ENGINEERING ETHICS (http://ethics.tamu.edu/ethics/hyatt/hyatt1.htm)

The Kansas City Hyatt Regency Walkways Collapse

Department of Philosophy and Department of Mechanical Engineering Texas A&M University NSF Grant Number DIR-9012252

Negligence And The Professional "Debate" Over Responsibility For Design

Instructor's Guide - Introduction To The Case

On July 17, 1981, the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Kansas City, Missouri, held a videotaped tea-dance party in their atrium lobby. With many party-goers standing and dancing on the suspended walkways, connections supporting the ceiling rods that held up the second and fourth-floor walkways across the atrium failed, and both walkways collapsed onto the crowded first-floor atrium below. The fourth-floor walkway collapsed onto the second-floor walkway, while the offset third-floor walkway remained intact. As the United States' most devastating structural failure, in terms of loss of life and injuries, the Kansas City Hyatt Regency walkways collapse left 114 dead and in excess of 200 injured. In addition, millions of dollars in costs resulted from the collapse, and thousands of lives were adversely affected.

The hotel had only been in operation for approximately one year at the time of the walkways collapse, and the ensuing investigation of the accident revealed some unsettling facts:

During January and February, 1979, the design of the hanger rod connections was changed in a series of events and disputed communications between the fabricator (Havens Steel Company) and the engineering design team (G.C.E. International, Inc., a professional engineering firm). The fabricator changed the design from a one-rod to a two-rod system to simplify the assembly task, doubling the load on the connector, which ultimately resulted in the walkways collapse.1

The fabricator, in sworn testimony before the administrative judicial hearings after the accident, claimed that his company (Havens) telephoned the engineering firm (G.C.E.) for change approval. G.C.E. denied ever receiving such a call from Havens.2

On October 14, 1979 (more than one year before the walkways collapsed), while the hotel was still under construction, more than 2700 square feet of the atrium roof collapsed because one of the roof connections at the north end of the atrium failed.3 In testimony, G.C.E. stated that on three separate occasions they requested on-site project representation during the construction phase; however, these requests were not acted on by the owner (Crown Center Redevelopment Corporation), due to additional costs of providing on-site inspection.4

Even as originally designed, the walkways were barely capable of holding up the expected load, and would have failed to meet the requirements of the Kansas City Building Code.5

Due to evidence supplied at the Hearings, a number of principals involved lost their engineering licenses, a number of firms went bankrupt, and many expensive legal suits were settled out of court. The case serves as an excellent example of the importance of meeting professional responsibilities, and what the consequences are for professionals who fail to meet those responsibilities. This case is particularly serviceable for use in structural design, statics and materials classes, although it is also useful as a general overview of consequences for professional actions. The Hyatt Regency Walkways Collapse provides a vivid example of the importance of accuracy and detail in engineering design and shop drawings (particularly regarding revisions), and the costly consequences of negligence in this realm.

For purposes of this case study, we assume that the disputed telephone call was made by the fabrication firm, and that the engineering firm did give verbal approval for the fatal design change. Students are, however, encouraged to view the case reversing these assumptions.

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Guidelines For Presentation

1) Read student handout for a detailed description of the case.

2) At the class preceding case discussion, distribute student handouts: The Kansas City Hyatt Regency Walkways Collapse, which includes literature on negligence and the professional "debate" over responsibility for design, and an annotated bibliography. Have students come to the follow-up discussion class prepared to address the Kansas City Hyatt Regency Walkways Collapse in light of the ethical issues raised in the student handout.

3) Show Hyatt Regency Walkways Collapse segment of the "To Engineer is Human," video. Discuss with students the five overheads:

1. The Hyatt Regency Walkways Collapse Cast of Characters2. Hanger Rod Details Original Design and As Built3. Chronology of the Hyatt Regency Walkways Collapse (four pages)4. ASME Code of Ethics of Engineers; and5. IEEE Code of Ethics. Ask students some of the following questions:

        Who is ultimately responsible for the fatal design flaw? Why?

        Does the disputed telephone call matter to the outcome of the case? Why or why not?

        What is the responsibility of a licensed professional engineer who affixes his/her seal to fabrication drawings?

        In terms of meeting building codes, what are the responsibilities of the engineer? The fabricator? The owner?

        What measures can professional societies take to ensure that catastrophes such as the Hyatt Regency Walkways Collapse do not occur?

        Do you agree with the findings that the principal engineers involved should have been subject to discipline for gross negligence in the practice of engineering? Should they have lost their licenses, temporarily or permanently?

        Was it fair that G.C.E., as a company, was held liable for gross negligence and engineering incompetence? Why or why not?

4) End the discussion with Overhead 6), Hyatt Regency Walkways Collapse: Ethical Issues of the Case. Discuss the ethical questions raised by the case: what are the professional responsibilities of the engineers, fabricators, and hotel contractors? How can professionals protect themselves, and the public, from the gross negligence of an incompetent few? What are the implications of this case in terms of state-by-state licensing procedures?

For a detailed discussion on these issues, see essay #5, "Negligence, Risk, and the Professional Debate Over the Responsibility for Design," appended at the end of the cases in the report. In addition, essays #1 through #4 appended at the end of the case listings in this report will have relevant background information for the instructor preparing to lead classroom discussion. Their titles are, respectively: "Ethics and Professionalism in Engineering: Why the Interest in Engineering Ethics?;" "Basic Concepts and Methods in Ethics;" "Moral Concepts and Theories," and "Engineering Design: Literature on Social Responsibility Versus Legal Liability."

Recommended Overheads For Use In Classroom Discussion

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1) The Hyatt Regency Walkways Collapse Cast of Characters 2) Hanger Rod Details Original Design and As Built 3) Chronology of the Hyatt Regency Walkways Collapse 4) ASME Code of Ethics of Engineers 5) IEEE Code of Ethics 6) Hyatt Regency Walkways Collapse: Ethical Issues Of The Case

Notes

1. Missouri Board for Architects, Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors vs. Daniel M. Duncan, Jack D. Gillum and G.C.E. International, Inc., before the Administrative Hearing Commission, State of Missouri, Case No. AR840239, Statement of the Case, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision rendered by Judge James B. Deutsch, November 14, 1985, pp. 54-63. Case No. AR840239 hereinafter referred to as Administrative Hearing Commission.

2. Administrative Hearing Commission , pp. 63-66. 3. Administrative Hearing Commission , p. 384. 4. Administrative Hearing Commission , pp. 12-13. 5. Administrative Hearing Commission , pp. 423-425.

Hyatt Regency Walkways Collapse Overheads

1. The Hyatt Regency Walkways Collapse Cast of Characters 2. Hanger Rod Details Original Design and As Built 3. Chronology of the Hyatt Regency Walkways Collapse (4 pages) 4. ASME Code of Ethics of Engineers 5. IEEE Code of Ethics 6. Hyatt Regency Walkways Collapse: Ethical Issues Of The Case

The Hyatt Regency Walkways Collapse Cast Of Characters

In 1976, as owner, Crown Center Redevelopment Corporation - commenced a project to design and build a Hyatt Regency Hotel in Kansas City, Missouri, and on April 4, 1978, Crown entered into a standard contract with G.C.E. International, Inc. Professional Consulting Firm of Structural Engineers (1980 formerly called Jack D. Gillum & Associates, Ltd. changed name to G.C.E. May 5, 1983)

Principals

Jack D. Gillum P.E., structural engineering state licensed since February 26, 1968 Daniel M. Duncan P.E., structural engineering state licensed since February 27, 1979 PBNDML Architects, Planners, Inc. Architect.

