tikhvin

Hitler's Strike for TikhvinAuthor(s): Gerald R. KleinfeldSource: Military Affairs, Vol. 47, No. 3 (Oct., 1983), pp. 122-128Published by: Society for Military HistoryStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1988082Accessed: 21/09/2009 01:16

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Lake Ladoga

Karelian Isthms

sinovets Novais Ladoga

Gulf of Finland SchlUsselburg Volkhovstroi

olpin ~~~~~~~~~~~Tikhvin 1# 4 e?eq&s * Pushkin \ Mga

'~ lam Izora Aleksandroavskai

Krasnogvard.....T. sno [Gatshinal Kirishi

Vyritsa~~~~~~~Krih

Kingisepp iuban ' tr0

I a > Rozhdestvenol v t X w Leningrad Kilometers

CFo Kud 0 25 Hs

.....Raii road - -. Road

From Klein feldt and Tambs, Hitler's Spanish Legion (Southern Illinois University Press, 1979).

Hitler's

Strike for

Tikhvin

by Gerald R. Kleinfeld Arizona State University

LENINGRAD - the City of the Glorious October. In the Sum- mer of 1941, Field Marshal Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb's Army

Group North raced towards the birthplace of the Soviet Govern- ment. Sixteenth Army of Colonel Ernst Busch formed his right flank, Eighteenth Army of Colonel General Georg von Kachler his left, and Panzer Group 4 of Colonel Erich Hoepner his armored strike force.I Von Leeb's mission, according to the plan for Operation Barbarossa, was to destroy Soviet forces in his path and seize the City of Lenin. Eighteenth Army lurched forward along the coast, crashing through the Baltic republics and then thrusting towards Leningrad itself. Von Kuchler rolled past Sovi- et units bottled up in a pocket around Oranienbaum and set his sites on the sprawling metropolis ahead. The tank factory at Kolpino continued to churn out T-34s just beyond his forward lines. Busch, meanwhile, smashed forward along the inland route, and advanced toward the Volkhov River.

Hitler had several options. He could order von Leeb to storm into Leningrad, but there would be the risk of street fighting that might devour his troops. He could have Army Group North skirt the city, and roll up the shoreline of the vast Lake Ladoga to unite with the Finns, who had entered the war to regain their old frontier with the Russians and were expected to move only as far as the former border posts. This option could spare his troops, and Leningrad would be cut off and left to starve or surrender. Its disadvantage lay in the fact that Tikhvin would lie on the German flank.

Tikhvin was a hitherto obscure junction on the Moscow- Leningrad rail line. Should it be left unmolested, Joseph Stalin could order supplies and troops north, where they could be off- loaded in position to be thrust against the German siege. If Hitler hoped to starve Leningrad into submission, Tikhvin might be a key. The Tikhvin assault is an important operation for several reasons, but historians of the Russo-German war have tended to overlook it. Hitler pushed for it. He restructured the Leningrad front to accomplish it, but lost his nerve immediately after the assault began and ordered von Leeb to pull back. Von Leeb was originally against the attack, but, once involved, warmed to the idea and persuaded Hitler to allow him to go ahead. It was the

disaster that Hitler feared, and helped weaken what confidence the Fuhrer had in the commander of Army Group North. Shortly afterward, he was ready to accept von Leeb's resignation.

On 7 September, the Finns, under Marshal Carl Gustav Man- nerheim, reached the Svir and prepared to receive their German allies. On 8 September, in a brilliant coup de main, Colonel Harry Hoppe led 424 IR (Infantry Regiment) of 126 ID (Infantry Divi- sion) into Schasselburg. The land route to Leningrad was closed. Von Leeb managed to create a ten kilometer-wide salient along the southern lakeshore but had difficulty in moving to the next stage of Hitler's plan.

Provisions were transported by rail north from Moscow and south from the ice port of Murmansk through the junction at Tikhvin. From there, a rail line was built to a railhead near the lakeshore. The vital stores were then trucked to a makeshift port and ferried past the Germans to emergency docking facilities within the Leningrad defense perimeter. The Leningrad defenders fought desperately to hold out, and to breach the German blockade.

On 24 September, Hitler flew to Smolensk to settle the problems at Army Group North and complete preparations for the coming assault on Moscow. Reluctantly, the Fuhrer decided to give von Leeb more assistance. He directed that two fresh infantry divisions be sent up - 250 ID (the "Blue Division"), a Spanish volunteer force then marching towards Smolensk, and 277 ID by rail at once from France.

On 1 October, OKH asked Army Group North to comment about a new plan. What would von Leeb think about mounting a powerful eastward thrust across the Volkhov River, driving through Tikhvin and on northward to meet the Finns on the eastern lakeshore at the Svir River? The projected advance of Army Group Center against Moscow would result in a broad pullback of the enemy in the north, and Leeb could move ambitiously.2 The Field Marshal was extremely unhappy. Having just surrendered most of his armor to Army Group Center and barely survived a furious Soviet counterattack, he was now asked to launch a major offensive resting only on his remaining two armored and two motorized divisions. Since these were on the lakeshore, they

122 MILITARY AFFAIRS

would have to be moved to Chudovo, which would mean a delay. Still, it was an enticing possibility which could have broad conse- quences. If Army Group North could really seize Tikhvin and go on to reach the Svir, not only would Leningrad fall like a ripe plum into the Fuhrer's hands, but the defeat of the Russian forces would endanger the stability of the Soviet northern front.

