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Toodifficulttomanage,toobigtoignore:

Partychoiceinmultipartypresidentialsystems*

Very,VeryPreliminaryVersion

CarlosPereira,SamuelPessoa,FredericoBertholiniandHelloanaMedeiros

Abstract:

Inconsensual(proportional)highlyfragmentedmultipartysettings,political

partieshavetwohistoricalchoicestomakeorpathwaystofollow:i)playinga

majoritarianrolebyofferingcrediblecandidatestotheheadoftheexecutive;orii)

playingthemedianlegislatorgame.Eachofthosechoiceswillhaveimportant

consequencesnotonlyforthepartysystembutalsoforthegovernment.The

purposeofthispaperistoinvestigatetheroleplayedbymedianlegislatorparties

oncoalitionmanagementstrategiesofpresidentsinacomparativeperspective.We

analyzeindepththeBraziliancasewherethePartidodoMovimentoDemocrático

Brasileiro(PMDB)hasbasicallyfunctionedasthemedianlegislatorpartyin

Congressbyavoidingtheapprovalofextremepolicies,bothontheleftandonthe

right.BasedonanexpertsurveyinLatinAmerica,webuiltanindexofPmdbismo

andidentifiedthatthereisapositivecorrelationbetweenpartisanfragmentation

andmedianlegislatorparties.Inaddition,weinvestigatetheeffectofhavinga

medianlegislatorpartyinthegoverningcoalition.Wefoundthatitischeaperand

lessdifficultforthegovernmenttomanagethecoalitionhavingthemedian

legislativepartyonboard.*Thispreliminarypaperwaspreparedtobepresentedattheworkshop“InstitutionalDeterminants

ofLegislativeCoalitionManagement”thatwilltakeplaceinTelAviv,Israel,onNovember16-19.We

aregratefultoFGVappliedresearchprogramforfundingthisproject.WethankNataliaRezendefor

researchassistance.

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1)Introduction:

Coalitionalpresidentialismhasbecomeincreasinglycommoninthe

democraticworld:itisnowthemodalformofdemocraticgovernanceinLatin

America,andanalogousregimesexistinAfrica,Asia,andpost-communistEuropeas

well.Itisalreadyknownthatitisverycostlytogovernamultipartypresidential

coalitionwithtoomanyparties,ideologicallyheterogeneous,andwithoutsharing

proportionalpowerwiththem(Pereira,BerthiliniandRaile2015).

However,therole-playedbytheorganizationalprofileandstructureof

politicalpartiestothemanagementofapresidentialcoalitionhasbeenunder

investigated.Infact,theimpactofthepartychoice(playingamajoritarianversusa

medianlegislatorgame)oncoalitionmanagementofmultipartypresidential

regimeshasbeenundertheorized.Inthecomparativeliteratureandintheexisting

theoreticalmodels,coalitionalpresidentialismoccupiesavaguespacebetween

classicworksonU.S.presidentialism(whereone-partisangovernmentsarethe

norm)andonEuropeanparliamentarism(inwhichmultipartycabinetsareroutine,

butinwhichisthereisnodirectlyelectedexecutiveandthefunctioningof

governmentsisdistinctfrommultipartypresidentialism).

Doesithelporharm,forinstance,thepresident’scoalitiontorelyonthe

supportofalargepartner,whichhasampledistributioninthenationalterritoryof

thecountry,bygoverningseveralmunicipalitiesandmanystatesandbyholdinga

substantialnumberofseatsinCongress?Atthesametime,thispoliticalallyhas

beenideologicallyamorphous,withoutaclear-cutpoliticalagendaorplatform,has

playedtheroleofthemedianlegislator,andhasbeenfulfilledbymanyregional

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leaderstryingtomaximizetheirownpoliticalinterestsandsurvival.Ontheone

hand,havingapartylikethisonboardmayhelpthepresidenttoachievea

confortablemajorityinCongress.Ontheotherhand,itcanmakethepresident

politicallyvulnerablebyfacingpotentialholdupproblemsandincreasing

difficultiesofgoverning.

InBrazil,forinstance,thecentristPartidodoMovimentoDemocrático

Brasileiro(PMDB)isthelargestpoliticalpartyinthecountryandhasparticipatedin

aboutallgoverningcoalitionregardlessoftheideologicalorientationofthe

government.ThePMDBhasbasicallyfunctionedasthemedianvoterpartyin

Congressbyavoidingtheapprovalofextremepolicies,bothontheleftandonthe

right.Nevertheless,therearegrowingconcernsthatgoverningwithanallylikethe

PMDBhasgeneratedpredatorypoliciesandrentseekingbehaviors.

Mainwaringetal(2015)arguethatBrazilhasanespecialcombinationan

exceptionallyfragmentedpartysystemincongressandaconsistentdominanceof

thesametwopartiesovermany(six)presidentialelections.Theyclaimthatthis

specificcombination“isuniqueinthehistoryofpresidentialdemocracies.Inother

presidentialdemocracieswithhighlyfragmentedcongressionalpartysystems,no

setoftwopartieshasconsistentlydominatedpresidentialelections(…)The

differencesinthepartysystemacrosstheselevelsaresogreatthatitmakessenseto

distinguishbetweenthepresidentialandthecongressionalpartysystemsinBrazil.”

Thepurposeofthispaperistoinvestigatetheroleplayedbypartieslikethe

PMDBoncoalitionmanagementstrategiesofpresidentsinacomparative

perspective.Particularly,weaimatanalyzingtheconsequencesofhavingcoalition

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alliessimilartothePMDBonboard.Towhatextenttheexistenceofapoliticalparty,

withthecharacteristicsofthePMDB,isparticularfeatureoftheBrazilianpolitical

systemoritisacommonfeatureofothermultipartypresidentialregimes?Ifitisso,

isiteasierforthepresidenttomanageamajoritycoalitionwithafull-sizepartisan

allyorwithamyriadofsmallparties?Andhowabouttheideologicaldistanceof

thosecoalitionpartners?

Wearealsoconcernedinthispaperwiththedegreeofdifficultyapresident

facesifthegoverningcoalitionwouldhavetorelyonthesupportofamedian

legislatorpartyinordertogovern.Precisely,weaimatanalyzingtheeffectofthe

sizeofthemedianlegislatoronthecostanddifficultofgoverning.Ontheonehand,

trustingonthesupportofthemedianlegislatorcouldgenerateaconfortable

majorityfortheexecutive.Ontheotherhand,thepresidentcouldfaceholdup

problems.Sincetheliteratureisnotconclusiveabouttheeffectofpartysizein

coalitioncostsandnoformalmodelwasabletorespondsuchquestionin

generalizedterms,wewillseektoprovideanempiricalanswerfortheBrazilian

case.

Thepaperisorganizedasfollows.Inthenextsessionwedevelopourtheory

arguingthatpoliticalpartiesinconsensualmultipartypresidentialregimeshave

twostrategicchoicestomake.Consensualsystemsarecharacterizedbyavarietyof

institutionalizedpoliticalpolesthatdividethepoliticalauthoritywithinthesystem,

thusgivingroomfortheemergenceoftwodifferentgamesthatpartieshaveto

choose:themajoritarianandthemedianlegislatorgame.Thefirstpartofthe

theoreticaldevelopmentsaccountsforthedifferencesbetweenthosetwogames,

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thusexplainingtheirfunctioningandspecificcharacteristics.Thesecondpart

accountsforthehistoricalconstraintsthatchoosingaspecifictrackmightimpose

onpoliticalparties,andthecostsandbenefitstheymightachieveiftheydecideto

switchtheirpoliticalstrategy.

Thehistoricalchoicespartiesmakeinthepastshapetheircontextual

environmentinthepresentandtheirprospectiveaspirationsforplayingeitherthe

majoritarianorthemedianlegislatorgame.Therefore,analyzingtheroleofPMDB

asthemedianlegislatorofrecentgovernmentsinBrazil,itiscrucialtounderstand

thehistoricaldevelopmentofthepartyinordertofullycomprehendhowtheparty’s

decisionsandtheirresultshaveshapeditspoliticalnature.Thusweprovidethis

historicalbackgroundhighlightingtheparty’searlydevelopmentinmilitaryregime

asamajoritarianplayeranditsswitchtothemedianlegislatorgameinrecentyears.

Thethirdsessionofthispaperanswersthefollowingquestion:isthePMDBa

particularitytoBrazilianpoliticalsystem?Weinvestigatethisempiricalquestionby

investigatingtheextenttowhichotherpartiesinLatinAmericanmultiparty

presidentialsystemsbearparticularsimilaritiesweidentifywiththePMDB,

featuresthatwehypothesizedthatalsocharacterizesmedianlegislatorplayersin

general.Wefoundthatmedianlegislatorparties’characteristicsaremorelikelyto

occurinfragmentedpartysystems,thusprovidingevidencefortheSartorian

theoreticalclaimthatinsystemswithcentrifugaltendenciesthecenterprovidesa

comfortzoneforpartymembersandgovernmentsinmultipartysystems.

