topoi volume 17 issue 1 1998 [doi 10.1023%2fa%3a1005972005357] georg stenger -- structures of...

7/27/2019 Topoi Volume 17 Issue 1 1998 [Doi 10.1023%2Fa%3A1005972005357] Georg Stenger -- Structures of World-Orient…

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Interculturally motivated thinking is increasingly be-

coming the crucial test of the general endeavours of

thought and their being comprehended as categories.

Amongst other aspects, this is revealed in the fact that

almost all spectres of philosophy deal with the topic of

interculturality. This may even serve merely to confirm

those strategies of thinking which have been employed

so far, where intercultural phenomena were considered

as having only marginal significance, being interesting,

yet having no decisive meaning. However, there

seems to be a deeper, gnawing uneasiness. In view of

intercultural philosophizing, philosophy itself is scruti-

nized. Its distinguished object, reason itself, is placed

at disposal in a new way. Thus, one can not be as naive

as to rely on the one base of reason. But even the seem-

ingly opposite endeavour, the pluralization of this base

by means of relations specific and relevant for culture,

is not very helpful, since each serious philosophical

thought has to refer to final, unquestionable presuppo-

sitions and reasons. Consequently one finds oneself in a strangely paradoxical situation, which, on the one

hand, is not able to leave the realm of general, cate-

gorically binding structures of thinking, yet, on the other

hand, perceives these structures as permanently ques-

tioned by the impact and demands of the intercultural

paradigm. Indeed, intercultural thinking seems to direct

philosophy into new paradoxes. In order to escape

them, it would be necessary to favour one of the respec-

tive aspects. Consequently, during the last few years,

pairs of opposite concepts have stepped into the

limelight, for example: “universalism and/or rela-

tivism”, “unity versus multiplicity”, “identity versusdifference”, “global- versus ethnophilosophy”, “logo-

centrisms versus contextualisms” etc. One can find a

preliminary exercise for this area of problems in the

various discussions of modernism and post-modernism,

where one side is gaining its legitimation of arguments

from its distance and opposition to the other side, at

the same time revealing the respective interdependence.

But there, too, one can witness reason’s self-criticism

towards its opening and pluralization, although these are

clad into typical European patterns of thinking.

The internal aporia of the concept of philosophy

seems to correspond more and more with the basic

situation according to which the basic ideological, philo-

sophical and religious disagreements develop into

cultural conflicts. One can not simply build bridges

across their abysses without becoming accused of har-

bouring mental, intellectual, economical and other pre-

dominances and supremacies. The fact that one culture,

while searching for itself, places ultimate strain onto the

respective others, and that the discovery of one’s own

worth instantly leads to other cultures being slighted

– a phenomenon which drastically demonstrates incom-

mensurability –, is becoming relevant all over the

world. This critical development reveals the political

dimension of all intercultural philosophical endeavours.

One must find ways beyond the difference betweentheories about unity and multiplicity, identity and dif-

ference. Everything else, even the apparent alternative

of viewing “enlightenment” on the one side and “fun-

damentalism” on the other side, seems to undermine and

to play down the problem, especially since, on close

observation, this particular approach reveals an aston-

ishingly double-edged face. All these aspects contribute

to a situation which is philosophically and politically

precarious, yet also challenging and exciting.

A possible attempt to, first of all, become conscious

of this new overall situation, which I want to call

“intercultural basic situation” (interkulturelle Grund-situation), could be to set the theme of world-concept

(Weltbegriff) which has always appeared in philosoph-

ical tradition, but now, due to the intercultural discus-

sion, moves towards the centre of attention in a different

way. The basic concept of “world ” is probably that with

the largest dimension, i.e. it is able to embrace universal

Structures of World -Oriented Encounter:The World Concept and theIntercultural Basic Situation1

Georg Stenger

Topoi 17: 37–47, 1998.© 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.



structures as well as regional or individual ones, even

the microstructures of environmental and physiological-

organical conditions. Of course I do not want to give a

description of the history of the world-concept. Instead,

the topic is to be examined in terms of its relevance for

intercultural thinking. I want to present some thoughts

about what is really meant by “world’, how we can

meet a world, and especially how its notion is to be seen

in very different ways and circumstances. It is under-

going a change and transformation so that we can not

start form a world-concept , but rather have to talk

about a “World-liness” (Welthaftigkeit) or, even more

accurate, a “world- phenomenon”. I want to suggest

some steps, demonstrating the “structures of world-

oriented encounter”.

1. “The one world”

1.1. The global world

This topic describes a Whole (ein Gesamt), within

which the world encounters itself by means of a global

network. Everything is, or could be, connected to every-

thing else. Globalization does not only bring new skills,

more knowledge, irresistible progress, but also dictates

a certain standard of life and affluence. Like a fish-

erman’s net around the globe, it catches everything

which gets tangled into it. Things which are not tangled

up are caught nevertheless, since they are taken into

consideration as the un-considered aspects. The globalworld is a closed system, yet it knows an outside world,

appearing as that which is different, and thus becoming

a constituent for the self-comprehension of the system

in the form of “outsider world” or “environment”.

System and environment are one thing, if you want, one

system.2 Global thinking is systemic thinking. At each

place, the world is meeting itself.

1.2. The notion of unity of the system and its possible

contradiction in itself (Selbstwiderspruch)

Embodied in systemic thinking and the globalization

coming with it is the universal aspect, the “aspect of

unity”, which always has been the prime cause of phi-

losophy. Unity is thinking, and thinking is unity, and

he who already says “two”, also says “three”, which,

of course, confirms the “one”. I can only think of dif-

ference because of unity. Thinking is unity-thinking.