There was another advantage as well. After crossing the Volkhov near Chudovo, some of Busch's divisions could head for Tikhvin while a second drive could be mounted southeast towards Borovitschi in the strategic Valdai Heights. Borovitschi was enormously tempting. As von Bock marched on Moscow, Stalin was expected to pull back units to defend the capital, drawing forces from the Valdai. If Busch could follow and press hard, he could contribute to the envelopment of Moscow. But was Army Group North strong enough to undertake such ambitious plans? Von Leeb did not think so. Busch agreed with him. Tikhvin would be the new objective.

The FUhrer had personally decided that General Rudolf Schmidtt and XXXIX Corps command, not General Kuno von Both and I Corps, would carry out the operation. Leeb reluctantly assented, and ordered that the staff of I corps switch places with Schmidtt and his staff. The newly arriving 27 ID would join I Corps on the shore. A temporary corps staff would be organized under the chief or Army Group Rear Areas, the elderly General Franz von Roques, to take command of the Spaniards when they came up north of Novgorod.

THE next several days were dominated more by confusion than certainty. Given an offensive launched from the area

around Chudovo, should Tikhvin and the Svir be the sole objective, or would Hitler change his mind again and bolster von Bock by choosing Borovitschi for the major thrust, leaving Tikhvin as a secondary objective? Every day seemed to bring a new plan, calling for new dispositions. On 10 October, Leeb instructed Busch to prepare an order for the offensive. Sixteenth Army issued Order No. 24, envisaging no less than three possible attack plans: one towards Tikhvin, one towards Borovitschi, and a simultaneous advance in both directions. Busch believed that the latter was more likely and instructed II and X Corps to look forward to a double envelopment of Lake Ilmen. They would march on the Valdai from the southwest while von Roques would come down from the northwest, bolstered by motorized troops and anoth6r infantry division borrowed from XXXIX Corps. All would converge on Borovitschi. The remainder of Schmidt's forces would move on Tikhvin. Then, von Both could sweep in on the mouth of the Volkhov.3 Group von Roques was to take over in the Novgorod sector on 11 October, with 250 ID (the Spaniards) concentrated around the Golden City. Schmidt's XXXIX Corps would be the main strike force, comprising 2/3 of 126 ID, 21 ID, 18 ID (mot), 20 ID (mot), 8 PzD (Panzer Division), and 12 PzD.

The Army Order was being implemented when General Friedrich Paulus arrived in Pskov from OKH to discuss objectives with von Leeb. Leeb was worried about the road situation. Schmidt was also unhappy and downright pessimistic about the roads. The terrain east of the Volkhov was marked by broad swamps and deep forests, through which ran a meagre system of trails and dirt roads. He knew that the official OKH maps were unreliable in such cases. Schmidt imagined his armored spearheads poking their way slowly along the paths, all the while harassed by flanking fire from Reds filtering around them, led into tank traps, and often blocked by relatively insignificant enemy forces. An assault across the Volkhov in either direction seemed to be a wrong move. He urged Leeb to press for a full scale attack on the Valdai Hills south of Lake Ilmen. This would have the advantage of reinforcing the Moscow advance by en- dangering Kalinin and, with the Valdai in German hands, Schmidt believed that Russian resistance in the north would

collapse. Leningrad would then fall. Schmidt's plan gathered dust quickly. On the morning of 13 October, Paulus telephoned Pskov from Fuhrer Headquarters to ask if von Leeb believed that one armored, one motorized, and two infantry divisions would be enough to take Tikhvin. The anxious Leeb responded in the affir- mative, especially since there were not enough roads for more.

For weeks, von Leeb had been assured that the Red Army was at the end of its reserves, but intelligence soon indicated that Busch faced far stronger opposition than the Field Marshal had described to Paulus. Six Soviet armies (each equivalent to a German corps) lay opposite his eastern front. Three - 22, 27, and 34 - were south of Lake Ilmen. Another three were north - 52 (Lt. Gen. N. K. Klykov), 4 (Gen. N. D. Yakovlev) and, guarding Volkhovstroi and the Volkhov delta, 54 (Gen. M. S. Khozin, after 24 October, Lt. Gen. I. I. Fediuninski). One more army, 7 Inde- pendent Army (Gen. K. A. Meretskov) patrolled the Svir. The southern group was part of Soviet Northwest Front, Klykov and Yakovlev were directly subordinate to Soviet High Command (Stavka), and Khozin aligned with the Leningrad Front. Len- ingrad Front was planning a de-blocking pincers assault on the German lakeshore salient. Busch did not know this, and it turned out to be pre-empted by his own offensive across the Volkhov.

