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Vessel Collision IncidentVessel Collision Incident

Lecturer – Capt Cao jihuiLecturer – Capt Cao jihui Aoxing Ship Management (Shanghai) Ltd Aoxing Ship Management (Shanghai) Ltd

• Incident Date :31st Mar.2010Incident Date :31st Mar.2010• Time: 0540LT / During Chief Officer’s WatchTime: 0540LT / During Chief Officer’s Watch• Vessel A -- Chemical Tanker, Full loaded with Vessel A -- Chemical Tanker, Full loaded with

3000mt Chemical Cargo3000mt Chemical Cargo• Vessel B – Domestic Bulk Carrier in ballast Vessel B – Domestic Bulk Carrier in ballast

condition, with DWT about 1000mt condition, with DWT about 1000mt • Category of incident: Vessel Collision btw “A” Category of incident: Vessel Collision btw “A”

& “B” & “B” • Location: China Costal WatersLocation: China Costal Waters• Visibility was 0.1 miles, wind SE/4Visibility was 0.1 miles, wind SE/4

Description of the IncidentDescription of the Incident

Vessel A, sailed along the fairway with course 11Vessel A, sailed along the fairway with course 110deg and speed 13.2Kts, visibility was 0.1 mile0deg and speed 13.2Kts, visibility was 0.1 miles, wind SE/4;s, wind SE/4;

0505Lt, Chief Officer found vessel B through Rad0505Lt, Chief Officer found vessel B through Radar on her port side 30deg/5miles without AIS, ar on her port side 30deg/5miles without AIS, vessel B sailed southly and vessel C followed vvessel B sailed southly and vessel C followed vessel B with distance 3 milesessel B with distance 3 miles

When the distance between this two ships was aWhen the distance between this two ships was about 2 miles, Chief Officer ordered to alter coubout 2 miles, Chief Officer ordered to alter course to port heading to vessel B, he planned to rse to port heading to vessel B, he planned to pass from the space between vessel B & Cpass from the space between vessel B & C

Description of the Description of the IncidentIncidentWhen distance was less than 1 mile, Chief Officer When distance was less than 1 mile, Chief Officer

observed vessel B altered course to starboard, observed vessel B altered course to starboard, Vessel B did not respond to his sound signal & Vessel B did not respond to his sound signal & VHF calling. he judged it’s dangerous to turn VHF calling. he judged it’s dangerous to turn to starboard, then ordered hard port, Vessel A to starboard, then ordered hard port, Vessel A turned around to come back to the original coturned around to come back to the original course, Vessel B turned course to port at that timurse, Vessel B turned course to port at that time, Chief Officer ordered hard starboard, but ie, Chief Officer ordered hard starboard, but it’s too late, Vessel A starboard bow collided t’s too late, Vessel A starboard bow collided with starboard side of Vessel B at 0540Lt, with with starboard side of Vessel B at 0540Lt, with speed 5 kts.speed 5 kts.

All ships were safe to float, Vessel A anchored imAll ships were safe to float, Vessel A anchored immediately and Vessel B made fast to Vessel Amediately and Vessel B made fast to Vessel A

Sketch for Ship movement :Sketch for Ship movement :

VSL A

VSL B

VSL C

Damage to Vessel A: Starboard Anchor lost;Damage to Vessel A: Starboard Anchor lost; Damage to Vessel B: Starboard shell plate was Damage to Vessel B: Starboard shell plate was dented and become tore, starboard hatch coming dented and become tore, starboard hatch coming disconnected from the ship’s construction. 4m long disconnected from the ship’s construction. 4m long gunwale was collapsed. gunwale was collapsed. No Personnel injured; No environmental pollutionNo Personnel injured; No environmental pollution

Damage to Vessel A

Vessel B

CAUSES ANALYSIS for CAUSES ANALYSIS for Vessel AVessel A1.1. Immediate CauseImmediate Cause Chief Officer took wrong collision prevention Chief Officer took wrong collision prevention

actions.actions. ----- Chief Officer altered course to port for a ----- Chief Officer altered course to port for a

vessel detected forward of the beam in vessel detected forward of the beam in restricted visibility restricted visibility

----- and did not lower down the ship’s speed or ----- and did not lower down the ship’s speed or stop the ship to use safe speed. stop the ship to use safe speed.

----- Even the ship made a turn around, Chief ----- Even the ship made a turn around, Chief Officer did not check the effectiveness of his Officer did not check the effectiveness of his action, the collision was not avoided.action, the collision was not avoided.