This can be observed starting from the Greeks until

today, although it was the step into modern times which

truly brought up the systemic thinking. System thinking

is the birth of modern times. The old notion of “cosmos

and ordo”, shaped and built with regard to substance,

is replaced by the notion of “system”, which, in its

radical version, does not know substance any more,

since everything has dissolved into functionalities. In

spite of all fundamental differences of these two basic

ideas, the aspect of unity and totality, the origin, so to

say, of all possibilities of thinking, remains consistent.

Knowledge is “world-knowledge” and world science.

Even Kant, who perhaps was most able to sense this dif-

ference, by taking it apart into the areas of “necessity”

and “freedom” and thus recognizing their respective

own logic, was not able, in spite of taking back thinking

into its “finite condition” (endliche Verfaßtheit), to

escape the postulate of a “concept of a universal world”

(Begriff des Weltganzen), even if it only functions as

transcendental idea.3

In the succession of these constellations of thinking,

there are honourable large projects like that of a “world

ethos”, as well as the more and more virulent debate

about “human rights”, “education issues” in connection

with the “postulate of enlightenment”, aspects of tech-

nological and economical rationality etc.

Alas, the system, claiming a better, more humane life

for everybody and tending towards universalization –

an inclination which is not merely manifested in its

practical realization and its brilliant results, but is intrin-sically inherent from the very beginning – does not

bring the expected equal rights, but rather causes

inequality, social and cultural decline. In a subtle way,

the so-called equalization of the world turns out as a

hierarchy. This contradiction in itself, which is no less

than the contradiction in itself of enlightenment, has

much more grave consequences than the “dialectics of

enlightenment” might suppose. For example, wealth

seems to make people richer; at second glance, however,

it makes them poorer. The education system brings more

and more knowledge, but somehow it makes people

poorer “in spirit”, for they do not understand any morewhat they know, let alone why they know it. Everything

is functioning, but nothing is really alive. The world

contradicts itself, but you do not quite know why. And

everything you might do against this contradiction in

itself seems to not only confirm it, but even makes it

stronger.

38 GEORG STENGER



1.3. The surface structure of the world

The world is “the real”, the encounter of “reality” in

general. Like the surface of the sea, reality is what you

perceive. Improvement meens progress on this surface.

The world is a world of progress, liberating human

beings of all possible chains. It even is a “progress in

the consciousness of freedom” (Hegel). Not only thateverything seems within reach, it truly is; it can be done,

it can be made possible. Progress causes development,

development in every respect. Everything is subsumed

under the notion of development; otherwise it is not

developing and falls behind. Only because of this one

could want to develop other countries or continents with

safe conscience. There are “developing countries”, i.e.

there is a “second” and “third world”. One helps where

one can. The world is divided into developed worlds

and worlds to be developed, yet the manifested “world

differential” (Weltgefälle) remains within the “one

world”, whose surface tension merely has to bear some

more strain. The surface of the world behaves as if it

were the “actual world” and this may come with a

“superficial” consciousness, which is expressed not just

in the language.

2. Self-criticism of the world

2.1. Nihilism and life-world (Lebenswelt)

The prominence of the “one world” is obvious. This“one world” is the standard everything must be

measured with – and everything allows itself to be

measured with it. The fact that this concerns the occi-

dental European world is not an external attribute, but

is inherent to this world’s character. Since the global net

appears to have holes and cracks, this predominant

position, experienced over centuries, is slowing begin-

ning to raise doubts about itself. At best, Europe finds

itself in a “special position of mankind”. Strange as it

may seem, the first European self-critics appear at the

same time as forcing technological and spiritual expan-

sion. Nietzsche diagnoses a “European nihilism”. Theonly constructive way to cope with it he sees in a

fundamental “transvaluation of all values”. Husserl’s

diagnosis is similar, although its motives were different

and his suggestions for therapy aim towards a different

method. Husserl discovers the “ Lebenswelt ” (life-

world) as the desired result of the “crisis of European

humanity”,4 i.e. a world which is truly lived and expe-

rienced is quite different from the world concept which

claims an objective value and truth.

2.2. The world’s creation of meaning (Sinnstiftung)

For Husserl, the self-contemplation of philosophy is theonly possibility to stop and to complement the decline

of scientific thinking. He especially reminds us of the

fact that all sciences are rooted in philosophy. He draws

our attention to nothing else but the humane basic aspect

of all sciences. As it is known, Husserl calls this

“Sinnstiftung” (creation of meaning), expressing that

it is philosophy and science which give meaning to

people and that without them, everything would be

sinking into its own bottomless abyss. The European

sciences seem to go down under indeed – however, there

are the lower grounds of the life-world (Lebenswelt),

those long forgotten sediments, which nevertheless

are able to stop the “free fall”5 of faith in science. The

“life-world” becomes the verification in reality of

Münchhausen’s utopian and contradictory reply: he said

that it is only youself who can pull you out of the

swamp. The “creation of meaning” (Stiftung von Sinn)

was forgotten, and Husserl’s phenomenology perceived

it as its main task to bring up these layers of meaning,

to which there belongs also a new valuation of everyday

life’s world. The discovery of the life-world is at the

same time a discovery of the world’s character of

meaning, which spreads out the world into “specialworlds”, into “home world” and “strange world”. The

world concept is brought back to its background of

meaning, and this endeavour takes place in the

workshop of the life-world.6

2.3. The strongholds of the world of meaning

If one realizes this discovery of meaning via life-world,

it also becomes obvious that these creations of meaning

can only be relevant for those cultures which have

created philosophy and science. For Husserl, and, witha certain reservation, for Heidegger, too, only a “spiri-

tual Europe” could meet this demand.7 However, one

can extend the demand towards other cultures, too,

as Jaspers did in his theory of the “axial period”