G.C.E. agreed to provide, "all structural engineering services for a 750-room hotel projected located at 2345 McGee Street, Kansas City, Missouri."

On or about December 19, 1978, Eldridge Construction Company, the general contractor on the Hyatt project, entered into a subcontract with Havens Steel Company Professional Fabricator who agreed to fabricate and erect the atrium steel for the Hyatt project.

Chronology Of The Hyatt Regency Walkways Collapse

Early 1976: Crown Center Redevelopment Corporation (owner) commences project to design and build a Hyatt Regency Hotel in Kansas City, Missouri.

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July 1976: Gillum-Colaco, Inc. (G.C.E. International, Inc., 1983), a Texas corporation, selected as the consulting structural engineer for the Hyatt project.

July 1976- Hyatt project in schematic design development.

Summer 1977: G.C.E. assisted owner and architect (PBNDML Architects, Planners, Inc.) with developing various plans for hotel project, and decided on basic design.

Late 1977- Bid set of structural drawings and specifications

Early 1978: Project prepared, using standard Kansas City, Missouri, Building Codes.

April 4, 1978: Actual contract entered into by G.C.E. and the architect, PBNDML Architects, Planners, Inc. G.C.E. agreed to provide "all structural engineering services for a 750-room hotel project located at 2345 McGee Street, Kansas City, Missouri."

Spring 1978: Construction on hotel begins.

August 28, 1978: Specifications on project issued for construction, based on the American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) standards used by fabricators.

December 1978: Eldridge Construction Company, general contractor on the Hyatt project, enters into subcontract with Havens Steel Company. Havens agrees to fabricate and erect the atrium steel for the Hyatt project.

January 1979: Events and communications between G.C.E. and Havens.

February 1979: Havens makes design change from a single to a double hanger rod box beam connection for use at the fourth floor walkways. Telephone calls disputed; however, because of alleged communications between engineer and fabricator, Shop Drawing 30 and Erection Drawing E3 are changed.

February 1979: G.C.E. receives 42 shop drawings (including Shop Drawing 30 and Erection Drawing E-3) on February 16, and returns them to Havens stamped with engineering review stamp approval on February 26.

October 14, 1979: Part of the atrium roof collapses while the hotel is under construction. Inspection team called in, whose contract dealt primarily with the investigation of the cause of the roof collapse and created no obligation to check any engineering or design work beyond the scope of their investigation and contract.

October 16, 1979: Owner retains an independent engineering firm, Seiden-Page, to investigate the cause of the atrium roof collapse.

October 20, 1979: Gillum writes owner, stating he is undertaking both an atrium collapse investigation as well as a thorough design check of all the members comprising the atrium roof.

October- Reports and meetings from engineer to clients

November 1979: owner/architect assures clients of overall safety of the entire atrium.

July 1980: Construction of hotel complete, and the Kansas City Hyatt Regency Hotel opens for business.

July 17, 1981: Connections supporting the rods from the ceiling that held up the 2nd and 4th floor walkways across the atrium of the Hyatt Regency Hotel collapse, killing 114 and injuring in excess of 200 others.

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February 3, 1984: Missouri Board of Architects, Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors files complaint against Daniel M. Duncan, Jack D. Gillum and G.C.E. International Inc., charging gross negligence, incompetence, misconduct and unprofessional conduct in the practice of engineering in connection with their performance of engineering services in the design and construction of the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Kansas City, Missouri.

November, 1984: Duncan, Gillum, and G.C.E. International, Inc. found guilty of gross negligence, misconduct and unprofessional conduct in the practice of engineering. Subsequently, Duncan and Gillum lost their licenses to practice engineering in the State of Missouri, and G.C.E. had its certificate of authority as an engineering firm revoked. American Society of Civil Engineering (ASCE) adopts report that states structural engineers have full responsibility for design projects. Duncan and Gillum now practicing engineers in states other than Missouri.

Hyatt Regency Walkways Collapse: Ethical Issues Of The Case 1. Who is ultimately responsible for checking the safety of final designs as depicted in shop drawings? 2. In terms of meeting building codes, what are the responsibilities of the engineer? The fabricator? The

owner? 3. What measures can professional societies take to ensure catastrophes like the Hyatt Regency Walkways

Collapse do not occur?

Synopsis

On July 17, 1981, the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Kansas City, Missouri, held a videotaped tea-dance party in their atrium lobby. With many party-goers standing and dancing on the suspended walkways, connections supporting the ceiling rods that held up the second and fourth-floor walkways across the atrium failed, and both walkways collapsed onto the crowded first-floor atrium below. The fourth-floor walkway collapsed onto the second-floor walkway, while the offset third-floor walkway remained intact. As the United States' most devastating structural failure, in terms of loss of life and injuries, the Kansas City Hyatt Regency walkways collapse left 114 dead and in excess of 200 injured. In addition, millions of dollars in costs resulted from the collapse, and thousands of lives were adversely affected.

The hotel had only been in operation for approximately one year at the time of the walkways collapse, and the ensuing investigation of the accident revealed some unsettling facts.

First, during January and February, 1979, over a year before the collapse, the design of the walkway hanger rod connections was changed in a series of events and communications (or disputed miscommunications) between the fabricator (Havens Steel Company) and the engineering design team (G.C.E. International, Inc., a professional engineering firm). The fabricator changed the design from a one-rod to a two-rod system to simplify the assembly task, doubling the load on the connector, which ultimately resulted in the walkways collapse.1

Second, the fabricator, in sworn testimony before the administrative judicial hearings after the accident, claimed that his company (Havens) telephoned the engineering firm (G.C.E.) for change approval. G.C.E. denied ever receiving such a call from Havens.2

Third, on October 14, 1979, while the hotel was still under construction, more than 2700 square feet of the atrium roof collapsed because one of the roof connections at the north end of the atrium failed.3 In testimony, G.C.E. stated that on three separate occasions they requested on-site project representation to check all fabrication during the construction phase; however, these requests were not acted on by the owner (Crown Center Redevelopment Corporation), due to additional costs of providing on-site inspection.4

Fourth, even as originally designed, the walkways were barely capable of holding up the expected load, and would have failed to meet the requirements of the Kansas City Building Code.5

Individuals Involved In The Hyatt Regency Case

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Several key players are involved in the case:

In 1976, as owner, Crown Center Redevelopment Corporation commenced a project to design and build a Hyatt Regency Hotel in Kansas City, Missouri, and on April 4, 1978 entered into a standard contract with G.C.E. International, Inc. Professional Consulting Firm of Structural Engineers (1980 formerly called Jack D. Gillum & Associates, Ltd. changed name to G.C.E. May 5, 1983) Principals Jack D. Gillum P.E., structural engineering state licensed since February 26, 1968 Daniel M. Duncan P.E., structural engineering state licensed since February 27, 1979 and PBNDML Architects, Planners, Inc. Architect. G.C.E. agreed to provide, "all structural engineering services for a 750-room hotel projected located at 2345 McGee Street, Kansas City, Missouri. On or about December 19, 1978, Eldridge Construction Company, the general contractor on the Hyatt project, entered into a subcontract with Havens Steel Company fabricator who agreed to fabricate and erect the atrium steel for the Hyatt project.