Altogether, the seven Soviet armies comprised thirty infantry, two cavalry, and three armored divisions. Busch had five corps with fifteen infantry, two motorized, and two armored divisions. But numbers of divisions were misleading. On neither side were they up to strength. The German corps were comprised of units which had been in constant combat since 22 June. Armor and mechanized elements were depleted, and replacement or spare parts inadequate. Effectives were also down, so that infantry divisions were scarcely two-thirds of schedule. Red Army units, however, were also under strength, divisions having fewer effec-

__~--- Leningrad Lake Ladoga

Gulf of Finland

Pavios IM S

H~~~Sbi T\osna/ Novlisino ostovo

l ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0

~ Liuban Vlosovo Vyr'ita

linois University Press, 1979).

OCTOBER 1983 123

tives than German counterparts. Many had been pumped up with half-trained or untrained recruits, but some men were unreliable and defected. However, with their superior number, the Rus- sians were by no means as weak as Hitler believed, and Siberian reinforcements had already begun to arrive. If there was a German advantage, it was evaporating with time, and the Fuhrer still had to make up his mind about the attack objective.

Hitler's decision reached von Leeb on the afternoon of 13 Oc- tober. Tikhvin! The Borovitschi thrust was secondary, and could come only after success seemed assured. Now, after the Fahrer's changes of mind and delays had imperilled any chances he might have for victory and it was already mid-October, Leeb could finally begin. On 14 October, Busch issued Army Order No. 25. "The enemy before Army Group Center is beaten and in large part destroyed.... [One may reckon] with the enemy fading rearward before the front of the south wing of [ 161 Army."4 The plan was clear. As Army Group Center swept through Kalinin on its way to Moscow, Soviet resistance south of Lake Ilmen would collapse and II and X Corps would advance towards the Valdai. Group von Roques, north of Lake Ilmen, would be poised for its move towards Borovitschi, but would await the success of the Tikhvin drive before heading out. I Corps, on the lower Volkhov, would also wait until Operation Tikhvin got under way, and then would open an assault on Fediuninski. There should be no trouble here, since Schmidt and XXXIX Corps would be rolling straight across Fediuninski's supply lines, which led through Tikhvin.

Tikhvin and the Svir were the primary objectives. The assault would begin on 16 October. Von Roques would use the artillery of 250 ID and strong probes out of Novgorod by the Spaniards to feint an attack in his sector, while Schmidt would cross the Volkhov in strength near Chudovo at Kusino and Grusino. Artil- lery and combat engineers of armored and motorized divisions would help get 126 ID and 21 ID across, where they would quickly overcome the enemy and establish two bridgeheads - 126 ID at Kusino and 21 ID to the north at Grusino. The Rhineland- Westphalians of 126 ID (Major General Paul Laux) would get out of the way and prepare either to wheel south to join von Roques near the Msta River or northeast to support Schmidt's push to Tikhvin. The East Prussians of 21 ID would swing north. Without waiting for the bridgeheads to be extended, the two panzer and two motorized divisions would funnel through and strike at once on all available roads for Tikhvin - the Southern Group (8 PzD under Brigadier General Brandenberger and 18 ID [mot] under Maj. Gen. Friedrich Herrlein) going over at Kusino; the North- ern Group (12 PzD under Brig. Gen. Josef Harpe and 20 ID [ mot] at Grusino). In fact, Busch urged Schmidt to get the mechanized units moving through the bridgehead and toward Tikhvin on the first day.

A light frost hung in the air during the early hours of 16 Oc- tober. The sky was almost cloudless as the assault boats

glided heavily across the wide Volkhov. The surprise was total. The Russians did not even realize that the artillery preparation had heralded an attack. The German effort was not only unex- pected; it came against a thinly-manned line, because the Reds had been concentrating on both sides of the Ladoga lakeshore salient for their de-blockading attempt. Moreover, Schmidt had struck precisely at the junction of 52 and 4 armies, directly at 267 RD (Rifle Division) and 288 RD. The engineers quickly moved in from the bank, ruefully observing the white crystals gently settling on the trees. The first snowfall of the Russian winter! By afternoon, the Soviets had recovered and resistance stiffened, but the Germans were able to begin ferrying the armor across under cover of darkness.5

On Friday morning, Busch, who had spent several hours at Schmidt's headquarters keeping close to the action, reported to von Leeb that progress was slow. Not until later that day could

8 PzD get across. Due to marshy bank conditions at Grusino, 12 PzD had to wait for bridging. By that time, 126 ID was meeting bitter resistance as it drove east. Laux was also trying to extend southward somewhat to open a crossing for 250 ID. Meanwhile, the Spaniards were raining artillery shells out of the Novgorod area.6

Schmidt was having trouble with the bridge at Kusino, where Laux was fighting hard to widen his perimeter. Soviet aircraft flew overhead, strafing and dropping bombs. On the third sortie, they damaged a section of the bridge. Repairs took four hours, but then Russian tanks forced their way through the line and blew another section. If was not until Saturday night that the span was open again. The Red Air Force kept on coming, achieving occa- sional air superiority and bravely challenging the advancing Germans, whose 88s were expected to do double duty. These excellent pieces were as important for antitank use as they served for Flak.

