topolski ,jerzy - lévi-strauss and marx on history

7/22/2019 Topolski ,Jerzy - Lvi-Strauss and Marx on History

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Wesleyan University

Levi-Strauss and Marx on HistoryAuthor(s): Jerzy TopolskiReviewed work(s):Source: History and Theory, Vol. 12, No. 2 (1973), pp. 192-207Published by: Blackwell Publishingfor Wesleyan UniversityStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2504910.

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LEVI-STRAUSSAND MARX ON HISTORY

JERZY TOPOLSKI

IThe great influenceof Claude Levi-Strauss' tructuralism n contemporaryhumanistic houghtand the fact that Levi-Straussrequentlycites Marx andemphasizeshis relation to Marx's theory of historymake it appropriate ocomparethe opinions of Levi-Straussand Marx on history.Much remains to be clarifiedby such a comparison,mainly because anattempt has not been made to make a comprehensive uxtapositionof theviews of both authors, but, secondly, because quite frequently the partialanalyses which have been made, includingLevi-Strauss',operate under aninadequatenterpretation f Marx'sthought.

In my subsequent emarks shall attempt o makea comparativeanalysisconcerninghistory,but with reference o the general heoriesof both authors.I shall treat historyas both everything hat has occurred n the past and asthe study of the past, or historiography.These two meaningsof the wordhistory cannot be separated n our analysis,because, if anything inks Levi-Straussand Marx, it is primarily he close connectionof ontologicalandmethodologicalviews in their systems.For this reason I shall first concernmyselfwith Levi-Strauss' nd Marx'stheoriesof the historicalprocess andonly then with their views on more strictlymethodologicalproblems. Withreference o methodological roblems, shallbe interestedprimarilyn model-buildingandexplanationprocedure. t is clear at this point that I proposetotranscend he borderof methodologyof historystrictlyunderstoodand en-croachon the broaderfield of the methodologyof the social sciences.

IITheconnectionbetweenLevi-Strauss'tructuralismndMarx's hought s oftenexplicated rom the followingpassagefrom the EighteenthBrumaireof LouisBonaparte: "Men make their own history,but they do not make it just asthey please."'According o Levi-Strauss,his statement onstitutes,as it were,the fundamental remisecommon o himselfandthe authorof Das Kapital.

1. K. Marx, The EighteenthBrumaireof Louis Bonaparte [1869] (New York, 1969),15.


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LEVI-STRAUSS AND MARX ON HISTORY 193What does it mean that people do not make their history just as they please?

Levi-Strauss is not the only one who has raised this question in contemporarysocial theory, but he is one of those who consider that they remain in the orbitof Marx's theory or who state that they are developing it.In order to facilitate our further analysis, I shall cite one of Levi-Strauss'basic theoretical statements. Stressing that men do not act freely because theyare directed by the unconscious universal structure of the human mind, heshows the place of historical research in the social study of man:Anthropology cannot remain indifferent to historical processes and to the mosthighly conscious expressionsof social phenomena. But if the anthropologistbringsto them the same scrupulousattention as the historian, it is in order to eliminate,by a kind of backwardcourse, all that they owe to the historical process and toconscious thought. His goal is to grasp,beyond the conscious and always shiftingimages which men hold, the complete range of unconscious possibilities. Theseare not unlimited, and the relationshipsof compatibilityor incompatibilitywhicheach maintains with all the others provide a logical framework for historicaldevelopments, which, while perhaps unpredictable, are never arbitrary.In thissense, the famous statement by Marx, "Men make their own history, but theydo not know that they are making it," justifies, first, history and, second,anthropology.2

Levi-Strauss' statement clearly shows his views on historical process andhistorical study:(1) Reality presents people with a given (but finite) set of actions possible

to accomplish; however, which of these actions will be undertaken isdetermined by the universal,unconscious structuresof the human mindwhich are identical for all men.

(2) The task of the structuralmethod is to "reach" these deep, unconsciousstructures, thus explaining the shape ("architecture") of the socialreality.(3) The task of history - of the historical method - is to provide descrip-tive material for the structural procedure in order to "cleanse" it ofeverything added by the historical process and consciously acting man.

mIt is easy to note here the closely associated ontological and methodologicalpresuppositions of L6vi-Strauss' theory previously mentioned. This, however,is a connection at whose base we observe a petitionprincipii.