Structural Failure During the Atrium Tea Dance

In 1976, Crown Center Redevelopment Corporation initiated a project for designing and building a Hyatt Regency Hotel in Kansas City Missouri. In July of 1976, Gillum-Colaco, Inc., a Texas corporation, was selected as the consulting structural engineer for the project. A schematic design development phase for the project was undertaken from July 1976 through the summer of 1977. During that time, Jack D. Gillum (the supervisor of the professional engineering activities of Gillum-Colaco, Inc.) and Daniel M. Duncan (working under the direct supervision of Gillum, the engineer responsible for the actual structural engineering work on the Hyatt project) assisted Crown Center Redevelopment Corporation (the owner) and PBNDML Architects, Planners, Inc. (the architect on the project) in developing plans for the hotel project and deciding on its basic design. A bid set of structural drawings and specifications for the project were prepared in late 1977 and early 1978, and construction began on the hotel in the spring of 1978. The specifications on the project were issued for construction on August 28, 1978.6

On April 4, 1978, the actual written contract was entered into by Gillum-Colaco, Inc. and PBNDML Architects, Planners, Inc. The contract was standard in nature, and Gillum-Colaco, Inc. agreed to provide all the structural engineering services for the Hyatt Regency project. The firm Gillum-Colaco, Inc. did not actually perform the structural engineering services on the project; instead, they subcontracted the responsibility for performing all of the structural engineering services for the Hyatt Regency Hotel project to their subsidiary firm, Jack D. Gillum & Associates, Ltd. (hereinafter referenced as G.C.E.).7 According to the specifications for the project, no work could start until the shop drawings for the work had been approved by the structural engineer.8

Three teams, with particular roles to play in the construction system employed in building the Hyatt Regency Hotel, were contracted for the project: PBNDML and G.C.E. made up the "design team," and were authorized to control the entire project on behalf of the owner; Eldridge Construction Co., as the "construction team," was responsible for general contracting; and the "inspection team," made up of two inspecting agencies (H&R Inspection and General Testing), a quality control official, a construction manager, and an investigating engineer (Seiden and Page).

On December 19, 1978, Eldridge Construction Company, as general contractor, entered into a subcontract with Havens Steel Company, who agreed to fabricate and erect the atrium steel for the Hyatt project.

G.C.E. was responsible for preparing structural engineering drawings for the Hyatt project: three walkways spanning the atrium area of the hotel. Wide flange beams with 16-inch depths (W16x26) were used along either side of the walkway and hung from a box beam (made from two MC8x8.5 rectangular channels, welded toe-to-toe). A clip angle welded to the top of the box beam connected these beams by bolts to the W section. This joint carried virtually no moment, and therefore was modeled as a hinge. One end of the walkway was welded to a fixed plate and would be a fixed support, but for simplicity, it could be modeled as a hinge. This only makes a difference on the hanger rod nearest this support (it would carry less load than the others and would not govern design). The other end of the walkway support was a sliding bearing modeled by a roller. The original design for the hanger rod connection to the fourth floor walkway was a continuous rod through both walkway box beams (Figure 1 below).

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Events and disputed communications between G.C.E. engineers and Havens resulted in a design change from a single to a double hanger rod box beam connection for use at the fourth floor walkways. The fabricator requested this change to avoid threading the entire rod. They made the change, and the contract's Shop Drawing 30 and Erection Drawing E-3 were changed (Figure 2 shows the hanger rod as built).

On February 16, 1979, G.C.E. received 42 shop drawings (including the revised Shop Drawing 30 and Erection Drawing E-3). On February 26, 1979, G.C.E. returned the drawings to Havens, stamped with Gillum's engineering review seal, authorizing construction. The fabricator (Havens) built the walkways in compliance with the directions contained in the structural drawings, as interpreted by the shop drawings, with regard to these hangers. In addition, Havens followed the American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) guidelines and standards for the actual design of steel-to-steel connections by steel fabricators.

As a precedent for the Hyatt case, the Guide to Investigation of Structural Failure's Section 4.5, "Failure Causes Classified by Connection Type," states that:

Overall collapses resulting from connection failures have occurred only in structures with few or no redundancies. Where low strength connections have been repeated, the failure of one has lead to failure of neighboring connections and a progressive collapse has occurred. The primary causes of connection failures are:

1. Improper design due to lack of consideration of all forces acting on a connection, especially those associated with volume changes.

2. Improper design utilizing abrupt section changes resulting in stress concentrations. 3. Insufficient provisions for rotation and movement. 4. Improper preparation of mating surfaces and installation of connections. 5. Degradation of materials in a connection. 6. Lack of consideration of large residual stresses resulting from manufacture or fabrication.

Figure 1. Hangar-rod/box-beam assembly as originally designed. (See Figures)

Note that the nut only carries the load of the floor above it.

Figure 2. Schematic of original versus changed design. Note that now the upper nut at the far left carries only the load of the floor above it whereas the nut at the far right carries the load of both floors. (See Figures)

On October 14, 1979, part of the atrium roof collapsed while the hotel was under construction. As a result, the owner called in the inspection team. The inspection team's contract dealt primarily with the investigation of the cause of the roof collapse and created no obligation to check any engineering or design work beyond the scope of their investigation and contract. In addition to the inspection team, the owner retained, on October 16, 1979, an independent engineering firm, Seiden-Page, to investigate the cause of the atrium roof collapse. On October 20, 1979, G.C.E.'s Gillum wrote the owner, stating that he was undertaking both an atrium collapse investigation as well as a thorough design check of all the members comprising the atrium roof. G.C.E. promised to check all steel connections in the structures, not just those found in the roof.

From October-November, 1979, various reports were sent from G.C.E. to the owner and architect, assuring the overall safety of the entire atrium. In addition to the reports, meetings were held between the owner, architect and G.C.E.

In July of 1980, the construction was complete, and the Kansas City Hyatt Regency Hotel was opened for business.

Just one year later, on July 17, 1981, the box beams resting on the supporting rod nuts and washers were deformed, so that the box beam resting on the nuts and washers on the rods could no longer hold up the load. The box beams (and walkways) separated from the ceiling rods and the fourth and second floor walkways across the atrium of the Hyatt Regency Hotel collapsed, killing 114 and injuring in excess of 200 others.

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One investigation report gave the following summary:

The Hyatt Regency consists of three main sections: a 40-story tower section, a function block, and a connecting atrium. The atrium is a large open area, approximately 117 ft (36 m) by 145 ft (44 m) in plan and 50 ft (15 m) high. Three suspended walkways spanned the atrium at the second, third and fourth floor levels [see Figure 3 on following page]. These walkways connected the tower section and the function block. The third floor walkway was independently suspended from the atrium roof trusses while the second floor walkway was suspended from the fourth floor walkway, which in turn was suspended from the roof framing.

In the collapse, the second and fourth floor walkways fell to the atrium first floor with the fourth floor walkway coming to rest on top of the second. Most of those killed or injured were either on the atrium first floor level or on the second floor walkway. The third floor walkway was not involved in the collapse.

Figure 3 - Schematic Layout of Walkways as Viewed from the South  (See Figures)

Figure 4. Schematic representation of hangar-rod/box-beam assembly as actually built. Note that the two top hangars to the fourth floor no longer continue through that floor to the second floor.  (See Figures)

Following the accident investigations, on February 3, 1984, the Missouri Board of Architects, Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors filed a complaint against Daniel M. Duncan, Jack D. Gillum, and G.C.E. International, Inc., charging gross negligence, incompetence, misconduct and unprofessional conduct in the practice of engineering in connection with their performance of engineering services in the design and construction of the Hyatt Regency Hotel. The NBS report noted that:

The hanger rod detail actually used in the construction of the second and fourth floor walkways is a departure from the detail shown on the contract drawings. In the original arrangement each hanger rod was to be continuous from the second floor walkway to the hanger rod bracket attached to the atrium roof framing. The design load to be transferred to each hanger rod at the second floor walkway would have been 20.3 kips (90 kN). An essentially identical load would have been transferred to each hanger rod at the fourth floor walkway. Thus the design load acting on the upper portion of a continuous hanger rod would have been twice that acting on the lower portion, but the required design load for the box beam hanger rod connections would have been the same for both walkways (20.3 kips (90 kN)).11

The hanger rod configuration actually used consisted of two hanger rods: the fourth floor to ceiling hanger rod segment as originally detailed on the second to fourth floor segment which was offset 4 in. (102 mm) inward along the axis of the box beam. With this modification the design load to be transferred by each second floor box beam-hanger rod connection was unchanged, as were the loads in the upper and lower hanger rod segments. However, the load to be transferred from the fourth floor box beam to the upper hanger rod under this arrangement was essentially doubled, thus compounding an already critical condition. The design load for a fourth floor box beam-hanger rod connection would be 40.7 kips (181 kN) for this configuration. ...

