesametimethe92ndGRDandthe12thGMBwouldattack towardVypolzovka,Avdeevkaand the53rdGTRwouldadvancealongtheHill241.5-Aleksandrovkaaxis.The12thGMBarrivedintheAvdeevkaareaat

daybreakon7/12andwerethenambushed.Whilepartofthe12thGMBengagedtheambush,therestof thebrigadeattacked towardAvdeevka.Bothsidessufferedheavycasualties.vzz415++.vzz478.In 7thGA sector and jumping off fromHill 202.9,Hill 209.6 andGremiache,MajGeneral

Terentev’s49thRC’s111thRDand270thRDwiththesupportofthe201stGTB,27thGTBandthe73rdGRD, launchedan attack in thedirectionofKrutoiLog,RazumnoeandDalniePeski.Duringtheassemblybeforetheattack,theGermanslaunchedtheirownrocketattackthatcausedconfusionanddelayedtheSovietattack.Theassaultwasdisorganizedandwentoffinpiecemealfashion.TheSovietsgainedamileortwoinplacesbeforeheavyGermanartilleryfirewasabletohalttheiradvance.Notwantingtogiveupthesemeagergains,theSovietsduginandwaitedouttheshelling.vzz437.dgr39m.Withthe6thPzDatRzhavetsandthebridgethatcrossedtheDonetsRiver,Kriuchenkinof69th

Armyregroupedhisforcesfor theexpectedbattleatdaybreakof the13th.Thenewlinewouldinclude 93rd GRD on the Rozhdestvenka-Druzhnyi line, southwest of Gostishchevo. The 89thGRDoccupiedthenewlinebetweenKiselevoandKrivtsevowhilethe81stGRDdefendedthewesternbankoftheDonetsfromKrivtsevoandRyndinka.The92ndGRDand96thTBdefendedthelinefromVypolzovka,northofRzhavets,toNovoAlekseevski.The107thRDand305thRDoccupied the line between Razumnoe to Gremiache. The 94th GRD and the 31st Anti-tankBrigade occupied along the line: Shakhovtsevo-Mazildno-Sheino-Ushakovo dgk163. wwf151.vzz7m.vzz12m.vzz5m.The3rdPzCandthe2ndSSPzCwereattackingtowardDonetsRiversfromthewest,eastand

south,drivingtheSovietdefendersbacktoGostishchevoandbeyond,wherenewdefenseswerehastily prepared. TheGermans had panzers leading the operationwith 167th ID and 168th IDadvancingfromeithersideoftheriverinsupportofthepanzers.Duringthepredawnhoursonthewest side of theDonets, the 417thGR of 168th ID fought for the forest next toGostishchevowhichwasdefendedby89thGRD.Thebattlecontinuedafterdaybreakandthe89thGRD,withthesupportof the148thTB,wereable topenetrate the lineandwere threatening to isolate the417thGRfrom429thGR.jp170.vzz3m.vzz5m.dlu115+.Inthesouthernsalient,StalinorderedSmershtroopstoblockthepathofanyofthesoldiersof

69thArmyfromfleeingthelines.Inonlyacoupleofdaysnearly3,000troopsweredetained.The48thRCof69thhadfivedivisionsandstartedthiscampaignwithastrengthof42,950men.By7/10 itwas down to 38,100men and by 7/17 it recorded 1,980 dead, 3,825wounded, 8,400missing and 1,350 other (jailed or executed). The 89thGRDwas the hardest hit in the corps.gjz189.wwf146.vzz410.vzz486.The 7th PzD, behind the other two panzer divisions of 3rd PzC, continued to strive toward

Rzhavets.LeadelementshadreachedRzhavetsandwereorderedtoassist6thPzDintakingHill241.5,justnorthofAleksandrovka,agoodlaunchandobservationpointtohitthevillagefrom.Thebulkof6thPzDandpart of 7thPzDheadingnorthwest toward theRzhavetsbridge,wereforcedtoreversecourseandclearAleksandrovka,sevenmileseastofRzhavets,aftertheinitialattackwith just a small groupof panzersof 6thPzDwas repulsed, practically eliminating anychance for 3rdPzC to reachPravorot and assistDasReich in advancing on Prokhorovka.On8/1/43MajorBakereceived theKnight’sCrosswithOakLeaves for thedaringcaptureof this

importanttown.He’dlateraddedSwordstohisOakLeavesandwouldendthewarasaMajorGeneral.gnk350+.vzz12m.wwf154.fzk53+.zsm226+AftercrossingtheLipovyiDonets,the167thIDtriedtocatchupwith168thIDtravelingnorth

to strengthen the line. At Nepkhai and west of Teterevino, Soviet infantry attacked but wererepulsed.Petrovski,avillagetwomilesnorthwestofRozhdestvenka,wasrecapturedbySovietsoldiers.fkk169.SovietforcesattackedRausCorps,assignedtotherightflankofKempfGroup,penetratingthe

line and holding its position, preventing Raus from advancing despite the repeated counter-attacks.ThesituationintheareawasveryunstableandreserveswerenotavailableforRaus.Tothenortheast,GroupKempfwasattacking69thArmyand7thGA,inflictingheavycasualtiesonthe69th.RotmistrovhadorderedreservestocomeupearlythatmorningandnowtheGermanswere feeling the presence of these reinforcements. These new reserveswere able to push theGermansback,forcingthemtocrossbackovertheDonetsandtoevacuateRyndinka.The7thGAand the few elements of 5th GAwere also able to force the 6th PzD and 7th PzD out of thevillages of Kuzminka and Aleksandrovka. With the last two actions, the threat south ofProkhorovkawaseased.Rotmistrovnowhadtoworryaboutwestofthetownandhebroughtthelastofthesecondechelonuptothefront:24thGTB,10thGMBandremaining5thGA.Theycameup to help 18th TC cope with the rising danger. The tank battles between Prokhorovka andRzhavetslasted18hours.je110.dgk222m.dlu63m.dgr221m.The3rdPzCcontinued tomakegains from thepreviousdaybut thepacewas slowing.The

73rdPzGRof19thPzDadvancedsixmilesfromSabyninotoRzhavetsby1400hrswiththehelpofaccurateartilleryandtheoccasionalLuftwafferaid.The74thPzGRtrailedbehindthem.FromRzhavetstheregimentscrossedtheDonetsandmarchedtoRyndinkawheretheywerepreparingtobreakoutoftheirbridgeheadandmeetDasReichsomewherenearStorozhevoeorPravorot.Duringtheafternoon,reconpatrolsfrom6thPzDdiscoveredtheSovietswereassemblingalongtheAleksandrovkalineandwereascloseasthreemileseastofRzhavets.Twenty-fivetanksfromthe96thTB,alongwithinfantryofthe92ndGRD,weresettingupnewdefensesinthevillage.Thetankshadfoughtwith6thPzDthepreviousnightnearRzhavetsandwerepushedout,forcedtofallbacktoAleksandrovka.Breithcouldnotaffordtoleavetheenemyintheirrearashedrovenorth,soheorderedallthepanzersof6thPzDthatwereassemblingatRyndinkatoturnaroundandheadeastandclearAleksandrovka.SeeMap21.vzz12m.dlu108.The3rdPzCcrossedtheDonetsRiverandestablishedanewbridgeheadonthewestbankin

theShtosholevo-Saverskoyesector.Ittooktherestofdaytoregroupfortheassaultnextday,aswellas repulsingSovietcounterson theKazache-Aleksandrovkaaxis.Thisdaywas themajortankbattleandtheirsupportwouldhavebeenappreciated,butitwasnotpossible,forthecorpswasbeingattackedfromallsideswithrenewedvenganceandfightingforitsownsurvival.AftertakingSohilnothepreviousday,the7thPzDmovedtothewestbankofRazumnoeCreekandintotheKazachearea.shn162.aaa125m.dgk222m.dlu63m.dgr39m.TheSovietsabandoned their southernpositionson the longsalientalong theLipovyiDonets

andtothewestofDalnaiaIgumenka,freeingupelementsofthe375thGRDand81stGRD.The375thassistedthe92ndGRDinstopping6thPzDatRzhavets,whilethe81stGRDmovedtothewestbankoftheDonetstodelaythe19thPzD.The305thGRD,107thGRDandthe94thGRD

attackedthe7thPzD.The5thGTAalsotransferredthe26thGTBwith44tanksandpartofthe5thGMCto69thArmy,bringingatotalof170tankstoblock3rdPzC.Theseunits,leavingthe5thGTAfortheeastflank,madeitalittleeasieronthe2ndSSPzCinthecenter.Otherunitsfromdifferentfrontsweretransferredtothissector.Apartiallistincludes1447thSURegiment,104thGTDR,737thAntitankBattalion,2ndGuardsMotorcycleBattalionand4thGuardsMechanizedBattalion.wdk162.dgk222m.dlu63m.dgr155m.dgr173m.vzz10m.WithRzhavetsmostlysecured,Breithsentmoreofthe19thPzDtoRzhavetstoallowthe6th

PzDtoheadtowardtheNovo-Aleksandrovski,VyselokandAleksandrovkaareatoassist7thPzDinbreakingthroughtowardProkhorovka.Vatutinorderedthe5thGMC,2ndGTC,375thRDand92ndGRDtoheadtowardthePlotaareatostopthisadvance.vzz413+*.vzz363.East of Rzhavets, the 92nd GRD and the 96th TB struck the 4th PzGR of 6th PzD near

Aleksandrovka and pushed theGermans back toward theNorthernDonets River. At the sametime,Trufanov’srightflankresumeditsattackonRyndinkaandAvdeevka.Afterabriefpausetoprepare, the 26th GTB with its 44 tanks attacked the southern portion of the 19th PzD’sbridgeheadatShcholokovo,whilethe11thGMBandthe12thGMBattackedGermanpositionsatRyndinka andVypolzovka.GeneralTrufanov’smotorcycle regimentwasheld in reserve, beingstationedatHill232.4.Bynightfall, theGermanswereevacuatingRyndinka. Ithadnotbeenagood day for 19th PzD and all of the divisions of 3rd PzC had failed to reach Prokhorovka.During the night, Kempf made some changes. 6th PzD was to clear Vypolzovka andAleksandrovkawhile7thPzDwastojoin19thPzDindefendingthebridgeheadonthenorthernbanksoftheDonets.dgk203.dgk222m.dlu63m.vzz3m.dgr221m.nzk106+.vzz417.At1530hrs,the6thPzDlauncheditsadvancetowardHill241.5andalmostimmediatelyran

intothe96thTBandelementsofthe92ndGRDForalmostfivehoursthetwosidesexchangedblowsbutneithercouldgetthewinninghand.Theyeventuallystoppedandpulledbackalittletoregroup.Thebulkof7thPzDhadnowreachedtheareasouthofRzhavets.Theirordersweretopreparetoattack,buttheywerenotsureiftheywereheadingtoAleksandrovkatohelp6thPzDorturnwesttohelp19thPzDnearRyndinka.gnk351.vzz12m.Elements of 7th PzD had to be diverted toMelikhovo to block the increasing pressure the

Sovietswereputtingontheeasternflank.OtherelementsofthedivisionlefttheiroperatingareanearSheino, crossed theRazumnaiaRiver to thewest and rolled throughVerkhniOlshanets toshift direction and headed for Kurakovka. In spite of strong resistance, they succeeded incapturingthehillsnorthofAvdeevka.Withincreasedresistance,the7thPzDcouldgonofarther.AndeevkawasnortheastofRzhavets.fkk296.dgr155m.dgr173m.vzz404.vzz12m.vzz3m.MajGeneralBurdeiny’s26thGTBhadattacked19thPzD’sbridgeheadonthewestbankofthe

DonetsnearShcholokovobut after severalhoursof fightingwasunable topush thegrenadiersintotheriver.Thetankersdisengagedandpulledbacktoregroupandprepareforthenextattack.At least it could be said their efforts had prevented 3rd PzC from linking upwithDas Reichtoday.dgk193+.dgk222m.vzz1m.gnk312m.While 73rd PzGR of 19th PzD stayed at Ryndinka, the 74th PzGR was ordered to take

Shakhovo to the west of Ryndinka. Shakhovo was only six miles fromDas Reich’s southernboundary.gnk350.vzz3m.The55thGTRof12thGMBwith36tanksredeployedovernightandbylatemorningattacked

KrasnoeZnamia, northofVypolzovkaagainst elementsof the19thPzDand7thPzD.The12thGMBwasultimatelyheadingforRyndinka-Vypolzovka.The55thGTRwasstoppedamilefromHill222.1andwasunabletojointherestof12thGMBfortheirattack.TheSovietsdidtakethehillbydarkbutcouldnotgomuchbeyondthat.vzz420.vzz12m.dlu131.Throughthepreviousdayandearlyonthisday,the48thRChadfallenback;therestoftheday,

withthehelpofthereservescomingsouth,theywereabletoslowKempf’sadvanceontheriverline.ThoughKempf could not reachProkhorovka, his crossing of theDonets forcedVatutin todivertforcesthatweremeantfor5thGTA’smainattackagainstthe2ndSSPzCandDasReichinparticular.vzz424+.Intheafternoon,the26thGTB,attackingalongtheShakhovo-Shcholokovoline,hadthehelpof

the11thGMBattackingtowardPlotaandRyndinkainsupportof81stGRDagainstthe19thPzD.Itwasanattempt topush theGermansback to theeasternbankof theNorthernDonets.At thesame time the 12thGMB attacked along theVypolzovka-Rzhavets axis starting nearAvdeevkaagainst the6thPzD.The92ndGRDand96thTB,nowattached to69thArmy,attacked the6thPzDnearAleksandrovka.dgk202+.dgk222m.dlu63m.vzz3m.dgr221m.NorthofKazache,ColUnreinofGroupUnreinwasdrivinghispanzersfrom11thPzR,anda

few Tigers from sPzAbt 503, north on the Kurakovka-Aleksandrovka road when they wereambushedby92ndGRD.TheSovietdivisionwasheadingwesttryingtocutbehindtheleadingGerman formations to reach 81st GRD, which was being threatened with encirclement. If acorridorcouldbecreated,additional reserveswouldbebroughtup tohelp isolateanddestroy6thPzD.dlu108.Intheboundarybetween2ndSSPzCand3rdPzC,theSoviet2ndGTCattacked,establishinga

wedgebetweenthetwoGermangroups.The3rdPzCwasalreadyinvolvedagainstthe3rdMCatRzhavetsandcouldnotclosethegap.The3rdPzCwasforcedtobreakawaytosaveitsflankbutafterdivertingtherisk,itwasabletodefeataSoviettankformationatPoleshayevHills.jp199.dlu63m.The2ndGTCrepeatedlyattackedtherightflankofDasReichfromthegapthathadnotbeen

closedbetween2ndSSPzCand3rdPzC.Withsomanyresourcesdevotedtoprotectingtheflank,DasReichcouldnotdriveforward.Withheavythunderstormsthatday,thetravelfortankswasdifficult, adding another burden to both sides.While two-thirds of Burdeiny’s 2nd GTC wasstrugglingwithDasReich, the remainingbrigade, the26thGTB,hadshifteddirectionandwasnowfighting3rdPzCwiththemissionofexpandingthegapbetweenthetwoGermancorps.ThatwasthemainreasonwhyGeneralVatutinorderedthemajoroffensivethatdayby5thGTA.Hewas very concerned about 3rd PzC coming alongside 2nd SS PzC in their drive towardProkhorovka; The SS had to be destroyed before that happened. A German corps had to bedestroyed,butIwouldargueVatutinchosethewrongcorpstoattack.TheweakestcorpsHothhadwas3rdPzC.Ifitwasdestroyed,Hothwouldhavenoalternativebuttofallback;hecouldnotallowHaussertocontinue,itwouldbesuicidal.Theoddsofdestroying3rdPzCwouldbehigherthan2ndSSPzC,butVatutinalmostimmediatelyrejectedaflankattackwhenhisstaffsuggestedit.dgk193.zow160.By1600hrsafterfightingforfourhours,the11thGMBwithsupportfromtheair,hadretaken

Shipy,northwestofRzhavetsandby1900hrsretookRyndinka,notfarfromthewestbankofthe

Donets.Howeverthe19thPzDand6thPzDstillheldasmallbridgeheadonthewestbankoftheDonets.vzz418.vzz7m.The3rdPzCcapturedSobyshno,but therewasstillagapbetween itand2ndSSPzCto the

west.Thisexposedtheirflankstoattack.snk84.dgk231m.snk433m.Around 1600 hrs, 200 German planes bombed the Soviet defenses at Vypolzovka and

Aleksandrovka.Itwasmeanttosoftenthelineincase6thPzDreachedtheareaandattheveryleast 3rdPzCwanted to keep theSoviets off balance to prevent further attacks against the6thPzD,whichwashavingtroubleholdingtheline.ThebombingsinflictedheavycasualtiesontheSovietsincludingsomekeymid-levelcommanders.vzz479.ElementsofSchmidt’s19thPzDspent thewholedayestablishingandsecuringabridgehead

overtheDonetsintheareaKrivtsovo-Shcholokovo-Ryndinkabutwasrepulsedeachtimebythe81stGRDwhenthepanzerstriedtoexpandtheirposition.The19thPzDdidtakeoverRzhavetsfrom6thPzDanddidmakeitacrosstheriverinthisareabutitwasstoppedbyheavyfireonthehillnexttoShipy,whichhadjustbeenrecapturedbyTrufanov.vzz423.dgr221m.Late in the afternoon, the 81st GRD and the 26th GTB were still holding the Krivtsovo-

Shcholokovo-Ryndinkalinewherethe19thPzDwastryingtopenetrateallday,inordertoforcetheDonetsandexpandtheirsmallbridgehead.Bymidnight,the19thPzDhadstillfailedtobreakthrough.Nexttothe81stGRD,the11thGMB,withthehelpoffiresupportfromthe26thGTB,was still holding on in the Vypolzovka, Shipy and Aleksandrovski Vyselok area. The mainbridgeheadontheDonetswasnearRzhavetswherepanzershadbeencrossingformostofthedaybutwerestillunabletomakeamajorbreakthrough.vzz423+.dgr221m.When the Soviets counter-attacked andwere pushing 11th PzR of 6th PzD back toward the

Donetsinlateafternoon,ColonelOppeln-BronikowskiorderedMajorBakeandhisbattalionofpanzersandsupporting infantry to theRyndinkabridgehead to stop theenemycounter-attack. Itwascriticalthe3rdPzCkeptafootholdonthewesternbankoftheriverand,despitethebridgebeingsabotaged,BakeandhisforcewereabletomaintainapresenceontheRyndinkasideoftheriver.TheywouldadvancefromtheretolinkupwithDasReich.fzk315.ColonelOppeln-Bronikovskiwasleavingthefrontfor6thPzD’sHQ,asordered,whenhewas

ambushed by an assault gun. A direct hit on the armored car caused serious injuries to thepassengers.HewasrushedtothehospitalinKharkovwhereherecovered,buthewouldmisstherestofOperationCitadel.InJanuary1945hewaspromotedtoMajorGeneral.zfk479+.zsm156..At1800hrs,asMajorKurnosov’s53rdGTRwasmovingsouthtowardNovoAleksandrovski

Vyselok, it started firingonwhat it thoughtwereGermandefensesonHill 241.5, just northofAleksandrovka.Inreality,theywerefiringonelementsofthe92ndGRDand96thTB.Oncetheerrorwasdiscovered,the53rdGTRfellback.KurnosovreceivedneworderstomoveoffandrecapturethevillageofKazache,furthersouth.At2000hrs,justsouthofAleksandrovka,itwasattackedbyaGermancolumnandlosteleventanksanditscommanderwascriticallywounded.ItstoppeditsadvanceandfellbacktoAleksandrovkatoregroup.vzz422.vzz3m.At1800hrs,elementsof5thGMCresumedatwo-prongedattack,onefromPokrovkaandthe

other fromAvdeevka towardRyndinka andHill 222.1, south ofAvdeevka.These forceswereabletopushthe73rdPzGRand74thPzGRof19thPzDoutofRyndinkawithlosses,forcingthemtofallbacktoRzhavets.Byearlyeveningthe92ndGRDhadmovedinandsecuredRyndinkaand

nearbyHill216.0against repeatedcounter-attacks that lasted throughout thenight toregain thisimportantvillage.dgr104.dgr221m.vzz475.After1800hrs,Trufanov’sforcescontinuedtoattackandgaingroundagainstGermanpositions

atRyndinka and south ofAvdeevka,while 26thGTBattacked the southern portion of the 19thPzD’sbridgeheadatShcholokovoand11thGMBand12thGMBattackedGermanpositions atRyndinkaandVypolzovka.TheGermanshadtofallbackfromRyndinkaandthe19thPzDdidnotexpandtheirbridgeheadatall,preventingthe3rdPzCfromreachingProkhorovka.Bytheendoftheday,Kempf’sprogresshadstalledagainsttheSovietreinforcementsthatwerecomingintothesector.dgk203+.vzz3m.dgr221m.vzz418.EvenwiththemodestsuccessDasReichand3rdPzCachievedtoday,furthercountermeasures

weretakentocurbtheGermanadvanceforgoodandpreventhavingthetwocorpsjoinforces.The11thMBand12thMBof5thGMCwererepositionedtotheVypolzovka-Avdreevkaregion,and prepared to engage and destroy the 3rd PzC driving north from their recently acquiredbridgehead atRyndinka.The 26thGTBwould stay in the Shcholokovo sector to eliminate thesouthernbridgehead.Afiercebattleensuedandby1900hrstheSovietshadcapturedRyndinkaandVypolzovka.Rotmistrovhadfailedtodestroy2ndSSPzCbuthehadstoppedtheiradvanceandkeptProkhorovkainSoviethands.Thenextdayhewouldbeorderedtorestrainhisassaults,regroupandbereadyforanothermajorattackon7/14.dgr226.vzz3m.dgr221m.Asitwasnearingdark,the73rdPzGRmovedoutfromnearRyndinkaheadingwest,slipping

throughtheSovietline,andwasabletooccupythehillonemileeastofShakhovobeforestoppingforthenight.Shakhovowouldbetheirobjecivefortomorrow.Inthemorningitwouldmovetothenorthwest andexpand thebridgehead.While the73rdwas travelingwest, aSoviet combatgroupattackedRyndinka,cuttingoffthewesternbridgeheadfromtheeasternbankoftheriverinthissector.Withthe74thPzGRalsowestoftheriverinthewoodsnearShakhovo,Rydinkahadfalleneasily,causingthe74thPzGRHQtoescapebyswimmingacrosstherivertotheeastside.With the73rdPzGRmoving into74thPzGR’ssector, the loosebandofSovietdefendersweregetting encircled.After dark they launched an attack to the north to free themselves before thecirclebecametoostrong.Theyranintoelementsof19thPzDwhichweremovinguptothelinetostrengthenthebridgeheadandwererepulsed.TherivercrossingintheShcholokovosectorwasstillbeingheldandwastheroutetakentobringmenandsuppliestoShakhovo.Shortlyafterdark,the6thPzDcounteredatRzhavetsandrecapturedthebridgeovertheDonets.vzz477+.vzz3m.At2200hrs,acommandogroupfrom19thPzDcrossedtheDonetstothewoodssouthwestof

Shakhovo,settingupascreentoprotectthesapperswhiletheybuildabridgeforthenextattackinthemorning.The19thPzDwantedtotakeShcholokovotocleartheirflankbeforemovingonShakhovotothenorthwestandfartherfromtheriver.TheGermansweretryingtobuildasecondbridgeheadsouthofRzhavets.vzz424.vzz3m.GroupTrufanov,whichconsistedof92ndGRD,53rdGTRand96thTBof69thArmy,aftera

forcedmarchreachedtheVypolzovka-Aleksandrovkaregionlateatnight.Thegroupimmediatelyattackedthe4thPzGRof6thPzDontheedgeofAleksandrovka,forcingHunersdorfftoholdmuchofhis6thPzDback from the river to support theendangered regiment.At the same timeotherelementsoftheTrufanovGroupcontinuedtoattacktowardRyndinkaandsouthofAvdeevka.ColNesterov’s (Col Piskarev’s?) 26thGTB again attacked the southern portion of the 19th PzD’s

bridgeheadatShcholokovowhileColGrishchenko’s11thGMBandColBorisenko’s12thGMBattacked German positions covering Ryndinka and Vypolzovka. These attacks succeeded inpreventing19thPzDfromexpandingtheirbridgeheadovertheDonetsorallowing3rdPzCfromreachingProkhorovkainordertosupport2ndSSPzCandalsorecapturedRyndinkabynightfall.dgk203+.dgk222m.dlu63m.vzz3m.dgr221m.gnk383.dlu121m.vzz402+.AfterdarkintheBatratskaiaDachasector,the305thGRand308thGRof198thIDwerejust

completingnewdefenseswhentheywereattackedbythe15thGRD.Afteraprobingattack,themainattackstartedaround2300hrs.Vatutinthoughtthissectorcouldbepenetratedandusedbyhis reserves togetbehindboth3rdPzCand2ndSSPzC.Thebattlewent throughout thenight.ThoughvonHorn’sdivisionheldtheline,theytookheavycasualtiesandthegeneralworriedjusthow long his division could hold for aerial reconnaissance had spotted reserves crossing theKorenRiver.Whilethedaybeforehadseenthe3rdPzCmakegoodgains,thisdaysawthecorpsmostlyonthedefensive.dlu116+.KempfwasagainorderedtodestroyKriuchenkin’s69thArmyandjointhebattlewith2ndSS

PzCforProkhorovka.Kempfknewalltoowellhismissionandcontinuedtobadgerhisdivisioncommanders, yet he also knew his corps would be late arriving. The first few days of thecampaign were too costly and with insufficient air support for the whole campaign, it is nowonderhisforcescouldnotkeepup.The6thPzDcrossedtheDonetsatRzhavetswhile to thewestsidethe19thPzD,withthesupportofthe198thID,attackedKazacheanddrove81stGRDand89thGRDnorthbefore crossing the river, expanding thenewbridgehead.The twopanzerdivisionswerenowthreateningtherearoftheSovietsattacking2ndSSPzC.The3rdPzCwithairsupportwouldattacktherearoftheSovietpositionguardingtheProkhorovkaroad.The167thIDand168thIDwereabletoencirclesomeSovietsbutthe89thGRDwasstillholdingbackpartof168thIDjustnorthofGostishchevo,weakeningthepocket.wdk161+.dlu121m.Large numbers of soldiers of the 69th Army were leaving their posts and deserting. Large

detachmentsweresenttoblocktheirescape.gjz189.Bytheendoftheday,thethreepanzerdivisionsof3rdPzChadwidenedthefledglingsalientit

createdwiththepreviousday’sgains.The19thPzDcontinuednorthalongtheDonetswhilethe6thPzDmovedfromKazachetothenorthwesttocapturetheimportanttownofRzhavets.The7thPzD trailed the 6th PzD shoring up the eastern boundary to south of Aleksandrovka. vzz402.dgr155m.dgr173m.Afterdark, vonManstein signaledKemp, tellinghim the23rdPzDandVikingDivisionhad

reachedBelgorod.gnk351.AtnightKempfsignaledvonMansteinthathiscorpsduringthecampaigncapturedordestroyed

412tanks,530anti-tankguns,132gunsandtook11,862POWs.snk55.fzk171.Just like4thPzA,the3rdPzCwasunable toexploit thegainsofyesterdaybutwereholding

their own against the major Soviet offensive, a commendable effort, although the 3rd PzC’sdispositionswerespreadoutanddifficulttodefendandvulnerabletocontinuedattack.Whenoneaddsthecatastropiclossof6thPzD’sseniorcommandtheoddsfor3rdPzCinreachingPravorotandlinkingupwithDasReichwerefadingquickly.

D

19

July12thontheNorthernSalientSeeMaps7,28

efending theOrel salientwould fall toSchmidt’s 2ndPzAwhich consistedof 55th IC,53rdIC,35thICandthe5thPzD.The14infantrydivisionsandthesinglepanzerdivision

werewoefullyinadequatetohandlethethreefrontscomingatthem.GermanintelligencegreatlyunderestimatedSovietstrengthonthenorthernborderof thesalient.Modelexpectedacounter-attackbutnottothedegreethatoccurred.Hehadthe14infantrydivisionsonthelinewiththe5thPzDinreserve.TheSovietshaddoneagoodjobofmaskingtheirforcescominguptothefrontline,especiallyinthenorthsector.SchmidthadjustbeenhauledbacktoBerlinbytheGestapoforinflammatoryremarksabouttheNazis.Modelhadtocommand2ndPzAaswellasthe9thArmy.dgk232.zzz101m.dgk87m.kcz169.dgk231m.snk433m.swm139+.Despiteheavyrainsthatslowedbymorning,theSovietairforceinthepredawnhoursbombed

theGermans at Glinnaya-Dudino and Shilkov. Thiswent on during the previous night and thepredawnhoursofthatmorning.Theyhaddropped240tonsofbombs.AircraftfromtheBryanskFrontdropped200tonsonBolskhoiMakinovez-Leski.Atfirstlight,theWesternFrontshelledtheGermanpositionsintheGlinnayaDudino-Perestriasharea,devastatingthefrontline.At0340hrs,the infantry, supported by tanks, launched its assault in the above area but itwas repulsed.At1150hrs,the3rdand63rdArmieslaunchedtheirattacksbycrossingtheSushaRiverandquicklypenetratingtheGermanline.Germanartilleryfirewasdirectedonthepenetrationsregardlessifithitfriendorfoe.Theseattacks, thoughnotatascale thatwereusuallyexpectedof theSoviets,werestilllargeenoughtohaveModelcancelpracticallyallplannedoffensivesintheKurskfront.fkk332+.dgk231m.snk433m.The Orel salient was 120 miles wide at its shoulder and about 100 miles deep along its

Bryansk-Orel-Jelezrailroadline.Theareaoutsidethesalientwasopen,withmanyriversrunningthroughitandwasbrokenupbyravinesandoccasionalhillsthatgavetheedgetotheGermans.Whenitraineditwasafurtheradvantagetothedefenders.TheGermanswereabouttolearniftheycouldexploittheseadvantagesfortheSovietswerepreparingtolaunchOperationKutuzov,thehugeoffensive toeliminate theOrel salientanddestroy2ndPzAand9thArmyat thesametime.fkk330.zzz101m.dgk231m.snk433m.In theOrel sector at 0300 hrs the Soviets began amassive barrage that lasted three hours.

Undercoverofthisbarrage,elementsofthefirstechelonforceswereadvancedwiththemissionof findingweaknesses in the line. At 0500 hrsmore of the 80 divisions and 3,500 tanks thatwouldtakepartinthefirstdaysofthecampaignadvancedbetweenShisdraanddueeastofOrel.At0605hrs,theremainderofWesternandBryanskFrontsassaultedtheentireOrelsectorfront

line.In thenorth, themissionof the11thGAwiththehelpofCentralFront in thesouthwastosever the salient at its shoulder. Then with support of 3rd and 63rd Armies and other forcesdriving from the east it was to crush the 2nd PzA. By the afternoon, Lt General Bagramyancommittedhissecondechelonwhichincludedthe5thTCtoquicklybreakintotherear.The5thPzDwassentintostopthebreach.Bytheendoftheday,the11thGAaccompaniedbythe1stTCand5thTChadonaveragedrivensixmilesintoGermanterritory,reachingUlianovo.UlianovowasanimportantstrongpointontheGermanfirstdefensebelt.The5thPzDwasabletostopMajGeneralSakhno’stanksfrompenetratingthesecondlinebutitwasjustamatteroftimebeforetheGermanswouldbeoverwhelmedasadditional reserveswerecomingup to the lineandwouldarrivebynextmorning.dgk233+.zzz101m.dgk231m.snk433m.After heavy air attacks, theWestern andBryansk Fronts started their great counteroffensive

towardOrel,theextremelyimportantlogisticalandcommunicationshuboftheentiresector.Thisassaultwas a reconnaissance in force to find theGermans’weak points. Themajor offensivewouldstartthefollowingday.The2ndPzAhadveryfewpanzersandwouldneedalltheycouldget.fkk328.zzz101m.dgk231m.snk433m.In theOrelsector theRedArmyattacked the2ndPzAwestofNovosil,eastofBolkhovand

northwest ofUlianovo.TheGermans only had 15 infantry divisions defending the line.Modelstoppedthe9thArmy’sattackandorderedtheArmytogodefensive.Overthenextthreedayshetransferredthe12thPzD,18thPzD,20thPzDand36thIDtosupportthe2ndPzA.BythenextdayModelrealizedthemajorscopeoftheSovietattackandknewtheintendedschedulefortheabovetransferswere not enough.Within 48 hours the Soviets had penetrated the line inmany areas,drivingasfarassixmilesforward.Thankstodiligent trafficcontrol,elementsof the12thPzDand 18th PzD deployed northwest of Bolkhov and north of Ulianovo, where the largestpenetrationoccurred, in time toclose thegapsandpreventacatastrophe.Otherdivisions fromAGCwerebeingcalledupandwouldarriveinafewdays.SeeMaps22,28.snk108.zzz101m.dgk231m.snk433m.During the predawnhours before themajor attackwasmade, 360 bombing sorties from the

BryanskFront,madeupofsmallgroups,hit therearareasof2ndPzA, trying todestroycommlines . The center line of the attack included Novosil, which hit 35th IC the hardest. To thenorthwest, another360 sorties from theWesternFrontalsoattackedagainst55th IC.A totalof210tonsweredroppedonthe55thIC.Inadditiontothesepredawnraids,furtherairraidswouldbelaunchedatdaybreakinthesamenortheastquadrantofthesalient.cbk82.dgk231m.snk433m.At0300hrson thenorthernborderof theOrel salient sixGRDsconcentratedona tenmile

frontattackedthejunctionofthe211thIDand293rdID,quicklypenetratingthefrontline.Intheafternoon,Bagramyancommittedhissecondechelon;infantryandthe1stTCand5thTCenteredthe gap and expanded the infiltration. The 5th PzD, stationed behind the line, tried to stop thebreachattheseconddefensebelt.The5thTCtraveledsixmilesandreachedUlianovobutwasunabletobreachthetownortheseconddefensebeltthankstothe5thPzD.dgk233+.dgk231m.snk433m.At 0320 hrs, theWestern Front and 61st Army opened a barrage that targeted the German

positionsinthePaltschikovo-Sinkovoarea.Atthesametimethe3rdand63rdArmiesopenedfireon theGlubki-Salegosch sector startingat0400hrs.At0505hrs, formationsof the12thGRD,

76thGRDand77thGRDaswellasthe336thRDofthe61stArmyattacked.Atthesametime,the2ndGAmaintained it fireon theGermans tokeep themdown.Groundattackaircraft from theWestern Front attacked through the smokescreen that had been laid down. Heavy attacks bybombersrakedtheGermanpositionsinfrontoftheattackingtroopsofthe3rdand63rdArmies.Within30minutesmore than4,000bombs fell on theGermanpositions east ofOrel.Then the235th RD, 380th RD, 129th RD, 348th RD and 287th RD stormed ahead as well, having thesupportofthe114thTR,82ndTR,6thTR,11thTRand12thTR,whichwereattachedtothe3rdand 63rd Armies. It was, in my opinion, a well thought out and coordinated attack. fkk333.zzz101m.dgk231m.snk433m.EastofOrelinthe35thICsector,theSovietsbeganashellingthatwasspecificallyagainstthe

431stIRof262ndID.Therivercrossingin431st’ssectorwouldbethebestfortheirtanks.Afteranhourofshelling,theinfantryattackedandaftercouplehourshadtakenpartofthefirstlineofdefense.Tankswere then sent inbut crashed into aminefield, losing60 tanks.Theattackwasresumed thenextday,wheremore tankswerebroughtupandwereable tomake furthergains,expanding their bridgeheadbut at a cost of20more tanks.Germanartillery shelled theSovietrearinordertodisruptanddestroyreserves.snk220+.zzz101m.dgk231m.snk433m.FortheGermans,Orelwasanimportantsupplydepotanditwascriticalforthemnottoloseit.

That’swhyModel put up such a stout defense system in the salient.Air patrols could see theBryanskFronttothenortheastwasclearlypreparingforanattackandthe55thICinthenortheastandthe35thICtotheeastwereasreadyaspossiblefortheattack.HoweverthebuildupoftheWesternFronttothenorthcameasasurprisetoModel.cbk83.dgk231m.snk433m.Justafterfirstlight,around0530hrs,thepilotsofthe32ndGuardsFighterRegimenttookoff

and flew west to attack the area around Novosil, where the 63rd Army would be assaultingshortlyafterwards.AttheSakovninoairfield,additionalplanes,mostlyfighters,weretakingoffheadingforthesametargets.AtGrachevka,theGermanshadtheirheavierartilleryconcentrationsandthatwouldbetheprimebutnottheonlytargetforthisraid.cbk83.dgk231m.snk433m.The11thGAsupportedbythe5thTCwouldattacktowardUlianovo,southwestofBelev,with

theobjectiveofsurroundingthecityanddestroyingthegarrison.Atthesametime,the61stArmysupportedbythe20thTCwoulddrivesouthwardtowardMtsenskandbeyondwiththeobjectiveofsurroundingBolkhovanddestroyingitsgarrison.The63rdArmywouldbesoutheastofthesetwo forces, driving duewest into the center of the face of the salient. TheWestern Front had200,000menand750tanksinthisoperationwhiletheBryanskFronthad170,000menand350tanks. In addition to these Fronts, the Soviet 1st VA and 15th VA (Air Armies) would be insupport.The1stVAwouldsupporttheWesternFrontandthe15thVAtheBryanskFront.The15thVAhad1,000planeswhilethe1stVAhad720totalplanes.The1stVAhad500fighterswhilethe15thVAhadmorebombers.cbk83+.dgk231m.snk433m.In the predawn shelling by the Soviets, the 211th ID and 293rd ID defending the northeast

quadrantoftheOrelsalientreceivedtheheaviestdamageandtheSovietswereabletopenetratethe front line trenches fairlyquickly.Once the linewaspenetratedSoviet tanksdrovepast theinfantryandintotheGermanreararea.SovietfighteraircraftcontinuetostrafeGermansaheadofthewaveofSovietsoldiersrollingovertheland.fkk333.dgk231m.snk433m.Bagramyan’s 11th GA of Western Front attacked the German defenses in the Glinnaya-

Ulianovo-Oshigovo area. Its objective was to penetrate the front line, advancing between theGlinnayaandVytebetRiversandgetbehindOrelandcutoffitssupplylines.Behind11thGAwas1stTCand5thTC.Elementsof11thGAwouldheadtowardZhizdra,nearthewesternboundaryofthesalient.Totherightof11thGA,Boldin’s50thArmywouldadvanceaswell.Atthesametime,the61stArmyofBryanskFrontcrossedtheOkaRiverandattackedtowardBolkhovinthenortheastcornerofthesalient.ThesouthernpincerofBryanskFrontwasLtGeneralGorbatov’s63rdArmywhichwaseastofOrelandwouldattacktowardOreltosplitthesalientinhalf.Tobreak open the line for 63rd Army would be the 730 tanks and assault guns of Lt GeneralRybalko’s3rdGTA. Ina fewdays,afterRokossovskyreorganizedhisCentralFront,hewouldjoin theattackbydrivingnorth towardOrelandslicing thesalient further.His48th,13th,70thArmiesand2ndTAwouldtakepart.Anestimated300,000menand1,000tankswouldbegintheattack in this southern quadrant. As 9th Armywas pushed backmore of Central Front wouldparticipate.LtGeneralFediuninsky’s11thArmywith65,000menandLtGeneralBadanov’sjustformed4thTAwith 650 tankswere in reserve. fkk331+. dgk230+. zzz101m. cbk82. dgk231m.snk433m.dgk420.dgk58.Thewell-constructedpositionsof the35th IC (Rendulic)were locatedeastofOrelbetween

Mtensk in the north and Ponyri in the south. Theywere protected byminefields and barbwireentanglements.Astreamalsocut in frontof their linewhichwouldslowanattacker.Aseconddefense linewas alsoprepared.The35th ICwouldbeharshlydisadvantaged against aSovietattack, for it did not have a single panzer. fkk340. zzz101m. dgr199m. dgk231m. snk433m.snz260.At the time Model halted his offensive, Rokossovsky’s reinforced Central Front still had

500,000 men including the 60th 65th Armies, 1,200 tanks and assault guns and 800 planes.Popov’sBryansk Front had 433,000men, 1,500 tanks and assault guns, 7,500 guns and 1,000aircraft.Bagrarmyan’s11thGAwhichattackedfirsthad135,000men,280tanksand2,700guns,strikingClossner’s53rdIC.Rendulic’s35thIC,deployedtotheeastof53rdIC,wouldsoonbeattackedby61stArmyand3rdArmy.snz256.snz226m.AftertheinitialhoursofOperationKutzov,northofKursktheRedArmyhadeitherlaunched

fromitsfirstechelonorwaspreparinginthesecondechelonatotalof80RDsand14TCsthatincluded thousands of tanks within the sector. The Western Front (Sokolovsky) was headingtowardKhotynetsandBolkhov,whiletheBryanskFrontwasdirectedtowardBolkhovandOrel.Model’s 9th Army was already under siege in that area. The Western Front engaged andpenetratedthefrontline,threateningthe9thArmyandOrel,theGermans’mostimportantsupplydepot in the sector. The 11thGApenetrated the 55th IC line and travel 15mileswithin days.Clossner’s 53rd IC andRendulic’s 35th ICwas holding back the 3rd and 63rdArmieswhichattacked from the east. While Model maneuvered his forces to best advantage with a slowwithdraw,KlugeandvonMansteinwereorderedtoWolf’sLairforameetingwithHitler.ItwasestimatedbyOKHthatupto50,000casualtiesandthelossof400panzerswereinflictedon9thArmy sinceCitadel started,making the 9thmuchweaker to handle the new offensive. fkk338.kcz169.mzk121.zzz101m.awk681.dgk231m.snk433m.awk681.ztc270.zro211.asz366.Sokolovsky’s Western Front and Popov’s Bryansk were the principle participants in the

opening attack. Between the two fronts 650,000men, over 1,000 tanks and thousands of guns

wouldstrikeModelinthefirstfewdays.ThemainthrustforPopovwouldbethe3rdand63rdArmiesheading towardOrelwhilea secondaryassaultbyLtGeneralBelov’s61stArmywithMajGeneralLazarov’s20thTCinsupporttowardBolkhov.FromthesouthofOrel,theexhaustedforcesofCentralFrontwerealsoexpectedtoengageinafewdays.dgk230.zzz101m.dgk231m.snk433m.ItwasonlyafewhoursafterdaybreakandGeneralModelhadtoabandonhisoffensivetoward

Kurskandmakesurehisdefensesalongthesouthernperimeterwereasstrongaspossible.bt88.dgk208.zzz101m.dgr105.dgr199m.dgk231m.Snk433m.EastofOrel,3rdArmyalongwithheavyartillerysupportwastryingtopenetratethe2ndPzA’s

line near Mtsensk. The Germans at this time had virtually no armor on the line, making itespeciallydifficulttostoptheattack.Artillerytookupthechallenge.dgk231m.snk433m.EastofOrel,the34thID,56thID,262ndIDand299thIDstruggledwithholdingbackthe3rd

and63rdArmies.TheexperiencedAustrianstrategist,Rendulic,wasfrustratingSovietplansforaquickvictory.fkk338.wwf55.zzz101m.dgk231m.snk433m.Thedaystartedfor9thArmywithnewdeploymentsofforcesinordertoimprovethechances

tosecurePonyriandcaptureOlkhorvatka.The12thPzDand36thID,whichwereintheprocessofmovingtothe46thPzC’ssector,werehaltedandsentimmediatelytotheOrelsalientandby1140hrsattachedtothe2ndPzA.Forthenextfewdays,theSovietsheavilyattackedtheKursknorthernboundarytopreventModelfromsendingotherforcesto2ndPzAbuthewasabletoalsosend the 18th PzD, 20th PzD, sPzAbt 653 and sPzAbt 654. In eight days of fighting,Model’sforces traveled less than twelvemiles and only at Teploe did theymake a dent in the Sovietdefenses.Theynowhadtocontendwithamassiveassaultonitsnorthernandeasternperimeters.Itseemedlikeanimpossibletaskbutifanybodycouldhandleit, itwasGeneralModel.Modeland Kluge must have discussed their response to an attack on Orel beforehand, for Modelimmediately responded without receiving Kluge’s permission and certainly before getting theapproval of Hitler. wdk183. dgk235. zzz101m. dgk231m. snk433m. dgk87m. nzk95. lck116m.kfz460.zro204+.snz253.Coming from theVelikieLuki area, the8thPzDwas rushed toOrelby train.TheOKHhad

thought thatwith thescaleof theattack forKursk thatmanypanzerswouldnotbenecessaryatOrel but it was quickly discovered their thoughts were definitely wrong. fkk335. zzz101m.dgk231m.snk433m.Evenwith thenewthreat in theOrelsalient,Modelandhisstaffcouldnot losefocusonhis

southernperimeter,althoughbothKlugeandModelknewtheSovietsnotonlywantedtodestroy2ndPzAbutalsotoattack9thArmyfromtherearanddestroyitaswell.Thestakeswerehigh;ifthetwoGermanarmieswerelostthenthefrontlinewouldbeuntenableandthewarcouldsoonbelost.Beforetheassault,theSovietsbegantheheaviestbarragetheEasternFronthadeverseen.The

11thGAhadover200gunspermile,plusrockets.Therewerealso250tankssupportingthetwofronts on their initial assault but that number would dramatically increase as the operationevolved.Bytheafternoonthe11thGAhadpenetratedthenorthernflanksofthe2ndPzAandwereadvancing towardOrel. IfOrel fellquickly the9thArmywouldbe in serious troubleaswell.Model’sforcesofover500,000menforbotharmiescouldbeencircledanddestroyed.Western

Front advanced westward from Novosil and Bryansk Front drove southward from betweenKozelsk and Sukhinichi. At the end of the day Hitler decided to put an end to the GermanoffensivetowardKursk.bt88*.zzz101m.nzk95.dgk231m.snk433m.With the fighting in the Kursk salient winding down, the German 1st Flieger Division

concentrated their attention on supporting the Orel salient, particularly in the Novosil sector,whereLtGeneralKolpakchi’s 63rdArmywas attackingRendulic’s 35th IC. cbk85. dgk231m.snk433m.dgk230.TheOKH,daysearlier,hadsentseveralairsquadronsfromAGStoOreltohelp9thArmygain

their initiative in reaching Olkhovatka. The planes arrived too late for that purpose but theirtimelyarrivalhelpedModelinsaving2ndPzAintheOrelsalient.snz262.Inthe11thGAsectorwherethe5thPzDhadstoppedtheadvance,the5thTCwasbroughtupto

engagethepanzersnearStarizaandRetschiza.InabittertankbattletheSoviettankscapturedthevillageofRetschizaandforcedtheGermansbacktotheareaofStarirzaandUlianovo.Bytheendoftheday,theSovietshadabreakthroughtoadepthofsevenmileswithawidthofninemiles.Asdarkness fell, the 70th TB of 5th TC discovered a weak point in the German defenses. ItpenetratedintothewesternportionofUlianovoandassaultedalongthehighwayleadingwest.Bythenextmorning,ithadreachedthegreatforestsouthofUlianovoandrapidlycrossedtheVytebetRiverintheJagodnayaarea,ninemilessouthwestofUlianovo.fkk334.dgk231m.snk433m.Atnight in theOrelsalient, the192ndGRof262ndIDwaspushedoutofVyashiandNovyi

Lug.Thelineofthe262ndIDwasnolongeralinebutaseriesofstrongpointsthat theSovietswerebypassing.fkk351.zzz101m.dgk231m.snk433m.Afterfightingallday,WesternFront’s11thArmysupportedbythe1stVApenetratedthelinein

theUlianovosector.Modelhadunderestimatedthestrengthoftheattacktothenorth.Thinkingthatthemainattackwouldbe fromtheeast,hisdefenseswere thestrongest thereStill thinking thatwouldbethecase,hedidnottransfermenfromtheeastlinetothenorthline.cbk86.dgk231m.snk433m.While the battle at Orel was intensifying, Rokossovsky was preparing to attack AGC and

captureKromy.Whentheassaultbegan,thesurprisedAGCdemandedits4divisionsbackthatitgave9thArmy.Withthisattackof9thArmyandAGC,thebattleforKurskwasover,especiallyinthenorth.KromywasinthesouthernportionofthesalientnotthatfarfromMaloarkhangelsk.zzz101m.dgk231m.snk433m.TheadditionofAGCreservesthelastfewdaysdidnotchangethecourseofbattleintheOrel

salient.TheSovietshadamplereserves tohandleanyGermancontingency.WithoutanyfurtherreservestheGermansstillputstiffresistanceinwhatwouldbethebeginningofitslongdeadlyretreatbacktoBerlin.ThemythofGermansuperioritywasfinallybrokenforgood.TheGermansweredoomedtofailureatKurskbytheendofthethirddaywhenadecisive,broadpenetrationoftheseconddefensebeltfailedtooccuraswellasfailingtocapturelargenumbersofPOWswhoescapedbacktothenextline.ThesituationwasmadeworsebytheheavyattacksoftheGermanflankswhichpreventedtotaleffortatthefront.wdk184.dgk87m.The 9th Army controlled only a third of the Orel salient while 2nd PzA’s twelve battered

divisionscoveredtheremaining140milesofthesalient.snz257+.Fortheprevioustwodays,theLuftwaffeinthenorthsalienthadreclaimedtheskies;the16th

VAflewonlyabout100sorties.The1stFliegerDivisionhadreceivedaninfusionofFw190sfromthenorththedaybeforeandweredoingagoodjobofintimidatingtheSovietpilots.Forthepasteightdays, the16thVAcalculatedlosing439aircraft;mostof thisnumberweredestroyedbut48planesweredamagedsobadlythattheycouldbeusedforpartsonly.Forthefirstsevendaysofthecampaign,the1stFliegerDivisionreported91aircraftlost,including26planesthatsafelylandedbutwouldneverflyagain.cbk73.BytheendofthedayintheOrelsalient,the16thVAflew868sortiesandreportedseeingonly

74Germanplanes.TheGermanbomberswereactiveinthesoutheastcornerofthesalientmakingrepeatedattacksonSovietconcentrationsoutsidethesalient.cbk85+.dgk231m.snk433m.Ofthe80divisionsattackingGermanpositionsintheOrelsalient,fivedivisionswerefocused

ondestroying262ndIDandthe56thID, locateddueeastofOrel.Themainaxisofattackwastheirboundaryline.The35thICandthe53rdICweretargetedbythe3rdand63rdArmies.Whenthemenattacked,theartillerydidnotstop;itmoveditsshellingtotherear.TheSovietsattackedIvanyandNovayaSlobodafourtimesandwererebuffedeachtime.Eventuallythe432ndGRof262ndIDwasforcedback300yardstoitsseconddefensebelt.Ofthe150tanksthatdeployedtothis sector, 61 were destroyed on this day. fkk341+. fkk350. dgk239m. zzz101m. dgk231m.snk433m.One of the first German strongpoints to be attacked in the Orel salient was Dudino. The

Germans offered bitter opposition to the 16thGRD and the 4thGTR to the very end.No onesurrendered; all Germans were destroyed. The 11th GA was also successful, penetrating theGermanline inmanyplaceswithin thefirst twohours.TheLuftwaffecame inandattacked theadvancing Soviets. Model redeployed reserve divisions and by nighttime the situation hadstabilized.The5thPzDwasbroughtfromtheStariza-Olianovoareaandwasabletostopthe11thGA. The 211th ID and 293rd ID fell back to their second trench system. fkk334. zzz101m.dgk231m.snk433m.IthasbeensaidbyRokossovsky,Antipenkoandothers that thereasonVatutin’sperformance

wasquestionablewasthathedidnotrelyenoughonhisartillery.Rokossovskyusedover21,500tons of ammunition compared to 8,300 tons forVatutin in the first eight days of the campaign.Whenyou also consider thatModel’s attack zonewas at least tenmiles narrower, that factoidseemsmorerelevant.gjz182.dgk87m.Bytheendoftheday,itwasestimatedthat9thArmyhadlostonly77unrecoverablepanzers

during theoperation.Afewpanzers thatweredamagedbut lefton thebattlefieldwouldadd tothattotal.Alltheotherdamagedpanzersthatwererecoveredwouldberepairedoverthecomingmonths.sgf346.The1stFliegerDivisionflew1,111sorties,withamajoritybeingflownintheOrelsalientin

supportof2ndPzA.Mostoftheseflightswereagainstgroundtargets.nzk77.lck116m.