The source of this error is the acceptance by Levi-Strauss of a hypothesisabout hidden structures of the human mind, a hypothesis which does not

2. C. Lvi-Strauss, StructuralAnthropology [1958] (New York and London, 1963),23-24.


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194 JERZY TOPOLSKIpermit verification by any empirical evidence. In addition, it is not associatedwith any method that would permit such verification. Levi-Strauss accepts theexistence of the hidden attributesof the human mind which make themselvesknown through a given shape of reality; however, at the same time, such areality is for him a representation (a "sign") of the unconscious structure ofthe human mind. Hence a hypothesis which ought to be the subject of verifi-cation is accepted out of hand. This vicious circle will accompany us in thecourse of the entire analysis of Levi-Strauss' views.

We do not find such an error in Marx's theory. Marx does not share withLevi-Strauss a belief in the existence of a Universal Mind making man anabstract, nonhistorical entity. Marx's main premise concerning man can besubjected to empirical verification. Marx regards man as a rational being andthe historical process as a result of purposeful human activity. LUvi-Strauss'assumption about the deep structures of the human mind which can be readin the shape of human culture is based, at least in view of the current state ofstudies of the functioning of the brain, on a subjective conviction; while Marx'sassumptions about the reality of human purposes can be studied with all themethods of the empirical sciences.

IV

Freud's and Fromm's method to "reach" the deep structures of the humanmind is psychology, while for Levi-Strauss it is the structural linguistics ofF. Saussure, R. Jakobson, L. Hjelmslev, and other researchers. For structurallinguistics the distinction between language (langue) and speech (parole) isone of the most characteristic features. Speech is a subjective use of languagefor verbal communication. Language is a set of certain structuresof which thephonological structureis the basic one. Superimposed on it are morphologicaland phraseological structures. Phonemes (elements of the phonological struc-ture or phonemic system) are elementary particles of language (langue)which serve the function of differentiating words. Therefore the phonemesalways appear in opposed pairs based on their distinctive features (such assonority and soundlessness, vocality and consonantality, and so forth). In sum,the phonological as well as the morphological structures are defined codesgoverning the use of phonemes of which people unconsciously take advantagewhen speaking. Fascinated by the new linguistic theory, Levi-Strauss recog-mzes:

Linguisticsoccupies a special place among the social sciences, to whose ranksit unquestionablybelongs. It is not merely a social science like the others, but,rather,the one in which by far the greatest progresshas been made. It is prob-


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LEVI-STRAUSS AND MARX ON HISTORY 195ably the only one which can truly claim to be a science and which has achievedboth the formulation of an empirical method and an understandingof the natureof the datasubmitted o its analysis.3

Levi-Strauss recognizes that like a language, which is a code, and a speech,which is a message transmitted by the language, other kinds of human behaviorcan also be regarded as codes referring to nonverbal forms of communication.Such a code is represented in different systems of dressing, feeding, kinship,and so on. Human culture can be regarded as a sum of all such codes. As withthe use of language, so other types of human behavior are also ruled by definitelaws (the basic structures of the human mind), independent of consciousnessand the will of man. Therefore, when making a verbal utterance man is refer-ring to the verbal signs, and he uses other codes to transmit the nonverbalsigns. Thus the whole human culture is for Levi-Strauss a "significant set."4 Sowith language as in social (and at the same time historical) reality, we havethe following pattern which constitutes the object of structural analysis.

Manifestation oftures of the Codes of human universal struc-univrds struc> behavior tures in humanhuman mind behavior

Without such an analysis the world remains for L6vi-Strauss unintelligible.Only through the procedure of "structuralism" (i.e., through discovery of theuniversal structures of the human mind) does the world become intelligible.Because of these universal structures all human codes (languages) are homolo-gous and can be easily submitted to the structural analysis by means ofsuitable transformations.As can be seen in the above figure, man's activity is understood in it as asteady reproduction of those same behaviors constrainedby the hidden forces.There is no place for history understood as a result of conscious and purposefulhuman activity. The introduction of purposefully and consciously acting manfully utilizing his practical experience (i.e., his historical experience) into thefigure destroys it. In this context Levi-Strauss' attitude to history is consistent.History only causes problems for him, muddying his concept of integration(through linguistics) of social sciences with the natural sciences. The priceof such an integration would be the elimination of consciously and purpose-fully acting man from the model of the social sciences.