Had this change in hanger rod detail not been made, the ultimate capacity of the box beam-hanger rod connection still would have been far short of that expected of a connection designed in accordance with the Kansas City Building Code, which is based on the AISC Specification. In terms of ultimate load capacity of the connection, the minimum value should have been 1.67 times 20.3, or 33.9 kips (151 kN). Based on test results the mean ultimate capacity of a single-rod connection is approximately 20.5 kips (91 kN), depending on the weld area. Thus the ultimate capacity actually available using the original connection detail would have been approximately 60% of that expected of a connection designed in accordance with AISC Specifications.12

During the 26-week administrative law trial that ensued, G.C.E. representatives denied ever receiving the call about the design change. Yet, Gillum affixed his seal of approval to the revised engineering design drawings.

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Results of the hearing concluded that G.C.E., in preparation of their structural detail drawings, "depicting the box beam hanger rod connection for the Hyatt atrium walkways, failed to conform to acceptable engineering practice. [This is based] upon evidence of a number of mistakes, errors, omissions and inadequacies contained on this section detail itself and of [G.C.E.'s] alleged failure to conform to the accepted custom and practice of engineering for proper communication of the engineer's design intent."13 Evidence showed that neither due care during the design phase, nor appropriate investigations following the atrium roof collapse were undertaken by G.C.E. In addition, G.C.E. was found responsible for the change from a one-rod to a two-rod system. Further, it was found that even if Havens failed to review the shop drawings or to specifically note the box beam hanger rod connections, the engineers were still responsible for the final check. Evidence showed that G.C.E. engineers did not "spot check" the connection or the atrium roof collapse, and that they placed too much reliance on Havens.

Due to evidence supplied at the Hearings, a number of principals involved lost their engineering licenses, a number of firms went bankrupt, and many expensive legal suits were settled out of court. In November, 1984, Duncan, Gillum, and G.C.E. International, Inc. were found guilty of gross negligence, misconduct and unprofessional conduct in the practice of engineering. Subsequently, Duncan and Gillum lost their licenses to practice engineering in the State of Missouri (and later, Texas), and G.C.E. had its certificate of authority as an engineering firm revoked.

As a result of the Hyatt Regency Walkways Collapse, the American Society of Civil Engineering (ASCE) adopted a report that states structural engineers have full responsibility for design projects.

Both Duncan and Gillum are now practicing engineers in states other than Missouri and Texas.

The responsibility for and obligation to design steel-to-steel connections in construction lies at the heart of the Hyatt Regency Hotel project controversy. To understand the issues of negligence and the engineer's design responsibility, we must examine some key elements associated with professional obligations to protect the public. This will be discussed in class from three perspectives: the implicit social contract between engineers and society; the issue of public risk and informed consent; and negligence and codes of ethics of professional societies.

Ethical Issues Of The Case - Points For Discussion

This case centers on the question of who is responsible for a design failure. As an ethical issue,

Who is ultimately responsible for checking the safety of final designs as depicted in shop drawings?

When we take the implicit social contract between engineers and society, the issue of public risk and informed consent, and codes of ethics of professional societies into account, it seems clear that the engineer must assume this responsibility when any change in design involving public safety carries a licensed engineer's seal. Yet,

In terms of meeting building codes, what are the responsibilities of the engineer? The fabricator? The owner?

If we assume the engineer in the Hyatt case received the fabricator's telephone call requesting a verbal approval of the design change for simplifying assembly, what would make him approve such an untenable change? Some possible reasons include:

saving time; saving money; avoiding a call for re-analysis, thereby raising the issue of a request to recheck all connector designs

following the previous year's atrium roof collapse; following his immediate supervisor's orders; looking good professionally by simplifying the design; misunderstanding the consequences of his actions; or any combination of the above.

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These reasons do not, however, fall within acceptable standards of engineering professional conduct. Instead, they pave the way for legitimate charges of negligence, incompetence, misconduct and unprofessional conduct in the practice of engineering. When the engineer's actions are compared to professional responsibilities cited in the engineering codes of ethics, an abrogation of professional responsibilities by the engineer in charge is clearly demonstrated. But what of the owner, or the fabricator?

What if the call was not made? While responsibility rests with the fabricator for violating building codes, would the engineers involved in the case be off the hook? Why or why not?

The Hyatt Regency walkways collapse has resulted in a nationwide reexamination of building codes. In addition, professional codes on structural construction management practices are changing in significant ways.14 Finally, what is your assessment of this case, based on the following questions:

What measures can professional societies take to ensure catastrophes like the Hyatt Regency Walkways Collapse do not occur?

Should Gillum and Duncan be allowed to practice engineering in other states? Why or why not? What is the engineering society's responsibility in this realm?

Annotated Bibliography

Davis, Michael, "Thinking Like An Engineer: The Place of a Code of Ethics in the Practice of a Profession," Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 2, Spring 1991, pp. 150-167. (see also, "Explaining Wrongdoing," Journal of Social Philosophy, Vol. 20, Numbers 1&2, Spring/Fall 1989, pp. 74-90.

In these lucid essays, Davis argues that "a code of professional ethics is central to advising individual engineers how to conduct themselves, to judging their conduct, and ultimately to understanding engineering as a profession." Using the now infamous Challenger disaster as his model, Davis discusses both the evolution of engineering ethics as well as why engineers should obey their professional codes of ethics, from both a pragmatic and ethically-responsible point of view. Essential reading for any graduating engineering student.

Engineering News Report.

Throughout the hearings, Engineering News Report, published by the National Society of Professional Engineers (NSPE), kept vigilant watch over the case. Of particular interest are their following articles:

"Hyatt Walkway Design Switched," July 30, 1981. "Hyatt Hearing Traces Design Change," July 26, 1984. "Difference of Opinion: Hyatt Structural Engineer Gillum Disputes NBS Collapse Report," September 6,

1984. "Weld Aided Collapse, Witness Says," September 13, 1984. "Judge Bars Hyatt Tests," September 20, 1984. "Hyatt Engineers Found Guilty of Negligence," November 21, 1985. "Hyatt Ruling Rocks Engineers," November 28, 1985. "Construction Rescuers Sue," August 7, 1986.

Glickman, Theodore S., and Michael Gough (eds.), Readings in Risk, Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, 1990.

This is an excellent collection of essays on managing technology-induced risk. As a starting-off point, of particular worth to the engineers are the essays: "Probing the Question of Technology-Induced Risk" and "Choosing and Managing Technology-Induced Risk," by M. Granger Morgan; "Defining Risk," by Baruch Fischhoff, Stephen R. Watson, and Chris Hope; "Risk Analysis: Understanding 'How Safe is Safe Enough?'," by Stephen L. Derby and

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Ralph L. Keeney; "Social Benefit Versus Technological Risk," by Chauncey Starr; and "The Application of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Techniques to Energy Technologies," by Norman C. Rasmussen.