The Kusino bridgehead was now about 15 km wide, and 15 km deep, but the Russians were resisting to the last man. All told, the two regiments of 126 ID had already taken 3,211 prisoners as they punched forward. Brandenberger's 8 PzD was also across and rolling. Delayed by mines, the tankers picked up many Ukrain- ian deserters. But it was slower going at the northern crossing, and there was no sign of a pullback of Soviet forces. The defending Russians were less of a problem, however, than getting the equipment across and out of the soggy bank. The ground was not frozen, despite a thin snow cover, and the whole region was marshy and soft.

All of that was nothing compared to the change of weather on 19 October. An intermittent rain turned open ground to swamp, and the narrow dirt roads disappeared completely. Everything be- came mired in a glue-like mud that was soon waist deep. It was the rasputitsa, the Russian season of rain and mud. Bearers had to be used for supply and ammunition, and not even tracked vehicles could make any headway. The maps were worse than Schmidt had feared. They showed a main road for the armor, but the road did not exist.

Late Sunday night, 20 October, Klykov tried to coordinate his forces and ordered a counterattack along the entire front of 52 Army. Cooperating with an assault force of 4 Army, the Soviet general instructed his troops to cut the Germans down as they tried to flee back across the Volkhov. His 306 RD was to "destroy" the enemy, 267 RD to "obliterate," 288 RD to "defend doggedly" and cooperate with Yakovlev's 4 Army. Yakovlev, however, was already in deep trouble.7

Nevertheless, Schmidt and Busch were beginning to be concerned about the slow progress of the entire operation. Terrain and weather difficulties were increasing and, although over 5,000 prisoners had been bagged, not much ground had been gained. von Leeb was still hopeful about reaching Tikhvin easily, and had even requested OKH to divert a panzer group from Army Group Center at Kalinin to help him put Borovitschi in a pincers. And that, while Moscow hung in the balance! OKH turned him down, but, more ominously, Hitler was keeping close watch on devel- opments. The Fuhrer spoke to the Army Group Commander both on Sunday and Monday. He was worried about the mud. Hitler asked Leeb whether the armor had not been launched on a mission from which they might never return. Von Leeb reassured him, and pointed out that Schmidt had finally succeeded in join- ing the Kusino and Grusino bridgeheads.

Monday, 21 October, five days into Operation Tikhvin, was sorely depressing for Army Group North. Laux and Branden- berger were planning to move on the substantial town (18,000 pop.) of Malaya Vishera, but 259 RD had been rushed up from the Valdai to block them, and the mud, waist deep in places, had forced the German tankers to abandon their armor and move on foot. Schmidt lamented that the advance eastward from Grusino


had come upon a line of field positions straddling the Chudovo- Tikhvin road at Oskuje.

The morrow brought still more rain, giving the Red Army respite, but Laux prepared to take Malaya Vishera. He was too weak, however, and Schmidt ordered a reorganization of the sector to allow more punch. Laux now tried an envelopment, which he began Wednesday morning. By evening, most of the town was in German hands. The terrain proved so marshy that some defending Soviet tanks sank up to their turrets in mud. To the north, Harpe's 12 PzD had only got as far as one-third of the way to Tikhvin.

Meanwhile, more and more units arrived to bolster Klykov and Yakovlev. While XXXIX Corps was penetrating two Soviet divisions, the Russians brought in four more through Tikhvin and they mounted strong but fruitless counterattacks. Klykov and Yakovlev changed their tactics and tried infiltrating between the widely spread out German units, interdicting supplies and am- bushing small columns of reinforcements. Schmidt was obliged to shift vitally-needed troops from his spearheads to escort transport elements, further slowing the already glacial advance. In eight days, he had advanced only about 35 kilometers.

The weather and stiff Soviet resistance were beginning to worry the Fihrer. All did not seem to be going as he had planned. On the afternoon of 24 October, Hitler told von Brauchitsch that it might be best to discontinue the entire Tikhvin operation. Brauchitsch succeeded in preventing him from making any such decision but sent out a plea to von Leeb for an evaluation of the road situation and the chances for success. Bolstered by an opinion from Schmidt that the enemy was beaten and the estimate of Busch that 12 PzD might make it to Tikhvin within 24 hours, von Leeb flew to the Wolf's Lair on 26 October for a conference with Hitler.

Their roles were now reversed. A cautious Hitler, worried about terrain and roads during the rasputitsa, asked Leeb once again if he did not agree that the motorized units were not going to get through. Even if they did, they would be in an exposed bridgehead. Knowing that von Brauchitsch agreed with him, the Army Group Commander emphasized the necessity of blocking the Leningrad supply route. They would have to reach Tikhvin, he pleaded, and pointed out that 12 PzD had already passed the halfway mark. The reports of XXXIX Corps indicated that frost was coming, and the marshes would soon freeze solid, enabling a rapid transit to the rail junction. The armor would roll right in. Now, when winter was imminent, was not the time to retreat. "A pullback across the Volkhov," Leeb insisted, "would be equivalent to a defeat.", Hitler allowed himself to be persuaded, for the

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.. ... ..