(Achsenzeit).8 Perhaps one could generally say that,

with the “axial period”, and previously with the very

STRUCTURES OF WORLD-ORIENTED ENCOUNTER 39



advanced civilizations, the step towards the “culture of

meaning” has been taken. Of course this does not imply

that there has not been any meaning before the advanced

civilizations, but rather that it was they who discovered

the meaning of “culture”, for example as opposed to

nature, and who discovered what the new step really

is.

2.4. The double structure of the world

The double structure of the life-world and the world of

science, which was diagnosed by Husserl, basically

holds true for all cultures which understand themselves

on the basis of this polarity. It does not matter whether

they have melted into a single system – which means

that blendings have taken place, and still continue to

do so; blendings which also cause things to blur – or

whether the polarity is kept clearly distinguished, as it

is, for example, the case in Japan (at least, this is con-

firmed by almost everyone). Basically, these cultures’

significance is that each of them embodies a specific

interpretation of this double structure, which could also

be described with notions like “tradition” and “mod-

ernism”, “old world” and “new world”.9 Each of these

cultures, in its particular way, contains both; but this is

probably the reason why, due to their relatively equal-

ized positions, they meet on common grounds of under-

standing, conscious of their superiority to others. This

attitude may also manifest itself in the fact that it is

exactly these cultures which fight about having thehighest standard of living and the greatest wealth, and

about who will be holding the claim of the leading

position in society and politics.10 Therefore, it can be

said that the double structure of the world is also con-

tributing to the difference (Gefälle) between the culture

worlds, causing those cultures to “fall flat” which either

did not experience or did not want to share into this

double structure.

It becomes obvious that, although the step from the

“one world” towards the “double structure of the world”

contributes to an immense mutual opening of the

cultures and to a much more intricate differentiationbetween them, this step nevertheless still forces a lim-

itation which is intrinsic to the measure of the double

structure.

3. The world’s dependence on horizon

(Horizontgebundenheit)

Not only does the world have a double structure in itself,

it also constitutes itself by means of a whole range of

smaller “worlds”, which perhaps should better be called

“horizons”. The horizon structures reveal the multitude

and different dimensions by differentiating towards the

inside and, at the same time, enabling the meeting with

other horizons on the outside.

Internally, this means that the single horizons con-

stitute a larger common horizon. This does not imply

that one could, for example, recognize a cultural era by

the correspondence of its buildings, its art, its modes

of thinking, its consciousness of certain problems, its

lifestyle etc. – such an interpretation could only be given

subsequently – but rather that one and the same thing

conveys a very different message according to the

horizon in which it appears. Moreover, the thing itself

does not even exist without the horizon. A cathedral,

for example, has a very different meaning when it

appears as the house of God, the house of prayer, or

when it is assessed by the criteria of the history of art.

It is different again when visited by tourists, and when

the local authorities discuss how it is to be kept clean.

These very specific horizon structures belong to a

further horizon, embracing the single horizons within

a certain relation, for example as the horizon, “city

culture” or “horizon of an era”, etc. The comprehension

of the horizon thus comes before the fact, although the

horizon can only make its appearance in connectionwith the fact.

Externally, the matter becomes more difficult. While

internally one can, for the most part, learn to understand

the oddities encountered, in the external realm the

task is to create horizons for the understanding of the

unfamiliar (Fremdverstehen). This sounds much simpler

than it is, for we encounter the unfamiliar, that which

is strange and completely different from what we know,

in such a way that we can definitely not “understand”

it. It refuses all attempts to be understood and, there-

fore, appears as “weird”, “scary”, “something that can

not be properly estimated”, and “unpredictable”. On theother hand, this implies that I nevertheless understand,

within its being removed, that which I do not understand

and which remains removed from me. One understands

that one does not understand.11 Therefore, one allows

things to be and allows them to be open.

The comprehension of the world is becoming a

40 GEORG STENGER



question of horizon. This is the specific interest of the

hermeneutic approach. If you understand the horizon,

this means above all that you understand the meaning,

that the meaning is given to you (Sinngebung). Actually,

understanding of the horizon is understanding! Further-

more, this implies that you do not understand something

in general, but from a specific vantage point, a specific

place which enables you to better comprehend the struc-

ture of your own horizon, since during the process of

understanding other horizons open up for you and reveal

themselves as horizons. The notion of “overlapping”12

seems to me to be quite appropriate, insofar as it does

not merely imply simple overlappings or even inter-

sections, but rather a kind of unfolding “range of

horizons” (Horizontenfächer), demonstrating that the

common aspect reveals itself in the very own form of

each horizon’s specific individuality. Such an under-

standing contains a universal character which, if you

understand all this more on the basis of the aspect of

the language, the thinking, the philosophy, leads towards

a “hermeneutic universe”, but if your understanding is

rooted within places and cultures, it opens up into a

“hermeneutic multiverse”. In other words: the world

becomes multiversal.