Root Cause: Chief Officer was in breach of rule 8 Root Cause: Chief Officer was in breach of rule 8

“action to avoid collision” and rule 19 “conduct “action to avoid collision” and rule 19 “conduct of vessels in restricted visibility” of the COLREGof vessels in restricted visibility” of the COLREG

CAUSES ANALYSIS for CAUSES ANALYSIS for vessel Avessel A2.2. Immediate CauseImmediate Cause Master was not on the bridge at that time.Master was not on the bridge at that time. ---- The visibility sometimes was good and ---- The visibility sometimes was good and

sometime was poor. Master get down the bridge sometime was poor. Master get down the bridge for a short rest when the visibility was goodfor a short rest when the visibility was good

---- The visibility was getting poor, Chief Officer ---- The visibility was getting poor, Chief Officer did not call Master on bridge to because of did not call Master on bridge to because of improper thought, he did thought he’s an senior improper thought, he did thought he’s an senior Officer and he can safely navigate without Officer and he can safely navigate without Master’s supervision and he was afraid to affect Master’s supervision and he was afraid to affect Master’s rest. Master’s rest.

Root Cause: Master & Chief Officer was lack of Root Cause: Master & Chief Officer was lack of

necessary safety awareness and did not follow necessary safety awareness and did not follow the Company’s policy: “SQI-133 the Company’s policy: “SQI-133 Instructions for Safe Navigation in Restricted Visibility”

Other Observations for vessel B:Other Observations for vessel B:

- Vessel B was detained by MSA, and just Vessel B was detained by MSA, and just released from the MSA released from the MSA

- Minimum Safe Manning Certificate required 5 Minimum Safe Manning Certificate required 5 persons on board, but only 4 crew on board at persons on board, but only 4 crew on board at time of collision. No Master on board. time of collision. No Master on board.

- Radar was used at range 1 mile only.Radar was used at range 1 mile only.

- Officer on watch did not keep proper Officer on watch did not keep proper watch on VHF.watch on VHF.

- Officer on watch was lack of knowledge Officer on watch was lack of knowledge who alter course frequently.who alter course frequently.

-----Marine Superintendent boarded this vessel and held a s-----Marine Superintendent boarded this vessel and held a safety meeting on board, discussed this incident togetheafety meeting on board, discussed this incident together with Master & Officersr with Master & Officers

-----The technical operator has promulgated Safety Circular -----The technical operator has promulgated Safety Circular and Lesson Learnt with regard to the collision accident fand Lesson Learnt with regard to the collision accident fleet wide, which emphasized to follow COLREGs & the Cleet wide, which emphasized to follow COLREGs & the Company’s policy ompany’s policy for Safe Navigation in Restricted Visibility strictly and clearly required: strictly and clearly required:

1.1. Officer on watch must call Master on bridge in restricted Officer on watch must call Master on bridge in restricted visibility. visibility.

2.2. To lower ship’s speed or stop the ship as the 1st step fTo lower ship’s speed or stop the ship as the 1st step for collision prevention in limited area and not to alter cor collision prevention in limited area and not to alter course to port for the vessel detected forward of the beaourse to port for the vessel detected forward of the beam m

3.3. Master and Officers need to check the effectiveness of tMaster and Officers need to check the effectiveness of their actions for collision prevention until other vessel is heir actions for collision prevention until other vessel is finally past and clear.finally past and clear.

4.4. Master must call all deck officers to hold safety meeting Master must call all deck officers to hold safety meeting to study the COLREG and improve safety awareness.to study the COLREG and improve safety awareness.

Preventive Actions:Preventive Actions:

Response to the IncidentResponse to the IncidentMaster Reported this incident to the Company Master Reported this incident to the Company

immediately and then reported to MSA nearby, immediately and then reported to MSA nearby, MSA investigator & Marine Superintendent came MSA investigator & Marine Superintendent came on board and investigation was carried out. on board and investigation was carried out.

Under the intermediation of the MSA, two ships Under the intermediation of the MSA, two ships settled down this incident at friendly method, settled down this incident at friendly method, Vessel A paid 35,000RMB to Vessel B. All liability Vessel A paid 35,000RMB to Vessel B. All liability for both vessels are clear to each other.for both vessels are clear to each other.

Vessel A: to install her anchor at next port Vessel A: to install her anchor at next port Vessel B: to go to shipyard for repairs directly.Vessel B: to go to shipyard for repairs directly.

Off-hire of Vessel A: Total 9 hours from 0540 to Off-hire of Vessel A: Total 9 hours from 0540 to 1440 on Mar.31,2010, 1440 on Mar.31,2010,

- END OF REPORT-- END OF REPORT-

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