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Searching for directions in the snow. (From the author's private collection.)

Advancing through the snow. (From the author's private collection.)

moment. In a burst of sudden confidence, he granted his Field Marshal complete freedom of action for the future course of the operation. The burden now fully on his shoulders, the veteran commander flew back to Pskov.9

Von Leeb telephoned Busch at once. The commander of 16 Army was skeptical. He had just returned from the front. The Soviets had defended every house in one little town. They were still capable of resistance. His mission had been to destroy the enemy, as well as to reach Tikhvin and the Svir. Since the Red Army had not been destroyed, a huge Tikhvin bridgehead could probably not be held. Busch greeted von Leeb with the news that the Reds had airlifted three battalions out of Leningrad to shore up the Tikhvin defenses, but tempered this by his estimate that no powerful enemy force lay between Schmidt and his destination. They talked about cancelling the Borovitschi drive, but post- poned a decision in the hope that the freeze would improve things. Busch was still skeptical as the Field Marshal departed.10

Leeb and Schmidt, under increasing pressure, shifted their forces. Since Brandenberger's 8 PzD and Herrlein's 18 (mot) were encountering impassable terrain moving northeast from Malaya Vishera on Tikhvin, they were pulled out completely- all the way back to Chudovo. The two divisions were ordered to recross the Volkhov at Grusino and dash after Harpe's 12 PzD. The latter had been exhausted and was calling for Luftwaffe and infantry support, even for paratroopers. The roads were so bad that the Luftwaffe was air-dropping provisions.

But 12 Panzer was giving the Russians all that it had. In one assault, the Russians lost 400 dead and 350 wounded, to only 30 German casualties. Rushing up, Brandenberger of 8 PzD re- marked that his men were carrying out their supplies on their backs and that replacements for his rifle units were only second grade conscripts with flat feet and other disabilities. Their fallout was averaging 60 percent!

T HUS, by the beginning of November, Operation Tikhvin remained two unequal bridgeheads, based on Kusino and

OCTOBER 1983125 5

Grusino, and connected by a too-narrow corridor on the Volkhov east bank. Schmidt was convinced that he could take Tikhvin with his two armored divisions and one motorized division, but he did want more infantry. The enemy seemed at the end of his rope, throwing in patchwork units, recruits with no training, ground personnel from Leningrad airfields, and everything else he could spare from the metropolis itself. These troops were deserting in flocks. As soon as the hard freeze arrived, XXXIX Corps would roll forward. Identification of new units, including some from the Far East, did not cause him alarm. But his intelligence officers began to sound a note of concern.

As late as 2 November, Harpe and the other division commanders were asked to comment about a possible withdrawal rather than stumbling exhausted into Tikhvin amid evidence that the Soviets were not giving ground as before. Harpe bitterly joined his comrades in rejecting any idea of retreat. The general urged that they go on until, after taking Tikhvin, they could be replaced with infantry. With both Germans and Russians bat- tered and exhausted, further advance seemed possible, but no spectacular progress could be expected. The Borovitschi phase of Operation Tikhvin was cancelled on 5 November.

All eyes now turned towards Tikhvin. Friday, 7 November, was critical. The Russians desperately attacked the corridor con- necting the two bridgeheads, between Malaya Vishera and Grusnio. At Gladi, scarcely a dozen kilometers east of Grusino, a reinforced Soviet regiment was pushing hard. Schmidt had no reserves. Busch had no reserves either and begged von Leeb for anything. With point only seven kilometers from Tikhvin, Schmidt could hardly stop to rescue Gladi. But the Grusino crossing was in danger. The Field Marshal watched tensely as the German lines swayed. Gladi did not fall, and Schmidt drove for the prize. The defenders, led by Yakovlev himself, included the remnants of four divisions, as well as mixed battalions of students, workers, and punishment details. Harpe led 12 PzD, while Herrlein had a reinforced regiment and units of 8 PzD. In tandem, the two punched into Tikhvin late at night on 8 Novem- ber, catching the Russians by surprise. Yakovlev's staff barely escaped at the last moment. The German units cleaned up the city and went over to the defense.

Von Leeb exulted, proclaiming that "the capture of Tikhvin has cut the water route to Leningrad.""1 Fuhrer Headquarters, the desperate struggle behind, now incredibly asked Schmidt whether he could push on, not to the Svir, but east to Vologda - a distance of 400 kilometers in the dead of winter!

XXXIX Corps had taken 20,000 prisoners and captured 96 tanks, 86 artillery pieces, 58 antitanks, 8 antiaircraft, 361 ma- chine guns, and a large quantity of miscellaneous military equipment. The cost had been heavy. The rifle companies of 12 PzD were down to 35 effectives.