4. The “inbetween world” (Zwischenwelt) of one’s

own (das Eigene) and the strange (das Fremde)

Here I want to point out a possible consequence of the

abovementioned aspects. B. Waldenfels has describedthis topic in much more detail and much better than I

could do it.13 We are talking about the phenomenal

discovery that one can neither suggest “one’s own” nor

“the strange”, but that, before that, there opens up

an “inbetween” area which, however, is not placed

“between” the two aspects, but is pointing towards the

fact that “one’s own” and “the strange” are in them-

selves open notions with different meanings, depending

on the respective constellation. Not only it becomes

obvious that the one could not even exist without the

other, but that the “own” always contains something

“strange”, and therefore it cannot claim to be differentfrom the “strange’, as well as the “strange” always

offers something “own”, too. There is an odd relation-

ship of the non-relationship, an “asymmetry”, refusing

every attempt of reciprocity. Actually, one cannot make

a difference between the two, and yet this difference

between “one’s own” and “the strange” is experienced .

The experience itself constitutes “own-ness” and

“strange-ness” in very specific ways, so that sometimes

the one side dominates, sometimes the other. Sometimes

we feel very much at home with ourselves, sometimes

we feel like strangers in our own house. 14 Here it is

important to note that “world ” constitutes itself as a

peculiar “inbetween”, showing the “own” and the

“strange” being necessarily interwoven, which can never

be denied. One can say that this inbetween is the

decisive field to be examined; it becomes the true

“world ” from which everything else receives its

place.

5. The microstructure of the world

The intention of understanding reaches out very far,

insofar as it has to open up and to illuminate the various

horizons (Horizontaufblendungen). It is directed more

strongly towards the macrostructures, since the world’s

variety of horizons needs to be brought into a whole,

in spite of its infinite variation. For the microstructure,

this would be too much “understanding”, neglecting the

work of intricate constitution, more so as it is through

such a work that the horizon phenomenon is created.

Thus, the microstructure becomes a critical authority,

since it reveals the blind spots of horizon-oriented

comprehension, of all understanding and being able to

understand. Microstructures are, so to say, “on the

scene”, they are open for the “ particular ” (das

Jeweilige) of a situation, which means that, apart fromreason and understanding, some very different fields of

experience come into view. Phenomena like the corpo-

reality (Leiblichkeit) appear, as well as feelings, and

areas which are generally more oriented towards per-

ception and experience. One does not merely register

something and then moves on towards the next thing,

which means that, in a way, the first thing has been

overlooked and ignored, but one listens, stays with it

for a while, or perhaps even longer, since the listening

itself opens up a space of its own, within something is

speaking which we have not yet perceived before.15

Microstructure is not smaller than macrostructure; quitethe oppostie – it is more alive and mobile, and, at first,

it is content with making the experience concrete

without always viewing the whole. Rush categorizations

and systematizations do not allow anything to really

come into existence, since everything is already brought

into order and set into place. This way, decisive factors




get lost, for example the opportunity for corrections

which result from the matter itself, or the realization

that “the world’ is now entering the microstructure in

such a way that it is emerging from it. When seen

microstructurally, the world “on the whole” is very dif-

ferent than when it is approached from the macrostruc-

tural viewpoint, for it is not a mere example or image

of a general world, as it is mostly perceived. The macro

view underestimates the microstructure, and this is fatal

for itself, too.

6. World as basic phenomenon (Grundphänomen)

So far, we have considered the attempt to understand

the “world” concept in its different facets, nuances and

transformations. We have found out that “the world”, as

it were, is becoming smaller with each step, but at the

same time it gains more dimensions, becomes more con-

centrated and open, too. It also becomes obvious that it

is hardly possible any more to speak of a “concept of

the world”, insofar as this already implies an abstract

concept creation (Begriffsbildung) with a specific rela-

tionship between subject and object. One is, so to say,

encountering yet a world, one is related “to the world”.

At the same time, the analyses reveal that, the more the

world opens up, the more it goes beyond the classical

differences between subject and circumstances. The

world is no longer a mode of appearance, but it becomes

the base and the field of all being able to appear.

The world becomes a basic phenomenon (Grund-phänomen).16 With the “world” as a concept being no

possible referent, but at best a “transcendental idea”

(Kant) or the “horizon of all horizons” (Husserl), which

can never come into appearance as such, now it is

obvious that “world” means a phenomenological basic

substance going beyond the subject-object constellation,

clarifying what can be understood as subject and object.

This also implies that neither “a God” nor “the I” can

be placed in front of the world. Rather, it seems to be

the other way around: out of the respective world, there

emerges the respective God, the respective “I” – under-

standing etc. At the same time it holds true that theworld is nothing different from this God, this “I”, this

whatever; it appears within these aspects as their foun-

dation structure (sie tragende Struktur), yet it is not

something different from their constituents.

6.1. “From the world” (von der Welt her)

I have borrowed this expression from Ohashi who got

it from Nishida.17 Nishida probably was one of the first

who took this step or, as one could call it, this “tran-

scendental turn”, which had appeared previously, but

only in a metaphysical, speculative way. With Nishida,

it becomes real, as it is already indicated by the topic

of the “active intuiting” (handelnde Anschauung). I

want to call it the “world turn”. It is about starting, not

from the “I”, but from the world; however, this means

that the “I”, as we know it in its intentional structure,

emerges from a specific world itself. “World” does not

describe the noematic nomenclature, but begins beyond,

or rather on this side of the noetic-noematic structure.