Thelastsectionofthepaperprovidesempiricalevidenceforthecostsand

difficultiesthatgovernmentsfacewhileformingtheircoalitionwithmedian

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legislatorparties.Isitcheaperormoreexpensivetogovernwithmedianlegislators?

Wefoundthatalthoughmedianlegislatorpartiesreceivethebiggestshareof

governmentperks,therelativecostofaseatforthegovernmentissmallerthanthe

relativecostofsmallerparties.Inconclusion,weclaimthatthoughinfragmented

systemsthecentertendenciesbecomeamoresecurepointforpartiespositioning,

thusenhancingtheprobabilityofmedianlegislatorpartiestoemerge;the

underpaymentofitsmembersmightprovideincentivesfordispersion.A

preliminaryexplanationforsuchcontradictoryresultsisthuspresented.

2)Theory

Thegreatmajorityofthecomparativeliteratureonpoliticalpartieshasbeen

intellectuallyrootedinthehistoricallegacyofparliamentaryregimesintheWestern

Europe(Janda1993).Itbecameacommonwisdomtheideathatstrongand

institutionalizedpoliticalpartiesaresynonymofparliamentaryregimeandthatthe

studyofparliamentarypartiesisthestudyofpoliticalparties.SamuelsandShugart

(2010:7)arguethatthe“startingpointformuchresearchisnotinstitutional

structurebutrathersocialstructure,focusingonhowcultureandeconomic

cleavagestranslateintopartiesandpartySystem.”

However,itispossibletoidentifyasubstantialnumberofscholarsthatalso

haveextensivelyexploredpartypoliticsinpresidentialregimes:partysystemand

structure(CoxandShugart1995);partystrategicvotingandcoordination(Cox

1997;Ames1995);partyrepresentation(Samuels2000;MainwaringandShugart

1997;BarryAmes1994;Crisp1997);howpoliticalpartiesareaffectedbydifferent

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electoralsystems(Durverger1954;CareyandShugart1995);andonthe

relationshipbetweenseparationofpowerssystemandpoliticalpartiesthemselves

inthesensethatpresidentialconstitutionsencouragethedevelopmentof

presidentializedparties,whicharecharacterizedbythecombinationofweakand

nationalizedparties(SamuelsandShugart2010).

Nonethelesstheliteraturesofarhasignoredtheroleplayedbythe

majoritarianandconsensualcomponentsofapoliticalsystemonthepoliticalchoice

partiesmaketoplaythemedianlegislatorgame.Inthefollowingsectionweaimat

analyzingthetheoreticalspecificitiesthatmultipartypresidentialismimposeonthe

coalitionformationprocess,formulatinganinnovativetheorythathighlightsthe

problemsthatpartiesfacebothinthemajoritarianandintheproportionalsettings.

2.1)Dividedauthorityinmultipartypresidentialsystems:majoritarianandmedian

legislatorgames

Inamajoritarianinstitutionalsetting(singlememberpastthepost),ifthere

weretwopoliticalparties,themedianvotertheory,proposedbyAnthonyDowns,

predictsthatthosepartieswouldtendtowardtothecenteroftheideological

spectrumproducingcentristpoliticalpreferencesandpolicyresults.1Thatis,there

wouldhaveendogenoussurvivalincentivesinthemajoritarianelectoralsystemto

pushpartiestowardthepositionofthemedianvoterinordertowintheelection.A

partythatdoesmovetothemediancanalwaysdefeatthepartythatfailsto

1Onasingle-issuedimensionifitisassumedtatthepreferencesofvotersaresingle-picked,the

positionofthemedianvoteristheonlypolicythatispreferredtoallothersbyamajorityofvoters.

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convergenearlytothemedian.Thekeystageforthemajoritarianenvironmentis

thereforetheelectoralcompetition.

Onceelected,thesingle-partymajoritythatwasabletobetterlocateitselfat

themedianpreferencewouldformanidentifiableandresponsiblegovernmentthat

wouldbeessentiallyunconstrainedbyotherpartiesinthepolicymakingprocess.

Thatis,thewinnerpartywillsubsequentlydominatethepolicymakingprocessand

implementthepromisedpolicyplatformconsistenttothemedianvoterpreferences.

Theremainingpolicymakingroomfortheoppositioninthismajoritariangameis

minorandassuchtherewouldbeasmallchanceofpartisancooperationwiththe

government.

Revisitingthedownsianparadigm,Sartori(1976)stressesthatwhilethe

medianvotertheoremcanworkconsiderablywellforexplainingthefunctioningof

partysystemscomposedoffourpartiesorless,forsomemultipartysystems(with

morethanfiverelevantparties)Downs’theoreticalframeworkcannotprovidea

reliableexplanation.WhatSartoriearlyperceivedisthatDowns’theoryassumesa

centripetalforcedrivingparties’electoralcompetitionthatisabsentinsome

multipartysystems.Therefore,asanelectoralsystemthatpermitsmultipartism,

proportionalrepresentationcanchangethewaythecompetitivesystemsoperates,

affectingthestrategiesandfunctioningofpoliticalparties(Sartori,1976).

ProportionalRepresentationelectoralsystemsmightalsobeexpectedto

producecentristresultsifmorecentristpartieshavebetterbargainingpositions

thanmoreextremistparties,hencearemorelikelytogetintoandhaveinfluenceon

government(seeCox1997;HuberandPowell1994).Nevertheless,itisalso

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reasonabletoexpectthatinproportionalsystemspartiesdonotcompetewitheach

otheralongsideacontinuousideologicalspectrum.BecausethePRelectoralsystem

permitsamoreinclusiverepresentationoftheelectorates’diversity,partiescan

maximizetheirutilitybyfocusingonsubgroupsofvotersconsistentwiththeir

preferences.Therefore,thecompetitioninaPRsystemisdiscontinuousinthesense

thatitprovidesamaximizationareathatislimitedtotheparties’closest

competitors.

Therefore,thestrategiesandprofilepoliticalpartiesdecidetofollowandthe

partypoliticstheychoosetoimplementdifferunderdistinctinstitutional

environments.Someparties,forinstance,mayhistoricallyprioritizetofocustheir

actionsonexecutivepositionsandtoplayaprotagonistrolepursuingtheirpolicy

platformsandpoliticalagendas.Otherparties,however,mayprefertoadjusttheir

politicalambitionsbyplayingasupportingroleforthegovernmentinthelegislative

branchtryingtopositionitselfasthemedianlegislatorofthegoverningcoalition.

Weclaimthat,inamajoritariansystem,politicalpartieshavenochoiceother

thanplayingamedianvotergame.Thatis,themedianvoterstrategyandbehavior

ofpoliticalpartiesisendogenousinawinnertakesallsystemandbecomesthe

protagoniststrategyifthepartyambitiousistowintheelection.Ifsomeposition

otherthanthemedianisadopted,thanaminorityhasprevailedoveramajority.

Inaproportionalrepresentationsystem,however,partiesdohavedifferent

choicestomake.Theymayeitherplaythemajoritariangameorthemedian

legislatorgame.Therefore,inmultipartypresidentialsystemswehavetwo

dimensionsforparties(andvoteralike)tocompete:amajoritydimension,

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representedintheraceforthepresidency;andaproportionaldimensionofthe

competitivegame,inwhichpartieshavetomaximizetheirvotesinordertoobtaina

relevantnumberofseatsinsidetheCongress(StromandNyblade2007).Although

scholarshaveassumedthatvotersandpartypreferenceswouldnaturallyalignin

bothdimensions,thereisnoclearreasonforsuchalignmentinpresidential

multipartysystems.

Whileinthepresidentialracethemajoritarianrulesselectasinglemedian

voterpreference,inthelegislativeracetheproportionalrepresentationrulesselect

severaldifferentsub-medianpreferencesthatdifferentpartieswilltrytomaximize.

Itsismisleadingthereforetoassumethatinproportionalrepresentationapartyon

theleftisdirectlycompetingwithapartyontherightforvoter’spreferences.Onthe

contrary,differentpartiesontheleftarecompetingwitheachothertowinthe

representationofthisspecificsubgroup.Dependingonthedominanceand

centrality(Roozendaal1990;Jelnov2014,StomandNayblade2007)ofeachparty

aftertheelection,theywilltrytolocatethemselvesforthemedianlegislative

positionbetweenthegovernment’smajoritarianpreferenceandtheCongress’s

preference.Itisexpectedthatthepartythatsuccessfullymanagestooccupythe

medianlegislativepositionwillnotbeboundedbystrongcommitmentsinorderto

flexiblytonegotiatewithwhoeverwonthepresidentialelection,andlocateasthe

medianlegislatorinafragmentedenvironment.