But Red resistance did not collapse with the fall of Tikhvin. As 4 Army disintegrated and remnants brushed into his rear, Meretskov, commanding 7 Independent Army on the Svir, be- came deeply concerned. After consultation with Leningrad, Meretskov contacted Stavka and was given temporary command of the remains of 4 Army. Yakovlev was recalled. Meretskov realized that there was no time to delay. The frost had also come for Army Group Center, and von Bock had turned loose his armor. Moscow was in grave danger. Not only to save Len- ingrad but also to retrieve the pressure on the Soviet capital, Stalin needed a prompt attack in the north. He urged Meretskov to move at once. With the Finns quiescent, he released 7 Army reserves to bolster what was left of the retreating forces. A practical military leader who realized that propaganda would not turn the enemy back, Meretskov quickly sent up rations and supplies and began reorganizing the units. He planned an im- mediate counterattack, beginning on 11 November, and managed to assemble four rifle divisions and a tank brigade.'2

On Tuesday, 11 November, Meretskov opened up with everything he had, including hundreds of obsolescent T-26 tanks and some of the new T-34s, against which the Germans had no effec- tive antitank weapons. In fact, the 88mm Flak was the best defense against a T-34. The shock sent Generals Harpe and Herrlein reeling. Most of 8 PzD was now up to Tikhvin, and they were rushed in to stop the advancing Russians. Meretskov kept on coming. Schmidt, given the command of 2 Army as reward for his success, asked von Leeb for permission to stay on a few days during the crisis. The Field Marshal agreed, but neither he nor Busch thought the situation was anything more than a temporary problem. Brauchitsch had criticized Busch for having painted things too darkly when the Soviets threatened to cut the bridgehead in two a few days earlier, and 16 Army's commander was not about to repeat his mistake.

On Saturday, hordes of brand new T-34s overran German field positions. The tanks rolled on until they came within range of the batteries of Artillery Regiment 18. That stopped them. That afternoon, Busch sent von Leeb an optimistic report claiming that, with not much reorganizing, he could reach the Svir, secure Tikhvin, and capture the mouth of the Volkhov as well! Schmidt would have been shocked if he had seen Busch's report. Two days later he was cautiously instructing his divisional commanders to be prepared to pull back supply units rapidly, but without panic, and - above all - to be certain that only a few trusted officers were told in advance.

The Soviets were suddenly hitting everywhere. In the south, against von Chappuis with two divisions, 52 Red Army now had seven rifle divisions. Against XXXIX Corps in the Talzy-Tikhvin sector was 4 Army with four rifle divisions, one armored division, and four other armored units. Opposite von Both's six divisions of I Corps was 54 Army with rifle divisions and parts of an armored brigade. In the face of a new evaluation of this enemy strength, Busch's next report to von Leeb was rather less optimistic. Still, he would not withdraw. While von Chappuis pleaded for re- inforcement, XXXVIII Corps dug in, and refused to disgorge its prize, holding on with a tenacity which even Meretskov admired. Schmidt departed for 2 Army reassured. On 18 November he was replaced by Major General Hans-Jurgen von Arnim.

The character of the fighting changed dramatically for the Germans in the first weeks of November. Attacking, a force could choose where to locate its center of gravity. By constantly moving, the assault could keep the enemy off balance and hurl him back. Neither Germans nor Russians had a continuous line in the mud and morass of the early advance, and this, too, favored the attacker. All changed in November. The temperatures dropped fiercely, beginning the worst winter in 140 years. This happened as the German advance ground to a halt. The Wehr- macht, without winter uniforms, clung to villages and towns, which provided shelter against the cold. The swamps froze, making passable the open terrain between occupied hamlets. Busch had enough men to attack, but not to defend. Now, with Meretskov in command, the Russians seized the initiative, their superiority in numbers mounted constantly, and they could select where to locate the center of gravity of attack, could infiltrate and cut supplies, and could rain shells or mount as- saults on numerous isolated posts and villages. With excellent winter uniforms and with lubricants for their weapons, the Rus- sians could stay out longer in the open than the Germans who were, in any case, far less accustomed to the cold. Little panje ponies carried supplies more predictably than commandeered Balkan remounts used by the Germans. Though short of shells, the Soviets hurled attack after attack and decimated the shiver- ing German defenders of the Tikhvin bulge. Encircled units had no recourse but retreat.

Von Arnim was under no illusions as he saw his men struggling in the frigid weather to stand their ground in what had become an


exposed salient. Von Leeb dejectedly allowed the War Journal to show that "Army Group North has no reserves.... The enemy believes that he can succeed everywhere and all at once.' 2 While Stavka ordered the building of an emergency supply road by- passing Tikhvin through the taiga, Russian reinforcements continued to arrive. Von Leeb received some assistance as well, and tried to squeeze some men out of 18 Army. He added two divisions fresh from France, but they were blooded before they could adapt to the cold and the tactics of Winter war in Russia. Two further divisions from the west were hurried up to assist the defenders of Tikhvin. When the Landser arrived, they found that the Soviets were virtually all around them. The panzer troops were fagged out but grimly fought on. On 19 November, Busch was forced to evacuate Malaya Vishera. Two regiments, savaged by five divisions, limped back to a new line. The Field Marshal knew the odds. He asked von Brauchitsch for still more infantry, but did not expect anything. Von Chappuis was begging for troops, and von Arnim had lost hope. Army Group North began to consider abandoning Tikhvin.