J

20

July13thontheSouthernSalientSeeMap17

ust past midnight leading into the predawn hours of 7/13, the panzers of SSTK reachedKartashevka road, threemiles north ofHill 226.6. They stopped their advance and began

regroupingtobepreparedwhenresumingtheiradvanceinafewhours.Theywouldbeunabletoadvancefurtherandforcedtofallbacktotheriver.gnk372.gnk365m.vzz1m.kuz195.zrl240.The95thGRDand52ndGRDattacked11thPzDandSSTKontheirflanksinordertostopthem

fromreachingOboyanorProkhorovka.Supportingtherifledivisions,ColKlinfeld’s51stGTRdroveuptothelineanddestroyedanumberofpanzers.ThecounterattackwassuccessfulandtheGermanshadtofallback.Attheendofthedaythe95thGRDandbattered52ndGRDwentinto5th GTA’s reserve area at Zhilomeste, five miles southeast of Prokhorovka. dgk214. vzz399.vzz461+.During the predawn hours, the panzers of SSTK except for the advanced armored group

retreatedtothesouthernbankofthePselRiver.Thisadvancedgroupwasalsoorderedbackbuthadnotarrivedyet.Itwouldbegintogetlightby0400andtheGermansdidnotwanttobeintheopenwhenSovietplanescameflyingin.vzz461.Atdaybreak, theRedAirForce flew lowandattackedGermanpositions in theLAH sector.

WhiletheSovietplaneswereattackingtheGermans,asmallprobingattackwaslaunchedalongbothsidesoftheProkhorovkaroad.At1000hrs,Peiper’sbattalionlaunchedanattackfromHill252.2towardtheeastagainstelementsofthe9thGAD.Atthesametime,asmallAbtofpanzersdeployed in front of the corridor launched to the west toward Mikhailovka, northeast ofVasilevka.Reducingresistanceherewouldassistthestrandedpanzerstothenorthgetbacktotheriver.The39panzerscrestedahillontheirwaytowardMikhailovkaandranintoawalloffirefrommanyPakgunsfromthe1000thATRanddug-intanks.ThepanzerscouldnotcopewiththefireandreturnedtoHill252.2.SSTKpanzersthatwerefallingbackfromtheKartashevkaroadareawere able tomove intoMikhailovka from thenorth.Soviet tanks from the area started toassembleoutsideofMikhailovkaand thenattacked.Thepanzerswereforcedoutof thevillageandhadtofallbacktoAndreevka,justeastofVasilevka,fightingarearguardactionalltheway.gnk372.vzz1m.kuz195.zow166.Atdaybreak,SovietartilleryopeneduponDasReich.Afterawhile,Sovietplanesaddedto

thedestruction.At0700hrs,asmallprobingforcethatincludedseventanks,launchedanattacktowardIasnaiaPoliana,whichwasdefendedbyDerFührer.Afteranhourofcombat,theSovietswere able to penetrate the line and reach IasnaiaPoliana. SeveralMarauderswith the 7.5 cmgunswerehidingandwhentheSoviettanksmovedintotownwerefiredupon.Theclosestthree

tankswere hit and damaged,whichmotivated the Soviet infantry and the couple of remainingtanks to fall back. The Marauders followed to the edge of town firing and hitting targets ofopportunity.gnk373.At0530hrs,asmallprobingforceof less thanabattalionfrom9thGADlaunchedanattack

fromProkhorovkaheadingforTeterevinoNorth.Theattackwasquicklyrepulsedbythe1stPzGRandtheSovietshadtofallbacktotheirstartingpoint,justsouthofProkhorovka.Anothersmallforceattacked2ndPzGRinthedirectionofHill252.2.At1200hrsalargerforcedrovedowntheProkhorovka road that was supported by artillery and air. This second attack started to gainmomentum,butthe55thWeferRegimentshifteditsattentiontotheassaultandwithaccuratefire,repulsedtheattackby1300.Aftertheterribledaythedaybefore,theSovietoffensivewasmodestandlocalized,ameansofharassingtheenemy.zrl239+.Germanreconplaneswereoutatfirstlight.Theirmissionwastocheckthelatestlocationsof

Soviettankconcentrations.ItwashopedthattheSoviettankswouldpullbackduringthepredawnhourstotheKartashevkaroad.ThisfallbackwouldlessenthepressureoftheSSTKbridgehead.Within the hour the spotters counted over 100 tanks between Petrovka and Prokhorovka. TheSovietshadnotmovedback toKartashevkaand therewasstilla real threat theSovietswouldlaunchanotherattackagainstthebridgehead.Around0900hrs,Bochmann’spanzers,whichwerenorthoftheSSTKbridgehead,wereattackedbythe51stGTR,24thGTBand10thGMBandwereinrealdangerofbeingpocketed.Ataboutthesametime,elementsofthe33rdGTCattackedthecenter of the bridgehead with infantry and a few tanks. At 0915 hrs, a Soviet infantry forceattackedtowardVasilevka.At0945,theextremewesternflankofthebridgeheadwasattackbyabattalion-size force. Initially this combat group was repulsed, but additional reserves weremovedupandasecondattemptwasmade.AtVeselyi,SSTKgrenadierswereattackedaswell.Withallthisactionoccurringatornearthebridgehead,PriesssignaledhispanzergroupwhichwasnearKartashevkaroadtobepreparedtopullbacktoHill226.6ifthreatenedorifsignaledtoreturnimmediately.AnotherarmorgroupnearPolezhaevreceivedthesamealert.Thepanzerswouldhave tofight theirwaytoHill226.6for itwasbeingattacked.ElementsofMikhailov’s10th GMB and Karpov’s 24h GTB were attacking the Eicke Regiment defending the hill.Elementsof42ndGRDarrivedlatebutthenaddedtheirweighttothebattle.ThebattlesouthofVeselyicontinuedbuteventuallytheSoviettankshadtofallbackintoVeselyi.PzAbt3claimeddestroying38tankswiththehelpoftheirPakguns.gnk378+.kuz195.zow166+.Atthebeginningofthepreviousdaybeforetheattacksbegan,theSS2ndPzChad294panzers.

Working hard throughout the night, repair crewswere able to raise the number of operationalpanzersavailablethatmorningto251fromthepreviousnight’s210.ThismeanttheSScorpslostanet44panzersintheprecedingday’sfighting.vzz453.Bakharov’s18thTCandKirichenko’s29thTCwereregroupingthatdayafterahorrendousday

the day before. Though not actively fighting that day, these corps had to contend with theLuftwaffe strafing their positions. The 18th TC, which was positioned in the Andreevka,Mikhailovka,PrelestnoeandPetrovkaareaalsohadtheresponsibilityofprotectingtherightflankof24thGTBbyshell fire.The24thGTBhad fought itsway to theslopesofHill226.6whileZhadov’s infantry following the tankers secured Veselyi and Polezhaev. The 2nd GTC wasattackingwestofBelenikhinotowardKalininwhile2ndTCwasattackingfromIvanovkatoward

IvanovskiVyselokandStorozhevoe,wheretheGermanscontinuedtohaveastrongpresenceandwererepellingeachattack.At0600hrs,theDasReichlaunchedanattackfromtheStorozhevoeareatowardPravorot,despitetheseSovietattacks,butfailedtoreachthekeyvillagetotheeastduetothestiffresistanceofLtColStepanov’s169thTB.HothbelievedthatwiththefailureofLAH in takingProkhorovka, itmadelittlesenseinhavingSSTKcontinue itsattack to thenorth.Das Reich went on the offensive to take Iamki and Pravorot so it could assistLAH in takingProkhorovka. When these two divisions attacked the important rail village then SSTK wouldresumeitsattack.Theremnantsofthe5thGTAwouldmeethisrenewedthreatona12milefrontwith 154 tanks (94 were T70s), less than half the number of the previous day. vzz470++.gnk312m.kuz193.ztc270.At0700hrs,Rotmistrovsentout reconcolumns to test forGermanstrengthnorthof thePsel

River,buthehadnointentionsofresumingthehorrifictankstruggleofthedaybefore.dgk212.PriessorderedthepanzergroupofSSTKneartheKartashevkaroadtofallbacktoHill226.6.

HewasnotsureofthebattlefieldconditionsbutexpectedanotherSovietassaultonthehillandtheentirebridgehead.Tomakesurehisnorthernforceswerenotisolatedandthebridgeheadnotpenetrated,hefelttheorderwasthewisecoursetotakeuntilgreaterclaritywasachieved.MajGeneralPriesshadinterceptedaradiomessagestatingHill226.6wastobeattacked.Whentheattackcame,theGermanswerereadywiththeirSturmsandartillery.Withinthefirsthalfhour,38Soviettanksweredestroyedandtheassaultrepulsed.kuz193++.zrl240.Shortlyafterdaybreak,theSSTKlaunchedaprobingattacktowardPetrovkatotestthelevelof

resistance.ThedivisionwasorderedtocrosstheriverheretohelpLAHbuttheresistancewastoogreatandthecombatgrouppulledbacktoHill226.6.Themarchhadbarelystartedwhenasecond aerial reconnaissance spotted numerous tanks blocking the intended route of SSTK’sadvance.InfrontoftheSSTKbridgehead60tankswereformingupintheAndreevka-Polezhaev-Petrovkaarea.Another100tankswereinthecorridoreastofPetrovkaandProkhorovka.FacingDasReich, another 50 tankswerewaiting. In 48th PzC sector,west ofVerkhopenie nearHill258.5areaanother25tankswerespotted.EventhoughmanySoviettankshadbeendestroyedby48th PzC, the resistance in Hill 258.5 area actually seemed to be growing and becomingthreatening.GD had to cancel all offensives to the north and help 3rd PzD cope with thisdangerouscondition.gnk364+.gnk365m.zow166+.Hitler summoned von Manstein and Kluge to Wolfsschanze, East Prussia, not far from

Rastenburg.HitlerconcededOperationCitadelhadfailedandwiththeAlliedinvasionofSicily,he was shutting down Citadel and sending reserves to Italy for its defense. He was alsoconcernedfortheSovietcounter-offensivethatbeganthepreviousdayagainstModel’sarmiesatOrel. Von Manstein argued that the Soviets were tired and were vulnerable to defeat. VonMansteinhadalreadybroughtup the24thPzC,Vikingand23rdPzDfromreserve toBelgorodandwasreadytosendthemto thefront.HothandKempfalsowantedtocontinuebut the threegeneralswereoverruled.BecauseHitler trustedModel,hemade thegeneral thecommanderofboth9thArmyand2ndPzA.KlugeagreedwithHitler,butvonMansteinaskedHitler toallowCitadel to continue in the south.HehaddestroyedmoreSoviet resources thanhehad lost andwantedtocontinuetoexhausttheSovietsasmuchaspossibletopreventamassivecounter-attackhe knewwould be coming. Elements of 4th PzAwere being transferred to Italy andAGCbut

HitlergavevonMansteinpermissiontocontinuethefight in the4thPzAsectorforafewdays.For therestof thewar,vonMansteinwould try,more thanever, tochoose locationswhere theGermanshadnaturaladvantagesthatwouldexhausttheenemywhentheyattacked.Afterthewar,vonManstein blamed Hitler for their defeat at Kursk. His frequent delays, sending planes toModelduringthecampaignandrefusingtorelease24thPzCwerereasonsforhisposition.I’msurethosereasonsdidimpacttheoutcome,butitseemstomethatvonMansteinunderestimatedSoviet reserves and that the final outcome would have still been victory for the Soviets, butperhaps with greater casualties. hsz132+. dgk217. dgk212. fkk172. rc222. pck87+. vzz454+.zzz101m.gnk388+. cbk96. awk681. fmz229.hjj128+. fzk172. ztc271. zzk381+. zrl241. asz364.zow165+.zow168.Early in the morning, the 5th GA resumed its attack from the previous night against SSTK,

whichlastedmuchoftheday.TheyweretryingtoretaincontroloftheKartaschevkaroadwhichthe Germans were advancing on. The 5th GAwere concentrating their forces for the counter.whichbylateafternoonsucceededinpushingtheSSTKbackfromtheroad.At1815hrs,theSSTKcounter-attacked,stabilizingthefrontforthenight,butfailedtoreachthecriticalroad,althoughtheywerewithinsightofit.ThisTigercombatgrouphadbeenorderedtofallbacktoHill226.6butitfeltsecureandwantedtotaketheroadandresistedthemoveback.DasReichatIvanovkaweredefendingagainstheavyattacks.The167thID,havingadvancedfromPetrovkathepreviousnight,resumeditstrekeastwardthatmorningand,againstweakresistance,clearedthebanksofthe Lipovyi Donets until meeting up withDas Reich. The 168th ID, to the east, made goodprogress.TheLAHhadarelativelyquietday.Whilethe2ndSSPzCdidnotgainanyground,itclaimed to have destroyed 144 tanks, 18 anti-tank guns and 9 aircraft. wdk165. hjj121m.dgk222m.dlu63m.vzz1m.The SSTK resumed its advance northward by launching between Polezhaev and Hill 226.6

againstthe18thTC.ThefinalobjectivewastocrosstheriverandreachPetrovka.TheSovietswere able to repulse all attempts.During the battle, the 5thGMCmoved in andpressured theSSTK.The10thGMBand24thGTBof18thTCthencounter-attacked,pushingtheGermansoutofPolezhaevandcapturingHill226.6.Aftertakingthehillandpausingtoregroup,the18thTCmoved towardKrasnyiOktiabrbutwere stoppedbefore reaching theirnewobjective.dgr226.gnk312m.WithOperationCitadelcanceled,SSTKdidnotneedtodefendthebridgeheadbuttokeepthe

Sovietstiedtothissector,vonMansteinwantedtokeepthebridgeheadandforcetheSovietstospendmenandtanksintakingitback.gnk395.Inadditiontothesendingofthe24thGTBandthe10thGMBof5thGMCtothePetrovkaarea

topreventSSTK’spanzersfromcrossingthePselRiver,Vatutinalsowaspreparingthe18thTCand29thTC’sremainingtanksassembledinthewesternsideofthecorridortoattacktothewestnearthePselinordertoseparateandisolatethepanzersnorthofHill226.6fromthegrenadiersofSSTK.PriessandHausser realized this threat to theirpanzersand recalled themback to thebridgehead.gnk372.The 2nd SS PzC had reqrouped from yesterday’s struggle and renewed its attack on

Prokhorovkaagainstthe5thGAbutcouldnotmakeanygains.Theyweredownto180workingpanzers.Theentire4thPzAwasdownto505panzers,halfoftheirstartingnumber.bt89.

Around 1000 hrs, the 183rd RD was battling Das Reich for possession of Kalinin andSobachevskiandwouldformuchoftheday.TheGermanswereabletomaneuveraroundtotheexposedflankoftheSovietsandforceditbacktoescapedestruction.AstheGermanspursuedtheretreating Soviets, a Soviet artillery barrage hit the Germans, forcing it to stop and dig in toescapetheshelling.At2000hrs,otherelementsofDasReich,supportedbyonly15panzers(onecolumn coming from Ivanovski Vyselok and another from Belenikhino), converged nearVinogradovkaagainst2ndGTC.TheSovietdefendersinthisareaclearlyfelttherenewedeffortoftheGermanstoadvance,causedbyHoth’sorderedtoshiftdirectiontotheeasttodestroy48thRCdeployedbetweenthetwoDonetsRivers.vzz481.At1000hrs,theLAHpanzergroupmovedouttowardthehillsnorthwestofOktiabrskiwhilea

reconforcesetouttothewesttolinkupwithSSTKatMikhailovka.Thepanzersmadegoodtimetothehighgroundbutwhentheygotthere,Soviettankersonthereverseslopesstartedfiringonthe panzers. The barragewas so thick the panzers had to quickly retreat. The recon battalionreachedMikhailovkabutSovietartilleryfromnorthof theriverbeganandchasedtheGermansbacktojustnorthofHill241.6.agk127.zrl240.The10thGMBwasmovedup tobolster the linewith33rdGRCand24thGTB to stop the

SSTK’sadvancefromgettingbehind5thGTAandhelpingLAHinreachingProkhorovka.VatutinhadorderedZhadovtocontinuehisattackonSSTKthatdaytopreventtheGermansfromreachingtheKartashevka-BeregovoeroadorcrossingtotheeasternbankofthePselRivertojoinupwithLAH.The74assortedpanzersofSSTKwerenotstrongenoughtobreakthelineand,afterseveralmorehoursof fighting,Priesshad to fallback toHill226.6.The13thGRDand66thGRDof32ndGRCof5thGAwiththesupportof31stTCweretolaunchanattacktowardHill235.9anddrive the 11th PzD out of Kochetovka. At the same time, Popov’s 33rd GRC would attackPolezhaev,and ifpossibleHill226.6 to thesouthwest.Vatutinhadhopesofbettersuccess thatday,sinceitwasdiscoveredthatSSTKhadsentsomeofitspanzerstothesouthernbankoftheriverduringthepredawnhours.mhz349.vzz460+.vzz1m.lck374.gnk312m.vzz11mTo the south of SSTK and LAH,Das Reich was to resume its attack toward Prokhorovka,

hopingthat3rdPzCwouldcatchupandjointheattack.Atthatmoment,RotmistrovconsideredSSTKthegreaterdangerandsent10thGMBof5thGMCacrossthePselRivertojoin33rdGRDin stoppingSSTK.After the fierce fighting thedaybefore,SSTK had only 54working panzerswith thedivision.Priesshadleft20StuGsat thebridgeheadtoprotect thecriticalbridges if itwasnecessarytofallbackquickly.SSTKhadadvancedtotheline:Andreevka-northwestedgeofEleshaev-500 yards north of Polezhaev-northwest of Kluchi-southwest of Ilinski. The LAHresumeditsmarchalongtherailroadtoOktiabrskiStateFarmbutthe29thTCattackedandwereabletostoptheLAHfromreachingthefarm.mhz349.dgr226.fkk172.fkk178m.lck372.As part of the 33rdGRC, the 95thGRD alongwith the 24thGTB, the 10thGMB and fire

supportfromthe18thTCwouldleadtheassaulttocaptureHill226.6whilethe132ndGRRof42ndGRDcapturenearbyPolezhaevandKliuchi.Theattacklaunchedat1100hrsafteranhour-longsuppressivepreparationfromartilleryofRodimstev’s32ndGRCwhilethe13thGRDand66thGRD launched towardHill 235.9 and the village ofKochetovkawhichwas defended by11thPzD.Thesetwodivisionswerequicklyrepulsedwhilethe31stTCpositionednearbystoodidle.The97thGRDhadbetteralittlebetterresultswiththeirattack.Theyreachedtheoutskirtsof

Veselyibutwerepreventedfromentering.The95thGRDreachedHill226.6andwasstrugglingtotakeitawayfromtheGermans.vzz460++.gnk312m.DasReichfoughtthroughoutthenightandpredawnhoursinanattempttoreachPravorot.To

regainStorozhevoe,whichwaslostthepreviousday,andtopreventDasReich fromadvancingonPravorot,the2ndTC’s99thTBattackedtowardthehamlet.The58thMRBwassupposedtosupportthetankersbuttheydidnotshowupuntil1400hrs.TheGermanshadplantedmanyminesand erected strong defenses and the Soviet attack failed east of Ivanovski Vyselok. Withoutartillerysupportasecondattemptalsofailed.vzz469+.DasReich had concentrated its forces in the Iasnaia Poliana,Kalinin andOzerovski region

while theLAH had a heavy presence in thePokrovka-Iakovlevo area.Theywere preparing tolaunchanattackon6thGAthenextmorning.dgr106.Though attacked but not threatened, General Priess ordered, with Hausser’s approval, his

TigerstocontinuefightingfortheheightsalongtheKartashevka-Beregovoeroad.WiththesehillssecuredfromSovietartillery,thedivisionwastoforceacrossingtotheeasternbanksofthePselandcleartheresistanceinthePetrovkaarea.ThiswastheroutetheLAHwasplanningontakingafterProkhorovkafell.AtthesametimeDasReichwastoremainonthedefensiveandstabilizetheirlineinordertosendforcesovertothe167thIDwhichwasattemptingtocomeevenwithDasReich.Hitlerwouldsquashthisorderlaterintheday.Insteadofdrivingnorth,theLAHandDasReichofSS2ndPzCwouldshifteastinordertoencirclethe48thRCof69thArmywhichwerecurrently fighting3rdPzCdrivingnorth.Knowing thatCitadelwasending,vonMansteinwas tryingnowtodestroyasmanySovietsaspossiblebefore theSovietscountered. If the5thGTAhadbeenmoresuccessfulthepreviousday,the48thRCwouldnothavebeeninthetroubletheywereinthatday.ItwasestimatedthattheSovietshadlost1,800tanksinOperationCitadeltothispoint.vzz456+.sgf351.vzz11mzrl238.Whilethe18thTCwasbattlingelementsof2ndSSPzC,the24thGTBwithsupportofthe42nd

GRDlaunchedanoffensivetodrive theSSTKback toPolezhaevandcaptureHill226.6.Afterregrouping, the 24thGTBs resumed its attack towardKrasnyiOktiabr. TheGerman resistancestrengthenandpreventedthe24thGTBfromreachingitsobjective.The42ndGRDaftersecuringPolezhaev, headed for Hill 226.6 and attacked its southern border. SSTK countered, breakingthroughthe42ndGRDlineandwereabletoreachtheKartashevka-Prokhorovkaroad,butwereforcedtoretreatfromtheheavyshelling.dgr226.vzz1m.vzz465.gnk312m.The13thGRDand66thGRDof32ndGRC(5thGA)supportedbythe31stTClaunchedan

attacktowardHill235.9andthevillageofKochetovka.Boththehillandthevillagewerebeingdefendedby11thPzD.Therestof32ndGRClaunchedtowardPolezhaevandHill226.6whichwere defended by SSTK and LAH. Vatutin, using an active defense, was making certain thatHausserwouldnotcaptureProkhorovka.Withhistankbrigadesgreatlyweakened,VatutinhadtorelyonhisinfantrytostoptheGermans.vzz460+.gnk312m.At1115hrs,HothtransmittedtoHausserthatCitadelhadbeencanceled.Themainobjective

was to shift to the east and encircle the 48thRC thatwas positioned between the twoDonetsRivers. The 3rd PzGRofDasReich (Deutschland)was ordered to launch an attack from thewoodssouthofIvanovskiVyseloktowardBelenikhinoStationwhilethe4thPzGR(DasFuhrer)wastoattacktowardthehillswestofVingradovkatolinkupwiththe3rdPzGR.Afterlinking,

DasReichwouldpassthroughVinogradovkaandheadforPravorot.TheLuftwaffewouldadditssupport.Though theStukaswerenot flying, the fighterswereactive.The167th IDwouldalsoadvancetoprovideflanksupport.Itstartedraining,slowingtheadvancealittle.The183rdRDwasdefendingKalininandSobachevskisectorbuthadtofallbackwhenDasReichcamethrougharound 2000 hrs. The 4th GMRB, 4th GTB and 26th GTB were in the area; they moved tointerceptDasReichwhilethegainsweresmall.ItwasonlyamodestgainforDasReichbeforetheywerestopped.WhileDasReichwasheadingeastandeventuallysouth,KempfcontinuedtoadvancenorthwardwiththeobjectiveoflinkingupwithDasReich.vzz480++.vzz488.kuz195.zow167.At1130hrs,HothorderedHaussertohaveDasReichandallavailablenearbyforcesattack

towardPravorot.Krugerwasnothappywiththeorder.Withthehardfightingofthepreviousday,hisdivisionneededtimetoregroup.Ithadbeenraininghardthepastfewdaysanditwasrainingat that time so the groundwas difficult tomaneuver andwith the cloudy skies, theLuftwaffewould not support the drive. Kruger also had difficulties with 167th ID to support their rightflank.Theassaultdidnotbeginuntil1630hrswithinfantryintheleadandpanzersintherearandevenwith lightresistance, thedivisionwasable to travel less thanamile towarditsobjectivebefore dark.Kruger refused to travel at night but did choose a good jumping off point for thefollowingmorning.AftertakingPravorot,DasReichwas toshift to thenorthanddrive towardsouthern Prokhorovka. It was hoped that 3rd PzC would continue its advance and assistDasReichwiththetakingofProkhorovka.PravorotwasthreemilessouthofProkhorovkaandsevenmilesnorthofRyndinkawhere6thPzDenteredthedaybefore.gnk374.zow166.By 1130 hrs on this Tuesday morning, SSTK had followed the Psel River northward and

reached the Prokhorovka to Kartashevka road but could go no farther due to a counterattack.Later, Hausser ordered LAH to attack the Oktiabrski State Farm, while at the same time theinfantry in the division was to advance along the southern bank of the Psel from AndreevkatowardMikhailovkawith the object of fortifyingSSTK atAndreevka.The initial attack on theOSFwasgooduntilthepanzersmetupwithalineofdug-inanti-tankgunswhichstoppedtheiradvance.TheattackfailedandthepanzershadtofallbacktoHill241.6whileunderheavyfirefromSovietgunsonthenorthernbankofthePsel.TheSovietsfollowed,wantingtoannihilatetheretreatingGermans.SSTKwassupposedtohavegonealittlefartherthenturnedtorollovertheSovietdefensesontheeastsideoftheriverthatwereblockingLAH’sadvance,butthiswasthefarthesttheyachievedandnowtheywouldbepushedbacktothenorthbanksofthePsel.dgk214.dgk213m.mhz349fkk172.Hill226.6wasnowunderconstantattackbytankandinfantryorartilleryandaerialassault.

TheEickeRegimentcalledPriessforbackupbuttheLuftwafferefusedtotaketotheair.Priesswasalsounabletosendpanzersormenfromwithinthebridgeheadfortheentirebridgeheadwasunder attack and SSTK was dangerously threatened. A lucky break for Hill 226.6 defendersoccurredinlatemorningwhenthepanzersthatwereontheKartashevkaroadmadeitbacktoHill226.6.By1900hrsHill226.6wasstabilized.Italsostoppedrainingaboutthistimeandtheskiesturnedonlypartlycloudy.AfewGermanplaneswerethenseenflyingovertherearareasoftheSovietsectors;nobombersbutreconplanessurveyinggroundconditions.Bythis timefuelandammowasexhaustedatHill226.6andelsewhere,butwiththegroundsomuddysupplieswere

slowtoreachthefront.gnk380+.The97thGRDstruck repeatedlyagainstSSTK’swestern flank, inflictingheavycasualties to

bothsidesbut theGermansdesperatelyheldon.Withagapbetween11thPzDon thewestandSSTKontheeastside,itmadeiteasierfor97thGRDtoattackSSTKalldaylong.AlittlefurthereasttheSovietscontinuedtoattackKochetovkaintothenight.gnk381+.FromeastofHill252.2,Soviet infantryand tanksattacked thehill.TheGermans responded

withheavyartilleryandmortarfire thatforcedtheSovietsback.Afterfallingbackaways, theSoviets started enhancing their trench system, adding more mines and guns expecting that theGermanswouldattackbynextmorningafterregrouping.Intheafternoon,SovietgunsbeganfiringonHill252.2andalongthefrontlinetodisruptasmuchastokilltheenemy.TheLAHdefendingMikhailovkahadtofallbacktothesouthwesttoHill241.6theshellingbecamesoheavy.LAHhadsuffered326casualties.gnk372+.gnk365m.vzz1m.AspartofVatutin’scounter-offensive,the95thGRDlaunchedtowardKliuchiandHill226.6.

The287thGRRheadedforKliuchiandthewoodseastofthevillagewhile290thGRRfollowedin second echelon. Fifty tanks from24thGTBalso followed.The 284thGRRheaded forHill226.6 and by 1115 hrs had thrown the Germans off the hill. From the southeast of the hill, aformationof50panzersattackedandseparatedthe24thGTBfromthe284thGRR.By1200hrswhentheGermanscouldnotretakethehillasecondformationof30panzersandabattalionofinfantrywereaddedtothebattle.AthirdformationofinfantryandpanzerswereneededtopushtheSovietsoffthehillandtofallback.Whilescreeningthehill,elementsofthisGermancombatgroup headed towardKliuchi in order tomaneuver around the 284thGRR. For the next threehoursbitterfightingoccurredbuteventuallythe284thGRRhadtofallbacktothelinedefendedbythe290thGRR,southandsoutheastofVeselyi.The287thGRRandthe24thGTBfellbackamile to the northwest of Hill 226.6 to the southeast corner of Hill 242.3 which was beingdefendedbythe104thDestroyerAnti-tankArtilleryBattalion.vzz463++.gnk312m.At noon, the bulk of LAH launched an attack northeast of Oktiabrski State Farm while the

remainderattackedalongthesouthbankofthePselfromAndreevkatowardMikhailovkainorderto smooth the line between LAH and SSTK. The recon forces of LAH did penetrate intoMikhailovka but were forced to withdraw to Hill 241.6, being the victim of heavy artilleryshelling.Themaingroupwasquicklystoppedbyalonglineofdug-intanksandthe9thGADand53rd MRB while the secondary attack penetrated the line of 42nd GRD and made it intoMikhailovka but were forced to withdraw to Hill 241.6 south of Andreevka under a heavybarrage.Theremainsof the29thTCthencounter-attackedthemainLAH,pushing themback tojustnorthoftheKomsomoletsStateFarm.SSTKhadreachedtheProkhorovka-Kartashevkaroadbut with the increased Soviet resistance, the SSTK decided to fall back to a safer position.dgk214+.vzz8m.vzz1m.Beforethedaywasout,the69thArmyclearlysawtheintentionsoftheGermansinattempting

toencircle the48thRC.The3rdPzCconsistingof the168th ID,6thPzDand19thPzDwouldhead north and converge onShakhovowhile the northern group ofDas Reich,LAH, 167th IDdriving fromTeterevino, Iasnaia Poliana andHill 258.2would drive south toward Shakhovo,clearingSovietresistanceasitmarched.The27thGABand32ndDABweresenttosupportthe48thRCwith its guns to prevent the encirclement.Nearby the 35thGRCwas augmentedwith

severalmortarregimentstostrengthenthelineaswell.vzz482+.Elements of the 18th TC launched an attack toward Andreevka but before reaching the

objective, it ran into a column of panzers heading for Mikhailovka. After a short fight theGermans, having an exposed flank, had to withdraw. The 18th TC continued on, capturingVasilevka.ThefailureoftheLAHtocracktheSovietdefensesnorthoftheOktiabrskiStateFarmcondemnedtheSSTKadvancenorthofthePselRivertofailure.The5thGMCalongwiththe18thTCmadefurtherattacksagainstGermanpositions, recapturingPolezhaev,Hill226.6andmadefurthergainsinthedirectionofKrasyniOktiabr.dgk215+.dgr226.6.vzz1m.gnk312m.Hothordered2ndSSPzCtocleartheareasouthofPetrovkawheretheSovietspenetratedthe

line the previous day and to regain the ground up to the Beregovoe-Kartschevka road. Theseactionswouldbenecessary if2ndSSPzCwereever to linkupwith3rdPzC,encirclingmanySoviets.Fewoftheseobjectiveswereachieved.TheGermanarmywasspentbuttheSSTKwasabletoekeoutathinsalientthatextendeddeepintoSovietforces,northofthePselreachingtheBeregovoe-Kartschevka road butwere stoppedwhen the 10thGMB and 24thGTB joined thefight.Bytheendoftheday,theSSTKwascompletelyspentandcouldnotcrossovertotheeastbank of the Psel to help LAH. Hausser was hoping if the LAH andDas Reich could reachProkhorovkathatthissalientwouldaddpressureandforcetheSovietsoutofthetown.The10thGMB was moved to Ostrenkov, six miles north of Prokhorovka in case they were needed.dgk209+.dgk212.fkk170.dgk211m.vzz11mIn the morning, Bakharov’s 170th TB and 181st TB with support from the 110th Brigade

attacked toward Andreevka and Vasilevka. Kirichenko pulled back his shattered 31st TB and32ndTBtoOktiabrski, replacing themwith the53rdMRBand9thGAD.With losingsomanytanks,Rotmistrovwasnowworriedabouthisflanks,withSSTKnorthofthePselRiverand3rdPzC to the east starting tomake progress toward Prokhorovka therewas a real possibility ofencirclementforsomeofhisbrigades.Heorderedthe6thGADtoforcemarchduringthenighttoblockthewayinthemorning.dgk195.lck374.Onthe5thGTA’sleftflankintheVypolzovkaarea,the53rdGTRattackedGermanpositions

northofAleksandrovkabutfailedtobreakthrough.dgr227.vzz3m.Overthepastcoupledays,SovietarmorhadbeenassemblingnearPetrovkaandstillhad120

tanks left after the fighting of the previous day. This group attacked midday and had enteredeasternVeselyi.SturmAbt3wascalleduptoplugthegapbutwhileGermanreinforcementswerecoming up, Soviet artillery increased on the German positions. That artillery was situated atIlinski.WhileStukascouldnotflyinthisweather,theHS129swiththeirnew30mmcannondidfly against the oncoming tanks heading for Veselyi. Rudel, a German ace, put 12 tanks out ofactiononthisdayalone.MoreSoviettanksandmechanizedinfantrycontinuedtodrivewestfromProkhorovkatowardPetrovkaandBeregovoe.Hill226.6,westofProkhorovka,washighpriorityforbothsidesandithadchangedsidesseveraltimesinthepastfewdaysbutitlookedliketheSovietsweredeterminedtokeepitforgood.fkk171.fkk319m.gnk312m.vzz11m.While 2nd SS PzCwas struggling forHill 226.6, a Soviet counter-attack broke through the

GermanlineandPzAbt3wascalleduptohelpplugthegap.ThefightingwasfierceandseveralStuGsweredamaged.Whilethebattleraged,twocrewsgotoutandrepairedtheirStuGsinthemiddleoffieldandthenreenteredthebattle.Thegapwaspluggedandtheleadingtankswithdrew

overthecrestofthehill.38Soviettankswereclaimeddestroyed.fkk171.gnk312m.The33rdGRChadalittlemoresuccessinitsattackinthebendoftheriverthan32ndGRC.

The97thGRDlaunchedheadingtothesoutheastfromtheline:Hill209.3totheleftbankoftheOlshanka River and then to the southern outskirts of Kartashevka. The assault was halted atVeselyiandtheSovietshadtodiginandfightastaticbattle.The95thGRDwith30tanksfromthe24thGTBlaunchedaboutthesametime.The287thGRRheadedforKliuchiwhilethe284thGRRdrove towardHill 226.6 and the290thGRRwasbehind the287thGRR.The284th and287th GRR did reach and capture the first line of trenches in front of Hill 226.6. vzz462++.gnk312m.At1300hrs,the29thTChad51tanks,the18thTChad33tankswhilethe2ndTChad42tanks

andthe2ndGTChad80workingtanks.Rotmistrovhadlessthanhalfthearmorofthepreviousmorning.vzz458.TheDasReichattackednorthofBelenikhino,inflictingheavycasualtieswhiledrivingthe2nd

GTCback.ItthenattackedandcapturedStorozhevoeIbeforemovingontowardVinogradovka.Theobjectiveofthisactionwastolinkupwith3rdPzCtotheeast.Lateatnight,Vatutinorderedthe42ndGRDtotravelfromPselValleysouthwardandmoveintopositionandattackDasReichinthemorning.dgk216.dgr172m.dgk184m.dgk222m.lck375.ZhukovarrivedatVatutin’sHQtoappraisethesituation.ZhukovwithVatutinandKhrushchev

immediately inspected the battlefield to confirm Vatutin’s appraisal. Stalin had doubts aboutVatutin and he was wondering if he should be relieved. After seeing the battlefield, ZhukovbackedVatutinandStalinrelented.ZhukovstayedwithVatutinuntil9/24.StalinwasalsounhappywithVasilevsky,whowasstationedatKurskanddidnotseemtorideVatutinenough.Stalinsenthim to the deep south to oversee the Donbas Offensive. gjz188+. dgk208. gnk355. kcz169.zro210.zrl238.Theregroupingof18thTCand29thTCdidnottakelong.Intheafternoonwhile2ndTCwas

attacking Storozhevoe and 2nd GTC toward Teterevino, these corps were tasked to advancetowardGresnoeandMalyeMaiachki(18thTC)andHill252.2,southeastoftheOktiabrskiStateFarm(29thTC).Allattacksfailed.TheattackareawasdefendedbyDasReichandLAHwhichhad133panzersand44anti-tankgunswhile theSovietshad154 tanks.Once theSovietattackwas neutralized, Das Reich resumed its offensive and was able to gain ground along theIvanovka-Vinogradovka axis. The LAH repulsed all attacks along the Prokhorovka-TeterevinoroadbutatthesametimetheSovietswereerectingstifferdefensesandestablishingminefieldsintheOktiabrskiStateFarmareaandeastward.However,theSSTKwasforcedtofallbackfromthePolezhaevareaafterbeingattackedbythe52ndGRD,95thGRDandthe11thMRB.vzz471++.gnk372.ztc270.IntheafternoonaftertakingPolezhaevfromSSTK,the136thGRRof42ndGRDmovedtoward

thesouthernslopesofHill226.6 toassist95thGRD.At thesame timeotherelementsof42ndGRDattackedtowardVeselyi.By1500hrs,thefirstlinewaspenetratedbutby1900hrs,thelinewasrepairedandthe95thGRDhadtofallback.vzz465.gnk312m.kuz193.zow167.Withtheroadsinbadcondition,DasReichstayeddefensiveagainstrepeatedattacksby183rd

RDasitdrovetowardKalininandSobachevskibutby1430hrs,itlaunched,withsupportoftheLuftwaffe andartillery, itsownattack.By2100hrs, ithadpushedback the183rdRD,gaining

ground in the valley between Ivanovka and Vinogradovka.Das Reich shifted to the northeasttowardPravorotbutwasstoppednotfarfromIvanovkawhenthe2ndGTCcameintosupporttheinfantry.TheGermansmadeonlymodest gains that day in this sector.For thewholeday,DasReichwastryingtoimproveitsposition,preparingtomakealastrunonProkhorovka.By1500hoursithadcapturedStorozhevoeandreachedthewesternoutskirtsofVinogradovka.Vatutinsentthe42ndGRDfromthePselRiversouthwardtomeetDasReich.vzz481.zow167.Along the southern banks of the Psel, the lead elements of LAH, panzers and motorized

vehicles, attacked the 42nd GRD but were repulsed. The 181st TB ambushed the on-comingpanzers which were heading for Mikhailovka, but the panzers had to fall back. The 181stfollowedandcapturedVasilevkabeforetheGermanscouldbuildadefense.dgk215*+.dgr172m.dgk184m.Elements of Das Reich, with 30 panzers, and the 167th ID crossed the Donets near

Shcholokovoandattacked26thGTBcapturingthevillage.WorkingitswayalongagullytowardShakhovo,itrepeatedlytriedtoreachthevillagebutfailedeachtimeagainstthestiffresistanceofthe11thGMB.NearRzhavets,anothergroupofGermanswereheadingwesttowardHill216.0trying to link up withDas Reich and encircling 48th RC. At about 2100 hrs, these GermanscapturedRyndinka.vzz475.dgr221m.The 95th GRD and 42nd GRD, along with some tanks of 5th GTA, launched an attack

southwardfromProkhorovka.Meanwhile,SSTKhaddug induring thenightandwasdefendingthelinenorthofPselagainstthe18thTCwhichhadmovedintoassistthe11thMRBwhichwasintrouble.Rotmistrov’s5thGTAhadlostalotoftanksthepasttwodays.Throughoutthenight,Sovietunitstriedtoregroupandfortifyforthenextday.dgk195.AttheendofthedayaftertheSSTKandLAHexhaustedthemselves,the18thTCand29thTC,

afterbeingonthedefensivealldayandstoppingtheLAH,wenton theoffensive.The two tankcorpswereabletopushtheGermansbacktojustnorthoftheKomsomoletsStateFarmwheretheGermansregroupedandstoppedtheSovietadvance.dgk215.vzz8m.zrl240.ThoughcommandingonlyaMkIVpanzer,HansMennelhaddestroyedordisabled24tanksor

assaultgunssincethestartofthecampaign.wwf149.The2ndVAand17thVAflew777sortiesthatday;mostwereagainst the3rdPzC.Withthis

strongairsupport,Trufanovwasabletostop3rdPzCfromreachingDasReich.The3rdPzCwasabandoned from the air. The 8thFlieger Corps flew 656 sorties in support of 4th PzA, withspecialattentiontoSSTK.Despitethisairsupport,SSTKwasunabletogaingroundandinfact,insomeplaces,thegrenadiersfellbackaboutmile.cbk97++.nzk77.Vatutinbelievedthatinadditiontoaproperlyprepareddefensethatwasheavilyecheloned,a

timelyinfusionofreinforcementswasanotherreasonforpreventingtheGermansfromreachingKursk as was the emphasis of having heavy flank protection/incursions, which disrupted theGermans from devoting their full attention to the northern front. The heavy deployment on thesides prevented the enemy in widening their attack zone and disallowed them freedom ofmovement.Being confined to a relatively narrow frontworked to the Soviets’ advantage. ThesamecouldbesaidforRokossovsky’sdefensesinthenorth.dgr123+.Realizing that his present forces would not be able to encircle the Germans, Vatutin asked

Stalinforthe4thGTCandonemechanizedcorpstocompletethetask.vzz457.

The95thGRD,42ndGRD,52ndGRDof5thGAalongwiththe24thGTBand10thGTBof5thGMCweretocontinuetheirdrivetoeliminateSSTK’sbridgeheadnorthofthePselRiver.TakingPolezhaev andHill 226.6were of special importance. Polezhaevwas taken that afternoon butHill226.6wasnotoccupieduntil7/17,whentheGermansstartedtoretreatfromthearea.The69thArmywas to continue to destroyKempf’s bridgehead at Rzhavets-Ryndinkawhile at thesame timeavoidany largeencirclements.The6thGAand1stTAwerecontinue toprevent the48thPzCfromreachingthePselRiver.vzz458*.vzz462.dgr221m.gnk312m.vzz578.Withthetankcorpsgettinghithardyesterdayandwith5thGAnowinsector,Vatutinplacesthe

tank corps in second echelon and the infantrywas nowon the front line. The 127thGRR and136th GRR of 42nd GRD defended Vasilevka, Andreevka, Mikhailovka and Oktiabrski StateFarm.The23rdGARand28thGARof9thGADweredeployedbetweenMikhailovkaandIamki.The285thRRof183rdRDdefendedfromIamkitoStorozhevoe.The26thGARof9thGADwasinsecondechelon.vzz468+.Bynightfall,mostGermanunitswerespent;therewasnothinglefttogive.dgk216.Hoth sent the following orders to Hausser for tomorrow’s objectives. Das Reich was to

continue its advance eastward in the Ivanovka-Vinogradovka area. After capturing those twoimportantvillagesthedivisionwastoturnnorthandattackPravorot,southofProkhorovka.LAHwastoholdtheirlineuntilDasReichattacksPravorotand then join inandattackIamkiwhichwasalittlenorthofPravorot.SSTKwastostaydefensiveandrepulseallattacks,givingupaslittlegroundaspossible.zrl241.gnk381.Atdawn,thepanzergroupofGDassembledjustoutsideofTolstoeWoodsthatranalongthe

Berezovka-Kruglikroad.Nearby,therewasalsoaroadrunningeasttoVerkhopenieandjustsouthofthisroadjunctionwasthetroublesomeHill258.5.Theonemilesquarewoodsweredefendedbythe100tanksofthe10thTCand30Pakguns.TheSovietshadtheadvantage,fortheyhadbuiltformidable defenses within the woods while the Germans were completely exposed on opengroundfortheupcomingbattle.Withoutshellingthewoodsthoroughly,KnobelsdorfforderedGDtoattackfromthenorthand3rdPzDtoattackfromthesouth.Tomaketheobjectiveevenmoredifficulttocapture,thenearbyHill258.5washeavilyladenwithSovietartillery.TheonlywaytheGermanshadachancetotakethewoodswouldbewithheavyairsupport,buttheskieswerecloudy and the Luftwaffe refused to fly until the skies started clearing. gnk384+. gnk365m.hsz132.At 0600 hrs as planned, the 3rd PzD attacked the southern edge of TolstoeWoods butGD,

havingalreadybeenattacked,hadnotreacheditsjumpingoffpointandthe3rdPzDwasfightingadesperatebattlebyitself.By0700hrs,theGD,commandedbyDecker,wasstilldefendingitselflessthanamilenortheastofHill258.5.ItwassubsequentlythoughtthatDecker,withouttheaidof air support, thought themissionwas suicidal and refused to join battle.To the south of thewoods,GeneralWesthovenwasobservingthebattlewhenagroupofSoviettanksbrokefreeandstarting firing on Westhoven and his staff. As more Soviet tanks left the woods, a group ofMarderscamebyandattackedtheT34sof10thTC.Thecounter-attacksucceededandtheSoviettanks retreated into thewoods. Just before 0900 hrs, elements of the 394th PzGR reached thesouthernedgeofthewoodsandjoinedforceswiththeleadelementsof332ndIDnearHill237.6.A small Soviet tank force broke out of the woods past this German group and was trying to

maneuvertotherearof3rdPzDwhichwasnearBerezovka.GeneralFranzWesthoven,seeingthedanger, calledKnobelsdorff and demandedDecker ofGD begin his assault. Instead of callingDecker, Knobelsdorff orderedWesthoven to break off the attack and fall back to Hill 237.6,northwestofBerezovkaand regroupbeforeattackinganexposed flankof theSoviets attackingBerezovka. It was just 1000 hrs.While 3rd PzDwas redeploying, Decker sent another reconpatrol to scout the northern edge of the woods. General Walter Hoernlein reported toKnobelsdorff that his panzers could not take the woods without additional resources. Whileleaving a scouting party nearHill 258.5,Decker again sandbags and slowly regrouped beforemovingtherestofhiscolumntoBerezovkatohelp3rdPzD.gnk385+.Afterthepreviousday’shardfight, the3rdPzD,GD,and11thPzDwereattemptingtoready

themselvestoresumetheirattackbuttheSovietscontinuedtoharassthewesternflanktothepointwheretheseGermandivisionshadtopostponetheiradvanceandfighttosecuretheirflanks.VonMansteinalsohadthe24thPzCinreserve,whichconsistedoftheViking,17thPzDand23rdPzDbutHitlerwouldnotrelease thesedivisions tovonMansteinfor fearofweakening theDonbasline. The 24th PzCwas reporting 181 panzers and assault guns plus 123 field guns. vzz452+.ztc271.The3rdPzDwasnolongerabletoadvancenorthwardsbuthadtothrust tothewesttokeep

frombeingencircled.TheSovietshadenteredBerezovkathepreviousnightandbythatmorninghadcaptureditalongwithGertsovka.TheleadunitswerenowclosinginonRakovobuthadtowait for reinforcements to take the village. In GD sector, the defenders on Hill 247.0 nearKalinovkawerecomingunderseriousattackbythe240thRDand86thTBcomingfromwestofKruglik.ItsoonforcedGDoffthehill.The48thPzC’sleftflankwascrumbling.InadditiontoallofVatutin’sotherordersforthenewoffensive,the6thGA’s23rdGRC,the3rdMCand31stTCweretaskedtocommenceanoffensiveoncetheGermansshowedsignsofpullingback.The5thGA’sfresh13thGRD,66thGRDand97thGRD(32ndGRC)weremoveduptothelineduringthe previous night and would be an integral part of this new offensive taking place today.dgk206+.In the attempt to assist 3rd PzD and reduce overall resistance on the west flank, theGD

attemptstogaingroundintheTolstoearea.hjj122.hjj123m.Onthe48thPzCfront,the1stTAand6thGAcontinuedtoattackusingabout70tanksagainst

the11thPzD.GDwasfightingtokeepthehighgroundthreemileswestofVerkhopenieagainstattacksbythe5thGTCandelementsof10thTC.Atthesametime,elementsofGDattackedthe3rdTCatNovoselovka.The3rdPzDatBerezovkahadtogodefensiveagainstattacksfromthe184thRDand219thRDsupportedby6thTC.TheSovietspenetratedthelinebutwerenotabletogofar.wdk165+.hjj121m.hjj117m.dgr209m.To bolster the left flank of 5th GA, the 5thMC of 5th GTA and 33rd GRC advanced past

Ostrenkov village, sixmiles north of Prokhorovka to block the 11th PzD andDas Reich fromreachingProkhorovkafromtheeastorwestandfor therestof thedayfiercefightingoccurred;bothsidessufferingheavycasualties.dgk212.dgk213m.The48thPzCwentdefensiveasitsflankwasbeingheavilyattacked.The48thfinallyhadto

withdraw,losingcontrolofBerezovkaandHill247.bt89.The left flank of 4th PzA, the 52nd IC, had no armor and was in serious trouble against

persistentSovietpressure.NorthoftheOboyanroad,11PzDwith50panzersleftwasstrivingforfurthergains,butwere

stoppedbySovietresistance.BylateafternoontheSovietscounter-attackedbutwereunabletopenetratethe11thPzD’sline.VatutinknewbynowhehadbrokentheGermans’advance;hisflankattackshadworkedagainst48thPzCandthattheywouldnotbeabletoadvancetoKursk.Vatutinwanted tocontinue toputpressureon theGermans to see if theymadeamistakeandcouldbeencircled.Vatutin resumedhisattackagainst3rdPzDaswell.The3rdPzDwaspushedoutofBerezovka then lost control of theRakova-Kruglik road and finally compelled to give upHill247.0byaSovietforcethatwasgettingstrongerbythehour.Atthesametime,GD,afterlosingHill247butwasstilldefendingwestofKalinovkacameunderstrongattackbythe204thRDandthe86thTBcomingfromthedirectionofKruglik.KalinovkaandHill254wassoonlostaswell.dgk207.Evenwithout the help of Decker’s panzer group (GD),Westhoven’s 3rd PzD attacked Hill