Whereasplayingthemajoritariangamemeanstoperformtheroleof

protagonistintheexecutivebranch,themedianlegislatorgamerepresentsto

performthe‘supportingactor’roleinthelegislativebranch.Weassumethatthe

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preferenceoftheelectorateisdistributedoverthosetwodimensions.Thus,while

voterscanhavesimilardistributionofpreferencesfortheexecutiveandforthe

legislative,especiallyinsystemswherethepartyidentificationwiththeelectorateis

weak,theremightbeincentivesfordisconnectionofvoters’preferencesbetween

theexecutiveandCongress.Itmeansthatthesamepartystrategycanbeawinnerin

theproportionalgameand,atthesametime,alooserstrategyforthemajoritarian

race,andvice-versa.Inotherwords,inmultipartypresidentialregimes,themedian

preferenceofthepresident’spartycouldbeverydistinctfromthemedian

preferenceinCongress,configuringthustheequivalentofadividedgovernmentina

classicpresidentialpluralitysystem,inwhichapartywouldholdthepresidencyand

itsoppositionwouldholdthemajorityinCongress.

Playing themajoritarian gamemeansmore than just a party presenting a

competitivecandidateforthepresidency.Itmeansthatapartyiswillingtopresent

aconsistentpolicyportfolioforvotersandwilingtomanageitsintrapartyconflicts,

coordinating cohesively over a single candidate’s platform in order to plausibly

competeforthenationalmedianvoterpreferences.Ontheotherhand, toplaythe

medianlegislatorgame,apartymustbeabletogatherenoughseatsfromasingleor

severaldiscontinuousmedianvoters, spreadoverdistinctelectoraldistrictsand–

once in office – to coordinate cohesively towards the center of the executive-

legislative distribution of preferences. Therefore, the nature of both competition

structures becomes inherently different, engendering almost contradictory

demands forpartyorganizationand linkages insideeither themajoritarianor the

medianlegislatorgame.

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Itisimportanttobearinmindthatthepartychoiceforeitherthe

majoritarianormedianlegislatorgameishistoricallycontextualized,basedonthe

incentivesandconstraintsgeneratedbypastelectoralperformancesaswellason

payoffsobtainedbyeachparticularstrategy.

Furthermore,bothmajoritarianandmedianlegislatorstrategiesengender

costsandbenefits.Underthemajoritariangame,forinstance,partiesmightachieve

ahigherpayoffbyoccupyingthepresidency(SeeFigure1).Thisisparticularlytrue

inpoliticalenvironmentsinwhichpresidentsareconstitutionallypowerfuland

enjoygreatdiscretiononbudgetarypoliciesandotherpoliticalandbureaucratic

resources.Thus,oncesuccessisachievedinthepresidentialelection,itisverylikely

thatthispartywillkeepplayingthemajoritariangameaimingataccumulatingthe

highestpayoffgeneratedinthepoliticalsystem.

Figure1here

However,incaseoflosingthepresidentialelection,majoritarianpartieshave

tobereadytobearthecostsofplayingtheoppositiongameforawhile.Itmeansto

getpoorerandpowerlessbythetimethepartyplaystheoppositiongamebecause

thegreatmajorityofpoliticalandfinancialrentsgeneratedbythepoliticalmarket

willbemostlyallocatedtothewinnerandtoitsfaithfulpoliticalalliesinCongress.

Evengettingpoliticalandfinancialpoorer,losers,especiallysecondrunnersinclose

elections,mightprefertokeepplayingthemajoritariangameasoppositionifthey

believetheyhaverealchancesandcrediblecandidatestobecomewinnersinthe

nextelection.Theyalsomayconsideradjustingtheirambitionandplayingthe

medianlegislatorgame,especiallyiftheyhadapoorperformanceinthe

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presidentialelection.Inthatcase,theywillprobablytrytoplaywhatwecallthe

“embarrassedmedian”legislatorgame.Insuchcondition,theembarrassedmedian

willprobablyenjoyalessadvantageouspayoffintheshortrunthanifitwouldhad

playedthemedianlegislatorsincethebeginningratherthantooktheriskofplaying

themajoritarianrace.

Inadditiontothecostsassociatedtolosingapresidentialelection,parties

havealsototakeintoaccountthatchoosingtoparticipateinpresidentialraces

engendersinternalcoordinationcostsofdealingwithpartisanfactions,which

sometimesmightbeextremelycontroversialandcompetitive.Someofthose

factionsmaygetverydisappointedanddecidetoleavethepartyandtrytobettheir

ownchancesofbuildinganewparty,forinstance.

Positioningatthemedianlegislatorisnotcostlesseither.Themedianparty,

almostbydefinition,givesuptheprotagonistroleofthepresidencyina

proportionalrepresentationsystemandthegreatmajorityofthepoliticaland

financialbenefitsthatthistoppositionoffersandconcentrates.Ontheotherhand,

themedianpartycouldbeabletoextractsomerentscontrolledbytheexecutivein

exchangeforthemedianlegislatorpoliticalsupportinCongressintypicalporkfor

policygame(AlstonandMueller2006).Themedianlegislatorwouldbethe

equivalentofa“comfortzone”,achievinganintermediatepayoffbetweenthe

majoritarianwinnerandthemajoritarianloser.

PereiraandRenno(2013:76)claimsthatrunningforreelectionandplaying

themedianlegislatorgameisthesafestbetstrategybecausetheprobabilityof

winningishigherforthosewhoattemptreelectionthanforthoserunningforany

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otheroffice.Thekeyfortheelectoralsuccessoflegislatorsistohaveaccesstorents

controlledbytheexecutive.Thatis,playingthemedianlegislatorgameina

multipartypresidentialregimemaynotgeneratethehighestpayoff,butitwould

provideenoughresourcestosurviveandtokeepplayingthepoliticalgamewhile

waitingforawindowofopportunitytoswitchforthemorerewarding,though

riskier,majoritariantrack.

2.2)TheCostsofSwitchingPoliticalTracks

Themajoritarianandthemedianlegislatorstrategicchoicesfunctionas

pathwaysortracksforpoliticalparties,whichdefinetheirspecificnature.Oncea

politicaltrackischosenandconsistentlyplayed,bothpartymembersandvoters

relyonthispathforfurtherinformationandpositioning.Nevertheless,choosinga

particulartrackcannotbeunderstoodasastraitjacket.Thatis,onceapartytakesa

particulartrackitcanchangeforadifferentone.However,changingpoliticaltracks

generatescostsofallsorts.Forinstance,apartythatonceplayedthemedian

legislatorroleanddecidedtochangethestrategytoplaythemajoritariangamewill

havetobeartheriskoflosingthemajoritarianelectionandgetasmallerpayoffthan

themedianlegislatorstrategyusedtoprovide.Similarly,ifapartyplayedthe

majoritariantrackandfaileditmayswitchtrackandstartplayingthemedian

legislatorgame.But,dependingonhowbitterandcompetitivethepresidential

campaignwas,itmighttakealongtimeforthemajoritarianlosertobuildbridgesof

cooperationwiththemajoritarianwinner.

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Itisimportanttobearinmindthatthosecostsarenotthesameforall

partiesthough.Thecostsarealsoaffectedbytheprobabilityofbeatingthe

incumbentexecutive.Thehigherthethreattheformermedianlegislatorpartyposes

totheincumbentexecutive,thehighertheprobabilityofchangingthepoliticaltrack.

Inotherwords,ifapartyevaluatesthatitschanceofwinningtheelectionishigh,

thispartymaydecidetotaketherisk,consideringex-anteuncertaintyofplayingthe

majoritariangame.

However,ifthispartyrevealsitselfastrongcontenderanddoesperformwell

intheelectionbutnotenoughtobethewinner,therewouldprobablyhaveapointof

noreturnforthispartyinthemajoritariangame.Howcomeasecondrunnerupora

close3rdplaceinamajoritarianracewouldimmediatelyjointhewinningcoalition,

gatheringforceswiththeonesthattheyvociferouslydebatedduringthecampaign?

Itturnsoutthatifapartyposesacrediblethreattotheincumbent,anddecidesto

playthemajoritariangame,thereputationalcostofchangingtrackbacktothe

medianlegislatorbecomeunbearable.

Anotheraspectisthesizeofthepartyanditspositionontheideological

spectrum.Thepartythathasconsistentlyenjoyedalargeportionofseatsin

Congressisapotentialtrackswitcherbecauseitcanposeacontinuouscredible

threattotheincumbent,aslongasitspositioninthepoliticalspectrumcansupport

atrackswitch.Therefore,thesizeoftheparty,notonlyintermsofthenumberof

seatsinCongressbutalsoconcerningthenumberofgubernatorialandmayoral

positionsitholdsinthenationalterritory,seemstobeanecessaryconditionfor

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trackchanging.Itmaysignalareliablemeasureoftheparty’sautonomoussurvival

inthecaseitdecidestochallengetheincumbent.