3. Ibid., 31.4. Levi-Strauss,The SavageMind [1962] (Chicago, 1967), 8.


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196 JERZY TOPOLSKIV

How does man conceivedby the authorof TristesTropiquesdifferfrom theworld of nature?Who says man says language and who says language sayssociety,Levi-Strauss rguesmanytimes. Hence thedistinguishingactor of thesociety is language.Social use of language (understoodas a code) in turninvolvesthe fact that man is able to make a distinctionbetweena sign (verbalor nonverbal) and the realitycommunicatedby a sign; but in makingthisdistinctionhe is unawareof the natureof this reality.Hence the researcher'stask is to discoverthis reality. For Levi-Strausshis realityis shaped by thealreadymentioneduniversaland formal aws (structures), orMarxthisrealityis a creationof purposefully ctingman.All behavior, according to Levi-Strauss - writes Susan Sontag - is alanguage,a vocabularyand grammarof order;anthropologyproves nothingabout human natureexcept the need for orderitself. There is no universaltruth about the relationbetween,say, religionand social structure.There areonly modelsshowing he variability f one in relation o others.To the generalreader,perhaps he most strikingexample of Levi-Strauss'heoreticalagnos-ticism s his view of myth.He treatsmythas a purely ormalmentaloperation,withoutany psychological ontentor any necessary onnectionwith rite.6Levi-Strauss laimsthat amongthe universal aws of the human mind thebasic one is thecapabilityof grasping eality n binaryoppositions.Under con-ditionsof societalexistence he distinctivepairs have cultural ignificance.Themostimportantor social ife is theprocessof communication hich akesplacethrough he mediumof a broadlyunderstood"exchange" f words, persons,andthingsgovernedby the sameformalrules.L6vi-Strausstatesthat,"inanysociety,communication perateson three different evels: communication fwomen,communication f goods andservices,communication f messages."Communicationakes place throughdifferent"totalities"of signs. The non-verbalsignsare used eitheras the partsof "paradigmatic"metaphoric)seriesof "syntagmatic" metonymic) chains. E. Leach comparesthis method of"structuralization"f realityto an orchestral core with reference o whichaperpendicular eadinghas a metaphoriccharacter,and a horizontalreadinga metonymic haracter.7Recognizing he shapingof different ets of codes in different ocieties andin the differentways theymanifest hemselvesn humanactivity,Levi-Strauss,consistentwithhis theory,emphasizesmanytimesthat man'sdecision-making

5. Susan Sontag, "The Anthropologist as Hero" in Claude Levi-Strauss:The Anthro-pologist as Hero, ed. Nelson Hayes and Tanya Hayes (Cambridge, Mass., 1970), 194.6. StructuralAnthropology,296.7. E. Leach, Claude Levi-Strauss(New York, 1970), 52.


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LEVI-STRAUSS AND MARX ON HISTORY 197can be compared with a game whose results at the moment are not known butwhose rules are a priori imposed.

First, man is like a player who, as he takes his place at the table, picks upcards which he has not invented, for the cardgame is a datum of history andcivilization. Second, each deal is the result of a contingent distributionof thecards unknown to the players at the time. One must accept the cards, which oneis given, but each society, like each player, makes its interpretationsn terms ofseveral systems. These may be common to them all or individual: rules of thegame or rules of tactics. And we are well aware that differentplayers will notplay the same game with the same hand even though the rules set limits on thegames that can be playedwith any given one.8In such a concept of man playing cards with reality according to previously

set rules, a game in which not only rules are handed down but in which thedistribution of cards is a matter of chance, there is no possibility of any otherexplanation of historical process than the recurrence to a contingency too.

In a conversation with G. Charbonnier, Levi-Strauss explains in the follow-ing way a fact that intrigues historians, namely, why a dynamically developingcivilization flourished during a given period to a greater degree in one part ofthe world and to a lesser degree in another:

Supposean inveterate roulette player sets out not only to pick the lucky num-ber, but to work out a very complex combination dependent on, say, ten or ahundred previous spins of the wheel, and determined by certain rules regardingthe alternationof red and black, or even and odd numbers. This complex com-bination might be achieved right away, or at the thousandth or millionth attemptor never at all. Yet it would never occur to us to say that, had he accomplishedhis combination only at the seven hundredand twenty-fifth attempt,all the pre-vious attemptswereindispensable o his success.9Hence, all historically developed civilization (i.e., the breaking with primi-

tive existence) is an accidental event unconnected with the historical continuityof human actions and their effects. History is not "a continuous flow of eventsbut a discontinuous choice by men of those incidents and processes which arefitted into a logical order by a human mind."10History thus is an unrelatedcollection of different events, the knowledge of which does not help us at allin making the world intelligible.