237.6 and by 1800 hrs, after more of his division arrived, had captured the hill. He quicklybrought up artillery pointed atVerkhopenie to help slowdown the expected tank attack on thetown from the 10th TC, which was currently regrouping in Tolstoe Woods. Westhoven wasorderedbyKnoelsdorfftoattacktheTolstoewoodsthenextmorningandwaspreparinghisattackforcesafterdarkforthatattack.gnk387.TheSovietscontinuedtoattack11thPzDintheKochetovkaareaandthedivisioncontinuedto

beunabletolinkupwithSSTK.TheSovietsalsoattacked11thPzDfurtherwestandsmallgapswerebeginning to appear in the line.MajorGeneralMickl responded to the threat by sendingassaultgunsuptothelinebutevenwiththissupporttheSovietskeptcoming.Withdarknessnottoofaraway,theSovietsbegantoshelltheGermansharderandlaunchedthelargestattackoftheday when sensing the Germans were about to crack. Of special interest to the Soviets wascapturingHill246.3butGermanassaultgunswerethereandwereabletorepulsetheattackinthisarea.Bytheendoftheday,theGermanlinehadbuckledinseveralplacesbutcounter-attacksstabilizedtheweaknessandthe11thPzDhadlostalittlegroundbutavertedadisaster.Infact,allthreepanzerdivisionsof48thPzChadbeentreatedharshlythatdaybutavoidedadisaster.WithnewSovietreservesmovingsouth,KnobelsdorffknewthathiscorpswouldnotmakeOboyan;hewasmoreconcernedaboutsurviving.KnobelsdorffwantedthefewpanzersofGD remaining tobypass TolstoeWoods and travel further south to support 332nd ID out of their predicament.gnk387+.Atnight,LtGeneralKnobelsdorffvisitedWalterHoernleinofGDtopersonallygivehisorders

for the next day. Instead ofmoving north as expected,GDwas to attack to the southwest in arepeatperformance toassist3rdPzDinclearing theBerezovka-Kruglik road,especially in theTolstoeWoods-Dolgisector,butbefore linkingupwith3rdPzD,GDhad to retakeHill243.0.Hoernlein had been part ofGD since 1941; hewas promoted to LtGeneral in January 1943.fmz226+.fmz227m.zsm254.Decker’sPantherBrigadehadtopulloutofthelineasithadlostmostofitsPanthers,either

throughbreakdownor damage.There hadbeenbitter tankbattles in theNovenkoe area on thewesternflankonthisdayandthedaybefore.snk85.gnk312m.Ofthenearly200newPanthersthatbeganthecampaign,only38werestillfighting.However

only31Pantherswere total lossesand131hadbeen recovered from the fieldandwerebeingrepaired.Many of these damagedPantherswould take longer than the usual couple of days torepair,duetotypeofmechanicalproblemandthefactthatsparepartswerenotreadilyavailable.wdk120.At0230hrs,aSovietsabotagegroupwithsupportofsixtankstriedtoforcetheirwaytoand

destroytheRzhavetsbridge.Theattemptfailed.gnk384.Atfirstlight,theLuftwaffewasoutlookingfortargetsandaccidentlybombed19thPzD,just

west of the Donets. The planes bombed a group of pioneers building a new bridge over theDonets.Thiswasthesecondfriendlyfireincidentin24hours,inthesamegeneralarea.Shortlyaftertheincident,the11thGMBattackedthenearby73rdPzGRwhichhadalreadylostmuchofitsfightingpowertocasualties.The73rdwasforcedback,takingadditionalcasualtiesandbeingthreatenedwithextinction.The74thPzGR,seeingwhathappeningnextdoor,shifteddirectionandattacked theSoviets coming through thegap.Theywereable to stop thebleedingandplug thegap,stabilizingtheline.gnk384.Whilethe18thTCwasattacking,the29thTCtotheeastwasdefendingitselfagainsttheLAH

alongtherailroadlinenearOktiabrskiStateFarm.Furthertotheeast,the53rdGTBandthe689thAAR attacked 6th PzD near Aleksandrovka but had to go defensive when Tigers came up tosupport the defense. By the end of the day, the Germans made no appreciable gains and theSovietswereabletostabilizetheirlines,especiallyontheflanks.dgr227.SouthofProkhorovkaatnightandintothepredawnhoursof7/13,the26thTBandothersbegan

an offensive at Shcholokovo, Ryndinka and Vypolsovka against von Manstein’s forces whichforcedtheGermansbackfourmilessouthward.Ryndinka,neartheDonetswascapturedonthisday. Without pausing, the Soviets advanced toward Gostischtschevo, nine miles southwest ofKurakovka.TakingGostischtschevobolstered theSoviet linewestof theDonetsandpreventedthe3rdPzCfromreachingDasReichforanotherday.ThiswasapenetrationofninemilesintoGermanheldground.fkk296+.dgr221m.As ordered, the 2ndVA started bombing 3rd PC’s sector in earlymorning andwouldmake

manyrunsthroughouttheday.OfspecialinterestwasthesectorthatincludedKurasovka,NovoOskochnoeandKazache.Vatutinwasdetermined tokeepKempf fromjoiningupwithHausser.HewasconvincedthatiftheGermanscouldclosethegapandstabilizethelinethatProkhorovkawouldfall.dgk208.TopreventKempffromlinkingupwithDasReich,the48thRCalongwiththe27thGABanda

fewtanksattackedtowardtheRyndinka,Rzhavetsarea.The48thDestroyerRegimentmovedtoPlotatoblockthepanzers’path.ArtillerymovedtoshellingdistanceoftheShakhovo-Vypolzovkalinetosupport theattack.The32ndDestroyerBrigademovedtotheLvov-Lutovolinetoblockthepath incase the first linewaspenetrated.The35thGTCwaspreparing toadvance towardVypolzovkaareabutitwouldtakehoursbeforereachingit.The2ndAirArmywasalsopreparingtoincreasethesortiesintheareaaswell.vzz482+.dgr221m.Despitetheheavylossesinthemorning,GroupBakefrom6thPzD,withsupportfromartillery,

broke through the Soviet defenses between the Donets and Korocha Rivers, stormed thedominatinghighgroundofAleksandrovkaandopenedthewaytothenorthforanadvanceof3rdPzC.The7thPzDand19thPzDofthe3rdPzCmovedfromthebridgeheadatRzhavetstoward

RyndinkabeforeshiftingtowardProkhorovka,butwerestoppedtwomilesfromtown.Theleadelementsof19thPzDhadbeenworkinginpredawnhourstostabilizethelinebetweenRyndinkaandShakhovo.The3rdPzCwasexhaustedandwasnolongercapableofmountinganattack;eachofitspanzerdivisionshadlessthanadozenworkingpanzers.rc209.dlu63m.gnk382+.vzz3m.vzz12m.fzk56.dlu120.In addition to all the reinforcements that were heading to block Kempf’s advance, the 2nd

GTC’s 26th GTB and the 11th MB would launch from Malye Iablonovo and attack towardShcholokovoandrecapturethevillage.Theattemptfailed.Duringthenight,Rotmistrovorderedtheseforcesandtheothersalongthelinetostoptheiroffensivesandgodefensive,ifnecessary,untiltheGermansfatigued,thentheoffensivewouldbeginagain.Thefinalobjectivewouldbetodestroythebridgeheadandtakecontrolof theDonetsRiveratRyndinkaandShcholokovo.The89thGRD,81stGRDalongwiththe26thTBwouldattackShcholokovofirst.TheattackfailedandKempfkeptShcholokovo.Rogozny’s48thRCconsistsof81stGRD,81stGRD,93rdGRDand the 375th RD. The 35th GRCwould join the attack at daybreak next morning and attacktowardRzhavetstopreventtheGermansfromsendinghelptoShcholokovo.vzz484+.dgr221m.The German 3rd PzC was engaged in battle with 69th Army near Aleksandrovka-Bolshie

Podiarugiarea.Elementsofthe5thGMCarrivedatRyndinkawhilethe11thMechanizedBrigadearrivedatProkhorovkaandadvancedtowardRyndinka.The26thGBwasshellingShcholokovo,destroyingmuchof the19thPzDbeforeitwithdrewfromthearea.TheSovietsalsopenetratedthe line nearMelikhovo but were eventually repulsed. shn162. aaa125m. dgr155m. dgr173m.dgr221m.vzz12m.TopreventRogozny’s48thRCfrombeingencircled,Vatutinmadeseveralredeployments.The

305thRDmovedonthelineVypolvzovka-Podsumki-Alekseevka-Ploskoe,replacing92ndGRD.The92ndGRDwasmovingtothelineRzhavets-Avdeevka-Verin,-Polovka-Ryndinkatosupportthe11thGMBand12thGMB.Throughoutthepreviousday,the6thPzD,7thPzDand19thPzDattemptedtoexpanditsbridgeheadbuthadmadefewgains.Whiletheothertwopanzerdivisionswerepreparingtoadvance,the19thPzDdidsoandmadeittothewoodseastofShakhovowheretheystopped.Kempfkepta linkwithhis forceswestof the river throughShcholokovo.KempfwasalsosecuringRzhavetsagainafteraSovietcounter-attack,buttheattackstowardAvdeevkaandVypolzovka failed. In late afternoon, a largeLuftwaffe formation bombedVypolzovka andAleksandrovkatotheeast.BytheendofthedayShipy,AvdeevkaandKrasnyiOktiabrwerestillheldby12thGMB;6thPzDhadtofallbackforthenight.vzz476++.lck375.dgr221m.AlongthebanksoftheNorthernDonetsRiver,3rdPzC’s19thPzDand7thPzDwastryingto

expandhisbridgeheadagainstthe53rdGTR,96thTBandthe92ndGRDnearAleksandrovka.Atthesametimethe12thGMBdroveintothe6thPzDbetweenVypolzovkaandAleksandrovka.The26thGTBandthe11thGMBlater joinedthebattlebyattackingGermanpositionsatRyndinka.The19thPzDwasunabletoexpandthebridgeheadbutdidinflictheavycasualtiesontheSoviets.The7thPzDwasabletocompleteassemblingintothebridgeheadwiththe19thPzD.ThesetwodivisionswereinagoodpositiontolaunchanattacktowardProkhorovkatomorrowbutitwastoo late. Hitler called off Operation Citadel. dgk216+. dgk222m. dlu63m. vzz3m. dgr221m.wwf173+.The 3rd PzC’s bridgehead on the west side of the Donets, not far from Rzhavets, was too

narrowandtheSovietAFfounditeasytostriketheGermansinsuchaconfinedarea.lck375.Another pocket was being closed when a combat group from 7th PzD moved toward

Vinogradovka from the southwhileDasReichmoved toward the town from the north. To thesoutheast,CorpsRaussuccessfullydefendedagainstrepeatedcounter-attacksfrom25thGRC.Itthenattacked theSoviets inorder tostabilize the lineanddisrupt theiroffensive.Over the lastdayorso,the7thPzDhaddividedintothreecombatgroups.OnewasstilldefendingtheeasternflanknearCorpsRaus.Asecondgroupwasfurthernorthnear theAleksandrovkascreening6thPzD’seasternflanknotfarfromtheRzhavets-Vypolzovkaarea.Thethirdgrouphadmigratedtothe Donets River between Strelnikov and Schcholokovo to support 19th PzD. General Rauswouldcommandapanzerarmyin1944and1945.wdk165.zsm258+.vzz12m.The7thPzDtriedtooverrunthelineAleksandrovka-Sviridovo-Hill235.4whichwasheavily

defendedbythe35thGRC.Despitesufferingheavycasualties,theSovietswereabletorepulseallattacksfrom7thPzDbutdidlosegroundinacoupleareas.Alittlefurtherwest,thedefenderswerealsoabletoholdtheShipy,Avdeevka,KrasnyiOktiabrlineagainst6thPzD.The12thGMBwith the support of the 92ndGRDpushed the 6th PzD southward and recapturedVypolzovka.vzz480.The weather was very bad with heavy rain showers, making the roads troublesome. The

Germanshaddifficultiesresupplyingtheline.The2ndSSPzChadtroublesregrouping.The3rdPzCwasabletocontinuetoadvancetowardProkhorovka.The19thPzDwasabletodrivethe81stGRDbacktowardSchakova.The6thPzDand7thPzDwerestruckbyheavycounter-attackswithallthenewreservesofthe5thGMCand2ndGTCcomingintothesectorfromthenorth.The6thPzDholding their bridgeheadover theDonets atRzhavetswas hardest hit.TheSovietAFmademany runs against thisbridgehead.Despite all these attacksbyevening theGermanshadwidenedtheirbridgeheadinanorthwestdirectionwith19thPzDonthewestand7thPzDintheeast.Acombatgroupofthe7thPzDhadalsomovedtotheDonetstosupportthe19thPzD.EastoftheDonets,the6thPzDprovidedflankprotectionagainsttheadvancing35thGRC.wdk164+.In theDonetsRiver valley at night, PzRRothenburg launched an attack that allowed him to

reachsouthofSchachovobeforebeingstoppedbystrongresistance.BothsidessufferedheavycasualtiesbuttheSovietsfellbackashortwaysafterlosing19tanks.fkk297.Insteadofcontinuinghisadvancethroughthenight,Kempfpausedtoregrouphisforcesforthe

nextday’sassault.The6thPzDwastaskedwithtakingVypolzovkaandAleksandrovkawhilethe7th PzD shifted to the northwest to join 19th PzD at Shcholokovo in order to advance onProkhorovka.dgk204.vzz3m.The69thArmycontinuedtoexperienceadesertionproblemanddeployedblockingpatrolsto

stopandevenshootdeserters.vzz486.LtGeneralHermannBreithspent thedaytryingtoconsolidateandexpandhisbridgeheadon

theNorthernDonets River, just sevenmiles from Prokhorovka. The 92ndGRD, supported bytanks,weretryingtostopGeneralBreith.Withthebulkof19thPzDand7thPzDattheriver,96thTBattackeddefenses atAleksandrovka.The12thGMBattacked6thPzDbetweenVypolzovkaandAleksandrovka.Inthenorthsincethestart,9thArmywasabletogainonly12milesatbestwhileHoth,inthesouth,gainedasmuchas30miles.dgk216+.dgk222m.dlu63m.vzz3m.OntheProkhorovkaaxis,thefiercefightinghadturnedintoastalemate.Tothesouthalongthe

NorthernDonets,the3rdPzC’sdramaticadvancethedaybeforehadturnedintoasluggingmatchwith5thGTAand theywerenowmovingnowhere.VonManstein,Hausser andKempf all hadhopesthatthetwocorpscouldmeet,destroythetrappedforces,reducetheirlineandresumetheirassaulttowardKurskwithabetter,cohesiveoffensiveposture.Withtheferocioustankbattlethepreviousday,the2ndSSPzCwasdowntofewerthan250panzersincludingfourTigersand11T34s.TheSoviets had sufferedworse than theGermansbut theyhadmore tanks to startwith.dgk210++.dgk211m.fkk256.Shortlyafterdark,thunderstormsstruckcausingVatutintopausehissuccessfulassaultforthe

day,whichwasledby5thGA,6thGAand10thTC.VasilevskyandVatutindiscussedplansanddecidedtocontinuetheassaultinthemorningtomakesurevonMansteincouldnotcounter-attackeffectively,especiallyintheProkhorovkaarea.ClearingallresistancenorthofthePselandthenthePenaRiverswouldcontinue,aswouldclearing3rdPzCfromtheRzhavetsarea.TheybothknewtheGermanoffensivewasdeadandthatFMvonMansteinhadlost.dgk208.zow166.Atnight,Hothwasdiscussingbattlefieldconditionswithhisstaff, lamenting thefact the2nd

Army on 4th PzA’swest flankwas tooweak to participate in the operation, unable to relievesomeofthepressureoff48thPzCand52ndICthatwasexertedby40thArmy.zrl240+.Itwas a chaotic day for 3rd PzC; the Soviets,with new reinforcements,were attacking the

corpsfromalldirections.Theadvances the3rdPzCmadein the last fewdayshadbrought thecorpstoitsphysicallimitsanditwasdesperatetopause,regroupandresupply,buttheSovietswerenotobiliging.BytheendofthedayKempfwasmoreworriedaboutsavinghiscorpsthanreaching Prokhorovka. Practically every regiment had been broken down into combat groupsspreadoutthroughoutthesectortoputoutthemanyfirestheenemyhadset.TheGermancohesionwasbeingtornapartandiftheenemyhadbeenalittlestrongerandbetterorganizeditcouldhaveshattered thecorps.Kempf, realizinghispredicament,wasdoingeverythingpossible to tightenhisdefensesduringthenight.

A21

July13thontheNorthernSalienttdaybreakandanhourbefore4thPzDwasscheduledtolaunchanotherattackonthehillsnearTeploe,GeneralJoachimLemelsenvisitedLtGeneralDietervonSauckennotifying

him that his attack was canceled. With 20th PzD being sent to Orel, the 4th PzD was to godefensiveandcoverboththeirsectorand20thPzD’soldsector.Withinaweek,the4thPzD,5thPzD,8thPzDandGDwouldbetransferredtoOreltorivalanoffensivethatwasaslargeandasimportantastheKursksalient.snz255+.AnticipatingaheavyattacknearNovosil,Modelhad the1stFliegerdivisionconcentrateon

theeastsector.Itpaidoffforthe15thVAsentasquadronofIL-2sintosoftenupthelineshortlyafter first line. TheGerman fighterswhowere circling the area quickly attacked and inflictedheavycasualtiesontheSovietplanesbeforetheyhadachancetoevade.Notdeterred,the15thVAsentalargersquadronaround1000hrs,withsimilarresults.Around1200hrs,athirdwavecameinandtheGermanshadtheadvantageagain.Whiletheairwarheatedup,Stukasweresentoutbeyondthesalient,attackingSovietconcentrationswhichforced theSovietcharge toabort.Theescorts,Fw190s,downedadditionalaircraftwhileprotectingtheStukas.cbk86+.dgk231m.snk433m.NorthoftheKursksalient,OperationKutuzovwasexpanded.TheWestern,Bryansk,andlater

CentralFront,attackedModel’s9thArmyand2ndPzAintheOrelsector.Inthesouthernsalient,Vatutinorderedhis5thGAand5thGTAtoclearallGermansintheRzhavetsarea,southeastofProkhorovka, which were currently defended by the 3rd PzC. Diversionary attacks were alsolaunchedintheDonbasandalongtheMiusRivertopreventreservesfromheadingtoBelgorod.dgk208.dgk227+.dlu63m.zzz101m.dgk231m.snk433m.OperationKutuzovexpandedby theadditionof50thArmyattacking to thewestof11thGA

towardZhizdraintotheboundaryof2ndPzAand4thArmy.dgk231m.snk433m.The 9th PzD,whichwas still deployed near Ponyri, was ordered to theOrel salient. They

arrivedlaterintheday.mkz121.dgk116m.dgk231m.snk433m++.Planes of Luftflotte 6 were already moving to airfields closer to attack area. The field at

Karachev and Suponevo, south of Bryansk were chosen. It was a calculated gamble movingcloser but Model was willing to take the chance. The 12th Flak Division was moved to theKarachev-Khotynetssectortoscreentheairfieldsandtoassistthetroopsagainsttheassault.Theypractically worked around the clock; their 88s were used as much on tanks as they were onplanes.snk171.IntheOrelsectortothenorth,Boldin’s50thArmyonBagramyan’srightflankjoinedthebattle

nearUlianovo.LaterGeneralButkov’s1stTCandMajGeneralKropotin’s1stGRDalsowentthroughthegap.Withthesenewforces,theSovietswereabletobreakthroughtheseconddefense

belt.Despite5thPzD’sefforts,bytheendofthesecondday,theSovietshadpenetrated10milesalonga14milefront.Modelwouldsendelementsof the9thArmytoassist.dgk234.snk108+.zzz101m.dgk231m.snk433m.Duetotheheavycasualties,the9thPzDwaspulledoutofthelineinfrontofOlkhovatkaand

sent tonorthofOrel tohelpagainst theSovietoffensive in theBolkhovarea. It arrived in theafternoonandforthenextdayandhalfactuallyslowedtheSovietadvance,butthenithadtofallbackagainsttheunrelentingpressure.mkz121.lck116m.WhilethelandbattlewasragingintheNovosilsector,alargeairbattlewastakingplaceas

well. In late morning, for about an hour, the two sides slugged it out, both sides sufferingcasualties.Afteritwasover,the1stFliegerDivisionclaimedknocking70IL-2soutofthesky.PerhapstheLuftwaffedidnotloseasmanyplanesintheengagementbuttheylostthreeoftheirtopaceswhichwasaheavyexpensefortheirvictory.cbk88.dgk231m.snk433m.IntheOrelsalient,theRedArmyresumeditsattack.Inone40-tankattack,theSovietsmadeit

toKotschely, theHQ of 192ndGR of 262nd ID forcing the staff to scatter. It also placed theSovietsbehindtheartilleryline.InothernearbyvillagesofJevtechov,VoskresenskandVeselayathegrenadiersfoughttothelastbullet.ThroughPOWinterrogationsitwasdiscoveredthatfivedivisionswith160tankswereattackingthetwodivisionsof35thICsector.Anothertendivisionswereattackingtherestof35thIC.Sofartheworstpenetrationwasin171thGRsector,buttheSoviets were intensifying their assault on the 192nd GR next door. Forty Soviet tanks weredestroyedinthissector.fkk351.fkk356.zzz101m.dgk231m.snk433m.Bagramyancontinuedtoexploitthegapintheline,sendingmoreforcesintoit.Healsodrove

the1stTCand5thTCtodeeperpenetrationsoftheseconddefensebelt.The5thPzDtriedtoplugthegapbutwasunabletodosountilModelsentelementsof9thArmytosupport.EastofOrel,Rendulic’sdefenseshadbettersuccessinfendingofftheSovietassault.The3rdand63rdArmybuiltabridgeovertheSushaRiverandfoughtalonganinemilefront,butthe35thIC’s56thIDand262ndIDinflictedheavycasualtiesonceacross.Soviettanksstumbledintoaminefieldandbytheendoftheday,hadlost60tanksbuttheweightoftheattackhadforcedtheGermansbacktotheirseconddefensebelt.Atnight,Rendulicbroughthisnewlyarrivedreservesof36thIDand8thPzDand2ndPzDsup to thesecond line.dgk233++.zzz101m.dgk231m.snk433m.snz260.snz226m.asz366+.In the Ilyinskoye area not far from Kursk, the pilots of the French volunteers bombed the

GermanpositionsthatwereadvancingontheSoviet4thTAand11thTA.Around1200hrs,afterurgentlyrequestingsupportfromthe55thIC,the1stFliegerDivision

shiftedpartofitfocustothenorthwestquadranttosupportthegroundtroopswhoweregettinghitfrom thegroundand theair.Asmall squadronof30planes flewnorth toattackandmaul50thArmyonWesternFront’srightflank.The50thhadtohaltitsadvanceandgodefensive.Despitetheairraids,the11thGAcontinueditsattack.Partofthe11thGAwereluckyenoughtobeinsideacopseoftreeswhichprovidedgoodconcealment.cbk87.dgk231m.snk433m.Flying2,400feetoverMelekhovonot far fromUlianovo,northofOrel,eightYak-7Bswere

escortingtenIL-2swhenfourFw190swerespottedflyingbelow.TheYakslefttheformationandattacked theGermanfighters justas theywererising tomeet theSovietbombers.TwoGermanplaneswereshotdownastheformationcontinuedtoflysouth.AsingleBf110wasshotdowna

fewminutes later.Withthe1stFliegerDivisonreturning tobase leaving theskiesunprotected,Bryansk Front resumed its assault with 15th VA providing close support. cbk88. dgk231m.snk433m.ModelcompletedanemergencydefensivebelteastofArkhangelskoye,Kichety,Baranovoand

Medyn.TheSovietforceheadingsouthwesttowardBolkhovwasstoppednorthwestofthecity.TheSoviet forceheadingsouth,andbypassingUlianovo inorder toenlarge thegap, struck the293rdIDand5thPzDalongtheVytebetandRessetaRivers.By7/15theSovietshadcrossedbothrivers though the 5th PzD retained a strategic bridgehead east of Ktsyn. Group Esebeck,consistingof18thPzDand20thPzD,managedtotemporarilytosealoffthispenetration.snk109.dgk231m.snk433m.South of Ulianovo, Soviet pilots discovered a long convoy of trucks and panzers from 9th

Armyheadingforthefrontlinetoreinforcethe55thIC.Thediscoverywascalledinandthe1stTCwascalleduptoaddextraweightagainsttheGermanline.cbk88.dgk231m.snk433m.Thoughknowinghimby reputationonly,GeneralModel flewup toMtensk tomeetGeneral

Rendulicanddiscussstrategy.IfhisfirstimpressionofRendulicwasfavorable,hewasgoingtoinstitute his plan of giving most of the new forces coming into sector to Harpe and givingRendulictheleastamountofhelptoallowhimtokeeptheSovietsout.Between7/13to7/17,the36th ID, 2nd PzD and 12th PzD arrived in sector and General Harpe receivedmost of thoseforces.snz260+.IntheOrelsectortotheeast,Sovietengineers,whileunderheavyfire,wereabletocompletea

bridgeovertheSushaRiverallowingthe3rdand63rdArmiestocrossagainst35thIC’s56thIDand262ndID.Bytheendoftheday,theSovietswererepulsedwithoutgainingmuchgroundandsufferingheavycasualties.GeneralLotharRendulicbroughtup the36th ID to the linewhere itwasabouttocrumble.Soonafterwardsthe8thPzDand2ndPzDarrivedtohelpout.The2ndPzDcamefromModelwhile8thPzDcamefromAGC’sreserve.RendulicwaspromotedtoCOofthe2ndPzAbecauseofhisfineperformance.Inthelasttwodays,Modelorderedfourdivisionsfrom9thArmyfightingnearKursktobebroughtuptohelpintheOrelsalient.ModelwassurefurtherescalationofSovietforceswouldoccur.dgk234+.zzz101m.dgk231m.snk433m.Driving out ofOrel in the evening, the 56th ID and 262nd ID (35th IC),with support from

armor,counter-attacked,surprisingtheSoviets,butdidnotgainmuchground.fkk335.zzz101m.dgk231m.snk433m.The11thGAoftheWesternFront,withthesupportofthe1stTCand5thTC,advancedagainst

the55thICtowardBolkhovandKhotynets,apenetrationof10milesbehindGermanlinesalongafrontof13miles.The61stArmywasalsomovingintheBolkhov’sdirectionandpenetratingfivemilesbehindthelines.Aftertwodays,the2ndPzAhadbeenbreachedintwomajorsectionsandwasintrouble.Modelbeganpullingthe9thArmyfromthePonyriareatohelpdefendtheOrelsalient in thehopesofplugging thesepenetrations.However theskillfuldefenseof the35th ICand53rdICtothesoutheasthadextractedaheavytollontheattacking3rdand63rdArmies.The15thVAand16thVAsupportedtheattackafter1300hrsandbytheendoftheday,the53rdIChadtostartfallingbackinanorganizedmanner.Thelineintheirsectorhadnotcracked,butitwasclose to it.Though theSovietswerebeginning tobudge theGermansfromtheir front lines, thecostpaidforthatsuccesswaslargelyderivedfromthesupportofthe1stFliegerDivision.All

told, 183 Soviet planeswere reported shot down. In addition to the planes, 32 tanks, and 50vehiclesweredestroyed,withanother25tanksdamaged.TheGermansclaimedtohavelost20aircraft, with nine of them being Fw 190s. The attrition for theGermans had reached a pointwheretheycouldnolongercovertheentiresalientatatime.TheRedAirForcewasinsimilarstraightsbutitwasdecidedthat1stVA’sprioritywouldbeinthenorthwestquadrant,wherethebiggest gains had been achieved so far. bt89. zzz101m. dgr199m. cbk88++. kcz169. dgk231m.snk433m.ColGeneralM.M.Popov,theCOofBryanskFront,askedStavkaforRybalko’s3rdGTAand

lateatnightitwasagreedthatPopovcoulduseit.Itwouldtaketwodaystoarriveonscene.The3rdGTA,whichhad730tanksand37,000menbutnoartillerysupport,wastowheelaroundtheperimeterandattacktheOrelsalientfromthesoutheasttowardStanovoiKolodez.andKromyin3rdArmy’ssectorbetweenthetownsofMtsenkandNovosil.Naumenko’s15thVAwastaskedtosupport3rdGTAduringtheassault.dgk235+.zzz101m.cbk112.kcz171.dgk231m.snk433m++.Inthenorththe1stFliegerDivisionflew1,113sortiesandreportedlosing18planes.nzk77.

H22

July14thontheSouthernSalientitlerorderedthe24thPzCtomoveclosebehind1stPzA,alongtheNorthernDonetsRivernear Izyum. At the same timeDas Reich and SSTK were notified that they would be

heading to theMius ina fewdays.To thenorth, the8thPzDand36thIDweremoving towardOrel.The2ndPzDwouldfollowtomorrow.dgk245.snk109.zzz101m.Inthepredawnhours,theSovietAFattackedLAHandDasReich’srearpositions.TheSoviet

pilotsattackedGresnoe,MalyeMaichkiandLuchkiNorth.Atotalof418missionshitthesethreetargets.cbk99.dgk231m.snk433m.TheLuftwaffewasbusyattackingrailtargets,aswellastankformationsmovinguptotheline.

Theyclaimedshootingdown103Sovietaircraft.jp187.TheSovietshadmoreplanes in theKursk salient than theGermans, but at least 70%of the

pilotswouldbeseeingcombatforthefirsttime.ClearlytheexperiencedLuftwaffepilotshadtheadvantage.cbk82.InLAHsector,reconpatrolsweresentouttogetaclearpictureofSovietdeployments.Itwas

determined that therewerestill largeconcentrationsofSoviet tankssouthofProkhorovkanearIamki as well as in the corridor to the west of the important rail junction. The patrols alsodiscoveredgreatly improved trench systems fromOktiabrskiStateFarmandHill 252.2 all thewaytoProkhorovka.Itwasdefendedbytherelativelyfresh110thTBandthe36thGTR.VatutinwasmakingsuretheSSwouldnevermakeitnorthoftheKartashevkaroad.WiththediscoveryofenemytanksassemblingnearMikhailovka,MajGeneralWischwantedtostrengthentheboundarywithSSTKandsentacompanywesttodefendtheflank.gnk395+.gnk397m.zrl244.At0400hrs,the167thIDattackedintotheboundarylinebetweenthe183rdRDand375thin

thegeneraldirectionofIvanovka.AftercapturingIvanovkapartofthedivisionwouldpivotsouthandhead forLeski andShakakhovoto linkupwith19thPzDwhile the restofdivisionheadednorth.Asthepanzerswereheadingeast,aheavyrocketbarragefellonthecolumn.The375thRDshiftedforcesandwasabletoplugthegaponitsrightflank.The375thRDwasdefendingthelinefrom half mile north of Teterevino South through Hill 209.7 to Teterevino South (along therailroad line).After taking Ivanovkaat1715hrs, the167th IDattacked towardLeski, southofIvanovka,butwashaltedattheoutskirtsofthevillage.The183rdRD,directlynorthof375thRD,washavingtroublekeepingthe167thIDoutofLeski.The167thID’smainaxiswasdrivingtothenortheasttowardHill234.7andMaloeIablonovoandultimatelyPravorot.Fightingpastsunset,the167thIDfoughtitswaytowithintwomilesofZhimolostnoe,southofPravorot.By2000hrs,thevillageofIvanovkaandHill234.9hadbeencapturedbutthedivisionhadcontinued,wantingtoreachPravorot.Hill234.9was2.5milesfromthemainroadthatledintoPravorot.Evenwith167th IDparallelingDasReich on its trek towardPravorot, therewas noway theDas Reich

grenadierswould reachPravorot that day; theLAH panzers, regrouping behind the front lines,waitingforthatobjectivetobetaken,wouldhavetowaitanotherday.Wischonlyhad53workingpanzers and objected strongly to sending them to Iamki to fight for another divisionwhile hissector was constantly being attacked. vzz491++. vzz496. vzz3m. gnk396. gnk397m. zrl244. #zow170.TheDasReich’sDerFührerRegiment hadbeen stopped the daybefore but the regiment at

0400hrscontinued itsattackalongwith the167thIDfromIasnaiaPoliana towardBelenikhinoandVinogradovkaandtheriversouthwestofPravorotthatmorning.TherenewedbattlesawtheGermanspenetratetheline.Bynoon,afterafiercebattleforBelenikhinowhichincludedhousetohousefighting,thevillagefelltotheGermans.Theregimentmovedonandby1730hrshadalsoenteredIvanovkawiththesupportof167thIDandanhourlatercapturedHill234.9.DerFührermoved on again but was attacked by armor just two miles west ofZhimolostnoe, where theadvancewashalted.The183rdRDwasdefendingnearbyKalininandSobachevskisectorandthe4thGMRB,4thGTB,25thGTBand26thGTBweredefendingBelenikhinoandVinogradovka.Afterlosingninetanks,theyeventuallyhadtofallbacktowardMaloeIablonovo.AfewtankerswereencircledinthewoodssouthwestofVinogradovkabutfoughttheirwayout.The375thRDwasdefendingLeski,TeterevinoSouthandHill210.7.Thewholeof theBelenikhino-Ivanovkaareawasinturmoiluntil1800hrswhentheSovietsmovedback,leavingtheleftflankof4thGTBinVinogradovkaexposed.TheLuftwaffehadbeenbombingtheVinogradovkaareaallafternoon.SeeMap23.vzz488++.vz498.dgr106.gnk396.gnk397m.wwf174.zrl241.zow168.Afterashortrocketpreparationat0400hrs,aspartofadivisionwideassaultelementsofDas

Reich,withDerFührerinthelead,onceagainattackedSovietpositionsatBelenikhino,reachingthe outskirts and fighting house to house. Engineers were called up with charges to destroybunkers and strongpoints. Stukaswere called in to assist, destroying 12 T34s and forcing theinfantrytowithdraw.By0700hrs,theSovietdefensesintownbegantoslowlycrumbleandby1200 hrs Belenikhino was captured. At the same time, and with the help of 167th ID, otherelementsofDerFührerwereabletocaptureHill220.3,southofBelenikhino.BytakingthetownandHill220.3,therewasasufficientgapinthelinetoreleasethepanzersthatwerestationedjustoutside ofOzerovski, just north ofKalinin.By1300hrs, the panzers reachedBelenikhino andstarted supporting the infantry in clearing the surrounding area before quickly moving towardIvanovkaahalfmiletothesouth.rc225.gnk398+.At0400hrs,DasReichalsoattackedtheIasnaiaPolianaareawiththeobjectiveofreaching

Belenikhinoandbeyond.Thedefenders,the89thGRD,initiallyputupfierceresistancebutwereeventuallyforcedoffthehighgroundsouthwestofPravarot.TheDasReichcontinuedtoadvanceandby1200hrswasthreateningthenewreardefensesof375thRD,whichhadfallenbackadayorsoagoandwasstill fightingtokeep3rdPzCfromjoiningDasReich.SeeMap8.wdk166.gnk397m.In the predawn hours, heavy rains soaked the SSTK / LAH area, turning the roads and

countryside into deepmud.The supply trucks had a difficult time reaching the linewith food,ammoandfuel.mhz360.Vatutin wanted to destroy SSTK’s bridgehead north of Psel River and to capture the two

bridges theGermans built.He assembled a large array of forces that launched soon after first

light.Topreventthe48thPzCfromhelpingSSTK,Vatutinwouldalsoattackthewesternflankashardaspossible.TheSSTKhaddiscoveredabuildupofforcesjustnorthoftheirbridgeheadthatincluded125tanksandhadstayeddefensivethewholeday;luckilyforthedivision,forifithadlaunched an attack to the north, it would have been costly. The 5th GA and 5th GTA stayeddefensiveintheLAHandDasReichsectorsfortheentireday,thoughVatutinshelledmostof4thPzAfortheentireday.gnk395.kuz193.ztc271.zrl244.Despite the reverses theGermanarmyhadsuffered inOperationCitadel,bothvonManstein

andHothstillbelievedthatapartialvictorycouldbeachieved.KurskwasnotattainablebutbothGermancommanderswanted todestroyasmanyof theSoviet forcesaspossiblebefore fallingback.gnk395.zow167+.TheLAHpanzerswereordered toprepare toshift to theeastandsupportDasReich if they

penetrated the lineandreachedPravorot.Fromthere, the twodivisionswould turnsouthawayfrom Prokhorovka. Iamki was supposed to be attacked byLAH panzers, but whenDas Reichfailed to take Pravorot today, Iamki was considered non-essential and LAH would turn southtowardRyndinkawithSSDRaftertakingPravorot.gnk396.gnk397m.Duringthenightof7/13,the24thGTBwaspulledfromthefrontandsentintoreservewhich

left 95th GRDwithout armor support.With ammo running low, the division launched anotherassaulttowardHill226.6butagainfailedtotakeit.vzz466.+gnk312m.TheTigercompanyofLAHhad five runningTigers,while thePanzerGroupofLAH had42

panzers,mostlyMk IVs. Panzers were deployed behind the line near Hill 247.6, northeast ofKomsomoletsStateFarm.Their original orderswere to drive on Iamki as soon asDas ReichcapturedPravorot,alittlefurthersouth.agk129.VatutinsuspectedHoth’splantoencirclethe48thRCand,topreventthatfromhappening,he

ordered the2ndTCand29thTCcloser toStorozhevoeandPravorot toblockDasReich fromclosing the ring.Hausser recognized the increased concentration in this area and orderedDasReich, whichwas atMaloe Iablonovo, to turn south immediately after capturing Pravorot. Toguard Das Reich when turning, LAH, also turning east, would capture Iamki, northeast ofStorozhevoe,andgodefensive.Tworegimentsof167thIDwouldcontinuesouthtoIvanovkaandHill234.9,amileeastof Ivanovka,anderectdefensesuntil identificationofSoviet intentions.vzz496+.vzz9m.ElementsofSSTKatVeselyi,northwestofProkhorovkaandhalfwaybetweenthebendinthe

PselRiver and theKartashevka road, came under heavy shelling and small attacks but itwasquietotherwiseintherestofitssector.Germanengineerscompletedanother60tonbridgeoverthe Psel by 0840 hrs. Priesswanted another bridge ready in case his division had to quicklyretreat to thesouthsideof thePsel.The33rdGRCmoved insoutheastof theVeselyiRiveratPrelestnoeandforcedtheSSTKtogiveuppartofitsbridgehead.The2ndSSPzCclaimedonlythreetanksandoneplanedestroyed,andonlyseveralhundredPOWscaptured.Atthesametimenorth of thePsel, theThuleRegiment ofSSTKwas caught alone and nearly surrounded, but itfought itsway clear and inflicted heavy casualties on the Soviets. The bulk of theSSTK wasattacked by tanks and infantry coming fromVeselyi andMikhailovka butwith the help of 111planeswasabletorepulsetheattack.wdk166.fkk172.fkk319m.gnk397m.vzz1m.ztc271.In themorning at theSSTK bridgehead, theThuleRegiment repulsed a battalion-size attack,

supportedbysometankswithartillery,mortarsandMGs.TheLuftwaffewasactivethatmorning;theyhadmissedthisfirstattackbutwereintheairwhenthesecondattackoccurred.ThetargetwastheVeselyiareaandthe100-planeformation,madeupofStukasandfighters,quicklyturnedbacktheassault,inflictingheavycasualties.TheSovietsmovedbackbutdidnotgoveryfar.Theywouldbebackinthemorning.kuz218.The 2nd SS PzC resumed its attack toward Prokhorovka gaining some ground, and was

approachingtheoutskirts.Intheafternoon,the48thPzCmadegainsnearNovenkoe,notfarfromthePselRiver,inflictingheavycasualtiesandcausingtheSovietsintheareatoretreatnorthward.The48thPzCfollowed,movingnorthofNovenkoe.Thisadvancegainedimportanthighgroundwhich allowed artillery to seeOboyan.With both Prokhorovka andOboyanwithin sight, vonMansteinwasforcedtocallofftheoffensivebutorderedHothtoholdhispositioninthePselandPenaRiverareasand to secure it.This securingoperationwascalledOperationRolandbut itwascalledoffalmostassoonasitstarted,fortheSovietsbeganamajoroffensiveallalongthelinethatforcedvonMansteintodetachunitsfrom4thPzAtoputoutthemanypenetrations.snk85.dlu121.zrl246.Formostoftheday,the5thGTAregrouped.The2ndGTCabandonedBelenikhinoinorderto

shortenitsfrontbutmaintainedafrontthatconsistedofIvanovka,LeskiandShakhovo.dgr227.Aspartofthenewordertoencircle48thRC,the167thID,totherightofDasReich,wasnow

drivingeasttowardtheDonetsRiverintheRozhdestvenkaarea.Its339thPzGR’sleftflankhadreachedtherailroadlineonemilewestofBelenikhinobyevening.Therestofthedivisionwasdeployed between Ivanovka and Maloe Iablonovo. The 167th ID would attack Leski nextmorning.Onitsrightflank,the168thIDhadreachedthenorthernoutskirtsofGostishchevo.Tothenorthof167thID,DasReichhadalinethatincludedthenorthernoutskirtsofIvanovkatoHill234.9.TheSovietshadbuiltstrongdefensesonthewestbankoftheDonetsatRozhdestvenkaandthe hills west of the Belgorod-Kursk railroad line. The Soviets had evacuated Leski, MaloeIablonovo and Shakhovo, moving north and northeast, but they seemed to have stopped theirretreatinthisarea.vzz497+.vzz3m.vzz5m.As part of their general offensive thatwas started the previous day,German forcesmoving

fromIasnaiaPolianaandShcholokovo,drovetowardShakhovo,attackingtherightwingof69thArmyintheattempttoencircleit.dgk220.DasReichopenedanassaultwithartillerypreparationwithcannonandrockets,thenlaunched

their assault. They quickly ran into a minefield, suffering heavy casualties. Once past theminefields, they marched along the ridge southwest of Pravorot and captured the village ofBelenikhinobynoonafterfiercestreetbystreetfighting.12Soviettanksthatweredefendingthevillagewere destroyed by infantry. Pravorot, fourmiles south of Prokhorovka,was their nextobjective.TheGermanscontinuedtopushtheSovietsbackallthenextday(15th)untilaheavyrainstorm turned the ground into a sea ofmud. The 3rd PzC’s 7th PzD and 19th PzDwere tobreakoutoftheirRyndinkabridgehead,drivewestandlinkupwithDasReich,looselyencirclingthe Soviets between the Lipovyi and Donets Rivers, but no catastrophic damage would beinflictedon69thArmyfortheGermansweretooweakatthispoint.dgk220+.hjj121m.mhz358+.lck379.dgr221m.agk129.agk130m.wwf132.SovietartillerycontinuedtopoundtheboundarybetweenSSTKandLAHforhours.Whenthe

artillerystoppedatnoon,aninfantryattackdrovetowardthatweaksection.LAHhadnoreservesandwasforced tosendengineers tohelpstop thepenetrationat theboundary. In theafternoon,aerialrecondiscoveredanevenlargerSovietforceassemblingneatMikhailovka,aboutamilenortheastofVasilevka.LAHartillerybeganfiringonthisconcentrationwiththeirbigguns.Wischwas ordered to keep his remaining panzers on hold in order to supportDas Reich when theycaptured Pravorot. Instead of shifting north after Pravorot, the two divisionswould now shiftsouthtowardRyndinka,inordertotrapasmuchof69thArmyaspossible.Prokhorovkawasnolongeranobjective.gnk396.gnk397m.While3rdPzCwasadvancingtothenorth,DasReich,withthehelpof167thID,afterbreaking

throughBelenikhinoStation,wasmakingslowprogress towardPravorotandLeski.VatutindidnotwantPravorottofallandorderedavailableelementsofthe2ndTCand29thTCtodefendtheStorozhevoe-Pravorotline.vzz496.gnk396.gnk397m.At1230hrs,asmallSovietforceattackedSSTKpositionsat thebarracks thatwererecently

capturedsouthofVeselyi.Theattackwasprecededbyartilleryandmortarfire.Germanartilleryreturned fire andwas able to repulse this initial attack. Reinforcements arrived and a secondattempt wasmade. He111swere called in to attack the tanks that were still north of Veselyi.StukasalsoattackedSovietinfantryeastofVasilevka.TheLuftwaffestayedforhoursbutleftasitgotdark.Duringtheday’sfightingitwasnoticedthatgrenadierswerenotdigginginaswasSOP;instead,beingtooexhausted,theywouldlayonthegroundandshoottheirrifles.Thiswascausingtoo many casualties and Hausser had to remind Priess to enforce this entrenching practice.gnk408.SixmilessouthofProkhorovka,theKempfArmywasabletolinkupwith4thPzAandbynight

movedalittleclosertothetown.Nearby,SSTKwasforcedtogiveupthebridgeheadonthenorthbank of the Psel. The Germans tried to regain the bridgehead but were repulsed with heavylosses.Atmidnight therainscameandforcedtheGermanstoregroupandgoonthedefensive.TheSovietswerebeginningtoincreasetheirplannedcounter-attacksontheexhausted48thPzCand2ndSSPzCwhohadjusttriedretakingHill247.0andHill243.0,westofProkhorovka.Hill243.0wascapturedbutnowtheSovietswerecounter-attacking.bt90.fmz221m.rc225.WhileDas Reich and 167th ID fought for control of Belenikhino and the surrounding area,

Sovietbatteries stationedatLeski,onemile southof Ivanovka, shelled theGermans.When theGermansdiscoveredwheretheshellingcamefrom,theirbiggunsreturnedfireonLeski,quicklyforcing theguncrews to fallback to thenortheast.With theLeskigunssilenced,Reitzenstein’spanzerswereabletoadvancemorequicklytocaptureIvanovkaby1730hrs,aboutthesametimethatDerFührerRegimentreachedHill234.9.Topreventtheenemyfrombuildingnewdefenses,thepanzerscontinuedtheireastwardmove,chasingtheSoviets.TothenortheastfromHill234.9,largenumbersofSovietforcescouldbeseenheadingnorth, leavingthepocket thatDasReich,167thIDand3rdPzCweretryingtoform.Afiercerearguardactionwasslowing3rdPzC,whilethe rest of the forceswere settling in along the Storozhevoe-Zhilomostnoe-Novoselovak-Shipyline.ThisnewlinealsoincludedthePravorotroad.TheSSDRpanzergroupreachedHill234.9at1900hrsbutdidnotstaybecausetheirobjectivewasPravorotandLtGeneralKrugerthoughtaquickassaultatnightmighttakethevillage.However,itstartedrainingharder;travelwasslowerand visibility was poor and the German column never reached the village. gnk399. gnk404+.

gnk397m.DuringthebattleforBelenikhinoandVinogradovkaDasReichforcedthe4thGMRBand4th

GTB back toward Ivanovka around 1630 hrs, leaving the left flank of 25th GTB exposed atVinogradovka. After the Soviet retreat to Ivanovka, the Luftwaffe’s bombing runs forced thetankersfurther,backtowardHill234.9.By2000hrs, theelementsof2ndGTChadfallenevenfurtherback,close toZhimolostnoeandMaloe Iablonovo.ElementsofDasReich pursued, butstoppedatthisnewline.TheleadunitsofDasReichcrossedtheSukhaiaPlotaravinebutcouldgonofurther.vzz491++.vzz3m.gnk397m.At1700hrs, elementsofDasReich, including somepanzers,were shelled in the Ivanovka-

BelenikhinoareabeforeabriefengagementthattooktheGermansintothetowns,fightinghousetohouseandforcingthe375thRDtowithdrawtothenortheast.DasReichcontinuedtoadvanceandtriedtotakePravorotbutfailedtodoso.DasReichhadtotakethetownif theyweregoingtooutflankthe69thArmytothesouthand5thGTAtothenorth.The167thIDwasontherailroadlinesouthwestofIvanovkatryingtocloseapocketatShakhovofromthewestwhilethe7thPzDwasattackingfromtheeast.TheLAHhadaquietdayexcept forsomeminorshelling from5thGTA; Rotmistrov’s Army was still recovering from the losses of 7/12. wdk166. hjj121m.dgk222m.gnk397m.vzz12m.vzz3m.At 1900 hrs, whenDas Reich was reachingMaloe Iablonovo, Hausser received his latest

order.HewastostopalladvancestowardProkhorovkaandtoconcentrateonshiftingtotheeasttoreachtheZhimolostnoe-Pravorotroad,beforeturningsouthtolinkupwithKempfandencirclethe48thRC.vzz496+.The2ndGTCabandonedBelenikhinoandfellback,formingalinefromIvanovkatoLeskito

Shakhovo.DasReichwasonlysuccessful inpushing2ndGTCbackwith theheavysupportofStukas.TheLuftwaffe lost one of their aces in this action.Gunther Schmidt, aKnight’sCrossrecipientandapilotwith700missions,waskilledwhenhisplaneexplodedinmid-airnotfarfromVinogradovka.dgr227.cbk99+.At2000hrs, theLuftwaffe launchedamassiveraidagainst the2ndGTCin theBelenikhino-

Shakhovoarea.ThiswasfollowedupbytheDasReichattackingtheSovietlinewhichinflictedheavylosseson the tankcorpsandforcing it tofallback.With2ndGTCfallingback, the10thGMB was called up to defend the Zhilomostnoe-Novoselovka (east) line. Vatutin was stilldeterminedtokeeptheGermantwocorpsfromlinkingup.The2ndTCrepulsedtheDasReichalongtheStorozhevoe-Pravorotlineaswell.dgr227.At2100hrs,HothconfirmedHausser’sorders.DasReichwasstillresponsibleforcapturing

Pravorot.OnceDasReichreachedthePravorotroad,itwastoturnnorthforPravorot.Whentheattackwasunderway,LAH’spanzersweretosetoffeastwardandheadforPravorot.ThisactionwouldalsoprotectDasReich’snorthernflank.HoweverMajGeneralWischrefusedtosendhisentirepanzergroup,forhejustrecentlydiscoveredalargerconcentrationofSoviettanksmassingtohisnortheast.ThiswouldclearlyjeopardizeDasReichandthesuccessfulcaptureofPravorot.gnk404+.gnk397m.zow167+.The38thArmytransferred167repairedtanksto5thGTA.vzz449.At0400hrs,GDattackedahillthreemilesnorthwestofBerezovkabutwasquicklycounter-

attackedby20tanks.Germanartillerywascalledintostopthecounter.The3rdPzDclearedthe

woodsnorthofBerezovkaataboutthesametime.The11thPzDfoughtoffanattackonabroadfront.The332ndID,alittlesouthaboutamilenorthwestofBerezovkamadeasmalladvanceandimproveditsdefensiveposition.The255thIDand57thIDof52ndICheldoffacoupleofsmallattacks.The48thPzCclaimeddestroying65tankswhichwasarisefromthedaybeforeandanindicationtheSovietswereincreasingthepressureonceagain.wdk167.Knobelsdorffwasstill threatenedbytheconcentrationofSovietforces in theTolstoewoods

andwanted tomakeone lastattempt indestroying thestrongpoint.At0400hrs, theGD PanzerBrigade,alongwithsupportfromthe677thGRof332ndID,movedintopositiononthesouthernborderofthewoods.GDassaultgunsanditsFusiliersmaneuveredtothenorthernedge.Thetwogroupswaiteduntil theLuftwaffeappearedandemptiedtheirplanesof theirdeadlycargo.Theattackwaslaunchedandmadegoodinitialprogressuntil theSovietartilleryfoundtherangeoftheGermansand startedpounding theadvance.At0700hrs, theLuftwaffewas called in for asecond attack and, having the coordinates of the Soviet artillery,made a solid run against theSoviets.At0730hrs,Decker’spanzerscapturedHill233.3southwestofTolstoeWoods.Afterawhile,theadvantagestartedleaningtowardtheGermans;theSovietdefendersbegantowithdrawfrom the woods heading to the northwest. A rearguard action consisting of a number of T34sprevented theGermans from following.At 0740hrs, the 3rdPzDbegan advancing toward theeasternperimeterofthewoodsbutwasbeingheldupbystiffresistanceatthevillageofDolgiandhugeminefields.Toavoidtheminefieldthepanzersshifteddirection,tryingtocirclethefieldanddroveoutside the battle zone leaving the infantry to fend for themselves.With the panzersaway, the Soviets counter-attacked, stopping theGerman advance.Despite the difficulties, 3rdPzDcapturedDolgiaround1800hrs.gnk412.During the predawn hours and into daylight it rained very hard, making travel slow and

difficultthroughoutthewholeday.gnk413.At0400hrs,GeneralKruger’sassaultforce(DasReich)resumeditsmarchbywayofIasnaia

PolianaandskirtingjustnorthofBelenikhinotowardthehighgroundsouthwestofPravorot.EvenwiththesupportofartillerypassingBelenikhinotookfivehours.Withoutpausing,theshockforcemade up fromDeutschland Regiment headed northeast toward the hill southwest of Pravorot.PlacingartilleryontopofthathillwouldmaketheirjobeasierinthetakingtheheavilyfortifiedvillagewhichwaslocatedashortdistancesouthofProkhorovka.zow168.At0412hrs in theGD sectoron thisWednesdaymorning,air strikesbegan.Afterwards, the