The fact that it is not easy to bring up the notion of such

a constellation, that it resists, in a certain way, being put

into words – which manifests itself in paradoxical terms

like “self-identity of the absolute contradiction” or “the

self in the contradictory self-identity” – demonstrates

the “coming to terms” (Zur-Sprache-Kommen) of the

world, the fact that it is a “coming around to itself”

(Zu-sich-Kommen), an inner “dialectical event”, where

the respective “ place” and the “nothingness” meet in

such a way that they unfold to each other.18 “World” is

what, in a contradictory way, connects that which is

closest and most immediate with that which is the most

far away, so that it becomes obvious that the two are

not separate at all.

6.2. “Being in the world” (In-der-Welt-Sein)

It is no accident that there exists a fruitful mutual accep-

tance between the Nishida school (Kyoto-Philosophy)

and Heidegger. Heidegger’s existential of “being in the

world” wants to illuminate the fact that the existence

(Dasein) is carried out , thus gaining this meaning. It

does not exist in the first place and then acts in relation

to the world, but it constitutes and approaches itself from

the world . The world, too, comes into being through

this process and has no continued existence in itself.

The “I”, which is completely “intentionally” fixed andthus grasps all circumstances within the mode of “objec-

tivity” (Gegenständlichkeit) is replaced by the “Self”,

which meets itself in the “open approach” (offenes

Entgegen). This way, the “objects” (Gegenstände)

become “blazed trails” (Bahnungen) and “opportuni-

ties of being” (Seinsmöglichkeiten), which thoroughly

42 GEORG STENGER



determine existence and have always done so. It may

however be possible that Heidegger underestimates the

hidden “making an absolute” (Absolutsetzung) within

the ipseity (Jemeinigkeit) of the respective world (Je-

Welt). Even if the absolute takes into consideration the

“co-existence” (Mit-sein) with others, this belongs to

the Jemeinigkeit . The question how the different worlds

are positioned in relation to each other and whether it

is possible at all to speak of several worlds remains

mysteriously unanswered.

7. Can there be a plural of “world”? Can there be

“worlds”?

This is now becoming the decisive question, since on

the one hand it is crucial for the general possibility of

philosophical thinking, and on the other hand for the

contemporary basic situation of society, politics and

intellectual life, where one is searching for veritable,

peaceful means for mutual encounters of the different

cultures. “World” has always been considered as a

“singulare tantum”, and if there were the demand for

several or even many different worlds, this would imply

a superworld which makes possible the multiplicity of

the others19 – and thus there would again be only “one

world”. My thesis is that, in spite of these problems,

there exists a “plurality of worlds”, and that exactly

there is the “intercultural basic situation”.

7.1. The mutual encounter of worlds

K. Nishitani has written a very commendable essay

entitled “About the essence of the encounter (Vom

Wesen der Begegnung).20 Without giving an exact

description of how Nishitani outlines the meeting of two

Zen masters according to the two basic categories of

“absolute” and “relative” – he does this on the basis of

the 68th koan example from the “Bi-yän-lu” – the

meeting comes to a point where there is no more way

out. Two absolutes meet each other absolutely, or rather

as opponents. All authorities of mediation have failed,and will always fail, for each attempt of mediation will

be at the expense of either the one or the other. In view

of this outer and inner abyss, which finally becomes an

“absolute opposition and deadly hatred”, there remains

nothing but “an infinite horror”. But it is exactly this

horror which is able to abruptly transform into a

“singing in unison” and an “infinite beauty”, just like a

“fight” can transform into a “play”, and “dialectics” into

an “event”. However, this requires a breakthrough,

which lifts both parties onto a new level. It does not

change anything and yet transforms everything. Here,

the breakthrough comes with the “great laughter”, which

I would like to interpret as there being no contradic-

tion between “entirely separate” and “yet one”. The dif-

ference between the one and the other is so big that it

cannot even be comprehended or manifest itself. It is

this experience which breaks through in the “greater

laughter”, and Nishitani calls it an “inspiration”, since

every word does already mean a loss. The laughter,

however, is coming out of the depths of the encounter

itself.

One could now ask what the encounter of two Zen

masters should contribute to the question of intercul-

tural encounter. The two men belong to the same

culture, and today we are in a situation completely dif-

ferent from that of the Zen masters. A contemporary

Japanese philosopher wondered who, in modern Japan,

still believed in “Zen stories”. One would of course have

to reply that it is not a matter of faith, but of a philo-

sophical insight. Zen is not to be a corrective of modern

times. If there is no premature backing out or rela-

tivization, but rather the courage to test its implicit

absolute, the abovementioned example demonstrates a

prototype of encounter. The real conflict is the colli-

sion of two or several absolutes. To withdraw from this

problem means merely to shift it, but not to solve it.

7.2. The conflict of the worlds

Well, not everybody is a Zen master! Probably only very

few people are. And if I am not, the laughter most often

changes into jeering at the other person. But the abyss

does not only open up between the two Zen masters, it

gapes between the different cultures, at least if one takes

them seriously, as the two masters rightfully demand.

Such a taking them seriously might manifest itself in

beholding their respective world behind and within the

remonstrance of the respective cultures. This might alsoexplain the exclusivity which, for the time being, finds

no other way but to start violent, even deadly conflicts.

I spare myself to mention examples; they are all too

obvious.