Usuallyaforgottenaspectofpathdependence,theorganizationalstructure

ofpartiescanalsoaffecttheirabilitytoperformasuccessfulswitch.Asbefore

mentioned,themajoritarianandthemedianlegislatorgamescreateopposing

pressuresoveraparty’sorganizationstructure,requiringdifferentspecificrules

androutinizedpatternsoffunctioning.Thuswecanexpectthatthemoreaparty

choosestoplaysuccessivelyasinglegame,themoreitlosesitscapacitytoswitch

fromit.Therefore,althoughitcanextracthighersuccessrates,astronglyrooted

organizationstructure,veryspecializedinasinglestrategicgame,isalsohighly

vulnerabletodrasticchangesintheenvironment,sinceitsorganizational

specializationwouldmakeitlesslikelytoquicklychangeandadaptits

organizationalformat.

Thedegreeofpartisanfragmentationisanothercomponentforthepartisan

strategytofollowamedianlegislatortrack.Itisreasonabletoexpectthatthe

greaterthefragmentationofthepartysystemthehighertheincentivesforaparty

toplaythemedianlegislatorrole.

Additionally,asSartori(1976)haspointedout,fragmentedsystems-with

morethanfiveparties-engendera“competitivepatternthatisnolonger

centripetalbutcentrifugal”.Forhim,thecrucialelementisthatthecenterofthe

distributionbecomesaveryappealingpositioninwhichpartiesandvotersalike

compete,strugglingforexpansionandcontroloverpolicies.

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AlthoughSartorihasinsightfullyhighlightedthecentrifugalforcesthatdrive

multipartysystems,hehasmistakenlyattributedthistendencytothepresenceof

extremistsandanti-systemicparties.However,thiscomponentcannotexplain,for

instance,theclearexistenceofhyper-fragmentationtendenciesinmultiparty

presidentialregimes,liketheBrazilianpartysystem.

We,otherwisearguethatitisthepresenceofaninstitutionalenvironmentthat

consistentlyunder-rewardsthemedianlegislatorthatcouldberesponsibleforthe

centrifugalforcesthatgeneratesanincentive-structureforpartisanfragmentation.

Thatis,becausesmallpartiestendtobeover-rewardedbytheexecutive,fewparties

wouldhaveincentivestoplaythemedianlegislatorgamegiventhatthepresident

doesnottakeintoaccountthepoliticalpowerandinfluenceofmedianlegislatorparty

intheprocessofallocatingpoliticalandfinancialresourcestopoliticalallies.

Thiscreatesaparadoxicalsituationinwhichtheneedofamedianvoter

legislatorpartyisenhancedinfragmentedpoliticalsystems.Atthesametime,its’

relativelylowerextractionofrentspushesthedispersionevenfurther,byprizing

smallpoliticalcoalitionallies.Managingavarietyofsmallpartiesinthecoalition

mightgeneratesfurthercoordinationproblemsandincreasethecostsofgoverning

forthepresident.Moreover,becausethemedianlegislatorpartyisalargepartythat

positionitselfinthecenterofthepreferencedistribution,itcaneffectivelyswitchits

strategyinthefollowingelections,challengingtheincumbentinthemajoritarian

game.Therefore,thepresident’spartyhasincentivestoprotectitselffromfuture

threatsrepresentedbythemedianlegislatorparty,rewardingitrelativelyfewer

resourcesthantherestofcoalitionpartners.

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WhoisthisanimalcalledPMDB?

ShorthistoryofPMDB

Brazilianpoliticalinstitutionsareacomplexmixofconsensualrulesthatseek

toenhancerepresentativenessandmajoritarianrulesthatpursuegovernabilityand

accountabilityatsomeexpensetofairnessandrepresentation(Lijphart1999;

Powell2000).Electoralinstitutions,forexample,allowfortherepresentationof

diverseinterestsinthepoliticalgame,butareoftenblamedforencouraginglevels

offragmentationanddecentralizationthatcancomplicatethepolicy-making

process(Ames1995a,1995b).The1988Constitutionmaintainedseveralfeatures

fromtheearlierdemocraticperiod,suchasaPresident;proportionalrepresentation

(PR);anopenlistforthelegislativeelectoralsystem;afragmentedpartysystem;

federalism;andanindependentjudiciary.

Duringthe21yearsofmilitaryregime(1964-1985),however,thepolitical

processwasinsteadverymuchcentralized.Afterbeingunexpectedlydefeatedin

fivestatesinthegubernatorialelectionof1965,themilitarygovernmentdecidedto

extinguishthemultipartysystemandimpose,viatheunilateralact#2,thecreation

ofatwo-partysystem,withapoliticalparty,AliançaRenocadoraNacional(ARENA),

aggregatingthepoliticalinterestsofthegovernmentandtheasecondpolitical

party,MovimentoDemocráticoBrasileiro(MDB),representingtheopposition.

Althoughtheelectoralcompetitionwassomehowrestrictedunderthe

military,theMDBcontinuedtoplaytheelectoralgame,sinceitcouldbeevenworse

iftheydecidedtoabandonachannelfortheofficialopposition.Second,theparty

believedthat,whileelectionswereheld,itwaspossibletoovercomethemilitary

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dictatorshipbyerodingitspopularsupport–whichinfactprovedtobeasuccessful,

thoughprotracted,strategy.

WhiletheMDBdidnothaverealpowerinCongressintheearlyyearsof

militarydictatorship,andthusboycottedtheindirectpresidentialelections,inthe

late1970stheMDBbeganmobilizingnationalsupportandwasabletoelect(still

indirectly)thefirstcivilianpresidentin1984.Theyearof1974isconsideredthe

turningpointofMDB’shistoryfromaminorityoppositiontothemajorpartyinthe

house.Inadditiontothemorecombativelinethatopenedspaceforcommunity

leaders,otherfactorscontributedsignificantlytothegrowthofMDB:theoilcrisis

causedbytheendoftheeconomicmiracleandthecollapseofthearmedstruggle.

TheMDBdefinitelyassumedtheroleoffosteringpopulardissatisfactionatalllevels.

Itbecomesanoppositionfront.ThehelmsmaninthistornwasthedeputyUlysses

Guimarães.TheAuthenticGroupMDB,whichwasalreadymaturingtheideainthe

early70s,decidedtolaunchUlyssesasan“anti-candidate”inthepassageof

GarrastazuMedicigovernmenttoErnestoGeisel’s.Inhisanti-campaign,Ulysses

runsthecountry'scapitalspreachingopposition’sideas.

Despitethefactofaproportionalrepresentationsystem,theinstitutional

bipartisansettingimposedbytheauthoritarianregimerenegadedtothejust-born

MDBalong-termroleinthemajoritarianoppositiongame.Asanoppositiontothe

establishedregime,theMDBmanagedtocoordinateverydifferentfactions(from

socialistsandcommuniststoconservativeformersupportersofthemilitarycoup)

andtocreatestrongboundswiththelocalelitesandconstituencies,whichgavethe

20

partyacompetitiveadvantagewhenthemilitarypowererodedandtheprocessof

liberalizationbecamenon-reversible.

Asaconsequenceofastagnatedeconomyandamoreaggressivepolitical

campaign,intheBrazilian1974electionstheMDBtookalmostenoughseatstogain

amajority.TheMDBusedthecampaignstogaintheattentionoftheglobalmedia,

anddenouncethe"democratic"facadeoftheBraziliandictatorshipandMDBbegan

toscorelegislativegains.Moreover,inthe1974electiontheMDBwasabletoraise

issuesofsocialjusticeandcivilliberties.

MDB’spoliticalorganizationwascharacterizedsinceitsearlyphasebytwo

veryimportantcharacteristics.First,thenecessitytoexpandsupportforthe

oppositionalmovementledthepartytodevelopatop-downorganizational

structure,whichprovidedlocalandregionalpoliticalpenetration.BecauseMDBwas

createdbylegislatorsalreadyestablishedinCongressforcedtotheoppositionby

themilitarycoup,thepartyhadtodevelopconnectionswithregionalandlocal

politicalelitesinordertoopenandsustainsub-nationaloffices.

Second,astheonlypermittedpoliticalpartyintheopposition,theMDBhad

tocoordinateabroadsetofideologicaltracksthatrangedfromsocialistsand

communistspoliticians(thrownintoillegalitybythemilitary)topersonalistand

liberalleaderships,whichgavetheorganizationaveryindefiniteideologicalprofile.

Forinstance,PereiradeMelo(2013:93)demonstratesthatalthoughthemajorityof

MDB’smembersemergedfromformerreformistsandlaborparties,36%ofthe

legend’slegislatorscamefromconservativepoliticalparties.