GDresumeditsadvancebutwasstoppedbyheavyartilleryfirealongtheline:Hill233.3-Hill240.2.Atthesametime,afterarocketpreparationandaLuftwaffeattackthatshatteredtheSovietanti-tankbrigade,the332ndIDadvancedintotheDolgiforestat1300hrsandby1630hrs,Hill240.2andthewoodswerecaptured.GDdestroyed28T34sandotherheavyfieldweaponsintheengagement.hjj124.hjj123m.At 0600 hrs on the western flank in 3rd PzD sector, Stukas came in and bombed Soviet

positionsbefore3rdPzDlaunchedadrivetostabilizetheirline.TheSovietscounterattacked,buttheseattackswerehalfheartedandwererepulsed.Intheafternoon,the3rdPzDmovedwestandenvelopedtheTolstoeForest,inwhichthe184thRDand219thRDhadassembled.PanzersfromGD supported 3rd PzD in clearing the forest. While the Soviet divisions suffered heavycasualties,manysoldierswereabletoescapetothewest.WiththisactiontheGDwasable to

closethegapthatwasbetweenthetwodivisions.Itstartedraininghardandlastedthroughoutthenightwhichcloseddownoperationsonbothsides.The3rdPzDdidsearchforSovietsurvivorsintheforest;itdidnotfindmanybutitdidfind70T34sthatgotstuckintheswampgroundandabandoned.Thissuccessfuloperationwasthelastoneof48thPzCandthe4thPzAofOperationCitadel. In the past two weeks, the panzer divisions had lost more than half of their fightingstrength.fkk256+.At 0600 hrs,GDmoved out as ordered toward thewest. The divisionwas configured into

threecombatgroups.Thefirstgroup,takingthemostnorthernroutewouldheadforHill247.0tosecurethedivision’snorthernflank.ThecentralgroupheadedstraightforHill243.0torecaptureitandtodestroythedefenders.ThesoutherngroupheadedforTolstoeWoodsthatranalongtheBerezovka-Kruglik road just north of Dolgi. This group attacking from the north, along withelements of 3rdPzDdriving from the south,were to encircle and thendestroy the tankers thatwerehidinginthewoods.Thenortherngroupdidnotexpectheavyresistanceuntilreachingtheroad to Kruglik but ran into counter-attacks from infiltrating reserves, slowing their progress.They never reachedHill 247.0. The center group did recaptureHill 243.0. The attack on thewoodswentwell. TheSoviet tankers came out to face the panzers butmanywere hit and thesurvivors returned to the woods where German artillery opened up on them causing greatercasualties.Inlateafternoon,thecombatgroupfromGDand3rdPzDmovedtowardBerezovkawhereSovietswerecausingmuchtrouble.fmz228.fmz227m.A local attack by elements of 3rd PzD and 52nd IC north of Berezovka, Rakovo line was

launchedtodisruptSovietforcesonthewesternflankwhenHothmadeafinalattempttocrossthePselRiverin48thPzCsector.TheattackgainedaboutamilebutfailedtodisruptSovietforces.dgr105+.dgr93m.IntheBerezovkasectorsouthofOboyanthePzGDcontacted3rdPzDandtheybothrepulseda

fierceSovietcounter-attackas theydrove toward theRakovo-Kruglikroadwhich3rdPzDhadlostthedaybefore.TheSovietswerenowsteppinguptheircounterattacks;theyhadevictedtheGermansfromHill247andrecapturedBerezovkafivemilesaway.NowTolstoeWoodsandHill258.5werebeingattacked.GDcounter-attackedthatstartedtopushtheSovietsbacktoHill240but the advance was stopped when it got within artillery range of the hill. dgk222m. fkk274.lck368.SouthofKruglik,theGDdivisionwaspreparingforanadvancewhenSovietbatteriesopened

uponit.ASovietattackfromthenorthandwestwererepulsedandafterwards,theGDadvancedtowardHill247butmade slowprogress.Otherunitsof the48thPzC joined inand routed theSovietsfromthearea.SeeMap8.TheGDwasorderedfromitscurrentpositionastridetheOboyanroadtojoinupwith3rdPzD

in an counter-attack against the 5th GA and 10th TC. The two-day attack launched from theRakovo-BerezovkaregiondecimatedtheSovietdefenders,aswellasthe6thTCthatgotintheway.Theentireforceinfrontofthisonslaughthadtoretreatalmost2miles.dgk219.dgr172m.dgk222m.Whilethe3rdPzDandGDwereontheoffensivealongTolstoewoodsandalongthewestern

flank, the11thPzDfoughtdefensivebattles throughout thewholeday.TheSovietscontinued toattack the boundary line betweenGD and 11th PzD’s west flank. Not having enough men or

panzerstodefendhissector,MicklwasforcedtouseartillerytostoptheSovietattacks.Hewassuccessful but by late afternoon, the division was almost out of ammo. If the Soviets hadcontinuedtoattack,Micklwouldhavebeenintroubleforhisresupplyarrivedlate.Tobridgethegapforthedelayoftheresupply,KnobelsdroffsentaheavymortarregimenttoMicklwhichwasgratefullyaccepted.gnk413.Whiletheinfantryof3rdPzDcompletedtakingDolgi, itspanzergrouphadfoughtitswayto

Hill240.2nearthenorthwestcorneroftheTolstoewoodsby1750hrs.The332ndIDwasthenorderedtoHill240.2asquickaspossible,tojoinupandrelievethepanzersof3rdPzDandGD,whichwerealsofightinginthearea.ThepanzerswereorderedtomovetoHill258.2toclosethecirclearoundTolstoewoods.Whentheassaultgunsof3rdPzDarrivedatHill240.2tolinkupwithDecker’sPanzerBrigade,Deckerwasnowheretobefound.Onhisowninitiative,Deckerdrove back to Berezovkawith his 18 Panthers to resupply and refuel. His actions once againcompletelydisruptedtheplansofKnobelsdorfftoencirclethestrongpoint.gnk412+.The8thFliegerCorpsflew1,452sorties thatday;mostof thesemissionswereagainst69th

Army,whichwasbeingsqueezedbyDasReichon thewestand3rdPzC to the southeast.VonMansteinwas trying to enclose the remainingSovietswithin this salient.The remainderof theflights assistedGD and 3rd PzD in copingwith the persistent attacks on theirwestern flanks.About1,000sortieswerebombersandtherestwerefighterattacks.TheHe111swereusingAB70bomb containers andSD50 fragmentation bombs onSoviet concentrations nearNovenkoe.Thecrewswouldcall thesefragmentationbombs“DevilEggs”whichcouldhaveadevastatingeffectoninfantryandtanks.Thesectorwasbeingdefendedbythe183rdTBandwasgivingthe3rd PzD a hard time. While the Red Air Force was absent, the German planes receivedtremendousgroundfire.Onlyoneplanewasdowned in this immediateareabutmanyreceiveddamageofvaryingdegrees.AnothersevenGermanplanesweredownedsupporting48thPzCthatday.The1stTAdidpreventGDand3rdPzDfromgainingmuchground,butitcostdearlyinmenandtanks.The8thFliegerCorpsreporteddowning31Sovietplanes,whichincludedsevenfromgroundfire.Theylost10planes.RespondingtothisincreasedGermanairactivity,theVVSalsoincreasedtheirmissionsandflew1,033sorties.cbk99+.nzk77.wwf90.LaterinthedayGDdivisiontriedtorecaptureHill243.0andHill247.0aswellastojoinup

with3rdPzDatBerezovka.Thecaptureofthehillswasinquestionalthoughthedivisiondidjoinupwith3rdPzDatBerezovka.TheforesttothenorthofBerezovkawasclearedattheexpenseofmanySovietdeadfrom5thGAand10thTCbutHill247remainedinSoviethands.VonMansteinwas trying to smooth out the line and stabilize it before the expected Soviet offensive waslaunched.ThisGermanoffensivewascalledOperationRoland.DasReichwastoattackontheIvanovka-Vinogradovka line and to capturePravorot.TheLAHwas to regroup and prepare tomovethroughIamkionProkhorovkawhentheotherforceswere in theirstartingpositions.TheSSTKwastoholditspresentpositionagainstallcounter-attacks.Atthesametime,the7thPzDand19thPzDweretoadvancefromtheirRyndinkabridgeheadandtotrapanddestroyallSovietsbetween theLipovyiDonets andDonetsRivers.The6thPzDwouldattackAleksandrovkaandnorthofVypolzovka as a flanking action. rc226. dgk219. dgk222m.vzz3m.dgr221m.wwf174.fmz221m.At 0100 hrs, fewer than 50 tanks from 26th GTBmoved out of Shakhovo toward Leski to

prevent the village from falling into 167th ID’s control. The 375thRDwas still garrisoned atShakhovo,fightingoff3rdPzC.Injustamatterofafewhoursitwouldstartafightingrearguardactiontothenorth.The2ndGTCwasstillputtingupstiffresistancedespitethemanycasualties.It was defending the line between Ivanovka, Vinogradovka, Maloe Iablonovo, Zhimolostnoe.vzz509.Breith had 7th PzD and 19th PzD join in order to attack from the Shcholokovo-Ryndinka

bridgehead theSovietswere trying to destroy.Then theywere to joinDas Reich between theLipovyiDonetsandtheNorthernDonetstoclearthearea,thenattackProkhorovka.The168thand167th IDswould followbehind toclear the stragglers.At the same time6thPzDwouldattackAleksandrovka,whichhad fallen to theSoviets earlier in theweek,Hill 222.1 and thenmovenorthandcaptureVypolzovka,justnorthofRzhavetsandeastoftheNorthernDonets.Thisactionwouldprotecttherestof3rdPzC’srightflank.Vatutinhadanticipatedhisassaultandhadsentthe5thGMCtostoptheattack.dgk219+.dgk222m.dlu63m.vzz494.vzz3m.dgr221m.At 0200 hrs, the 2nd GTC moved into their ordered position: Vinogradovka-Belenikhino-

Shakhovo-Pokrovkaand startedenhancing theirdefenses.Theywere tokeep the3rdPzC fromjoiningthe2ndPzC.Theyhadgathered80workingtankstogetthejobdone.vzz488.At0330hrs,DasReich resumed itsattack to thesoutheast fromIasnaiaPoliana,pushing the

89thGRDbackandtakingthehighgroundsouthwestofPravorot.Itpushedthe89thGRDbackuntil it bumped into 375thRDwhichwas trying to halt the advance of 7th PzD. Theweatherfinally improved, clearing by afternoon. At the same time the 3rd PzC drove north towardShakhovoandbeyondinanattempttolinkupwithDasReichtopocketasmuchof69thArmyaspossible.Thepocketdidnotworkasthefivedivisionsof69thArmywerealreadyfallingbacktoward the line that included Storozhevoe, Zhilomostnoe, Novoselovka (east) and Shipy. Thedivisionswouldcompletetheirfallbackby7/15.wdk166.hjj121m.dgr106.dgr93m.At 0500 hrs, the 6th PzD launched an attack toward Aleksandrovka but quickly met stiff

resistanceandhadtofallback.HunersdorfforderedthesPzAbt503tojointhenewattack.WithTigersinthelead,theGermanspenetratedtheSovietlineandfoughttheirwayintotown.AssaultgunsfollowedintotownandbeganasystematicprocessofdestroyingSovietresistancehousebyhouse.ThepanzersandassaultgunsfollowedtheretreatingSoviets,strafingthemwithMGfireaswell as running them down. 300 yards north of Aleksandrovka, the remnants of the SovietgarrisonassembledonHill241.3and tried tostop theGermanadvance.With theTigers in thelead,theSovietscouldnotstoptheGermansandquicklymovedoffthehill.Bake’spanzergroupcontinuedtoadvancepastthehillandbydarkhadreachedNovoKhmelevo.Bakehaddestroyedorcapturedover50tanksandassaultguns.gnk410.vzz12m.dlu126.At0700hrs,3rdPzC’spanzersbrokeoutoftheirDonetsbridgehead,butTrufanovwasableto

rally his forces and stopped theGermans aftermakingmodest gains.WhenTrufanov sawDasReich making gains in linking up with 3rd PzC, he ordered his forces back and away fromencirclement.Thiseasingofresistanceallowed7thPzDtolinkwithDasReichthenextdaybutitwas too late. Operation Roland would fail its primary objective of destroying 48th GRC ormovingonOboyan.lck380+.dgr105.NearSachovoat0700hrs,the19thPzDrepulseseveralattacksbySoviettankers.At1950hrs,

the19thPzDmetupwith7thPzDandtogetherattackedthefortifiedtownofSchachovofromthe

south.Astronganti-tankdefensewasovercomeandtheGermansmovedintothetownaswellasthenearbywoods.fkk290.SouthofProkhorovkaat0700hrs,aSovietattackfromShakhovoagainst7thPzDwasrepelled

nearRzhavets,southeastofProkhorovka.Anhourlater,nearby,theCOof6thPzD,Hunersdorff,was shot by sniper firewhile driving to the front and died three days later in the hospital atKharkov.Hewas45yearsoldandhad just received theKnight’sCrosswithOakLeaves.Thegeneraltookpartinthereliefattemptof6thArmythepreviousDecember.Hiswife,aRedCrossnurse, attended the funeral and delivered the eulogy alongwithGeneralHoth.ColonelUnreintookover6thPzDuntilapermanentreplacementwaschosen.TheSovietshadmanysnipersinthewarandtheykilledmanyGermans.pck87.dlu63m.fkk284+.fzk56.dgk201.zfk481.Afterfightingthroughoutthepredawnhours,at0730hrs,withsupportofaround30panzers,the

6thPzDbrokethroughthefrontlineandattackedtowardAvdeevkaandAleksandrovka,northeastof Rzhavets. Before reaching Avdeevka, nine panzers broke through the line and crested Hill222.1. While the 11th GMB and 12th GMB of 5th GMC, which was defending this Shipy-Avdeevka-Hill222.1line,triedtostop6thPzDfrombreachingthisline,the19thPzDwasabletofightitswayinandcaptureShipyafterdarkonthe14th.The6thPzDmadeseveralattemptstoreachAvdeevkabutfailedagainsttheunitsof35thGRCandof5thGMCofGroupTrufanov.BytheafternoontheSovietswerebeginningtostabilizethelineAvdeevka,Hill222.1,Hill241.5,butbyevening, thepanzerswereon theoutskirtsofAvdeevkaandhad tenuouslycapturedHill222.1. The 53rd GTR moved up to just behind the 92nd GRD and Group Trufanov in theAvdeevka,Aleksandrovkaarea.SeeMap23.vzz494++.vzz498.dgr221m.dlu126.dlu131.The 7th PzD finally caught up with 6th PzD, deployed in the Ryndinka bridgehead, by

assemblingtotheirleft.TheSovietswereassemblingastrikeforcenearAlexsandrovkaand6thPzDwouldhavetodefendagainsttheattack.AlltheTigersof3rdPzC(sPzAbt503)werebeingassembledwith6thPzDwithplanstopre-empttheSovietattackandtakeAleksandrovkawhilereigning havoc on the Soviets. The 19th PzD, the weakest panzer division in the corps, wasorderedtomoveupintothebridgeheadbutstaydefensive.The168thIDwasorderedtoadvancefromtheBelgorod-Prokhorovkaraillinetotheeastandjoin19thPzDbeforetravelingnorthandsqueezing48thRCagainstDasReich.At0700hrs,the6thPzDattackedtowardAlexsandrovka.Afterbeingdelayedatthetankditch,thepanzerswereabletoracetowardtheSoviettankersandout-maneuverandoutgunthem.Afterabriefstruggle,theT34sreversedcourseandheadedeast.The11thPzRwoundedupprisonersandacacheofweaponsasthetownwassecured.gnk408+.gnk397m.vzz12m.zzt91.The7thPzDwas trying to improve its position in theRyndinkabridgeheadwhen theywere

attackedby100tanks.The21panzersof7thPzDwereabletorepulsetheattackandadvancetoHill 222.1 which was captured by 1000. At the same time the 19th PzD advanced and thencapturedthevillageofShipy,abouthalfmilenortheastofRyndinka.TheSovietsregroupedandlaunched a counter-attack to retake Shipy. At the same time, the Soviets launched a massiveartillery barrage against Shcholokovo, south of Ryndinka, from a nearby woods. The GermanWerferRegiment52respondedwithaheavyrocketattackagainstthewoods.TheGermanFlakbattalionattachedto19thPzDusedits88s toaccuratelyhit thesmallgroupof tanksadvancingfromthewoodstowardthevillage.Theywerequicklyrepulsed.AcoupleofSovietfighterswho

wereflyingbyandjoinedtheassaultwereshotdownaswell.Evenwiththeseminorsuccesses,neitherofthepanzerdivisionsof3rdPzCwereabletolinkupwithDasReich.Kemptstillhadhopesof reachingPravorot andorderedhis panzers to continue their attacknextmorning.DasReichwasstillinchingitswaytowardPravorotbutwassufferingheavycasualtiesandwouldnotbeabletotakethevillageifitreacheditwithouthelp.gnk410+.vzz3m.Throughout the predawn hours and into the afternoon, the 35th GRC, defending in front of

KrasnoeZnamia,Avdeevka,AleksandrovkaandNovoKhmelevo, repulsed repeatedattacksby3rdPzCwith6thPzDinthelead.At0900hrs,thelargestattackyetwaslaunched.TheGermansgainedalittlegroundbutwereunabletomakemajorprogress.By1900hrs,Hill222.1(nexttoAvdeevka)andthenearbyvillageswerestillinSoviethandsandtheGermanattackwasfaltering.Bothsidessufferedheavycasualties.The48thRChadbeensqueezedbutnotencircledasHothwanted.vzz495+.OnthewestsideoftheDonets,panzersfrom7thPzDand19thPzDmetatShakhovo.The3rd

PzCwasnowsocloseto2ndSSPzCthattheirgunscouldbeheardfiringontheenemy.wdk167.vzz12m.Elements of 7th PzD attacked and captured the village of Krasnoe Znamia, southeast of

Rzhavets,aspartoftheplantoclearresistancefromtheRzhavetssector.fzk56.The6thPzDand7thPzDdefeatedaSovietcounter-attackasitdrovenorth.Itwasdecidedto

continuethedrivetothenorthwestandforgetaboutcapturingKorocha.The6thPzDstayedintheKazache-Aleksandrovkaarea toprotect thenorthern front,whilemostof7thPzDmoved to thenorthwest toward Das Reich. The 19th PzD would join the 7th PzD in the Shcholenkovo-SaverskayasectorandadvancetowardPlota.PlotaandZhilomostnoewereoccupiedbynightfall.TheGermans then encircled and tried reducing a Soviet force but failed to do so for lack oftroops,manyofthemescaping.The69thArmyescapedtotheeast.shn162+.dgk222m.dlu63m.West of theDonetsRiver, PzRGothenburg capturedPlota by a surprise attack.TheSoviets

counter-attacked,encirclingtheGermansinsidePlota.Otherelementsofthe7thPzDwereintheareaanddrovetheSovietsaway.fkk297.Later in theday,after repulsingaSovietcounter-attack, the19thPzDand7thPzDencircled

andrecapturedthewoodsandtownofShakhovo.AftersunsetthetwogroupscapturedthenearbytownsofPlotaandMaloeIablonovo,capturingPOWs.SeeMap8.dgk222m.dlu63m.Totheeast,the6thPzDand7thPzDcapturedAleksandrovka,eastofRzhavets,inflictingheavy

losses and driving the defenders further north. Counter-attacks weremade but were repulsed.wdk167.vzz12m.At night, the 3rdPzCwas ordered again by vonManstein to link upwithDasReich in the

morning and trap the 69th Army. The 6th PzD, which would lead the attack, had 69 panzersincludingsixTigersand12assaultguns.fkk285.At 2000 hrs after an air raid, the 3rd PzC, driving from the direction of Kleimenovo and

Shchololkovowith30panzers,attackedthe2ndGTCalongtheVinogradovkaandShakhovoaxes.Shakhovo fell by 2400 hrs. Another combat group with 40 panzers, coming from Ivanovka,capturedHill234.9.Aftersufferingheavycasualtiesthe2ndGTCfellbackalongitsentirefront.Lt General P.A. Rotmistrov transferred the 10th GMB to the Zhilomostnoe and Novoselovka(east)areasinordertostopDasReichasitadvanced.Duringtheday,theDasReichlaunchedan

attackagainst2ndTCalongtheStorozhevoeandPravorotaxisbutmadelittleprogress.dgr227.vzz502.vzz482.vzz12m.With the top command of 48th RC in chaos and separated from its divisions,Maj General

Shchelakovsky was sent to Plota at 2000 hrs to take control of the corps and get it runningsmoothlyagain.HewasorderedtosecureHill225.0andtheroadtoLeski.The375thRDwastobesenttothewestandsouthwestofIamkitoblockLAHfromreachingthere.The93rdGRDwastobedeployedsouthwestofShcholokovotoblocktheGermans’advance.The89thGRDwastobe sent toKleimenovo.All these deploymentsweremeant to stop theGermans from reachingLeskifromShcholokovoenmasse.vzz501.By the end of the day, and after repulsing many attacks from 3rd PzC, the 5th GMC still

retainedtheline:Shcholokovo-Vypolzovka-Avdeevka-Hill222.1.vzz498.dlu138.Thewithdrawal of 48th RC began at 2100 hrs. It went down in stageswith the 89thGRD

retreatingfirst,followedby81stGRD,93rdGRDand375thRD.Bydaybreakalldivisionswereon the road.By0700hrs on7/15, the 89thGRDwere setting up their newposition along theIamki-Gridino-Pokrovka-Kuzminkaline.ThistimelyretreatsavedthempartiallyfromtheassaulttheGermanshadplannedinthemorning.The375thRD,whichwasscreeningtheretreat,didgethitby3rdPzCwhichwasadvancing fromShakhovo towardMaloe Iablonovo.By0900hrs, asmallscoutingpartylinkedupwiththeleadingtroopsfromDasReichnearBelenikhino.Mostofthe375thRDmadeittoPravorot.vzz505+.During thenight, the74thPzGRof19thPzDattackedandcapturedShipy, situatedonahill,

northofRyndinka.ItmadeagoodOPfortheGermans.Itwasfortifiedwithartilleryandpanzers.Totheeast,the6thPzDrepeateditsattackonHill222.1notfarfromAvdeevka.vzz494.vzz12m.Bytheendoftheday,the3rdPzChadaccumulatedabout50panzersandseveralbattalionsof

menintheareaeastofShcholokovoandnortheastofShakhovo.TheywerepreparingtoadvanceinthemorningandhopefullylinkupwithDasReichinameaningfulway.vzz505.dlu133+.Besidestryingtopocketthe48thRC’sfourdivisionsbetweentheDonetsRivers,the2ndGTC

and the 5th GMC’s 11th GMB and 12th GMB were deployed in the Shipy, Avdeevka andVypolzovkaareaandmighthavebeentrappedalsoiftheywerenotcareful.ThesituationforthecorpsHQwasmadeworsebypoorcommunicationswithitsfront lineunitsand69thArmy,aswellasthefactthat48thRCwasrunningoutofammo.Elementsofthe89thGRDand375thRDwere sent to this area tohelpbolster the lineand reestablishcommunications.Elementsof the93rd GRD were being sent to the Shcholokovo-Plota line to relieve the weary troops in thetrenches. They would use Plota as their base of operations. These forces were now beingsqueezedbetweenthe6thPzD,7thPzDand19thPzDof3rdPzCinthesouthandDasReichand167thIDtothenorthandwest.vzz498++.dgr221.

D23

July14thontheNorthernSalienturing the predawn hours, the Soviet air force flew 259 sorties. The missions were acombinationofhittingGermaninfantryonthenorthernfrontline,aswellashittingcritical

railjunctionstotherear.Theseairattacksinthe11thGAsectorweregivencreditforhelpinginweakeningthelineandpushingthe18thPzDbackwhenthe11thGAlaunchedatdaybreak.TheGerman53rd IC had to fall back but part of the corps became isolatedwhen theSoviet tanksdrove past them. The 1stFlieger Division was urgently called to help free the trappedmen,northeastofOrel.Stukaswerequicklysenttoneutralizetheenemyinthesectortoallowthementofallbacktotheirline.WithoutanySovietinterferencefromtheair,theStukasweresuccessfulinopeningacorridor toallow themen to fallback.While thisepisodewas successful for theGermans,anotheronenearDudorovsky,southwestofBolkhov,wasnot.The1stFliegerDivisionlostsixplanestoasmallerSovietsquadron.Inanothersituation,agroupofIL-2sandPe-2sof1stVAattackedaconvoyofaround150vehiclesatZikeyevo,notfarfromZhizdra,claiminganunspecifiednumberoftrucksdestroyed.cbk90+.dgk231m.snk433m.The4thPzDwasordered to relieve20thPzD.Thepanzershadbeenorderednorth toassist

2ndPzAinstoppingthenewSovietoffensiveintheOrelsector.ModelorderedallunitstodiginandgodefensiveagainstSokolovsky’sWesternFrontandPopov’sBryanskFrontas theydrivetowardOrel.ModelalsosuspectedRokossovsky’sCentralFrontwould join theoffensive.TheGermanshadheld thisOrel salient fora long timeandwereable toerect strongdefenses toadepthofthreetofivemiles.ThetownsofOrel,Bolkhov,MtsenskandKarachevwereorganizedfor defense from all directions. TheGermans had 16 infantry and four armor divisions in thissalient.Butafter48hoursofconstantfighting,theRedArmyhadpenetratedthelineandencircledBolkhovinthenorthernsectionofthesalient.fkk70+.zzz101m.dgk87m.lck116m.The11thGAadvancedalongside the1stTCand5thTCwith the83rdGRCand26thGRD

right behind themagainst the 18thPzDwest ofYagodnaya.At the same time the 5thPzDwasforcedoutoftheforestwestofDudorovo.TheResertawasthencrossed,expandingthegapintheGermanlineto15milesfromMoilovoandtheVytebetRiver.fkk339.dgk231m.snk433m.IntheOrelsalient,theRedArmycontinueditsattack.Thistime,eightRDsandupto250tanks

attackedRendulic’s35thIC.The262ndIDcontinuedtogethammered,withagapopeningwhichallowed theSoviet tankers tohead forShelyabugSouthandShelyabugNorthwhere theHQof56thIDwaslocated,reachingtherebynoon.Atthelastminute,beforetheSovietscoulddestroythe German defenses, eight Ferdinands of sPzAbt 654 underMajor Noak arrived and startedshootingfrom2,000yards.15of the40T34sandKV1sweredestroyedbefore the tankersfellback.ThreeoftheFerdinandsreceiveddamagetotheirtracksandhadtobetowedaway.ButastheGermanstaffwascelebratingtheirrelief,18Stukascamedivingin,mistakenlybombingtheir

own forces.Many officers and troops were killed. The command post wasmoved to SytschibehindtheAleshnyaRiveraftertheincident.fkk357+.zzz101m.dgk231m.snk433m.NearOrel,the11thGAand11thArmywerebringingupreservestryingtocrushtheenemyas

Modelcontinuedhiswithdrawal.TheSovietairforceflewaheadoftheadvancinggroundforce.bt90.je113.zzz101m.dgk87m.SeeMaps22and28.The 2nd PzAwas giving support to 9thArmy butwith the current deep penetrations by the

Soviets,the9thArmyhadtocometotheiraidtoavoidannihilation.jp210.dgk87m.lck116m.In theOrel sector, the48th, 13th, 70th and2ndTA, supportedbymassive artillery, attacked

northwesterly towardGeneralModel’sArmieswhichnowcounted492,300 combat troops.Atthesametimethe3rd,63rdandthenewlyarrived3rdTAattackedeastofOrel.Thispinceractionintendedonencirclingthe9thArmyandthe2ndPzA.AtthispointalmostallGermanactionwasdefensiveintheKursk-Orelarea.zzz101m.kcz171.dgk231m.snk433m.IntheOrelsector,theWesternFrontbrought4thTAand11thArmytothelinetosupport11th

GA.TheBryanskFronthadbroughtup3rdGTAtosupport3rdand63rdArmiestocrushtheapexoftheGermansalient.TheGermanscontinuedtheirslowwithdrawal.je113.zzz101m.dgk231m.snk433m.Model continued to askOKH for reinforcements from outside the sector. Today a group of

fifteen Ju-52s arrived loaded with troops and landed at the Orel airfield. cbk93+. dgk231m.snk433m.Friessner’s23rdIC,Harpe’s41stPzCandGroupEsebeckhadallreceivedorderstoredeploy

asfastaspossibletotheOrelsalient.The20thIC,46thPzCand47thPzCremainedandhadtoexpandtheirsectorstocovertheentire9thArmy’sresponsibility.WhileLemelsonof47thPzCdisappointedModelasanoffensivecommander,hewasextraordinaryasadefensivecommanderin the northern section of the Orel salient, stationed between Ulianovo and Bolkhov whereelementsof11thGA,11thArmyand4thTAwouldtrypenetrateanddestroyhisforces.GeneralHarpe,whoModeltrusted,alsowasgivenlargeresponsibilities instoppingtheSovietassault.EastofbothLemelsenandHarpe,Model,whoknewofGeneralRendulicbyreputationonly,anAustrianwhoshowedhistalentedcapabilitiesthroughouttheentirewar,heldtogethertheEasternFrontwithhis35thICagainst48thArmy,63rdArmyandlater3rdTA.Rendulichadtocover80milesoffrontwithonaverageofonly2.5gunsandoneassaultgunpermile.Hetoowasgreatlyoutmatchedforhewasfacing,duringtheoffensive,upto1,400tanks.Theextensivetrenchsystemwastheonlythingthatsavedthefrontlineforcesinthosefirstdaysoftheoffensive.Thatandthethree experienced generals that frustrated the Soviet commanders for the whole offensive.snz258++.EastofOrel,the1stTCresumeditsadvanceandranintothe18thPzDand20thPzDandwere

halted. To the north of Orel, just east of Bolkhov and north of Ulianovo, Belov’s 9th GRCattacked the 53rd IC’s 208th and 34th IDs and despite advancing three or fourmiles, did notpenetrate theGerman line.Belovordered the20thTC into action in thehopesofbreaking theline. TheGerman infantrywith the help of the 12th PzDwas able to stop the tanks, inflictingheavycasualties.Stavkaorderedthepowerful3rdGTAtoBolkhovbutitwouldtaketwodaystogetthereandtheGermanswouldstabilizetheirlinebythen.dgk235.snk109.zzz101m.dgk231m.snk433m.

EastofOrel,MajGeneralPankov’s1stGTC(BryanskFront),drivingthroughthefirstdefensebelt,hitheadonwiththe12thPzDand18thPzDwhichstopped1stGTC’sprogress.Tothenorth,eastofBolkhov,LtGeneralBelov’sattackedtheboundarybetween208thIDand34thIDwithhis9thGRC’s12thRD,76thRDand77thRDanddespiteheavyresistance,theSovietswereabletodriveaboutthreemilesinward.dgk235.zzz101m.dgk231m.snk433m.IntheOrelsalient,the8thPzDmovedintoblockthe3rdand63rdArmies.Elementsofthe2nd

PzDwerealsocommittedthatwerecomingfromPonyriinpiecemealfashion.fkk339.zzz101m.dgr199m.dgk231m.snk433m.EastofOrel,eightRDsand250tanksagainattackedthe431stIR.30SturmIIIsandeightguns

hadjustarrivedtothelineandtogetherwereabletostoptheattack.Some120Soviettankswereclaimeddestroyed in thesector.Thedestructionwascausedbyfieldguns, flakgunsandaerialattacks,aswellaspanzers.Infantry,sneakingupontanksandusingcharges,alsodestroyedafewSoviettanks.snk222.zzz101m.dgk231m.snk433m.Around1400hrs,aflightofIL-2escortedbysevenYak-7BswereattackedoverBolkhovby

fourBf110s.TwooftheGermanplaneswereshotdownandtheothertwomovedoff.ThepilotsoftheYakswereFrench,fightingagainsttheGermans.Whilethisairbattlewasplayingout,the11thGA,nowwiththesupportofthe5thTCand1stTC,werepushingthe2ndPzAsouthward,causing a break in the line thatwas 25mileswide and 30miles deep.The 1stVA’s repeatedattackson the reinforcementsModelwas trying tobringup slowed theirprogress reaching thegap.AgroupofHe111’sfromOlsufyevoairfieldtothenorthwestofOrelwerescrambledwithorderstoslowthe11thGA’sadvancesothegapcouldbeplugged.cbk91+.dgk231m.snk433m.In 2nd Army sector repeated small attacks were repulsed by the 82nd ID and 88th ID,

especially at Rylsk. In the Orel sector, the 36th ID, 299th ID and 262nd ID were repeatedlyattacked and requested air support to reduce the pressure. These divisions were part ofRendulic’s35thICdeployedontheeastlineofthesalient.wdk167.dgk231m.snk433m.SoutheastofKochely,the234thPzGRwasfightingalldayagainstrepeatedSovietattacks.The

35th ICdestroyed100of the250 tanks that attacked thatday.Rendulicbelieved if theSovietsattackedagainthefollowingdayonthesamescaleasthelasttwodayshiscorpswouldcrumble.fkk358.dgk231m.snk433m.TothenorthoftheKursksalient,bothSovietpincersmadegoodprogresstowardOrelbut,by

theendof theday, theaction in theOrel areahadclimaxedasKlugewas forced togooff theoffensiveandwasnowfightingdefensively.TheGermanshellingcontinuedunabatedandwasabigfactorforslowingtheSovietoffensive.zzz101m.dgk231m.snk433m++.Approximately120mileseastofOrel,the3rdTAunderRybalkowasorderedtoNovosiland

bepreparedtoenterbattleatamoment’snotice.Forty-eighthourslater,thetanksstartedarrivinginthewoodsjusteastofNovosil.The12thTC,15thTCand2ndMCeachtookseparateroadstothis destination.The 91stTB and the 50thMotorcycleRegimentwere trailing butwould soonreachNovosilshortly.The3rdTAhad475T34s,224T70s,492gunsand37,200men.Novosilwas38mileseastofOrelandjustoutsideoftheGermanline.The2ndMCwasanewadditiontothe3rdTA.zra180+.While the previous day saw many downed planes of the Red Air Force, this day saw a

complete turnaroundof fortunes,withmoreGermanplanesbeingdestroyed thanSovietplanes.

Russia claimed destroying 100 German aircraft but that figure is exaggerated. The Germansclaimedlosing38planesandtheactualtotalisprobablyclosertothatnumber.TheVVSreportedlosing20planes.With this day’s successes, theVVSbegan taking control of the skies. cbk92.dgk231m.snk433m.Inthenorththe1stFliegerDivisionflew979sortieswhichincludedtargetingpositionsinthe

Orelsalient.nzk77.The3rdTAisredesignated3rdGTA.

A24

July15thontheSouthernSalientccording to Hans-Joachim Jung, 4th PzA destroyed 2,000 tanks and 2,000 guns duringOperationCitadel.hjj130.

Hitler ordered AGC to quit offensives along its entire front. OKH withdrew 4th PzA andKempfCorpstonewdefensivepositionstothewest.GermanforcesintheBelgorodareaweretransferredtoOrel.zzz101m.ItisclaimedbysomethattheonlymajorstrategicmistaketheSovietsmadeatKurskwasthe

deploying ofmore assets in the north than the south. Thismost likely had to dowith Stalin’sobsessionthatHitlerwouldtryagaintocaptureMoscow.Whilethissimplisticassessmentistrueitdoesnotexplain thewhole truth, the reasons forwhichwillbeexpanded in the lastchapter.gjz198.TheSovietsbegananewassaulttopenetratetheOrelsalientandheadforBryanskalongthe

Tereben-Bryansk railroad. The 707th ID and other units were defending the area. snk113.zzz101m.TheGermanslaunchedanothercampaignagainstthepartisans,intheareabetweenVilnaand

Polorsk,namedOperationHermann.During the predawn hours from east of Hill 252.2, the LAH panzer group assembled and

preparedtolaunchanattackatdaybreaktowardIamkiinordertosupportSSDR’sattacktowardPravorot.Thedivisionhad46workingpanzersincludingeightTigersbutfourwouldstaynearthehill to safeguard the column’s rear as it headed east. As the panzers began their trek towardIvanovka,aheavyrainstartedandthepanzersweredrasticallyslowedbythemuddyroads.By0900hrsHothhad tocancel theattackeastward toprepareforOperationRoland.Thepanzersturnedwestagain,butbythistimetheRedAirForcediscoveredtheconvoyandharassituptodark.ItwasacompletewastedtripfortheLAHpanzers.Thegrenadierswhostayedbehindhadabusydayfightingoffnumerousaerialattacks,artilleryshellingandinfantryattacks.TheGermanflakgunswerebusyagainst thenumeroussorties.TheRedAirForceowned theskiesbynow,withtheLuftwaffelosingsomanyplanessincethestartofthecampaignthattheylosttheiredge.TheLAHdivisionsuffered130casualties.Thegoodnewswas that thepanzermechanicswereable to repairadozenpanzersandby theendof theday, thepanzercounthad increased to62includingnineTigers.gnk418.Duringthepredawnhours,byorderofGeneralHausser,allavailablecorpsartillerywasbeing

senttotheDasReichsectortoassistthedivisionintakingPravorot.Themovementoftheheavyequipmentwasbeingslowedby themuddy roadscausedbyanotherheavy rain storm.gnk396.gnk397m.kuz193.VonMansteinorderedHoth to implementOperationRoland, requiringamajor redeployment

thatmorninginordertolaunchtheattacklaterintheday.VonMansteincontinuedtounderestimateVatutin’s forces andRoland,whichmademodest gains, ultimately failed.The48thPzCwouldresumeitsadvancenorthwardtowardOboyan.TheLAHwouldwithdrawfromthecorridorandmove behind the 48th PzC and become their reserve.Das Reich would give up its east flankposition and move west to the 11th PzD’s position. SSTK would defend the entire east flankpositionwhile11thPzDwouldmovetotheoldLAHpositionatthemouthofthecorridor.The7thPzDwouldleave3rdPzC,movewestanddeployin11thPzD’soldposition.Therestof3rdPzCwouldmovewestoftheDonetsandprotecttheriverline.TheobjectiveonceagainwouldbetotravelonbothsidesoftheOboyanroadandcaptureOboyan.48thPzCwouldbeontheleftandDasReichand11thPzDontheright.OnthewaytoOboyan,1stTAwouldbeisolatedfrom5thGTAand destroyed.OperationRolandwas a crazy, desperate plan of redisposition that nevermaterialized.Theplanwouldprobablyhavebackfired terribly if ithadbeen throughlyput intoaction.gnk417.sgf351.Theweatherwascloudywithsporadicheavyrains.Bothsideshadtroublemovingtroopsand

littleairactivitywasallowed.The3rdPzCandDasReichresumedtheirjointrunuptheDonetsfromlastnight.Despiteheavyrain,DasReichadvancedeastofVinogradovkaandIvanovkaat0500 hrs, pushing the 375th RD. By noon, the Soviets were aware of Das Reich andreinforcementsarrivedtostopfurthermovement.DasReichclaimeddestroying12tanks.The7thPzDpushedaheadontheleftflankof3rdPzCandmetupwithDasReichatMaloeIablonovoby1420 hrs. The gapwas closed between the two corps, shortening the front and freeing up the167thIDandotherelementsofDasReich.ExceptfortakingthehillnorthofGostischtschevwiththe support of the 168th ID, the 167th ID had little activity and claimed destroying only threetanks.TheLAHwasstalledatPravorot,southofProkhorovkabythe69thArmy’sheavyshelling.wdk167+.hjj121m.At0530hrs,the3rdPzDlaunchedanotherattackonTolstoeWoods.The394thPzGRattacked

theeasternedgeof thewoods,while thepanzergroupattacked from thesouth.With the recentheavyrains,thegroundinandaroundthewoodswasdifficulttotravel.GDpanzerswereonthenorth side. Initially, Soviet resistancewas stiff but eventually theGermans entered thewoods.Elementsof332ndIDarrivedandpushedintothesouthwestquadrant,forcingthedefendersbackfurther. The Germans finally had control of the woods.Much of the Soviet force had left thewoodsduring thenight,headingnorthwhereDeckerhadvacatedhispositionagainstorders totravelbacktoBerezovka.gnk421.TorelievesomeofthepressureoffDasReichinitsattempttoreachPravorot,the1stPzGRof

LAH launchedat0230hrseastward, trying to reachHill234.9,eastof Ivanovka.Assaultgunssupported the men and were instructed to assist 2nd PzR in its advance northward towardPravorot.WhenMajGeneralWischlearnedthatover100tankshadassemblednearMikhailovka;itseemedprettyclearthatthisformationandtheconcentrationoftanksatIamkimeantthatVatutinwasplanningatwo-prongattack,withtheobjectiveofisolatingLAHfromSSTKandDasReich.The general immediately canceled the advance by 1st PzGR towardHill 234.9with orders toreturnbacktotheStorozhevoeareaandstaydefensive.Alittlelaterat0600hrs,GeneralKrugerwas instructed to cancelDas Reich’s advance toward Ivanovka-Vinogradovka. The division,whichwasontheridgewestoftheintendedlineandwhenitreceivedtheneworders,stopped

immediatelyandwentdefensive.zrl244+.Despiteheavyrainsat0600hrs,DasReichhadalreadylaunchedOperationRolandwith the

objectiveofdrivingclosertoProkhorovkaandlinkingupwith3rdPzCwhichwasdrivingwest.TheirfirstobjectivewasthehighgroundsouthwestofPravorot,butthesectoreastofBelenikhinohad to be cleared first. After securing Belenikhino, Das Reich had moved on and capturedIvanovkaandbynightfall,DasReichwasapproachingPravorot.Notwanting toattackso late,DasReichduginforthenightandwouldattackinthemorning.Duringtheday,7thPzDwasabletolinkupwiththesouthernflankofDasReichbut6thPzD,afterfightingallday,failedtocaptureAleksandrovka.By0600hrs,7thPzDhadcapturedthevillageofMaloIablonovo, justwestofPlota,beforelinkingupwithDasReich.Laterthatmorning,the167thIDalsolinkedupwithDasReich, strengthening the line a little.The linking up ofDasReichwith 3rd PzC trapped someelementsof69thArmyand two tankcorpsbetween the rivers: betweenRzhavets,Belenikhinoand Gostishchevo. The Luftwaffe still covered air support for Das Reich. mhz359+. vzz3m.vzz5m.vzz12m.zow170+.Hoth ordered all front line units to dig in and stay defensive unless specifically ordered to

attack.Healsoorderedalldamagedpanzersandtanksthatwerenotimmediatelyrecoverabletobedestroyed.Theseweretwoclearsignsthat theoffensivewasoverandthatHothexpectedacounter-attack soon.Das Reich had been ordered to capture the fortified village of Pravorot,whichHothsawasthekeytotakingProkhorovka.WithoutPravorot,southoftheimportantrailvillage,Prokhorovkawouldneverfall.Aspartofimprovingtheline,HothorderedKempftotakeHill249.2.wdk168+.mhz361.zow171.The SSTK bridgehead was attacked again. The Veselyi area as well as the terrain east of

Mikhailovkawerebothattackedthatdaybysmallforces.kuz218.ztc271.TheTigerCompanyofLAHnowhadeightworkingTigers,whichwereguardingtherailline

notfarfromTeterevinoNorth,butitwasafairlyquietday.agk129.After discovering a large buildup of Soviet forces south ofKharkov, the 8thFlieger Corps

deliveredabombingrunonthosepositionssouthofIzyum.WhiletheRedAirForcewasgettingstrongerthepastfewdays,itcouldbesaidtheytookcontroloftheskiesonlyonthisdayanddidnotrelinquishit.ThesituationintheOrelsalientwasgettingworseand8thFliegerCorpshadtoshiftplanesnorthtokeepthesalientfromcrumbling.ItwouldnotbeabletomakespecialrunssouthwhileModelandvonMansteinwereinvolvedwithCitadel.cbk100.InSSTKsector,itrainedallmorningandthegrenadiershadnorelieffromSovietartilleryor

therain.TherocketregimentatGresnoereturnedfirebutitwasnomatchfortheSovietshelling.TheirtwobiggesttargetswereMikhailovkaandAndreevka,bothnortheastofVasilevka.The5thGA made repeated attacks on Mikhailovka which was defended by the 6th PzGR, the EickeRegiment,but failedeach timetopenetrate the line.During thepredawnhours, theSovietshaddoubledtheirdefenseswithwireobstacles,moretrenchesandprobablymoremines.VatutinwasmakingsurethatiftheGermanstriedanotherattackthatitwouldfail.InthepasttwoweekshehadnotpleasedStalinwithhisperformanceandVatutinwasmakingsurethatnofurthercriticismcouldbeleviedonhim.Generally,thesectorwasfreeofSovietinfantryortankattacksthatday.Theoneexceptionwasinlatemorning,around1100hrs,whenasmallcommandoraid,supportedby several tanks south of Hill 226.6, penetrated the line. Once German artillery was alerted,

quickandaccurateshellingstoppedtheattackandtheSovietsretreated.gnk420.vzz1m.kuz193.kuz218.At0500hrs,DasReich launchedanattackeastward in theVinogradovka-Ivanovkaareaand

wasable topush the375thRDbacka little.Hothwas still trying to encircle asmuchof69thArmy between 2nd SS PzC and 3rd PzC but the advance was still too slow and would notsucceed.wdk168.vzz12m.Formostofthemorning,DasReich’sReitzenstenstruggledtogethispanzersthroughthethick

mud.HewastryingtoadvanceonandattackPravorotbutitlookedlikehewouldnotreachhisobjectivethatday.Behindthecolumnofpanzers,theconvoyofpersonneltrucksandammotruckswerehavinganevenmoredifficult timeandwere falling furtherbehind.Bymidmorning,DasReich’sDerFührerRegiment entered the village ofLeskiwhere themen of the 167th IDhadalready arrived.Bymidday, a few panzers of the 7th PzD, after breaking out of theRyndinkabridgehead,wouldalsoarrive.TheSovietshadalreadyfallenbacktowardthenorth.FromLeski,areconpatrolofDasReichtravelednorthontheroadtoPravorotanddiscoveredby1100hrs,minefieldsandfurtheraheadtankditchesandstrongfortificationsinfrontofthevillageonHill247.2.TheLuftwaffe,informedofHill247.2,wasmakingpreparationstosupporttheattackthatafternoon.Theairattackscamearound1400hrs,butwithinterferencefromtheRedAirForce,theGerman attackwas ineffective.TheDeutschlandRegiment advancing southofDer Führerhad harsher terrain east of Vinogradovka andwasmakingworse progress. Kruger decided todelaytheattackuntilearlynextmorning.gnk419.zrl244.Itstartedrainingagain,makingall theroadsmuddyandharder to travel than thedaybefore.