Gibble, Kenneth (ed.), Management Lessons from Engineering Failures, Proceedings of a symposium sponsored by the Engineering Management Division of the American Society of Civil Engineers in conjunction with the ASCE Convention in Boston, October 28, 1986, New York: American Society of Civil Engineers, 1986.

This short work examines a variety of engineering failures, including those involving individual planning, and project failures. In particular see Irvin M. Fogel's essay, "Avoiding 'Failures' Caused by Lack of Management," and Gerald W. Farquhar's "Lessons to be Learned in the Management of Change Orders in Shop Drawings," both excellent illustrations for use with the Hyatt case.

Hall, John C., "Acts and Omissions," The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 157, October 1989, pp. 399-408.

This article is a discussion of the legal and ethical ramifications of professional choices and activities, both active and passive.

"Hyatt Notebook: Parts I and II," Kansas City, October 1984 and November 1984.

These are two articles written by a Kansas City television reporter for the local magazine, Kansas City, detailing highlights from the 26-week Hyatt Regency Walkways Collapse hearings.

Janney, Jack R. (ed.), Guide to Investigation of Structural Failures, prepared for the American Society of Civil Engineers' Research Council on Performance of Structures, sponsored by the Federal Highway Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, Contract No. DOTFH118843, 1979.

This short volume gives an excellent overview of structural failure investigation procedures, and discusses failure causes by project type, structural type, and material, connection and foundation type. In addition, discussions on field operations, project management, and data analysis and reports are offered. Of particular interest to those studying the Hyatt case are sections 4.5-4.7, "Failure Causes Classified by Connection Type," and "Steel to Steel Connections."

Martin, Mike W. and Roland Schinzinger, Ethics in Engineering (2nd ed.), New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1989.

An excellent text-book treatment of ethical issues in engineering. Of particular interest to this case is Part Two, "The Experimental Nature of Engineering," and Part Three, "Engineers, Management and Organizations."

McK Norrie, Kenneth, "Reasonable: The Keystone of Negligence," Journal of Medical Ethics, Vol. 13, No. 2, June 1987, pp. 92-94.

This article is a brief discussion of legal liability for professional actions. "The more knowledge, skill and experience a person has, the higher standard the law subjects that person to" (p. 92).

PDF version: Missouri Board for Architects, Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors vs. Daniel M. Duncan, Jack D. Gillum and G.C.E. International, Inc., before the Administrative Hearing Commission, State of Missouri, Case No. AR840239, Statement of the Case, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision rendered by Judge James B. Deutsch, November 14, 1985, 442 pp. Note this is a BIG file - 20 Mb!

Word version: Missouri Board for Architects, Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors vs. Daniel M. Duncan, Jack D. Gillum and G.C.E. International, Inc., before the Administrative Hearing Commission, State of Missouri, Case No. AR840239, Statement of the Case, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision rendered by Judge James B. Deutsch, November 14, 1985, 442 pp. This has been changed to Word format, without any checking.

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Many errors are found when the scanner attempted to transcribe the pdf file to Word, but no one has found the time to correct the conversion

This volume contains the findings, conclusions of law and the final decision of the Hyatt Regency Walkways Collapse case, as rendered by Judge James B. Deutsch. The volume contains both the findings of the case and an excellent general discussion of responsibilities of the professional engineer.

Pfrang, Edward O. and Richard Marshall, "Collapse of the Kansas City Hyatt Regency Walkways," Civil Engineering-ASCE, July 1982, pp. 65-68.

Official findings of the failure investigation conducted by the National Bureau of Standards, U.S. Department of Commerce. Among its conclusions was this: "Even if the now-notorious design shift in the hanger rod details had not been made, the entire design of all three walkways, including the one which did not collapse, was a significant violation of the Kansas City Building Code."

 

 

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ENGINEERING ETHICS (http://ethics.tamu.edu/ethics/plow/plow.htm)

A Plow For Mexican Peasant Farmers Department of Philosophy and Department of Mechanical Engineering Texas A&M University NSF Grant Number DIR-9012252

Instructor's Guide

A Challenge for Designers

There is a pressing need for a device to assist third-world peasant farmers in cultivating their small plots of land. This need has never been satisfactorily met by any of the plows currently available. This case involves the design of a plow which can fulfill this need.

The plow should be assisted in some way by a gasoline engine, but the precise nature of the assistance the engine will provide is a matter for the designer to determine. For example, the engine might be used to pull the plow, but it might also be used to vibrate the plow, making it less difficult for animals to pull the plow. Other ways of using the power from the gasoline engine may be possible. Although the plow would probably be appropriate for use in any third-world country, we have specified that it will be used in Mexico. This gives the design project an additional note of realism and direction.

There are a number of other important design considerations. (1) Most peasant farmers in Mexico and Central America have hillside plots, the more desirable land being in the hands of large landowners. So a plow with a high center of gravity which would be easily overturned would not be appropriate. (2) The plow should probably be designed to be operated by one or at the most two people; but farming is usually labor-intensive in third-world countries, and the need for additional people to operate the plow would probably not be an obstacle.(3) The plow should be relatively simple to operate and maintain; replacement parts must be easily available. (4) Finally, the cost should be under $1000.00.

Uniqueness Of This Case

This case differs in important ways from most of the other cases in this series. Most of the other cases are real-world cases in which issues of engineering professionalism and ethics have arisen. By contrast, this case involves a design project, although the design is intended to meet a real-world problem. The focus here is not on a moral evaluation of the actions of particular engineers, but rather on identifying and intelligently addressing the value issues that arise in an engineering design project. The case helps students to see that the introduction of new technology can have profound implications for a community. It is thus an effective means of impressing on young engineers their responsibilities for the consequences of their professional work.

This particular problem is specifically oriented toward a senior design course in mechanical engineering, and it is not appropriate for chemical, electrical, or civil engineering. However, instructors who do not find this particular case appropriate for their own classes may still find that it is a useful model for something they might do in their professional area. The instructor who developed this case chose it in part because of the obvious value dimensions inherent in it. But there are cases in every area of engineering that can illustrate the value aspects of design.

The Hidden Dimension

There is a tendency on the part of professionals to overlook value issues in their work. Consider the following simple illustration from medicine. Suppose a physician must decide whether to administer a more powerful analgesic to her dying patient who is suffering from increasingly high levels of pain. On the one hand, if she does not prescribe the more powerful analgesic, the patient will be in considerable pain that could be eliminated. On the other hand, if she prescribes a more powerful analgesic, the patient will not suffer pain, but he will not be able to

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think as clearly and to relate to his family as effectively during the last days of his life. Should the physician administer the more powerful analgesic?

A decade or more ago, most physicians might have said that this question involves a "medical" decision and that the physician should make the decision. Today, many physicians are willing to concede that questions such as this are not primarily medical decisions, but rather value decisions that, under normal circumstances, are better left to the patient.

This is of course a very simple example, but it illustrates the way value decisions are often unrecognized by professionals. Professionals are predisposed to appraise issues from the standpoint of their own fund of technical knowledge. This is for the most part entirely proper, and it is what they have been trained to do. There is a weakness in this approach, however, namely that it tends to obscure the fact that some issues are not most appropriately dealt with from the perspective of their professional knowledge. As the above example illustrates, some decisions are primarily matters of values. This affects not only the criteria appropriate for a decision, but also the decision as to who should make it.