21

Thetwo-partysystemlasteduntil1979,whenthemultipartysystemwas

reestablishedasamilitarygovernmentstrategyoftryingtoweakentheopposition

party,MDB,whichwasgrowingstronger.Priortothedeeprecessionofthatyear,

theadministrationrestoredthemultipartysystem.Themilitarysoft-linersrealized

thatthetwo-partysystemwasnolongercapableofpreservingthelegislative

majoritysupportingthemilitaryregime.Onthecontrary,itelectorallyconsolidated

theoppositionunderthebigpartisanMDBumbrellathatwasabouttowinnotonly

thecontrolofCongressbutalsostateassembliesandmanymunicipalgovernments

intheupcominggeneralelections,asaresultofatypicalmajoritarianwinner

strategy.

Toavoidthismassivedefeat,thealternativewastofragmenttheopposition

byreestablishingarestricted(noMarxistpartiesallowed)multipartysystemwith

theemergenceofseveralnewparties,especiallyonthecenterandontheleftofthe

ideologicalspectrum.Thisdecisionpleasedsegmentsoftheoppositionandfactions

thatwouldnolongerhavetosqueezeundertheMDBpartisanumbrella.This

militarystrategyofpreservingopen-listproportionalrepresentationwithout

restrictingthenumberofpoliticalpartiesprovedsuccessfulwiththecreationof

severalnewpoliticalparties,includingtheWorker’sParty(PT)foundedby

unionists,intellectuals,andmembersofthechurchundertheleadershipofLuis

InacioLuladaSilva.

TheMDBwasonthevergeofbecomingamasspoliticalpartywhenCongress

dissolveditin1979.Thepartypresident,DeputyUlyssesGuimarães,convincedthe

partyto"addaPtotheMDB"topreservethehard-foughtoppositionimage.In

22

January1985,thecoalitionbetweentheBrazilianDemocraticMovementParty

(PMDB)andthePartyoftheLiberalFront(PFL),knownastheDemocraticAlliance,

undertheleadershipofTancredoNeves,wasindirectlyelectedbyCongressasthe

firstcivilianpresidentinabout25years.Nevertheless,thejustelectedpresident

TancredoNevesdiedinthenighteveofhisinaugurationandthevice-president,

JoséSarneyfromthePFL,tookpowerasthenewpresident.

PerformanceofPMDBsincetheRe-Democratization

Thefirstciviliangovernmentaftertwenty-oneyearsofauthoritarianregime

tookplaceinBrazilundergreatdemandforpoliticalandsocialinclusion,andthe

PMDBwasthenaturalstrongholdofanemergingdemocracy.Inordertoobtain

politicalsupportforthenewgovernment,theDemocraticAlliance,underthe

leadershipofTancredoNevesandJoséSarneyrespectively,gotheavilyinvolvednot

onlyonreformingpoliticalissues,butalsostrongreformpromisesofsocialand

economicnature.

Thegeneralexpectationreliedmostlyonthepersonalabilityandleadership

ofTancredoNeves,whichwouldbeabletoovercomethestructuralweaknessofthe

democraticalliancecoalitionandguaranteetheimplementationoftheNew

Republicambitiousagendaofreform.Theformationofthecoalitionitselfdepended

largelyonthepersonalcredibilityandskillfulnegotiationsofTancredoNeves

himself.Infact,Tancredohadalreadyshownhisnegotiationabilitieswithinhisown

party,beatinghispartisanUlysses-whowasamajorpoliticalfigureduringthere-

democratization-torunasthepresidentialcandidateforthePMDBingeneral

23

elections.ThebrandnewPMDBhad40%oftheseatsinchamberin1982,with168

outof420seats.ThepartyhadthesameshareintheElectoralCollegein1985

presidentialelections(180of686seats)butTancredowasabletomanagea

tremendouswin,with70%ofthevotes.Theseelectoralresultsreinforcedthe

majoritariantrajectorythePMDBwouldtrailinthefollowingyears.

ThenewbornBrazilianpartysystemdidnothaveyetfelttheimpactof

electoralrulesovertime,solegislaturefragmentationwaslow.Therewasadefacto

two-partysystem(sincePMDBandPDScombinedfor92%oftheseats).Thus,likea

bigpartywoulddoinamajoritariansystem,theambitiontocontroltheexecutive,

atthatpoint,wasthemostviabletrackforthePMDB.Accordingtoourtheoretical

frameworkdiscussedearlier,inagivenstateoftheworld,majoritarianormedian

legislator,partieswillobservethenature(elections)todecideonwhichpaththey

willgo.ThePMDBfolloweditsinitialdestinyandgalvanizedtheopposingforcesto

dictatorshipunderTancredo’sumbrella.

Itisveryclearthatpoliticalopportunitystructuresshapeparty’semergence,

evolutionandstrategy(Strom1990),howevercriticaljuncturescanreshufflethe

expectationsinawaythatpartieswillhavetorethinktheirstrategies.Those

unexpectedfactsjointlyconformpartyevolutionaltogetherwiththepolitical

opportunitystructures.TheshockingdeathofTancredoNevesinthenighteveofhis

inaugurationgeneratedhugedisappointmentandraiseddoubtsaboutthecapacity

ofthenewciviliangovernmenttobeabletodeliversuchacomprehensiveagenda

undertheleadershipoftheVice-president,JoséSarney.Sarneywasapoliticalfigure

withaverydifferentprofileandprestige.Theextremelyprotractedprocessof

24

openingoftheBraziliandemocracyandthecircumstancesofanegotiatedtransition

withoutaclearrupturemadetheSarney’sgovernmentevenmoresuspicious.

Sarneyhadlongbeenidentifiedwiththerightwingparty,asheadoftheArena,and

supporterofthemilitarydictatorship.

Thelackofpoliticallegitimacyofthenewpresidentmadethetransitionto

thefirstciviliangovernmentvulnerabletoallkindsofpressureforimmediate

structuralchangesnotonlyoneconomicandpoliticalspheres,butalsoonsocial

policies.Sarneytriedtorespondtothosepressuresbyimprintingthelabel“Tudo

PeloSocial”(everythingforthesocialpolicy)asthetoppriorityofhis

administration.Therequisiteofacomprehensiveandinclusiveagendaofreform

couldbenoticedinthepoliticalmanifestoofTancredo-Sarney,called“commitment

tothenation,”whichenumeratedthemainpolicyconcernsoftheirelectoral

campaignonsocial,political,andeconomicpolicies.Theall-encompassingfeatureof

theinclusiveagendaoftheNewRepublicgeneratedtoomuchexpectationandsoon

revealedthelimitsthataheterogeneouscoalitionlikethatwithapolitically

vulnerablepresidentcoulddeliver.

Inordertodemonstratethegoodwillandthathisgovernmentwouldactina

democraticfashion,PresidentSarneydecidednottomakeuseofunilateraldevices,

suchasdecreeandurgencypowers,untilanewconstitutionwaswrittenand

approved.Congresscametooccupythepowervacuumleftbyapoliticallyfragile

president.Givenhisrelativelypoliticalweakness,Sarneyalsodecidedtokeepthe

cabinetchosenbyTancredoNeves.Thisdecisioncausedcontradictoryviewsof

25

whatpolicydirectionthegovernmentwaspursuing.Ontheonehand,the

governmenthadpromisedtoaddressthecountry’sdifficultsocialagenda.

TheMinisterofPlanning,JoãoSayad,whopressuredforaheterodox

economicpolicy,somehowsupportedthispolicydirection.Ontheotherhand,the

MinisterofFinance,FranciscoDorenelles,anephewofTancredoNeves,wasafiscal

conservativeandputforwardanorthodoxapproachthroughdomesticfiscaland

monetaryausterityestablishinga10percentcutinpublicspending,atwomonth

suspensionofallgovernmentbanklending,andone-yearfreezeofallpublicsector

hiring.

Aftertwenty-oneyearsofdictatorship,themajorityoftheCongress,

includingtheleaderofthePMDBUlyssesGuimarães,wasverydisappointedwith

suchpolicies.Theywantedtodemonstratetotheirconstituents,especiallypriorto

theNovember1986elections,thattheywereresponsivetovoters’expectationson

socialinclusion.AccordingtotheFolhadeSãoPaulo(January14,1986),only20

percentoflegislatorsdemonstratedsupporttotheSarney'sadministration,55.5

percentwerepoliticallyneutral,and24.5percentwereclearlyhostiletohim.