THE end was near. On 24 November, Stavka ordered a full scale effort to cut off the Tikhvin bulge at the Kusino and

Grusino crossings and to annihilate XXXIX Corps. On 30 Novem- ber, Stalin personally telephoned Meretskov and instructed him to attack without delay. Twenty-nine trainloads of Soviet troops rolled towards Tikhvin, now surrounded on three sides.

Meanwhile, the entire German eastern front had reached thye brink of disaster. Rostov, in the south, had fallen to the Red Army, and supply troops had panicked in the retreat. Hitler blamed everyone in sight but himself. Army Group Center was spent at the outskirts of Moscow, and von Bock was at the end of his rope. Von Leeb, the old campaigner, knew it was all over. As Moscow began to breathe again, he concluded that the enemy would probably turn on Leningrad, because the relief of Len- ingrad would be a political as well as military victory. Operation Tikhvin had come full circle.

On 3 December, the Russians opened their battle to destroy XXXIX Corps and eliminate the Tikhvin bulge. Army Chief of Staff Halder offered von Leeb 100 new tanks, but they would have been little use in weather so cold that the turrets could not rotate. While Hitler fumed that he still wanted to link up with the Finns, that he had told von Leeb in October the Operation would fail, von Arnim's outposts fell, one by one. The Field Marshal finally bowed to the inevitable and, on 7 December, ordered the evacu- ation of Tikhvin. There was no point in discussing where to stop the retreat. Only the Volkhov line seemed strong enough to hold.

On 16 December, von Leeb flew into the Wolf's Lair to explain his situation to Adolf Hitler. He was received for breakfast and a two-hour conference. As the Army Group Commander described von Arnim's plight, the Fuhrer broke in to defend his allocation of more tanks at the moment when infantry was needed. Admitting that the armor was inadequate in cold weather, he stressed how useful it could be in defense. Von Leeb must have shaken him, however, since he then asked if the line of the Volkhov could be held. Reassured, he suggested that the Russians would soon try to liberate Leningrad now that the pressure on Moscow had been relieved. Since Army Group Center had evacuated Kalinin, a double tracked railroad was available for Stalin to send reinforcements to the units opposing von Leeb. He promised no new divisions for Army Group North, and von Leeb departed in a somber mood.'4

Army Group North was never again to attempt the broad sweep to the Svir. Indeed, as Busch licked his wounds behind a frozen river that was no barrier, Stalin prepared to strike hard in January 1942 through the weakened German lines -a double envelopment of Lake Ilmen and another thrust straight through

Chudovo. Eighteenth Army would itself be cut off and Leningrad relieved.

Operation Tikhvin was born of Hitler's frequent changes of mind during the 1941 campaign. Having halted Army Group North at the gates of Leningrad, the Fthrer waited too long before reaching a decision on an alternative. By determining upon Tikhvin and the Svir as his objectives, he had to leave von Leeb an armored corps, which was then lost for the operation against Moscow. As before, he spread his forces too thin. Leeb was unwilling at first to strike for the Svir. He and Busch wanted a more limited operation, within their means. Schmidt, too, had great misgivings about rolling tanks through swamp roads and trails. They were all overruled. The High Command assumed that the Russians would collapse in the central front before the juggernaut of Operation Typhoon and, faced with a determined offensive mounted simultaneously in the north, pull back here as well. When intelligence on the eve of the Tikhvin offensive reported the substantial strength of the Soviet forces facing Busch, with no evidence that they might withdraw, Hitler gave the order to begin anyway. But he was not so overconfident that he could not change his mind. More than once, he hesitated and wanted to consider calling off the operation, only to be dissuaded by Leeb. As the battle wore on, Hitler finally committed more infantry divisions piecemeal, after the attacking forces had been bled white, but there were never enough troops to complete the drive. At a crucial point, 10 October, Colonel General Franz Halder, Chief of the General Staff, was injured in an accident. He was incapacitated until 2 November, and was unavailable to provide counterpoise to Hitler's wavering.

Leeb, realizing the importance of Leningrad, then wanted to keep pushing. He and Hitler still shared the hope that Army Group Center would take Moscow, a victory which should lessen Soviet resistance before Army Group North. Could Tikhvin, once reached, have been held? Von Leeb and Busch were convinced that it could, with more infantry. But there was no more infantry, the Russians were getting stronger all the time, and a bypass road was being constructed to skirt the junction. Tikhvin without the Svir was not crucial, and von Arnim could not man the perimeter until Spring, even with two more divisions.

Other factors contributed to the Russian defensive victory, most of them common to more than one sector in the Winter of 1941. Hitler's indecision and intervention in the operation even on the divisional level had an important effect. However, the failure to equip his troops and to plan properly played a major role. The Soviets, on the other hand, had an able general, and a growing manpower superiority notwithstanding the use of untrained recruits and the loss of numerous defectors. The Russian soldiers were winter-hardy men, and their equipment functioned in cold weather. They had superior armor and other weapons. Yet, if the weather had cooperated with the Wehrmacht, these still might not have been enough. Schmidt had clearly outfought Yakovlev.