The engineer's work contains many such buried value decisions. Training in the ability to distinguish genuinely technical issues from value issues--or the ability to distinguish the value aspect of a technical decision from the more purely technical aspects--is an important aspect of the professional training of engineers. Just as the physician who did not recognize the value dimension of the decision whether to prescribe an analgesic to her dying patient should be considered in some way professionally deficient, so engineers who do not recognize the value dimension of their professional work should be considered professionally deficient.

Questions For Discussion

The following series of questions may serve to increase the students' awareness of the ethical dimension of this design project.

Will the Plow Be Perceived As Foreign Or Alien?

Anthropologists who have studied peasant cultures in Mexico and Central America emphasize that anything brought into such cultures from the outside and perceived as foreign or alien can be very destructive to the culture. It can also be detrimental to the self-esteem of the people who use it.

The peasant farmers in Mexico, many of whom are Indian, are very sensitive to the differences between their way of life and the way of life of the "white man." The "white man" includes not only Anglo Saxons from the United States, but also Mexican descendants of the Spanish invaders. The Indians often view anything brought in from the outside as an indication of their own inferiority. The acceptance of such imports implies, they believe, that the white man knows how to do things better than they do. Sometimes they will reject the imported item and not use it. Sometimes they will use it, but the result will be culturally or psychologically destructive. At other times they can incorporate the item into their culture in a more positive way.

Thus a very serious question arises as to whether a mechanically-powered plow would have a beneficent impact on the indigenous cultures into which it is introduced by making their method of farming more efficient and their way of life more sustainable, or whether it would tend to disrupt their culture and contribute to its destruction.

Here is a case where there is an ethical issue demanding choice, whereas one might not have seen an ethical issue at all. It is an example of the way ethical issues lie hidden under the surface of considerations which appear purely technical.

There are, however, several ways in which an engineer might attempt to evade any responsibility regarding the ethical questions that this issue raises. For example, she might argue that this kind of consideration is not her concern as an engineer. But this relies on a narrow conception of responsibility. If a person's being a causal agent

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with respect to an event gives one a share in the responsibility for it, then a designer has a share in the responsibility for the effects of the plow.

A second argument might be that the degree to which peasants can incorporate a plow into their culture is determined more by the way the plow is marketed to the peasants, and this is an issue over which engineers have no control. There is a considerable degree of truth in this response, but it still seems inadequate. As we shall see in the next section, some of the factors that determine the ability of the culture to assimilate the plow are directly affected by the design, and these are factors over which the engineer does have a say. So engineers do share in the responsibility for whether or not the plow can be assimilated.

Finally, an engineer might say that primitive peasant cultures should be assimilated into the dominant, more western-oriented culture of Mexico. If the plow he designs contributes to that end, this is one of the fortunate consequences of the creation of the plow. Whether or not this view is correct, it is clearly not a value-neutral position. It shows even more clearly that the engineer cannot wholly escape responsibility for the value dimensions of her work.

A number of factors might determine whether the plow will be perceived as an unwelcome import from a foreign and hostile culture, including such simple things as what color the plow is painted. Some colors may have special meanings for the culture, and they may be important determinants of who uses the plow and what significance it has in the culture. For example, some colors may be more associated with one gender than the other, or one social stratum rather than another.

Here are some other questions that are also important for the significance of the plow.

For Whom Should The Plow Be Designed?

If the plow is used by the wealthier and more competent and enterprising members of the peasant community, it may be used most effectively. This may have the result, however, of putting these members of the community even further ahead of their neighbors. If the plow is used by the less talented members of the community, it may not be used effectively, and the community may not make as much economic progress.

Which value is more important, community solidarity or economic progress? Is there any way to achieve both ends? Could this be incorporated into the design of the plow? For example, the cost of the plow is an important determinant of who will use it.

Several other factors might be important in deciding which group would be more likely to use the plow. The simpler the construction and the more easily repairable the plow is, the more likely it would be that the less advantaged peasants would use it. The important thing for the student to see is that these kinds of ethical issues are raised by the question about the group for which the plow is designed.

Will Humans Or Animals Be Used To Pull The Plow?

Animals are an important part of many traditional cultures. Mechanical devices that make animals useless, or even less useful, can be important determinants of social change. We have already pointed out that it is possible to design a plow that is pulled by an animal, but has a motor to vibrate it or in some other way move the blades so the plowing can be done more easily. Human power is even an option in some cultures. Would this be desirable?

The care and association with livestock is important to peasants' sense of self and social place. Animals are also a kind of insurance for peasants. If times get too hard, the animals can be sold to help sustain the family. If animals are not used for draft purposes, they would be idle much of the time. On the other hand, animals may be a significant drain on the limited food resources of some groups. Perhaps the reduction in the number of animals the peasant would have to support would be a benefit to him.

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Is The Design Of The Plow Sensitive To The Gender Of The Operator?

In some traditional societies, women do most of the farming. If the plow is not suitable for women, the introduction of the plow into the community would be disruptive of traditional ways. What design considerations are relevant here? For example, some plows might be too heavy for women to use. A heavy plow might be too difficult for women to turn at the end of the row. If a heavy plow overturned, some women might not be able to set it up again.

If, in a given culture, women do not do farming and their exclusion from agricultural work is one of the reasons for their subservient status in the culture, a plow suitable only for men would perpetuate these conditions. A plow suitable for women would be a vehicle for raising their status in the society. But then this augmented status might be highly disruptive to the society, and the need to be "liberated" might be something that the women of the culture do not recognize. Is it morally permissible for outsiders to, in effect, mandate change by introducing revolutionary technology? Perhaps the engineer should strive to make the plow "gender neutral." If so, she must know how to do this.

Will The Operator Of The Plow Walk Or Ride?

The change from walking to riding or riding to walking is a significant one. In general, walking behind a plow is probably better for the operator's health, but it might not be desirable from a social standpoint. For example, riding might have more social status than walking. Whether one walks or rides might also be related to the perception of whether the work of plowing is appropriate for men or women. Finally, safety issues might be important considerations in whether the operator of the plow walks or rides.

Should The Plow Be Designed At All?

Technology makes such a profound impact on a culture that there is always a question whether a particular technological artifact should be created at all. Some technological innovations have clearly been more destructive than constructive. It is possible that the Loriana stove discussed in the student handout should never have been produced. The question about the ultimate value of a technological innovation is often difficult to answer, but it is one which an ethically sophisticated designer should consider.

Three final observations should be made. First, a designer cannot answer all of the questions we have posed here. In order to do so, she would not only have to do an enormous amount of research, but she would have to know the particular social group for which the plow is being designed. Many of these questions would be answered in different ways for different social groups. Since the plow is presumably being designed for a large number of cultural groups, the designer cannot design the plow so as to accommodate only one such group. Perhaps, though, the engineer could design the plow so that it would be as adaptable as possible to the demands of different groups.

Second, the purpose of this discussion has not been to cause an engineer to be so obsessed with the cultural and ethical aspects of her work that she looses sight of more narrowly engineering considerations. Rather, the purpose has been to broaden the horizons of students, so that they will be more aware of the fact that design work does have social consequences. Engineers, like most of the rest of us, tend to forget the wider implications of what they do.

Third, this discussion also serves to raise the issue of "problems of conscience" as they arise in engineering work. Engineers sometimes object to working on a project for moral reasons. Some engineers do not want to be associated with military projects. Others object to working on projects (such as dams or projects that involve draining wetlands) that they believe are destructive to the environment. Similarly, an engineer might believe that this plow should not be produced because it would have a negative impact on the culture of those who would use it. Should he or she be given the option of working on another project?