VIThis kind of interpretationof the historical process is fully opposed to Marx'sconcept of man and history. Marx understood the statement that people do not

8. The SavageMind, 95.9. G. Charbonnier,Conversationswith Claude Levi-Strauss(London, 1969), 25.10. L. Rosen, "Language, History, and the Logic of Inquiry in Levi-Strauss andSartre,"History and Theory 10 (1971), 285.


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198 JERZY TOPOLSKImake their history just as they please entirely differently than Levi-Strauss.We have to do here with two opposite models of understanding the historicalprocess, or, in other words, two contrasting models of man. One of them couldbe called fatalistic and the other activistic. In the former, the factors on whichhuman activity is based are independent of man's purposeful decision-making.In the latter, man acts in a conscious, purposeful manner not directed byfactors which are not connected with his activity.

The fatalistic model manifests itself in the form of three basic submodels.In the first of these submodels, the factors on which man's actions are depen-dent are "external" in relation to man, are located beyond him. Amongdifferent kinds of these submodels we can classify theories of historicalprocess joining human actions with such factors as God, the geographicalenvironment, deterministic laws (present among others in the fatalistic inter-pretation of Marx's thought), and self-realizingprogress (characteristic, amongothers, for the rationalistic views on historical process of the Enlightenment).In the second of these submodels, the factors determining human actions exist"inside" man. To this submodel belongs all psychoanalytical interpretationsof history which use the tool of Freud's theory. In the third submodel, on theother hand, the factors on which human actions are dependent pertain equallyto the forces "external"in relation to man and to mechanisms hidden in him.Such an interaction of two sets of factors is characteristic of Fromm's con-ception of history.

The activistic model demonstrates itself through at least two submodels:the free-will model and the dialectical model. The first of these submodelsrecognizes human activity as a manifestation of the unconstrained free will ofman. Sometimes it is associated with restrictions of a fatalistic type, such as,for example, God's will - mixing the activistic interpretation (model) withthe fatalistic one. The second submodel takes into consideration the inter-relation between man's decision-making and the conditions in which thisdecision-making takes place. This interrelation between two mentioned fac-tors is not direct, but through the factor of human knowledge of the condi-tion of action. This knowledge can be more or less adequate and differentfor different individuals and social groups.

It is easy to see that Levi-Strauss'vision of man and history fulfills the con-ditions of the first model in its second submodel's form. The activistic modelin its dialectical form is characteristic of Marx. It appears in different worksof Marx in more abstract or more realistic forms. In the theoretical partsof Das Kapital where, among others, the concept of a rational capitalist, havingfull awareness of the conditions of his decision-making, appears, we have themore abstractapproach. In The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte thereare real men and social classes who act; in this case also they act with an


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LEVI-STRAUSS AND MARX ON HISTORY 199awareness f the circumstancesn which they make decisions.Marx showsthatthis awarenesscan be sometimesdeformed.This was the case of the Frenchpeasants n EighteenthBrumairewhose historicalconsciousnesswas deformedby the Napoleonic egend.We read: "Historical raditionhas nourishedamongtheFrenchpeasantry hesuperstitionhata man namedNapoleonwouldreturnin the fullness of time bringing hem all that their heartcould desire."'For Marx, who acceptsthe model of a rationalman, man is acting con-sciouslyand purposefullyon the basis of his knowledgeof the conditionsofaction. His activity thatis, his practice is more or less effectivedepend-ing on how adequate s such knowledgeabout the conditionsof action whichhe takes into considerationduring his activity. Certainpermanentattitudesarisein man'smind, and certain types of knowledgeaccumulateas a resultof long-termpractice.As the result of practice,at a certainstageof historicaldevelopment, he humanmind attaineda "satiation"with those tried methodsof thinking (for example,rules of logic) heretoforecharacteristic f man.Thatis whyMarxsaid thatthe humanmind, such as it is, alwaysremains hesamewhile man's awareness thatis knowledgeabout the world changes.At a given time, in certainplaces, man began to thinkhistorically,and thisintroducedmomentsof dynamics n his structureof thinking, a convictionabout the variabilityand creativerole of man, eliminatingattitudes whichtendedto maintain he worldunchangedand to reproduce,as primitivecom-munitiesdo, the same statesof things.'2Wheneffectiveactivity s of concernto him, actingman takes into consideration he condition in which he acts.Sometimesdifferentpsychicalprocessescause disturbancesn the action,butman, whowantsto attainhis goal, tends to eliminate his deforming nfluence.Does he act "freely"?No. He is limitedby the conditions n which he actsandby his knowledgeaboutthese conditions.Here we observea dialectical unc-tion of objectiveand subjective actors. To Marx, man is not waiting solelyfor this or that combinationof fate;he does not play a gamewith the realitybut is, as Marxsaysin his famousTheseson Feuerbach 1845), changing heconditionsof his actions. M. Godelier,who himself tends to a "dynamicstructuralism," ointsto the necessityof makinga differencebetweenformalstructuresof thinkingand the transformations f thoughtdue to historicalprogress n learningaboutthe world.'3The previouslycited statementof Marx from the EighteenthBrunaireincludedstill anotherpartwhichLevi-Strauss id not take into consideration.In it Marxexplainswhat he meansby the opinionthat people do not make