Brazil,despiteresurgenteconomicgrowthin1985,wasthenconfronting

annualinflationratesexceeding200percent.Dailylifewasinherentlyconstructed

aroundwaystominimizethereallossesinherentinsuchcircumstances.The

poorest,ofcourse,intheabsenceofinterestpayingbankdeposits,couldnotavoid

theinflationarytaxontheirmeagercashbalances.Inastruggletoimposehis

authorityandpoliticalleadership,SarneydecidedtoreplacetheMinisterofFinance

appointedbyTancredoNeves,FranciscoDornelles,byDilsonFunaro,anactive

26

businessmanoftheSãoPauloFederationofIndustry-FIESPwhofavoredgrowth

overfiscalausterityandusedtobeverycriticalofIMFdemandsforadjustments.

FunarohadalsoservedasthepresidentoftheNationalBankofEconomicandSocial

Development-BNDESinthefirstmonthsofSayney'sadministration.

SubsequenttotheintroductionoftheAustralPlaninArgentina,the

heterodoxPlanoCruzadowasenactedbydecreeattheendofFebruary1986.The

planquicklyachievedbothitseconomicandpoliticalobjectives:ittamedthe

inflation,ontheonehand,anditwasabletostopthebleedingofthepresidencyand

itsgoverningcoalition,ontheother.TheCruzadoplan,whichwasdesignedto

reducetheinflationviaacombinationofpriceandwagefreezes,boostedthe

presidentialpopularity,calmeddownthepoliticalcriticismsandreunifiedthe

DemocraticAlliance.However,theredistributionofincomecontainedintheprice

freezeledquicklytoanexplosivedemandforconsumergoodswhichoverheadthe

entireeconomy.Businesssectorreactedbyreducingthesupplyandintensifying

theirpoliticalpressure.

AfterthissuccessfulstartthePlansoondisappointed.Thepricefreezehadto

beshort-livedsothatpricescouldagainhelptoallocateresources.However,the

cominggeneralelectionofNovember,whichwasalsoscheduledtoelectlegislators

whowouldformtheConstituentAssembly,placedenormouspressurefor

postponingpricerealignment.ThepoliticalsuccessoftheCruzadoplanpaidoffby

generatingamassivevictoryforthePMDB,whichwonalltheelectoralracesfor

governor,exceptthestateofSergipe,andthemajorityoftheChamberofDeputies

(53percent)andintheSenate(63percent).Still,in1986,underthevergeofthe

27

neweconomicplan,thePMDBheldanunprecedentedmajorityincongress.Itwas

thefirstandtheonlyperiodinrecentdemocracythatasinglepartyhadthecontrol

oftheexecutiveandwasasinglemajoritypartyinlegislature.Itwasthelargest

electoralvictoryeverwonbyapoliticalpartyinaproportionalrepresentation

multipartysystem.ThisstorywearetellingiswelldecribedinFigure2.

Figure2here

Thenecessaryadjustmentswerepainfullyimplementedjustafterthe

electioninanabruptway,whichsuggestedaclearlyopportunisticelectoral

maneuverfromgovernmenttowinthegeneralelection.Theimpactofthe

adjustmentpackage,whichwasnamedCruzadoPlanII,upontheauthorityand

popularityofSarneywasverynegative.Thegeneralmoodofoptimismgeneratedby

theCruzadoplanIwastransformedindisillusionmentasvotersfelttheywere

cheatedwiththeCruzadoIIwhichhadbeendesignedbeforetheelectionbutmade

publiconlyafterwards.Sarney'spoliticalcapitalerodedquicklyandhewasno

longercapableofunifyinghisDemocraticAlliancecoalition.

In1989,thePMDBfinallygrantedUlyssesGuimarães-thecraftsmenof

transitiontodemocracy–aspottoruninpresidentialelections.Thefirstdirect

presidentialelectionsoccurredunderanowfragmentedlegislatureandtherewas

nottwo,rathertwenty-twoofficialcandidates.Amongthosecandidates,Collor,a

veryyoungnortheastpolitician,sellingliberalideasandrepresentingtheno-

politician(althoughmemberofalong-lastingoligarchy),andLula.Collorwonthe

28

election,LulawastherunnerupandUlysseshadmelancholic4.73%ofthevotes.

EventhoughthefigureofUlysseswasstillrespectful,thePMDBpaidthepriceof

Sarney’s(awful)administrationandthe1986‘electoralburglary’episodeof

unfreezingthepricesonedayafterthegeneralelections.

TheinaugurationofFernandoCollorgeneratedgreatexpectationandhope.

Populationbelievedthatthefirstcivilianlegitimatelyelectedpresidentafter29

yearscouldofferadefinitivesolutiontotheproblemofhyperinflation,toendemic

corruptionandtofulfillvoters'expectationsofeconomicdevelopment.Thispositive

expectationcanbecapturedbythehugepopularsupportCollorachieved(70

points)atthebeginningofhisadministration.

However,Collorseemedtointerpretthispopularsupportasafreeticketto

ridethepoliticalrollercoasterwithouttakingintoaccountthenecessityof

politicians'support.Collorpreferred,therefore,todevelopdirectconnectionwith

votersinsteadofmakinguseoftraditionalpoliticalinstitutionssuchasCongress,

politicalparties,orbuildingasustainablemajoritycoalition.

AlthoughCollorinitiallyenjoyedenormouspopularsupport,hewas

handicappedbyhislackoflegislativesupport.Hispoliticalpartyheldlessthan10

percentoftheseatsinCongress.Infact,Collordecidedtobuildapost-electoral

minoritylegislativecoalitionthatconsistedofonlythreepoliticalparties(PMDB,

PFL,andPRN).Collor’scoalitionbeganinMarch1990with245seatsonly,which

wasabout49percent.InOctoberofthesameyear,thePMDBdecidedtoleave

Collor'sgoverningcoalitionandthePDSwasincorporated.Hisnominalsupportin

Congressdroppedto29.6percent.InJanuary1992Collor'sownparty,PRN,was

29

extinguishedandhiscoalitionshrunkevenfurtherto26percentofseatsinthe

ChamberofDeputies.

Anewunexpectedevent,however,couldhavesignificantlychangethePMDB

history.InMay1992Collorwasaccusedbyhisyoungerbrother,PedroCollor,of

involvementinacorruptionschemeofinfluencepeddling.FederalPoliceand

Congressbeganindependentinvestigationssoonafter.OnAugust26,1992,thefinal

congressionalinquiryreportwasreleased;asaresultofthisreport,apetitionwas

presented,formallyaccusingPresidentCollorofhavingcommittedcrimesof

responsibility(theBrazilianequivalentof"highcrimesandmisdemeanors")

warrantingremovalfromofficepertheconstitutionalandlegalnormsregulating

impeachmentproceedings.Onthatformalpetition,impeachmentproceedingswere

initiatedintheChamberofDeputies,thelowerhouseofCongress.OnSeptember29,

1992,Collorwasimpeachedbyavoteof441forand38votesagainst.

OnOctober2,1992,PresidentCollorreceivedformalnoticefromthe

BrazilianSenatethattheChamberofDeputieshadacceptedthechargespresented

againsthimandthathewasnowadefendantinatrialofimpeachmentthatthe

Senatewouldconduct.PertheBrazilianConstitution,uponreceiptofthat

notification,Collor'spowersweresuspendedfor180days,andVicePresident

ItamarFrancobecameactingpresident.Facingalmostcertainconvictionand

removalfromofficebytheSenate,CollorresignedonDecember29,1992justasthe

trialwasunderway,inthelastdayoftheproceedings.

WithCollor’sremoval,hisvice-president,ItamarFranco,aquirkyand

relativelymarginalpoliticalfigure,succeededCollorinofficeinauguratinginakind

30

of“salvationgovernment.”WiththeexceptionoftheWorker'sParty(PT),that

preferrednottooccupyformalpositionsinthegovernment,allpoliticalpartiesthat

supportedCollor’simpeachmentdecidedtotakepartofFranco'sgoverning

coalition.Franco’sadministration,therefore,re-establishedthecoalition-based

presidentialism.Thisdecision,somehow,helpedtorebuildbridgesbetween

executiveandlegislativebranchesthathadbeenbrokenunderCollor's

administration.

Hereiswhenhistory,again,makethepresidencyfallintheleapsofthe

PMDB,inaveryerraticway.Franco,electedbythePRNwasnowaPMDBpartisan.

Onceagain,aPMDBpresidentwasincharge,onceagain,hewasnotdirectlyelected

andonceagainhewasfarfrombeingacentralfiguretotheparty.Evenwiththat

chance,thePMDBwasnotabletodevelopaviablecandidacyintheforthcoming

elections.Thepartydidnotgiveupthemajoritariangamehoweverandin1994the

candidatewasOrestesQuercia.The4.38shareofvotesobtainedbyQuerciawasa

symbolicendforlastpresidentialcandidatethePMDBhad.

Figure3here

ThePMDBstrategyofplayingthemedianlegislatorinsteadofinsistingin

havingacandidatewasnotadecisionmadefromthedaytonight,aswecansee.

Thisdecision,however,aspredictedbyourtheory,canbeaconsiderablycostlyone.