War and hatred, mutual elimination and exclusion

have never been a solution. Therefore it is even more




astonishing that a large part of human history is a

history of war(s). This has a meaning, and I think it is

not the aim to install peace since it fails if it is pre-

scribed . Peace wants to be created and born, and in this

process both sides want to participate without limita-

tions and fully conscious of their own strengths. They

want to co-create peace. Each of them has one dove of

peace to offer, may it appear as eagle, griffin or even

dragon. The “great laughter”, too, has a bird, even if it,

being enlightened, always seems to fly away. But each

bird symbolises a respective, special world-character. I

believe that a fruitful, intercultural dialogue cannot step

back behind this critical development.21

8. About the phenomenology of the dialogue of

worlds

8.1. The “rising of world” (Aufgang von Welt)

For two reasons a world is not an entity one can inter-

pret. First, it comes before all that can be revealed, and

second, it is only relevant for those who live in it.

However, a world is never given as a whole, but only

in an extremely limited way. We always are in a specific

situation, at a specific place, which we interpret and

determine as well as they determine us. Truly, the

situation has occupied us to a much larger extent than

we would at first want to guess. We experience this in

being approached and appealed. A heavy demand is

made on us, and we cannot escape it. The demand maystem from a specific family structure, a constellation

within our profession, a certain physical experience,

and further demands are connected with it, so that we

cannot really have some repose. Even repose makes

eminent claims on us. Embodied within all these

demands there are further demands, and this is only

possible because even the smallest situation is some-

thing like the “exponent of a world” and this is experi-

enced that way. Only from the outside it seems to be a

mere segment. Let us remember the recent war in the

Balkan Peninsula, where everything, even the minutest

humanity, seemed to go to pieces. First of all, the formalend of the war, induced by the high “world politics”,

was nothing more than a politically enforced ceasefire.

But one can not yet perceive a truly peaceful co-exis-

tence. Only the protest movement which started in

Belgrad in spring 1997 can be regarded as a first

positive form of activity, where the people themselves

created something new. After all those injuries and

destructions, this is perhaps the expression of the path

towards a new “cultural identity”. The loss of this

identity had brought the people to their ultimate limits.

It may now become an open and mobile identity, which

does not bury the past and which does not want to

have everything as it used to be, but which shapes the

past in a creative way, in order to have a future, which

is beyond Jugoslavian past and Serbian megalomania.

Within this encounter, this being touched by a world

which is in itself the basis and yet completely open, one

experiences a rise (Aufgänglichkeit) which carries all

who rise with it. These dynamic events of situation and

world are the rise of a world. World is never a “status

quo”, but rather “in statu nascendi”. More accurately,

it is no “status” at all, but a movement, a happening, a

rise. This means that all approach each other and

respond to each other in such a way that this is the cause

of their emergence. It is not only they who are rising,

but the emergence, i.e. the ground on which one walks,

or, as we say, the world rises, too. The more this

happens in a clear, permeable, open way, the more the

world is experienced as friendly and affirming. The

more it happens in a tight, exclusive way, oriented

towards ultimate situations and circumstances, the more

the world seems to be threatening and full of fear. 22 H.

Rombach, who has examined this phenomenon of the

world at various places and who has identified it as a

“basic phenomenon”, calls it “con-creative events”

(konkreatives Geschehen).23 Basically, the rise of a

world always happens in a con-creative way. If this isnot the case, or if it goes wrong, the world character

goes wrong, too. What remains are world views

(Weltanschauungen), dogmatisms and ideologies.

8.2. Encounters and friendship of the worlds

According to the wonderful Zen proverb: “a flower

blooms and a world rises”,24 one could also say: “a

culture blooms and a world rises.” But how are the rises

of the worlds related to each other? The one world does

not perceive the other one as a world, but as the mirrorimage or deduction of itself, or, if one wants to put it

more moderately, the other world appears within a

horizon structure with the label “foreign horizon”. This

means that, at first, one perceives the other world within

one’s own horizon structure, but not in its world char-

acter. Thus one faces indeed the problem of a difference

44 GEORG STENGER



of worlds, which is enhanced by the fact that one can

not interpret or even name them, although one definitely

perceives and experiences them. It is true, the same

things, notions, etc., or at least related or very similar

one appear everywhere, and thus one believes to be in

a common world. And it seems that this is confirmed

everywhere. However, all these rational endeavours

leave behind a strange remnant, which cannot be

neglected, but turns out to be the real “heart of the

matter”. It is, so to say, impossible to talk about this,

and yet it is the basis of all speech. This difference of

worlds does not appear here or there, but everywhere,

at least as long as it is all about a clarification and deep-

ening of humans or matters. Whether it is a question of

gender or cultural differences, the difference is so

forceful and convincing that one could not even say

where exactly it is. The difference cannot be skipped,

but it also does not get stuck within its aporia and

paradoxicality.

There seems to be a way, which nevertheless does

not sacrifice the respective world character .25 It may be

that one finds an entrance, a point, a place where, in a

very specific, flashlike way, one encounters the world

character of a different culture. However, this also

means that, in another way, we say farewell to our

own world. The more the new one is rising, the more

the old one is sinking. It sinks back into a horizon

where it can be compared, but this is not its world any

more. Within such experiences of world transitions

(Weltenübergangserfahrungen), which, simultaneously,

always constitute the rise of a world and the sinking of a world, one also experiences that worlds are not only

in motion, but they themselves are the moving. Worlds

are ways, and only when the character of the way is lost,

everything becomes static, receives the insignia of

eternity, and one believes that one owns the truth. This

truth, however, is not only a road much travelled, a

claim to the absolute, but, more subtly, it appears as a

thought and data highway, which even claims to own

the ultimate truth. Nevertheless, it was and it is a way

– like all the others, too! Thus, one could say that it is

one’s duty to bring each other on the way, i.e. to help

each other into the respective opening of the world (Welteröffnung). Nothing, though, is more difficult,