The ability of a firm to assign other work to an engineer depends in part on the size of the firm, but the larger issue is whether engineering societies should be more active in promoting the rights of engineers to object to work on the basis of a problem of conscience. Should engineering codes have a statement that at least encourages firms to

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provide alternative forms of work for an engineer who has a problem of conscience in working on a particular project? This is an interesting question to raise with your students.

Instructors preparing to lead classroom discussion on this case will find particularly relevant essay #4, "Engineering Design: Literature on Social Responsibility Versus Legal Liability," appended at the end of the case listings in this report. In addition, essays #1 through #3 appended at the end of the case listings in this report will have relevant background information for the instructor preparing to lead classroom discussion. Their titles are, respectively: "Ethics and Professionalism in Engineering: Why the Interest in Engineering Ethics;" "Basic Concepts and Methods in Ethics;" and "Moral Concepts and Theories."

Recommended Overheads

The overhead can assist the students in gaining a better understanding of some of the issues involved in this case. Here is a short explanation of the overhead:

1. Two tables which give the student a sense of various costs per hectare for the small farmer, and the distribution of mechanization between the developed and underdeveloped countries.

A Plow For Mexican Peasant Farmers

Overhead

1) Relevant Tractor Farming Data

Size and Costs of Tractor-Powered Operations

Concept Farm Size (ha)

1 2 4 8 16 32 64

Optimum tractor size (hp) 1.5 2.3 3.9 7.0 12.9 24.8 48.5

Annual fixed cost (kg/ha) 375 287 244 219 202 194 189

Annual labor costs 279 176 105 59 32 17 9 (kg/ha)

Annual cash capital costs 745 565 446 373 330 307 294 (kg/ha)

Annual timeliness losses 93 118 140 158 171 178 182 (kg/hg)

Total Annual Cost (kg/ha) 838 683 586 531 501 485 476

Annual hours of operation 186 235 280 316 341 363 367

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Cash and capital costs 2.71 2.05 1.62 1.36 1.20 1.12 1.07 per unit work (kg/hp-hr)

Distribution of the Cultivated Area According to

Stages of Mechanization in 1975

Concept Stage of Mechanization

Manual Work Draught Tractors Total Animals

Developing Countries

Cultivated area 106 ha 125 250 104 479

Relative percentage % 26 52 22 100

Developed Countries

Cultivated area 106 ha 44 63 537 644

Relative percentage % 7 11 82 100

World

Cultivated area 106 ha 169 313 641 1123

Relative percentage 15 28 57 100

NOTE: Both tables were obtained from: FAO, The State of Food and Agriculture, 1988.

A Plow For Mexican Peasant Workers - Student Handout

Synopsis

In Mexico, as in many third-world countries, those who are engaged in agriculture can be roughly divided into two groups: large landowners and small subsistence farmers. For the most part, the large landowners have done a good job of keeping up with technological changes, and they have had the financial ability to utilize those changes. For the poor farmers, the situation has been very different. While the Mexican government has taken some steps towards land redistribution, 65% of the farmers hold less than 5 hectares of land. This diminishes the advantage of technology, which usually depends upon scale. Further, the land owned by these farmers is in the hills and mountainous terrain. It's difficult to transport and manipulate large machinery in these areas. Finally, water projects for increasing irrigation have generally not benefited the rural population, which remains dependent on the rains.

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If large farms can achieve efficiencies of scale, small farms will be unable to compete and may eventually be driven out of business. One might argue that it is better to let these small farmers get out of the agricultural business altogether. By allowing large farms to produce the agricultural needs for Mexico, the peasants can be moved to populated areas to work in industry.

Yet this solution seems patently wrong for three reasons. First, agrarianism is an important part of the Mexican cultural heritage. Many peasants want to remain close to the land and to continue to be a part of rural life. Second, the agrarian economy can support many more individuals than the industrial sector of Mexico. Prior to the 1970's, Mexico's economy was expanding due to the influx of petro-dollars, and advances were being made in reorienting Mexico's population towards a Western model. However, with the rise of inflation in the seventies, and a crushing foreign debt load, those advances stopped.1 Thus, if a way could be found to increase agricultural yields without forcing rural flight, the economy as a whole would benefit. Finally, the agricultural sector has had difficulty in recent years meeting goals of self-sufficiency for production of staple crops, such as maize and beans. It would be highly desirable, then, to increase yields on all available farmland.

Since supporting small farms is important to Mexico's immediate future, making small farming more efficient is an immediate need. One way of doing this is by producing a small plow that is appropriate for subsistence farming. Such a plow might increase crop yields and also lessen the backbreaking work of hand farming.

The development of a small plow might not be an unmixed blessing, however. Your instructor will present some reasons for thinking such a development might have negative effects. The following discussion presents some of the relevant considerations.

A first consideration for anyone interested in mechanizing small farming is that the rural economy places considerable value on animal ownership. Draft animals can be used for plowing and transport, and the calves can be sold for meat. In fact, a draft animal is an important asset for the farmer, because it can be sold if he is in financial distress. How a mechanization project affects animal ownership is thus an important consideration.

A second consideration is that the small farmer is very risk averse. More technologically advanced farming might provide 120 bushels one year and 25 bushels the next, whereas less advanced farming might produce 60 bushels of maize in a good year and 50 in a bad year. Given the choice between these two options, the small farmer would probably choose the second. This is because the small farmer is interested first in providing for his family, and only then selling for profit. Thus, if the costs of operation of a plow are too high, or detrimental to the soil or has other features tending to increase risk, farmers may not adopt it. Even if the plow is provided to them without charge, they may not accept it if it is perceived as substantially increasing risk.

Another consideration is that care should be taken lest technology is seen as foreign, or as an affront to the culture of the farmers. Artifacts seen as foreign sometimes convey the wrong cultural message: "their way is good and ours is bad." This tends to undermine cultural identity and social solidarity. Technological artifacts with which people can identify, and which can be seen as supportive rather than destructive of their culture, will be more likely to be accepted.

The history of the Loriana stove is often used by anthropologist as an example of the problems of introducing Western technology into non-Western societies. The stove is twice as efficient in its use of wood fuel as the indigenous Guatemalan peasant stove. But the Mayan Indians think of it as something non-Indian. The use of the stove is interpreted as an admission that the technology of others -- i.e. of the Spanish and North Americans -- is superior to Indian ways. There is another problem with the Loriana stove that emphasizes the importance of knowing the audience for whom one is designing. The stove gives off less heat than the traditional Indian method of cooking. Even though this is connected with its greater efficiency, it has a disadvantage. The main heating source of Indian housing is the stove. Use of the Loriana stove by Indians in the mountains regions of Guatemala means their homes are cold. If the designers had known this, they might have decided that making a more efficient stove should not be one of the design goals. They might have even decided that the Indians did not need a new stove.

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Here is a final consideration. One means used to assist in making decisions about technology is cost/benefit analysis or highest utility analysis. This method requires the engineer to select the design option which will produce the greatest benefits relative to cost. This method has come under considerable criticism, however. One criticism is that the benefits could be maximized without being equitably distributed. The best way to maximize the total benefit from the plow might be to provide plows to the most ambitious and capable of the small farmers. They would probably use the plow most efficiently. The plow might also enable the more capable farmers to become even wealthier, relative to their less capable and ambitious neighbors. The overall utility might be highest, yet the distribution of wealth resulting from this approach could be even more uneven. One might argue that rewarding efficiency is a good thing for the society, but this is a value judgment. The important thing to keep in mind is that introducing Western technology can initiate important social changes.