11. The EighteenthBrumaire,23.12. Cf. J. Topolski, Swiat bez historic [World without History] (Warsaw, 1972).13. M. Godelier, "Mythe et Histoire: "Reflexions sur les fondements de la penseesauvage,"Annales (mai-aouft,1971), 553.


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200 JERZY TOPOLSKItheir history as they please: "They do not make it [history] under circum-stances chosen by themselves but under circumstances directly encountered,given and transmitted from the past."'4

This statement by no means justifies structural anthropology's questioningthe role of historical experience in human practice.

VIIThe question arises as to how close Levi-Strauss' structural analysis is toMarx's model method (called by Marx the abstraction method). In otherwords, we can ask if Levi-Strauss' methodological rules are similar to Marx'smethodology of social inquiry and at the same time to his methodology ofhistory. There are, as we shall see, fundamental and irreconcilable differenceswhich are strictly connected with the divergences in the ontological views ofboth authors. For Marx there is historical research which makes world andman intelligible, for Levi-Strauss this aim can be achieved only through struc-tural analysis. Only structuralanalysis can transcend the "observationallevel"of the research and "reach" deeper levels of reality: "On the observationallevel, the main - one could almost say the only - rule is that all the factsshould be carefully observed and described, without allowing any theoreticalpreconception to decide whether some are more important than others."15

Such a positivistic approach to the research is, as Levi-Strauss repeats veryoften, the historian's or the ethnographer'stask. This task consists in "gather-ing data," while anthropology and sociology "deal with models constructedfrom these data.""'

Here we come to the heart of the structuralistmethod. It consists in model-building from the empirical data. In order to reconstruct this method weshould first ask what model in Levi-Strauss' methodology means.Structuresare models, the formal propertiesof which can be compared inde-pendentlyof their elements.The structuralist's ask is thus to recognizeand isolatelevels of realitywhich have strategicvalue from his point of view, namely whichadmit of representationas models, whatever their type. . The essential valueof these [structural] tudiesis to constructmodels the formal propertiesof whichcan be compared with, and explained by, the same properties as in modelscorresponding o other strategic evels.'7

In order to answer the question arising here, we must return to Levi-Strauss'notion of structure in its methodological meaning. Its already characterizedontological status is defined by certain permanent brain-function properties

14. The EighteenthBrumaire,15.15. StructuralAnthropology,280.16. Ibid., 285.17. Ibid., 284-285.


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LEVI-STRAUSS AND MARX ON HISTORY 201which are independent of human practice. Of course a structure understood inthis way can be characterized in a more or less general manner. Having inmind the same formal characteristics linking all structures, Levi-Strauss fre-quently uses the concept of "form" common for all structures or, on a some-what lower level of generalization, for a group of structures. What kind ofcommon "form" do Levi-Strauss'structures possess? Generally speaking theseare certain systems of relation. Each such relation system is a set of orderedpairs (known from the set theory) whose elements remain in opposition toeach other and which possess mutually exclusive qualities. In other words, forLevi-Strauss structure is a classification where the relation of opposition is thecriterion of division. These classifications have a simple or frequently a den-drite form: "The part played by motivation, however, diminishes, and that ofarbitrariness increases progressively as we turn our attention higher: theterminal branches can no longer compromise the tree's stability nor alter itscharacteristic shape."18

Hence it could be said that for structuralists of Levi-Strauss' type, the maintask of studying society consists of formulating statements about distinctiveelements of certain totalities which are defined as "structures." The statementsabout these structures are models; however, a model can be called a struc-ture only when the structure revealed by the model is truly a structure. Whendoes such a case occur? Levi-Strauss furnishes only some formal tests. In thecase of such a true structure: 1) A change of one element results in the changeof all the remaining elements. 2) Each structure is capable of being trans-formed into some other structure. 3) Each element explains the existence ofothers. 4) A structurereflects the observed facts.