Haussersentorderstohisdivisionstostop,diginandgodefensive.fkk172.kuz218.Elementsofthe69thArmythatwerepotentiallytrappedinthesalientbetweenthetwoDonets

Riversmade it to the Storozhevoe-Zhilomostnoe-Novoselovka (east)-Shipy line and out of thegrasp ofDas Reich and 3rd PzC. Novoselovka was about four miles east of Zhilomostone.dgr106.GeneralHausserorderedhismeninthefieldtoweartheirsteelhelmets.Inthepastfewdays

in the scorchingheat, themen inquiet sectorswerenotwearing theirhelmetsanda surprisingnumber were being killed by Soviet snipers. To stop this senseless killing, Hausser feltcompelledtoissuetheorder.zow170.The bulk ofDas Reich resumed its attack against 2ndGTC, 10thGMB and 11thGMB but

gainedonlyalittleground.ADasReichRegimentwasabletolinkupwithKempf’s3rdPzCand7th PzD. This joining effected a loose encirclement and potential destruction of some Sovietforces in theGostishchevo-Leski area, but this tactical success could not salvage the strategicfailureofCitadel.The increasedpressure in theOrel area forcedModel to forgetCitadel andconcentrate on saving his Army Group from encirclement, and vonManstein could not attainvictorybyhimself;hewouldcontinuetheoperationfordaystokeeptheSovietsbusyinthesouthand towringoutasmuchdestructionon theSovietsaspossible.Citadelwasfinished.dgr227.rc226.zzz101m.vzz3m.vzz5m.Afterdarkelementsofthe287thGRRof95thGRDmadeacommandoraidinthehopeofat

least capturingPOWswith themainobjectiveof capturingHill 226.6.The287thGRRalmostmadeittotheKliuchi-PolezhaevroadbeforebeingstoppedbyheavyMGfire.The290thGRR

wastaskedtocaptureKliuchi,southwestofHill226.6,butthatattemptfailedalso.ItmadeittotheoutskirtsofthevillagebutthenhadtopullbackduetotheheavymortarandMGfire.vzz467.gnk312m.Priessreceivedanordertoevacuatethebridgeheadduringthepredawnhoursof7/18andto

movesouthofthePselRiver.kuz193.ztc271.By1200hrs,DasReich had reached themarshes nearVinogradovka andwere immediately

assaultedbyartilleryonnearbyHill242.7.ThehillgavetheSovietsahugeadvantageplustheaddeddifficultyofthemarsh,andDasReichdecidedtopullbackoutofrangeandwaitfordark.Itwouldtrytotakethehillthatnight.zow171.In a surprise attack at night, the 32nd MRB of 18th TC captured the eastern outskirts of

VasilevkaandtheslopesoftheheightsrunninguptotheroadsoutheastofOktiabrskiStateFarm,whichimproveditsposition.Thiswasaccomplishedat0200hrson7/16.dgr228.The2ndSSPzCclaimedanother44tanksandfiveplanesdestroyed,alongwithcapturingonly

344POWs.Inthe48thPzC’ssector,theSovietsshelledGermanpositionsbutthe3rdPzDstillengaged the10thTC,claiming tohavedestroyed60 tanks.The sector in frontof52nd ICwasquietbuttheSovietscontinuedtoharassColGeneralWalterWeiss’2ndArmytothewest.Thistime82ndIDdefendedagainstrepeatedsmallattacks,losingtwotanks.wdk168.The5thGTA,amongothersupportingunits,attackedandstoppedtheadvanceof4thPzAinits

attempt to reachProkhorovka from thewest, forcing it on the defensive.TheGerman columnscoming from the south of the city were also stopped. This ended the German assault onProkhorovkaaswellastheBattleforKursk.TheGermanshaduseditslastreservesandthoughtheSovietshadnotwon,theyclearlyhadtheadvantage.At2130hrs,GroupWoestmovedtheirassaultgunstothewesternslopeofHill252.2togive

support to1stPzRofLAH and the flakguns thatweredeployed there to safeguard thepanzersagainstairattack.zrl245.AttheendofthedayLAHreported21dead,114woundedand16missing.Itwasalsoreported

toGeneralHauser thatLAH still had 47 panzers (no Tigers) and 41 assault guns. TheLAH’srepair shop hadmoved to LuchkiNorth on 7/12 and had done an impressive job of returningdamagedpanzersbacktothefield.AreportwasgiventoMajGeneralWischstatingthedivisionhaddestroyed500enemytankssincethestartoftheoperation.zrl245.WithalltheSovietdeploymentsofthelasttwodays,thelinesintheProkhorovkasectorwere

stabilizing.ThiswouldbethelastdaytheGermansmadeanygainsinthissector.vzz512.Inthesouththe8thFliegerCorpsreportedflying706sortiesandlosingfiveplanes.nzk77.In the morning north of the TolstoeWoods, the Soviets attackedGD along the Berezovka-

Kruglik road. The remaining panzers of GD counter-attacked, surprising the attackers. TheyheadedforNovenkoeandengaged.Inashortbattle,theSovietslostadozentanksbeforefallingback.gnk422.Itwasa fairlyquietdayforGD. Inoneengagement,16T34sweredisabled. In theswampy

area between Verkhopenie and Tolstoe woods, a large number of abandoned T34s and KV1swere discovered mired in the thick mud. Not having the facility to recover these tanks,GDdestroyed them.ThePantherRegiment ofLauchert ofGD reported having destroyed over 400tanksinthetendaysending7/14.Inadditiontothetanks,manycars,trucks,rocketlaunchersand

mortarswerealsodestroyed.hjj126+.dgr209m.Laterthatnight,3rdPzDwasorderedtorelieveGDnorthandwestofTolstoeWoodsand11th

PzDwasordertostayinplace.gnk422.The11thPzDhadonceagainbeenindefensivemode,beatingbackrepeatedattacksthroughout

thedayandnight.ThefirstSovietattackbeganat0500hrsontheireastflankneartheSolotinkaRiverandHill227.0.ThishillwasnotfarfromKochetovka.Germanartilleryfirewasabletostop the assault.TheSoviets fell back to regroup and then in early afternoon attacked the lineagain.Again,Germanartillerystoppedtheattack.Accurateartilleryfirefor thepast threedayssavedthe11thfromdestruction.gnk422.The 1st TA in the Rakovo-Berezovka area had to go on the defensive and wait for

reinforcements from the 6th GA and 5th GA. The following night it was sent to the rear toregroup.VonMellenthinremarkedthatthedangeroussituationon48thPzC’sleftflankhadbeenrectified temporarily.Of the 180+ Panthers that actuallymade it to the battlefield, only a fewremained. The German forces were spent while the Soviets still had reserves. In reality theGermanshadlittlechancetomakeittoKurskandwhen2ndSSPzCwasrecalled,allhopefaded.KatukovaskedVatutin for replacement tanksbutwas told therewerenotany readilyavailableand that therepairshopswouldhave to recoverandrepair tanksfromthebattle field.dgk219.dgr172m.dgk222m.zra63.ThecostofCitadelhadbeensteepforbothsides.TheGermansclaimroseto32,000POWs,

85,000casualtiesinflictedand2,000tanksand2,000gunsdestroyed.TheSovietsonlyhad1,500tanksleftintheKurskarea.TheGermanshadbeenhithardaswell.Forinstance3rdPzDhad30panzersleftwhile7thPzDhad60and19thPzDhadonly17.Somevehicleswereintherepairshop.TheGDhadlost220ofits300panzers,while2ndSSPzClost242ofits425panzersandassaultguns.The3rdPzChaddestroyedthreeRDs,oneRBandthreeTBs.ItbadlymauledfourotherRDsandoneTR.Itcaptured10,000POWsanddestroyedorcaptured334tanks,101guns.Itwasestimatedthat3rdPzClost142ofits243panzers.bt91*.shn165+.shn173.At0100hrs,aGermancolumnsupportedbypanzersmovedfromShakhovotowardLeski.By

0900hrsanothercolumnfrom3rdPzCcontinuedtogainground,capturingMaloeIablonovoandPlota.TheGermansquicklystartedmovingmenandpanzersup fromShakhovowhichhad justbeencaptured.Theleadunitsofthe167thIDhadhelpedintakingthevillagesandnowtherestofthedivisionwasmovingupaswell.UnabletocaptureProkhorovka,theywantedtocompletethecircle around 48thRCbut by this time the 48thRChadmoved further north and incapable ofbeingpocketed.Ontheotherhand,Vatutinwantedtokeepabridgeheadontheriversasajumpingoffpoint forhismajoroffensivewhenStavkagavehim thegreen light.The168th IDwasstillmakingprogressalongtherailroadline.Hothwasfinallyrealizingthatthe48thRChadescapedthepocketandorderedDasReichtoturnnorththenextdayandcapturePravorot,fourmilessouthof Prokhorovka.LAH panzers would join in if SSDR neared the town. Operation Roland, thebrainchildofvonManstein,wouldchangeall this;acomplete redeploymentwould takeplace.vzz502.gnk417.zow171.At 0200 hrs, elements of the 107th RD and 94thGRD launched a disruptive attack toward

Raevka,VerkhniOlshanetsandShliakhovo, inordertodiluteGermanstrengthagainst48thRC.The Soviet force was stopped before reaching any objective and were forced to fall back to

Novoselovka (east), where theywere able to repel two attacks. The 94thGRD did reach theoutskirtsofShiliakhovobutthenwithdrewtotheirstartingpositions.vzz506.dgk231m.snk433m.Duringthepredawnhours,aregimentofmotorizedinfantryandanumberofpanzersregrouped

justoutsideofShakhovo.Whileitwasstilldark,thisgroupleftShakhovoandheadedforLeski,in the attempt of linking upwithDas Reich. Just before dawn anotherGerman force attackedtoward Plota andMaloeLabonovowhichwas being reinforced.After a three hour fight, bothtownsfelltotheGermans.vzz502.In thepredawnhours, the7thPzDwas redeployed to theTschurssinoarea, threemiles from

their old position of Schachovo where they performed a screening action against increasingSovietresistance,alongtheLipovyiDonetsRiverintheSoshenkov-Tarnovkasector.AfewunitsmovedtoGostischtschevo,furthertothewest.fkk297.At0600hrs,leadelementsofDasReichmetupwith19thPzDatShakhovo.Withoutresting

they joined forces and attacked the26thGTBsouthwest ofPlota.Soviet positionsnearMaloeIablonovo were also attacked. Both defenses had to pull back in the general direction ofNovoselovka (east).Theonly remaining combat-ready corps, the5thGMC,wasdefending thelineHill222.1-Shipy-Plota-Zhimolostnoe.Ontheeasternsideoftheline,the11thGMBand12thGMB was defending against the 6th PzD and 7th PzD who were driving from Rzhavets-Avdeevka. A little to the west near Zhimolostnoe and Maloe Iablonovo, which the Germansdesperatelywanted, the 10thGMBwas holding on but by 0850 hrs, the Soviet tankerswouldhave to fall back from both villages. The Germans, probably elements of 7th PzD, had out-maneuveredthe11thGMBandwerealsomovingtowardPokrovka(east).vzz510++.dgr221m.Vatutin believed the bestway to stopKempf’s advance and to prevent 48thRC from being

encircledwas torecaptureShakhovo,whichwascentrally located to theGermanadvance .TothewestornorthwestofShakhovo,Leski,PravorotandIamkiwasalsoorderedtobetakenandheld at any cost.Heordered a combined all-out effort from5thGTA,69thArmyand2ndAirArmytoretakeandholdthevillages,drivingfromthelinethatgenerallyfollowedVinogradovka,Maloe Iablonovo, Gridno, Hill 235.0 and Ryndinka. By this point, all three armies weredrasticallyweakened andwould be unable to achieve their orders.By the end of the day, theGermanshadcapturedVinogradovkaandLeskiandsecuredShakhovo.The48thRCmovedbackand erected new defenses along, but not including, the Zhimolostnoe-Maloe Iablonovo-Leski-Shakhovo line.The2ndGTCwasordered into thatarea.Elementsof29thTCwasordered toholdthelinethatincludedPravorot,IamkiandeastofVinogradovkavzz503++*.The168thIDwastransferredtotheKazacheareainordertorelievethepanzerswhichcould

beredirectedtothenorthwest.The167thIDarrivedwestoftheDonetstosupportthe19thPzD.Together,theGermanswereabletorepulseSoviettankattacks.shn164.dlu63m.Withthe375thRDactingasrearguardfortheretreating48thRC,itwasattackednotfarfrom

ShakhovobyaGermancolumncomingfromMaloeIablonovoandby0900hrs,asecondGermancolumncoming fromBelenikhino joined thebattle.The375thRDcontinued to fall backwhilefightingalongtheSukhaiaPlotaravinetowardPravorot.Thedivisionalgunswhichwerefurthernorthstoppedtheirretreatandgavesupporttotheinfantry.Whenallfourdivisionsreachedtheirdestination, the linewas formed about 1,000meters east of the front line. The 375thRDwasbetween Storozhevoe-Zhimolostnoe. The 81st GRD was east of Dalnil while the 89th GRD

defended fromNovoselovka toGnezdilovka. The remaining units fell back to second echelon.vzz506+.That morning, the divisions of 48th RC started arriving at their new positions along the

Pravorot-Zhimolostnoe-Novoselovka line. It included the375thRD,93rdGRD,81stGRDandthe183rdRD.vzz507.The96thTBandelementsofthe5thGTAattacked3rdPzCinwhichthebattlelastedintothe

night.TheGermansrepulsedtheSovietattack,inflictingheavylossesontheSoviets.TheTigercrewsclaimeddisabling100tanks.At1440hrsafterfightingallday,the7thPzDreachedMalyeIablonovoandlinkedupwithDas

Reich. The gap between the two German corps had loosely closed which shortened the line,freeingupthe167thIDandpartofDerFührer(SSDR).Elementsof the167thIDworkedwith168th ID and captured the high ground north of Gostishchevo. These small victories werehappeningtoolateinthecampaignandwouldhavelittlestrategicmeaning.Vatutinhadmovedhis69thArmyfurthernorthtoblockthewaytoPravarotandProkhorovka,preventingLAHandDasReichfromadvancingonthoseobjectives.wdk168.vzz12m.vzz3m.The3rdPzCcontinuedtochipawayatthe35thGRCastheypushedtowardVypolzovkaand

NovoKhmelevoe,but theGermanscontinuedtofail togaincontrolof thevillages.Nearby, theGermans had, by 0900 hrs, gained control of Plota but the 10th GMB and the 51st GTR justarrivedonsceneandbegantoattacktheGermansbeforesuitabledefenseswereerected.The3rdPzCbeganthedaywithlessthan75workingpanzersincludingsixTigers.vzz512.vzz502.fzk56.Aftertwodaysofbitterfightingwith7thPzDand19thPzD,thefivedivisionsof69thArmy

werenearly encircledandVatutin finallygavepermission towithdraw to the east.Theassaultbegan in the Iasnaia Poliana and Schchelakovo regions and moved into Shakhovo, where theSovietsdisengagedandretreatedtotheStorozhevoe-Zhilomeste-Novoselovka(east)-Shipyline.dgk220.dgk184m.Operation Roland began this morning, with 7th PzD and 19th PzD moving west from the

RyndinkabridgeheadtolinkupwithDasReich,whichwasstillfightingnearPravorot.The167thID and 168th IDwould support the panzers.At the same time the 6thPzDwould drive to thenortheast towardAleksandrovka, acting as a flank blocker. The 7th PzDdid link upwithDasReichthatday,butitwasthreeorfourdaystoolate.Ifthelinehadbeenjoinedbefore7/12,DasReich,with3rdPzCscreeningitsrightflank,wouldhavehadabetterchanceoftakingPavrovotandassistingLAHintakingProkhorovka.The168thIDcouldalsohavebeenofgreaterhelpforDasReich.SSTKhadbeendefendingitself throughoutthenightandmorningalongthePselandhad not the time to redeploy which disrupted von Manstein’s new plans. mhz358. lck378.gnk417+.dgr221m.kuz193.vzz12m.ThoughOperationCitadelhadbeencanceled,vonMansteinstillwantedtopursuetheenemy

anddestroyasmuchofitforaslongashisforceswereable.However,thattimewasjustaboutoverandvonMansteinwouldberequiredtowatchoverAGS’sretreat,justashedidduringthewithdrawalfromStalingrad.For the past few days, Das Reich had been driving east trying to reach and control the

importantIvanovka-Belenikhino-Vinogradovkaridgelineandthatobjectivewasaccomplishedonthisdayby1200hrs.Fromtheridge,apatrolwassentouttotheeasttowardMalIablonovoto

reconthearea.At1420hrs,thispatrolmetupwith7thPzD,drivingnorthfromtheDonetsRiver.ThepocketthatvonMansteinwantedsobadlywasbeginningtoclosebuttheproblemwasitwasclosingmuchtoolateandtherewerenotmanyenemytroopsinthepocket.zow170.Just as in the south against 198th ID in theBatratskaiaDacha area,Vatutin also thought that

furthernorthintheKazachesector,the168thIDwastheeasiestwaytopenetratetheeasternline.The last few days and days to come, 7th GA would make repeated attacks against Germaninfantry.IfGeneralVatutinfeltthisway,whydidherejectproposalsforamajorassaultinthissectoronorabout7/12?dlu123.Thatnightelementsofthe2ndSSPzCjoinedupwith7thPzDof3rdPzCintheGostischevo-

Leski area and destroyed the Soviet complement that were encircled, but the bigger salientbetweenHoth’sandKempf’sforceswasstillintact.Thefactis,vonMansteindidnothavetheforcesortimetoliquidatetheentiresalientandstillfightofftheSovietsassaultsfromoutsidethesalient. Though the 7th PzD had succeeded to gain ground,most of 69thArmy alongwith 5thGMCwasabletowithdrawfromtheareaaswellaskeeptheGermansoutofPravorot.Bytheendoftheday,theLAHwasdownto57panzersandtheothertwodivisionsof2ndSSPzCwerenotmuchbetter.TheLAHestimatedthattheyhaddestroyed501tanksinthecampaignwhilethewhole SS corps destroyed 1149. Late at night Priess was ordered to prepare to evacuate thesalient north of the Psel River and to move across the river to defend the southern banks.OperationCitadelwasfinallyoverwiththismove.dgk221++.hjj121m.mhz360.Bytheendoftheday,92ndGRDhadlessthan2,200men.On7/9ithad8,430menwhileon

7/7 just before entering battle, the division was at full strength of 10,506 men.Much of thisdivision’s battle actionhadbeendefending thewest bankof theDonets.Thewest bankof theriverwasmuchhigherthantheeasternbank,givingtheSovietsanadvantageovertheGermans.TheSovietCOclaimedthatwastheonlywayhismenwereabletolimittheGermanadvanceintheirsector.vzz421.

D25

July15thontheNorthernSalienturing the predawn hours, the Red Air Force flewmanymissions; many of themwereagainst the Orel train station which Model desperately needed to stay open. cbk95.

dgk231m.snk433m.AspartofOperationKutuzov,Rokossovsky’sCentralFront,afterregrouping,launchedaheavy

assault againstModel’s 9th Army, which had several days to prepare for it. The main attackstruck41stPzCandtheinteriorwingsof47thPzCand23rdICbuttheSovietshadbeenrepulsedafter a fulldayofattacks, losing250 tanks.After today’s fighting,Modelmovedhis9thArmybacktotheirstartingline.In2ndPzA’s35thICsectorontheeasternperimeterofthesalienttheSoviets did not attack in strength, preparing for a massive attack in the morning. snk110.snk222dgk87m.dgk231m.lck116m.IntheOrelsalient,theBryanskandWesternFrontsresumedtheirattackinthenorth,northeast

and east parts of the salient. Rokossovsky’s Central Front joined the campaign. Driving fromOlkhovatka, elements of the 13th and 2nd TA assaulted Gremiache. The 13th Army’s primeobjectivewas to captureKromy, south ofOrel.TheCentral Front also supported attackswithforces of its 48th and 70thArmies.One attackwas fromNikoslkoye area againstGnilets andSacharovka. Another attack launched from the area northeast of Ponyri against Busuluk andKamenkaandthethirdattackfromtheareasouthofArkhangelskoyeagainstGlasunovka.Modelcouldseetherewasnowayofstoppingtheattacksandwantedtopullhisforcesbacktotheneckof the salient in a controlled manner; defenses were better there. fkk339. zzz101m. dgr199m.dgk231m.snk110.snk433m.je113.Rokossovsky’s Central Front, supported by 16th VA, launched its offensive on the southern

borderoftheOrelsalientagainst9thArmy,althoughitsforcesweretiredandineffectiveagainstthewell dug-inpositions.Nevertheless, this assault did complicateModel’sdefense for in thenorth near Bolkhov, the 11th GA, the 1st TC and 5th TC continued to create havoc, whichrequired his undivided attention. The situation was was made worse when Maj GeneralAnikushkin’s25thTCdrovethroughthegapinsecondechelon.Asthe70th,13th,48thand2ndTank Armies attacked Rudenko’s 16th VA, which had had a five-day rest, resumed its attackagainst9thArmyaheadofthegroundforces.TheRedAirForcecompletelycontrolledtheskiestoday.The16thVAmade threemajorbombing runswith at least300planes in each raid.ThesituationwasgettingdesperatefortheLuftwaffe;theyorderedadditionalplanesfrom8thFliegerCorpstoOrelbutthistransferhadtobecutshortwhenitwasdiscoveredamajorSovietbuildupwasoccurringsouthofKharkov.dgk237.zzz101m.cbk95.kcz170.snk170+.dgk231m.snk110.snk433m.In theOrel salient, theSoviets, except for local attacks, did not resume their offensive in a

majorway thatmorning,which surprised theGermans. This gave theGermans a little time tobringreinforcementsuptotheline,especiallyin35thICsector.Duringthedaythe36thIDmovedupandsqueezedinbetweenthe56thIDand262ndID.fkk360.zzz101m.dgk231m.snk433m++.dgk237.WithCentralFrontlaunchingitsassaulttoday,theOrelsalientwasnowbeingattackedonthree

sides,forcingthe9thArmyand2ndPzAtoretiretosecondarypositions.Rybalkowasorderedtoshifthisaxisofattacktothesoutheastquadrantnextto63rdArmy.Thesectorwasbeingdefendedby35thIC.Bythistimeeightadditionaldivisions(mostfrom9thArmy)haddeployedtosupportthethreeoriginalcorpsstationedhere.dgk230.dgk236.zzz101m.je113.dgk231m.snk433m.TheGermanresistanceeastofOrelremainedhighandtheSovietprogresswasslow.Aflight

of Soviet bombers attacked a panzer concentration near Podmaslovo. Using the new PTABbombs,sevenofthe25panzerswerehitandputoutofaction.cbk95.dgk231m.snk433m.EastofOrel, the2ndSSPzChadarrivedinsectorandwasdividedinto twogroups.Group

Buckwent into action near Bogdanovo, south ofMstenskwhileGroup Schmidthuber attackednearZheliabugskie,eastofOrel.By7/21,bothGroupshadtofallback,occupyingpositionsonthewesternbankoftheOkaRiver,northeastofOrel.Bythe29th,the2ndSSPzChadtofallbackagain toward Orel and by 8/3 occupied positions north of town. kn99. zzz101m. dgk231m.snk433m++.IntheOrelsalient,the20thTCwascommitted,butranintoheavyresistancefromthe112thID

and the 12th PzD. The 20th TC suffered heavy casualties and had towithdraw from the line.dgk235.zzz101m.dgk231m.snk433m.Modelrealizedthathis9thArmyand2ndPzAdefendingtheOrelsalientwasincriticaltrouble

now that three Soviet frontswere attacking.Model had been asking for further reinforcementsfromtheOKLandfinallytheplanesstartedarrivingthatday,withafewmorewereduethenextday. With the added planes, a major counter-offensive was planned to strike the importantrailheadsatKaluga,SukhinichiandKozelsk inorder todisruptSovietcommunications.Duringthe late evening and predawn hours, 155German planes headed for targets.Half of the groupattackedSukhinichi,athirdoftheplaneshitKalugaandtheremainderattackedKozelskandothertargetsofopportunity.TheADDofVVSflewtheirownnightmissions.The222bomberstargetedMokhovayarailstation,19mileseastofOrel,andtheareaaroundBolkhov.cbk102.dgk231m.snk433m.SouthofKharkov,SovietspearheadsoftheSouthFronthadadvanced15to30milesagainst

the German line. The new 6th Army was defending the Mius River and losing ground as itdesperatelyneededmorearmor.TheSSPzCandotherunitswere rushed in to support the6thArmy.ThisreinforcementhelpedstoptheSovietadvance,butitweakenedtheGermandefenseintheBelgorod-Orel areawhichwas the target of the currentSoviet counter offensive. zzz101m.dgk231m.snk433m++.ThebattleeastandnorthofOrelhadignitedonceagainwithbothsidessendinginreserves,

trying to gain an advantage. The Soviets, using a pincer action, were trying to encircle theGermansbutModel’scunningwashamperingtheSovietsuccess.zzz101m.dgk231m.snk433m.AfterfourdaysofbitterfightingintheOrelsalient,the11thGAand61stArmyhadpenetrated

theGermanlineinthreemajorplacesandhadgonearoundBolkhovonbothsides.Asmallergap

hadopenedbythe63rdArmywestofNovosilbutthe35thIChadrepairedthebreach.Thatday,thepanzerssentfromtheKurskconflictarrived,butcouldonlyslownotstoptheSovietadvancebecausethe4thTA,11thCCand2ndGCCalsoarrivedinsector.SeeMap28.fkk338.zzz101m.dgk231m.snk433m.Duetoattrition,the1stFliegerDivisionflewonly703sorties,comparedwith1,113missions

on 7/13. The Luftwaffe reported losing ten planes in this sector. cbk95. nzk77. dgk231m.snk433m.

26

July16th-July31stJuly16th–SouthernSalientAt0200hrs, aSoviet battalionmoving fromout of a ravine east ofVeselyi,was trying to getclosetothelinebeforeattacking,butwasquicklydiscoveredandrepulsedbyelementsofSSTK.The raidingparty sufferedheavy lossesanddidnotattempt toattack the restof theday in thisarea. Vatutin did continue to assemble forces near Veselyi and Mikhailovka for what Priessconsideredwasalargeassaultintheoffing.AtthispointSSTKhad27MkIVs,30MkIIIs,23StuGs,7commandpanzersandnineTigersstillworking,thoughafewpanzerswereintherepairshop and would be returning to the division in the near future. fkk173. fkk319m. kuz218.zow171+.The32ndMRBof18thTClaunchedanightattackandby0200hrshadcapturedtheeastern

outskirtsofVasilevkaandtheslopesoftheheightsleadingtoOktiabrskiStateFarm.dgr228.The2ndVAand17thVAflew926sortieswhilethe8thFliegerCorpsflewjust500missions.

To avoid Soviet fighters as much as possible, most of these sorties were flown early in themorningoratdusk.TherewereafewdefensivepatrolsmadeupofBf109fightersbuttheywereunabletocompletelyblockSovietformationsfrombombingGermanpositions.InjusttheSSTKsectoralonetheRedAirForceflewalmost300sorties.cbk100.kuz218.zrl246.VatutinsetupastiffdefensefromVasilevkatoStorozhevoe,usingthe5thGAand69thArmyin

frontwith5thGTA’scorps in secondechelon.Until themajor counter-offensivebegan,VatutinwantedtomakesuretheGermanswouldnotcaptureProkhorovkaandwiththetanksintherear,hewasforcedtorelyonhisartillerytosquelchGermanactivity.The2ndGTCand5thGTC’s6thGMRBweretheexceptions,havingtotakethefrontlineintheBelenikhino-Leskiarea.The183rdRDwasinsecondechelon.vzz468*+.zrl246.DasReichwasorderedtostaydefensive,protectingtheircurrentpositionwhichincludedthe

ridgeline:eastofIvanovka-Vinogradovka,eastofStorozhevoe.kuz193.HausserwastoldtobepreparetoredeployhiscorpsbacktotheIakovlevo-Belgorodroadin

preparations for Operation Roland and wait for further orders on a moment’s notice. Theoperation died before ever getting started because Hitler started dismantling 4th PzA fordeploymentelsewhere.TheGermanretreatwasbeginning.ButinthemeantimeHausserorderedhis corps to redeploy on von Manstein’s orders to launch Operation Roland, in case Hitlerchangedhismind.SSTK,afterdarkandintothepredawnhoursofthe17th,wouldsneakbacktothe south side of the Psel River. The other two divisions of the corps hadmore complicatedrealignments. During the retreat, another major thunderstorm hit the men, making it a trulymiserable experience.VonManstein still had faint hopes of destroying 1stTAbefore reaching

Oboyan,andperhapsmorewiththisnewoffensive,beforeHitlercloseditdownandsplintered4thPzAapart.gnk418.zrl246+.zow172+.The 2nd SS PzC began falling back, heading for their start positions near Belgorod. They

claimeddestroying18 tanksand29anti-tankgunsaswellascapturing1,136POWs.Thatday,3rdPzCcameunder4thPzA’scontrol.Earlier,the2ndSSPzChadattackedthe29thTCand2ndTCinthedirectionofNovoKhmelevoebutfailedandthenretreated.wdk169.mh361.dgr228.vzz512.MarshalZhukovarrived in theProkhorovkasectorandquestionedZhadovofhishandlingof

5th GA on 7/12. Zhukov was displeased with Zhadov’ and reprimanded him for his poorperformance.vzz468.Orders arrived to evacuate the bridgehead sooner than originally ordered, and the SSTK

grenadiersbeganretreatingnon-combatpersonneltothesouthbankofthePsel.Theretreatwascovered by rocket fire fromGresnoe.Despite the rockets, at 2100hrs, theSoviets launched asmallattackintothebridgehead,hopingtocatchGermansunaware.Theattackersmadeittothefirst trench linewherehand-to-handcombaterupted.Priess, seeing thesuccess theSovietshadmade and fearing Soviet reserves would enter the fray, canceled the withdrawal and orderedTokenkopfRegimenttothefrontline.RealizingtheGermanswerecrossingbacktothesouthside,theSovietAF increased their sorties todestroy thebridgesandkeep theGermanson thenorthside,wheretheycouldbedestroyedeasier.Theirattemptsfailedtodestroyeitherbridgeanditwas almost midnight when the panzers started crossing the bridges. LAH andDR were alsoorderedtoprepareforawithdrawaltoanewdefenseline.Inthepredawnhoursof7/17,thelastvehiclecrossedandtheengineersdestroyedbothbridgestoslowthepursuitoftheSoviets.Onthesouthside,SSTKremainedforseveralmoredayspreventingtheSovietsfromcrossingover.ThechangesinredeploymentsinrecentdayswereinpreparationforOperationRoland.gnk420+.kuz193.ztc271.zow172.LAHreportedtoheadquartersthatcasualtieswere16killedand86woundedwith3missing.

Thedivisionalsoreported60workingpanzersincluding9Tigersand49assaultguns.zrl247.General Hoth discontinued his advance and in some areas began a slow retreat to better

defensiveareas.Thisgradualretirementtookuntil7/23toreachitsstartingpointsforOperationCitadel.ColGeneralN.F.Vatutin’sforcesfollowedtheGermansbutdidnotengage inamajorcounteroffensive.TheSovietswereregrouping,receivingsuppliesandwaitingfortheordertocounter-attackasplanned.dgr106.The2ndSSPzClaunchedanightattackinthedirectionofNovoKhmelevoeagainst29thTC

and2ndTCbutwasrepulsed.dgr228.GeneralWalterKrugerofDasReichinformedHausserthatsincethecampaignstarted,ithad

destroyed 448 Soviet tanks and assault guns while losing only 46 unrecoverable panzers.wwf149.zow171.WithvonManstein’sforcesfallingbackinallsectorsandwithOperationRumyantsevstarting

soon, thisdaycouldbe considered theunofficial endofOperationCitadel. vzz175.wwf174+.dgn232.At1700hrsonthewestsideoftheDonets,the114thPzGRadvancedfromHill240.0toward

Hill 222.1, which had been contested for couple days and now had a platoon of Germans

surrounded. The 114th GR reached the hill and rescued the survivors which were almost allwounded.Aftertherescue,theregimentmovedonHill241.5whichwasalsocaptured.zzt91+.Afterhavingtakenafewdaysoff,theRedAirForcecamebackwithavengeancethatday.It

particularly hit hard theLAH andDasReich sectors.DasReich suffered heavy casualties andgreatlossofequipmentfromtheseraids.zow171.In theKursk sector, the dawn brokewith heavy clouds andmore heavy rains. TheGerman

offensivehadfallenoffdrasticallythatdayandZhukovknewtheGermanoffensivehadended.Infact, the German line was ordered to retreat to their start lines. The closest the two Germanpincers got to each other was 78miles. Even though Soviet casualties weremuch higher, theGerman offensivewas a failure, not entirely achieving any of theirmajor objectives.mhz361.cbk100.zfk177.ColCrisolliwas chosen to replaceGeneralHunersdorff.When the colonel arrived hewas

appalled at the fighting condition of the division and the fact that therewas only a handful ofpanzersstillworking.Justfourdayslaterthedivision,underthesupervisionofMajorBake,hadrepaired over 25 panzers and now had 34 working panzers. Crisolli was promoted toMajorGeneralinFebruary1944andtransferredtoItalywherehewaskilledshortlyafterbypartisans.fzk57.zsm76+.

July16th–NorthernSalientEastofOrel, theSovietsopenedamightybarragethatstretchedacross the15milesof35thICsector.300tanks,supportedbyrushinginfantry,launchedtheirattackwhilethewaitingGermanswatchedastheSovietsclosedin.TheirmachinegunnersandmortarmenwerereadyandwouldhittheSovietsashardaspossibleassoonastheywerewithinrange.fkk361.zzz101m.In262ndIDsector,thenewlyarrived36thIDunderGolnickmoveduptobolsterthefrontline.

Thesupportwasdesperatelyneeded.TheSovietsresumedtheirattackinthissectorafteradayoff.Ofthe300tanksthatparticipated,halfofthemweredestroyed.IntheafternoontheSovietsexpandedtheirattacktoinclude52ndID,underNewiger,whichwasdeployedjustnorthof262ndID.Fichtner’sshattered8thPzDwasalsomovednorthtohelp.snk222.dgk231m.snk433m.The53rdICof2ndPzAwasreinforced.The8thPzD,2ndPzDandsPzAbt653,allfrom9th

Armyarrivedinsectorthatday.The36thIDfromAGCReservealsoarrived.Thekeytosaving2ndPzAand9thArmywas in the stoppingofWesternFront from linkingupwithCentral andpocketing the forces within the salient. Model thought the best way to stop 11th GA and thesupportingtankswasthroughairpower.cbk104.dgk231m.snk433m.KnowingtheOrelsalient,adistanceof250miles,couldnotbeheldindefinitely,andinfact

wasinimminentdangerofcollapse,ModelorderedtheHaganlinetobeimplemented.ThiswasadefensebeltalongtheDesnaRiver,about12mileswestofBryansk,whichranalongthebaseoftheOrelsalient.ThenortherntipofthedefensebeltwasKirov.TheSovietsresumedtheirattackon9thArmyeastoftheimportantraillinethattheyweretryingtocapture.Inthenexttwodaysoffightinganother280Soviet tanksweredestroyed.dgk238.dgk239m.snk110.zzz101m.kcz171.dgk231m.snk433m.The 16th VA performed three large air raids against German positions around Kunach and

Kudeyarovo,bothsouthofOrel.Thefirst raidoccurredabout1230hrsand includedover400

planes.Thesecondraidstruckaround1600hrsandthelastraidaround1900hrs.Thelasttworaidswereonlyslightlysmaller.ThefirsttworaidssawnoGermanplanesbutthelastattacktheGermanswere ready,but stillcouldnt stop the raid. In total the16thVAflew1713sortiesandwasamajorcontributorinhelpingthegroundforcestogainground.The15thVAsupportedtheBryanskFrontinthenortheastquadrantofthesalient.Thebiggestsingleraidfor15thVAthatdayoccurredin63rdArmysectoragainstGermanpositionsnearZhelyabug,when153bombersandfightersattacked.Fourpanzersweredestroyedand28damaged.Despitetheaerialsuccess, the63rdArmymadefewgainsagainstthehighlydevelopeddefenses.TheGermanshad18monthstobuildthedefenses.cbk103+.dgk231m.snk433m.Bagramyan’s11thGAcontinuedtomakeprogress.Thegeneralwashopinghisforceswould

reach theBryansk-Orel highway aswell as the rail line atKhotynets.Reaching this far south,alongwiththeprogressthatRokossovsky’sCentralFrontwasmaking,wouldalmostencircleallof2ndPzAandmuchof9thArmy.Modelwaswellawareofthesituation,whichwasthereasonfor the extra planes being redeployed closer to Orel without actually being in the salient. Atdaybreak, the fortified 1st Flieger Division took to the skies, flying north, looking for thesupporting tanks of the 11th GA that had broken through. The area in question was heavilywooded,makingitdifficultforGermanpilotstofindtheirprey.Despiteflying1595sorties,theLuftwaffewasabletodestroyonly19tanksand70trucks.Another25tanksweredamaged.Mostof theplanes in the raidswereeitherStukasorHs129s.For scoringso fewhits, theHs129ssufferedheavycasualtiesfromheavygroundfire.Theextensiveraidsonlyslowedthe11thGA’sadvance.cbk102.dgk231m.snk433m.BytheendofthedayintheOrelsector,2ndPzA’slinehadbeenpenetratedinthreeplaces.On

bothsidesofBolkhovthe11thGAand61stArmyhadbrokenthroughandsurroundedthecity.TothesouthwestofBolkhov,thedeepestpenetrationhadbeenmade.The4thTAhadbeeninsertedthrough a gap and now racing toward Karachev. If they could reach the Oka River and itstributary, theOptucha, the salientwould be untenable, forcing a urgent retreat. To thewest ofNovosil, the63rdArmyachievedasmallpenetrationagainst35th IC, forcingRendulic toshiftforcestoplugthegap.BothriversrunbetweenMtenskandBolkhov.fkk364.zzz101m.dgk231m.snk433++.German fighters flew 369 sorties, the largest number flown in days. 1st Flieger Division

reporteddestroying40planeswhilelosing16.cbk103.dgk231m.snk433m.

July17th–SouthernSalientBy0245hrs,LAHreportedcompletingredeploymentordersofshiftingforcesfurthertothewestinpreparationforOperationRoland,shoulditbelaunchedthatday.The1stPzGRofLAHmovedupclose to the right flankofSSTK andwas actually attached to that division for the next fewdays.Theregimenthadnotbeenintheirnewpositionlong,whenatfirstlighttheywereattackedbyacombinationofinfantryandafewtanks,buttheattackwassuccessfullyrepulsed.The2ndPzGRofLAHhaddestroyedthebridgeoverthetankditchnearHill252.2andplantedminestoslowtheenemyinanticipationoftheirnewdeploymentorders.Thoseneworderscameshortlybut they were not for Operation Roland but for general retreat orders. It was a slow phasedretreatinsmallgroupstothesouthwest.TheLAHHQmovedtothewoodsofBolDolzhikwhile

the2ndPzGRwouldmoveback toLuchkiNorthbynextdaywith the finallydestinationbeingKharkov.ThepanzerswouldbeloadedontrainsatBelgorodforthetriptoKharkov.zrl248.In an attempt to disguise the upcoming offensive south of Belgorod called Operation

Rumyantsev,theSouthwestern/SouthernFrontsattackedAGSfurthersouthalongtheMiusRiversector.ThiswouldbesouthwestofKharkov;theSovietswerehopingtheGermanswoulddivertforces from Belgorod southward, weakening their defenses at the exact spot the Soviet weregoingtoattackon8/3.dgk244+*.dgk223.Malinovsky’s Southwestern and Tolbukhin’s Southern Fronts launched initially a 16-day

offensive against the easternmost bulge ofAGS’s defenses in theDonbas, along theNorthernDonetsnear IzyumRiverandMiusRiver. ItwouldcauseHitler tobreakup4thPzAquickly tosendforcestothisareaandinsodoingmakingiteasieronKonev’soffensivetotakeBelgorodandadvanceonKharkov.dgk245.kcz170+.Atdaybreakthe167thIDbeganrelievingDasReichoftheirpresentpositionsinorderforthe

panzerdivision to fallback to the Iakovlevo-Belgorod road lineasordered.During thewholeprocessSovietartillerywasactiveandcausinghavocamongthetroops.Germanflakgunswerebusy trying to keep Soviet ground attack fighters from harassing the convoys. Der FührerRegimentwasthefirsttopulloutandmadeitwithoutincident.DeutschlandRegimentwasusedasrearguardandhadatoughtimeofit,fortheSovietinfantryfollowedcloselyusingmortarfireasmuchaspossible.Theymadeitalsobutsufferedcasualtiesintheprocessastheypulledintothenewlineby1600hrs.gnk419.TheLAH had suffered474killed, 2,202wounded and77missing.Wittmann,whowasnow

commanderoftheTigerCompany,hadnineworkingTigers.The13thPanzerCompanydestroyed151tanks,87assaultgunsandfourbatteriesofartillery.Personally,Wittmannreporteddestroying28 tanks, 28 assault guns and many anti-tank guns. These numbers do not include damagedvehiclesordestroyedtrucks.WittmanndiedsouthofCaenonAugust8th,1944andbyhisdeathhad compiled 138 tank victories.Despite Soviet propaganda that stated over 100Tigersweredeployed in the southern salient on this morning it is estimated the greatest number of Tigersdeployedatanyonetimeonthebattlefieldwas146acrossthetwosalients,andthatwasearlierinthecampaign.agk129.wwf123.wdk170.TheSovietsattackedtheGermandefensesalongtheMiusRiverlineaswellastowardIzyum.

Hitlerbegantobreakup4thPzAtodifferentsectorstohelpputoutfires.Bytheendofthemonth,LAHwouldbetransferredoutofRussia,leavingStalinoforItaly.AllofLAH’spanzerswouldbeleftinRussiaanddistributedbetweenSSTKandSSDR.gnk418+.erz209.The Soviets watched as 500 panzers and 1,000 trucks, traveling in five columns, left

Komsomolets State Farm area for Pokrovka and Bolshie Maiachki. By the end of the day,Storozhevoe andKomsomolets State Farmwas once again in Soviet hands.OperationCitadelwasclearlyover.vzz515.dgk183m.The8thFliegerCorpsflew138sortiesagainst2ndVA’s484missions.TheLuftwaffeclaimed

tohaveshotdownsixplaneswhilelosingtwo.cbk100.TheOKHorderedthe2ndSSPzCtoshutdownOperationRoland,assembleatBelgorodand

prepare tohead for Italy.Thisorderwouldbequickly changed so that onlyLAHwould leaveRussia. Since his meeting with Hitler on the 13th, Manstein had done everything possible to

encircle theSovietsbetweenHoth’sandKempf’s forcesandnearlysucceeded inclosinganetaroundtheSoviets.TheGDwastransferrednorthtoAGCwhile3rdPzDwentsouth.EstimatedlossesfortheSovietVoronezhandSteppeFrontsinclude85,000casualtiesand32,000POWsinthe southern salient againstManstein for the first 19 days of the campaign. TheCentral Frontsufferedapproximatelythesamenumberagainst9thArmy.TheGermanstookheavycasualtiesaswellandwouldneveragainbecapableofhavingastrategicreserveorastrategicoffensive.Forthe same time period casualties in the south were roughly 44,000 and in the north during theoffensive against only Central Front 35,000. The battle for Kursk is claimed to be a visibleturning point in thewar and culminated a series of costly battles for theWehrmacht that alsoincludedStalingradandNorthAfrica.TheUSandBritishLendLeaseaidwasalsoamajorfactorin Russia’s victory; the 200,000 trucks Stalin possessed in July 1943 improved logistics andinfantrymobilitysignificantly.dgk218.dgk223.snk54.snk85.mhz358.pck93+.lck378.sgf352.Fortheperiodfrom7/5tothisday,the2ndSSPzCclaimeddestroying1,149tanks,capturing

18 tanks,destroying459anti-tankguns,killing4,262 soldiers, capturing6,441POWsand561desertersaswellasdestroying85planes.The48thPzCclaimed500tanksdestroyedforatotalofover1,650destroyedbutthisnumberisalittlehighastheSovietswereabletorecoversomeunits. ByAugust, Rotmistrov and the other tank commanderswould already be receiving newreplacements.Thislargelossoftankswouldgounnoticedinthenearfuture.wdk169.Since the startof7/12oneestimateclaimedAGShad lost about150panzers,while the5th

GTAlost334tanks.OthersclaimtheSovietlosswascloserto600-650tankswithsomeofthemrecoverable.gjz187*.Inthemorning,GDwashithardbyseveralwavesoffighters,westofVerkhopenie.At1200

hrs,thedivisionreceivedorderstostoptheadvanceandpreparetofallbackthenextmorning.GroupLauchertofGDhad lost43Panthers thatwereunrecoverableduringOperationCitadel.MostofthedamagedvehicleshadtobeshippedbacktoGermanyforrepairs.hjj128.

July17th–NorthernSalientDuringthepredawnhours,the3rdTAmovedtotheirassemblyareasixmilesfromtheOleshenRiver andwould be advancing in themorning. The orders to attackwere postponed; the nextmorningRybalkowasorderedtothealternatestartpoint.Drivingnorththrough3rdArmysector,Rybalkowasnowordered todriveeastof theOleshenRiver in theStrelnikovareaandattacktowardtheSpasskoe-OtradaareaandcuttheOrel-MtsenskhighwayinordertostarvetheGermangarrisonatMtsenskwhichwasdefendedby34thIDof35thIC.The12thTC,assemblednorthof15th TC, had specific orders to drive toward Sychi and capture the German airfield nearGrachevkaandthencrosstheRybnitsaRivernearLyubanovoandStupino.The15thTCwastoattack toward Bortnoye and Khotetovo and cross the Rybnitsa River at Golokhvastovo andYeropkinoStation.The2ndMCwaslaunchedatthesametimedefending15thTCsouthernflankand to capture Novopetrovka and Znobishino. The villages mentioned are located in Mtensksector.zra181.snk433++.IntheOrelsalientatdaybreak,theSovietsopenedatwo-hourbarragealongtheentire65mile

sectorof35thIC.The36thIDandthelatearriving8thPzDgothitthehardest.Afterwards,tendivisions supported by 400 tanks charged theGerman positions repeatedly.Many of the tanks

weredamagedordestroyed;theoverpoweringforceoftheSovietscouldnotbedenied.The36thIDwaspushedbackfivemilesandagapofsixmilesopenedintheline.The192ndGRof56thIDwasalsostrugglingtodefendthevillagesofShelyabugandSuvorovo.Eventuallythe192ndGRwouldhavetofallbacktoAleksandrovkabehindtheAleshnyaRiver.The171stGRwasalsobeingpressuredatMelynandPlyankaandwasforcedtobenditslinebacktoBorodinskitosaveitself.fkk365++.zzz101m.dgk231m.snk433m.The16thVAorganizedthreemajorraidssimilartothepreviousday.Atleast350planestook

partineachraid,withthefirstonelaunchingat0600hrs.Thesecondlaunchedfivehourslaterandthethirdattacklaunchedfivehoursafterthesecond.Theattackswereaimedat theOzerki,Vesyoly,Berezhok,OchkiandSokolnikilinewhich2ndTA’s3rdTCwastryingtoachieve.With11thGAhavingmadeadeeperpenetration,theLuftwaffespentmoretimein thenorth.cbk106.dgk231m.snk433m.The234thGRwashithardforthefirsttimesincetheoffensivebegan.Itwasdefendingtheline

betweenSoimonovotoBorodinski.ItinitiallyheldbacktheSovietsbutthenithadtogivegroundand fall backaswell.Bynoon in the53rd IC sector, its right flankwas in trouble and itwasfallingbackevenquicker.Thisactionexposed the left flankof34th ID,whichalsohad to fallbacktothewestbankoftheOkaRiver.Anhourlater,the2ndPzDstartedarrivinginsectorandwouldbeorderedtosupportthe56thIDwhichhadallowed50SoviettanksintotheGermanrearareathatday.The12thPzD,withits20panzers,werebeingredeployedandwouldbearrivingnextmorningaswelltosupportthe35thIC.Thenextday,Rendulicdecidedtopulltheentire56thIDbackbehindtheOkaRiver.fkk367++.dgk231m.snk433m++.Forthreedays,CentralFrontslammedintothedefensesof9thArmywithspecialinterestinthe

sector east of theKursk-Orel railroad, but 9thArmy held against the terrific pressure.Modelclaimedhisarmyhaddestroyed530tanksinthosethreedays.snk110.Bagramyan launched the25thTC,whichhadbeensitting in reserve thewholemonth. Itwas

headingforBolkhovinthenortheastcornerofthesalient.Thecityhadbeenencircledbutithadto be reduced for the offensive to continue in this quadrant without complications. cbk108.dgk231m.snk433m.TheSovietsattacked the35th ICsectoragainwith tenRDsand400 tanks.The36th IDwas

drivenbackamilebutthefrontlinewasmaintained.AgainabouthalfoftheSoviettanksweredestroyed but 50 tanks penetrated the 56th ID line and drove about tenmiles in before beingstoppedanddestroyed.Nearby,the34thIDhadtofallbackwhen53rdIClostBolkhov.Luebbe’s2ndPzDandBodenhausen’s12thPzDarrivedintheareabutbetweenthemhadonly20workingpanzers.snk222.dgk231m.snk433m.TopreventCentralFrontfromlinkingupwithWesternFronteastofOrel,theentirefocusof1st

Flieger Division was the northern and southern fronts with little attention to the eastern line.Manydogfightserupted,especiallyinthesouthhalf.WiththeabsenceofLuftwaffeintheeasternsector of the salient, the 15thVAhit hard the 53rd IC that had been holding back 63rdArmy.AreasofspecialattentiontotheSovietpilotsincludedHill269.5,Arkhangelskoe,PodmaslovoandTsarevka.cbk104.dgk231m.snk433m.The25thTC, fresh intocombatwent through the61stArmygapand turned tobreak into the

rearareasofBolkhov.The9thPzD,10thPzGDandthe253rdIDweredefending.TheGermans

weregreatlyovermatched.dgk237.zzz101m.dgk231m.snk433m.Becauseofthemanycasualtiesoverthelasttwoweeks,the9thPzDwasunabletofunctionas

an independent division andwas attached toGroupEsebeck, a part of 2ndPzA.Thenext dayelements of 4th PzDwas transferred to enhance theKahlerGroup. That same day, theKahlerGroupwasmovedtoBolkhovalongsideof9thPzDtostrengthentheline.mkz121.lck116m.The Soviets made their first penetrations on the Mius River line. Hollidt’s 6th Army was

beginningtofallbackandneededpanzersupportiftheyweretoholdbacktheSovietattack.TheSouthwest Front also attacked toward Izyum. These two major attacks convinced Hitler tocompletely cancel all operations in the southernKursk region.The 24thPzCwas immediatelyrecalledfromBelgorodandsentsouthtotheMiusRiverandIzyumregions.gnk420++.dgk231m.snk433m.(July17)The11thGA’sadvanceinthenorthernhalfoftheOrelsalientwasslowingdownduetostiff

resistance and an activeLuftwaffe that had destroyedmany tanks andBagramyanwas still 13milesfromKhotynets.The4thTAhadbeenorderedtothesectortoassist11thGAbutithadnotarrivedyet.Itwouldnotarriveuntil7/26.kcz170.dgk231m.snk433m.In the lateafternoon twelvemilesnorthwestofOrel, a small squadronofbombersand their

seven escorts were attacked by 16 Fw 190s. The Soviet bombers released their bombs andescapedwhile thedogfightbetween thefightersplayedout.TheLuftwaffeescaped injuriesbutseveraloftheYaksweredowned.OneoftheFrenchpilotsparachutedtosafetybuttheothertwodidnotmakeit.cbk108.dgk231m.snk433m.The1stFliegerDivisionwithitsnewplanesflew1,693sorties.Besidesjustafewplanesshot

down,24tanksand31trucksweredestroyed.TheGermanairdivisionlost12planes.Evenwiththe increased sorties, theLuftwaffewas unable to stop theRedAirForce fromattacking theirgroundforces.cbk108.dgk231m.snk433m.

July18thontheSouthernSalientDuringlastnightandintothepredawnhours,PriesssteppeduphisevacuationofthebridgeheadnorthofthePsel,crossedtheriveranderecteddefensesonthesouthernbanks.Katukov’s1stTAhadalreadyleftthelinetoregroupsoitwasarelativelyeasyevacuationagainstamajorarmorassault,butthe5thGAdidattacktherearguardEickeRegiment,stilldeployedinthebridgehead.Theattackwasrepulsed.TheRedAirForcedidharassthecolumnmovingsouthandtherewereprobingattacksbutnothingmajorbeyondthatoneattempt.FordaysVatutinhadbeentestingtheSSTKbridgeheadwithsmallscaleassaultsbutnothingthatcameclosetothecounter-attackspriorto7/12.Vatutinwasrestinghismenandrepairinghistanksforthebigoffensivethatwouldstartin earlyAugust. To the right ofSSTK,LAH andDas Reich were also pulling back. TheLAHreportedtoHausserhaving28StuGsand57panzersincludingeightTigers,fiveofwhichwerejust repairedand returned to the field.Thirty-twoof thepanzerswere the longbarrelMk IVs.SSTK reported having 81 panzers and StuGs. It included seven repaired Tigers and 28 longbarreledMkIIIs.OveradozenmoreMark IIIsandStuGswereexpectedback from the repairshopanydaynow.snk55++.mhz360.fkk173.At1800hrsthe2ndSSPzCwasofficiallyreleasedfromHoth’s4thPzC.Thecorpswouldbe

brokenupwithLAHmovingtoItalyandtheothertwodivisionsmovingsouthtotheMiusRiver

sectorwheretheSouthwestFrontwerebeginningtheirownmajoroffensive.zow176.SSTK abandoned its bridgehead on the north side of thePsel, crossed the river and quickly

erectednewdefensesonthesouthernbank.ItwouldretreatagainthenextdayfordefensesalongthelinethatincludedLuchkiNorth.Priesslostmorethanhalfhispanzersandhadcasualtiesofalmost2,700men,including512killed.Inreturn,hedestroyed241tanksandcapturedover1,700POWs.fkk173.ztc271.Inthepreviousfourdays,theVVSclaimedtohaveflownatotalof2,209sortiesinandaround

theKursksalientduringthedaylighthours.Thesortiesflownatnightwereanimpressive1,298.Therespectivenumbersforthe8thFliegerCorpswere1,422and241.TheSovietplanesdidgofartherafieldthantheLuftwaffe,strikingtheBarvenkovoandIlovayskayarailstationsaswellastheairfieldatStalinofurthersouth.cbk100+.At nightLAH grenadiers began leaving theBelgorod area. Themen had tomarch about 38

milestowardKharkov.ThenexttwodaystheregimentsstartedarrivinginassemblyareasnorthandwestofKharkovbutthatwasonlythefirststepinthejourney.LAHreceivedneworderstoheadforSlavyansk,furthersouth.wheretheSovietswereassemblingthe8thGA,the1stGMCandthe13thGTC.TheseforceshadalreadymadeprobingattacksacrosstheSouthernDonetsandthe40thICandVikingdivisionhadbeenrushedsouthtoblockanyfurtherpenetrations.Thenextday,theTigerswereloadedonatrainatBelgorod,headingforStalino.TheTigerswouldarriveatSlavyanskon7/21.agk131.zrl248+.At the end of the day Hausser reported his Corps since the start of Operation Citadel had

destroyed1,150 tanks, counted approximately4,200 enemydead and captured6,400POWs. ItwasnotthehaulGeneralHothorHausserwereexpecting.kuz218+.Konev’sSteppeFrontbeganitsplannedoffensivetodestroy4thPzA.Konevhadalreadygiven

uphistwolargestarmiestoVatutin;hehadleftonlythe53rdand47thArmies.TwodayslatertheVoronezhFrontwould join inandby7/23 theSovietswereback to theirstartingpointsbeforeCitadelbegan.vzz515.cbk101.kcz170.The19thPzDwas recalled fromKempf, forcinghim tomoveback.The11th IC’s106th ID,

320thIDplus168thIDlost8754troopsincludingofficersintheoperation.erz210.shn173.

July18thontheNorthernSalientGeneral vonGreimofLuftflotte 6, before getting official permission, began the evacuation ofnon-combatpersonnel,woundedandcriticalequipmentandsuppliesfromtheOrelsalientbackbehind theHagen Line, theDesnaRiver. TheLuftwaffe was successful in saving all suppliesexcept the large bombs, but they were used in destroying all essential buildings, bridges andrailways.Modelwanted to slow the assault and did notwant to leave anything useful for theSoviets.TheJu-52swereusedformuchofthisevacuation.snk172.snk433m.dgk231m.WithinthelastweekStavkareleasedthe11thArmyand4thTAtotheWesternFronttobolster

itsattackonthenorthernperimeteroftheOrelsalient.Onthisday,MajGeneralKriukov’s2ndGCCwasalsoreleasedandwasorderedtosupportthe4thTAwithitsoffensive.dgk420+.The234thGR,defendinginfrontofSusha,wasattackedbyinfantryrunningbehindtanks.The

SovietswantedtogothroughSushatoget to theOkaRiver.Thegroundinfrontof theGermanpositionwasheavilyminedandonthefirstassaultdamagedseventanks.Nearby,the171stGR

andthe156thARwerealsostruggling.TheintensityoftheSovietsoldierwasextreme,somethingthatsomeGermanshadnotseenbefore.Thiswasespeciallyhecticdayforthe35thIC.Atotalof24Soviettanksweredestroyedinthissmallengagementand304tanksbyallofthe35thIC.Ontheway toKamenka theSoviet tankcolumnstruck thevillageofProtasovo.AnumberofT34swere destroyed but the Soviets kept on going. The Germans for the most part were able tocontinuetofallbacktotheOkainanorderlymanner.fkk374++.dgk231m.snk433m.ModelorderedthePzAbt4tocrosstheOrelasquickaspossibletojoinupwith9thPzDat

Snamenskoye,15milessouthwestofBolkhov.Twohourslaterthe4thPzDwasorderedtoTrosnatowaitforfurtherorders.ItwasdiscoveredalargeconcentrationofSoviettankswereformingnorthofKarachev(westofOrel)thatintendedtodrivesouthandhelpsplittheOrelsalient.The4thPzDwiththesupportofsPzAbt505andStuGAbt909wouldbetaskedinblockingthisassaultforce.fkk388.zzz101m.dgk231m.snk433m.Onthesouthernboundaryofthe9thArmysector,theSoviets,unabletocracktheline,shifted

directiontothewestintheTrosna-FatezhandChernRiverbend.Theforcesinthenewareawerespottedandreinforcementswerequicklysenttostoptheincursion.WhentheSovietsattackedthatsameafternoonwithapproximately threedivisionsand60 tanks, thequicklyprepareddefenseswereabletostopthem.snk112.dgk87m.TheSoviets attacked again along the entire 35th IC’s front but, despite pushing some forces

back, could not penetrate the line in strength.Model had launched a counter that surprised theSoviets,butdidlittletopushthemback.snk223.fkk71.dgk87m.The1stFliegerDivisionflew1,104combatsortiesthatday.Mostoftheseraidstargetedthree

specificareas:Ulianovo,BolkhovandNovosil.TheGermansclaimedshootingdown25planesaswellasdestroying15 tanks,18 trucksandfiveguns,withanotherseven tanksdamaged.AnunknownnumberofSoviet infantrywerekilledaswell.Despite theheavybombing, five tanksfromthe70thTBpenetratedthelineandstarteddrivingtowardtherear,tryingtoreachandcutthe Orel rail line. A group of Hs 129 spotted the tanks and attacked. Four of the tanks weredestroyedfromtheair.Whilethelasttankwasunderattack,theGermanpilotmisjudgedhispointofturningupandslammedintothetank.OneoftheHs129planesreceivedflakdamageandhadto perform an emergency landing next to amarsh.Getting out of his plane, the pilot noticed aconcentrationof80T34scamouflaged,whichhadbeenundetecteduptothispoint.Meyerscalledinthis intelandaflightofFw190sheadingforanother targetwasorderedto thedownpilot’slocationtoattacktheSoviettanks.Thatnightandforthenexttwodaysthosetankswerehunteddown and destroyed. Theywere destroyed by either 250 pound bombs or from 37mm cannonbeingfiredfromJu-87s.cbk108+.dgk231m.snk433m.