We tend to assume that technological improvement is always a good thing. Unfortunately, introducing new technology may destroy or seriously modify a culture, and this may or may not be desirable.2

Cost/benefit analysis is only useful if it can specify and quantify all relevant factors in a decision. Obviously we do not have perfect information for any case, but if cost/benefit analysis systematically undervalues certain aspects, such as cultural or moral factors (as Thompson argues), then the decision made on the basis of cost/benefit analysis will be flawed.

In the end, the choices made in designing the plow are going to have many ramifications. One writer has pointed out that:

the telling fact is that agricultural science and technology, like all technologies, have no inherent value; their human value is manifested only by the results achieved when they are properly applied to serve the need for which they were created.3

Design Considerations

Here is a list of considerations that you should keep in mind when designing the plow:

1. The plow could be designed to require two or more operators. Generally there is an abundance of human labor in subsistence farming.

2. The plow should not cost more than $1000. 3. The plow should be easily maintained. The tools available for repair will probably be minimal, and the

level of mechanical expertise will probably be low. Also, the parts should be easily available. 4. The plow should be easily operable. The operators will have minimal skills with machinery, and extensive

training would be impossible. 5. The plow should use fossil fuels that are readily available. 6. The plow could either move under its own power or be pulled by a human being or a draft animal. 7. If possible, the plow should be safely operable on slopes of up to 30 degrees. 8. The plow should be able to cultivate to a depth of 2-12 inches. The adjustments that vary the depth of

plowing should be easy to make. 9. The plow should be able to cultivate more than .2 hectare/day; which is the amount of cultivation that could

be expected if draft animals were used. Since the operating costs of a plow are greater than the maintaining costs of an animal, the greater efficiency of the plow should offset this cost.

10. Preventive maintenance should be easy. Parts will be difficult to come by, and factory service technicians may be nonexistent. Any maintenance which can prevent problems before they occur will add significantly to machinery life.

11. Since the storage and transport of fuel is an expense, a plow having a large gas tank is desirable. 12. Mexican gasoline's octane rating is quite low. The compression ratio of the engine will have to be low, with

a lower specific horsepower rating than would be normal with higher octane fuel.

Problems With Small Plows

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Obviously, given the price constraint, the engine is going to be small. Unfortunately, the small engine plows in use have numerous problems. These are enumerated in a very useful text entitled, Agricultural Mechanization in Development, by R.C. Gifford.4 Here are some of the difficulties of small plows (518 hp) according to Gifford:

1. High operation cost . Small engines must operate at higher r.p.m. to gain the torque necessary to pull a heavy implement. Because of this, maintenance and repair costs will be higher than with larger engines that can operate at lower speeds.

2. Low traction . The average tractive efficiency of regular tractors (say, 50 hp) is about 46%; for small tractors, the efficiency is 1734% less. Traction is a function of the weight of the tractor and its ability to turn that weight into traction for the tires. Obviously the smaller the tractor the less weight available. A second problem with traction in smaller tractors is the limitations in the size and width of tires they can use; this also leads to low traction. Low traction will lead to difficulty in cultivation in heavy or dry soil conditions.

3. Low stability . A single-axle plow's stability is limited by the ability of the operator to prevent the machine from tipping. If the slope of the land where the tractor is used is steep and the ground rocky and hard, the plow can skip and twist over the earth. Small two-axle tractors are limited in the width and length of their wheel base. This leads to the same problem Jeeps have, namely the tendency to tip over easily in sharp turns or on slopes. Yet a short wheel base and high ground clearance are necessary for a plow which can operate in difficult areas such as small, irregularly-shaped plots. Thus a trade-off between stability and mobility is often made in the design of the machine.

4. Low operator comfort . Operator comfort is often slighted in favor of power and design constraints. Yet being able to operate a machine comfortably for long time periods increases both productivity and safety. Unfortunately, price constraints limit the designer's ability to make both economical and well-designed tractors.

5. Safety problems . Safety of operation can be improved by considering ergonomic factors, as well as the lay-out of proper drive shafts and moving parts. It can also be improved with features which protect the operator from the machine. In designing small tractors, however, ergonomic factors are often given scant attention. As for safety features, these may work well when the plow is new, but a scarcity of parts and proper servicing may result in their degradation with time. Usually, there is little in the way of operator training. This tends to increase safety problems. Finally, small tractors have fewer safety features to begin with than larger ones.

6. Referring to the small tractor, Gifford concludes that "in spite of the seemingly attractive low cost it is more costly per horsepower to manufacture, and more costly per hectare of output to operate, than conventional tractors."

Engineering Data and Questions

Here is some additional data for your calculations:

1. Hp (metric) = Draft x Plow speed - 375 2. Width of Implement usable with = Max draft - a given tractor Draft/meter 3. Values for Draft/meter

o a. Mould board plow 224.7 Newtons o b. Chisel plow 179.7 Newtons o c. Disk (medium draft) 67.4 Newtons 8

4. Plow Speed = 1 meter/second 5. Usable Drawbar horsepower (power to pull the implement) is 67% of max or stated horsepower. 6. Plow field capacity is a measure of the distance covered in a given time.

Annotated Bibliography

This bibliography is divided into two groups. First there is a set of references relating to the value issues involved. Then there are references relating to the engineering issues.

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Value Issues

Gifford, R.C., Agricultural Mechanization in Development, FAO Agricultural Services Bulletin 45, Rome, 1981. - An indispensable collection of data on what does and does not work in rural mechanization. Published by the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations.

Grindle, Merilee S., Official Interpretations of Rural Underdevelopment: Mexico in the 1970's, Working Papers in U.S.-Mexican Studies, Vol. 20, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, California, 1981. - Tables and sources for understanding what government agricultural policies were implemented by Mexico during the 1970's.

Leagans, J. Paul, Adoption of Modern Agricultural Technology by Small Farm Operators, Cornell International Agricultural Mimeograph 69, June 1979. - Addresses the question of how we can increase adoption of technology in developing countries.

Sheridan, Thomas E., Where the Dove Calls, University of Arizona Press, Tucson, Arizona, 1988. - Discusses the political ideology of peasant farmers in northwestern Mexico.

Thompson, Paul B., "Ethics in Agricultural Research," Journal of Agricultural Ethics, Vol. 1, pp. 1120. - Focuses on ways in which utilitarian considerations in agricultural research effect the design of agricultural technology.

Yates, Paul Lamartine, Mexico's Agricultural Dilemma, University of Arizona Press, Tucson, Arizona, 1981. - Survey of the history and the development of Mexico's agricultural sector through the 1970's.

Engineering Issues

ASAE Standards (1990), Code D497, pp. 285-291. - Data on farm machinery operation parameters. Bowers, Wendell, Machinery Management, John Deere and Co., Moline, Illinois, 1975. - A guide to the

method of estimating the amount of tractor power needed for different tractor weights, plot sizes, etc. Crossley, Peter and Kilgour, John, Small Farm Mechanization for Developing Countries, John Wiley &

Sons, Chichester, Great Britain, 1983. - A standard reference for data on designing small farm equipment for developing countries.

Eckaus, Richard S., Appropriate Technologies for Developing Countries, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., 1977. - Considers the level of technology that is needed for developing countries and the design process for technology.

Goering, Carroll E., Engine and Tractor Power, PWS Publishers, Boston, Massachusetts, 1986. - A textbook concentrating on the more technical aspects of engine design. For use as a secondary source.

Wilkinson, Robert H. and Braunback, Oscar A., Elements of Agricultural Machinery, FAO Agricultural Services Bulletin 12, Suppl. No. 1, Rome, 1977. - Good explanation of the different types of plows available.

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