IntheparticularcaseofthePMDB,thetwoconsecutivedefeatsthepartyfacedin

thepresidentialelectionsof1989and1994werealsorelativedefeatsatthelocal

level.EventhoughthePMDBremainedtheoveralllocalwinner,itsmunicipality

31

shareconsistentlydecreasedinthenextlocalelections.Ontheotherhand,thePSDB

andthePTdramaticallyincreasedtheirnumbersofcontrolledmunicipalitiesinthis

period(Figure3).Obviously,notparticipatinginthegoverningcoalitionhasaneven

worseeffect,butgivingupthemajoritariangamemightbedangerous.The

DEM/PFLispayingthepriceofplayingbothgames,givingupasinglecandidacyand

beinganoppositionparty(Figure2).

Theelectoralevidenceofthosetwocyclesunveilsanoftenhiddencostof

playingthemajoritariangame.Usuallysmallpartieshavecandidatesinnational

electionsevenknowingthatavictoryisimplausible.Thosesmallpartiesdoasbest

astheycanintheelectionsinordertoextractbiggerrentsfromtheirsupportto

presidentialcoalitioninthefuture.Withbigpartieswhatsoeveritcanworkthe

otherwayaround.Theexpectedreturnforplayingthemajoritariangameinthecase

ofbigpartiesisrelativelyhigh,soamajordefeatinnationalelectionscanimplya

decreasedbargainpowerwithincoalitionandashrinkingshareofmunicipalitiesin

thefuture.

Thefirstanddecisivetrackchangeoccurredin1998,whenthepartydecided

nothavingacandidate.AtthattimethePMDBwasstillthebiggestpartyincongress

andbyfartheonewithmoremunicipalitiesunderitspoliticalcontrol.ThePMDB

wassatisfiedinplayingasupportingroleforthePSDBandPFL/DEMwhatsoever.

In2002thePMDBplayedthegameofthe‘embarrassedmedian’,theylostthe

vice-presidentelectionsbutafteronlyoneyearrapidlyjoinedthePTwinning

coalition.ThereaftertheirparticipationinPTcoalitionswasconsolidatedandthe

contractionwasstanched.

32

LookingforPMDB-likepartiesacrosstheworld:ThePMDBIndex

Inoursearchforapartywiththeaforementionedcharacteristicsofthe

PMDB,wedevelopedameasureofproximity.Wewerelookingforlargecoalition

partnerwithnoambitiontocontroltheexecutive,whichhasampledistributionin

thenationalterritoryofthecountry,bygoverningseveralmunicipalitiesandmany

statesandbyholdingasubstantialnumberofseatsinCongress,ideologically

amorphous,withoutaclear-cutpoliticalagendaorplatform,andwithmanyregional

leaderstryingtomaximizetheirownpoliticalinterests.Ourobjectivewasto

accountforresemblancebetweenthePMDBandpartiesacrosstheworld.This

measurewasbasedoneightindicatorsconcerningeightdifferentpartyattribute

dimensions.Theseeightindicatorsweregivenvaluesfrom0to1,where0isthe

mostdistantfromthePMDBand1istheclosesttothePMDB.

Dataonpartieswasgatheredthroughaexpertsurvey,conductedwith74

specialistsonLatinAmericanpolitics.2Thespecialistswereabletochooseacountry

theywouldliketorespondandansweredfewquestionsconcerningpoliticalparties

inthatspecificcountry.WecomparedthentheiranswerstoaPMDBbenchmarkon

eachquestion,andappliedaformulatogenerateanindexgoingfrom0to1oneach

dimension.DimensionsD1toD4haveobservablebenchmarkvalues.Ondimensions

D5toD8,valuesforthePMDBweregivenbytheauthors(table1).

Table1Here

2ThefirstwaveofsurveysconsideredonlyLatinAmericancountries.Therewere37complete

responsesamongthe74.

33

Wedecidedtotakeintoconsiderationonlydatapointswiththreeormore

responsesandwherespecialistsconsistentlyagreedontheirevaluations,whichis,

thecoefficientofvariationontheaggregateresponseswaslowerthan50%.3Here

weplotonlythebest-fitforPMDBineachcountrywehavedatafor(Figure4).The

PDCinChileisbyfarthemostsimilarpartytothePMDBinLatinAmerica,followed

bythePRIinMexico.Allthepartiesconsideredtendtoplaythemedianrole,havea

nationaldistributionandacenterideology.Thedifferencesappearontheother

dimensionsandoneofthemhasthemostintriguingandstrikingresult:candidateto

executive.NoPMDB-likepartyinLatinAmericadecided,asthePMDBdid,togiveup

fromaleadingmajoritarianroleinpresidentialelections.Whatcouldexplainsucha

puzzle?Thefearofplayingthemajoritariangamewithanexpectedlowprobability

ofwinseemsapossiblereason.

Figure4here

Previoustheoreticaldevelopmentsinthispapermentionedaspacefor

PMDB-likepartiesinfragmentedenvironments.PlottingthePMDBIndexagainsta

fragmentationmeasure(liketheeffectivenumberofparties)amongLatinAmerican

countriescangiveusanideaofhowthistheoryholdsornot(Figure5).Thereisan

interestingcorrelationbetweenthePMDBIndexandtheleveloffragmentation.

CountrieswherethePMDB-likepartyhasthehighestvalueonthePMDBindexare

usuallythesamecountrieswheretheleveloffragmentationishigh.Although

censoreddatastilllimitouranalyticalstrength,thiscorrelationpartiallysupports

theideathatafragmentedenvironmentwouldgeneratesuchanimalslikethe

3Completeresultsannex.

34

PMDB.Causalityisstillaconcernwhatsoever.Eventhoughthereisaclear

theoreticalexplanationtosupportcausality,moresophisticatedempiricalstrategies

arewaitingtobedeveloped.

Figure5here

Twomainreasonsexplainwhysuchacorrelationissostrong.Thefirstoneis

relatedtotheneedofacooperationanchorunderover-fragmentedlegislatures.In

theabsenceofthisanchor,systemwouldbecomedysfunctional,soinorderto

defenditselfthesystemwouldgeneratesuchparties.Thesecondonehastodowith

Sartori(1976)predictionsforfragmentedsystemsencompassinga“centrifugal

competitivepattern”.Thecenterofthedistributionbecomesaveryappealing

positioninwhichpartiescompete,strugglingforexpansionandcontrolover

policies,themorefragmented,thebiggerthestruggle.

Theproblemnowis:howtofindacounterfactualforBrazil?Itmightbethe

casethatthesingularityofthePMDBhastodowithBrazilianpoliticalsystem

singularities.Inthissense,ourempiricalsearchforapartycanbeelusive.Wewill

neverfindit

PoliticalDifficultiesofmanagingthemedianlegislatorinthecoalition

Weassumethatthepresidentmaximizepoliticalsupportinthelegislature,

butwiththelowestpossiblecost.Therefore,thechiefexecutivemustdefinehow

manyandwhatpartieswilltakepartofhiscoalitionandthepowerandresources

willbesharedwithpartners.Basedonthesechoices,thecoalitionparticipants

35

achieveagreaterorlesserdegreeofsatisfactionthat,inturn,hasthepotentialto

generatehigherofsmallergovernabilitycost.

Animportantaspectofourmodelistounderstandhowthepresident,asthe

coalitionmanagerinafragmentedmultipartyenvironment,allocatesherpolitical

andmonetaryresourcestocoalitionpartnersinexchangeforpoliticalsupportin

Congress.Astrategicpresidentwhoisconcernedaboutpolicyoutcomesandabout

hervariousmanagementfunctionswillconsiderthesecostsinworkingtowardan

optimalstrategy.Onceelected,thepresidentfacesatleastthreeinterconnected

exogenousconstraints:(1)thelevelofpartyfragmentationinthelegislature;(2)the

sizeofthepresident’spartyrelativetothesizesofotherparties;and(3)the

ideologicaldistancesbetweenthepresident’spartyandtheotherpoliticalpartiesin

thelegislature.Workingwithinsuchconstraints,theexecutivemakesdecisions

aboutthesizeandideologicalheterogeneityofhiscoalitionandtheproportionality

ofrewardsofcabinetseatsandfinancialresources.

Raileetal.(2015)demonstratethatgoverningcostsincreasewithcabinet

disproportionality,ideologicalheterogeneity,andcoalitionsize.Specificallywith

regardtothislastcomponent,theyassumethatthegreaterthenumberofcoalition

allies,thehigherthegovernabilitycost.Thetheoreticalrationaleoftheirhypothesis

isthatpresidentswouldfacehighercoordinationproblemsmanagingacoalition

withalargernumberofparties;therefore,highercosts.