July19thontheSouthernSalientThe8thFliegerCorpsflewatotalof92missionswhichincludedreconpatrols.cbk101.GeneralKruger ofDasReich computed the casualties for his division since the start of the

campaign.Therewere456killed,1,844woundedand23missing.GeneralHausseraddedupthecasualties for his corps and the numbers were high: 1,447 killed, 6,198 wounded and 138missing.Thetotalwas7,774andbreaksdownwhereeachdivisionhadaboutthesamenumberofcasualties.SSTKwashighestwith2,668.FMvonMansteininformedhiscorpscommandersthat

it was estimated that 2,000 tanks were destroyed, along with 1,500 guns and 1,000 planes,besides 32,000POWs and 18,000 (counted) deadwhich extrapolates to an estimated 100,000dead.zow174+.PanzerremainsofGDwereloadedontrainsforBryansk.Forthenextfewdays,therestofthe

division would follow. It is estimated that 56 of the nearly 200 Panthers were destroyed inOperationCitadel.Thenumberupuntilthispointhadbeen43PanthersbutwhenGDwasorderedto fallbackandbeprepared toembark thenumber jumped to56panzers.Thosepanzerswereheavilydamagedbutrecoverable,iftimepermitted,butwhenitwasdeterminedrecoverywasnotpossible due to the retreat, theywere destroyed by the division. The PantherBrigadewas nolongeranindependentunit;itbecameanintegralpartofthedivision.BerlinwasalreadyshippinganewbatchofPantherstothedivisiondestinedtoarriveatBryanskinacoupleweeks.hjj128.mhz292.The69thArmywasrelievedfromVoronezhFrontandwastransferredtoSteppeFront.gjz190.Afterbeingrecalledfromthefront, the19thPzDstartedarrivingatBelgorodand threedays

latertherestof3rdPzCreturnedtoitsstartpositions.Duringthecampaign,itwasestimatedthecorps shattered nine infantry divisions and four tank brigades. In addition 10,000 POWs andhundredsofgunsandsometankswerecaptured.shn164+.

July19thontheNorthernSalientBeginningon thisdayand for thenext twodays, theLuftwaffe retookcontrolof theskies.TheSovietoffensivehadbeensoclosetoclosingthegapbetweenthenorthernandsouthernsalientbutwiththesupremeeffort,theGermanpilotsfoughtofftheSovietaircoverandhitthegroundassaulthardwhichforcedatemporaryretreat.ItgaveModelenoughbreathingroomtocallforaretreat to the Hagen Line on 7/21. During these three days, the 1stFlieger Division claimeddestroying or damaging 200 tanks and killing countless number of troops,much of the damageoccurringin11thGAsector,northwestofOrel.cbk109.dgk231m.snk433m.At0745hrs,theSovietsattackedthe258thIDandpenetrateditslinewith40tanksthatwere

nowheadingforsouthofTrosna.ByeveningithadcapturedTrosnanorthandhadenteredTrosnasouthandfightingfor therestof thevillage.The4thPzDhadnowentered theOrelsalientandwasheadingfortheRakitnayaRiveratChernodieWestandChernodieEast.The258thIDwasontheleftandthe102ndIDontheright.Otherelementsofthe4thPzDwenttoHill247.2andHill236.7.Thebulkofthe4thPzDattackedintheRakitnayaRiverValleyandpushedthetheSovietsbackalittle.Theywerefacingthe19thTCwhichwastaskedtoreachKromy.The53rdWerferRegimentwasalsosenttoTrosna.fkk389.zzz101m.dgk231m.snk433m.After250planesofthe15thVAraidedtheeasternperimeteroftheOrelsalient,the3rdGTA’s

12th TC and 15th TC launched almost 700 tanks toward the area south ofMtsensk (southeastquadrant).Agroupoftankspenetratedthefrontline,crossedtheOleshenRiverandadvancedatotal of sevenmiles.The air capwas able to keep 1stFliegerDivision at beywithout losingmany bombers. The Soviets claimed destroying or damaging 35 panzers in the raid.With theincreasedpressurecausedbytheentryof3rdTA,theSovietsnowhadoverwhelmingstrengthonthree sidesof the salient andModelwasenactingaorganized retreat to thewest to theHagenline. It is quite an accomplishment that theGermanswere able to fall back in such anorderly

mannerunder such stiff pressure from three sides.TheGermangarrisonatMtsenskwas at thegreatestriskfromencirclementandtherewasconcernthattheordertopullbackwasgiventoolate.Flyingatnightandintothepredawnhoursof7/20,the1stFliegerDivisionattackedthe3rdGTA to allow the ground troops to pull back but even with air support, the ground troopssustainedheavycasualties.TheLuftwaffereportedshootingdown54planesafterdarkfromtheair and ground fighting. The VVS claimed destroying 30 panzers and 100 trucks that werewithdrawingweston theMtsensk-Orel road.Withmostof thenight-qualifiedplanesandpilotsbackinGermany,fightingtheAlliedbombing,therewerenotmanyplanesavailabletoflyatnightatOrel.cbk112+.dgk231m.snk433m.The36thIDhadarrivedjustafewdaysagototheOrelsalientbutitwasalreadyintrouble.

The78thADof9thArmyarrivedtodayandGeneralRendulicquicklyinserteditwiththe36thID.fkk381.zzz101m.dgk231m.snk433m.At 1030 hrs, after a thirty-minute preparation, the 3rdTA launched and quickly crossed the

OleshenRiverattackingtheGermandefenses.TheLuftwaffewasquicklycalledinandattackedthetankstryingtobreakthroughthefronttrenches.WhiletheGermanplanesattackedandslowedthe Soviet assault, Model sent two panzer divisions to the area to help the 35th IC stop themassive attack. Despite the aerial, artillery and panzer resistance, by nightfall the 3rd TAadvanced six miles, pursuing the retreating Germans. During the night, Zinkovich’s 12th TCtraveled another six miles while Rudkin’s 15th TC gained little against stiffening resistance.zra182.Withaerialsupport,thetankersof3rdTAcrossedtheOleshenRiverandadvancedsixmiles

by nightfall. The 8th PzD counter-attacked, forcing the 15th TC column to stop for the night.Rybalko, next morning under orders, would split his forces (promoted to 3rd GTA) and shiftdirectiontocaptureOtrada,northeastofOrelbuthewouldbeunabletocrosstheOkaRiver.Onegroupwith100 tanksattacked theboundary linebetween36th IDand262ndID,broke throughandheadedforthecriticalrailjunctionatArchangelskoye.The2ndPzDwithitsfewpanzersandPakguns intercepted toprevent theSoviets fromreaching the junction.While thepanzerswerekeeping the Soviet tanks busy, German engineers would sneak up and, using demo charges,attackedthetanks.TheGermanshadstoppedthecolumnlessthanamilefromArchangelskoyebydestroying47tanks.dgk236.fkk372+.zzz101m.dgk231m.snk433m.Tobolsterthestrengthof9thPzD,GroupKahlerwasattachedtothedivision.The9thPzDwas

thenjoined to9thArmoredReconnaissanceBattalionand togetherwerecalledGroupSchmall.mkz121.snk433m++.While the new offensive on the eastern perimeter was escalating, the 16th VA flew 1,222

sortiesinsupportofCentralFront’sadvancetothenorth.Withthehelpofairsupport,asmallgapinthelinewasopenedsouthofKromycbk112.dgk231m.snk433m.In2ndPzA’ssector,aSovietassaultpenetratedtheKarachev-Bryanskroadandconfirmingthe

wideoffensivetheSovietsweredeveloping.The2ndPzAhadtofallbackagaintocontainthepenetrationwhichnecessitated9thArmytofallbackaswell.Atthesametime,theSovietswereattackingtheboundarylinebetween2ndPzAand9thArmyandadvancingtowardSmiyevka.ThelastofModel’sreservesweresentthereandby7/24wouldslowdowntheadvance,butbythatdate the 2nd PzA had fallen back to the next trench line. At the same time General K.K

Rokossovsky sent two or three divisions of 13thArmy alongwith a few tanks up theTrosna-Fatezh road to attack Model’s southern perimeter. Receiving aerial intel that the force wascoming,Modelwasreadyforitwhenitstruck.Modelwasamasterinshiftinghisforcesquicklytomeetthenewthreatsthatwereconstantlyforming.snk112.dgk231m.snk433m.IntheOrelsalient,the3rdTAdroveintothelineof35thICunderRendulic.Itsdivisions,34th

ID,56th ID,262ndand299th ID,had finallybeenpenetrated in severalplaces.The2ndPzD,underLuebbe,8thPzDand36thIDweresenttoplugthegap.The9thPzDwasalsosenttothesectorfromthesoutheast.The183rdID,253rdIDand707thIDwerealsosentbuttheywouldbeadaybehind.Whilethereinforcementsweremoving,theSovietscuttheOrel-KarachevrailnearIlinskoye but the Soviet contingent was destroyed by a Luftwaffe raid. The 253rd ID shifteddirection,movedintosecurethearea.ItrecapturedIlinskoyeon7/21.By7/23,the35thIChadfallen back to the second trench system but the line in the area had been stabilized by all thetransfers from 9th Army but southeast of there the Germans were still in trouble. snk110+.zzz101m.dgk231m.snk433m.The 1st Flieger Division made another successful attack on Soviet assets near Karachev,

northwestofOrel.ItthenhadtoflymissionsagainsttheconcentrationsofSovietsnearKhotynets,also northwest of Orel, to prevent the 11th GA from breaking through. Then the 1st FliegerDivisionhadtoflyeasttoattackthelatestthreat,Rybalko’s3rdTA(3rdGTA).Therewerenotenoughplaneslefttocoverallthreatsatthesametime.Thepilotshadtoflymultiplemissions,puttingoutonefire thenanother.Bynowtherewasnotmuch left to theOrelsalientbutModelwasstillveryconcernedinevacuatinghismen.cbk112+.dgk231m.snk433m++.

July20thontheSouthernSalientThe day before Das Reich had been detached from 4th PzA and was currently en route toBarvenkovo toprepare foracounter-attack toward Izyum,which theSovietshad just attacked.HitlerchangedhismindonDasReich’sdeploymentandhadthemtransportedon7/23totheMiusRiverlinewheretheSovietswerealsoactive.gnk420.dgk231m.snk433m.Whilethe6thPzDand19thPzDwerefallingbackwithSoviettankscloselyfollowingMajor

Bake with six Tigers from the sPzAbt 503 ambushed the enemy. The Tigers coming from thenearbywoodsattacked thepassingcolumnofT34s andwithin a shortperiodof time23T34sweredestroyed.Slowtoreact,theSoviettanksfinallycountered,tryingtomaneuvertothesidesand rears of the panzers. The attemptwas unsuccessful and the Soviets lost another ten tanksbeforebreakingaway.Thoughreceivinghits,noneoftheTigersweredamagedenoughtorequireatow.fzk57.The48thPzCreportedtoGeneralHoththatofthenearly200Panthersreceivedatthestartof

the operation, 56were completely destroyed andwere left on the battlefield. Themany otherPanthersthatweredisabledandtowedoffthebattlefieldwouldbeabletoberepairedorusedforpartsorforfurthertesting.zzt101.

July20thontheNorthernSalientBryanskFrontcommander,Popov,ordered3rdTAtoshiftdirectiontothenorthwest,cutacrosstheOrel-MtenskroadandcaptureOtradabynightfall.Mtenskwastobecapturedwithin24hours.

ThesewereveryambitiousplansbutRybalkowasconfidentthattheycouldbeaccomplished.Hehadtheassetsof3rdArmyinthesectorandbetweenthetwoarmiesitshouldbeeasy.Bynoon,the leading forces of both armies had crossed the highway andwere fighting toward the OkaRiver,eastofOrel.The initialquickadvancewasslowingdownagainst thestiff resistanceofnewresourcescomingintothesector.InordertocaptureStanovoiKolodezbytheendofdayon7/22,Rybalkobroughtupthe2ndMCfromsecondechelontohelpwiththeattack.zra182+.In theOrel salient,Model launchedanothercounter-attackbut itwas repulsed.TheRedAir

ForcesentmanysortiesagainsttheweakeningGermanpositionstoday.fkk71.fkk389.zzz101m.dgk231m.snk433m++.HitlerorderedModel tohaltallfurtherwithdrawalsby9thArmyand2ndPzAbut twodays

laterModelconvincedHitlertorescindtheorder.The9thArmyimmediatelybeganevacuatinganestimated20,000casualtiesinOperationCitadel.Somesourcesclaimthenumberwastwiceasmuch.dgk238.dgk217.dgk231m.snk433m.The2ndPzDand8thPzDwereexpectedintheOrelsalienteastoftheOkaRiverbuttheyhad

notarrivedyet.TheintendedlineofProtasovo-Dobrovody-Bogoroditskoe-Spasskoecouldnotbeheldwithout thepanzersandmore troopswere retreating for the farbanksof theOka-Optuchaline.fkk380.zzz101m.dgk231m.snk433m.ASovietairraidagainsttheGermanairfieldatKramatorskaya,notfarfromStalino,destroyed

tenStukas.cbk101.dgk231m.snk433m.Despite theheavypressureon the eastern line thepast twodays. theGermanswere able to

prevent3rdArmy, fightingon3rdGTA’s right flank, frompenetrating the line.Though the linewas bending, it had not ruptured and the 3rdArmyhadbeenprevented fromcrossing theOkaRivertothewestofMtsensk.Bynow,theSovietthreeFrontattackhadevolvedintofouraxesofattackaround theentire salient.TheLuftwaffewasno longer able to support theentiregroundforcesatthesametime.Situationswiththegreatesturgencyreceivedprioritysupport.ItalsohadtoabandonallattemptstohitSovietairfieldsandrailroadsoutsidethesector.cbk113.snk170+.dgk231m.snk433m.The20thPzDhadreportedlosinganothertwelveunrecoverablepanzersinthepasteightdays.

mhz262.fkk285.dgk87m.In the Orel salient, the 1st TC reported having only 33 working tanks. cbk109. dgk231m.

snk433m.

July21stontheSouthernSalientFurtherdismantlingofHoth’s forcescontinued.While7thPzDmarched toward theBorisovka-Graivoronarea,the6thPzD,whichnowhad34workingpanzers,and167thID,weretransferredfrom3rd PzC to 4th PzA, forcingKempf, once he receivedOKHpermission, to speed up hisretreattobehindtheDonetsRiver.Withthosetwodivisionsleaving3rdPzC,the11thIC,whichhadlosthalfitsstrengthinthecampaign,hadtoexpanditssector.snk55.erz210.fkk297.

July21stontheNorthernSalientAt0300hrs,Rybalkoonceagainreceivedneworders.His3rdTAwastoturnsouth,cross theRybnitsa River and capture Stanovoi Kolodez. Rybalko had always been good in reacting to

changingordersandthis timewasnodifferent.Leavingasecurityforceat theOkabridgehead,the3rdTAshifteddirectionatfirstlightandmovedtowardthenewobjective.Fightingalongtheriverwithelementsof63rdArmy,the3rdTA’spaceslowedtoacrawl,fallingbehindscheduleandfailingtoreachStanovoiKolodez.The91stTBwascalledupandthepacequickenedalittle,allowingthe91stTBtoenterandcaptureSobakinoonRybalko’sflank.Itwasanexpensivedayfor 3rd TA, suffering many casualties. General Rybalko, while driving to the front to see forhimselfwhyhisarmywasstalling,wasnearlykilledwhenaGermanplanestrafedhisentourage.Hiscarwastotaled,buthewasuninjuredandcontinuedtothefront.HisusualpracticewastovisitthefrontinasingleJeep,believingthataGermanplanewouldnotbotherwithasinglejeep.However that day he had a convoy of two other jeeps and a guard truck, and the Germansattacked.zra184+.zra186.General Scheller of 9th PzD was ordered to launch a suicide attack north of Orel toward

Krasnilkovo.Herefused theoriginalorderandproposedasensibleorder.Theproposedorderwas accepted but thenGeneral Harpe of 41st PzC rejected the proposal andwould convinceModeltofirehim.ItisironicbecauseatdaybreaktheSovietsattacked,preemptingtheGermanattackandthe9thPzD,andthenlaterthe10thPzGD,wereforcedonthedefensivewithnochanceof ever launching the objectionable attack. The 10th PzGRwas also involvedwith the attacktowardHill222.4,southofKrasnilkovo.By1430hrs,HarpeorderedthetwodivisionstomakeastandalongtheKarentievo-Koptevoline.mkz122.dgk231m.snk433m++.RealizingtheWesternandCentralFrontswerenotclosingthesalientoffquicklyenoughand

seeing that some of the German troops were falling back, Stavka ordered the 3rd GTA toimmediately shift direction andhead forStanovoiKolodezwith the objective of pocketing the35th IC east of Orel. The 1st Flieger Division flew 1,500 sorties in support of the easternperimeterandespeciallythe35thIC.The3rdGTAwasconstantlybeinghitandlost38tanksand85trucks.cbk113.dgk231m.snk433m++.IntheOrelsalient,thefortifiedtownofMzenskfinallyfelltotheSoviets.ThefightingforOrel

continued.fkk71.zzz101m.dgk231m.snk433m++.ModelrelievedLtGeneralSchellerof9thPzDforrefusingtolaunchasuicidalattackagainst

Bagramyan’s tanks west of Krasnikov. Model called in the Luftwaffe to help support thedesperate ground defense but the Luftwaffe was so short of fuel that its participation wasnegligible.The flakgunnerbatterieswere called in todefend against onrushing tanks. dgk237.dgk231m.snk433m++.The 56th ID had been pushed back behind theOka River and now it defended a fivemile

sectionofitthatincludedthedestroyedvillageofVoin.AstheSoviettanksapproachedVoin,the234thGRwaiteduntilthetanksgotto300yardsandstartedfiringonthemwitheverythingtheyhad.The7.5cmPaKshitfivetanksbeforetheT34sandKV1sreturnedfire.Germankill teamsleftthelinetosearchoutanddestroytheincomingtanks.Sovietinfantrybehindthetankscameouttostop theGermansandahand-to-handcombatensued.After twohoursof fighting, theSoviettanksgaveupandbypassedthestrongpoint.Stukasfinallyarrivedtosearchfor the tanks.Theyfoundthemandattacked,stoppingafewofthem.AnotherfriendlyfireincidentoccurredthatcostthelivesofsomeoftheGermansoldiers.PzAbt156whichhadwarnedouttheirguns,receivedfournewanti-tankgunsthatday.fkk381+.dgk231m.snk433m++.

Modelorderedthe46thPzCtofallbackbehindtheRakitnaya.Themovewouldstartafterdarkthe followingnight.The4thPzDwouldmovebackaswellassoonas46thPzCwas inplace.GeneralvonSauckenof4thPzDcomplainedtoLtGeneralHansZornof46thPzCofthewayhisdivision had been deployed in a piecemeal fashion. An inventory of the 4th PzD that nightrevealed that it had12,000men, 1,800horses, 48panzers, 20Pakguns and24Mk IVs in therepairshop.fkk390.lck116m.Popov orderedMajGeneral Rudkin’s 15th TC andMajGeneralKorchagin’s 2ndMC (3rd

GTA)whichwerecommittedaroundOtrada,tothenortheastofOrel;therestof3rdGTAwastoshift and expand to the south and punch through the southern shoulder of the penetration. Theadvancewasslowduetostiffresistance.ThenorthernflanksawMajGeneralZinkovich’s12thTCstayonitoriginalaxis.dgk236*.zzz101m.dgk231m.snk433m++.The1stFliegerDivision reported losing13planeswhiledowning16Sovietplanes.Sixof

those13planesweredestroyedbygroundfire.cbk113.dgk231m.snk433m++.

July22ndontheSouthernSalientOver theprevious fewdays, the6thPzDhad retreatedback toGonki,northofBelgorod.Thatmorning, the69thArmyattackedalong the line that includedGonkibut theattackwas initiallyrepulsed.knz189.

July22ndontheNorthernSalientAtfirstlight,theSovietsopenedwithanhour-longbarragebeforetheassaultwaslaunched.RedfightersstrafedtheGermanpositionsaswell.DuringthenighttheSovietshadmovedupthroughtheravinestobeveryclosetotheGermanline;itwasabigsurprisefortheGermans,with theSovietssocloseatthetimeoftheattack.Inonesection,PzAbt49defendeditself,knockingout17tanks.Themainaxishitthe7thID,whichwasontherightof4thPzD,headoncausingagapintheline.TheSoviettankersheadedforHill254andHill250.Thosehillsweredefendedbythe35thPzR.Thecommanderofthe35th,MajorCossel,wasintheleadandquicklydestroyedthreetankswhenhispanzertookadirecthitthatcausedhisownroundstoexplode,killingeveryoneinthepanzer.AtLomovea, theSovietswere stoppedby4thPzD.General vonSaucken expectedanothercounter-attackatLomoveathenextmorningandsentStuGAbt244uptheretosupporttheline.fkk384.fkk390+.dgk231m.snk433m++.At0630hrs,the1stFliegerDivisionflewitsfirstmissionofthedayagainstaconcentrationof

tanksinavillagenortheastofOrel.TherewaslittleresistanceintheairbutanumberofGermanplanes received damage from ground flak. Several runsweremade against the targets and anunknownnumberoftankswerehit.Duringtheraids,theadvanceontheGermanlinewasslowed.Bythispointinthecampaignthepilotsofbothsideswereexhaustedandcouldbarelystayawakeevenduringcombat.Itcouldnotbehelpedforbynowbothsideswerelowonpilotsandplanes.cbk114.dgk231m.snk433m++.Stavkashifted3rdTAalittlesouthtothe2ndPzA-9thArmyboundary.Theyalsobroughtup

4thTA to drive onBolkhov. The fightingwould continue to be the focal point in the northernsalientuntiltheendofthemonth.Modelbroughtup95thIDtojustsouthofBolkhov,alongsideJaschke’s55thICtoholdbacktherenewedattackthatwasexpectedthere.TheGD,293rdIDand

129thIDwerebroughtupandinitiatedadisruptivecounterattacktopreventthemfromcapturingtheimportantKhotynets-Karachevrailwayandhighway.The25thPzGD,the10thPzGD,the18thPzDandthe20thPzDunderthedirectionofHarpe,formerlyof41stPzC,wouldalsotakepartinthedefense.Anestimated200Soviettanksperdayweredestroyedbythisgroup.The3rdTAwasredeployedto9thArmy’sNikolskoe-Filosopovsector.snk113*+.kcz171.dgk231m.snk433m++.Model ordered the southeast quadrant of the Orel salient to withdraw westward. The 48th

Army tried to follow,but the1stFliegerDivision constantly raided theSoviets, slowing theirprogress. In the northern sector, northeast of Karachev, the Soviet pressure had subsided,allowing the Luftwaffe to concentrate on the east and southeast sides of the salient. cbk115.dgk231m.snk433m++.The51stWerferRegimentwiththeirfourrocketlauncherswerebroughtclosetotheOkaRiver

andstartedfiringontheenemy.Itwastheirfirstdayinbattle.Forthatdayandthefollowingtwodays the Soviets repeatedly attacked this sector of the Oka and the 51stWRwas in constantbattle;thismadeabigdifferenceintheGermandefensewhichkepttheSovietsfromcrossingatthispointforanothercoupledays.fkk385.dgk231m.snk433m++.Intheearlyafternoon,theSovietsattemptedasecondattackalongtheline:Lomovea-Kasmino

Juryevski. The line flexed but held by the end of the day. A total of 62 Soviet tanks weredestroyed in the engagement in 4th PzD sector. Next morning the 4th PzD and Maj GeneralHitzfeld’s 102nd ID would counter, trying to regain ground lost today. fkk392. dgk231m.snk433m++.The Soviets entered Bolkhov and began a house to house clearing; the city would not be

secureduntil7/25.fkk399.dgk231m.snk433m++.WithSoviettanksnowarrivingattheOka,Sovietartillerywasmovedwestwardaswelland

wasnowpoundingtheGermanpositionswestoftheriver.ModelwasbringingallreservesuptotheOka,inanalloutefforttostoptheSoviets.Boththe2ndPzDwhichwasdeployedtotherightof56thIDand8thPzDhadarrivedandwereontheriver.The34thIDwasontheleftsideof56thID.TheSovietshadstillbeenabletoestablishtwosmallbridgeheadsonthewesternbanksoftheOkabytheendoftheday.fkk383+.dgk231m.snk433m++.HitlerhadforbiddenModeltoenhancethetrenchesatthebaseofthesalientandorderedhim

tostandfastontheoutsideperimeter’sdefenses.HoweverModelbroughtmoretroopstothebasedefensesandstartedenhancing the trenches.Modelknewtheywouldbeneededandhedidnotwanttolosehisarmies.sgf354.dgk231m.snk433m++.The1stFlieger Division reported losing 11 planeswhile shooting down 14 Soviet planes.

cbk114.dgk231m.snk433m++.

July23rdontheSouthernSalientThe4thPzAand3rdPzCin the lastweekhadretreated to theirpreCitadelstart line,southofTomorovka.Konev’sSteppeFrontheldalinefromjustnorthofTomarovkatoVolchansktotheeast.AtthislineKonevpausedforalmosttwoweekstoregroupandresupplyhisforcesbeforeresuminghisadvance.Vatutin’sVoronezhFrontwasdeployedtothewestofTomarovka.The4thPzAestimatedthat itcaptured32,000POWs,destroyedupto2,000tanksand2,000gunsbutitappearedthatthesecasualtieshadlittleimpactontheRedArmyforitseemedtotheGermansthe

RedArmyhadanunlimitedpoolofmenandproductioncapacity.kcz171+.wwf174.fmz229.AstheRedArmycontinuedtopush4thPzAawayfromProkhorovka,theGermanrepairshops

continuedtorepairpanzers,returningthemtoactiveduty.HausserreportedtovonMansteinthathiscorpshad221assortedpanzersand78assaultguns.Thebreakdownincluded72PzIIIs,98PzIVs,30Tigers,17T34s.Thecostinmenwasevenworse.Duringthecampaignthecorpshadlost196officers and6,232menandwas shortof its authorized strengthby1,041officers and5,609men.wdk170.vzz175.dgk241.

July23rdontheNorthernSalientIntheOrelsectorthe253rdIDcounter-attackedandregainedHill223.6,establishingalinkwiththeleftflankof9thPzD.The253rdIDnowheldthelineStrykovo-Hill223.6-Ilinskoye.Fordays,the Soviets had attacked the boundary line between the 9th PzD and 253rd ID without muchsuccess.mkz123.dgk231m.snk433m++.TheGD, arriving by train, reached the Orel salient and was sent to the swampy woods

northeast of Karachev where they were most needed. Soviet tanks from the 6th Anti TankDivisionsupportedbythe31stGRRwereonlyfourmilesfromtheOrel-Karachevroad.DespitetheheavyrainfallthatdaytheSovietswerenowapproachingthewoods.TheGDdivisionwasstilldeployingwhentheyhadtoengagethe31stGRRwhoweredeterminedtoseverthecriticalOrel-Karachevroad.Whilethewoodswerebeingdefended,otherelementsofGDwenton theattackandwereabletoclearthenearbyvillagesofKrutoye,UmrichinoandShishkinowheretheSovietswerebringingupsuppliestousetoadvancetheirattack.hsz134+.hsz140m.FromBolkhov,the12thPzDwasrushedtoeastofOreltohelppluganewgapintheline.The

78thAD from 9th Armywas also traveling there to help out.With these penetrations,ModelorderedRendulictowithdrawhisforcestoBolkhovtoshortenthelineandtopreventtheSovietsintohis reararea.The10thPzGDmovedover fromKrasnikovoandwasusedas rearguard toslow the Soviet advance while Rendulic prepared defenses. snk111+. zzz101m. dgk231m.snk433m++.Late at night, the 3rdTA stopped its advance atNovoPetrovtsa to rest and prepare for the

plannedassaultonStanovoiKolodeznextmorning.RybalkowasalsoorderedtoreachtheStishRiverbymidnightthenextday.zra186.The1stFliegerDivisionrecordedlosing19planeswhiledowning18Sovietplanes.cbk114.

dgk231m.snk433m++.

July24thontheSouthernSalientSSTKwasbeingloadedontotrainsatBelgorod.ItwasrumoredtheywouldbetravelingsouthtotheMiusRiversector,wheretheSovietswereassemblingontheeastsideoftheriver.kuz219.

July24thontheNorthernSalientDuringthepredawnhours,theSovietstriedtosurprisetheGermanlineandforceacrossingofthe Oka. The Germans quickly responded and only a few Soviets made it across and intocaptivity. They suffered heavy casualties and the crossing was aborted. fk386. dgk231m.

snk433m++.TheGD division arrived that day in the Karachev-Khotynets area and immediately set up

defensesagainstthetanksattachedto11thGA.cbk115.dgk231m.snk433m++.Aerialphotosshowed176SoviettankswereassemblingintheTrosnaarea.Thiswasthearea

that 4th PzDwas going to attack that day. The attackwas canceled and a new defensive belterected.fkk392.dgk231m.snk433m++.The3rdTAgotalatestartandlauncheditsattacktowardStanovoiKolodezaroundmidday.On

this extremely hot day, the 12th TC and 2nd MC led the advance but failed to reach theirobjective.zra186.

July25thontheSouthernSalientHitlerorderedthe2ndSSPzCtoItalybutrescindedtheordertohavejusttheLAHtransferredtoItaly; the other two divisions were needed in the Kharkov sector. LAH left their 42 panzers,includingafewTigers,insector.ThedivisionwouldbepickingupnewpanzersinItaly.cbk101.kuz219.SSTKwasorderedtotheMiusRiverareatohelpstoptheSouthernFrontfromdestroying6th

Army.DasReichand3rdPzDwerebeingdeployedthereaswell.gnk421.The11thPzRof6thPzDwentintoreservetorestandrefit.MajorBakedidsuchagoodjob

duringthecampaign,especiallyinkeepingtheRyndinkabridgeheadon7/12,thatHothpromotedhimtoregimentalCOandon8/1hereceivedtheOakLeavestohisKnight’sCross.Justsixdayslater,Bake’s commander and friend,ColonelOppeln-Bronikovski received theCross inGold.fzk57.fzk315.zfk479.

July25thontheNorthernSalientInearlymorning,heavyrainscame,turningthedirtroadstomud.At0800hrs,the4thPzD’slineintheTrosnasectorwasheavilybombed.At0900,theattackwaslaunchedwiththesupportof100tanks.ThePzAbt6allowedtheSoviettankstobreakthelineandheadinlandbutthepanzersturnedanddemolishedtheRedtanksfromtherear.Nearby,35thPzRwasattackedasitdefendedHill250.Itrepulsedtheattack,destroyingseventanks.4thPzDdestroyedatotalof20tanksthatday.fkk393.dgk231m.snk433m++.Mussoliniwasarrestedandremovedfrompower.Hitlerconsideredsendingmoredivisionsto

Italy.dgk238.cbk101.Nowseveraldaysbehindschedule,the3rdTAresumedtheiradvanceatdawn.TheGermans

wereputtingupstiffresistanceandtheadvancecontinuedslowly,buttowardeveningYeropkinofell and 3rd TAwas on the verge of accomplishing one of its original objectives which wascuttingtheOrel-KurskraillineandcapturingStanovoiKolodez.zra186.Shortlyafterdaybreak,SovietgunsopenedupontheGermanlinewith theprimaryrecipient

beingthe34thIDandpartofthe56thIDtoitsright.Theshellingturnedintoarollingbarrageasthe Red Army started crossing the Oka. The 78th SD, which had just arrived a couple daysbefore,swungthetideofvictorytotheGermansidewhenitassistedthe34thIDasitwasaboutto crumble. After the end of the day, the Soviets paused for a few days to regroup. GeneralRendulic’s35thICaccountedfortakingdown819tankssince7/11.Allofthe22Sovietdivisions

thatbattledthe35thIChadsufferedheavycasualties.RendulicwaspromotedandwasawardedtheOakLeavestohisKnight’sCross.The35thICstayedontheOkauntil7/31.fkk386.GeneralRybalko’stwocorpscontinuedtoslowlygaingroundandwerefinallyabletocutthe

raillinefromOreltoKursk.TheconstantpressurefromtheSovietforceswouldeventuallyweardowntheGermandefensesandforceamoredeterminedretreat.Thebulkof3rdGTAwasshiftedsouthwards to support the 48th Army in quickening its pace northward. This move probablyshouldhavebeendonedaysearlierwhenitwasdiscoveredthatsomeoftheGermanforceswerepullingbackandescaping.dgk236*+.zzz101m.The3rdArmycrossedtheOkaRiverandestablishedabridgeheadonthewesternbanksbefore

movingon.The1stFliegerDivision immediatelyattacked theSovietson thewestbankof theriverandpreventedthemfromadvancingfurtherthatday.TheOkaRiverrannorth-southjustwestofOrel.fkk399.zzz101m.cbk115.

July26thontheSouthernSalientWittmann’sTigersalongwiththerestofpanzersofLAHwerehandedovertoSSTKandSSDRastheywere about to be ordered to Italy on 7/29,where theywould receive their new panzers.Wittmann,during thecampaign to thispoint,haddestroyed30 tanks,28assaultgunsandmanyfieldguns.agk131.fzk317.zow175.For thenexteightdays, the38thArmy,fromthesouthwesternendof theKurskbulge,would

demonstrate an attack to mislead Hausser. The real attack would come from the east. Sovietengineersbuilt22underthesurfacebridgesalongtheNorthernDonetsRiveranditstributariesinpreparationforthemassiveattackthatwascoming:OperationRumyantsev.Itwouldincludethe6thGA,5thGAand53rdArmyintheleadwiththe7thGAfollowing.Thereplenished1stTAandthe5thGTAwouldsupport.TheSovietshada5to1advantageinmenand10to1advantageintankswhentheoperationlaunched.dgk245+.

July26thontheNorthernSalientThegrenadiersofGDlaunchedanattacktowardtheVitebyetRiver,whichtheenemywasusingasanassemblyarea.Theassault,whichlastedallday,forthemostpartfailed;theenemywastoostrong.OnebattalionofGDdidreachtheriveratIsmorosny.Knowingthatthecapturedsitewasimportant to the Soviets and that theywould try to get it back, additional forceswere quicklybrought up to resist the attack. In the afternoon, the Soviets attacked at Ismorosny and nearbyAlisovo,aswellasthewoodsnortheastofKarachev.OnceitwasrealizedthatGDhadmovedintotheareaplusthefactitwasanimportantarea,11thGAbroughtupitsreservestoputgreaterpressureontheline.hsz137+.ThethreetankcorpsofGeneralBadanov’s4thTA(496tanks)struckwestofBolkhov,inthe

northern sector of the salient, threatening a breakthroughwhich would take the Soviets to theimportant rail townofKarachev. Initially the 23rdPzC and 41st PzC resisted, but theSovietseventually broke through, forcing the Germans to abandon Bolkhov to a new defense beltnorthwestofOrelandlessthansixmilesfromthevitalBryansk-Orelrailline.ThearrivalofGDfinally stopped the advance of 11th GA and 2nd GCC. Karachev remained in German handsdespite Bagramyan throwing new reserves into battle. It started raining after dark. dgk238+.

fkk393.zzz101m.dgk231m.snk433m++.TheOKHunofficiallynotifiedModelthatOperationHerstreise(AutumnJourney)wouldbegin

inafewdays.Duringthepreviousthreeweeks,Model’stwoarmieslost62,300soldiers,butyetthey prevented three fronts from surrounding them. The Soviet casualtieswere even higher.AmajorreasonforModel’ssuccessinholdingbacktheSovietssolongwashisdisobedienceoftheorderfromOKHnottodigdefensesintheOrelsalient.ModelquietlybuiltfourtrenchesbeforeandduringOperationCitadel because he realized theSovietswould eventually counter-attack.The order not to build defenses by theOKHmade no sense at all except to a fanatic like itsleader.dgk238.snk112+.mkz123+.zzz101m.The4thPzDfinallycrossedtheRakitnayatonewly-builtdefensesinordertorestandregroup.

There were no major fighting in 46th PzC sector that day. Model believed the Soviets werepreparingtoshifttheirattacktotheSolotnoyeDnoarea.Thegeneralsentthe103rdPzARtothearea to bolster the line thatwasdefendedby the102nd ID, 7th ID and258th ID.Soviet tanksbrokethroughthelinesoutheastofMartinovskianditwassealedoff,butnotbeforeHill260wascaptured.Acounter-attackledby4thPzDchasedtheSovietsoffthehilltostabilizethe102ndIDline.Anotherbreakinthelineoccurredin258thIDsectorbutthatgapwassealedaswell.Thatnight4thPzDcounted37panzersand10StuGs.fkk393+.dgk87m.lck116m.Stavka, recognizingRybalkoandhisarmy’ssignificantcontributions, renamed3rdTAto3rd

GTAandrenameditscorpsaswell.The12thTCbecame6thGTCandthe15thTCbecame7thGTC,while2ndMCbecame7thGMC.zra187.The23rdICand41stPzC,defendingBolkhovareawereslowlypushedback,abandoningthe

townandfallingbacktonewlyconstructeddefenses,northwestofOrelandonlysixmilesfromthecriticalBryansk-Orelrailline.OnlythetimelyarrivalofGDcontainedthesouthwarddriveofBagramyan’s11thGAand2ndGCC.dgk238+.zzz101m.dgk231m.snk433m++.Badanov’s 4th TA finally arrived in sector and pulled up behind the 11th GA. The army

consistedofthe11thTC,30thTCand6thGMC.The4thTAhad500newtanksthathadneverbeeninbattle.Intheweekthatittookthetankstoreachthissector,Modeltransferredfourpanzerdivisionstothisareaandwasabletoputupstiffresistance.BadanovlostmanytanksandwasunabletohelppushtheGermansbackveryfar,buthewassucceedinginenclosingsomeGermansnearBolkhov.kcz171.dgk231m.snk433m++.

July27thontheSouthernSalientPreliminaries of Operation Rumyantsev began. The Voronezh and Steppe Fronts launched amassive counter-attack along the Belgorod-Kharkov line. The Germans had anticipated thisoffensive and the Orel offensive as well but what really surprised them was the speed andresilienceofthefightingunitsintheKurskdefenseastheyparticipatedinthesenewoffensives.dgk229.zzz101m.

July27thontheNorthernSalientModel, to avoid senseless deaths, ordered his garrison at Orel to fall back to theHagen linewhile therewas an escape route.Hitler approved all forces to theHagen line. The rear areaservicesbeganthenextday.Therearguardwasformedby12thPzDand78thAD.The3rdand

63rdArmiesarrivedinfrontofOrelon8/4.fkk387.fkk399.zzz101m.ThePzAbt653hadlostatotalof13Ferdinandssince7/5.Theyhadmoredamagedmachines

buttheywererepaired.mhz262*.Atnight,apanzerbattalionofGDmovedintotheVarkyareaonasearchanddestroymission.

Itwasdiscoveredthatelementsof11thGAhadshifteddirectiontothewestandweretryingtooutmaneuver German forces. For themost part Soviet forces evaded the shock group and thesearchpartywaseventuallyrecalled.hsz139.

July28thontheSouthernSalientGeneralHausserwasdecoratedwithOakLeavestohisKnight’sCrossforhisdeterminationandleadershipinthecampaign.Hewasthe261strecipientsohonored.fzk184.

July28thontheNorthernSalientModelwasorderedtolaunchOperationHerbstreise.ItwasthecompleteevacuationoftheOrelsalient by German forces. While the front line was moving back toward the Hagen Line, 17divisionsweremovingintosectortostiffenthelinefortheexpectedassaultthatthethreefrontscouldgenerate.Model’s leadershipduring this evacuationwasexcellent andwasprobably themainreasonwhyfewGermanswerelostduringtheoperation.Inadditiontothe9thArmyandthe2nd PzA, 20,000 injured and 53,000 tons of supplieswere saved during the retreat along theOrel-Bryansk highway. The 1stFlieger Division played an important role in safeguarding theevacuation.cbk115.kcz171.dgk231m.snk433m++.zzk385.IthadbeenrainingoffandonalldayintheKarachevsectorwhereGDwasdefending,andthe

swampinggroundwasgettingworse.At0630hrs,whenithadtemporarilystoppedraining,theLuftwaffemadeabombingrunnorthofShudrewheretheenemywasassemblingforces;resultswere inconclusive. At 0900 hrs, a heavy artillery barrage targeted the GD division whichhunkered down and endured the shelling. During the shelling, a combined force of tanks andinfantry advanced and recaptured Alisovo from the Germans. Though the nearby village ofKusmenkovowasalsohithard,itwasstillbeingheldbyGD.Bynoon,theSovietshellinghadstoppedandleadunitshadreachedIsmorosnyandwerefightingwiththesmallgarrisonholdingthe village.By 1500 hrs, Ismorosny had fallen and the Sovietswere fightingwithGD for thewoods near the village. At about this same time a small squadron of German fighters werestrafing Alisovo, trying to cause as much death and destruction as possible. Increased Sovietactivity was felt at Semenovka, Tvanosvskoye Dvoriki, Krasaskye and Novogorodskye as theKarachevsectorattackwasrenewed.Thesevillageshadfallenbydark.Thenewlyarrived293rdIDwassenttotheareatotrytoplugtheforminggapintheline.hsz140+.The 3rd TA (3rd GTA) was pulled from the line, given a few days to rest and was then

transferred to the command of General Rokossovsky of Central Front in an attempt to speedCentralFront’space.zra187.In theOrelsalient, the102ndIDand7th IDwas repeatedlyattackbySoviet squads,but the

attacks were initially repulsed. At 1400 hrs gaps opened on either side of Iablonovez whichallowed the tankers to head for Golenischtschevo, Brussovez and establish a bridgehead atGolenischtschevo.fkk394.dgk231m.snk433m++.

July29thontheNorthernSalientIntheOrelsalient,elementsofthe4thPzDattackedtowardTopkovotostopSovietattemptstocaptureHill260whichhelp7thID’sdefensiveposture.Ontheway4thPzDfoughtahardbattleto captureMartinovski.The capturewasmade evenharder by the shelling being delivered bynearbyYaltaWoods.Anattemptwasmadetoclearthewoodsbutafterenteringthewoods,itwasdecidedthatafteranairattackthatfailedtoshaketheSovietsloose,theoddswereagainstthemsotheypulledback.fkk395.dgk87m.lck116m.The129thIDhadjustarrivedintheKarachevsectorandwasimmediatelysentontheattack.It

was joinedby the293rd IDand together they launchedan attackon thenewly lost villagesofSemenovka, Krasaskye and Novogorodskye. Two of the three villages were recaptured butKrasaskyeremainedinSoviethands.hsz141.TheFusiliersofGD received bad news that day.TheirColKassnitz had died in aBreslau

hospitalfromwoundsreceivedwhenhewasleadinghisgrouponJuly5th.TheregimenthadjustpassedButovoandwasheadingforCherkasskoewhenitranintoaminefieldcoveredbysmallarmsandmortars.HewasawardedtheKnight’sCrosswhileinhospitalon7/21.hsz142.dgk94.lck228.

July30thontheNorthernSalientThe PzR ofGD had arrived in theKarachev region, west of Orel four days before and beenimmediately placed in the line. That morning, while maintaining a defensive posture it wasattacked by 30 T34s supported by infantry, near Hill 211.7. The Soviet attackers fought in asuicidalfashion,notgivingupwhentheyrealizedtheywerefacingmostlyPanthers.TheGermansdestroyed almost all the tanks and repulsed the infantry aswell, forcing them to fall back. LtRischandhiscrewofaMkIVdestroyed18tanksthisdaybutthreedayslaterdefendingagainstanothertankattack,LtRischwaskilled.hjj143.hsz142.

July31stontheNorthernSalientIt is estimated that since 7/11 in the Orel salient, Model’s 9th Army and 2nd PzA sufferedcasualtiesof62,300menandasmanyas400panzers.Thesenumbersfarexceedthecasualties9thArmyexperienced in the firstweekofOperationCitadel. It isestimated that for thewholemonthofJuly,9thArmylost304panzers.sna262.snz226m.The Fusiliers ofGD had a restless night. They were defending the line on either side of

Alechinoandwerehearingtanksmovingcloser.Atfirstlight,thosetanksattacked.TheFusilierswerereadyandweresupportedbyafewpanzersthatwerebroughtupduringthepredawnhours.QuicklytheGDdestroyedadozenormoretanksbeforetherestfellback.hsz142.In theAlisovosector, itwasdiscovered that therewasastrongenemypresenceon the road

north of Shudre that crossed the Vitebyet River. Besides sending a strike force fromGD, theLuftwaffesentasquadrontohittheconcentration.hsz143.At night in the Orel salient, Model began to fall back to the Desna River, the Hagen line

(OperationHerbstreise).Itwasthefirstofafourpartphasedretreattoanewline60milestotherear.Thisfallbackwouldfreeupupto20divisionsfordeploymentwhereneeded.Itrequireda

tremendousamountoftimeandplanningbytheofficers, inadditiontorunningthebattlefieldtoachievethissuccessfulendeavor.Bythistime,mostofthefightingwasoccurringintheBolkhovsalient.Thisfour-phasedwithdrawalwould takeuntil8/17 tocomplete.The taskofstoppingamajorSoviet offensive,moving huge ammunition stores,withdrawing two armies and buildingnew defenses all at the same time was a monumental effort. Once the Soviets realized thewithdrawalwason, they increased theirefforts topenetrate the line.For themonthofJuly, theelite4thPzDwhichcontributedsomuchlost2,521men.dgk240.snk112++*.fkk396.zzz101m.dgk231m.snk172.snk433m++.zzk385+.

27

August1st-August27thAugust1stontheNorthernSalientQuicklydiscoveringModel’sevacuation(OperationHagen),theSovietsrenewedtheirattackon9thArmyintheShepelovo-Gomelsector.Fourrifledivisionsand120tanksattackedthe7thID,31stIDandthe258thID.ThoughtheGermanswereoutnumberedinbothmenandpanzers,theydidagoodjobinstoppingtheattack.It’sclaimedtheSoviets lost77tanks.OnAugust4th, thedivisions reachedKromy, southofOrelbut thepressurewasmaintained from theChernRiverareaandModelhadtotemporarilyredirectLuftwaffesupportawayfrom2ndPzAto9thArmy.Thoughnopenetrationwasmade,thelinedidbendwiththeSovietscapturingHill269.5andwiththeadvancedreconbattalionheadingforHill263.TheywerenowonlysevenmilesfromtheirmainobjectiveofKromy.snk115.fkk398.dgr209m.aaa124m.lck116m.The33rdPzGR,underMauss,wasordered to theKrasnikovoWest-GunyavkaWest-Krasnyi

Kommunar to eastofHill269withexplicitorders thatHill269.5must stay inGermanhands.fkk398.The9thPzD,westofOrel,hadsufferedcasualtiesof3,642mensinceCitadelwaslaunched.It

had22MkIIIsand32MkIVsand241otherarmoredvehicles.mkz122.dgk231m.snk433m++.

August2ndontheSouthernSalientAtBelgorod,the4thPzAhadseveraldefensebelts,butonlythefirstonewasmannedandwithinfantryonly.VonMansteinwasforcedtogiveuppanzerunitstootherareasandwasnowinamuch weakened condition. The 11th PzD, 19th PzD and 6th PzD were still available nearBelgorod.HesenttheDasReichandSSTKtoassistthe3rdPzDnorthwestofKharkovtostopthenewmassiveSovietassault.VikingwassenttohelpGroupKempf.dgk246+.

August2ndontheNorthernSalientWestofOrel, the35thPzRandPzAbt49wereattackedbySoviet tanks.Though theGermansdestroyed16tanks,theSovietswereabletofighttheirwaypast.TheCOof46thPzC,GeneralZorn,waskilledonthisdaybyashellburst,ashedrovetotheline.LtGeneralHossbach,theCOof31st ID,eventuallyreplacedhim.The temporarycommanderuntilLtGeneralHossbachwaschosen was Lt General Esebeck. Hossbach would lead the 56th PzC in June 1944. fkk398.zsm266..zmb239+.Atnight,Soviet partisans exploded5,000charges, destroying30milesof track, interrupting

rail traffic for48hoursandpreventing theGermans fromemptying theirhugeOrelwarehouse.Another1,700chargeswere setoffon the3rdandanother4,100chargesexplodedon the4th.

dgk240.zzz101m.dgk231m.snk433m++.

August3rdontheSouthernSalientOperation Rumyantsev began that day. The combined efforts of Vatutin’s Vorenzh Front andKonev’sSteppeFrontlaunchedwiththesolepurposeofdestroying4thPzAand,ifpossible,therestofAGSdeployeddownto theBlackSea.The1stTA,5thGTA,5thGA,6thGA,7thGA,69thand53rdArmieswouldbe involved in themainspearhead.The38thand40thArmiesaswellas the47thArmyand3rdGMCwouldattackon thewesternflank.TheSovietsadvancedover15milesthatdayandwereinthevicinityoftheTomarovka-Belgorodline.ThefirstphaseobjectivewastosecureKharkov.dgk241+.dgk243m.zra65+.dgn242m.gmn260.gmn260m.WhenOperationRumyantsevbegan,theSovietforcesnumbered980,000menand2,439tanks.

TheGermanshadonly210,000menand250panzers.At0500hrs, theSoviets openedwith amassivebarrageandby0800hrs, theassault force jumpedoff intonarrowattackzoneswheremen and tanks would far outweigh the enemy. VonManstein knew a counter offensive wouldeventuallycomebut itwasasurprise that itcamesosoon.4thPzAandKempfGroupsufferedheavycasualtiesbynotbeingreadyfortheassault.DasReichandSSTKdivisionswentsouthbutwerequicklycalledback.The5thSSPzGDmoveduptoassistKempf.Whileafewfactsofthisoperation are presented, the operation was much too large to cover in depth here. dgk247*.dgk241*.gjz192.gmn260.gmn260m.zro211.At 0500 hrs, Operation Rumyantsev began with a heavy barrage that lasted three hours.