The last condition seems to have non-formal character, but the reference tothe empirical data has in Levi-Strauss' work a special meaning. The model isnot subject to test by the empirical data; the only problem is whether thesedata are more or less complete and well described.

From what we have said, it seems clear (and Levi-Strauss does not denythis) that the models in the structural analysis are understood as researchtools; their methodological character is purely instrumentalist. They can bediscovered only by a sort of intuition, their correspondence to reality is solelya question of the structuralistfaith. For sober researchers who do not allowthemselves to be misled by the structuralist poetic associations, they can beonly pure fictions and trivialities of elementary logic. It is not an accidentthat numerous anthropologists accuse Levi-Strauss of not taking facts intoconsideration. Thus, for example, E. Leach speaks of Levi-Strauss' contempt"of ethnographic evidence,"19while T. 0. Beidelman writes: "Another feature

18. The SavageMind, 159.19. Leach, ClaudeLevi-Strauss,104.


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202 JERZY TOPOLSKIof his field is its relative superficiality.The interrelated endenciestowardssuperficialityand oversimplification re importantsince they allow L6vi-Strauss to interpretwith great freedom what he considers the basic forcesbehindthese [dying]cultures."20This freedom, supporting tself with the conceptof universalstructuresofthe human mind, gives him a directive of "approaching"hese structuresthrough he "cleansing" f models fromthe elementswhich history (events)introduced.This cleansingin connectionwith the comparisonsof differentmodelspresents"the evel of experimentation"r model-levelof the research.As Levi-Strauss ays, structuresdemonstrate ubstantial esistance n relation"to diachrony"and flow permanently hrough time. Therefore, n order tomake structuralistanalysis as simple as possible, Levi-Strauss irst of allanalyzesprimitive ommunities,hat s, societies"withno history." nprimitivecommunities"structures"ruefor all mankindappear,as it were, in the most"undisturbed"tate, therebyproviding he key to the understanding f man.And here, again,we can observe that we have to do with a type of petitionprincipii. For an assumption s madethat "structures"re resistant o history,and then society is examinedwithouthistory,that is, historyis excludedinseeking proof for that assumption.Limitedto societieswithout historical hinking, erritoriallymixed, and atthe same time freed of the requirementsof historicalmethod, informationabout myths,food systems,structuresof kinship,taboos, and so on can bebrought nto the followingscheme,which is characteristicor the phonemicsystem 21

S =(U; R, A,. ..,A T1,. . ., Tm),whereU is a set of distinctivequalitiescorrelatedwith itself by the relationof opposition R&,with which these qualities create ordered pairs Al, . . . , An.In the case of the phonemicsystem,these qualitiesarephonemes, n the caseof myths,mythemesor "grossconstituentunits,"22n the case of food systems,gusthemes, etc. T1, . . ., Tm are chains of phonemes, mythemes, gusthemes,etc. creatingcertainsyntagmaticotalities.The model-levelof the researchs reservedonlyto the structuralismnalysis.Characteristicor historywhich "organizes ts data in relationto consciousexpressionof social life"23 s the "observationalevel" of the research or"ultimately"he buildingof the so-called"statisticmodels"24which have toshowthe frequencyof events.

20. The Journalof InterdisciplinaryHistory 1 (1971), 512.21. J. Kmita, L. Nowak, Studia nad teoretycznymipodstawami humanistyki [Studieson TheoreticalFoundationsof the Social Sciences] (Poznan, 1968), 201.22. StructuralAnthropology,211.23. Ibid., 18.24. Ibid., 285.


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LEVI-STRAUSS AND MARX ON HISTORY 203VIII

Marx does not exclude history from the model method. He also transcendsthe "observational" level of the research and recommends going "deeper"below the "surface phenomena" through the model method. But a funda-mental difference separates the model method of Marx from that of Levi-Strauss. Marx's models, as compared with Levi-Strauss' structure-models, donot have an instrumentalistic character. They are not only research tools (likeMax Weber's ideal types); they have a realistic character. In other words,Marx's models are realistically understood ideal types, that is, ideal typeswhich have their reference in objective reality. Such an ideal type (model)is a real object in its simplified version. Thus Marx's model-building consistsin the formulation of statements about the objects which have been submittedto special procedure of "simplification" or (in Marx's words) "abstraction."During this abstractionprocedure we suspend (do not take into consideration)the influence of various secondary factors which deform the action of mainfactors and the manifestation of basic relationships and regularities. In such amanner we still have to do with a real object; it is only observed in anidealized condition. Thus the formulation of models statements pertaining torealistically understood ideal types enables us to "grasp" the complex reality,to make it more intelligible.