However,itisalsoreasonabletoinferthatalargecoalitionally,especiallyif

itisthemedianlegislator,couldleadtomoregovernabilitycostsforthepresident.It

mightbecheapertobuyabunchofsmallpartiesratherthanalargeone.Thatis,the

36

presidentwouldfacehigherriskoffacingholdupproblemsfrombeingtoocloseor

toodependentonalargemedianpartner.Therefore,inordertoavoidthispotential

vulnerabilitythepresidentwouldprefertobuildanumericallyverylargecoalition.

Ontheotherhand,italsoreasonabletoinferthatsmallerpartiescould

extractahigherpremiumrelativetotheirsize.Theirinclusioninthecoalition

generallymeansthatpartyisnecessaryforthepresidentand,asaconsequence,

suchapartymightbeabletoextractdisproportionaterewards.Forthemanagerof

thecoalition,therefore,itmightbecheapertobuysmallpartiesintheretail(Varejo)

ratherthantobuythemedianlegislatorinthewholesale(atacado).Theexecutive

couldalsofellthreatenedbyastrongmedianlegislativepartnerthatwouldhavethe

capacitytochallengetheexecutivebyswitchingtothemajoritariantrackand

offeringapresidentialcandidateinthenearfuture.

Inordertoinitiallyaccessthestatusofthisrelation,weestimateabasic

correlationtest,consideringmonetarytransfers(individuallegislativeamendments

totheannualbudget)toparties,politicaltransfers(cabinetpositions)topartiesand

seatshare(thepercentageofseatsheldbyeachparty)inthechamberofdeputies.

Weoperationalizedbothmonetaryandpoliticaltransferswithregardtothesizeof

theparty.Thus,wehavebeenabletohaveaglimpseifpoliticalandfinancial

rewardswereproportionallydistributed.

Figure6here

Thecorrelationsaresignificant.However,whiletherelativeamountof

resourcesdirectlyspentbythepresidentintheformofporkincreaseswhenparty

sizealsoincreases,thecabinetsurplusobtainedbythepartiesdecreasewhenparty

37

sizeincreases.Therefore,itmightbethecasethatbiggermedianlegislatorparties

arecheapertobuyoutwithpoliticaltransfers,whilesmallerpartiesarecheaperto

buyoutwithmonetarytransfers,suggestingthusasubstituteeffectbetweenthose

twogoverningcurrencies(Raileetal2011).Inotherwords,thereareeconomiesof

scalewhenitcomestomonetarytransfersanddiseconomiesofscalewhenitcomes

topoliticaltransfers.

However,thestrengthofthoserelationsmatterandthenegativecorrelation

inthiscaseisfarmoreconsistent.Figure6showstherelationbetween“SeatShare”

intheChamberofDeputiesand“CoalitionSurplus”.CoalitionSurplusmeasuresifa

coalitionpartyisunderoroverrewardedbythepresident.4ThehighertheSurplus,

thegreaterapartywillbeoverrewardedvis-a-visitscontributiontothegoverning

coalition.

Lookingattheoverallpicture,thefirstnoticeablefactisthattherehasbeena

verystrongandnegativecorrelationbetweenSeatShareandCoalitionSurplusover

time.Thatis,thebiggertheparty,thelowertherelativepoliticalrewarditwill

receivebythepresident.ThedataforBrazilisfairlyconsistentandsuggeststhat

smallerpartiesextractahigherpremium.Wecanalsoinferthatthestrengthofthis

relationincreaseswhiletheSeatSharedecreases,observingthenarrowingofthe

confidenceinterval.

4TheCoalitionSurplusofpartyp(CSp)formulaisdefinedbyCSp=mp/jmj-sp/scwherespaccountsfor

thenumberofseatspartypholds,scaccountsfortheoverallnumberofseatsthecoalitioncholds,mp

isthenumberofministriesoccupiedbythepartypandjmjisthetotalnumberofavailablecabinet

positions.

38

Thiscorrelationresultlendssupportthehypothesisthatthepresidentwill

facehighergoverningcostsifshedecidestohaveacoalitionwithmanysmall

partiesratherthanrelyingonthesupportofabigmedianlegislator.

Thesecondaspecttohighlightisthatdifferentpresidentsindifferentterms

haddifferentstrategies.FewbigpartiestookpartofpresidentCardoso’scoalitions

mostofthetime.Ontheotherhand,manysmallpartiesformedLulaandRousseff’s

governingcoalitions.Asaconsequence,itisreasonabletoexpectthatPT

governmentstoaccountformorepressureonthedistributionofpoliticalgoods,

sincethosesmallpartiesmightexpecttoreceivemorerewardsinordertoachievea

surplus.

Conclusion

Tobewritten

39

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42

Figures

Figure1:PartisanChoicesonConsensual(Proportional)Systems

Nature(election)

Majoritarian

WinnerMajoritarian(winner)(10)

Loser

Majoritarian(Opposition)

(4)

EmbarrassedMedian(2)

MedianLegislator

Majoritarian

MedianLegislator

(6)

43

Figure2:Supportingroleparties(PMDBanPFL/DEM)performanceafterre-democratization,Brazil,1982-2015

44

Figure3:Leadingmajoritarianroleparties(PTandPSDB)performanceafterre-democratization,Brazil,1982-2015

45

Table1:PMDBIndexDimensionsDimension Question PMDB

D1 Coalitionparticipationfrequency

Howoftendoesthepartyparticipateinthegoverning(presidential)coalition?(0%to100%) 85%

D2 Ideology Howwouldyouplacethefollowingpartiesabouttheirideologicalposition?(1to10) 5.5

D3 CrediblecandidateInthelastfiveelections,hasthispartylaunchedanycrediblecandidatetothepresidencywithrealchancesofwinning?(0to5)

0

D4 Post-seatdifferential

UsuallyincoalitiongovernmentstheexecutivedistributecabinetsaccordingtothenumberofseatsthatpartiesholdintheCongress.Consideringthis,whatistherelationbetween[CabinetShare(%)-SeatShare(%)]ofthesespartieswhentakingpartingoverningcoalitions?(+100to-100)

-15

D5 Medianrole

Doesthepoliticalpartyplayamedianvoterole?Thatis,howwouldyouconsiderthepoliticalpartyintermsofavoidingextreme-leftorextreme-rightpolicydecisions?(0to6)

3

D6 Internalcohesion Towhatextentmembersofthosepoliticalpartieshavepresentedinternalpartycohesion?(1to10) 2

D7Abilitytopasslegislationorvetotheexecutive

Howdoyourankthepartiesconcerningtheability/powertovetoandpasslegislation(constrainingtheexecutive’spreferences)?(1to10)

9

D8 NationaldistributionConcerningthedistributionofvotersandsympathizers,wouldyouconsiderthepoliticalpartytobe?(1to10)

10

46

Figure4:ThePMDBIndex,LatinAmerica

47

Figure5:PMDBIndexandFragmentation,LatinAmericanParties

48

Figure6:PartyRewardsandSeatShare-BrazilianChamberofDeputies-1995

to2015

49

AnnexI

PMDBIndexvalues

country-

party

D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8

Bra-PMDB 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00

Chi-PDC 0.94 0.99 0.50 0.69 1.00 0.63 0.80 0.94

Mex-PRI 1.00 0.98 0.22 0.57 1.00 0.57 0.80 0.97

Chi-PD 0.93 0.81 0.58 0.70 0.85 0.56 0.67 0.96

Arg-PJ 0.77 0.97 0.20 0.65 0.98 0.73 0.67 0.91

Arg-UCR 0.40 0.97 0.50 0.92 1.00 0.69 0.46 0.91

Chi-PS 0.93 0.78 0.40 0.84 0.80 0.51 0.66 0.93

Mex-PAN 0.86 0.72 0.39 0.84 0.80 0.63 0.70 0.73

Chi-RN 0.43 0.81 0.54 0.93 0.80 0.56 0.59 0.99

Arg-FPV 0.86 0.85 0.21 0.46 0.89 0.46 0.77 0.94

Uru-FA 0.53 0.80 0.07 0.78 0.89 0.52 0.86 0.93

Uru-PN 0.64 0.79 0.34 0.88 0.85 0.56 0.45 0.82

Uru-PC 0.69 0.76 0.47 0.88 0.81 0.61 0.39 0.62

Chi-UDI 0.43 0.68 0.52 0.94 0.68 0.40 0.59 1.00

Ven-AD 0.34 0.95 0.60 0.65 0.96 0.56 0.24 0.90

Ven-COPEI 0.25 0.91 0.60 0.65 1.00 0.78 0.24 0.66

Ven-PSUV 0.91 0.63 0.00 0.39 0.68 0.42 0.80 0.98

Mex-PRD 0.37 0.75 0.44 0.82 0.80 0.77 0.35 0.50

Ven-UNT 0.21 0.91 0.57 0.65 0.92 0.54 0.24 0.36