Elementsof1stTAand6thGAquicklypenetratedthefront linebut the53rdArmywasstalledagainst the stiffGermandefenseof theErikRiver.Vatutinhad to shift resources toassist53rdArmy.dgk247.Konev’s Steppe Front was having trouble crossing the Northern Donets River against stiff

resistance.TohelpKonev,the5thGMCpivotedtotheeast,towardthevillageofKrasnoewhileRotmistrov’s18thTCand29thTCcontinuedtowardthesouth,parallelto1stTA.ThisdiversionhastenedtheGermansevacuationofBelgorod.ThestiffresistanceinthetownsofBorisovkaandGraivoronforcedRDsfromboth27thArmyand6thGAtostaybehindtoclearwhilethetankersmovedaheadunprotected.The twofieldarmieshadencircledfiveGermandivisionsandweretrying to reduce thepocket.The11thPzDandGD attacked theSoviets from the rearandwereabletoopenacorridorforthetrappedcomrades.MajGeneralPoluboiarov’s4thGTCwasabletoforceaflankof11thPzDbackfromthemainattackandhadtofightforsurvivalthemselves.dgk248.The4thPzAwasfightingforsurvival.The19thPzDand6thPzDjoinedtoestablishadefense

northeastofTomarovkathatstoppedthe31stTCof1stTA.Onthefollowingday,the6thTCand3rdMCcontinued toexploit thegapsouthwestofBorisovka.The6thGAwereridingwith thetankers.To theeastof1stTA,Konev’sSteppeFrontwashaving troublecrossing theNorthernDonetsRiver.Vatutinsenthis5thGTAovertoKonevtoassisthis7thGAinbreakingtheGermandefenseattheriver.The5thGMCpivotedandadvancedonKrasnoewhileRotmistrov’s18thand29th TC continued to drive south, parallel to 1st TA. These forces were nearing Belgorod,threateningencirclement.TheGermansstartedtoevacuatethecitythatday.dgk248.TheBakeGroupwasexitingtheGonkiwoodswhentheywereattacked.Afterabriefstruggle,

nineT34sweredestroyedbeforethetankspulledoff.BythistimetheBakeGrouphaddestroyed150tanksandanumberofgunsduringthiscampaign.fzk58.

August3rdontheNorthernSalientDuringthepredawnhours,thePzRofGD,underMajorPossel,movedtoIsmorosny.Atfirstlightthe panzers moved out toward the northwest through the woods near Alechino. While in thewoods,thecolumnwasambushedbuttheattackwasrepulsed.Thecolumncontinued,fightingitswaynorthofAlisovotowardtheimportanthillsouthofShudre.TheGD reached thehillbut itwascostly.hsz145.TothewestoftheOrelsalient,100,000partisansbeganaseriesofbombingstodestroytherail

lineleadingintothesalientinordertoblockallsuppliesfromreachingAGC.Despiteacriticalsituation in the salient,Modelwas forced to send troops to the rear to stop thepartisans.Thedestructionwas so extensive that all supplieswere blocked from reachingModel for the nextthreedays.sgf354.Rokossovsky’sCentralFrontreachedtheKromaRiverandtriedtocrossbuttheinitialattempt

fails.ThelastoftheGermanswerecrossingtheOkaRiverandwouldhavebeenvulnerableiftheCentralFrontwasnotstoppedattheKroma.ThebridgesovertheOkawereblown.fkk399.TheRedAirForceflew1,000sortiesagainstOrelthatday.Thetownwasnearlysurrounded

anditwasmeanttosoftenthefronttrenchesforwhenthegroundforcesmadetheirlastassaultonthecity in themorning.The followingday, the3rdand63rdArmieswoulddrive into thehardfoughtcityandby8/5thecitywouldbesecured.Asasmallcontingentofsoldierscameintothecity,thecitizenscameoutandstartedcheeringtheirliberators.fkk399.awk692.

August4thontheSouthernSalientFor the leadership displayed during the campaign, Capt Kageneck of the sPzAbt 503 wasawardedtheKnight’sCross.zfk177.

August4thontheNorthernSalientThe4thPzDreachedthenewdefensesbehindtheNeschivkaRiver.AllGermanunitswereabletomakeitoutoftheOrelsalient.Inthepreviousthreeweeksthe4thPzDanditsattachmentshaddestroyed240tanks.fkk399.During thewithdrawal from theOrel salient, the9thArmy reachedKromy.With theSoviets

havingshiftedtheirmainassaultfrom2ndPzAto9thArmy,ModelhadtheLuftwaffeturnsouthandhelpsupport9thArmy.The3rdand63rdArmiesenteredtheevacuatedOrel.Nextday,Stalingavea120gunsaluteforliberatingOrel.BelgorodalsofellthatdaytotheVoronezhandSteppeFronts.LosingOperationCitadelandbeingpushedoutoftheOrelsalientwasthefirsttimetheGermansweredefeatedinasummercampaign.snk115.fkk388.fkk400.zzz101m.

August5thontheNorthernSalientNowpartofCentralFront,duringthepredawnhours,3rdTAassembledintheKoroskovoarea.Rybalko’s orders were to advance alongside 13th Army toward Kromy and capture it before

crossingovertheOkaRiver.KromywasinthedeepsouthernsectorofthesalientandwassouthofOrel.CapturingKromywoulddeprivetheGermanseastofthecityavaluableexitroutetothewest.Rybalkoreceived200newtanksthepreviousdayinpreparationforthisnewassault.The3rdTAnowhad417tanksandassaultgunsintheirarsenalbutoneproblemwiththenewtankswasthattheywereaccompaniedbypoorlytrainednewrecruits.Helaunchedatmidday,withhis12thTC,15thTCand2ndMCintheleadwhilehis91stTRand50thMotorcycleRegimentwerein reserve.The3rdTAand itscorpshadbeen renamedat thispoint,but I’havekept theirolddesignationstoavoidconfusion.zra187+.Therecentlyarrived8thPzDmoveduptothelineatdaybreaktorelieveGDintheIsmorosny

area.The10thPzRand the28thPzGRrelieved theexhaustedFusiliersand fewpanzerswhiletheirthirdregimentstayedbehindinreserve.hsz146.TheRedArmyshifteddirectionsouthwestofKromyagainst9thArmyandespeciallyagainst

the258thIDof46thPzC,butagaintheSovietattackwasrepulsed,howevertheconstantpressureon9thArmyand2ndPzAwouldeventuallyweakentheGermanline.Itwasonlyamatteroftime.Modelalsotransferred12thPzDfrom2ndPzAto9thArmytobolstertheline.Modelalsomadeascienceofquicklyredeployinghismobileforcestoareasofurgency;usingtheseforcesas“firebrigades”. Stavka had created a two pincer offensive with the objective of penetrating theGermanlineandswinginginbehind9thArmytodestroyit.ThetwomainfocalpointsofattackwereKhotynetsandKromy.Modelrecognizedtheplanandwasabletorebuffit.snk115.TheSovietsrenewedtheirassaulton9thArmysouthwestofKromy.TheRedArmymade15

assaults on this day, primarily against 258th ID of 46th PzC. Partisan action against the railsincreased, causing shortages of fuel and ammo from reaching 9thArmy.Model had to transfer12thPzDto theareaeastofSmablykin tohelp292ndIDand383rdIDwhichwere in trouble.snk115.Popov’sforcesinthenorthandGeneralRokossovskyinthesouthernpartoftheOrelsalient,

resumedtheirattacktoliberatetheOrelsector.Thatsameday,the2ndPzAcompletedevacuating53,000tonsofsuppliesand20,000woundedfromOrelandblewtheremainingbridgesheadingwest.AstheyheadedfortheHagenline,theyexecutedascorchearthpolicy.TheSovietsquicklymovedintoOrelwiththeGermanevacuationofthekeycity.WiththecaptureofOrel,Moscowbroadcasted the good news and delivered a 120 gun salute to the victors.RegainingOrel andeliminatingtheOrelsalientwithinthemonthwasahugerelieftoStalin.EversinceOctober1941when the city was captured, Stalin always considered the possibility that theGermanswouldmove from there towardMoscow. In 1941, the population ofOrelwas 140,000 but inAugust1943,whenthecitywasliberated,thepopulationhaddwindledto30,000.Nearly40,000peoplewereeitherexecutedordeportedbacktothecamps,afewthousandescapedandtherestdiedofstarvation.AsasignofhowimportantOrelwastotheGermans,veryfewGermansoldiersweretaken prisoners.Most, that could not fall back at the lastminute, fought to the last bullet. TheGermansalsoleftthousandsofminesinthecitythattooktheSovietengineersweekstoclearout.dgk240*.snk115.fkk400.zzz101m.kcz170+.dgk231m.snk433m++.awk685.zro211.

August6thontheSouthernSalientThe6thGAhadfinallybrokenthroughinthewestanditsbattered5thGTCpassedundercontrol

ofthe1stTA.dgk248+.Now south of Belgorod, the grenadiers of 6th PzD were falling back in disorder; several

panzersfrom11thPzRmovedupandslowedtheenemyadvance,givingthesoldiersachancetocompose themselves.The same thing happened the next day on a bigger scale and the panzerscameuptoblocktheSovietattackagain.fzk59.zro211.

August6thontheNorthernSalientThe initial advanceby3rdTAwasgoodbut as it approached theKromyRiver, theLuftwaffecontinued to strike it and German artillery zoomed in on it, causing heavy casualties anddramaticallyslowsitspace.Tocross theriverandattackthecityofKromy,Rybalkoformedanew shock group using elements of all his units. It had 100 tanks and its onlymissionwas tocaptureKromy. The rest of 3rd TAwould keep the enemy busywhile this new combat groupsneakedoffinthenight,gettingaheadstartonthemaingroup.zra188.awk685.

August7thontheSouthernSalientBogodukhov,ontheMearlaRiver,felltothe1stTA.The1stTAalsofoughttheGDDivisioneastof Akhtyrka, as well as the 2nd SS PzD east of Bogodukhov. Heavy fighting at Zolochevcontinuedbetweenthe3rdPzCand5thGTA.Otherunitsof1stTankArmyranintothe2ndSSDasReichDivofthe3rdPzCeastofBogodukhov,sparkingafurioustankbattle.The5thGTChad slippedby thepanzers andwere southwestofBogodukhov.Thegapbetween4thPzAandGroupKempfhadwidenedto30miles.bt99.dgk249.The 11th PzD and theGD began an advance toward Graivoron and Borisovka to free the

remains of five divisions entrapped there. The 4thGTC of 27thArmywas able to push backelementsof11thPzDasittriedtoprotectthewesternflankof1stTA.dgk248+.Thegapbetween the twoGerman armies hadgrown to 30miles nearBogodukhov.The5th

GTC,attachedto1stTAwasdrivingsouth,tryingtoextendthegap,southwestofthetown.Overthenextthreedays,reinforcementsarrivedonbothsides, intensifyinganalreadybittersee-sawbattlethatstartednearBogodukhovandmovedtowardAkhtyrka.dgk249.GeneralGustavSchmidtof19thPzDwaskilledinactionnearBorisovka.fkk87.dlu29.OfficialSovietrecordsshowcasualtiesfor the lastmonthinboth theKurskandOrelsalient

reached430,000menand2,600tanks.Germanlossesforthesameperiodareestimatedat86,000casualtiesand343panzers.sgf355.

August7thontheNorthernSalientTo thenorthofKursk, theWesternFrontandKalininFront launchedOperationSuvorov.FromDukhovshchina in the north and Roslavl to the south, the two fronts drove west in order toencircleSmolensk.Though theKursk sector saw the heaviest fighting, the rest of the line sawactionaswell.dgk254.GroupHarpecompleteditsretreattotheMoshcherkaRiverdespitetherepeatedattacks.The

SovietswereheadingtowardKhotynetsbutfailedtoreachitby8/10.With9thArmyfallingback,2ndPzA’ssouthernflanknearSmitrovskwasexposed.Thenextday,alargeSovietassaultbegan

fromBryantsovotowardDmitrovsk,whichwasdefendedbyLtGeneralMuller-Gebhard’s72ndID.Aidedbyathunderstorm,theSovietspenetratedtheline.Withagapopening,thenextdaysawthreemoreRDsandtanksenterthebattletoexploittheiradvantage.The72ndIDwiththehelpofthe31st ID regroupedandstopped theadvance.The20thPzGDthenmovedup to the lineandacting as a rearguard allowed the infantry to continue to fall back while still holding on toDmitrovsk. A breakthrough of the line at Dmitrovsk would present tremendous problems toModel’sevacuationtotheHagenLine.Heorderedthetowntobeheldforaslongaspossible,buttheSovietpressurebecame toomuchandby the eveningof8/11,20thPzGDhad to fall back,givingthetowntotheSoviets.Inthedaysthatfollowed,theRedArmyexpandedtheiroffensive.Tothenorthof9thArmy,4thArmywasattackedandinthesouth,4thPzAwasattacked.snk116+.dgk231m.snk433m++.The6thPzDwasheadingsouth towardKharkov.TheBakeGroupwas in the leadwhen the

columnwasambushedonitseasternflankby40T34s.Withthehelpofanearbybatteryof88s,the6thPzDwasabletorepulsetheattack.ThedivisionwasheadingforKharkovaspartoftheforcetodefendthecity.fzk59.

August10thontheSouthernSalientEversinceOperationRumyantsevbeganinearlyAugust,the6thPzDhadbeenfallingbackfromBelgorod.Onthisday,itsettledintotheouterdefenseline,northofKharkov.Forthenextthreedays, the 6th PzD had been up against fierce resistance north and east ofKharkov against theSovietmajoroffensive.On8/22,thedivisionwouldbewithdrawnfromthelineandsentbacktonearMerefa,southwestofKharkov,torefit.knz189.

August10thontheNorthernSalientElementsofthe4thTAresumedtheassaultonDmitrovskwhichwasanimportantblockingpoint,allowingModeltocontinueitsfallbacktotheHagenLine.Thenextnight,theGermansevacuatedDmitrovskandtheSovietsquicklymovedin.snk116.Three days earlier, the Soviet offensive launched toward Spas-Demensk and were making

gains.Thatday, the remainsof the9thPzDmoved to theareawestofKirov (southwestof theoriginalpenetration)andforthenexteightdays,slowedtheSovietprogress.Bytheendof8/17,the9thPzDhadonlyfivepanzersand12assaultgunsworking.Itwasthenincorporatedinto56thPzC.mkz124.

August11thontheSouthernSalientItwas determined that of the 212 PanthersGD received since 7/5, 156werewrite-offs. Thisclearlyshowshowviciousthefightingwasinthisfiveweekperiod.mhz292+.

August11thontheNorthernSalientDuetoitsheavylosses,the3rdTA(3rdGTA)wasorderedtodisengageandwastransferredtoStavkaReserve.ItwassenttonearKursktoregroup.ItwasnotwiththeKutuzovoperationverylongbutbeingpartoftheleadingspearheadagainstModel’sforces,itsufferedheavycasualties.

Besides the stiff resistance of the enemy, the 3rdTAhad to overcomeharsh terrain andheavyrainstormsthat turnedthegroundanddirtroadsintomuddyswamps.Evenwithall thesethingsgoing againstRybalko,Stavkawas still disturbedwith the general’s performance.Stavka alsobelievedVatutin’sprematuretankattackscosthisfrontvaluabletanksandcrews.zra188+.

August12thontheSouthernSalientTheSSTKlaunchedacounter-attackagainsttheoverstretched1stTA,neartheraillinethatwentfromBelgorod toKharkov.TheGermansquickly surroundedpart of the columnanddestroyed100 tanks. During the battle, Soviet reinforcements arrived, launching an attack of their own.SSTKwithdrew, allowing the Soviets to captureVysokopole, another small village on the railline. At the same time, the Das Reich and Wiking divisions attacked the 1st TA south ofBogodukhov.Furtherelementsofthe3rdPzCarrivedandafewdayslater,wereabletopushthe6th GA and 1st TA back to theMerchik River and stopping the Soviet advance in this area.dgk249.VonMansteinprepared4thPzA to a two-prong counter-attack fromAkhtryka to isolate 27th

Armyand6thGAthatwereintheAkhtryka-Bogodukhovarea.The3rdPzCwouldbetheotherhalfoftheattack.Theattackwasscheduledtostartby8/17.dgk251.WithSovietsapproachingKharkov,Kempfpreparedtoevacuatethecity,fearingencirclement.

Konev’sSteppeFronthadcuttheraillineintoKharkov.Konevwasinnohurrytoattackthecity;hewantedtolayseigetoitatfirsttoweardowntheGermans.dgk251.AftervonMansteininformedhisdictatorthatAGSwasunabletoholdDonbaswithoutfurther

reinforcements,HitlerorderedtheEastWalltobebuilt.Hitleruptothispointrefusedtoallowthe East Wall because to him it was a sign of defeatism, but reality finally seeped into hisconscience.ThewallwouldrunforthemostpartalongtheDneprRiverandrunfromChernigov,Kiev,ZaporozheandMelitopol.wwf177.

August13thontheNorthernSalientModel’s9thHQtookcontrolof2ndPzAaswellastheybeganthefinalphaseofthewithdrawaltotheHagenLine.BitterfightingwasnowoccurringintheKarachevarea,westofOrel,asbothsides tried to build up forces. The Soviets, under the umbrella of artillery shelling, launchedanother offensive toward Krarachev, crashing into 8th PzD and 18th PzD. For two days thepanzerspreventedtheSovietsfromgainingmuchground,allowingModeltoreachtheHagenLineon 8/14. The rearguard arrived on 8/18. Karachev was on the Bryansk-Orel Highway, abouthalfwaybetweenthetwocities.BythistimetheOrelsalientwasgoneandthefrontlinewasjusteastofKarachevorneartheshoulderoftheoldsalient.WhiletheGermanfrontwasholdingbacktheenemy,thedefensesoftheHagenLinewerebeingenhanced.snk117.dgk231m.

August14thontheSouthernSalientHitler was outraged by the evacuation of Kharkov and fired Kempf. Von Manstein chose LtGeneralWoehlerasKempf’sreplacement.Kempf’sforceswouldnowbedesignated8thArmy.In1941,KempfhadbeentheCOof48thPzCbeforebecomingthecommanderofArmyDetachment

Kempf.dgk251+.zsm266.

August14thontheNorthernSalientTheSovietspausedtheirattackagainstModeltoregroupandredeploytonewattackpoints.ThesouthernpincermovedsouthwestofKarachevwhilethenorthernpincermovedtoKirov.snk117.dgk231m.snk431m.

August16thontheSouthernSalientThe47thArmylaunchedanattacktoclearGermansnearBoromliaandnorthofAkhtyrkaandbythe18th,theGerman57thIDwasshattered.Bythe19th,the47thArmywasthreateningtherearoftheGermanAkhtrykaforces.TheGDhadtofallbackfromthetowntoescapedestruction.MajGeneralObukhov’s3rdGMCwasattachedto47thArmyandwasamajorinfluenceinpushingtheGermansback.dgk251*.

August16thontheNorthernSalientIn the9thArmysector,along theHagenLine, theOKHtransferred the followingunits to otherareas:1stID,102ndID,183rdID,258thID,293rdID,4thPzD,9thPzDand12thPzD.Italsotookfromthelinecoveredby56thPzCand12thICof4thArmy.snk118.The9thArmyand2ndPzAcompletedarrivingattheHagenline,eastofBryansk.TheSoviets,

notrealizingthisdefensebeltwasprepared,crashedintoitandwerequicklystopped,sufferingheavycasualties.TheSovietsfellback,regroupedandmadeseparateconcentratedattacksnearShablykino,KarachevandKirov.ThissmalldelayallowedModeltoresupplyandstrengthentheHagen Line. With the front line shortened, AGC was able to free up 19 divisions for otherdeployments.dgk240.snk117.mkz124.sgf354.kcz171.

August17thontheSouthernSalientIn a concerted effort, 7th PzD, 19th PzD andGD attacked from southeast of Akhtryka towardBodgodukhov, to meet up with SSTK and 223rd ID in order to trap Red forces there. Theencirclementworked,buttheGermansweretooweaktoliquidatethepocket.LtGeneralKulik’s4thGAwithits3rdGTCmovedintofreethepocket.GeneralGustavSchmidtof19thPzDwaskilledinactionthatday.dgk251.fkk87.

August18thontheSouthernSalientWoehlerofthenew8thArmy,formerlyKempfGroup,askedHitlertoevacuateKharkovandtofall back to the Dnepr. The savage battles west of Kharkov did have one advantage for theGermans;itkepttheirescaperoutetotheDnepropen.Onthe22nd,the5thGAand5thGTAtrieddesperatelytoclosetheescaperoutebutfailedtodoso.Though4thPzAsucceededtoevacuatebothBelgorodandKharkovtotheDneprRiver,itcameatahighprice.TheSovietshadinflictedheavy casualties but by the end of operations they would have casualties of 250,000 men.dgk251+.

August18thontheNorthernSalientBythistime,OperationKutuzovhadexpandedtoafrontthatwas250mileslong.Ithadbegunon7/12withjust11thGA,3rdand63rdArmiesbutthenthe13th,48th,60th,65thArmiesandthe2ndTAjoinedintodissolvetheOrelsalient.TheGermanlinewasdefendedby2ndPzAandafewdayslaterwithalso9thArmy.TheGDleft48thPzCinthesouthtoadditsweightwith2ndPzA.On7/20, the3rdGA,11thand4thTAwerealsobroughtup to the line.gjz192.zzz101m.fmz229.NowthattheGermanswerebehindtheHagenlineandthefrontlinehadshrunkbyover100

miles, Stavka pulled the battered 61st Army from the line and sent it to southern Ukraine.Coincidentally, the 47th PzC was sent to southern Ukraine at about this same time. kcz171.dgk231m.snk433m++.ThecityofBryanskfelltotheSoviets.zro211.

August19thontheSouthernSalientMajGeneralKozlov’s47thArmywasthreateningtheGermanrearareaatAkhtryka,forcingtheGDtoevacuate.dgk251.

August19thontheNorthernSalientTheRedArmylaunchedanoffensiveontheHagenLineagainst23rdIC,expandingtheattackon8/26toinclude46thPzCandattackingGroupHarpeon8/28.snk118.

August21stontheSouthernSalientMaj General von Waldenfels became the CO of 6th PzD, replacing its former chief, MajorGeneralHunersdorff,whodiedinbattleinJuly.GeneralHunersdorffhadbeenaveteranofWWIandhadbeenborninCairoin1898.fkk285.dlu42.

August22ndontheNorthernSalientWestofOrel,the9thPzDloadedontoatrain,headingsouthtowardtheMiusRiver.Itwouldnowbeattachedto24thIC.mkz124.

August23rdontheSouthernSalientOperationRumyantsevwasofficiallyterminatedandwithitconcludedSovietactivitiesrelatedtoOperationCitadel.However, thatdidnotend theSovietoffensives.On8/7OperationSuvorovlaunched against AGC. On 8/13 the Southwest Front and South Front launched the DonbasStrategicOffensive.Theseoffensives lasteduntil around the start ofOctober andgainedabout175milesofterritory.gjz193.The11thPzDhadonly820menand19panzers,while19thPzDhad760menand7panzers.

The19thPzDalsolostitsCO,GeneralSchmidt,whowaskilledatBorisovka.DasReichhad55panzers andSSTK had 61. The 1st TA had lost 646 tanks in Citadel and, after reinforcement,another 1,042 tanks in the Belgorod-Kharkov Offensive; it was now down to 120 tanks.

Rotmistrov’s5thGTAhadonly50ofits503tanksremaining.dgk252*.TheSovietshadmaderepeatedassaultsonKharkovandtheGermanswerelosingtheirgripon

thecity.Usingtheremainsof6thPzD,theGermansevacuatedthecityforthelasttime.The183rdRDpushedtherearguardoutofKharkovandthecityonceagainwasfree.By8/27the6thPzDarrivedatTamovka,whereitwentintoreserve.Afewdayslater,MajGeneralvonWaldenfelstookovercommandofthedivision.fzk59.dgn359.zro211.

August26thontheNorthernSalientInthe20thICsector,theSovietsbeganamajoroffensivewithMajGeneralFelzmann’s251stIDandLtGeneralWeidling’s86thIDtakingthebruntoftheattack,whileMajGeneralFalkenstein’s45thIDandLtGeneralKamecke’s137thIDreceivedonlyminorpressure.Afterseveraldaysoffighting,penetrationsinthe251stand86thIDareaappeared,especiallynearSevskandonalinethatheadedtowardSeredinaBuda,abouttwelvemilestothewest.SouthofSevsk, inthedeepforest that was the boundary line between 20th IC and 13th IC, fighting remained heavy andobscured. LtGeneralRappard’s 7th IDmoved into this contested area but it did not slow theSovietsdown.snk230+.OperationHagen officially ended.Luftflotte 6 covered the retreat for nearly all of the last

month.ItlostmanyplanesprotectingtheconvoysandtrainsheadingtowardtheDesnaRiver,butitwasstillintactandfunctioningfairlywell.snk172+.dgk231m.snk433m++.The 1st Flieger Division, covering both the Kursk and Orel salients, made the following

claims for the period starting July 4th:The division flew37,421 sorties and shot down1,733Sovietairplanes,destroyedordamagedover1,100tanksanddestroyed1,300armoredvehiclesandtrucks.The12thFlakDivisionshotdown383planesanddestroyedordamaged225tanks.This flakdivisionandothersusedhugeamountof ammo; theywere lucky theammunitionwasavailable.It’ssafetosaythattheLuftwaffehadamajorimpactinpreventingthe2ndPzAand9thArmyfromdestruction.snk173.dgk116m.dgk231m.snk433m++.

August27thontheSouthernSalientAfter regrouping for five days nearMerefa, the 6th PzDwas sent to Taranovka, southeast ofMerefa,todefendtheline.knz189.Northwest of the Sevsk River, the Soviets mademany separate attacks of up to a division

againsttheleftflankof251stIDandtherightflankof86thID.TheattackswererepulsedandtheSovietssufferedheavycasualties.snk231.ThemonthofAugustsawtheSovietoffensiveexpandtoincludefightingfromaroundSmolensk

inthenorthtotheSeaofAzovinthesouthandbeyond.SevencompleteSovietFrontswouldbefullyinvolved,stemingfromOperationCitadel.TheSovietscontinuedtomaintainasuperiorityofmenandtanksandinsomesectorsofthelinethatsuperioritywasgreaterthanitwasbetweenOrelandBelgorodinearlyJuly.StalinbelievedthebestwaytodefeatGermanywaswithawarofattritionalongtheentirefrontline.ItwasluckyforStalinthathisarmieshadasuperiorityfortheycontinued to lose two to three timesormore inmenandarmor than theGermans in thesesummerandfallmonths.IbelieveVatutin’smanyill-preparedarmoredcounter-attacksinthefirstweekofthecampaign,plustheSovietstrategyofstartingOperationRumyanstevinearlyAugust,

wasamistakeandthatifKonev’sSteppeFronthadbeeninpositiontoattacktheGermanflankswhile4thPzAhadbeendeployedalongthePselRiver,theSovietswouldhaveseenfargreatergains.Wewill return to this in subsequent pages.With the success ofStalingrad so recent it’slikelytheStavkawouldhavewantedtorepeatthatsuccessatKursk.

U

28

FinalThoughtsSeeMap29

singhindsight,itisobviousthatOperationCitadelshouldneverhavebeenlaunched,buteven inmid-1943afterseveraldelaysmanyof thegeneralswereagainst theoperation.

VonManstein,Guderian, vonMellenthin,Kempf, Jodl andHeinrici are just a few. The aerialphotos showed the massive defensive measures that were taking place in the salient. Hitler,Zeitzlerandhis staff shouldhaveknown theSovietswerealertedandpreparingandwouldbereadyfortheassault,butthedictatorwouldnotlistentohisgenerals,believinghisnewpanzerswouldovercomeeveryobstacle.Inadditiontopoliticalconsiderations,hewasobsessedwithhisheavyarmor,despitethefactthatthePantherhadneverbeeninbattleandwasalreadyshowingmajormechanicalproblemsorthattheFerdinanddidnothaveamachineguntoprotectitselffrominfantryandwouldbetremendouslyhandicappedasthefrontrunnerintheassault.Knowinghisarmieswouldbeupagainstsuperior forces,ColGeneralKurtZeitzlerscraped

togethereverypossibleman,gunandpanzerfromtherestoftheEasternLine,butitstillwasnotnearlyenough.ItwasnotenoughtotakeProkhorovkainthesouthorOlkhovatkainthenorth,letalonehavethetwoarmieslinkupatKurskanddestroythepocketedSovietstrappedinthesalientasordered.Anover-relianceon thenewpanzersandanextremeunderestimationof theSovietdefensivepreparationsandsubsequentresponsewerethetwomajorreasonsforGermanfailureinthiscampaign.ItcanalsobearguedthattheGermanstrategicplanwasflawedaswell.Theywere abandoning thevirtuesofBlitzkrieg andusing their armor asbattering ramsandGeneralHoth made the situation worse by deploying the Panther Brigade in the worst terrain sectorpossibleforarmor,placinghisnewpanzersatalargerdisadvantage.Thisdifficultsituationwasmadeevenworsewhen2ndSSPzCwasdirectedtowardProkhorovka,furtherweakeningtheirprimaryaxisofadvancewhen48thPzCwasallowedtocontinueitstrektowardOboyan.Whilethere was good reason to move toward Prokhorovka, Hoth should have abandoned his attacktowardOboyan,contracting48thPzCsectortotheeastandallowedthiscorpstosupport2ndSSPzCinitsdriveacrossthePselRiverandthroughthecorridor.Clearly4thPzAdidnothavetheresources tocontinueanassaultonbothOboyanandProkhorovka.Tomakemattersworse, the3rdPzContheotherflankhadtolaunchfromastartlinefurthersouththantheothertwopanzerscorps, cross theDonetsRiver, head further east towardKorocha, enlarging their attack sectorneedlesslytocatchuptotheSSanddoitwithadeficiencyofinfantryandairsupport.It isdifficultformetoviewtheGermanperspectivewithoutthebenefitofhindsightbutit is

clearthatHitler,andespeciallyHoth,hadalreadyforgottenthedefensivestancetheSovietswerecapableof,asatStalingrad,orthecostsincurredbyabadstrategicmove.Anobjectivebecame

too difficult, too costly, too time consuming yet efforts continued to capture it, allowing theSoviets to wear down theGerman forces and affording them time to concentrate forces for acounter-attacksuchasthatwhichresultedinthelossof6thArmyorthesubsequentdrubbingAGSreceivedas theywerepushedback to theDonetsRiver.Evenwithouthindsight,knowing largeconcentrationsofSovietforceswereassemblingintheOrelandsouthofKharkovareas,aswellasthefactthatforthisoperationtobesuccessfulthetwoGermanarmieswouldeachhavehadtotravelcloseto70milestolinkupwhilemaintainingflankprotectiononbothsidesoftheirassaultspearhead, it seems over ambitious and an unreasonable risk at that stage of the war. FieldMarshalsvonMansteinandKlugeknewtheiropponents,hadgoneupagainstRokossovskyandVatutinbeforeandknewthemassmartandaggressivecommandersthatwouldputupadifficultandcostlydefense.Ironically,itseemstheStavkahasashortmemoryaswell.OperationUranuswas so successful, why did not the Soviets attempt an encirclement of 4th PzA in a similarmanner?With bothVoronezh and Steppe Fronts properly deployed and attacking at the propertime,itseemshighlylikelythat4thPzAwouldhavebeendestroyedoratleastfatallywoundedandwithnoGerman reservesavailable theSovietshad little to fearofacounter-attackon thescalethathadoccurredatKharkovtheprevioustwosprings.Ifyouextendyourthinkingbeyondactualevents,itisprobablyagoodthing4thPzAdidnotget

beyondProkhorovkaor9thArmypastOlkhovatka, for thatwouldhave extended their linesofcommunicationsandflanksthusweakeningtheirdefensesonbotheasternandwesternflanksofthe corridor that theywere developing.WhenOperationKutuzov launched, LtGeneralWalterModel would not have had as many panzer divisions to deploy to Orel and when OperationRumyantsev launched inearlyAugust,Hothprobablywouldhavebeenunable to fighthiswaysouthtoKharkov,letalonesendforcessouthto6thArmytodefendagainstthemajorassaultbySouthwesternFront.IwouldargueColGeneralHeinzGuderianwasrightwhenhestronglydefendedhisposition

that theGermanArmyshouldhavestayeddefensiveduring thesummerof1943andwaitedforStalin tomakethefirstmove.TheWehrmachtwouldnothavegoneupagainstsuchformidabledefensesatKurskwhich leviedsuchaheavy toll, thebugsof thePantherandFerdinandcouldhave been worked out and new supplies of panzers could have helped restore the panzerdivisionsaswellasgivetheinfantryalittlemoretimetorefitandtrain.Let us replace the pessimism and say Hoth and Model had a chance to succeed and the

operationshouldhavelaunchedasplanned,butwhenitgotoff toanunsatisfactorystartfor thetwoflanks,Isubmit,vonMansteinandHothdidnotdoenoughtoresolvetheexistingbattlefieldconditions.GoingagainstvonManstein’swishes,Hoth,favoring48thPzC,allowed3rdPzCtolanguish in the east.Theoriginal plan forKempf to fighthisway toKorocha toprovide flankprotection also seems unreasonable after seeing how the campaign started forGeneralKempf.ForHoth tocontinue to ignore thiscorpsas thedayspassedandas thecorpscontinued to fallbehind, leavingacriticalgapin theGermanlineandthesubsequentproblemsitcausedfor the2ndSSPzC,wastrulyanerrorofjudgement.Onthewesternflank,ColGeneralHothcouldsee48thPzCstrugglingtoreachthePselRiver

intheOboyansector,whichwaspredominatelycausedbyanover-extendedfrontlinewhenthe2nd SS PzC shifted to the northeast away from 48th PzC. The situationworsenedwhenHoth

wanted48thPzCtodrivefurtherwesttocontroltheBerezovka-Kruglikroad.ItwaspotentiallyanimportantroadandonethatshouldbekeptfromtheSoviets(butlesssowiththeshifttowardProkhorovka)butwhenyoudonothaveenoughforcestogetthejobdonewithoutinterferingwithyourprimaryobjectivethenyoushouldbackaway.Withthecombinedstiffresistanceinthenorthaswellason thewesternflankGeneralHothshouldhavepulledhis forcesback toeastof thePenaRiverline,butdidnotandthiswasanothererrorofjudgement.Starting on the afternoon of 7/8,GD had to shift assets to the west to assist 3rd PzD in

protectingandexpandingtheflank.Bythenextday,mostofthedivisionhadbeendivertedfromthenorthernassaultandfortherestofthecampaignGDhadlittletodowiththenorthernadvance.At thispoint, thechancefor the48thPzC tocross thePsel in forcewasunattainableand therewerenoclearalternativesolutionsto4thPzA’sproblems,butitcouldclearlybeseenthat48thPzChadfailedtheirmissionasplannedandremedialactionneededtobetakenimmediately.Withthe far eastern flank also failing theirmission, it is reasonable to consider a restriction of theflanks, to between the PenaRiver line in thewest and the LipovyiDonets River orNorthernDonetsRiver line in theeast, asaplausiblealternative. If these restrictionshadbeen inplaceearlier, or better still from the beginning of the campaign, it would appear SSTK could havefought alongsideLAH throughmuchof the campaign,while allowing3rdPzC to safeguard theflankwith thehelpof thenaturalbarrierof theLipovyiDonetsRiver.Hereagain, therearenoguarantees and despite the increase in traffic congestion,my supposition is that itwould havefosteredgreaterresultsthantheoriginalway.Ibelievethisnarrowerattackaxisshouldhavebeenpartoftheoriginalplan,notanafterthought.HavingtheentireSSCorpsdrivingnorthandhavingthePantherBrigadeas theirbackup,while the twoothercorpscovered the flanksofasmallerarea, thechanceswouldhavebeengoodthat theSScouldhavereachedthePselRiverandtheProkhorovkacorridorbefore5thGAand5thGTAarrived.Toavoidroadcongestionwithinthesmallerattackzone,the3rdPzCcouldhavebeenphasedintothebattlealongtheLipovyiDonetsas the SS advanced northward. If battlefield conditions warranted it, once the SS reachedTeterevinoSouthormorelikelytheKalininline,the3rdPzCcouldhaveshiftedeastwardbeyondtheLipovyi and expanded their attack zone to the Invanovka-Zhilomostnoe axis or even to thewestern bank of the Northern Donets in preparation for the attack on Pravorot, Iamki andProkhorovka.ThisexpansionwouldreducecongestionandplaceanextratacticalburdenontheSoviets while reducing the pressure on the SS as the 3rd PzC headed north, but under thisscenariotheGermanlinebetweenthetwocorpswouldbeunifiedandtheentire2ndSSCorpswouldbeadvancing in step towardProkhorovka, itscorridorand thePselRiver. If conditionswerenotconducivetoexpansionthe3rdPzCcouldstaybehindtheLipovyiRiverlineandprotecttheSS’sflank,asitsbeendoingsincethestartofthecampaign.Extendingthisscenario,ifthe3rdPzChad advancedwith theSS, itwould have been even harder for the 5thGTA to launch anattackfromwheretheydid,causing5thGTAtobemoredisadvantagedthantheyactuallywere.With all three divisions of the 2ndSSPzC advancing northward and allowing the 3rd PzC tohandle the eastern flank from west of the river, advancement should have achieved a moredramaticpace,whichwouldhavegivenGeneralVatutinawholenewsetofproblemstocontendwith.Withhisplatealreadyfull,itwouldhavebeeninterestingtoseehowVatutinhandledthisscenario; this extra burden with 4th PzA already across the Psel and into the corridor past

Prokhorovka,probablyasfarasKartashevka,withouttheaidofhistworeservearmiescouldbetraumatizingevenforamanlikeVatutin.Plus,howwould5thGAand5thGTAhaveattackedtheGermans from their new positions and howwould Stavka have reacted to this situation? Thepossibilitiesareintriguing.As an alternative to the Pena River to Lipovyi River attack zone, the Vorskla River to

RamzumnaiaRiverortheVorsklatoKorenRiverattackzonecouldhavebeenused.Theyhadthedisadvantageofhavingtworiversbetweenthe2ndSSPzCand3rdPzCbutwouldhavegiventheGermanforcesmoreroomtoworkwhileavoidingtheworsepartsoftheoriginalwesternattackzone. They would also have allowed the Panther Brigade, or at least half of it, to fight onfavourable terrain east of the Donets. With the Panthers divided between the three panzerdivisions,itwouldhaveallowedtheTigerBattalion,thesPzAbt503,tostayintact.Aspearheadof 45Tigers could have been successful in clearing a path toRzhavets.Both theRamzumnaiaRiverandKorenRiverrunparallel totheDonetsRiver.TheRamzumnaiaisaboutsevenmileseastwhiletheKorenisabout14mileseastoftheDonets.dgr172m.lck164m.zzy123m.While there are pros and cons to a narrower attack zone, several advantages of a reduced

attackzonecometomind.Thereducedlandareawouldmeanfewerstrongpointswouldhavetobefoughtoverandthatincludesfewerminestoavoidandclearaswellasfewertanktrapsanddug-inPakfrontstoovercome.Themenandweaponsinthosestrongpointswouldhavetoleavethe relative safety of their defenses and advance on the Germans, giving the Germans greaterparity.Also,withtoofewplanestosupportthegroundassault,asmallerattackareawouldallowthe available planes a better chance to cover the battlefield andwhen thoseSoviet forces lefttheirprepareddefensestoattacktheGermanline,thoseplanescouldexploitthesituationtothefullest.Onthewesternfront,strongpointsatCherkasskoe,Korovino,Rakovo,Berezovka,Kruglikandanumberof fortifiedhills couldhavebeenavoided.On the far eastern flank, strongpointsincludingStaryiGorod, Iastrebovo,Blizhniaia Igumenka,Miasoedovo,Melikhovo,Shliakhovo,Kazache, Aleksandrovka and Rzhavets, to name a few, could have been avoided. The abovebattlesitescosttheGermanforcesdearlyintimeandmanycasualtiesofmenandarmor.Whenthegarrisonsofthesesiteswereforcedtoleavetheirdefensesandattacktheenemy,itwouldhavenaturallycosttheGermanstimeandcasualtiestodefendthemselvesbutmostlikelynotasmuchasactual resultsandcorrespondinglywouldbemoreexpensive to theSovietside.ByJune theGermans had photographed the entire battlefield and should have known the areas of difficultterrain,useableroadnetworksandofcoursethemanydifficultstrongpointstoovercomeandyettheymadenoappreciablechangestotheirexistingattackplan,forgingaheadtohaveOboyantheirprimaryaxisofattack.Theonlypracticalwayfor48thPzCtoreachOboyanenmasse,especiallywithall the rainand subsequentmuddyconditions,wasbywayof theBelgorod-OboyanRoadand General Vatutin had amassed so many reserves on this route that it would have beenimpossible for 48th PzC in its present condition to breakthrough, cross the Psel and enter thetown.IfindithardtoacceptthatwithalltheaerialreconnaissanceHothreceivedinadditiontothestiffresistanceoftheenemythathedidnottakemajorremedialactionsconcerningtheOboyanaxisand48thPzC’sdeployment.ThephotostheGermanCommandreceivedclearlyshowedthe48thPzC sector had theworse terrain for armor and evenwith the extra punch of thePantherBrigadetocompensatethiswasnotthebestaxistotake.Addthefactthatthecorpswouldalso

haveflankdutiesandonecanclearlyseethissectionshouldnothavebeenthemainaxisofattack.Inconjunctionwiththecorpsplacement,theGermanstrategywasnotwellthoughtout.AlthoughIdonotbelieveitwasthecase,let’sassumetheattackaxesofthethreecorpswerewellchosenforthebeginningoftheoffensive.However,itdoesnotappearthebattleplansoncepastOboyanand Prokhorovka were ever seriously considered. By the time the Germans crossed the PselRiverlinethesalientthathadbeencarvedouthadexpandedgreatlyinbothwidthandcertainlyinlength;itmakesyouwonderwhattheGermanswerethinkingofwhentheychosethisoperation.WhenoneaddsinthedifficultiesofcrossingthePselandhavingtwocorpsseparatedbythetwoDonets rivers besides giving the enemy months to prepare, the odds of success drasticallyplummeted.Withtheexpandedlinetodefendplusthealreadyconsiderableattritionandwithnoreserves what was Hoth planning to do? How could Hoth allow the two divisions of the SSattempttofighttheirwayintothecorridor,evenasfarasonlytheKartashevkaroad,withhistwoflanks completely stymied and fending off flank attacks, preventing any appreciable flankprotectionfortheSSwhileinthecorridor?Again,abattleplanbasedonanarrowerfrontfromthe start had its advantages and probablywould have given the 4th PzA a deeper penetrationtowardKursk.FMvonMansteinwantedtocontinuethecampaignon7/13whenAdolfHitlercanceledit.In

thiscircumstance,IwouldarguethatHitlerwascorrectandvonMansteinwrong.Thechancetoencirclethebulkof48thRC,whichhadalreadyfallenback,waspracticallygoneandtoattempttochaseitdownafterwardswiththeremainsofGeneralKonev’sSteppeFrontcloseenoughtointercede if necessary,was toodangerous considering the condition anddispositionof 2ndSSPzCand3rdPzCat the time. It could alsobe argued thatHitlerwaited too long to cancel theoperation. With the attrition, both German Armies suffered by 7/10 and the fact that Sovietresistancewas still strong, it couldclearlybe seen that theoriginalplan tomeet atKurskanddestroy the trapped enemywas never going to happen.And though69thArmyhad fallen backfrom their original defense line, the new defense line south of Prokhorovka was still strongenoughtopreventDasReichfromprovidingstrongsupporttoLAHinitsattempttotaketherailvillageon7/12.Asitturnedout,thetankbattlesof7/12favoredtheGermans,but4thPzAwasatanoffensive endby theendof7/12andcancelationof theoperationwas the right action.Theworse results of 9thArmy only fortifies the position thatOperationCitadel should have beencanceledearlier.Col General Vatutinmade somemistakes as well; hemade enoughmistakes that Stalin felt

compelled to send Marshal Zhukov to Kursk to oversee the battle zone. He had built animpressivedefensesystemthat includedPakfronts,dug-in tanks,aneffectivemazeofmutuallydefending trenches, many anti-tank trenches and huge minefields and yet he made numerousredeployments and numerous counter-attacks, forcing his tank brigades to launch offensivesprematurely, before they were ready or coordinated with each other. The results on severaloccasionswerecostly.VatutinforcedGeneralRotmistrov’s5thGTAtoattackpracticallyassoonasitarrivedinsectorfromanareathatwasnotwellsuitedforanoffensiveagainstthestrongestpart of theGerman line. Consideringwhere theGerman linewas at the end of day of 7/11, Isubmitthatif5thGAand5thGTAhadhadadefensivepostureforthenextfewdays,sayto7/14,toweardowntheSSCorpsevenfurtheraftertheGermansresumedtheiradvanceon7/12,then

theGermanscouldhavebeeneventuallypushedbackenoughtoallow5thGTAtogainabetterlaunchpoint.ThiswouldhaveprobablyresultedinlosingfewertanksandvaluabletankcrewswhenRotmistrov’s offensivewas finally launched. I know that a passive defensewas lookeddown on byVatutin, Zhukov and Stalin but in this case,waiting a day or two before counter-attacking would have been beneficial. Vatutin felt compelled to attack as soon as possible toavoidallowing3rdPzCtoreachDasReichandsolidifytheeasternline,butthatthreatwasnotaslargeashethought.TheentireKempfdetachmenthadlessthan100workingpanzerson7/12andthesepanzergroupswerespreadoutovermuchofthesector.Elementsof69thArmyandallof7thGAwereconstantlyresistingandinfact,inafewareasoftheline,werenearingpenetration.Thoughthe7thPzD,withabout35workingpanzers,wasKempf’sstrongestdivisionbythistime,itstillcouldnotconcentrateenoughstrengthtobeabletoreachandthenassistthe2ndSSPzCintimetotakeProkhorovka.ItcouldalsobesaidthatVatutin’suseofhistankcorpswasill-advised.FromJuly7thonwards

these tank corpsmade repeated attacks to slow or stop theGermans from driving through theseconddefensivebeltorreachingthethirdbelt.ByJuly7thitwastoolatetostoptheenemyfrombreakingthroughthesecondbeltandtoattacktheleadingTigerscompaniesontheflatsleadingtothe third belt was foolhardy. By the 12th, these Soviet corps were, for the most part, at halfstrength.With the thirddefensivebelt’smanyadvantages– thehighnorthernbanksof thePsel,numerous hills critically located plus the prepared defenses – these tank corps at or near fullstrengthcouldhavehadamoredestructiveimpactfrombehindthesedefenseswhentheGermansattackedonthemorningofthe12ththangoingheadtoheadinopenground.ThisisespeciallytrueinpreventingSSTKincrossingthePselandestablishingabridgeheadonthenorthernbanksoftheriver.SeveralotheralternativeattackplansthatVatutincouldhavetried, thatprobablywouldhave

worked better, resulting in fewer casualties for him and greater destruction of 4th PzA, seemfeasible. Here is one crazy idea that might have worked: While the terrain in parts of theBelenikhinosectorwas ruggedandnotconducive formajor tankoffensiveson thescaleof5thGTA,theterraineastoftheDonetsinthe7thGAsectorwasbetter.Whatifthe18thTCand29thTC,alongwithadequateaircover,hadstruck3rdPzCoreven11thIConitseasternflank?The5th GTA could probably have rolled Kempf’s forces fairly easily for they were spread out,exhaustedandnotpreparedforamajorflank/reararmorattack.Bytheendof7/12,Kempfhadhisless than100workingpanzers and assault guns already engaged andhaving a difficult time insecuringtheirobjectives.ItdoesnotseempossiblethatGeneralBreithcouldhavecreatedanewshockgroupwhilemaintaininghiscurrentdefensestoeitherreachDasReichorcombatthisnewattackspearhead.Afterreducing3rdPzC,thetankerscouldhavecontinuedwest,penetratedthe167thIDlineandgotbehindthe2ndSSPzC,cuttingoffcommunicationsandcrushingHausser’scorpsbetweenitself,7thGA,69thArmyand5thGA.Itmaybeanovelidea,butitwascertainlyfeasible.Idonotsuggestthatthisflankassaultwouldbeeasy.Thoughtherewereclearavenuesofattack, therewerenotanymajorpavedhighwaysandtherewereseveralrivers tocross,butwiththeproperbridgeequipmenttheassaultcouldstillhavebeeneffective.The5thGMCwouldhave been detached from 5thGTA and sent to theKartashevka-Prokhorovka road area to stopSSTKfromaccomplishingtheirobjectives.Infact,withthesupportofelementsofthe32ndGRC

and 33rd GRC of 5th GA, the three recently arrived corps had a good chance to prevent theSSTK’sbridgeheadfromreachingKartashevkaroadinanymeaningfulway.Inthisscenario,whenit was discovered that the 5th GTA had attacked and penetrated the 3rd PzC eastern and ornorthern line, theentire4thPzAwouldhave togoon thedefensive, eliminating thechance forfurthergainstothenorth.AnotheralternativeattackplanalsodealswiththeSSTKbridgeheadbutastheprimaryassault,

not secondary. Instead of attackingLAH as they did on 7/12, the 5thGTA (18thTC, 29thTC)shouldhaveattackedSSTKintheirnorthernbridgehead.ThedefensesofSSTKwerenotnearlyaselaborateoraswelldefendedasLAH’s,plustheSoviettanks,thoughstillhavingtocopewitharavineortwo,hadgreaterfreedomofmovementwithinthebendofthePselRiver.WhenSSTKadvancednorthward fromHill226.6 towardHill236.7whichstraddled theKartashevka road,the division was spread out and became vulnerable to a massive counter-attack. If GeneralRotmistrov,supportedbyacoordinatedairattackandthemanygunsdeployedalongtheriver,hadwaiteduntilSSTKwas approachingHill 236.7before attacking,hehad an excellent chance toisolate and destroy much of Priess’s division north of the river, which by this time wasvulnerable.Muchof5thGAwasalreadydeployedintheareaandthecombinedstrengthofthetwo armies againstSSTK in its ownmini-salient should have been overwhelming.WithSSTKlosingmanymenandpanzersaswellas theirbridgeheadin thisoffensive, itseemsreasonablethat the entire northern German line from Novoselovka to Prokhorovka would soon becomeuntenable, as 5thGTA / 5thGA crossed the swollen Psel River, forcing 4th PzA to fall backwithindaystosaveitself.Asaprecautionarymeasure,the5thGMCwouldhavedeployednearHill252.4tomakesureLAHdidnotadvancetoomuchorincase69thArmyneededhelpagainstDasReichor3rdPzC.GeneralsVatutinandRotmistrovhadwantedtodestroytheentire2ndSSPzC in this single attack, but that battle plan had been too ambitious, especially from theimprovisedlaunchpoint.VatutinhadanticipatedwhatSSTKwasgoingtodoon7/12;PriesshadtodrivenorthtoscreenLAH’sleftflankasitdroveonProkhorovka.GeneralVatutinshouldhaveseenthevulnerabilityofSSTKinthesalientthattheywoulddevelopandtakenadvantageofit,buthewasoverconfidentandimpatient,wantingtodestroytheentire2ndSSPzCinonemorning.HeshouldhaveallowedthepanzersofSSTKbecomeextendednorthofthePselandseparatedfromtheirgrenadiersbeforelaunchingamajorassault.Generals Vatutin and Rotmistrov defended their actions by saying that perhaps the main

objectiveofdestroying the2ndSSPzChadfailedbutat least theGermanswerestoppedfromadvancingfurthernorth.Whilethereissometruthbehindtheirdefense,itisalsotruetosaythatagolden opportunity to destroy a good deal of 4th PzAwas wasted by poor planning. It is nowonderStalinwasconsideringsackingbothofhisgenerals.Isavedmyfavoritescenariountillast.Itissimilartooneoftheabove-mentionedalternatives,

but it isona largerscalewhichwasprobablynecessary,aswhile theGermanforcehad takenmanycasualtiesby7/12,itwasstillaforcetoberespected.Hereisthelastalternative:It can also be argued that Stavka made a strategic mistake by waiting too long to launch