since “with regard to the opening of a world (. . .) we

all are strangers”,26 as Rombach says. But what matters

are these openings, for the “insight into the plurality of

the concepts of reason [= the worlds] is only successful

when positions have become ‘ways’.”27 We owe to our-

selves our ways, and this means that we owe to our-

selves our worlds. This also implies that, in order to

achieve mutual appreciation and opening, mutual cor-

rection is not only permitted but even desired. This

correction clarifies its own world by helping the other

world to become itself. Mostly it even happens that only

then one’s own world is recognized as a world, which

makes it rise in a new way. Mere descriptions, tran-

scendental foils of conditions or the more carefully

operating horizon concepts are not sufficient, but a

creative argument is needed, a “con-creativity”, which

aims at mutual rise and clarification of the worlds.

Nobody owns this nor will ever own it, for we meet

each other by travelling and returning from one world

into the other. One becomes a “traveller between the

worlds”, such as Nietzsche probably was: “I teach you

the friend, within whom the world is complete, a bowl

full of the good – the creative friend, who always has

a world to give.”28 I would argue about the “teaching”

and the “complete”, but I can agree with a rising world

becoming a friend at the same time – this is how I

understand Nietzsche. A friend is not only a world, but

he shows me a world, possibly even that one which,

until now, I thought to be mine. Actually, “world”, and

thus “worlds” are opening up. “Friend ” is something

like the discovery of the world character within the

other, the strange, the enemy, if you want. In other

words: only when one comprehends the other as friend,

one comprehends his world; and if one comprehends

his world, he becomes a friend. The other, the stranger,

the strange and foreign culture becomes a friend, espe-cially by remaining the other, strange and foreign –

however, it must be added, in a transformed way. The

dialogue of the cultures, intercultural communication,

is aiming towards friendship insofar as cultures are not

only seen as worlds, but these worlds are actually

emerging.29

Many of the cultural and intercultural arguments at

the end of this century seem to confirm this attitude,

especially if it is not all about a world peace which is

applicable to everyone in the same way, but about

fighting for such a peace, which cannot be the “peace

of one world , but only the “peace of the worlds”. Whathas to be learned and achieved is no less than something

like an “intercultural competence”.30 For the program of

harmonization of the one world turns out to be not as

harmonious as it claims to be; quite the opposite, it

creates levels and hierarchies in a way that it can hardly

perceive itself. In comparison, the encounters of the




different cultures, for example in the form of claims

for respective rights and self-determination, which are

always followed by unpleasant conflicts, appear to be

much more dramatic. But how could one want to step

back, especially if one understands the deep human seri-

ousness, the “morale”, the persuasiveness, the offensive

yet open basic attitude, even the passion with which all

these arguments are carried out?

Notes

1 Revised version of a lecture held at the II AS-GIP International

Symposium “The Structure of the Intercultural World” (Near Kyoto,

Japan 1997); Translation: Karen Anke Braun.2 Here, one may think of N. Luhmann, but only because it was he

who probably gave the most striking description of the concept of

the global system. Nevertheless, this system-immanence also knows

outside factors, for example “the environment” or “the observer”, and

a theoretician of systems should be able to show their “systematicity”,

too, in order to not accept them as given. Here, strange notionsborrowed from metaphysics knock at the gates of systems and system

theories.3 As is known, Kant’s philosophy is really based on this distinction,

However, if one observes the matter from the view-point

of the world concept, it becomes very obvious how and why “theo-

retical” and “practical” philosophy are connected. Most of all, it

becomes clear that for practical philosophy one must postulate an

unconditional total world as a regulative idea. The difference

emerging between the regulative idea and reality is experienced, so

to say, as everyday life. The basis of this difference is the whole of

the idea which can never be “fulfilled”, but just because of this it

regulates everything.4 See especially E. Husserl, Die Krisis der europäischen Wis-

senschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie, Hua VI (1954),and the supplementary volume Hua XXIX (1993).5 When Husserl examines the origins of modern thinking, which,

for example, can be found in the question of mathematization and

quantification, he always does this (at least in his later years) with

regards to the inherent basic motive, which is the relevance of the

creation of meaning and of the Lebenswelt . See “Zweiter Teil” of

Hua VI.6 For Husserl, the concept of the Lebenswelt (life-world) was, in a

way, a rival of the “Weltbegriff” (world concept), this “universal

horizon” of all horizons.7 Especially within the philosophical guild, the European occidental

tradition occupies the prominent position, it is playing the first violin;

one can even say that the violin perceives itself to be the whole

orchestra. Philosophy is either “occidental philosophy” or none at all.