The north did not seem as important in the Autumn of 1941 as Moscow, but Leningrad uncaptured tied down and devoured besieging forces. The Tikhvin offensive was ambitious because it took place simultaneously with Operation Typhoon, and was not cancelled when the assumptions that produced it were proven wrong. It stumbled on as von Leeb and Hitler exchanged hesi- tancy. When it failed, von Leeb was compelled to stand guard, to watch and wait for the Soviet drive to attempt the relief of the City of the Glorious October. It came in weeks, with the opening of the new year, and almost succeeded. Von Leeb, worn out and pessimistic, retired in January. Hitler ignored Busch and replaced him with von Kuchler.

REFERENCES 1. Walter Chales de Beaulieu, Der Vorstoss der Panzergruppe

4 auf Leningrad - 1941 (Neckargemand: Vowinckel, 1961), 109-127; A. Guillaume, The German-Russian War (London: War

OCTOBER 1983 127

Office, 1956), 15-16; Werner Haupt, Heeresgruppe Nord 1941-1945 (Bad Nauheim: Podzun, 1966), 72-74; FUlhrer Directive No. 21, Case Barbarossa, H. R. Trevor-Roper, ed., Hitler's War Di- rectives 193945 (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1964), 50.

2. Fihrer Directive No. 34 (30 July 1941), No. 34a (12 Aug. 1941), No. 35 (6 Sept. 1941), Trevor-Roper, Directives, 90-98; Alan Clark, Barbarossa: The Russian-German Conflict 1941-45 (New York: William Morrow, 1965), 121-128; Kriegstagebuch der Heeresgruppe Nord [War Journal of Army Group North, here- after cited as KTB Nord], (28-29 Aug., 3-5 Sept. 1941), (Wash- ington: U.S. National Archives Collection of Captured German Documents), Microcopy T311, Roll 53, Frames 7066080-5, 7065244-53; Burkhart Muller-Hillebrand (Gen-Maj.), Der Feld- zug gegen die Sowjet-union im Nordabschnitt der Ostfront 1941-1945, U.S. Army Historical Division, Washington, U.S. National Archives Manuscript MS-P-114a, p. 179. KTB Nord (1 Oct. 1941), T311/53/7065399.

3. KTB Nord (10 Oct. 1941), T311/53/7065435; I Corps, Orders Received, 16 Army Order No. 24 (10 Oct. 1941), T311/40/1199-1210; Army Group North, Draft Order for Tikhvin-Borovitschi Oper- ation (Oct. 1941), T311/51/7064435-42.

4. I Corps, Orders Received, 16 Army Order No. 25 (14 Oct. 1941), T314/40/1224.

5. KTB XXXIX Corps (16 Oct. 1941), T314/025/1253; Gerhart Lohse, Geschichte der rheinisch-westfalischen 126. Infanterie- Division 1640-1945 (Bad Nauheim: Podzun, n.d.), 62; I. I. Fediuninski, Podniatye po trevoge, 2nd ed. Rev. (Moscow: Voen- noe izd-vo min-va Oborony SSR, 1964), 61.

6. Gerald R. Kleinfeld and Lewis A. Tambs, "North to Russia: The Spanish Division in World War II," Military Affairs, 37 (1973), 8-10.

7. 52 Red Army, Klykov Order, Captured Document (20 Oct. 1941), T315/484/636-7.

8. KTB Nord (27 Oct. 1941), T311/53/7065499. 9. Memorandum of von Leeb visit to Hitler and von Brauch-

itsch (29 Oct. 1941), T311/51/7064485-8; KTB Nord (27 Oct. 1941), T311/53/7065496-500.

10. KTB Nord (28 Oct. 1941), T311/53/7065502; KTB 16 Army (28 Oct. 1941), T312/544/8151502; Busch Memorandum (31 Oct. 1941), T311/51/7064251-6.

11. KTB Nord (8 Nov. 1941), T311/54/7066410; XXXIX Corps, Instruction (7 Nov. 1941), T315/696/399; 18 (mot), Order for As- sault on Tikhvin (8 Nov. 1941), T315/696/397; 12 PzD, Order No. 81 (8 Nov. 1941), T315/696/392-4; XXXIX Corps, Situation Map (10 Nov. 1941), T314/928/2607; KTB Nord (9 Nov. 1941), T311/54/7066411.

12. Kiril A. Meretskov, Na sluzhbe narodu (Moscow: Izd-vo polit. lit. -ry, 1970), 236.

13. KTB Nord (12 Nov. 1941), T311/54/7066419; KTB Nord, Situation Evaluations, 22 (26 Nov. 1941), T311/54/7066447.

14. Army Group North, Notes on Hitler-von Leeb Conference (17 Dec. 1941), T311/51/7064677-81.

Gerald R. Kleinfeld has been a Professor of History at Arizona

_ State University since 1962. A graduate of New York Univer- sity, he received his Ph.D. in 1961. He is the co-author of Hit- ler's Spanish Legion: The Blue Division in Russia, and his published articles concentrate chiefly on German military history and post-World War II German-American relations. This article was accepted for publication in June 1982.

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