OperationRumyantsev.Ideally,ifthiscounteroffensivehadstartedbetween7/12and7/15,while4thPzAwasstilldeployedalongtheNovoselovka-Prokhorovkaline,thentherewasaverygoodchanceofpocketingmuchofthe4thPzA.Asitwas,Stavkawaitedanotherseveralweeksandby

thattimethe4thPzAwasbackingawayfromtheirvulnerability.Letmesuggestthattheidealoffensivewouldhavebeenatwo-prongpincerattack,ontheorder

ofOperationUranus,thatwoulddrivebehindtheGermanfrontlinefromtheeastandwest,butthat assaultwould have takenmonths to plan anddeploy. Itwas not done, but an operation oflesser dimensions and complexity could have been put together in less time that could haveresultedwithamajorupheavalagainsttheGermans.Brieflythismulti-armyattackcouldhavecomefromtheeastnotnorth,attackingthevulnerable

eastflankof3rdPzCwhere198thand106thIDsweredefending.IfSteppeFront’s47thand53rdArmies,whichalsohadattached the4thGTCand1stMC(400 tanks),haddeployedandbeenreadytoattacknotfarfromtheKorenRiverby7/12andifVatutinhadusedthe18thTCand29thTCof5thGTAalongwiththeseothertwoarmies,therewouldhavebeenanexcellentchanceofpenetrating the eastern line defended by the German infantry (11th IC and 198th ID) andoverwhelmingthe3rdPzCwhichby7/12hadbeenwidelydeployedforthemostpartalongtheDonetsRiverfromKrivtsovotoRyndinkaandalongtheRzhavets-Aleksandrovka-Kazacheline.With the resourcesof the threenewarmies, plus the remainsof69th and7thGAalongwith amassiveartillerypreparationandcompetentaerial support, theSovietscouldhave finishedoff3rd PzC and then drivenwest into the Shishino-Petropavlovka-Khokhlovo area to take on the168thIDandthenthe167thID.Thesouthernflankoftheadvancing5thGTAcouldhavedrivenwestbetweenStaryiGorodandShishino.With3rdPzCgoneand167thIDthreatened,4thPzAwouldhavehadtoimmediatelyreactandprobablyfallback.Withthe1stTA,6thGA,5thGAandthenew27thArmy,whichshouldhavedeployedjustnorthofProkhorovka-KartashevtkaroadandnorthwestofVeselyiaswell,drivingsouthatthesametimethe48thPzCand2ndSSPzCwouldhavebeenpressuredtobreakingpointandintheirdesperationtofallbackmanymenandheavyequipmentwouldhavebeenlostagainsttheonrushinghordesofnewarmiesthathadjustarrivedinsector.OnecanextendthisscenariotoincludethetroubletheGermanlinewouldhavefacedifthe4thPzA/3rdPzCsuffereddevastatinglossesandagapof30to50mileshadopenedin thelinebutI’llstopherefornow.Admittedly,forthisscenariotowork,Stavkawouldhavehadtoplan,prepareanddeployweeksinadvance.Isubmitthatthiscounter-offensivecouldhavebeenmore beneficial and with fewer casualties for Vatutin than the actual offensive, due to theextendedposition4thPzAhadcarvedoutby7/12.Thiscounter-offensivecouldalsohavebeenfitting retribution, under similar circumstances, forTimoshenko’s loss atKharkov (May1942),where his initial gains were cut off and his forces isolated and destroyed by a dual pincercounter-attackbyColGeneralPaulus’s6thArmyandFMKleist’s1stPzA.SeeMap29.Criticismcanbe levied in thenorthaswell.Even thoughModelopenedhiscampaignusing

nearly 300 panzers and assault guns, he should have usedmore. Rokossovsky was only trulyvulnerableonthefirstday.Heheldbackheavyreservesinsecondechelontoseewherethemainattackswouldtakeplace.HeintendedtoseehowtheGermanassaultunfoldedandthenquicklysend reserves to the assault areas. The two biggest formations being held in reserve forRokossovsky were the 17th GRC and 2nd TA, which both eventually played pivotal roles instopping 9th Army. IfModel had used the 2nd PzD, 9th PzD and 18th PzD with the openingassault in the 41st PzC and 46th PzC sectors and attacked toward Ponyri and Samodurovkarespectively,therewasanopportunitytoreachandpenetratetheseconddefensivebeltbeforethe

17thGRCand2ndTAwerecalledup.Therewasnoguaranteethisalternativeactionwouldhavegotten 9thArmy toKursk, but it seems plausible that ifModel could have controlled the highgroundaroundOlkhovatkabytheendofthefirstday,hischancesforreachingKurskwouldhavegreatly improved. At the very least it would have cost Rokossovsky many more men, tanks,ammunitionand time topush9thArmyoff thehighgroundand if thecasualtieshadbeengreatenough,itcouldhavemadeadifferenceduringOperationKutuzov.During the campaign,GeneralModelmade a practice of leavinghisHQ for thewhole day,

visitingthefrontline.Thereweremanyinstanceswherehewouldbeoutoftouchwithhisstaffandseveraleventsoccurredthatdesperatelyneededhisattentionandhemissedthem.Thebiggestincidentoccurredwhen4thPzDwasattachedtoGeneralLemelsen’s47thPzC.Lemelsen,onhisownresponsibility,decidedtoseparatethepanzerregimentfromtherestofthedivisioninorderto fight thedivision in twoseparatesectors.Withoutproperarmoredsupport that firstday,4thPzD went into battle disadvantaged: the two infantry regiments suffered heavy casualties,includingitsdivisioncommander.IfModelhadbeenathisheadquarters,hecouldhavepreventedthiscostlyerrorandothersthatoccurredduringthecampaign.GeneralRokossovskyprobablymadefewermistakes than theother threecommandersbuthe

was also up against an enemy with slightly fewer combat soldiers, panzers and aircraft ascomparedtothesouthernsalientaswellasacommander,thoughamasteratdefense,whowaspartiallyrestrictedwithhisorderofbattlebyvonKluge,besidesbeingalittletoocautious.Tohis credit, Model’s handling of the Orel defense was superb and saved AGC from practicaldestruction.ContinuingwithRokossovskyforamoment,IbelievethatthereareseveraldistinctreasonswhyCentralFrontdidsomuchbetter instopping9thArmythanVoronezhFrontdid instopping4thPzA.The first reason isbattlefielddefensesweremoreevolved,providingbettercoverageformanandmachine.RokossovskyhadmoregunsthanVatutinandhemadesurehisguncrewsusedthem,consumingmanymoretonsofammunitionthanthesouthernbatteries.Germansurvivorsof9thArmyallcomplainedofthehorrendouswalloffirethattheyfaced.Mistakes were made at German Group level as well, and fall directly on von Manstein’s

shoulders.DuringthecampaignhequestionedcertainofHoth’sdecisions,mostlypertainingtotheflanks.Hothneglectedairsupportandrefusedtosendelementsofthe167thIDtoGeneralKempfaswellorderingthe48thPzCtoexpanditswesternborderbeyondtheRakovo-Kruglikroadatatimewhenthenorthernadvancehadstalledand11thPzDandespecially3rdPzDwereintrouble.Mansteindiscussed the issueswithhis subordinatebutdidnot takeanyaction to correct theseissueswhenHothfailedtorespond.Thisreluctancetotakecorrectiveactionseemsunfathomablefromsuchanotedstrategistandcommanderandhadaclearimpactonthefinaloutcome.More importantly, errors were being made prior to the launch that would have a profound

impact on the campaign, and consequently revisiting theGermanHighCommand one last timeseemsappropriate.WhileHothandvonMansteindidnothavecomplete freedomofcommand,theydidhavealotofcontrolovertheirdestiny.Theyalsohadplentyoftimebeforeattackingtostudythebattlefieldinordertomakemajorchangesorreceivepermissiontomakethosechanges.It should be emphatically stated that the German attack plan was flawed and Hoth and vonManstein shouldhave seen it, especiallywhenone takes into account the fact thatSoviets hadmonthstoprepare,thatthenewpanzersandassaultgunswereunreliableorflawedandthatvon

Mansteinhadonly threepanzer corps to advance alongmostly rugged terrain that sported fivemajorrivers,fewhighwaysandonlyafewnarrowoff-roadavenuesforhisarmor.TomakethesituationworsethedistanceneededtotraveltoreachKurskwasrelativelylarge,andthefurthernorththearmytraveledthefrontwouldexpand.Andif thatwasnotbadenough,Hothwasaskingthe48thPzCtoadvancealongtheprimary

axisandalsodeployalongthewesternflankwhichmeanstheadvancewouldbetwiceashard.To confirm this theory is true, the 48thwith the inclusion of the Panther Brigade and theGDdivisioncouldnotkeepuporgoasfarasthe2ndSSPzC.Justfromthisaspectalone,itsseemsmore logical to have the primary axis from the very start of the campaign to have been in thecenter,allowingthetwooutercorpsprovidethenecessaryflankprotection.As48thPzCveeredslightlytothenorthwest,the2ndSSPzCwasheadingtothenortheastand

the3rdPzC,whichwasstartingthecampaignasmuchas20milesfurthersouthoftheothertwocorps,hadto immediatelycross theDonets,headeastbeforepivotingto thenorthwithat leasttwo major rivers between itself and the SS. Having the weakest corps traveling the greatestdistancewhilebeingseparatedfrom4thPzAandhavingitadvancenorthwardanddefenditselfalongbothexpandingflankswithinadequateairsupportwasarecipeforfailure.Toprovidethattimely protection 3rd PzC needed at least half of the available Panthers to assist the Tigersattachedtothe3rdPzCinpenetratingthedifficultdefenselocatedneartheBelgorodsector.In the laterplanningstage,by the time the threeGermancorps(assuming the3rdcouldhave

caughtup)reachedthePselRiverline,thefrontwouldhaveexpandedapproximatelyanothertenmiles or more from their start positions. Once past Prokhorovka the front might have beenreducedalittlebutbytheideathatbythentheexhaustedvanguardoffiveweakenedcorpswouldcontinuetocarveoutandmaintainacorridoratleastthirtymileswideallthewaytoKurskseemsagrossmisjudgement,andthisdoesnoteventake intoaccount theneedtoreducethepocketedSoviet 38th and 40thArmies in the south and the 60th and 65thArmies in the north thatweredeployed to thewest of the corridor afterHoth reachedKursk. IfAGS had three full strengthpanzerdivisions, threeinfantrydivisionsinreserveplusgreaterairsupport(ataminimum)theplanmighthaveworkedinitiallybutreserveswerenotrealisticallyavailableanditwasdoomedtofail.HitlerdemandedandHothcompliedwithsupplyingdailycasualtyfiguresforarmorandmen.Bythe10thorevenearlier,itshouldhavebeenpatentlyobvioustoHothandvonManstein,asitwastoModel,thatCitadelwouldfailtoreachKurskandthatdrasticremedialactionwasrequired.Ifthe48thPzChadthegoodfortunetocrossthePselenmassewhilethe2ndSSPzCentered

theProkhorovkacorridorwhile the3rdPzCcontinued to struggle, lagging farbehind theothertwo, then seriousgapswouldhave formedwhichVatutinwouldhaveexploitedbybringingupreserves.With two corps north of the Psel River and the 3rd PzC east of the Lipovyi River,Kemp’sforceswouldhavebeendangerouslyisolatedandindiretrouble.Butrealisticallybythe10th,bearinginmindthetroublesthe48thand52ndCorpswereactuallyhaving,itmadenosenseforHothtoexpandwestwardandcontinuetoconcentrateeffortsontheOboyanroute.Theopenflanks on the 2ndSSPzC and 3rdPzC sectorswere causing a greater long termdisruption tosuccessyetHothcontinuedtoobsessaboutthe48thPzCexpandingitssector.IhavealreadysuggestedanidealGermandispositionbutthefollowingscenariohadabetter

chanceforacceptanceforitwasclosertotheoriginalyetdivertedthemainfocusawayfrom48thPzC. After studying the aerial photos plus situation reports from patrols, along with theexperiencesgainedin1941and1942whentheareawasoriginallyclearedandoccupied,itcouldclearly be seen that the central and eastern sectors were best suited for armor and thereforeshouldbeused for theprimaryattackaxis.Thewesternsector,whichhad the shortest route toKursk but theworse terrain, andwas themost obvious sector to be protected by the Soviets,shouldhavebeen reduced inscaleand importanceandusedas flankprotection for the2ndSSPzC.ThePantherbrigadeshouldhaveredeployed to theeasternsector tosupport3rdPzCandProkhorovkashouldhavebeen theprimaryaxis from thebeginning.Withall threedivisionsof2ndPzCalongwiththe167thIDdevotedtothenorthernfrontalongwiththereinforced3rdPzC(includesthePanthers),itseemsveryplausiblethatthetwocorpscouldhaveclearedthegroundbetweentheDonetsRiverandtheProkhorovkarailroadformingaunifiedfrontwithindaysofthelaunch.ItalsoseemsplausiblethatthesetwocorpswouldhavecapturedProkhorovkaandthesouthern

portionofthecorridorbeforethearrivalof5thGAand5thGTAandhavedonesosufferingfewercasualties.The3rdPzCalongwith thePantherscouldhaveerectedadefense thatwouldhavestopped the5thGTAif itattackedfromtheeast. IfRotmistrovhadmannuveredhis tanks to thenorthsothatitdefendedtheSeimRiverline,thefullforceoftheSSCorpswouldhavebeeninpositiontoengage.ThatisnottosayvonMansteinwouldhavesuccessfullyreachedKurskandliquidatedthe38thand40thArmiesbutIbelievethe4thPzAcouldhavehadmuchbetterresultsthat would have inflicted far more Soviet casualties and caused a definite disruption to theenemy’splans.It is hard to know for surewhether theGermanswould have been better off staying on the

defensiveandpreparingfortheeventualSovietoffensiveontheOrelsalient-OperationKutuzov.However, after studying the Belgorod-Kursk-Orel sector it seems plausible that the GermanswouldhavebeenbetteroffbyneverlaunchingOperationCitadel.ItseemsobviousthatwhentheGermansdidnotattackinJulyStalin,whowasanxioustoattackinJune,wouldhavepreparedtoattackOrelinAugustorSeptembertoeliminatethelastmajorbulgesituatedlessthan350milessouth of Moscow. The Germans could have used this time to good use. In the interval, theGermans could have improved defenses, repaired the Panthers, trained their crews aswell asinstalledmachinegunsontheElefants.HavingamonthortwotoworkonthePantherscouldhavemade an appreciable difference to their dependability.Deploying the new panzers in theOrelsalientwheretheterrainwasmoresuitedtoarmorascomparedtothemuddyPenaRivervalley,theGermandefensecouldhavebeengreatlyenhanced, inflictingevengreatercasualtieson theSovietswhilesufferingfewercasualtiesanddelayingtheinevitable.Routinemaintenanceontheothervehiclesand rest for theirexhaustedmenaswellas restore logisticswerealso inorder.Withdilligentintelligence,theGermansshouldhavebeenfairlypreparedtotakeontheassaultswhenlaunchedalongtheline.Aftermonthsofbeingonthedefensive,thetacticalvictoryatKharkovearlierintheyearwas

just a brief respite, not an indication or omen to Hitler that the German onward march hadresumed.ItwouldhavetakenablunderbytheSovietsofunimaginablescalefortheGermanstoscratch theirway up to parity, but thatwould not happen in 1943. The Soviets had just about

completed tranforming their war doctrine and organization and by July 1943 the massive aiddeliveredbytheWesternAllieswouldhelptoseethatthoseimprovementsputinplacewouldbeefficiently carried out. Consideringwhat the Stavka had planned for the last half of the year,especiallyinthesouth,thewarofattritionwouldhavecontinuedunabated,keepingtheGermansconstantlyoffbalance.By carefully expanding one’s view to the entire front in themiddle of 1943, after the huge

lossesatStalingradandNorthAfricaandthelossofhundredsofmilesofterritory,aleaderwholess of a gambler thanHitler could see thatGermany no longer had the capability to launch amajoroffensivethatwouldhavestrategicsignificance.WithoutlaunchingOperationCitadel,theGermanforceshadjustenoughstrengthtodefendtheentireshortenedline(afterpullingbackfromOrel)andiftheirintelligencewasdilligenttheycouldslowtheirretreat.However,theydidnothaveenoughstrength togainground inanymeaningfulway throughanoffensiveandOperationCitadel’spoor resultsclearlyproves thatpoint.Despitehavingawinning ledgerondestroyingmanymore enemy tanks and inflictingmanymore casualties on the enemy, this campaign hadknockedtheGermansdownanotherpeginthiswarofattritionthatwouldforcetheWehrmachtonthestrategicdefensivefortherestofthewar.

AppendixI

GermanOrderofBattleJuly4th1943

ArmyGroupCenter(FieldMarshalGünthervonKluge)2ndPzA(LtGenRudolfSchmidt)

55thIC(GeneralErichJaschke)321stID339thID110thID296thID134thID5thPzD(reserve)

53rdIC(GeneralFriedrichGollwitzer)211thID293rdID25thPzGD208thID112thID

35thIC(GeneralLotharRendulic)34thID56thID262ndID299thID36thID

OKHReserve8thPzD305thSD707thSD

9thA(ColGeneralWalterModel)20thIC(GeneralFreiherrvonRoman)

45thID72ndID137thID251stID

46thPzC(GeneralHansZorn)7thID

31stID102ndID258thID

47thPzC(GeneralJoachimLemelsen)2ndPzD9thPzD20thPzD6thID

41stPzC(GeneralJosefHarpe)18thPzD86thID292ndID

23rdIC(GeneralJohannesFriessner)216thID383rdID78thAD

21stPanzerBrigadesPzAbt505sPzAbt653sPzAbt654sPzAbt656StuGAbt177StuGAbt244StPzAbt216StuGAbt909

Reserve10thPzGD12thPzD4thPzD

ArmyGroupSouth(FieldMarshalErichvonManstein)4thPzA(ColGeneralHermannHoth)

52ndIC(GeneralEugenOtt)57thID255thID332ndID

48thPzC(GeneralOttovonKnobelsdorff)3rdPzD11thPzDPzGDGrossdeutschland167thID

2ndSSPzC(GeneralPaulHausser)1stSSPzGDLeibstandarteAdolfHitler2ndSSPzGDDasReich3rdSSPzGDTotenkopf

ArmyDetachmentKempf(GeneralWernerKempf)3rdPzC(GeneralHermannBreith)

6thPzD7thPzD19thPzD168thID198thID(attached)

11thIC(GeneralErhardRaus)106thID320thID

42ndIC(GeneralMattenklott)39thID161stID282ndID

1stWerferRegiment52ndWerferRegiment54thWerferRegiment4thAnti-aircraftRegimentStuGAbt905StuGAbt393sPzAbt503

LuftwaffeLuftflotte4(GeneralOttoDessloch)

8thFliegerCorps(MajGeneralHansSeidemann)-SouthLuftflotte6(ColGeneralRittervonGreim)

1stFliegerDivision(LtGeneralDeichmann)-North

AbbreviationsAD AssaultDivisionIC InfantryCorpsID InfantryDivisionPzA PanzerArmyPzC PanzerCorpsPzD PanzerDivisionPzGD PanzerGrenadierDivisionSD SecurityDivision

sPzAbt HeavyTankDetachmentStPzAbt AssaultPanzerDetachmentStuGAbt AssaultGunDetachment

AppendixII

SovietOrderofBattleJuly4th1943

BryanskFront(LtGeneralM.M.Popov)3rdArmy(LtGeneralA.V.Gorbatov)

41stRC(MajGeneralV.K.Urbanovich)235thRD308thRD380thRD

269thRD283rdRD342ndRD82ndSeparateTR114thSeparateTR

15thAirArmy(LtGeneralN.F.Naumenko)

61stArmy(LtGeneralP.A.Belov)9thGRC(MajGeneralA.A.Boreiko)

12thGRD76thGRD77thGRD

110thRD336thRD356thRD415thRD68thTB36thTR

63rdArmy(LtGeneralV.I.Kolpakchi)5thRD41stRD129thRD250thRD287thRD348thRD397thRD

231stTR

CentralFront(GeneralK.K.Rokossovsky)2ndTankArmy(LtGeneralRodin)

3rdTC(MajGeneralM.D.Sinenko)16thTC(MajGeneralV.E.Grigorev)9thTC(attached)(MajGeneralS.I.Bogdanov)19thTC(attached)(MajGeneralI.D.Vasilev)

13thArmy(LtGeneralN.P.Pukhov)17thGRC(LtGeneralA.L.Bondarev)

6thGRD70thGRD75thGRD

18thGRC(MajGeneralI.M.Afonin)2ndGAD3rdGAD4thGAD

15thRC(MajGeneralI.I.Liudnikov)8thRD74thRD148thRD

29thRC(MajGeneralA.N.Slyshkin)15thRD81stRD307thRD

16thAirArmy(LtGeneralSergeyRudenko)3rdBombingAirCorps6thAirCorps6thFighterAirCorps

48thArmy(LtGeneralP.L.Romanenko)42ndRC(MajGeneralK.S.Kolganov)

16thRD202ndRD399thRD73rdRD137thRD143rdRD170thRD

45thSeparateTR193rdSeparateTR

299thSeparateTR

60thArmy(LtGeneralI.D.Chernyakhovsky)24thRC(MajGeneralN.I.Kiriukhin)

42ndRD112thRD129thRB

30thRC(MajGeneralG.S.Lazko)121stRD141stRD322ndRD

55thRD150thTB

65thArmy(LtGeneralP.I.Batov)18thRC(MajGeneralI.I.Ivanov)

69thRD149thRD246thRD

27thRC(MajGeneralF.M.Cherokmanov)60thRD115thRB193rdRD

37thGRD181stRD194thRD354thRD

70thArmy(GeneralGalanin)28thRC(MajGeneralA.N.Nechaev)

132ndRD211thRD280thRD102ndRD106thRD140thRD162ndRD240thSeparateTR251stSeparateTR259thSeparateTR

VoronezhFront(GeneralN.F.Vatutin)1stTankArmy(LtGenKatukov)

3rdMC(MajGeneralS.M.Krivoshein)1stMB3rdMB10thMB1stGTB17thTR49thTB

6thTC(MajGeneralA.L.Getman)22ndTB112thTB200thTB6thMRB

31stTC(MajGeneralD.K.Chernienko)100thTB237thTB242ndTB

5thGTC(MajGeneralA.G.Kravchenko)20thGTB21stGTB22ndGTB6thGMRB48thTR

2ndAirArmy(LtGeneralS.A.Krasovsky)1stBombingAirCorps(ColI.S.Polbin)1stAssaultAirCorps(LtGeneralV.G.Gribakin)4thFighterAirCorps(MajGeneralI.D.Podgorny)5thFighterAirCorps(MajGeneralD.P.Galunov)

6thGuardsArmy(LtGeneralI.M.Chistiakov)22ndGRC(MajGeneralN.B.Ibiansky)

67thGRD71stGRD90thGRD

23rdGRC(MajGeneralP.P.Vakhrameev)51stGRD52ndGRD375thRD

89thGRD96thTB230thTR245thTR184thRD

219thRD31stAAB

7thGuardsArmy(LtGeneralM.S,Shumilov)24thGRC(MajGeneralN.A.Vasilev)

15thGRD36thGRD72ndGRD

25thGRC(MajGeneralG.B.Safiullin)73rdGRD78thGRD81stGRD

213thRD27thGTB201stTB148thTR167thTR262ndTR

38thArmy(LtGeneralChibisov)50thRC(MajGeneralS.S.Martirosian)

167thRD232ndRD340thRD

51stRC(MajGeneralP.P.Andreenko)180thRD240thRD204thRD

180thTB192ndTB

40thArmy(LtGeneralK.S.Moskalenko)47thRC(MajGeneralA.S.Griaznov)

161stRD206thRD237thRD

52ndRC(LtGeneralF.I.Perkhorovich)100thRD219thRD309thRD

184thRD86thTB59thTR

60thHTR

69thArmy(LtGenV.D.Kriuchenkin)48thRC(MajGeneralZ.Z.Rogozny)

107thRD183rdRD305thRD

49thRC(MajGeneralG.P.Terentev)111thRD270thRD

35thGRC(MajGenS.G.Goriachev)92ndGRD94thGRD93rdGRD

81stGRD89thGRD

SouthwesternFront(GeneralR.I.Malinovsky)17thAirArmy(LtGeneralV.A.Sudets)

SteppeFront(ColGeneralKonev)4thGuardArmy(LtGeneralG.I.Kulik)

20thRC(MajGeneralN.I.Biriukov)5thGAD7thGAD8thGAD

21stRC(MajGeneralP.I.Fomenko)68thGRD69thGRD80thGRD

3rdGTC3rdGTB18thGTB19thGTB2ndGMRB

5thAirArmy(LtGeneralGoriunov)7thAirCorps8thAirCorps3rdFighterCorps7thFighterAirCorps

5thGuardsArmy(LtGeneralA.S.Zhadov)(originallySteppeFront)

32ndGRC(MajGeneralA.I.Rodinstev)13thGRD66thGRD6thGAD

33rdGRC(MajGeneralI.I.Popov)95thGRD97thGRD9thGAD42ndGRD(attached)

10thTC(MajGeneralG.V.Burkov)178thTB183rdTB186thTB11thMRB

5thGuardsTankArmy(LtGeneralP.A.Rotmistrov)(originallySteppeFront)5thGMC(MajGeneralB.M.Skvortsov)

10thGMB11thGMB12thGMB24thGTB55thGTR

29thTC(MajGeneralI.F.Kirichenko)25thTB31stTB32ndTB53rdMRB

18thTC(MajGeneralB.S.Bakharov)110thTB170thTB181stTB32ndMRB36thGTR

2ndTC(attached)(MajGeneralA.F.Popov)26thTB99thTB169thTB58thMRB

2ndGTC(attached)(MajGeneralA.S.Burdeiny)4thGTB25thGTB26thGTB

4thGMRB47thGTR

SouthwesternFront(GeneralR.I.Malinovsky)17thAirArmy(LtGeneralV.A.Sudets)

WesternFront(ColGeneralV.D.Sokolovsky)1stAirArmy(LtGeneralM.M.Gromov)

50thArmy(LtGeneralI.V.Bolden)38thRC(MajGeneralA.D.Tereshkov)

17thRD326thRD413thRD

49thRD64thRD212thRD324thRD196thTB

11thGuardsArmy(LtGenI.K.Bagramyan)8thGRC(MajGeneralP.F.Malyshev)

11thGRD26thGRD83rdGRD

16thGRC(MajGeneralA.V.Lapshov(initially))1stGRD16thGRD31stGRD169thRD

36thGRC(MajGeneralA.S.Ksenefontov)5thGRD18thGRD84thGRD

108thRD217thRD10thGTB29thGTB43rdGTB

AbbreviationsAAB Anti-AircraftBrigade

GAD GuardsAirborneDivisionGMRB GuardsMechanizedRifleBrigadeGRC GuardsRifleCorpsGRD GuardsRifleDivisionGTB GuardsTankBrigadeGTR GuardsTankRegimentHTR HeavyTankRegimentMB MechanizedBrigadeMRB MechanizedRifleBrigadeRB RifleBrigadeRC RifleCorpsRD RifleDivisionTB TankBrigadeTC TankCorpsTD TankDivisionTR TankRegiment

AppendixIII

GermanArmoredStrengths

AppendixIV

SovietArmoredStrengths

AppendixV

AFVTechnicalData

AppendixVI

GroundforcesstrengthsasofJuly4th1943

German ApproximateTotals

ArmyGroupSouth

4thPzA 223,900

ArmyKemp 126,000

Total 349,900

ArmyGroupCenter

9thArmy 335,000

2ndArmy 96,000

Totals 431,000

Grandtotal 780,900

Soviets

VoronezhFront EstimatedTotals

38thArmy 60,000

40thArmy 77,000

6thGA 79,000

7thGA 76,000

69thArmy 52,000

1stTA 40,000

35thGRC 35,000

FrontReserve 204,000

Total 623,000

CentralFront

48thArmy 84,000

13thArmy 114,000

70thArmy 96,000

65thArmy 100,000

60thArmy 96,000

2ndTA 37,000

FrontReserves 184,000

Total 711,000

SteppeFront 573,000

WesternFront (estimate) 277,000

BryanskFront (estimate) 400,000

SouthwesternFront 700,000

Totals 1,950,000

ThistotalrepresentsforcesdeployednearKharkov,Belgorod,Kursk,OrelandBryanskforJulyandAugustperiod.Thenumbershrinksto1.9millionforjusttheVoronezhandCentralFrontsanddirectreinforcementsfromotherFrontsforthefirsttendays.

Grandtotal 3,284,000

AppendixVII

AviationStrengths

(IncludesoperationalaircraftonlyasofJuly4th1943)

*includesnoncombataircraft

AppendixVIII

Casualties

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Map1NorthernSalient,July4th1943–midnight.

Map2NorthernSalient,July5th1943–midnight.

Map3NorthernSalient,July6th1943–midnight.

Map4NorthernSalient,July7th1943–midnight.

Map5NorthernSalient,July8th1943–midnight.

Map6NorthernSalient,July10th1943–midnight.

Map7NorthernSalient,July12th1943–midnight.

Map8SouthernSalient,topographical.

Map9SouthernSalient,July5th1943–midnight.

Map10SouthernSalient,July6th1943–midnight.

Map11SouthernSalient,July7th1943–midnight.FirstmajorSovietcounter-attack.

Map12SouthernSalient,July8th1943–midnight.SecondmajorSovietcounter-attack.

Map13SouthernSalient,July9th1943–midnight.4thPzAresumesitsattack.

Map14SouthernSalient,July10th1943–midnight.

Map15SouthernSalient,July11th1943–midnight.

Map16SouthernSalient,July12th1943–midnight.

Map17SouthernSalient,July13th1943–midnight.

Map18SouthernSalient,BattleforProkhorovka,July11th1943–midnight.2ndSSPzC’sattempttotakeProkhorovkabefore5thGTAfullyarrived.

Map19SouthernSalient,BattleforProkhorovka,July12th1943–midnight.Theadvanceof2ndSSPzCafterRotmistrov’sassaultfailedtoencircletheGermans.

Map20SouthernSalient,Counter-attackof1stTA,July12th1943–midnight.Thesectorretreatof48thPzCagainst1stTA’scounter-attack.

Map21Kempf’sOffensive,July12th1943.3rdPzC’sadvance.

Map22OrelSalient,July11th1943–midnight.DeploymentsatthestartofOperationKutuzov.

Map23SouthernSalient,largetopographical.

Map24SouthernSalient,PrimaryAxis,July5th1943.Openingdayfor48thPzCand2ndSSPzC.

Map25SouthernSalient,July8th1943.Sovietarmoredcounter-attack.

Map26ASouthernSalient,July9th1943.2ndSSPzCoffensive.

Map26BSouthernSalient,July10th1943.2ndSSPzCoffensive.

Map26CSouthernSalient,July11th1943.2ndSSPzCoffensive.

Map27SouthernSalient,July12th1943.DefenseofProkhorovka.

Map28OrelSalient,OperationKutuzov,July12th-August16th1943.

Map29Proposedalternateoffensive,SouthernSalient,July12th1943.

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BarbarossaDerailed:TheBattleforSmolensk10July-10September1941,Volume1

TheGermanAdvance,theEncirclementBattleandtheFirstandSecondSovietCounteroffensives,10July-24August1941

DavidMGlantzISBN9781907677502

TheBattleofSpicherenAugust1870

ExpandededitionwithnewessayandbibliographybyDuncanRogersMajorGFRHendersonISBN9781907677571

TheFranco-PrussianWar1870-71Volume1:TheCampaignofSedan.HelmuthvonMoltkeandtheOverthrowoftheSecondEmpire

QuintinBarryISBN9781907677588

TheFranco-PrussianWar1870-71Volume2:AfterSedan.HelmuthvonMoltkeandtheDefeatoftheGovernmentofNationalDefence

QuintinBarryISBN9781907677595

Bismarck’sFirstWar.TheCampaignofSchleswigandJutland1864MichaelEmbree

ISBN9781907677618

RaysoftheRisingSun.Japan’sAsianAllies1931-45Volume1:ChinaandManchukuoPhilipJowettandJohnBerger

ISBN9781907677564

ALongLongWar.VoicesfromtheBritishArmyinNorthernIreland1969-98KenWharton

ISBN9781907677601

AbolishingtheTaboo:DwightD.EisenhowerandAmericanNuclearDoctrine,1945-1961BrianMadisonJonesISBN9781907677809

AfterStalingrad:TheRedArmy’sWinterOffensive1942-1943DavidM.Glantz

ISBN9781907677823

Cataclysm:TheWarontheEasternFront1941-45KeithCumins

ISBN9781907677816

CrucibleofCombat:Germany’sDefensiveBattlesintheUkraine,1943-1944RolfHinze

ISBN9781907677830

‘Iwouldn’twanttodoitagain’D-DayinNormandyasseenthroughtheeyesofPrivateFayetteO.Richardson(Pathfinder)and1stLtRexG.Combs,508thParachuteInfantry

Regiment,US82ndAirborneDivisionJoëlBaret

ISBN9781907677847

AnActiveServiceThestoryofasoldier’slifeintheGrenadierGuards,SASandSBS,1935-58RichardDorney

ISBN9781907677885

Bullets,BombsandCupsofTeaFurtherVoicesoftheBritishArmyinNorthernIreland1969-98

KenWhartonISBN9781907677892

ImperialGermanArmy1914-18Organisation,Structure,OrdersofBattleHermannCron&DuncanRogers

ISBN9781907677878

RememberingtheDragonLadyTheU-2SpyPlane:MemoirsoftheMenWhoMadetheLegend

BrigGen(Ret.)GeraldE.McIlmoyleISBN9781907677854

USArmyInfantryDivisions1943-1945Volume1–Organisation,Doctrine,EquipmentYvesJ.Bellanger

ISBN9781907677861

PanzerGunner:FromMyNativeCanadatotheGermanOsfrontandBack.InActionwith25thPanzerRegiment,7thPanzerDivision1944-45

BrunoFriesenISBN9781907677076

AdvancefromMons1914:TheExperiencesofaGermanInfantryOfficerWalterBloem

ISBN9781907677908

LandreciestoCambrai:CaseStudiesofGermanOffensiveandDefensiveOperationsontheWesternFront1914-17DuncanRogers(Ed.)ISBN9781907677915

MostUnfavourableGround:TheBattleofLoos,1915NiallCherry

ISBN9781907677922

BlackDevilsMarch—ADoomedOdyssey:The1stPolishArmouredDivision1939-1945EvanMcGilvray

ISBN9781907677939

MilitaryGovernmentinExile:ThePolishGovernmentinExile1939-1945,AStudyofDiscontent

EvanMcGilvrayISBN9781907677946

HistoryoftheBritishArmyFilmandPhotographicUnitintheSecondWorldWarDr.FredMcGlade

ISBN9781907677953

ARendezvouswiththeEnemy:MyBrother’sLifeandDeathwiththeColdstreamGuardsinNorthernIrelandDarrenWare

ISBN9781907677960

StrikingBack:Britain’sAirborneandCommandoRaids1940-42NiallCherry

ISBN9781907677977

TheSilentGeneral:HorneoftheFirstArmyABiographyofHaig’sTrustedGreatWarComrade-in-Arms

DonFarrISBN9781907677984

OperationDingo:RhodesianRaidonChimoioandTembué1977DrJ.R.T.Wood

ISBN9781907677991

Publishedinassociationwith30DegreesSouth

FranceinCentrafrique:FromBokassaandOperationBarracudetotheDaysofEUFORPeterBaxter

ISBN9781908916006Publishedinassociationwith30DegreesSouth

BattleforCassinga:SouthAfrica’sControversialCross-BorderRaid,Angola1978

MikeMcWilliamsISBN9781908916013

Publishedinassociationwith30DegreesSouth

SelousScouts:RhodesianCounter-InsurgencySpecialistsPeterBaxter

ISBN9781908916020Publishedinassociationwith30DegreesSouth

TheWholeArmourofGod:AnglicanArmyChaplainsintheGreatWarLindaParker

ISBN9781908916037

TheRoyalCorpsofSignals:UnitHistoriesoftheCorps(1920-2001)anditsAntecedentsCliffLordandGrahamWatson

ISBN9781908916044

TheRoyalCorpsofSignals:UnitHistoriesoftheCorps(1920-2001)anditsAntecedents:SupplementaryVolume

CliffLordISBN9781908916310

AirborneArmour:Tetrarch,Locust,Hamilcarandthe6thAirborneArmouredReconnaissanceRegiment1938-50

KeithFlintISBN9781908916051

DiaryofaRedDevil:ByGlidertoArnhemwiththe7thKing’sOwnScottishBorderersAlbertBlockwell,editedbyMaggieClifton

ISBN9781908916068

Vlamgat:TheStoryofMirageF1intheSouthAfricanAirForceBrigadierGeneralDickLord

ISBN9781908916075Publishedinassociationwith30DegreesSouth

DeltaScout:GroundCoverageOperatorAnthonyTrethowanISBN9781908916099

Publishedinassociationwith30DegreesSouth

19WithaBullet:ASouthAfricanParatrooperinAngolaGrangerKorff

ISBN9781908916105

Publishedinassociationwith30DegreesSouth

Counter-StrikefromtheSky:TheRhodeisanAll-ArmsForceintheWarintheBush,1974-1980J.R.T.Wood

ISBN9781908916112Publishedinassociationwith30DegreesSouth

OutofAction

ChrisCocksISBN9781908916129

Publishedinassociationwith30DegreesSouth

ShadowsintheSand:ALoevoetTracker’sStoryofanInsurgencyWarKamongo,S.andL.Bezuidenhout

ISBN9781908916136Publishedinassociationwith30DegreesSouth

PathfinderCompany:44ParachuteBrigageThePhilistinesGrahamGilmore

ISBN9781908916143Publishedinassociationwith30DegreesSouth

FieldMarshalVonManstein:TheJanusHead,APortraitMarcelStein

ISBN9781908916150

FlawedGenius:FieldMarshalWalterModel,ACriticalBiographyMarcelStein

ISBN9781908916167

Hitler’sLastLevy:TheVolkssturm1944-45HansKissel

ISBN9781908916174

InaRagingInferno:CombatUnitsoftheHitlerYouth1944-45HansHolzträger

ISBN9781908916181

ANewBattlefield:TheRoyalUlsterRiflesinKorea1950-51DavidR.Orr

ISBN9781908916297

OnceIhadaComrade:KarlRothandtheCombatHistoryofthe36thPanzerRegiment1939-45

R.W.ByrdISBN9781908916303

TheCampaigninAlsace:August1870J.P.duCane

ISBN9781908916327

MilitaryOperationsoftheDutchArmy10-17May1940P.L.G.DoormanOBEISBN9781908916334

ForRexandforBelgium:LéonDegrelleandWalloonPoliticalandMilitaryCollaboration1940-45

EddydeBruyneandMarcRikmenspoelISBN9781908916341

LearningfromForeignWars:RussianMilitaryThinking1859-73GudrunPersson

ISBN9781908916358

WithTegetthoffatLissa:TheMemoirsofanAustrianNavalOfficer1861-66MaximilianRottauscherISBN9781908916365

HistoryoftheCampaignof1866inItalyAlexanderHold

ISBN9781908916372

Mons1914-1918:TheBeginningandtheEndDonFarr

ISBN9781908916389

BibliographyoftheSevenWeeks’Warof1866StuartSutherland(Comp.)ISBN9781908916396

TheContributionoftheRoyalBavarianArmytotheWarof1866BavarianGeneralStaffISBN9781908916402

OrganizationoftheGermanStateForcesin1866StuartSutherland

ISBN9781908916419

TheDanishCampaignof1864WilhelmvonGründorfISBN9781908916426

FalloftheRedBaron:WorldWarIAerialTacticsandtheDeathofRichthofenLeonBennett

ISBN9781908916433

UnderHimmler’sCommand:ThePersonalRecollectionsofOberstHans-GeorgEismann,OperationsOfficer,ArmyGroupVistula,EasternFront1945

Hans-GeorgEismann,editedbyFredSteinhardtISBN9781908916440

BlackTuesdayOverNamsi:B-29svsMiGs-theForgottenAirBattleoftheKoreanWar,23October1951

EarlJ.McGill,LtColUSAF(Ret.)ISBN9781908916082

ComeBackToPortofino:ThroughItalywiththe6thSouthAfricanArmouredDivisionJamesBourhill

ISBN9781908916617

FromFledglingtoEagle:TheSouthAfricanAirForceduringtheBorderWarBrig-GenDickLordISBN9781908916624

SoFarandNoFurther:Rhodesia'sBidforIndependenceDuringtheRetreatfromEmpire1959-1965

Dr.JRTWoodISBN9781908916631

TheSearchforPuma164:OperationUricandtheAssaultonMapaiNeillJacksonandRickvanMalsen

ISBN9781908916648

WestoftheMoon:EarlyZululandandaGameRangeratWarinRhodesiaRonSelley

ISBN9781908916655

WindsOfDestruction:TheAutobiographyofaRhodesianCombatPilotPeterPetter-BowyerISBN9781908916662

TheOtherSideoftheWireVolume1:WiththeGermanXIVReserveCorpsontheSomme,September1914-June1916

RalphJ.WhiteheadISBN9781908916679

HandbookofWWIIGermanMilitarySymbolsandAbbreviations1943-45TerrenceBooth

ISBN9781908916686

InCaseFrankEdwards

ISBN9781908916693

GooseyGooseyGanderFrankEdwards

ISBN9781908916709

AQuestionofPedigree

FrankEdwardsISBN9781908916716

DanceoftheCranesFrankEdwards

ISBN9781908916723

Fireforce:OneMan'sWarinTheRhodesianLightInfantryChrisCocks

ISBN9781908916815

TheGaysh:AHistoryoftheAdenProtectorateLevies1927-61andtheFederalRegularArmyofSouthArabia1961-67

FrankEdwardsISBN9781908916822

Standby!:SouthAfricanAirForceSearchandRescue

Brig-GenDickLordISBN9781908916839

KenyaCowboy:APoliceOfficer'sAccountoftheMauMauEmergencyPeterHewitt

ISBN9781908916846

FirstIn,LastOut:TheSouthAfricanArtilleryinAction:1975–1988CliveWilsworth

ISBN9781908916853

TheIfMan.DrLeanderStarrJameson,theInspirationforKipling'sMasterpieceChrisAsh

ISBN9781908916747

TheDiariesofRonnieTritton,WarOfficePublicityOfficer1940-45EditedbyFredMcGladeISBN9781908916808

BarbarossaDerailed.TheBattleforSmolensk10July-10September1941Volume2.TheGermanOffensivesontheFlanksandtheThirdSovietCounteroffensive,25August-10

September1941DavidGlantz

ISBN9781908916785

RussianWorldWarIIDictionary:ARussian-Englishglossaryofspecialterms,expressions,andsoldiers'slang

IsaakKobylyanskiyandStuartBrittonISBN9781908916945

MadDogKillers:TheStoryofaCongoMercenaryIvanSmith

ISBN9781908916884

Sir,They'reTakingtheKidsIndoors.TheBritishArmyinNorthernIreland1973-74KenWharton

ISBN9781908916778

FourBall,OneTracer:CommandingExecutiveOutcomesinAngolaandSierraLeone

RolfvanHeerdenastoldtoAndrewHudsonISBN9781908916792

LZHot!FlyingSouthAfrica'sBorderWarNickLithgow

ISBN9781908916761

CounterinsurgencyinAfrica:ThePortugeseWayofWar1961-74JohnP.Cann

ISBN9781909384309

JetAgeMan:SACB-47andB-52OperationsintheEarlyColdWarLtColUSAF(Ret.)EarlJ.McGill

ISBN9781909384316

ZambeziValleyInsurgency:EarlyRhodesianBushWarOperations(Africa@WarVol5)J.R.T.Wood

ISBN9781909384323

CongoUnravelled:MilitaryOperationsfromIndependencetotheMercenaryRevolt1960-68(Africa@War#6)AndrewHudson

ISBN9781909384330

BloodClot:InCombatwiththePatrolsPlatoon,3Para,Afghanistan2006(Revised&ExpandedEdition)

JakeScottISBN978190891676

TheRoadToKöniggrätz:HelmuthvonMoltkeandtheAustro-PrussianWar1866QuintinBarry

ISBN9781909384743

StrikingInsideAngolawith32Battalion

MariusScheepersISBN9781909384699

‘YoungCitizen,OldSoldier’FromboyhoodinAntrimtoHellontheSomme

TheJournalofRiflemanJamesMcRoberts,No.1885,14thBattalionRoyalIrishRifles(YCV)January1915-April1917EditedbyDavidTruesdaleISBN9781909384682

TheRoleoftheSovietUnionintheSecondWorldWar:ARe-Examination(HelionStudiesinMilitaryHistoryno14)

BorisSokolovEditedbyStuartBrittonISBN9781909384712

SAAF’sBorderWar:TheSouthAfricanAirForceinCombat,1966–1989(Africa@WarVolume8)

PeterBaxterISBN9781909384729

TumultintheClouds:StoriesfromtheSouthAfricanAirForce1920–2010DeanWingrin

ISBN9781909384750

ChickenStreet.AfghanistanbeforetheTaliban:ClearingtheDeadlyRemnantsofWar

JohnLaneISBN9781909384767

Radetzky’sMarches:TheCampaignsof1848and1849inUpperItalyMichaelEmbree

ISBN9781909384736

WiththeRedDevilsatArnhem:PersonalExperienceswiththe1stPolishParachuteBrigade

1944(TranslatedfromthePolishbyH.C.Stevens.AdditionalmaterialandfootnotesaddedbyNiallCherry)

MarekŚwięcickiISBN9781909384705

AnecdotesoftheAnglo-BoerWar:Talesfromthe‘LastoftheGentlemen’sWars’(RevisedandUpdatedSecondEdition)

RobMilneISBN9781909384811

TheBattleofWörth:August6th,1870(NewintroductionbyDuncanRogers)Lieut.-Col.G.F.R.Henderson

TheYorkandLancasterRegimentProfessorofMilitaryHistory,TheStaffCollege

ISBN9781909384842

BlueandOldGold:TheHistoryoftheBritishSouthAfricaPolice1889–1980(IllustratedbyRichardHamley)

PeterGibbs,HughPhillipsandNickRussellISBN9781909384873

TheCheetah:TheRhodesianLightInfantry50thAnniversaryEditionChrisCocks,editorISBN9781909384910

DingoFirestorm:TheGreatestBattleoftheRhodesianBushWar

IanPringleISBN9781909384781

FromAddistotheAostaValley:ASouthAfricanintheNorthAfricanandItalianCampaigns1940–1945KeithFord

ISBN9781909384828

Masodja:ThehistoryoftheRhodesianAfricanRiflesanditsforerunnertheRhodesianNativeRegiment

CommissionedandcompiledbyBrigadierDavidHeppenstallandtheRhodesianAfricanRiflesRegimentalAssociation(UK)

AlexandreBindaISBN9781909384897

ManofSteelandHonour:GeneralStanisławMaczek.SoldierofPoland,Commanderofthe1stPolishArmouredDivisioninNorth-WestEurope1944-45

(HelionStudiesinMilitaryHistoryNumber18)EvanMcGilvray

ISBN9781909384798

“Recce”:ACollector’sGuidetotheHistoryoftheSouthAfricanSpecialForcesP.Matthysen,M.KalkwarfandM.Huxtable

ISBN9781909384880

TheGreatTrekUncut.EscapefromBritishRule:TheBoerExodusfromtheCapeColony1836RobinBinckes

ISBN9781909384804

TheSaints:TheRhodesianLightInfantryAlexandreBinda

compiledandeditedbyChrisCocksISBN9781909384903

ThreeWeeksinNovember:AMilitaryHistoryoftheSwissCivilWarof1847RalphWeaver

ISBN9781909384835

TroepieSnapshots:PictorialRecollectionsoftheSouthAfricanBorderWarCameronBlake

ISBN9781909384866

TunisianTales:The1stParachuteBrigadeinNorthAfrica1942-43NiallCherry

ISBN9781909384859

WiththeCourageofDesperation:Germany'sDefenceoftheSouthernSectoroftheEasternFront1944-45RolfHinze

ISBN9781909982505

MrsAdolfHitler:TheEvaBraunPhotographAlbums1912-45BlaineTaylor

ISBN9781909982437

IceSteelandFire:BritishExplorersinPeaceandWar1921-45LindaParker

ISBN9781909982451

BrownWatersofAfrica:PortugueseRiverineWarfare1961-1974JohnP.Cann

ISBN9781909982475

AWhisperintheReeds:'TheTerribleOnes'-SouthAfrica's32BattalionatWarJustinTaylor

ISBN9781909982468

WithTrumpet,DrumandFife:Ashorttreatisecoveringtheriseandfallofmilitarymusicalinstrumentsonthebattlefield

MajorMikeHallISBN9781909982512

MuddlingThrough:TheOrganisationofBritishArmyChaplaincyinWorldWarOnePeterHowson

ISBN9781909982482

ThreeSipsofGin:DominatingtheBattlespacewithRhodesia'sfamedSelousScoutsTimothyBax

ISBN9781909982444

TheGermanFallschirmtruppe1936-41(Revisededition):ItsGenesisandEmploymentintheFirstCampaignsoftheWehrmacht

Karl-HeinzGollaISBN9781909982499

WarintheEast:AMilitaryHistoryoftheRusso-TurkishWar1877-78QuintinBarry

ISBN9781910294154

Waffen-SSArmourinNormandy:TheCombatHistoryofSSPanzerRegiment12andSSPanzerjägerAbteilung12,Normandy1944,basedontheiroriginalwardiaries

NortbertSzámvéberISBN9781910294147

DaysofBattle:ArmouredOperationsNorthoftheRiverDanube,Hungary1944-45NortbertSzámvéberISBN9781910294208

TheViaz’maCatastrophe,1941:TheRedArmy’sDisastrousStandagainstOperationTyphoonLevLopukhovsky

ISBN9781910294185

TheRzhevSlaughterhouse:TheRedArmy’sForgotten15-monthCampaignagainstArmyGroupCenter,1942-1943

SvetlanaGerasimovaandStuartBrittonISBN9781910294178

FürVolkandFührer:TheMemoirofaVeteranofthe1stSSPanzerDivisionLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitler

ErwinBartmannISBN9781910294277

WastedYears,WastedLivesVolume1:TheBritishArmyinNorthernIreland1975-77KenWharton

ISBN9781910294215

FirstSchleswig-HolsteinWar1848-50NickSvendsen

ISBN9781910294192

BelfastDiaries:AGunnerInNorthernIreland1971-74SteveCorbett

ISBN9781910294222

Somalia:USIntervention,1992–1994PeterBaxter

ISBN9781910294239

TheFlechas:InsurgentHuntinginEasternAngola,1965–1974JohnCann

ISBN9781910294246

GreatLakesHolocaust:FirstCongoWar,1996–1997TomCooper

ISBN9781910294253

GreatLakesConflagration:SecondCongoWar,1998–2003TomCooper

ISBN9781910294260

BattlefieldRations:TheFoodGiventotheBritishSoldierForMarchingandFighting1900-2011

AnthonyClaytonISBN9781910294284

Portugal’sGuerrillaWarsinAfrica:Lisbon’sThreeWarsinAngola,MozambiqueandPortugueseGuinea1961-74

AlVenter

ISBN9781910294307

RedDevilsovertheYalu:AChronicleofSovietAerialOperationsintheKoreanWar1950-53IgorSeidovandStuartBritton

ISBN9781910294314

SpecialBranchWar:SlaughterintheRhodesianBush.SouthernMatabeleland,1976-1980EdBird

ISBN9781910294321

TheBattleforMozambique:TheFrelimo–RenamoStruggle,1977–1992StephenA.EmersonISBN9781910294338

TheirsNotToReasonWhy:HorsingtheBritishArmy1875-1925GrahamWinton

ISBN9781910294345

ThunderatProkhorovka:ACombatHistoryofOperationCitadel,Kursk,July1943DavidSchranck

ISBN9781910294352

WeepforAfrica:ARhodesianLightInfantryParatrooper’sFarewelltoInnocenceJeremyHall

ISBN9781910294369

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