The model in Marx's sense can be characterized in the following manner:(x) [Ti (x) - a, .. . , an (X)]

which means: for each x, if x is T then x is a,, . . . , an, where T signifiesMarx's ideal type (abstraction) among a set of possible types of a given kind,while a,, ... a., the varied behavior of that ideal type.25The building of realistic models, which is the cornerstone of Marx's meth-odological program, is strictly connected with an historical approach. It ishistorical knowledge which enables us to set forth hypotheses concerning themain and secondary factors. Very often, as Marx shows, we can find in thepast the more simple forms of different phenomena. Sometimes these unde-formed, "classic" phenomena were characteristic only for certain regions.Such "ready" models Marx uses very often in his study. This is the case ofcapitalism analyzed in Das Kapital, where English capitalism plays the roleof an ideal type. The same can be said about the "natural"economy character-istic of early stages of human history, but regarded as an ideal type in severalchapters of the first volume of Das Kapital. In history, the model methodenables one to "grasp" historical change and, at the same time, structuralrelationships. Marx's typology of social and economic development in which

25. Cf. J. Topolski, "The Model Method in Economic History," The Journal ofEuropeanEconomic History 2 (1972), 4.


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204 JERZY TOPOLSKIdifferent socio-economic formations are distinguished is one of the most im-portant results of Marx's model-building procedure. We have cited anotherexample from the Eighteenth Brumaire. Here Marx described the influenceon the political behavior of the French peasantry of its faith in the nameNapoleon.

The realistic models can be submitted to the concretization procedure.Levi-Strauss' "experiments on models" do not present such a possibility.Marx's concretization consists in more or less gradually eliminating the ideal-izing assumptions. In this way the model is "getting closer" to the reality.This concretization always depends on the needs of a given research oranalysis. Sometimes our historical study is more "concrete," sometimes more"theoretical." In Marx's works we find easily examples of both approaches.The best example is Das Kapital itself. The first volume of that work hasboth historical and theoretical character. In its theoretical analyses Marxtreats capitalism and different economic categories in their "pure" form, whilethe next volumes give a most complex and realistic image.26

Let us analyze the law of value, which is one of the fundamental notions inDas Kapital. In the first volume this law was formulated in its simple form:the price of the commodity corresponds to its value. This model formulationwas indispensable for Marx to start his analysis of the capitalistic system.Then he could submit his model to the concretization procedure eliminatingdifferent idealizing assumptions. The effect of this procedure we see in thethird volume. The law of value, after some twelve idealizing assumptions havebeen eliminated, assumed more concrete form: "The assumption that thecommodities of the various spheres of production are sold at their valuesimplies of course only that their value is the center of gravity around whichprices fluctuate."27

Concretization is simultaneously a procedure of verification. Hence, thisverification does not here depend on multiplying empirical data, but onobserving the prognostical value of concretized statements. If, on the basis ofa suitable concretized statement, it is possible to make effective predictionsor explanations, the statement attains the status of a verified statement.Nothing of the kind is possible with Levi-Strauss' structures. They remainirreversible,not susceptible to confrontation with empirical material.

IXLevi-Strauss' position with reference to the explanation procedure in thesocial sciences is wholly compatible with structural methodology. For Levi-

26. Cf. L. Nowak, U podstaw marksowskiejmetodologii nauk [Foundationsof Marx'sMethodology] (Warsaw, 1971).27. K. Marx, Capital,III (Chicago, 1909), 209-210.


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LEVI-STRAUSS AND MARX ON HISTORY 205Strauss the classic causal explanation lay far from the main task of scientificstudy, while for Marx the researcher's attention should focus on the explana-tion of the chronological changes. The same can be said about the explanationof human actions. Here also the differences which separate Marx's and Levi-Strauss' concepts of explanation in the social sciences are irreconcilable.

Above all, the author of The Savage Mind is an opponent of any explana-tion accomplished on the "conscious" level. Explanation by discovering thepurpose of human action or the meaning of a cultural object (the answer tothe question why a given object has been created) does not interest him. Heregards it as scientifically barren, not advancing our knowledge about theworld. Also, explanation by the circumstances (causes) preceding the ex-plained event does not appear in structural methodology. We have here asituation similar to the one created by C. G. Jung's archetypes or by SigmundFreud's unconscious instincts. Like Levi-Strauss' theory, these are theorieswhich cannot have any use for interpretingconscious and purposeful activities.