This sounds plausible; however it is only justified as long as the

underlying “concept of philosophy” is adequately explained and

pointed out.8 K. Jaspers, Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte, München

1949.9 Cf. R. Ohashi, ‘Die Zeit der Weltbilder’, in: R. A. Mall/N.

Schneider, Ethik und Poli tik aus interkultureller Sicht (= Studien

zur Interkulturellen Philosophie, Vol. 5), Amsterdam – Atlanta, GA

1996, pp. 19–30. Ohashi votes for a plurality of “world images”

(Weltbilder), which stem from the respective specific combination of

a “vertical axis” (local, regional, traditional and cultural defining

quantities) and a “horizontal axis” (the westernized, modern, scien-

tific-technological world). “The time of the ‘world images’ shall

come when the respective vertical axis of a culture crosses the hor-

izontal, universal axis in such a way as to produce different cross-

ings, i.e. cultural worlds” (ibid., p. 28).10 One can observe the more and more obvious signs of claims for

leadership, for example in Asia between China and Japan, and in

the West between North America and Europe.11 This is probably the basis of the hermeneutic doctrine that all

understanding is subject to prejudice, which is especially promoted

by Gadamer.12 R. A. Mall created this notion for the question of intercultural

understanding and being able to be understood. See R. A. Mall,

Philosophie im Vergleich der Kulturen. Interkulturelle Philosophie

– eine neue Orientierung. Darmstadt, 1995.13 B. Waldenfels, Ordnung im Zwielicht , Frankfurt/M., 1987;

Der Stachel des Fremden, Frankfurt/M., 1990; Antwortregister ,

Frankfurt/M., 1994.

14 Such a constellation cannot be argued for in a formalistic andgeneral way, it wants to be shown. This is why, at that point, phe-

nomeno-logy takes over the relay baton from logic.15 Cf. H. Kimmerle’s approach of a “Methodology of listening” in:

Die Dimension des Interkulturellen. Philosophie in Afrika –

afrikanische Philosophie. Part two, Amsterdam – Atlanta 1994,

p. 125.16 E. Fink has discovered this fundamental dimension of the

phenomenon. In his analyses he mainly pointed out the “dialectical”

character of the phenomena. Cf. also: E. Fink, Grundphänomene

des menschlichen Daseins, Freiburg/München 1979; Welt und

Endlichkeit , Würzburg 1990.17 R. Ohashi, Die Zeit der Weltbilder , p. 28. Cf. also Nishida’s texts

“Selbstidentität und Kontinuität der Welt” and “Das künstlerische

Schaffen als Gestaltungsakt der Geschichte”, in R. Ohashi (Ed.), Die

Philosophie der Kyoto-Schule, Freiburg/München 1990, pp. 54–137;

‘Die Welt als Dialektisches Allgemeines’, in: Y. Matsudo (Ed.), Die

Welt als Dialektisches Allgemeines. Eine Einführung in die

Spätphilosophie von Nishida Kitaro, Berlin 1990, pp. 115–246; “Die

intelligible Welt” (NKZ 5), translated by R. Schinzinger, Berlin 1943.18 There is no ultimate substance here; this mode of thinking goes

beyond the level of the categories of substance.19 The various aims of post-modernism go in a very similar direc-

tion. At any rate a theory of multiplicity cannot destroy the thought

of unity but rather confirms it.20 K. Nishitani: ‘Vom Wesen der Begegnung’, in R. Ohashi (Ed.):

Die Philosophie der Kyoto-Schule, pp. 258–274.21 Nishitani adds to his interpretation of the koan a praise poem of

master Daito, which lifts the argument onto the level of a “compe-

tition (of plum blossoms and willow sprouts) for their fragrant

freshness”. This, of course, is a more friendly approach, but to me

the complex struggle of cultures seems to be more profound than

the nature image can show. See p. 270. – Cf. also B. Waldenfels,

‘Verschränkung von Heimwelt und Fremdwelt’, in R. A. Mall/

D. Lohmar (Ed.): Philosophische Grundlagen der Interkulturalität

(= Studien zur Interkulturellen Philosophie, Vol. I) Amsterdam –

46 GEORG STENGER



Atlanta 1993, pp. 53–65. Waldenfels mentions a “double universal-

ization” in the context of the respective universal claims of two reli-

gions (Judaism and Buddhism) (63).22 Thus, at first, the Solidarnocz-movement in Poland probably

wanted to achieve better work conditions, but as it became obvious

that much more was behind it, that perhaps even the future of the

Polish population was at stake, all basic foundations were shaken,

so that the basic motives of society, politics and religion were at

disposal in a new way.23 H. Rombach, Der Ursprung. Philosophie der Konkreativität von

Mensch und Natur. Freiburg i. Br., 1994.24 Cf. Takeichi, ‘Was ist zur Auslegung nötigt’, in Y. Nitta (Ed.):

Japanische Beiträge zur Phänomenologie. Freiburg/München 1984.

In the context of his interpretation of “transcendental experiences”,

Takeichi quotes the Zen master Dogen with the chapter “Plum

Blossoms” from the “Shobogenzo”: “When the old plum tree

suddenly blossoms, with this blossoming a world is happening – it

is spring . . .” (p. 105).25 Most attempts at encounters of different worlds imply such a

sacrifice, in the form of compromises, diplomacy, economy etc. All

of them mediate, but they can only do this at the expense of the

respective “world”.26 H. Rombach: Der Drachenkampf. Der philosophische Hinter-

grund der blutigen Bürgerkriege und die brennenden Zeitfragen.

Freiburg i. Br., 1996, p. 40.27 H. Rombach: Strukturanthropologie. Second, amended edition,

Freiburg/München 1993, p. 318.28 F. Nietzsche, Zarathustra I, KSA 4, p. 78.29 The much appreciated “offer of tolerance” would be still not

enough, since it is a much too static response.30 This was, for example, mentioned by R. A. Mall in his opening

lecture at the II AS-GIP-Symposium in Japan, 1997.


topoi volume 17 issue 1 1998 [doi 10.1023%2fa%3a1005972005357] georg stenger -- structures of...

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