Hence, what explanation model is characteristic for LUvi-Strauss' struc-turalism?In each case it is not an explanation which takes into considerationas an explanans human conscious and purposeful actions. Neither is it anexplanation which takes into consideration as components of the explanansgeneral laws reflecting relationships between different elements of reality.Thus Levi-Strauss' explanation procedure does not fit either causal laws on aHempelian model or the interpretation of human actions on a "conscious"level. The latter is called by J. Kmita the humanistic interpretation.28

Levi-Strauss' main explanation constructs are his "structures" or "models"which, as we know, reflect the non-empirical properties of the human mind.Such a "structure"has a permanent character regardless of historical eventsand time factors. In other words, this is a structure which does not conferreality on a definite developmental direction, as is the case with the explana-tion concept of J. Piaget. Thus, Levi-Strauss' structures have, ex definitione,the properties of maintaining a system in a state of equilibrium. For Levi-Strauss, explanation is simply the discovery of the necessity of the explainedelement (behavior, object) in the structure. Confirmation of the fact that itdoes fulfill a defined function in that structure essential for the maintenanceof that structure,Levi-Strausssays, demonstrates its structuralvalue. "Nothingcan be conceived beyond the fundamental requirements of its structure," heargues.29As we see, it is a kind of functional explanation. We can find thisexplanation by reference to a structural "value" on many pages of Levi-Strauss' works. For example, explaining what determines the existence of anavunculate: "we must treat it as one relationship within a system, while the

28. Cf. J. Kmita, Z metodologicznychproblem6w interpretacjihumanistycznej[Meth-odological Problems of HumanisticInterpretation] Warsaw, 1971).29. StructuralAnthropology,48.


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206 JERZY TOPOLSKIsystem itself must be considered as a whole in order to grasp its structure."30In another place, pondering over tribal structure, Levi-Strauss states that:various types of grouping found in these societies specifically, three forms ofdual organisation,clans, sub-clans, age grades, associations, etc. - do not repre-sent, as they do in Australia, so many functional groups. They are, rather, aseries of expressions, each partial and incomplete, of the same underlying struc-ture, which they reproduce in several copies without ever completely exhaustingits reality.31

Let us now ask what kind of value functional explanation referring to thesupra-empirical structure has. From the methodological point of view it is anexplanation of very low value. It is a kind of ad hoc explanation based on avicious circle. Explanans, in this explanation, is based on the same evidenceas explanandum, which is the object of its explanation. "Hence the situation,"J. Kmita writes, "is such that theory arises at the base of empirical materialwhich at the same time is to constitute its explanandum; this theory does nottake into consideration any new material, no new, possible empirical evidencefor itself."32

For Marx, the central figure, whose actions are submitted to the explanationprocedure, is man acting consciously and purposefully. The motivationstructure of human actions which we observe in Marx's analyses can besummarized in the following manner:

MS - (U; G, K, V)where MS signifies the motivation structure; G, goals; K, knowledge of con-dition of action; V, system of values (preferences) of acting man (or socialgroup).

Thus in order to explain human decision-making and human actions it isindispensable to try to reconstruct such elements as acting man's goal (orgoals), knowledge of conditions of action and the system of values of actingman (or of an acting social group). All Marx's explanations of human actionsfulfill the rules of this model. On the other hand, all Marx's explanations ofhistorical processes or historical facts which are not expressed in terms ofhuman actions (as, for example, the rise of capitalism) fulfill the rules of adeductive model of explanation which is regarded as the main explanationmodel in the social sciences.

In view of the inadequacy of LUvi-Strauss'methodology, what determineshis popularity?We explain it by a certain impasse in which the social sciences,dominated by positivistic views, found themselves, and by the subject matter

30. Ibid., 46.31. Ibid., 130.32. J. Kmita, "C. LUvi-Straussapropozycje metodolodiczne" [LUvi-Strauss'Method-ological Propositions],StudiaFilozoficzne3 (1971), 134.


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LEVI-STRAUSS AND MARX ON HISTORY 207which Levi-Strauss deals with, finding willing readers in the world of moderncivilization as in J. J. Rousseau's time. L6vi-Strauss' reply on the needs ofchange is poetically beautiful, but from a methodological point of view it isbut an ornament on the building of social sciences. However, its rather sub-stantial scientific role is indirect. Structuralism motivates thinking, it intro-duces a refreshing ferment into many disciplines (including history), and-important in each field of research - the inspiration for unstereotypedassociations.University of Poznan'

topolski ,jerzy - lévi-strauss and marx on history

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